The King's Representative: Benning Wentworth, Colonial Governor, 1741-1767.

THE KING'S REPRESENTATIVE:

BENNING WENTWORTH, COLONIAL GOVERNOR,

1741 - 1767

by

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A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Faculty

of Lehigh University

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Lehigh University

1961

Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 25, 1961
(Date)

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Accepted, May 30, 1961
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is not possible here to express appreciation to each and every individual who has contributed to the completion of this work. A general acknowledgement of gratitude to them must suffice on this occasion.

However, special recognition is owed Professor George D. Harmon, Chairman, and Professor George W. Kyte of the Department of History and Government, Lehigh University, and to Lawrence Henry Gipson, Research Professor of History, Emeritus, Lehigh University. They have been my constant source of guidance, have contributed generously of their time and attention to my needs, and were instrumental in securing the necessary research grants to make this study possible. To them I acknowledge a special debt of appreciation.

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AN ABSTRACT

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A DISSERTATION

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Benning Wentworth had a two-fold task to perform during his twenty-five years in office. As an imperial administrator, he was commanded to restore, strengthen, and preserve the royal prerogative of the crown, and make it palatable to the people of New Hampshire. As governor of this tiny province, he was expected to rescue it from deterioration and place it upon a sound financial and economic basis to make it a flourishing and useful member of the empire. The difficulty in performing this task became especially evident in his function as surveyor of the King's woods, since New Hampshire had hitherto paid scant attention to the masting regulations, and whose major staple of export and source of wealth derived from lumber. Benning Wentworth set about to restore royal authority in New Hampshire, and the prosperity of the province, with the avowed intention of placing his family in the position of

chief dispensers of the one and principal recipients of the other.

His public and private correspondence, and that of his friends and relatives in high government circles, indicate the degree of success in promoting the interests of crown, colony, and family. He sought to free the executive from financial dependence upon the assembly by extracting from it a permanent salary grant. He failed in this, and the two wars which consumed half of his administration, served to jeopardize further the prerogative and weaken his position as an imperial administrator. Wentworth possessed outside sources of income which enabled him to act with a minimum dependence upon the assembly, and between the wars, he fought its encroachments upon the prerogative and won a sweeping victory for the crown.

Once royal authority became firmly established, Wentworth directed his attention to revitalizing provincial trade and expanding his territorial limits. He claimed all the land west to New York and promoted its rapid settlement by selling it cheaply. He maintained the primacy of Portsmouth as a commercial center and tapped the rich forests along the Connecticut Valley by linking the coast and hinterland with roads. Since lumber was the most important exportable staple of New Hampshire, Wentworth used his office as surveyor to stifle competition from the neighboring colonies. He refused to permit removal of obstructions in the Merrimack River to prevent timber from entering Massachusetts ports. He prevented Connecticut from poaching on his western timber lands, and persuaded the Board of Trade that the Connecticut River was not a fit conveyance

for getting masts to port. The virgin territory of Maine, and the accessibility of its timber to water, posed a serious threat to the lumbering interests in New Hampshire, and Wentworth attempted to remove it by urging that Maine be turned into a nursery for the royal navy.

Wentworth placed his relatives in every important provincial office and made them the largest landholders in New Hampshire. The assemblymen also possessed considerable holdings and their susceptibility to this form of bribery was particularly useful during the storm over stamps because New Hampshire was seeking a favorable determination of its western boundary and reimbursement for the past war. Wentworth persuaded the assembly not to participate in the Stamp Act Congress, and the governor, council, and assembly worked harmoniously during the crisis to maintain the appearance of a loyal and peaceful province.

It was a difficult task to administer to the interests of crown, colony, and family concurrently to the satisfaction of all concerned and to reconcile them. Yet Wentworth did reconcile them, and though there was general dissatisfaction from all by 1767, nevertheless each had come to occupy vastly better circumstances than at any previous time.

CHAPTER I

THE STRUGGLE FOR AN EMPIRE

The inauguration of Benning Wentworth, December 13, 1741, as governor of New Hampshire, marked a singular victory for control of the province by the party which supported him. Ever since its union with Massachusetts in 1641, the province had been plagued by a factious struggle between the proprietors of the soil and the settlers. So doggedly did the latter resist, with the support of Massachusetts, that the King made New Hampshire a separate royal province in 1679 to enable the heirs of the proprietor, Captain John Mason, to bring suit in court for their claims.

The Wentworths had little share in this early dispute with the proprietors. At that time they were not sufficiently important in provincial affairs to have a vested interest with one faction or the other. The accession of John Wentworth, a successful Portsmouth merchant, as lieutenant-governor of the province towards the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, however, aligned the rising Wentworth clan with the principal families of the province, the Waldrons, Sherburnes, Vaughans and Weares, in active opposition to all proprietary claims.

In this long struggle for the New Hampshire soil it was a common device of the anti-proprietary faction to petition and talk of re-union with Massachusetts. Since 1702, the two provinces shared the same governor, and though the union extended no further than that, still it had important consequences. The governor was the source of

political, social and often economic advancement, and his supporters, as recipients of such patronage, occupied the leading places in provincial affairs. New Hampshire traditionally had looked to her sister colony for political leadership, and a Massachusetts man as her governor only served to strengthen the political bond.

By the 1720's, however, the fears of the little province against a proprietor became increasingly overshadowed by the more aggressive and dangerous claims of Massachusetts. Having swallowed up Plymouth colony and the territory of Maine, Massachusetts endeavored to confine New Hampshire to the land between the Merrimack and the Piscataqua Rivers, an area some sixty by one hundred twenty miles in extent, actually the grant claimed by the Mason heirs. The southern boundary of New Hampshire had never been determined whereas the Massachusetts northern boundary was three miles north of the course of the Merrimack River. This had been allowed on the assumption that the river flowed in a general east-west direction, and, when it became known that the Merrimack some sixty miles inland, veered sharply to the north, contrary to the intent of her charter, Massachusetts continued to press her claim and fortify it with numerous land grants to her citizens. These grants had the approbation of some of the most prominent families in New Hampshire who comprised the 'Massachusetts party' and, under the leadership of the Waldrons and Sherburnes, came to occupy the principal offices of government and shared in the grants thus parcelled out.

As the province grew in number and wealth so was there an increasing resentment against the encroachments of its usurping neighbor. In 1726, Lieutenant-Governor John Wentworth attempted to stem the Massachusetts tide by himself granting, in the absence of the governor,

several townships in which his family and every member of the assembly became proprietors.[1] From this time on the Wentworths and their vast family connections, the Rindges, Jaffreys, Atkinsons, Pierces, Packers, and others, became the center of a wealthy and increasingly prominent circle in the province that demanded a separate government for New Hampshire, which they should direct. By 1730, with the appointment of Jonathan Belcher, a rich Boston merchant, as governor of the two provinces, the Wentworth faction could claim a large popular backing, perhaps even a majority of the inhabitants, that would take the least offense at any partiality Belcher should show to his native province or his private friends in New Hampshire.[2]

Instead of conciliating the Wentworth party, Belcher broke with his lieutenant-governor and formed a New Hampshire party of his own with the provincial secretary, Richard Waldron, as its leader, the governor, like his predecessors, preferring to spend most of his time in Boston. During his administration New Hampshire was tied even closer to the Massachusetts interest, and though complete organic union never became a reality, the governor's party actively promoted it both here and with the home government. The one great obstacle to their designs, the Wentworths and their "mean Ignorant despicable People," were summarily dismissed, whenever possible, from all appointive offices in the government and replaced by the governor's supporters. Lands continued to be given away to the governor's friends in both provinces without regard to protecting mast trees for the King's navy.[3] A notable example of such exploitation was the grant of Kingswood near Lake Winnipesaukee. Whereas Lieutenant-Governor John Wentworth made grants of 500 acres each to his supporters, Governor Belcher now granted

3000 acres each to some sixty friends. Between 1730 and 1737 he also approved the Massachusetts legislature granting some twenty-five townships in the area under dispute besides grants of other large tracts, like Kingswood, to Massachusetts citizens upon favorable terms.[4]

Besides political and economic ties, the Belcher faction in New Hampshire also possessed close religious affinity to Massachusetts. The governor and his supporters in the little province were Congregationalists, and considered by their opponents as the greatest enemies of the Church of England upon the continent. When the Wentworths endeavored to raise subscriptions to build a chapel for Church of England followers in Portsmouth, Belcher was asked to contribute. He agreed to give £30 only "if the Proprietors would make a stall-house of it."[5] On the other hand, Councilor Henry Sherburne donated the windows for Portsmouth's leading Congregational Church, the Old South Meeting House, the name itself indicating the direction of their religious sympathy.[6]

The most practical reason the Belcher party could muster for complete union with Massachusetts concerned its defense. New Hampshire was small with a population in 1737 of about 11,000 inhabitants. They believed that this weak province could neither support a separate governor nor defend itself against the incursions of the French and Indians. Up to this time Massachusetts had assumed most of the responsibility for defending the frontiers, and though only a matter of self-protection to her, New Hampshire reaped the benefit. As it stood, New Hampshire taxes were high, the greatest source of revenue deriving from head and property taxes. Most of the people were poor farmers, and because their number was small, so also the taxes collected. The few wealthy families in the province derived their income from shipping,

mostly timber, and to a lesser extent, fish by the late 1730's. Both were experiencing great competition at that time from the neighboring provinces, and the forests were pretty well cleared along the coast, making the lumbering business a costly operation.[7]

In contrast, the Wentworth faction had a deep personal interest in securing complete separation of the two provinces. As successful merchants of Portsmouth, it was a logical step for them to enter the sphere of government to direct provincial affairs in a manner that would best serve to protect and advance their economic interests.[8] Their fortunes had risen rapidly under the leadership of Benning Wentworth's father, Lieutenant-Governor John. Now one of the leading carriers of provincial commerce, the Wentworths began building their own ships to achieve virtual dominance in that field. In league with their merchant cousins in New York, the Lloyds, Nelsons and Temples, their trade sprawled to the West Indies and home to England where cousins Barlow Trecothick, MP and Mayor of London, and Henry Apthorp, in partnership with the future agent for the province, John Thomlinson, managed their affairs.[9] The lieutenant-governor's liberal land grants to them and his distribution of political offices as collectors of customs, sheriff and justices of the lower courts, and the establishment of the iron industry under their patronage all were indicative of a family moving to achieve a complete monopoly of provincial affairs. If left unchecked, the Wentworth bid for power would eventually lead to control of the council and the executive itself. This must have been particularly galling to some of the more established families of Portsmouth that had been striving to achieve the same ends for their own clans. Family jealousies acted as a powerful incentive to dim the

lustre of the Wentworth star, and their avowed loyalty to the Church of England only served to further animosity from a Portsmouth gentry long tuned to the strain of Massachusetts Congregationalism.

Jonathan Belcher proved to be the instrument by which the ambitions of the Wentworth family not only became dampened but nearly were extinguished. As governor of Massachusetts and New Hampshire in 1730, he soon humiliated his lieutenant by refusing him any allowance from his own salary, as was customary, because the lieutenant-governor had sent a similar letter to him and a rival candidate praying that each would be successful in obtaining the governorship. In Belcher's eyes such duplicity stigmatized the whole Wentworth clan, and open hostility broke out between the two factions when five months later John Wentworth died and his eldest son, Benning, inherited the mantle of Wentworth leadership. Benning had not yet learned to practice the virtues of moderation and diplomacy, and Belcher was determined to deny any patronage to a family whose leader treated the governor "with that height of impudence that has no parallel. . . ." If the Wentworths, whom he now described as his enemies, wanted any favors from him, they must first "stroke down [on] their stomachs. . . ."[10]

During the ensuing decade, the struggle between the two parties became more than just a contest for political control of the province. It was a war of survival for the Wentworths. The changing years brought changing fortunes, unfavorable to New Hampshire and the Wentworths. New England's primacy in trade and industry increasingly came to be challenged by the fast-growing Middle Colonies.[11] In this spirited economic competition New Hampshire interests seem to have been forgotten in the scramble by Massachusetts and her governor to

maintain its commercial leadership. The iron industry, introduced under Wentworth patronage, languished for want of experienced workmen, and it became necessary to import iron from Spain and Sweden and later from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia at a "most intolerable price."[12] Enclosure of common land by the proprietors increased the scarcity of sheep and led to a decline in woolen manufacture.[13] Settlement of the frontier continued at a standstill because it remained exposed on all sides to Indian incursions, and land titles were insecure so long as the boundary with Massachusetts and the Mason claim continued in dispute. The reluctance of settlers to move west tended to keep land values depressed.[14] The population increased slowly, principally because of natural increase of the inhabitants, and the Belcher party exhibited no zeal in encouraging foreign immigration. Rather than hazard the frontier, the population remained along the coast, and the number of new towns increased simply by dividing the older ones. Even the population gain received a setback in 1735 with the outbreak of a diphtheria epidemic that took over a thousand lives, mostly among people under twenty.[15]

During the 1730's, in addition to pestilence, entrenchment on the land and industrial depression, New Hampshire received its greatest setback in lumbering, and here the Wentworth pocketbook was most seriously pinched. Towards the end of his administration Governor Belcher informed the Board of Trade that trees along the coast that could be brought to port easily and cheaply, particularly those fit for ship masts, had all but disappeared. Whereas two huge pines of a hundred feet or more could be hauled to port in one day, it now took

a minimum of two days to haul one tree to port. The further inland the loggers had to travel to trap their quarry, the greater the cost.[16] New Hampshire and the Wentworth fortune, as well as the fortunes of many other families in Portsmouth, had been built on the lumbering business. For nearly a century the New England woods were tapped almost exclusively through this tiny province, and the day of reckoning seemed at hand. Lumbering interests and mast contractors for the Royal Navy now turned to the virgin territory of Maine, whose jurisdiction belonged to Massachusetts, and with some of her best timber tracts owned privately by Massachusetts citizens. By 1737, Falmouth [Portland, Maine] began to eclipse Portsmouth in the export of masts and spars, principally because of the accessibility of timber to water,[17] and the trade in pine of Portsmouth had dropped off by seventy-five percent.[18]

Pine trees, while more lucrative, were not the sole lumber exports of the province. New Hampshire oak was preferred by British shipbuilders for commercial construction; for one thing it was £3 a load cheaper, but they exerted powerful pressure on the Admiralty, possibly out of selfishness or jealousy, against the building of warships in the American colonies and the use of American oak in these warships. Consequently, the Royal Navy secured its oak mostly from Northern Europe, and New Hampshire merchants had to seek other markets for this product.[19]

Benning Wentworth, as with many other merchants, turned to Spain to sell his oak. He borrowed money in London to fulfill a large order and shortly after delivery, in 1732, relations between England and Spain became strained. Benning was refused payment and became

bankrupt to the amount of some £11,000.[20] This last blow, coupled with the general economic decline of the province at this time, and the inaccessibility of the Wentworth clan to political patronage, so depleted their finances that Theodore Atkinson, Benning's brother-in-law, could write that they were "verry strait Lased for money. . ." and looked forward to "a Change of times for the better. . . ."[21] To save themselves from financial ruin, the Wentworth faction, mostly at the instigation of George Jaffrey, promoted a scheme whereby they issued their own paper currency. The bills thus circulated presented in form a similar appearance to the regular provincial notes. Actually they were nothing more than promissory notes whereby three members of the Wentworth clan merely agreed to pay a stated sum to a fourth member, or to the bearer, at the end of twelve years. The Wentworths flooded Massachusetts with these bills, and the governor, a hard money man himself, proved quite incapable of preventing their circulation, a most galling situation since he had been fairly successful in resisting similar efforts by the paper money faction in his native province.[22]

By advocating an inflated paper currency for the province and opposing the Belcher party, in effect desiring a settlement of the Massachusetts boundary and with it a separate governor for New Hampshire, the already popular Wentworth party now was able to capitalize on its prestige and completely tie the hands of its enemies in the executive department.

An unexpected ally in the person of Lieutenant-Governor Dunbar embraced the Wentworth cause after a falling out with his superior. Belcher suspected his subordinate, who was the Surveyor-General of the King's Woods in America, of inefficiency in that capacity and failure

to prevent looting of the King's mast timber. Dunbar, for his part, accused the governor of insincerity and failure to support his arrest of mast thieves, especially after Belcher journeyed through Exeter, the seat of mast depredations, and chose not to notice some five hundred thousand board feet of illegally cut timber awaiting transport.[23]

Dunbar used his influence with Colonel Bladen at the Board of Trade to secure the appointment of Benning Wentworth, Theodore Atkinson and Joshua Pierce to the council.[24] Because of a legal technicality, Belcher managed to prevent their admittance for two years and, in the meantime, Wentworth and Atkinson were elected to the assembly, where they could effectively lead opposition to the governor's party by playing the patriot and blocking appropriations bills.[25] For the next seven years they rode rough-shod over the Belcher party. When bills providing for a paper currency were vetoed, they refused to make appropriations, not only for the salaries of the various executive officials, but even for provincial defense. The governor's obstinacy was founded not only upon principal, but on the sound realization that existing provincial currency had already depreciated by half.[26] During the decade of his administration he consented to emitting paper money only upon four occasions for a total of £10,500[27] whereas the assembly wanted something like £60,000 emitted. Because of this lack of a medium of exchange, the assembly accused Belcher of deliberately impeding the growth and settlement of the province. The assembly planned to use the expanded currency, however inflated, partly as a bounty on hemp to encourage its manufacture and partly to encourage the manufacture of potash. In clearing the land many settlers were forced to burn the

timber on the ground because it was impractical and too expensive to ship to port. With a proper bounty, ashes could be used to make potash and this wasteful practice turned to profit.[28]

The Wentworth-led assembly and the governor also collided on the matter of taxation, and here the hopelessness of provincial finance best may be appreciated. The assembly wished to alleviate taxes by providing an expanded paper currency, in effect borrowing, while Governor Belcher attempted to compel the province to follow a method of taxation as laid down by the crown; that is, increase head and property taxes rather than paper money in circulation. The governor's program proved to be as impossible as the assembly's was dangerous. To sink the debt acquired since Queen Anne's War would necessitate raising £1,000 a year until 1743. In addition to this the annual expenses of government, maintenance of the harbor fort and defense of the frontiers aggregated something more than £1,500 a year. The excise tax brought in about £396 annually, leaving some £2,000 needed to be raised by head and property taxes for some years to come. Only upon one occasion had the province raised as much as £1,500 by this method and it proved so oppressive that it was not tried again. Usually £1,000 a year could be collected without inciting too much grievance, and that simply would not meet annual expenses let alone clear the province of debt.[29]

With the governor's party in control of the executive and the Wentworth party controlling the legislature, the conflict soon resolved itself into a stalemate with very little provincial business transacted.[30] Thus stymied at home, the Wentworths continued their offensive in England. Backed by the assembly, they sent cousin John Rindge to London

as provincial agent to use his money and influence to secure the settlement of the boundary line and removal of Belcher as governor. In this he employed the able services of John Thomlinson, a prominent London merchant, who was associated with himself and Mark Hunking Wentworth, Benning's brother, in the masting trade.[31]

Thomlinson's brains, money, connections with London merchants and government officials, and an untiring zeal on behalf of his constituents proved to be too much of a force for the Belcher party to overcome. He knew how to petition the Board of Trade to secure a favorable reception by playing upon the natural hostility of the home government towards Massachusetts troublesomeness that had plagued all British rulers since Charles II. New Hampshire's poverty, distress, and smallness were adjectively compared with the opulence, power, and vastness of Massachusetts, a situation that could be corrected only by complete separation of the provinces.[32] So effectively did Thomlinson engage the Board of Trade's ear, that on one occasion it read only one of five addresses on behalf of Governor Belcher and then dismissed it on the testimony of Benning Wentworth, Samuel Waldo, and Christopher Rymes as having been made by "persons of no reputation." It seemed incredible to the governor that his enemies should be asked to testify on the character of his supporters.[33]

Little by little, Thomlinson secured the appointment to the council of one Wentworth relative or friend after the other. By 1740 it consisted of six supporters of the Belcher party and six of the Wentworth party. The governor became so distraught at the antics and success of his opponents that he could not understand why "a whole

Province [had to] be bamboozl'd and betray'd and lost thro' the wickedness of a malicious crew, most of whom have but little to lose. . . ."[34]

The Wentworth party perhaps had little to lose, but they approached the problem by what they could gain. Furthermore, the removal of Belcher had become more than just a party or provincial question. There were interests in Massachusetts that the governor had offended at one time or another and they all joined in the demand for his scalp. Samuel Waldo, a powerful Boston merchant, sought Belcher's aid in disciplining the settlers on his valuable land in Maine. Finding no satisfaction, Waldo went to London to secure the appointment of a governor who would protect his interests.[35] Waldo employed William Shirley of Massachusetts "to give . . . any advice and assistance," that the Wentworths should need, and "to do it gratis. . . ."[36] Benning's brother in Boston, Samuel, also a merchant, supported Belcher and his hard-money policy at first but later contributed financially to the Wentworth cause.[37] Robert Auchmuty, judge of the admiralty court at Boston, handed down decrees unfavorable to the crown. Belcher estimated that the judge was bribed to make such decisions and that he had lost £1,000 because of such a one.[38] Belcher's aversion to paper money caused him to deal harshly with that faction in the Massachusetts General Court that attempted to secure legislation to this effect. The governor vetoed the assembly's choice of speaker and thirteen newly elected councilors, and removed several others from office who showed any partiality to paper currency.[39] Another blunder committed by his supporters on the New Hampshire council concerned their petition to the King that New Hampshire be annexed to Massachusetts and that the settlers of New Hampshire should be moved wholesale into the province of Maine.

This would have been a most satisfactory solution to Massachusetts, but such a proposal was particularly ill-timed in view of the fact that the King already had established a commission to resolve the boundary dispute, and it recommended in favor of complete separation for New Hampshire.[40]

On July 14, 1738, Thomlinson advised Benning Wentworth to return to London that "something might be done for him. . . ."[41] Benning had not dared venture into these parts for some years fearing confrontation by his creditors, and possibly even debtors' prison. Thomlinson convinced these merchants that they should support Benning's candidacy for the governorship of New Hampshire if they ever expected to be repaid. Sir Benjamin Keene, British minister to Spain, also interceded with the Duke of Newcastle on Benning's behalf, reasoning that Benning should be rewarded for his sufferings from the crown of Spain.[42] With the separation of the two provinces now an accomplished fact, Benning Wentworth was commissioned governor of the royal province of New Hampshire June 4, 1741.

The triumph of Wentworth over Belcher, of New Hampshire over its powerful neighbor, Massachusetts, brought an oligarchy into power that doggedly retained its control of provincial affairs until the Revolution; and the victory gave them jurisdiction over an area that exceeded even their wildest expectations. The boundary settlement added a fourteen mile strip to the southern part of the province that extended, for certain, fifty miles inland from the sea and, if, according to Benning Wentworth's interpretation of his commission, the due west line extended "till it meets with his Majesty's other Governments," New Hampshire could claim all the territory over to New York, or to twenty

miles east of the Hudson River. The gain of seven hundred square miles more from Massachusetts than New Hampshire had claimed would be a mere trifle if this latter claim could be made good; for it would add some nine thousand square miles to the province, more than quadrupling its present size and giving the Wentworths jurisdiction over one of the richest timber lands in America.[43]

At last the sun had begun to rise over the tiny province, and it lighted an air of confidence and hope for the future to those with courage and determination.

CHAPTER II

DON GRANADA[1]

The extreme cold of that December day in 1741 when Benning Wentworth formally assumed control of the provincial government did not prevent the inhabitants of Portsmouth from giving him a warm reception. A half barrel of gunpowder boomed from the cannon of Fort William and Mary as though to shake the province from its lethargy; and depending upon whether they had been supporters of the new governor or not, men rubbed their hands together to keep them from freezing or in anticipation of reward.

It was traditional in all the King's colonies to receive a new governor with pomp and ceremony, not only indicating respect for the office, but providing an opportunity to celebrate and otherwise color the routine of everyday living. Benning's reception, ordinary in this respect, displayed one important difference from those of his predecessors: the joyous sentiment expressed a genuine and effervescent affection for the new governor.[2]

The people of New Hampshire had good reason to be pleased with Benning Wentworth's appointment. A native son, he was born and grew up in Portsmouth and like everyone else who wanted to get rich in a hurry, probably engaged in illegal timber operations and evaded customs duties, both of which practices had come to assume the proportions of a popular pastime along the coastal towns of New Hampshire. He attended Harvard College, and because of the prominence of his family, graduated fifth

in the class of 1715. Here he distinguished himself by setting a new record for broken windows and fines paid for misdemeanors.[3] After graduation he remained in Boston to take advantage of the greater opportunities for commercial profit by associating himself with uncle Samuel Wentworth in the export-import business, and with step-brother Hugh Hall as his Barbados agent, became engaged in the West Indies trade. Though married to the daughter of one of Boston's most prominent merchants, Abigail Ruck, Boston did not hold great fascination for him. He never acquired property there and after his election, declined serving as town constable. He soon returned to Portsmouth and continued his import activities, principally in wines and brandies, the greater laxity of customs officials making it even more profitable than in Boston. It was inevitable that as a merchant of Portsmouth he should be drawn into the lumbering business, and with the dire consequences already mentioned, became bankrupt in 1732. That year he was elected to the assembly where he could actively lead the opposition to Governor Belcher, and two years later the governor reluctantly admitted him to the council. This new position gave him more time to concentrate on his personal affairs but with little success. Finally in 1741, after much intrigue, Benning received the appointment as Governor of New Hampshire to bail him out of his financial difficulties, and the province looked forward to an era free of Massachusetts meddling in its internal affairs.

In the person of Benning Wentworth were combined all of the seemingly irreconcilable qualities displayed in the checkered background of three generations of American progenitors. Great-grandfather William,

a close associate and follower of the Reverend John Wheelwright, accompanied the latter into exile in 1639, settling Exeter, New Hampshire. Wheelwright was banished from Massachusetts with his sister-in-law, Mistress Ann Hutchinson, for teaching that salvation could be achieved by good works in contradiction to orthodox Puritan belief in salvation by faith alone. Wheelwright, William Wentworth, and a number of other heretical followers, escaped the clutches of Zion's Wilderness after nearly rending it into theological halves, and planted themselves at Exeter to enjoy their rambunctiousness in solitude.

Grandfather Samuel inherited his father's independent spirit and carried it with him to Portsmouth. Here it collided head-on with the established order, Portsmouth being a more settled community under the sway of the Massachusetts theocracy, and Samuel was arrested in 1671 for attempting to establish the family fortune by "selling . . . wine & Liquors without Licence."[4] Samuel's good sense and a £5 fine tempered the undisciplined Wentworth spirit and he adapted himself to that society, was admitted freeman and constable in 1680, and became such a model good citizen to be elected foreman of the grand jury in 1686. He was quick to learn the ways of commercial Portsmouth and by this time had accumulated sufficient wealth to branch out into the lumbering business on a small scale.[5]

Benning's father, John Wentworth, proved even more adaptive. Inheriting a substantial house, he abandoned the tavern business to concentrate on the more profitable export-import of timber and other articles, and by the standards of the time, was reckoned a successful and prominent merchant. After he had won the esteem of the Portsmouth oligarchy and gained admittance to its ranks, he was appointed to the

council and later became lieutenant-governor of the province. Once he had "arrived," so to speak, that unpredictable Wentworth spirit asserted itself again. He embraced the Anglican Church in a town that neither offered chapel for its services nor cared to see one, and increased his already great popularity by hurling the first serious defiance at Massachusetts domination of the province by himself granting lands within the limits which the latter proscribed upon New Hampshire to stifle it.[6] Massachusetts successfully checked the political ambitions of John Wentworth and his growing clan, which had come to identify itself with a rising sentiment in the province seeking to achieve territorial expansion and complete political independence from the Puritan commonwealth.[7]

John Wentworth's legacy consisted of a good reputation and nearly a score of ambitious children. Some inherited Elder William's independent spirit, embraced the Congregational church, favored an inflated paper currency, and were to be found in the front ranks of the rebellion against the King's government in New Hampshire at a later date. Others inherited their father's agreeable Tory nature and sense of business and remained loyal to the Church of England and a policy of hard money. It was a family of diverse interests and beliefs which time would cement until it resembled the two diametrically opposed factions that faced each other in 1775.

The eldest of this fourth American generation of Wentworths was Benning who properly belongs somewhere in the midst of this hodge-podge of diversity. In him, more so than in any of his brothers and sisters with the possible exception of Mark Hunking Wentworth, was compounded all the conflicting forces of his progenitors. He possessed a

generally agreeable and friendly nature but was known at times to display a furious and uneven disposition, probably concurrent with the agonizing periods he suffered from the gout. He tended to reward the loyalty of his friends but could be vindictive in nursing grudges against his enemies. He was fond of ostentation and liked to entertain his small circle of friends in a grand manner. Yet few of them ever got close enough to know him or understand him, and even his brothers and closest supporters were kept at a respectful distance. For the most part, his life was a lonely one and invariably he had to depend upon his own resources in times of adversity. He was known to be haughty in his manners, which he acquired from the noblemen he traded with in Spain, but it would seem that this was a device he used to shield his own uncertainty and indecision from others. Once he had decided on a course of action he invariably pursued it to the end with ruthless determination. Time and experience would show him when to beat a strategic retreat and temper the impetuosity that sometimes seized him in his earlier days. A staunch royalist, he made an ideal guardian of the King's prerogative, yet when the King neglected to amplify his instructions or when they seemed to be unadaptable to provincial conditions he discarded them or interpreted them in the broadest possible manner. More often than not, however, he tended to maintain a strict construction of his commission and instructions, so much so that it evoked protests even from his closest supporters.

A gambler who calculated his odds but seldom shrank from them if they were too great, Benning Wentworth was a typical rugged individual capitalist of his day. He had ambitions to improve his own fortune but

also had plans that were designed to improve the province and make it a flourishing and prominent member of the British Empire. For a time he reconciled these two objectives into a happy medium by settling and developing the western lands, now Vermont. He favored a policy of hard money for New Hampshire, but in the 1730's he advocated an inflated paper currency out of expediency and later out of necessity, only to return to his original policy with undue severity in the 1760's.

Benning rewarded his relatives and friends with the best political plums in the province but was shrewd enough to win most of his political opponents by the same means. He seems to have carried on a spirited economic competition with his more wealthy relatives, particularly brother Mark, as though being governor and the eldest in the family meant that he should have a more elaborate house and a greater store of treasure. Bankrupt when he first took office, he tended to favor Mark with lucrative mast contracts for the Royal Navy, yet in all probability Mark paid for this privilege by bestowing substantial commissions upon his older brother. When Mark and others became purchasers of the Mason Claim, which Benning had planned to distribute in the name of the King, the governor signified his disapproval by keeping him from a seat on the council for nearly twenty years. Towards the end of his life he flaunted the pretensions and elevated position to which he had raised his clan and shocked its sensibilities by marrying a girl much his junior and beneath him in social status, and from his grave hurled a final defiance at an ungrateful family by cutting them all off from a share in his large estate.

Unfortunately, what little has passed down to us about Benning Wentworth is the work of revolutionists who had little under-

standing or sympathy for royal governors. They have emphasized his haughtiness, greed, favoritism, and vindictiveness while avoiding any honest attempt to evaluate his place in the history of the province and his contribution to its progress, the benefits of which they unwittingly reaped. Certainly he was proud and haughty in his speech and manners but this was not unusual for a governor, and it bears a striking resemblance to the spirit of nationalistic pride that dominated life in nineteenth century America. He was proud in 1741 because he had defeated and humbled the great colony of Massachusetts Bay; he was proud in 1748 because he had played a prominent role in securing British victory over the French, and again in 1763; he was proud in 1752 because he was perhaps the only royal governor in the American colonies that fought the encroachments of an assembly on the prerogative, and he had won out; he was proud because he had prevented the colony of Connecticut from poaching on his timber lands along the Connecticut Valley; and he was proud because he had nearly wrested nine thousand square miles of the best timber land from the colony of New York. He took pride in being the master of New Hampshire and of the powerful Wentworth clan as well. Each proved difficult to manage at times, and it required great skill to ward off the assembly's aggressiveness with one hand and control the exclusive self-interest motives of his relatives with the other.

Benning Wentworth's greed became well known among provincials because of the high fees he charged for making land grants. True, they were high and made him rich, but his own relatives, who possessed some of the largest tracts of land in the province, also were subjected to his exactions. He charged high rates and freed himself from any great dependence upon the assembly and his own family, escaped the clutches

of both and lived in a manner he thought befitting a governor. His trading misfortunes with Spain had left him bankrupt and he was forced to sell what land, warehouses, and wharfs he owned in Portsmouth.[8] He could not even pay the £300 fees for his commission as governor, and because he was too proud to ask his relatives for it, they were unaware that he "needed any thing of this sort."[9] To get the commission as Surveyor-General of the King's Woods in 1743, he had to pay £2,000 and further obligated himself to his relatives. None of his deputies, including his most trusted associate and brother-in-law, Theodore Atkinson, collected any salary until the debt was paid.[10] By such heavy exactions Benning Wentworth freed himself of debt and escaped becoming a captive governor to anyone.

He distributed his relatives through the council and courts and placed them in the offices of sheriff, secretary, treasurer, and the various collectorships. Like his predecessor he removed his worst enemies wherever possible from any office or emolument. Such conduct exposed him to the charge of favoritism towards his relatives and vindictiveness towards his enemies, and to this he must plead guilty. Yet, considered by themselves, such actions do not fully explain the conduct of his twenty-five year administration. They reveal only certain aspects of a greater plan that Benning Wentworth's mind had evolved for the future of his own family and the province of New Hampshire.

Benning's plan had one general aim: to place New Hampshire on an equal footing with his majesty's other colonies on a self-sustaining basis; and to install the Wentworth family at the head of this province, directing its political, social, and economic life.[11] In his mind Wentworth-New Hampshire was an inseparable concept, and

until about 1755 he directed all his energies to the achievement of this concept. After this time, as will be seen, he had spent his energy and lost his zeal for the cause, mostly for personal reasons, and the remainder of his administration exhibited a marked indifference, perhaps more so towards the province in general than toward his own relatives. Until 1755, however, one must view his administration as an effort to tie the interests of province and family into one indestructible union.

The first step necessary to the fulfillment of this goal involved reaffirmation of the province's position as an integral unit of the British empire and restoration of the undisputed prerogative of the crown. A substantial beginning had been made to renew the religious affinity between colony and mother country with the establishment of the Anglican Church in Portsmouth. As one of its promoters Benning hoped it would serve as an example for other towns to emulate, and once the citizens of New Hampshire acknowledged and submitted to the teachings of the official church of Great Britain, the task of restoring the political leadership of the crown, in the person of the governor, might be greatly simplified.[12] It would not be an easy task, for it would involve a reversal of strategy for Governor Wentworth. As a representative from Portsmouth in the 1730's, he had encouraged open resistance to the executive by the assembly. It had been a practice of long standing for the latter to impose its will upon a governor and infringe upon the royal prerogative by withholding appropriations until he consented to its demands. Perhaps no one knew better than Wentworth the difficulty and precariousness of pursuing such a program, and he did not exaggerate when he told the Board of Trade that since his arrival as governor he "scarce found the shadow of the Prerogative, but

the whole was changed into the privilege of the people." Because he thoroughly understood the perils of his task he "endeavoured gradually to introduce the rights of the Crown."[13] This involved taking away the appointive power of certain provincial officials, which the assembly had come to assume, and restoring them to the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive. It also involved securing a permanent salary for the executive, not subject to depreciation, which would allow him to pursue his royal mandate independent of pressure from the legislature.

In his first address to the Assembly, January 14, 1742, Governor Wentworth said it was his determined and unalterable aim to make New Hampshire a "usefull & Flourishing Province."[14] To do this he hoped to stimulate overseas trade with Europe and the West Indies to bring into the province badly needed specie. In 1730 this trade was valued at £1,000 annually whereas the coasting trade with Boston was worth £5,000.[15] By increasing the former there would be less urgency to submit to paper currency, commerce could be pursued more securely, and the shipbuilding industry along the Piscataqua River would be expanded with an increase in employment. Portsmouth-built ships had established an enviable record as being more outstanding specimens of quality, strength, and durability than their more costly English counterparts. Governor Wentworth confidently expected to build more of these ships for the province trade, and with his family connections in England, to break down any opposition to Portsmouth-built men-of-war for the King's navy.[16]

The revitalization and expansion of commerce was but one phase of Wentworth's plan to promote the interests of province and family. Equally important and perhaps consuming more of the governor's

attention, was his plan for westward expansion of the province limits beyond the Connecticut River and rapid settlement of these lands. He hoped to induce immigrants from abroad, particularly from Northern Ireland, to settle these lands, bringing their skills to produce various naval stores and expand agriculture so that the province could feed itself with a minimum of importation. The governor was well aware of the advantages that Pennsylvania had reaped from its immigrants, and he proposed to do the same for New Hampshire. Increased settlement would raise land values, promote speculation and profit, and within ten years bring an annual revenue to the King from quit-rents. This land, rich in timber and especially that fit for masts, would bring additional blessings and profit to the province if it could be linked to Portsmouth on the coast. Wentworth had no intention of letting this natural resource slip from New Hampshire by way of the Connecticut or Merrimack Rivers to the advantage of Massachusetts or Connecticut. His most urgent and insistent demand from the assembly called for funds for a highway linking Portsmouth and the Connecticut River near the southern boundary of the province.[17] Such a road would insure the primacy of Portsmouth shippers within New Hampshire and continue that town as "the metropolis of the King's Government."[18]

This, then, was the program Wentworth had outlined for the future of the province and his family. It was perhaps the most ambitious program and the first long-range planning to come from a chief executive since New Hampshire achieved provincial status in 1679, and though the road was to be a long and difficult one, the governor could indulge himself with a reasonable prospect of success when he first took office.

The majority of representatives indicated a willingness to cooperate with the executive and were pleased with the King's appointment of such an "acceptable gentleman."[19] In addition to this good will and fortified by his own unbounding determination, Wentworth occupied an office distinctly vice-regal in character which vested him with all the powers and rights the King would exercise were he personally present in the province. In return, he was expected to secure legislation desired by the home government, prevent any infringement by the popularly elected assembly on the crown's prerogative, and assist Great Britain with men and money for military operations.

Wentworth, as with other royal governors in the empire, was adequately equipped with powers to carry out his royal mandate. His commission and instructions served as the provincial constitution while they were in force, and in theory granted him extensive powers. He could appoint and remove members of the council; he could call, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly, and had a veto over all its laws and its choice of speaker; he could establish courts and appoint judges and other officers for the administration of justice; he could grant pardons in all cases except treason and murder, in which cases he could grant reprieves until the King's pleasure was known; he appointed all Anglican ministers of the Gospel, had sole authority to grant lands and incorporate towns, and had complete power for the control and regulation of shipping within the province, excluding ships of the royal navy, in conformity with the Trade and Navigation acts. He could levy, arm, muster, and command the militia and erect all necessary military fortifications; all bills for the issuance of money were subject to his approval, otherwise they were void, and as surveyor-general he had sole

authority over disposition of the King's woods in all the American colonies. Many of these powers could not be exercised without advice and consent of council or without the financial support of the assembly, and of course all the governor's actions were subject to the King's approval. Neither proved to be much of a hindrance to Governor Wentworth during his twenty-five year administration, as he was highly successful in securing the support and approval of his sovereign, and the council comprised mostly relatives by blood or marriage who accepted his leadership.

In theory, such a grant of power made Governor Wentworth as absolute a monarch over New Hampshire as the King was over Great Britain; and he was determined to assert that power as much as any King ever had. There were two factors, however, which tended to limit and sometimes diminish his authority. First, there was the assembly's control of the purse, the power to initiate money bills including the governor's salary. In itself it had no serious consequences for the prerogative in New Hampshire because Wentworth developed independent means of support and could safely defy the assembly until it came to terms. But what made this power of the assembly a potent and dangerous threat to the prerogative was the two great wars with France and her Indian allies. Wentworth's twenty-five years as governor encompassed thirteen years of war the nature and circumstances of which forced him to suffer the assembly's encroachments on his authority to obtain military appropriations. However, in times of peace he regained whatever authority the popular house had come to assume, and when he retired in 1767 the royal prerogative occupied a more secure position than it had ever

known before or since in New Hampshire.

For a full quarter century after he took office, Wentworth had his work cut out for him. If he could reconcile any differences that might arise between the King's will and his own personal ambition and make both palatable to the people of New Hampshire, then he might be reckoned the most successful of magistrates ever to manage the province.

CHAPTER III

THE PLAN AND THE PREROGATIVE IN DANGER

In his first address to the assembly, January 14, 1742, the governor made a number of recommendations on which he expected legislative action. He asked that funds be appropriated to conclude the survey and marking of the new boundary; that those individuals who invested heavily to secure separation of the provinces, including the agent, be reimbursed out of the public treasury; that the defenses of Fort William and Mary be properly strengthened and an additional fort be built at Lake Winnipesaukee to guard the frontiers and protect the infant settlements there. He hoped that the assembly would take proper cognizance of its duty and discountenance any of its members that might try to block these proposals and disturb the "Harmony & Union in every branch of Power."

Paramount among his proposals was a request, indeed a demand, that the assembly settle upon him a permanent salary, not subject to depreciation, "suitable to maintaine the dignity of [his] office."[1] On this point of contention between the executive and legislature, the latter invariably tended to prevent the former from achieving a sort of independence of it by refusing to vote a permanent salary to a governor, preferring instead to make grants on a yearly basis. Since it was the governor's principal means of support, it could be withheld each year, in case of conflict between the two branches, and approved only when the executive made whatever concessions the assembly sought.

Governor Wentworth's instructions from the King directed him to remedy this situation that proved to be so damaging to the royal prerogative in this as well as other provinces. There is reason to assume that now the goal of a permanent salary for the governor might be achieved by Wentworth where his predecessors had failed. A native son who had worked with the assembly, he understood its behavior and possessed many friends therein. For the current session it had elected as speaker his close supporter and associate of his father, Andrew Wiggin. Furthermore, the general impression existed among the representatives that the new governor would make them all grantees of the new lands which he alone could parcel out in the name of the King.[2] No governor had possessed such favorable circumstances for effective bargaining advantageous to himself and his King.

The governor calculated that £1,500 annually would spell out what he considered an adequate salary. Surprisingly enough, the assembly took more than a month to comply with his wishes and only then with a hitch. The £1,500 it voted on February 17 was not sterling but "Old Tenor" or provincial currency, and making allowance for its depreciated condition, figured only £375. The governor rejected it, of course, and the assembly hastened to vote him £500 out of the West Indian Expedition funds that lay untouched. This amount was to reimburse him for some of the expense he acquired in securing the governorship and did not comprise a salary grant which the assembly assured his excellency would be forthcoming if he would only exercise a little "patience."[3] By March 3, Wentworth not only was not patient, he was fuming at the assembly for its ingratitude and tardiness and warned

that it was "contending with the Crown and not with the Governor, and that its non-compliance with his request as the King's Representative will be esteemed by his majesty as the highest act of disobedience."[4]

The assembly, not so much concerned with the King's opinion about its salary grants to the governor, was more interested in increasing the supply of paper currency in the province. Wentworth consented to emitting £4,720 to pay off provincial debts, but the assembly sought a £6,000 emission, the maximum allowed by his instructions. It proposed to lay the balance of £1,280 in the treasury for further use, but the governor could not see his way to consent to more than was absolutely necessary. Furthermore, the interest on the loan would allow Wentworth a salary of £250, which he vetoed as far short of his expectations.[5]

The governor's obstinacy and high-handed manner of addressing the assembly only cost him friends there and increased its determination to hold out for an expanded paper currency. In this regard it had economic necessity on its side. If the governor wanted an adequate salary and expected to improve the province's defenses, it would take a greater emission of paper currency than his instructions allowed and far greater than the wildest fancy could calculate. With no salary granted and the governor's creditors becoming impatient, the assembly towards the middle of March reckoned Wentworth to be more amenable towards consenting to bills of credit. It passed two bills; one was an outright grant of £250 to the governor, and the second bill allowed him an additional £250 annually for ten years, provided he approved the emission of £25,000 in paper currency, the interest on which would

defray the cost of his salary. The currency would be of "New Tenor" bills, devalued to bring inflation under control and maintain a sensible and steady ratio to sterling money.[6] Tempted by the offer, Wentworth told the assembly that the grant was acceptable to him but there still existed a great dispute in his mind as to whether the King would consider it a competent salary.[7] The assembly proposed to allay his fears by voting an additional £125 if he would approve the bill plus £100 house rent for the current year.

It appeared useless to the governor to press the matter further, and he approved the bills with a proper suspending clause deferring its execution until the King signified his approbation. Though the £1,350, with "Oeconomy," would afford him a decent support, he had clearly hoped for a more "handsome" allowance but made it clear in a letter to the Board of Trade, May 25, 1742, that the province could not afford it at that time. He argued further that the new currency would be less subject to fluctuation and depreciation than "Old Tenor" and therefore, less prejudicial to British merchants trading in the province. Besides this advantage the governor reckoned that it would cost some £20,000 alone to put the province in a proper state of defense. Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth harbor badly needed repairs and new guns to protect the mast fleets that operated from there; and a lighthouse was needed. To protect the frontier, new forts were needed, and it was an absolute necessity to cut roads to and from them. All of these requirements, plus a number of other public services, including his salary, an executive mansion, state house for the legislature, and repair of the prison were encompassed in this bill, and since poll and property taxes were already burdensome and

could not be increased, he urged the Board to be "moved Compasionately to Consider the case of the Province in their present Situation, and give countenance to this Act."[8] Convinced by the governor that the future prosperity and welfare of the province depended upon this act, the Board recommended favorably, and four months later the King signified his approbation.[9]

The approval of such a large emission of paper currency by the governor and King might appear on the surface a stunning victory for the assembly over the royal prerogative. The amount allowed was clearly a violation of royal instructions in quadruple, and the governor's salary fell short of ideal as it was not permanent and tended to make him dependent upon the assembly. One-half of his salary came annually from the excise tax, and this at times failed. Other funds had to be earmarked for military operations with the outbreak of war in 1744 and could not make up the deficiency. The other half of his salary derived from interest on the bills of credit emitted. Unfortunately, they depreciated in value and the act expired in 1752. Eventually, the system of annual grants was renewed, and because his salary was always in arrears, the governor might have become the tool of the assembly had he not other visible means of support.[10] His office entitled him to various fees for incorporating towns and performing other services, and he received £200 annually with his appointment early in 1744 as Surveyor-General of the King's Woods in America.

If his salary, because of its inadequacy, non-permanent nature, and susceptibility to depreciation, tended to compromise his position as defender of the royal prerogative, his other sources of income struck a balance in favor of the crown. Furthermore, he had

achieved substantial gains in favor of making New Hampshire a first-rate royal province by approving the new paper currency. For the first time sufficient funds were provided for the province to defend itself without outside help or interference. The frontier settlements could now be protected and increased with the £1,000 appropriation for roads to the Connecticut river.[11] In other instances Governor Wentworth, as the King's representative, placed province interest above his own. Though the salary issue remained a source of conflict with the assembly for twenty years, the governor refrained on various occasions from drawing it on a treasury depleted by war. Once he refused £2,000 because the money was more urgently needed to purchase military supplies and pay the salaries of other public officials.[12]

Though the governor prepared the province for an eventual war, which he knew would greatly retard his plans for expansion and settlement of the western lands, he did not anticipate its outbreak between England and France as early as 1744.[13] The rather large appropriation of the previous year for repair of the only fort situated to resist a French invasion by sea proved insufficient when its true condition became known. Its armaments, more than adequate, consisted of thirty-nine cannon of the 24 and 32 pounder class plus thirteen smaller field pieces ranging from 4 to 18 pounders. Every one was found to be in an inoperative condition, some because of rust, and all with their wooden carriages rotten. The 300 balls of 18 to 32 pound shot and the 180 balls of 4 pound shot, even if the guns could fire, proved useless as there were only six barrels of gunpowder. Most of the seventeen muskets lacked locks and were out of repair. "The Walls, Barricks,

Flankers & Storehouses in said Garrison, except the gateway & Northeast corner require[d] rebuilding from the Foundation."[14]

The governor took what action he could to improve the situation. An appeal to the Board of Trade obtained almost £5,000 of ordnance and powder and an engineer to supervise the huge task of reconstruction. The gun carriages, however, would have to be made locally as their odd sizes were unavailable in England. By scrounging through the nearby towns the governor secured an additional fifty muskets and twelve and one-half pounds of gunpowder to keep a company of infantry on duty. Every town was ordered to supply, at its own expense, five pair of snow shoes and five of mocassins for every fifty males that were subject to militia service. Meanwhile, Governor Wentworth had secured and transmitted to the King the plans and specifications of the French fort at Crown Point, located some eighty miles from the settlements on the Connecticut River.[15]

Up to a point the assembly cooperated with Wentworth's efforts to improve the defense of the province. It approved the specifications for building a fort at Lake Winnipesaukee and sent one hundred fifty men, at £5 a head, to scout the frontiers for a fortnight. Fifty workers were hired to commence repairs of Fort William and Mary, and to pay them £450 was borrowed at 6% interest from four individuals, three of whom were brothers to the governor.[16] Beyond this the assembly would not go because of a divergence of views with the governor concerning not only the means of financing military operations but also their scope. Wentworth dared not violate his instructions by approving any further emissions of paper money, and yet he asked for troops to defend

the fort at Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, near the French fortress at Louisbourg. If Annapolis Royal fell, nothing was to prevent a French fleet, operating from Louisbourg, from playing havoc with the mast ships out of Portsmouth. The assembly conceived its duty to provide first for provincial defense and not to defend "remoat" places and defeated this proposal along with the governor's request for a gunboat to patrol the harbor. The latter suggestion it considered too expensive, and with its rejection came an observation that more adequate preparations could be provided if the money were available, a broad hint to the governor to approve further emissions of paper currency.[17]

A committee of both houses was organized to convince the governor that his nineteenth instruction against paper emissions was not intended for an emergency, which it construed the war to be. In estimating necessary military appropriations and the ordinary expense of government for the next six months, the committee urged the necessity of emitting at least £10,000 immediately, part of which could be redeemed from the interest on the £25,000 loan made the year before. The governor was unalterably opposed to using government revenue as a fund for redeeming bills of credit, but if some other means of redemption could be found, and if the assembly would petition the King to pardon the governor's violation of his instructions, the safety and protection of the province could tempt him to violate them. The assembly would not alter the bill as drawn up, and Wentworth, unconvinced by its arguments, vetoed it.[18] In August, 1744, the assembly passed another bill proposing to emit £5,500 in paper currency, but the governor vetoed it also because it lacked a suspending clause

and because it allowed the assembly to assume powers for erecting forts and garrisons, powers which belonged to Wentworth alone as Captain-General of all military forces in the province.[19]

In October the governor convened a new session of the assembly and directed its first attention to the procurement of troops. The provincial militia at that time consisted of some eighteen hundred men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, divided into two regiments of infantry, each with a cavalry detachment. No improvements in size or efficiency had been observed in ten years; in fact, it steadily declined for lack of attendance on muster days because of the low fine for non-appearance. Any man with more important business could afford to pay the fine, and many often did. It would be some time before the governor was able to restore its efficiency and increase its size to ten regiments, including one of cavalry. But in that October, 1744, the best he could hope for was regular troops sent by the King to defend the province or permission to emit further paper money. As the winter months slipped by with neither forthcoming, the governor became hard pressed to come to an agreement with the assembly.[20]

In this time of crisis Wentworth and Governor Shirley of Massachusetts sought mutual friendship and cooperation. The latter advised Wentworth not to let his instructions interfere with raising money to carry on the war against the French, that the King approved of such measures in the emergency, and that troops should be raised in New Hampshire by draft, if necessary, and Wentworth should disregard any fears of resentment such a move might stir up among the inhabitants.[21] In return, Shirley had first turned to Governor Wentworth for assistance

with his projected expedition for the reduction of the French fortress at Louisbourg. Wentworth shared the Massachusetts governor's enthusiasm for this project designed to end once and for all French encroachments on the New England fisheries. As governor of New Hampshire, "the frontier of all the King's subjects & Interest in North America,"[22] Wentworth conceived of a grander plan that would liberate his province permanently from encroachments by its French neighbors to the North. If all the governments as far as Philadelphia would unite to make the conquest of Louisbourg a reality, he believed that they should immediately undertake the capture of Montreal, and once this was accomplished, Crown Point and other secondary military objectives must necessarily surrender "or starve by famine." If these objectives could be accomplished and control of Canada wrested from the French, such a war "would be the happiest war New England ever engaged in."[23]

Despite the ample military powers vested in the governor by the terms of his commission, he was never able to exert that authority to any great extent because of the assembly's control of the purse. In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle he stated the futility of his calling out troops, regardless of the degree of emergency, without an appropriation by the assembly to support them.[24] On Friday, February 1, 1745, Governor Wentworth turned to the assembly to vote the money necessary to send troops to Louisbourg in conjunction with the other colonies. Overwhelmed by its own enthusiasm for this project, it appropriated £4,000 to enlist two hundred and fifty men, each volunteer to receive 25 shillings pay a month, plus a blanket and one month's pay in advance, and voted that "they be entitled to all the plunder."[25]

After a little more sober reflection it changed its mind and voted to emit £10,000 in paper currency, the additional £6,000 to be used to pay government operational expenses and be a fund for other military operations that might arise. The governor sympathized with its intent but could not agree to the paper money provisions not connected with the expedition. However, he told the assembly that if it would change the wording of the bill so that redemption of the money began in 1751 and not 1755, and if the appropriation referred only to the expedition and provincial defense, he might approve it "that no delay may be occasioned on my Acct."[26]

The assembly felt that to begin calling in the paper bills as early as 1751 would increase the tax burden too much, but were about to accede, nevertheless, when the governor forwarded the petition of a number of prominent citizens of the province recommending that the assembly enlist five hundred men because only two hundred fifty "might justly be considered as a poor Pittance to an Enterprise" of this importance.[27] In his desire to destroy the enemies surrounding the province and to make a good showing before the home government, Wentworth's submission of such a proposal to the assembly at this time only increased the latter's bargaining position. It agreed to provide for an additional two hundred volunteers if the governor would put off the redemption date until 1760, otherwise it would vote only one hundred men. Wentworth preferred the assembly to adhere to his previous vote, but being unsuccessful, signed the bill appropriating £13,000 for three hundred fifty men.[28]

During these negotiations Shirley had hinted to Wentworth that the governor of New Hampshire would be a fit person to lead such

an expedition had he not been subject to periods of disablement by gout. Perhaps this was a motivating factor for Wentworth's spurring his assembly to action and not being querulous about some of the provisions of the bill. At any rate, Shirley had to retreat with some embarrassment from his offer because Wentworth told him that he would not allow his poor health to keep him from doing his 'duty.' "The truth was that in the time between Shirley's two communications, the desired grant of money had been made by New Hampshire, and the good-will of the Governor of that Province was no longer worth so much."[29]

Wentworth accepted this disappointment gracefully and continued his efforts to make the war a success. He impressed sailors to man two captured French warships, the Bien Aime and the sixty-six gun Vigilant and confiscated masts and other materials necessary for their refitting. He collected transports to get the troops to the rendezvous point, Canso, Maine, and outfitted a gunboat to escort the convoy by stripping eight guns and fifty barrels of gunpowder from Fort William and Mary. Food, especially pork, could not be purchased in Boston, and the supply in New Hampshire was being withheld by merchants for profiteering. Rather than pay the 18 pence a pound they demanded, the governor confiscated every pound that he did not consider essential for survival to the local citizenry. Because he placed the success of this expedition above all other considerations, he aided Massachusetts recruiters to enlist one hundred fifty New Hampshire men to serve under the jurisdiction and pay of the neighboring province. The efficiency and zeal with which Wentworth prosecuted these preparations perhaps can best be appreciated by the fact that the New Hampshire contingent arrived at the rendezvous point four days before the troops of her

sister colonies.[30]

Not perceiving that the reduction of Louisbourg would be so swift, the governor secured an additional hundred men June 12 and approved a further emission of £6,000. At his request the two houses formed a committee to "implore his majesty (if any Censure or aspersion should happen upon his Excellency's conduct in that matter) to excuse it. . .upon so extraordinary an Emergency." By October 5 the governor would repeat this request for consenting to an additional £8,000 to cover the expense of maintaining a garrison at Louisbourg.[31]

Governor Wentworth was too good a strategist to carry the war to the enemy at the risk of leaving his own flanks exposed to invasion by way of Canada proper, and in this he again proved more far-sighted than the assembly. It took his utmost exertions to maintain between eighty and one hundred fifty troops on the frontier for scouting and defense. The assembly not only proved niggardly in acceding to this necessity but further made it difficult for the governor to obtain volunteers by rotating the troops from garrison to garrison on a monthly basis. The only way Wentworth could circumvent the assembly's short-sightedness was to keep the troops on the frontier longer than the assembly grants allowed for and hope that the soldiers would be reimbursed. In 1744 he maintained frontier troops 625 man-hour days beyond the limit covered by appropriations, and in 1745 he increased it to 2050 man-hour days. Each time he shook extra appropriations from the assembly to pay for the additional service, and each time it voted them only on condition that its action be not considered a precedent for the future.[32]

All of the nine frontier forts defending the New Hampshire settlements extended inland only to the Merrimack River, or some sixty miles. Along that river, forming the corners of a box, were located forts at Canterbury, Penacook [Concord], Suncook [Pembroke], and Contocook [Boscawen]. These formed the spearhead behind which five other forts, at Rochester, Barrington, Nottingham, Chester and Londonderry, stretching in a straight line from northeast to southwest, protected Portsmouth and the main area of population. It was a good defensive set-up, except that it offered no protection to settlers venturing beyond the Merrimack River into the territory recently acquired from Massachusetts by the boundary settlement.

Wentworth's long-range plans for the province encompassed not only the settlement of this area between the Merrimack and Connecticut Rivers but beyond to the Hudson River, or the territory now Vermont. Many of the assemblymen did not share this vision however. Some of them, who were members of Governor Belcher's Massachusetts party, looked upon this western land as still belonging to the Massachusetts government; Belcher's followers insisted that the boundary settlement was temporary and the decision would be reversed by the King in favor of Massachusetts.[33] This small group of representatives worked diligently to throw every obstacle in the way of Wentworth to embarrass and discredit his administration in the hope that he would be removed from office.[34] Blinded by personal as well as political animosity towards Wentworth, they had repeatedly caused the governor to consent to measures often in violation of the King's instructions, but he refused to be unhorsed. With the new session of the assembly in

January, 1745, a fresh opportunity presented itself by which they hoped to achieve a falling out between Wentworth and his royal master.

Fort Dummer, situated just above the New Hampshire-Massachusetts boundary on the Connecticut River, had been erected by the latter government some years prior to protect the western settlements in its own province as well as its grants in New Hampshire which it proposed to develop. The boundary line decision in 1737 clearly transferred it to the jurisdiction of New Hampshire, and though the fort was far remote from the most western settled townships of that province, the King ordered Governor Wentworth, September 6, 1744, to take control of the fort and assume responsibility for its maintenance.

Wentworth did not present the King's order to the assembly until the session of January, 1745. He needed the interim to work out ways and means by which the representatives could be made to comply with the royal order. The course of action pursued by the governor clearly indicates that he had grave misgivings about its willingness to accept the additional burden of Fort Dummer. In addition to the few he knew would oppose him in the matter, there were a number of representatives who felt that the location of Fort Dummer held little strategic importance to the New Hampshire settlements and considered it unjust of the King to expect them to maintain a fort designed to protect the frontiers of Massachusetts. If the two groups joined forces in the assembly, they held sufficient votes to reject the King's order, weaken the governor's standing with the home government, and seriously impede, if not destroy, Wentworth's plans for western expansion to the Connecticut River and beyond.

Wentworth, to insure a sufficient number of votes to adopt the royal order, summoned representatives from the nearby towns of Rumford, Chester, South Hampton, Haverhill, Methuen and Dracut. These towns, most of which had been acquired from Massachusetts by the boundary settlement, could be expected to favor the acceptance of Fort Dummer as their proximity might derive some protection from it.[35] By three o'clock Tuesday, January 24, 1745, nineteen representatives had arrived for business "Besides these five gentlemen who said that they came to Represent some places that never sent any Representative to this Court before."[36] The governor adjourned them at five until the next forenoon, when Secretary Atkinson appeared and administered the proper oaths to all. The representatives of the older towns demanded the governor show by what authority new members were admitted. Wentworth replied that it was by the King's writ that he had done so, with the council's advice, and that it should immediately choose its speaker and proceed to business. At ten on Saturday the assembly complied, but a majority voted not to allow the new members to join in the proceedings. There were two dissents and two abstentions. After the assembly informed the governor of its choice, he asked if all the members had voted, and being advised to the contrary, refused to approve the speaker until an explanation of the assembly's conduct was forthcoming. The assembly justified its action on the basis of custom and precedent whereby "No Town or Parish (Not before priviledged) ought to have a writ sent to them to choose a Representative without [first] a vote of this House or act of the General Assembly" and it cited the admission of Newcastle in 1726, Greenland in 1733, and

Kingston in 1744.[37] Wentworth adjourned them to Monday when the assembly reiterated its position. The governor decided to approve of the speaker because "In the present situation of affairs in Respect to the war, his Excellency thinks it for his Majestie's immediate service not to enter further into the Dispute." But he warned them that this denial of the King's writs was an invasion of the crown's prerogative, and that the affair would be placed before the King for action.[38]

Meanwhile Governor Shirley had secured a vote from the Massachusetts legislature to maintain and defend Fort Dummer until April 20. During March he increasingly brought pressure to bear on Wentworth to either take over the fort or give him a clean-cut determination otherwise.[39] The governor forwarded this correspondence to the assembly for action, but it desired time to consider the matter and voted instead to send an inspection team to Number Four [Charlestown], some forty miles north of Fort Dummer on the Connecticut, to "view that place & see if that be not a better situation. . .for security of his Majestie's subjects in this province."[40] Wentworth advised against delay as dangerous since the Massachusetts government had probably written to the King presenting a damaging case against New Hampshire. Furthermore, he told the assembly if it refused to assume responsibility for Fort Dummer, the King would be under a necessity to restore that fort to Massachusetts "with a proper District contiguous thereto," an area which he understood to be fifty miles square.[41] The assembly would not be hurried into a decision that would further add to the war debt with no apparent advantage to the

province, and it berated the governor for expecting a decision within two days whereas he had delayed presenting it to them for months.

Wentworth's anxiety turned to rage at this criticism of his conduct, especially as the reply was drawn up by his cousin, Henry Sherburne. Speaking as the "Representatives of a Free People" the assembly brought forth all the cliches that would be popular in another generation. It considered the governor's manner of address as "Gross & Course" and an invasion of its "rights and privileges," charging him with exercising "arbitrary power" in reflecting upon its debates and right of free speech. It urged him to "shew some Regard to the Privileges of the People we Represent which we see are in Danger of being swallowed up in the Term Prerogative," and determined that its loyalty to the King could best be shown by "standing up for [its] Rights & Privileges."[42]

At this juncture, April 8, former speaker Andrew Wiggin addressed the assembly to urge its acceptance of Fort Dummer. He reasoned that to do otherwise would be a rebuke to the King, who might express his displeasure by altering the boundary line in favor of Massachusetts, in which case the £8500 expended to secure separation from that province and surveying the line would be all for nothing. In case this appeal to reason did not soften the assembly, Wiggin concluded by an appeal to its business instincts. "I am fully of the mind," said he, "that that part of the Province you will Luse if you give up that fort, if it be peace in twenty years will be bigger than all the province besides is now." In the vote that followed, two were in favor, two in doubt and eleven voted not to accept Fort Dummer.[43]

The question came before the representatives again on May 3, and again it was defeated, this time twelve to six. They informed Wentworth that the four-fold increase in government expenditures in as many years prompted their desire not to assume further financial liability. Besides, they added, the royal order was based on a misrepresentation as "the People of this Province have no right to the Land [around Fort Dummer] which by the Dividing Line now appears to be within this Province notwithstanding the plausible arguments heretofore made use of . . . ."[44] Therewith the governor dissolved them. In the two previous votes Wentworth had gained considerable support for his measure, but not enough to carry it. By calling for new elections at this time, he and his supporters were preparing to go into town meetings to unseat some of his antagonists and secure the election of enough representatives to carry the measure at the next session.

One thing in the governor's favor was the tendency of his opponents to underestimate his astute political capacity, preferring instead to think of him as an ignoramus.[45] Now the sly old fox demonstrated his ability for all to observe. By some dubious practices in the Newmarket town meeting, Wentworth attempted to replace Israel Gilman with Thomas Young. Gilman protested to the assembly for an investigation, and after calling for a new election, Gilman was seated but not until June 19. Wentworth's efforts in Dover proved more rewarding. Thomas Wallingford, John Gage and Thomas Davis were elected over Thomas Millet and John Wingate, the last two having voted against the Fort Dummer measure. Their election was carefully scrutinized by Wentworth's enemies in the assembly, and after seven days of wrangling over the legality of it, they were

admitted June 12. The governor now watched anxiously for the right moment to bring the Fort Dummer issue to a vote. It came on June 15. With three additional supporters from Dover seated and with the leaders of his opposition, Henry Sherburne of Portsmouth, Meshech Weare of Exeter, and Ebenezer Stevens of Kingston all absent from the assembly, and Israel Gilman not yet seated, the governor's supporters reintroduced the measure. It passed twelve to four with a vote to send twenty men to garrison the fort for six months.[46] It was a stunning victory for Wentworth even though subsequent appropriations for its maintenance proved disappointing and Massachusetts bore the major cost of it for several years to come.

The Fort Dummer issue was only one facet of Wentworth's overall plans for dealing with the Indian problem. Owing to its widely scattered settlements, New Hampshire suffered greatly whenever the Indian took up the tomahawk, which occurred regularly since Queen Anne's War. Their depredations on the frontier and slaughter of cattle struck such fear into the settlers that the surviving cows often went unmilked and the land untilled.[47] Wentworth hoped to pacify the Indians and end their periodic uprisings. In so doing, western settlement would be encouraged, and it seems that the governor entertained a mild hope of diverting some of the fur trade from Albany to Portsmouth.

As a first step to improve relations with the Indians, Wentworth in June, 1742, urged the assembly to legislate against the selling of rum to them on the frontier. This practice often proved to be the cause of disputes, which could lead to war, and the assembly promised to take the matter under consideration, meaning they would

not put a stop to this profitable traffic.[48] The following year, in October, Coaus, representing the many Indians residing about the province, petitioned the governor to build a truck house or trading center on the Pemigewasset River near Canterbury. Here, they argued, furs could be exchanged more conveniently for such supplies as powder shot, bullets, flints, knives, blankets, shirts, cloth for stockings, pipes and tobacco. The governor promised to make the recommendation to the assembly when it convened in November, but he could not admit that these western lands belonged to the Indians and not to the King. However, he was willing to arrange a council with them for the following summer in Portsmouth that some amicable agreement might be reached.[49] The assembly threatened to repudiate the governor's agreements unless it could appoint the trading master. If it succeeded in taking this appointive power from the exclusive jurisdiction of the governor, it would have been another serious invasion of the royal prerogative. Wentworth dared not presume to give it up and urged the assembly to reconsider its vote "that it may come to me free of any clogg whatsoever, thereby my good purposes to the Province will not be frustrated."[50]

Taking no notice of this, the representatives changed their attack and proposed to build a trading center at Lake Winnipesaukee instead. Even the Indians protested this move as doing them more harm than good.[51] The outbreak of war with France in 1744, and the ever present possibility that the Indians would be drawn in as her allies failed to move the assembly, and the governor's proposed council in Portsmouth that summer came to nothing.[52]

With all chance for peace with the Indians lost, the governor urged the assembly to do the next best thing; provide an adequate defense of the frontier settlements. It had taken thirty years to build them up, and another Indian war, which the governor knew would follow for certain, would cause them to be abandoned and take many more years to have them reestablished. Two hundred scouts were provided for one month service, but nothing was done for another two years about the governor's desire for western roads.[53] Following Governor Shirley's example, Wentworth declared war September 25, 1745, against the Penobscot, Neridgewock, St. Francis, Wowenock, St. John, and Cape Sable Indians.[54] The assembly rather confidently provided a bounty of £50 on Indian scalps, raised it to £100 and in 1747 to £400, only to confess that it proved an ineffectual encouragement for stopping the increasing tempo of their depredations against the frontier settlements.[55]

By 1747 the assembly was willing to make some amends for the peace it had disdained in 1744. The six-nation Iroquois Confederacy had remained neutral up to this time, and Sir William Johnson was using his best efforts in New York to get them to join the war on the side of the English. His appeal for money for presents to encourage a favorable decision was answered by an Assembly grant of £250. Wentworth rejected it as too small and called for an amendment. On May 23, 1747, it "Voted That in case this province should hereafter come into any agreement with his Majestie's other Governments to be at a proportionable charge in encouraging the said six Nations to

prosecute the War that then the said sum shall be deemed as so much advanced on such account." By July 14, the governor had secured and dispatched £1,000 to Johnson at Albany.[56] Yet the problem of frontier defense remained acute during the remainder of the war. Owing to the planned expedition against Canada in 1746, large numbers of the soldiers that would have otherwise been doing garrison duty enlisted so that many of the inhabitants, left unprotected, retreated to safer parts. Fortunately for New Hampshire, Massachusetts sustained garrisons along the Connecticut Valley to protect her own frontier, with forts at Charlestown, Westmoreland, Walpole, Hinsdale, Keene, and Swanzey.[57]

Early in June, 1746, Wentworth received word from the Duke of Newcastle announcing the King's intention to carry on an expedition against Canada. The governor immediately called a special session of the legislature and sought to enlist its support by outlining the advantages of such a conquest. He told them that "the expense of scouts and inland frontiers would wholly be taken off; a flow of wealth and an increase of inhabitants must consequently be introduced and everyone would enjoy the blessings of peace under his own vine."[58] The assembly responded by a vote to raise one thousand men if it could be accomplished by August 1, and offered each volunteer a bounty of £30 and a blanket. A committee was appointed to collect transports and supplies, and early in July, the governor approved an emission of £60,000 to cover the expenses of the expedition. At first he had grave misgivings about giving his consent, especially as

he had received no word from the King about the Louisbourg emissions, but Shirley assured him that such silence was a good sign and the necessity of another emission to carry on his majesty's service was sufficient reason to allow it.[59] By the end of July eight hundred men had been raised and placed under the command of the governor's brother-in-law, Colonel Theodore Atkinson. All through the month of August and into September the troops remained idle pending the arrival of a British fleet which was to cooperate with the expedition. It was a trying time for Atkinson to train and discipline eight hundred men in the service of the King without a single officer of the British Army to aid him and no real authority or power from the King. Atkinson repented ever allowing the governor to persuade him to lead the New Hampshire troops. He had not wanted the honor, but now so much was at stake as to make a graceful resignation impossible.[60]

The monotony of August turned to panic in September when rumor of an approaching French fleet spread through the northern colonies. Wentworth ruthlessly stripped the expedition and ordered one hundred men to the frontier for fourteen days and posted another hundred at Fort William and Mary in the harbor. The sloop Warren and the brigantine St. Clair were dispatched with one hundred and twenty-eight men to reinforce the besieged garrison at Nova Scotia. The governor would have filled these ships to capacity, some one hundred eighty men, had it not been for interference by "evil minded People" in the assembly.[61] Of the remaining troops, Wentworth employed two hundred to open a road northwest to Canterbury and then due north to Lake Winnipesaukee where they were to build a fort and

establish a base of operation from which to attack Canada. There existed the possibility that the governor wanted to continue this road all the way to Canada, and Atkinson urged it that fall as the best season for such a project, but apparently nothing came of it.[62] The rest of the expedition under Atkinson spent the winter in the northern part of the province awaiting orders to join troops from the other colonies in an attack on Crown Point. It never came off. Neither did Wentworth's alternate plan for using them to make a diversionary attack against the St. Francis Indians.[63] The war, embraced with such enthusiasm in 1745, now drifted towards its conclusion and it only remained for France officially to call it quits.

The cost of King George's War to New Hampshire amounted to an exorbitant sum. In addition to emitting some £87,000 in paper currency between February 16, 1745 and July 12, 1746, the province raised £7,000 by poll and property taxes on the inhabitants. The paper money had become so inflated and its redemption dates so remote that Governor Wentworth advised the assembly to adopt the Hutchinson Plan, whereby the money reimbursed by the King should be used for retiring as much of the paper as possible. The assembly seemed agreeable but never took action to appoint commissioners to treat with the other colonies in the matter.[64] Eventually Parliament voted a reimbursement of £37,801:23:14 1/2 sterling which, after various fees and charges, came to £29,000, but New Hampshire could not apply it to the debt or even invest it because of the dispute between Governor Wentworth and the assembly from 1749 to 1752.[65]

The financial burden of the province was nothing as compared to the setback the royal prerogative received during the war. By the terms of his commission from the King, Wentworth had sole power to levy, arm, muster and employ all persons whatsoever relating to military matters, and with the council's approval, to erect any and all necessary fortifications. Yet, the governor found his authority greatly limited in military as well as civil affairs by his need for financial support from the assembly. Time and again that body used its control of the purse to infringe upon Wentworth's powers and hammer him into submission to its will. It made an appropriation for the governor's salary and internal improvements conditioned upon his assent to a paper emission in excess of the amount allowed by the King. Money and men to carry on the war were allowed only on condition that it should appoint committees, chaplains, surgeons, and commissaries responsible to itself. Though it accepted £5,000 of free military stores, it refused to reimburse the King for £932 worth of gunpowder. It persisted in its laxity in restoring Fort William and Mary, which was not completed until the war's end, and neglected to maintain Fort Dummer despite a royal order to the contrary. It refused to pursue a policy of pacification towards the neighboring Indian tribes and later neglected to send commissioners to Albany to win the support of the Iroquois Confederacy. It denied the King's writ and refused to seat new representatives not called by its own initiative. These were but a few of the transgressions of the assembly on the prerogative, yet they were of such magnitude to weaken greatly the position of the executive and destroy the two-house

system of coordinate powers as provided in the King's commission.[66]

The performance of Governor Wentworth in promoting English victory over the French, nevertheless, enhanced his reputation at home and secured his position as chief magistrate of New Hampshire. The record of accomplishment was achieved only at great sacrifice to the royal prerogative, but Wentworth suffered defeat in many battles confident that he would eventually win the war. With the return of peace and no longer a necessity to scurry to the assembly for money, Wentworth prepared for a war of attrition against the enemies of the prerogative, and he was determined to fight it to the finish.

CHAPTER IV

THE GRAND DESIGN

A conflict with the assembly had been brewing since the day Governor Wentworth took office but had not resolved itself into open warfare because of his conciliatory policy. At first he had avoided any quarrel until he securely entrenched himself and his family at the head of provincial affairs, and when the war assured this, it was done so only by promoting New Hampshire's participation in it and patiently enduring the assembly's encroachments upon his authority.

As already seen, the opposition to the governor was based largely, but not solely, upon personal animosity. A small diehard group of ex-Governor Belcher's friends, under the leadership of the province's Secretary, Richard Waldron, could not and would not reconcile themselves to a chief magistrate in the person of Benning Wentworth. When the assembly first took under consideration a permanent salary for the governor, in March, 1742, it proposed to vote him a yearly grant of £1000 from an increased excise tax, a £1000 outright gift and another £1000 if he could get royal assent to a large emission of paper currency. Through Waldron's efforts these proposals were defeated, and the governor received only one-third the amount and that only upon a yearly basis.[1]

Wentworth achieved some small success in weaning away Waldron's supporters with a liberal distribution of minor political plums, but this was only a stop-gap measure until he could hope to

break the back of his opposition by finding a legitimate pretext for dismissing the secretary. The opportunity came when Waldron was caught tampering with the King's mail, specifically, intercepting a letter from General Wentworth in the West Indies requesting troops of the governor. Wentworth moved swiftly to install his brother-in-law, Theodore Atkinson, as provincial Secretary and at the same time summarily dismissed Waldron from his seat on the council.[2] To be ejected from office in such manner was a sharp rebuke for a man who had practically ruled the province for several years during the previous administration. A man of lesser stuff might have accepted the change in political fortune with more good humor but not Waldron. He attempted to secure £1000 from the Massachusetts towns which the boundary division had ceded to New Hampshire to carry him to England and pay the charges for securing a royal patent reinstating him as the province's secretary, a commission which the governor would be bound to honor. The money was not forthcoming and the plan failed. Urged on by ex-Governor Belcher to make a "bold push on Granada," Waldron now conspired with Major John Vassall and others to accompany him to England as agent for these Massachusetts towns to complain against Wentworth and have him removed. Vassall made the trip alone because he was not willing to make it financially worthwhile for Waldron to accompany him, but his mission ended in failure for lack of a proper complaint against the governor.[3]

Out of office, Waldron continued his efforts to remove Wentworth by directing operations at a distance. The outbreak of war in 1744 was a god-send to his supporters in the council and assembly

who could be relied upon to engage in obstructionist tactics designed to embarrass the governor at home and supply Waldron with the proceedings of the assembly from which he could abstract sufficient material to erect a complaint against Wentworth.[4]

The many instances in which Wentworth had to compromise the prerogative and disobey his instructions have already been cited. So also have been some of his efforts to fight back and hold his ground in the name of the King. More often than not he was unsuccessful as in the case of emitting huge sums of paper money and in submitting to the assembly's directing the supply of troops. The governor resorted to politically shrewd measures of questionable ethics at times to secure a proper obedience from the assembly. For example, in 1747 he sought a loan to the King which would pay off the troops of the Canada Expedition. The assembly refused until he consented to a further emission of paper money to cover the debts accrued from frontier defense. Because of the Indian threat at that time, Wentworth hoped to strike fear into it by refusing to consent to any appropriation for frontier defense "or for any other occasion" for that matter, until the King's loan was first forthcoming. For three months both parties remained adamant, but in the meantime a small-pox epidemic broke out in Portsmouth. The members of the assembly begged Wentworth to adjourn them that they might "retire to their Homes." He absolutely refused "until the King's business was effectually done." Having a greater fear of the small-pox than the Indians, the assembly gave in, voted the loan and appropriated additional money to defend the frontiers for another year. Therewith Wentworth adjourned the

assembly, "which Declaration gave the House universal joy."[5]

The appointment of a provincial Recorder of Deeds and Land Conveyances engaged the governor in a two-year running battle with the assembly. Such an appointment was within the crown's prerogative, but for some time past the assembly had come to assume this function, arguing that its constituents were directly concerned by being landowners, and therefore in their name it would make the appointment. Wentworth endeavored to restore this function to the executive, but his efforts met with counter-proposals which would throw the recorder's office open to popular election by the province's freeholders, or those possessing £50 in real or personal property. Such a procedure was even more repugnant to the governor's royal nature and instructions than the past custom, and he agreed to the assembly's choice. It was not a total defeat for Wentworth, however, for he secured two major points for himself. First, the appointment now rested on an annual basis, and annually he challenged the assembly on this issue; secondly, the choice for recorder for the next two decades was the governor's cousin, Daniel Pierce, who could be expected to work harmoniously with the administration.[6]

Such machinations by the assembly were the doing of Richard Waldron, to be sure, but the burden of carrying on the fight against the governor in that body fell to his lieutenants, chief of whom were Henry Sherburne, Junior, and Peter Gilman. Sherburne was a close cousin of Governor Wentworth, but there was personal animosity between the families of some years standing, and outside of sharing a common belief in an inflated paper currency with some of the governor's

other relatives, the two were poles apart in all other matters. Sherburne derived from a family of merchants that were keen competitors to the Wentworths in Portsmouth and, becoming a follower and close friend of George Whitefield in 1740, embraced a form of enthusiasm that was particularly distasteful to Benning Wentworth. As a member of the assembly in 1745 he immediately came forward to demonstrate political and constitutional concepts diametrically opposed to the governor's views. A member of the "Massachusetts Party," he favored reunion with that colony, opposed the governor's efforts to assume Fort Dummer for New Hampshire, and led the attack against Wentworth's admitting representatives from new towns on his own authority. During the war he was a member of several important committees, especially that to do with finance, and used his best efforts to wring concessions from Wentworth so much so that by 1749 he was the recognized leader of the new "patriot" party which tried to remove Governor Wentworth or at least reduce his constitutional authority to that of a figurehead.[7]

Sherburne came from a popular family in Portsmouth, and the governor's efforts to unseat him in the assembly came to nothing. It might be said that both factions resorted at times to tactics the ethics of which were highly questionable, but there is less excuse for the governor's manner in dealing with his enemies. Possessing a greater far-sightedness than most of his opponents in the assembly, Wentworth at times exhibited a tendency to preoccupy himself with petty prejudices and lingering hatreds unbecoming a representative of the King. Two cases in point are those of Joseph Sherburne and Peter

Gilman. Sherburne was an officer in the militia and because of this vulnerable position became the target by which the governor vented his fury against the whole clan. Although he had been a captain during the war, Wentworth later reduced him to the rank and pay of a lieutenant because of an unfortunate accident. Sherburne commanded the brigantine St. Clair carrying a detachment of troops to Louisbourg, and because he deviated from his sailing instructions, slipped his anchor and cables at Annapolis, missing the rendezvous with the rest of the squadron, and lay inactive for some time at the King's expense. Furthermore, the six recruits he had enlisted from Londonderry deserted after being paid bounty and billeting money. Later, Sherburne allowed them their wages, contrary to Wentworth's instructions, and the latter became furious at this double charge to the crown. Not content with the reduction in rank, Wentworth added to the humiliation by entering his own son Foster on the muster rolls as captain in place of Sherburne.[8]

Peter Gilman, a representative from Exeter since 1734 and also a member of the "patriot" party, came from a family all of whom were openly or secretly enemies of the governor.[9] Like Henry Sherburne, he had fought Wentworth to the bitter end over the Fort Dummer issue, and though the governor proved incapable of unseating him, he was not beyond the watchful eyes of the Surveyor General of the King's Woods. Gilman was the recipient of many mast contracts, none of which he fulfilled, and Wentworth believed this to be a "cover to rob the King of his timber," for Gilman was more wasteful in his masting operations than any ten other men in the province. Unfortunately the surveyor always received reports of his illegal operations after the six months

required by statute for prosecution, and Gilman never was caught.[10] For the time being Wentworth had to content himself with removing Gilman as a deputy surveyor, but during the war the governor reduced him from captain to lieutenant as responsible for the mutiny among his men while stationed at Dover. In his place the governor entered his son, Benning, Junior, on the muster rolls as captain. Both Sherburne and Gilman considered the governor's actions as degrading, which they were intended to be, all the more so as the governor's two sons had not seen previous militia service.[11] Both men carried their complaints to London where even Wentworth's friend and provincial agent, John Thomlinson, became incensed and successfully used his influence to reinstate them over the two Wentworths.[12] Of course the governor justified his actions in his own mind, and many of his friends thought him too lenient with his enemies.[13] Whatever the case, these two incidents indicate the lengths to which Wentworth was willing to go to strike back at his opposition in the assembly in the only way left to him under war-time conditions.

Governor Wentworth did not remain content to humiliate his enemies. What he was trying for was the complete destruction of them because their endeavors made any hope of reconciliation impossible, and if the prerogative of the crown was to become a potent force in the province and his plans for economic expansion were to achieve any measure of success, these men must be reduced to a position whereby they could offer no serious challange to the executive. Waldron correctly assessed the governor's intention "to crush [him] and [his] family into atoms." In actions reminiscent of his own against the

Wentworth clan in the 1730's, the governor refused a commission to Waldron's son, Thomas, in spite of his good conduct at Louisbourg, and now, in 1748, Wentworth's "dupes" unsuccessfully tried to prevent Thomas' election as a selectman of Portsmouth.[14] Waldron, urged on by the same necessity for survival that motivated his enemies a decade before, renewed his efforts to have the "Tyrant" removed. His latest scheme to this effect he styled the "Grand Design," and it was worthy of the title.[15] With the support of Henry Sherburne, Senior, and Ellis Huske in the council and Henry Sherburne, Junior, Peter Gilman, James Clarkson and Thomas Millet in the assembly, Waldron enlisted the aid of Colonel Isaac Royal, a wealthy merchant of Massachusetts and representative to the General Court from Charlestown.[16] Royal was willing to spend £500 for securing the commission as governor of New Hampshire and had the backing of Slingsly Bethell, MP for the city of London and reputedly worth one hundred thousand pounds sterling. Royal was also a good friend of the Reverend George Whitefield and considered utilizing this gentleman's high esteem for Henry Sherburne, Junior, to promote the scheme, but it does not appear that he carried it out.[17] Belcher, now governor of New Jersey, lent what moral support he could to the project, and Ellis Huske, who was also Chief Justice of the Superior Court, went to England with Joseph Sherburne and Peter Gilman to recount the injustices of Governor Wentworth. It is probable that the wealth and prestige of Sir William Pepperell of Kittery, Maine, added encouragement to the scheme and gave Wentworth's enemies high hopes of securing his removal. Sir William himself remained passive, but his interest in the governorship was actively

promoted by his son-in-law, Nathaniel Sparhawk.[18] During these maneuvers in England, the strategy on the home front was to secure the admission of Waldron to the assembly from Portsmouth, and with his associates therein, lend decor to the proceedings against Wentworth by advancing an official protest to the King.[19]

During the Fall and Winter of 1748 Wentworth made no move that would indicate an awareness of the plot. Waldron was anxious for the election of a new assembly and, when it did not come, wrongly concluded that the governor was afraid to face the situation. Actually, Wentworth was preparing to reassert his prerogative to admit new representatives to the assembly but was awaiting more specific instructions from the King as to how to proceed. The instruction, dated June 30, 1748, commanded the governor to call a new assembly as soon as possible, sustained his actions in 1745 regarding the admission of new representatives, and advised him to support the rights of these representatives as it was properly within the sphere of the prerogative to "lawfully extend the privilege to other New Towns as shall be worthy of it."[20] Thus armed, Wentworth set January 3, 1749, as the date for the assembly to meet and was prepared to pit the power of the crown against his enemies.

The one common denominator among the governor's enemies was their mutual dislike for him, and their efforts as embodied in Richard Waldron reflected this personal animosity. Another motivating factor, but of less importance, was their desire to restore the close union of New Hampshire with Massachusetts that had existed prior to 1741.[21] Because this "patriot" party was a minority in the new

assembly these two motives, either singly or in combination, were not strong enough arguments to win the additional representatives necessary to give them a quorum and thus effectively obstruct the governor's legislative demands. There was, however, one question that would appeal to any conscientious representative which this faction effectively utilized to gain supporters; it was a question of the relationship between the provincial constitution and the constitution of Great Britain. Specifically, it resolved itself into two main points: the extent to which the crown might interfere in the province's internal affairs, and whether the governor's instructions were a part of the provincial constitution and therefore had the force of law binding upon all. Wentworth insisted that his instructions were a part of the provincial constitution, and indicated that he expected a due obedience to them from the assembly.[22] In this he had the full support and backing of the home government, and his new instruction, affirming his right to admit new representatives to the assembly, was based upon the studied opinion of the best legal authorities in England. Unfortunately, Parliament had never spelled out in detail the exact relationship of instructions to the constitution although Governor Wentworth advised the Board of Trade that such an act was imperative to secure obedience to the King's instructions from the assembly.[23]

The assembly looked upon the King's instructions in another light, and credit must be given Henry Sherburne, Junior, as one of the leaders of the opposition in the assembly, for justifying his stand against Wentworth primarily upon this constitutional difference rather than from any personal petulance. The practice of invading the pre-

rogative and forcing the governor to disobey or at least depart from his instructions, though of long standing with the assembly, came to be intensified during Benning Wentworth's administration. This was due primarily to war, which favored the opportunity for encroachment because of the governor's need for appropriations; and there was a direct ratio between the necessity for money and the assembly's ability to invade the prerogative to advantage. It looked upon these instructions as binding upon the governor only, and in 1745 it effectively demonstrated its ability to ignore them by discountenancing the King's writs to new representatives, maintaining instead a position of independence to manage its own affairs without royal interference.[24] The governor protested this invasion but knew he could not pursue it to advantage until peace returned, and since the successful conclusion of war was the immediate objective, gave way to the assembly in an action which had the appearance of executive weakness.

The assembly thus convened in 1749 comprised some twenty-five representatives, six of whom had been summoned by the King's writ from Governor Wentworth. Only eight representatives or one-third of the assembly was aware of the plot to effect his removal, but the necessary quorum of eleven could be secured by masking the contest with the constitutional issue.[25] Richard Waldron had been elected from Portsmouth, and the representatives immediately chose him to be their speaker. The governor refused to approve the choice when he discovered that the two representatives from the new towns of South Hampton and Chester were not allowed a voice in his selection. When

the assembly demanded by what authority the governor vetoed its choice of speaker, Wentworth replied that when he was "fully Obeyed in the Choice of a new Speaker wherein the Members for South Hampton and Chester are to have a vote his Excellency is Ready to give them Any Satisfactory Answer to things they have a Right to Inquire into And not till then." The governor made good his word but the assembly refused to recognize the new representatives. By January 10 it sent a committee to the governor's house where an attack of pleurisy confined him, but Wentworth refused to see them and ordered his servant to advise them to deliver any message they might have to the council. The committee complied and for seven days the assembly was "silent and patiently waiting" upon the governor's reply. The governor's only reply on January 17 was that they should obey his previous instructions. This hostility continued for another three weeks in which time nothing was accomplished. If the affairs of government were to suffer for the assembly's obstinacy, Wentworth was determined that the private affairs of these gentlemen should suffer also. Each day he summoned them to meet at ten or eleven o'clock, adjourned them until three o'clock, and then adjourned them again until the next forenoon, thus causing them to neglect their business pursuits.[26]

Wentworth's reason for vetoing the assembly's choice of Richard Waldron as its speaker was his obvious personal hostility to a man trying to oust him and his family from office. By not allowing the new representatives a voice in his selection, the assembly, unaware of the governor's latest instruction, played right into his hands and gave him a good and legal justification for his action. Yet, Wentworth

did not use this justification in reporting the incident to the Board of Trade. Surprisingly enough, he cited a paragraph from the commission of Charles II to Governor Cranfield in 1682 which stated that a suspended councilor might not sit in the assembly while his seat in the council remained vacant. Samuel Solly was admitted to the council in 1743, but because the King never signified that he approved or disapproved the removal of Waldron, Wentworth considered the vacancy still to exist.[27]

Wednesday afternoon, February 8, Joseph Blanchard and Thomas Packer, representing the towns ceded by Massachusetts, demanded their seats in the assembly and showed an extract from the governor's recent instruction as their authority. Of course it was Wentworth's subtle way of informing the assembly that he had the law and the King behind his actions. This was the first notice it had that such an instruction existed and demanded the governor present the entire original for its consideration and not an extract copy by the province secretary. Because a governor's instructions were not intended for general circulation, even among the council, there appears a certain smugness in Wentworth's reply that he was the sole judge of what portions of them were to be made public and what not. The assembly then summoned the sheriff, also Wentworth's brother-in-law, and hoping to break him down, demanded he hand over the precepts he sent to the towns for the election of representatives and also the returns they had made. The sheriff, who occupied one of the most profitable of provincial offices and appeared well-coached by the governor, said he would comply with the assembly's request only when it became a legally constituted body and not before.[28]

The assembly endeavored to lead the governor away from the original issue by asking him to explain the meaning of the phrase in his latest instruction which read: "the Right of sending Representatives to the said Assembly was founded originally on the Commissions and Instructions given by the Crown to the respective Governors of the Province of New Hampshire."[29] It could not see how 'to the Assembly' gave the governor the authority to admit representatives from the towns, for 'to' and 'from' conveyed different conceptions which it could not reconcile.[30] Neither could it see how the governor could admit representatives from Dunstable, Merrimack, Hollis, Monson, or Nottingham West since these towns were not specifically mentioned in the instruction. Wentworth refused to be led astray by these minor points and told the assembly in no uncertain terms that the King's commission empowered him to admit any number of towns he thought worthy, that he had full power to veto every act of government including the assembly's choice of speaker and that if it had any doubts about his authority it could go straight to Whitehall. The assembly had no choice but to take this advice and petition the King to replace Wentworth with a "Gentleman of better abilities, and a different Disposition."[31]

The list of grievances against the governor was almost as long as that against George III at a later date. He was accused of attempting to destroy custom and get control of provincial land deeds by assuming to appoint a recorder in place of the assembly. He had abridged civil and religious liberties by endeavoring to appoint a minister in the town of Brentwood and later violated the laws of

incorporation by trying to divide that town into two parishes. Furthermore, he had allowed the sheriff to enter that town's church and drag the minister from the pulpit. He was accused of circumventing the law as presiding officer of the Supreme Court of Probate, and of forcing the assembly to make a loan to the King in 1747 which was not a grant but "a vote only" and then paying off the troops of the Canada Expedition without its consent. Not content with the absurdity of these charges it went on to imply that Wentworth had purposely created this distressing situation so that he and his friends could lay their hands upon the £30,000 reimbursement by Parliament for New Hampshire expenses during King George's War, which they would use for their personal gain. It disclaimed any party spirit or design to embarrass the administration and maintained its right to resist what it called innovations in the provincial constitution or unjust encroachments upon its liberties, and had the audacity to advise the King that his instruction of 1748 to the governor was "not only partial but unjust."[32]

The assembly did not forward this complaint through the usual channel, the provincial agent, for John Thomlinson had repeatedly advised against attempting to remove Wentworth on the legality of his conduct. Thomlinson further warned that the governor had the full moral and legal force of the crown behind his prerogative to admit new representatives and to veto the assembly's choice of speaker, and under the circumstances, it was not within the power of his most sanguine enemies to eject him from office.[33] Instead, the complaint was sent to John Thorpe, a Lincoln's Inn lawyer, who after reading it,

did not think it advisable to present it to the King. In Thorpe's opinion the complaint would fix Wentworth "firmer in his seat of Government. . .instead of answering the Expectations of the Assembly," for the governor was operating strictly within the limits of his commission and instructions. Thorpe's legal advice was a sharp rebuke to the complainants, and it must have been a shattering blow to whatever hope of success they entertained when he concluded that "it is most certain the plantations have not that Inherent Constitutional Right to hold Assemblys as the Kingdom of Great Britain has to holding Parliaments, . . . [and] the Assembly of New Hampshire met and acted after the Governor had negatived their Speaker which is wholly unwarrentable as they were not a House without a Speaker."[34]

The assembly continued to meet, however, although by March of 1750 attendance was reduced to the five die-hards, Waldron, Sherburne, Gilman, Clarkson, and Millet. Wentworth continued to summon it to session and prorogued it each month for a few weeks at a time. By now Royal had realized the futility of unseating the governor and decided to remove himself from the contest. He regretted taking such action but informed his friends in New Hampshire that the struggle had seriously impaired his health and his purse was poorer by £1,000. He hoped that Sir William Pepperell might be more successful in "relieving [their] Distressed Province."[35]

On several occasions during 1749, 1750, and 1751 the assembly attempted to start the machinery of government and force Wentworth's hand. Each time the governor, backed by his council, remained steadfast, secure in the belief that the points in controversy were pre-

rogatives of the highest order and too delicate in nature to be dispensed with.[36] For three long years he kept the assembly under a steady series of short adjournments and prorogations to force it to a due obedience to the King's instructions, and for three years not a single piece of legislation was forthcoming.[37] Taxes went uncollected, soldiers were not paid and defenses neglected. The £30,000 bounty money for the late war lay idle and the recorder's office remained closed. The governor received no salary, which was already in arrears when the controversy began, and therefore sustained a personal loss of several thousand pounds in defense of a point dear to the crown. The decline of provincial currency by fifty per cent coupled with the fact that the veterans had not been paid, many of whom would have invested in new land, seriously retarded Wentworth's plans for western expansion and settlement.[38]

Under the terms of the Triennial Act the assembly expired in January, 1752. For all practical purposes the governor had won his point, but the strain on his nervous system had been great.[39] For this reason Wentworth did not hurry to call a new assembly into session; he was expecting additional orders from England, and perhaps most important of all, he desired the malcontents in the province to learn an unforgettable lesson and learn it well. He gave the people of the province an additional eight months to consider the folly of tampering with the royal prerogative of the King's representative and to make selection of more judicious men as their representatives in the future. It was a much chastened assembly that convened September 19, 1752. Within twenty days it had admitted the new representatives, selected a speaker acceptable to the governor, chosen a recorder,

provided for the maintenance and defense of forts, disposed of the Louisbourg money, appointed collectors of customs, seven out of eight of whom were representatives, and increased the governor's salary and house rent money.[40] It was a total war the governor had waged, and now it was total victory he enjoyed. By selecting the time and place of battle Wentworth had won a sweeping victory for the crown. Though the province was in bad economic straits and was considered to be practically in a state of rebellion for the past three years by the home government, Wentworth came through it all practically unscathed, especially in a financial sense. Of course there were those in England who did not consider his conduct blameless, and had been willing to make concessions to prevent the occurrences of the past three years, but as one authority has pointed out Wentworth's victory was not only complete but permanent and the assembly never again challenged the prerogative in New Hampshire until 1775. It has been further stated, perhaps with some justification, that "had there been more Benning Wentworths in the provinces, colonial history might have taken a different course."[41]

CHAPTER V

TOWARD A BROADER HORIZON

Benning Wentworth's land policy for westward expansion of the province's limits perhaps best illustrates his ability to reconcile the qualities of a shrewd business sense with an imperial sweep of vision and to parlay both into a winning combination. He inherited his father's dream of a government entirely distinct from Massachusetts, but he knew it would be only a partial solution to the province's poverty and insecurity. It was clear to him and some of his supporters in the 1730's that one cause of this was the narrow confines which the Bay Colony had attempted to impose upon New Hampshire to stifle it. By arguing that separation alone would be insufficient to guarantee a greater prosperity and encourage the inhabitants to a more loyal devotion to the crown, Wentworth sought and secured larger territorial limits than New Hampshire had hitherto known, and than even he had anticipated. His party hoped that one of its members would be placed at the head of the greater province, but it cannot be concluded that at the time it sought expansion for personal profit because all appearances indicated the acquired lands would either revert to the King for regranting or become the property of the Mason heirs.[1]

In the past Massachusetts had not shown much respect for the Mason patent, but when the limits of the new boundary became apparent, it sent Thomas Hutchinson to London to secure a quitclaim from John Tufton Mason of some 24,000 acres to Massachusetts which would nearly

cancel any material benefits from their being transferred to the jurisdiction of New Hampshire. The scheme failed because the King's solicitor advised against it, but the Wentworth party jumped at the opportunity to purchase it for their own province.[2] On April 6, 1739, a tripartite agreement was concluded between Mason and John Thomlinson acting as agent for John Rindge, Theodore Atkinson, Andrew Wiggin, George Jaffrey, and Benning Wentworth. They made a down payment of 7 pounds 7 shillings to Mason, with an option to purchase the whole claim for £1,000 when the two governments became separated, the only condition being that each grant they made should reserve an equal share to Mason.[3]

Governor Wentworth delayed presenting this agreement for adoption by the assembly until late in 1744 because of the suits which arose among the border towns concerning their boundaries. Not wishing to dispossess some 400 families in the area, he requested the Board of Trade, January 23, 1744, to allow him to "Incorporate these Circumstances will admitt of, Seting off to each family, a reasonable portion of Land, according to the Improvements they have made."[4] There is no indication that the Board granted this request or even replied to the governor. He deferred action until October 30, when he sent the agreement to the assembly for ratification. By this time he had already made up his mind, with the council's approval, to ignore the Massachusetts grants on the west side of the Merrimack River, because they contained no provision for protecting mast pines for the King's navy, and proposed to grant a double tier of townships from the southern border clear up to the farthest head of the river. The

council concurred in the proposal to develop the west bank and advised the governor to begin making the grants "as soon [as] a suitable number of Persons should apply. . .for such Townships."[5] The war delayed settlement of the area, but Wentworth was convinced that when it ended, there would be a great push of population across the river which would double itself within five years.

The business of carrying on a war only added to the assembly's lethargy about approving the purchase of Mason's claim. Mason himself appeared before it on February 18, 1745, to urge that the sale be concluded, and the governor and council forwarded favorable recommendations on February 22, 1745, and again on May 7, 1746, when Mason again appeared to repeat his demand for a determination of the matter. Further delay was occasioned because of a disagreement between the two houses as to who should dispose of the land. By the terms of his commission Wentworth was fully empowered to act with the approval of the council, but the assembly feared they would grant the lands to themselves and their friends rather than to the people and made the purchase conditional on itself granting the lands.[6]

Wentworth pressed the assembly for a positive decision so that he could begin making the grants, collecting his fees and the quit rents which would accrue to the King. After two years of stalling by the assembly, Mason on May 16, 1746, leased his claim, some 100,000 acres, to Councilors Richard Wibird and Samuel Solley for a £5 down payment. The lease was for one year and excluded the eleven settled towns and districts, and the leasees were to pay rent of one peppercorn due the last day of the contract. The purpose of the lease was

to permit Solley and Wibird "to accept and take a Grant or release of the Reversions & Inheritance thereof to them. . . ."[7] Actually, it was all part of a deal designed to lead to a common recovery for Mason in court so that he could dock the entail and have a perfect and undisputed title to the land. Now that Wibird and Solley were tenants, they agreed to be sued by the governor's brother, John Wentworth, for recovery of the lands against one Michael Falker, the common vouchee. Falker agreed not to appear in court for Wibird and Solley and, therefore, would be held in contempt so that Wentworth would recover the land from them, and Mason could recover it from him for his own "proper use Benefit."[8] By July 28 all these legal maneuverings were completed and John Wentworth had full seizen of the land, that is, a right to possession but not actual possession, thereby cutting out any other claimants so that Mason, in fact, was in sole possession of his claim and could sell it without dispute.[9]

On the very day the assembly sent a committee to Mason to make final arrangements for the purchase, July 30, 1746, he sold it right under their noses to twelve men for £1,500 or about £130 sterling. The new proprietors divided the purchase into 15 shares, with Theodore Atkinson possessing three of them, Mark Hunking Wentworth two shares, and Richard Wibird, John Wentworth, George Jaffrey, Nathaniel Meserve, Thomas Packer, Thomas Wallingford, Jotham Odiorne, Joshua Pierce, Colonel Samuel Moore and John Moffat possessing one share each. Wallingford was the only non-resident of Portsmouth, and of the twelve, ten were related to the governor, seven of whom were also members of his council.[10] Mason confirmed the deed whereby the claim

was expanded September 30, 1749, at which time the shares were further divided. Mark Hunking Wentworth controlled 2/15 shares, and Atkinson, Wibird, Moffat, Odiorne, Pierce, Packer, Jaffrey, John Wentworth and Thomas Wallingford held 1/15 share each. To these were added nine additional proprietors who included Samuel Solley, Nathaniel Meserve, Daniel Pierce, provincial recorder and secretary to the proprietors, Mary Moore, widow of the late hero of Louisbourg, John Thomlinson, provincial agent in London, Clement March, a representative from Greenland, each possessing 1/30 share; Joseph Blanchard, the surveyor and representative of the new town of Dunstable, owned 1/16 share, while Paul March and Joseph Green, a Boston merchant, possessed 1/120 share apiece. The remaining 1/15 share was reserved for John Tufton Mason.

Both the assembly and Governor Wentworth were furious at their "taking a bargain out of the Governments hands."[12] Before the deed was executed the former was willing to comply with the terms of Thomlinson's Tripartite Agreement of 1739 if the proprietors would break their contract with Mason, and as late as 1748 tried to buy direct from them but failed because Mason would not execute a deed to the assembly "upon any Terms whatever."[13] Some of the proprietors indicated a willingness to sell their claim, but disagreement over whether the governor and council or the assembly should grant the land prevented it. Furthermore, the latter did not appear to be acting in good faith since it had failed to appropriate any money for the purchase.[14]

Wentworth was dismayed, not so much that some of his councilors used their public knowledge for private gain, but because they had done it behind his back. On May 10 the council approved his granting three townships near Rochester; the plans and charters had been drawn up, and the governor was about to affix the seal and make the grants official when the news of the purchase broke.[15] George Jaffrey wasn't sure the governor's opposition was real or only a political maneuver but inclined to think the latter. He was wrong. Wentworth made preparations to initiate legal proceedings against the proprietors, but the King's attorney advised him of the uselessness of such action because they had immediately quitclaimed their rights to all the land in the established towns, thus winning over the people, and no provincial jury would convict them.[16] The governor could get no backing from the home government as the important people in London approved of the "Scheeme" and Thomlinson warned Wentworth that he "had Beter be Easy than to Mollest [the proprietors] in the Least. . . ."[17] Having no resort to the province's courts or censure from London, Wentworth then devoted his efforts to have the proprietors sell their rights to the crown, but a majority of the proprietors voted against it. It was a serious setback for the governor's plan of westward expansion and is the only instance during his entire administration of the executive and council working at loggerheads. He had respect for these proprietors as men of ability but doubted their veracity in council where land grants were concerned. When four vacancies had to be filled in 1751, he sent a list to the Board of

Trade, which included most of the purchasers, and recommended they not be admitted to the council because he did not wish to increase their power since Atkinson, Wibird and Solley were still on that board. This negative list included his brother Mark Hunking Wentworth, and Mark remained out of the council until 1759.[18] Over them he recommended two young men who had no connection with the Masonian proprietors.

During 1747 and through 1749 Wentworth watched as great tracts of valuable land were disposed of swiftly and profitably. He had requested the Board of Trade for a loosening of his 38th, 39th and 40th instructions regarding the conditions for granting lands in the name of the crown, arguing that they placed limitations too severe to encourage settlement. He did not feel that quitrents should be demanded of the new Masonian settlements on the east side of the Merrimack River because they would provide an insufficient revenue to warrant the opposition that was sure to come from the inhabitants. All theee instructions allowed only for grants to "planters," and Wentworth believed this to be a discouragement to people in England and Northern Ireland who would specialize in manufacturing naval stores if given proper inducement to immigrate. Furthermore, no grant could be made until at least 50 families indicated a willingness to settle, with a limit of 50 acres per individual. Wentworth argued that between 300 and 500 hundred acres per family was an absolute necessity to encourage people to hazard the frontier and make a proper living, that 50 acres per individual would not amount to this as few families had servants or slaves that could be counted. Besides, it

was customary to make allowances of 500 acres for a minister and a school, which his instructions did not comprehend. If grants could be made only upon a person's ability to cultivate, and if three acres out of every 50 must be improved within five years, Wentworth argued that the King would not see his province properly developed. He requested that both requirements be revoked, recommending instead that the improvement of ten acres within five years as more reasonable and encouraging to settlers.[19]

By late 1749 Wentworth was under a lot of pressure to begin making grants of his own. The private property of the Mason owners took a large area out of his jurisdiction, and he was forced to look further west. For some years now he had designs to assert a claim to the lands beyond the Connecticut River, and the Mason purchase only confirmed and hastened the decision to interpret that part of his commission which stated New Hampshire's boundary extended due west "until it meets with our other governments." The other government was New York, which so far as the governor was concerned, extended only sixty miles north of the sea and no farther than twenty miles east of the Hudson River. Wentworth had the added incentive to please the home government. His commission commanded him to make grants and settle the province, and the Board of Trade thought the governor too slow in carrying out this command. In a report to the King it indicated decided disappointment at Wentworth's failure to settle and improve this western territory "where there is an inexhaustable Fund of Naval Stores of all sorts and Many Other Valuable Productions." So far as it was concerned the Connecticut Valley region was still a liability

to the crown because of Wentworth's caution.[20] Furthermore, the Fort Dummer case and the report of the attorney and solicitor general to the King in 1752 indicate that the authorities in England regarded the territory beyond the Connecticut River as within the bounds of New Hampshire.[21]

The late war and the constant passing of troops to and from the frontier increased interest and knowledge of this western land, and it whetted the appetites of those who would settle and especially those who would speculate. The King was displeased that the lands were not put into productive use, and the governor knew that if he made grants contrary to his instructions, that too would displease his sovereign. Reasoning that the end justified the means, he decided on the latter course by choosing to ignore the impossible restrictions of his 38th, 39th and 40th instructions and to make grants on a first-come first-served basis. He knew such action would be a boon to speculators, particularly his relatives, but the Mason grants of the past few years convinced him that land in the hands of speculators could be distributed and settled more rapidly and efficiently than if they were parceled out directly by himself to settlers. By making important and respected people in New York and the surrounding provinces proprietors of these lands, Wentworth hoped to gain valuable support for his western boundary claims, and it appears he had a view to hold out a similar promise of enrichment to his rebellious assemblymen to make them submit to the authority of the crown.

These, then, were some of the reasons that impelled Wentworth late in 1749 to begin grants of the land west of the Connecticut River.

Fully appraised that possession was an important point in law, he hoped to secure royal recognition and approval of his claim by presenting an accomplished fact to the crown, a fact which he was confident would carry the issue successfully for New Hampshire in the litigation which was sure to follow.[22]

On November 17 Wentworth advised Governor Clinton at Albany of his intention to grant the "unimproved lands within my government" and, though expressing a desire to avoid interference with New York, his letter clearly indicated that he considered the Vermont area as within the bounds of New Hampshire and determined to press his claim. Wentworth waited a reasonable time for Clinton's reaction, but it is very clear from the correspondence that the New Hampshire governor would not tolerate condescension in any manner or shape. Clinton's delay only irritated Wentworth's royal sense of dignity, and on January 3, 1750, he made a bold push designed to humble his neighbor and bring to fruition his ambitious program. The first grant was in the extreme western corner of the province, or some 24 miles from the Hudson River and six miles north of Massachusetts, and Wentworth showed his determination in making it the dividing line between the two adjacent colonies and hinted at his ability to make good his claim by lending it his own name, Bennington. Clinton's protest of April 9 and again on June 6, after a second grant had been made, accused the doughty governor of poaching and demanded the grants be revoked, otherwise a protest would be sent to the King. Wentworth said that the request was impossible and considered it out of order though he did promise to "desist from making any further grants on the western

frontier of my government that have the least probability of interfering with your government."[23]

Historians have accused Wentworth of insincerity, and even duplicity for this statement, because 16 days later he made another grant. What they have overlooked, however, is that Wentworth more often than not was a strict constructionist, and this is just one instance of where he chose his words carefully and carried them out. Actually, the statement contains two concepts which cancel each other. Historians have emphasized the first one which gives the promise not to make further grants, but the second part says he will do this only if the New Hampshire grants interfere with New York. It should be emphasized that Wentworth obviously did not consider these grants as interfering with New York because he did not consider it New York territory in the first place.[24]

A dispute of this nature could only be resolved by the King in council, and if it was agreeable to Clinton, Wentworth proposed submitting New Hampshire's case to the King, suggesting that New York do the same. Clinton had already threatened such action if the New Hampshire grants were not vacated but now proposed that the two provinces exchange copies of their cases. Wentworth agreed that such a procedure would be "for the mutual advantage of both governments. . ." and promised to send a copy of the New Hampshire representation to Clinton as soon as it was "perfected." Clinton assumed, or at least hoped, that the exchange would take place before the representations were forwarded to the King so that the New York representation would overcome all arguments presented by his wily adversary. He overlooked a state-

ment in Wentworth's letter of June 22 saying that New Hampshire would "lose no time" in presenting its case to the King, and his first knowledge that Wentworth had stolen a march on him came from the secretary of the Board of Trade who questioned Clinton about his tardiness in submitting the New York representation.[25]

The New York claim was based on the charter to the Duke of York, but as Wentworth pointed out to the Board of Trade, it extended only 60 miles north after commencing at the sea, which would approximate 20 miles east of the Hudson River around Albany.[26] The governor further argued that the Massachusetts-New York boundary had been mutually agreed upon at this line, and New York and especially its principal landholder in the area, Rensselaer, had not thought fit to dispute the Massachusetts claim. The Board of Trade was inclined to agree with Wentworth's contention that the boundary commission had established this line in 1738 as the western limits of New Hampshire and that the numerous grants by the neighboring colonies were forfeit to the crown since conditions of settlement and improvement and reservation of masts for the King's navy had not been honored by the proprietors.[27]

New York was extremely agitated over the possibility that the King would confirm Wentworth's "iniquitous" grants in the disputed area.[28] While these matters were pending, Wentworth continued his grants with an air of caution. In addition to the two grants made in 1750, the following year Wentworth made two more and another two in 1752. That year the Attorney and Solicitor Generals made their report to the King, taking Wentworth's side and quoting his case almost

verbatim. The report promised such a prospect of success that Wentworth added seven more grants in 1753 and three in 1754, when the outbreak of war interrupted proceedings both in New Hampshire and in England.[29]

In all of these grants Wentworth reserved for himself a choice lot of 500 acres in lieu of a fee for affixing the royal seal. All of the townships were of the customary six square miles in area, containing about 23,000 acres each, and were usually divided into about 70 shares. In addition to his own, the governor always reserved equal shares for a school, the first settled minister, the Church of England and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. From these grants it is apparent that Wentworth was eager to improve the fortunes of the weak Church of England in New Hampshire, but, in fact, these early grants had a tendency to promote the increase of town-supported Congregational churches, for in practically all the towns the first settled minister was of the Congregational faith.[30]

Most of the grantees lived in New Hampshire and of these all of the governor's relatives, the council and members of the assembly figured prominently. So also did residents of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York, and it seems that these were made on the basis of Wentworth's pronounced likes and dislikes. No New York officials were included in these grants, neither were ex-Governors Belcher and Shirley or any of Wentworth's Harvard classmates, except Nathaniel Sparhawk. Boston men figured prominently in these grants without any regard for their politics. Patriots like

John Adams and James Otis were never honored by the governor but such others as William Doge of Ipswich, Sam Adams, and William Dawes were listed along with other patriots and prominent loyalists like William Story, a deputy of the Vice Admiralty Court, Thomas Hutchinson, Francis Bernard, William Brattle, Benjamin Faneuil, Harrison Gray, Andrew Oliver, Reverend Edward Wigglesworth, and Edward Holyoke, President of Harvard College.[31]

At first sight the list of grantees might cause one to assume that Wentworth's land grants were a speculative venture pure and simple for his personal gain and that of his relatives and friends. To be sure they were this, but it is consistent with Wentworth's shrewd business sense to kill two birds with one stone. Not only could he enrich himself and his friends, but he could secure their support in their own colonies and in England for his extensive western claims. These men had power, position, and money to influence merchants in England to pressure the Board of Trade for a favorable recommendation. It was not a new trick. Wentworth had become governor by it, and the efforts of the West Indies planters to secure a more stringent sugar act in the 1750's were defeated by the same means only to be carried at a later date.[32] True, these men were not "planters" and none ever settled their lands, but if they had a vested interest in them, Wentworth hoped to encourage them to induce emigration from their colonies so that the lands would be improved and not forfeited to the crown. In the long run his strategy worked, for after the war great swarms of prospective settlers flooded New Hampshire from the neighboring colonies and more than doubled her population.[33]

Wentworth's expansive policy barely began when war interrupted the proceedings in 1754. Up to that time he had granted only 16 townships, a small proportion of the number of grants he would make between 1761 and 1764. The Wentworths did very well by these grants. Looking ahead for a moment to take into consideration the entire 128 grants in Vermont, it can be seen just how speculative a venture it was for them. Theodore Atkinson owned shares in 16 townships, while assembly Speaker Henry Sherburne possessed tracts in 11 towns. Of the governor's councilor relatives, Richard Wibird possessed tracts in 48 towns, Mark H. Wentworth 37, John Downing 28, John Nelson 25, Joseph Newmarch 38, Nathaniel Barrell 14, Sampson Sheafe 18, John Temple 14, William Temple 16, and Daniel Warner 51. Other members of the Wentworth clan owned tracts in 54 of these township grants.[34]

Undoubtedly, the grantees in the neighboring provinces, particularly the Boston men, received their grants gratis as an honor or a bribe depending upon how one looks at it. It has always been assumed that Wentworth's grants to his relatives had been made on the same basis. Yet the amount of money he accumulated from the grants enabled him to live well and leave an estate of 10,000 guineas at his death. Somebody had to pay his reputed high fees, at that a bargain for what they received, and it is more than likely the governor extracted some sort of commission for favoring his relatives. This is further borne out by the wide discrepancy in the number of holdings that each possessed. Mark Hunking Wentworth's 37 shares indicate that he was greatly interested in the rich timber tracts that would yield

masts for profit, and the governor was more than willing that he should keep the royal navy supplied with fine masts but not without sharing in such a profitable venture. Furthermore, the governor was under heavy financial obligations to his brother, and extracting some sort of fee for making him owner of fine masting lots was the only way Wentworth could ever pay off this debt.

In looking at the speculative nature of this venture, one tends to overlook the fact that Wentworth used this profitable procedure to settle and develop the lands in western New Hampshire and Vermont. Perhaps profit became a motivating factor over and above his desire to develop the province, but the fact remains he accomplished both whereas his predecessors had failed, and the prosperity of the province can be traced from this period.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT WAR FOR EMPIRE

The outbreak of war in 1754, which accompanied French aggression in the Ohio valley, caught New Hampshire totally unprepared both materially and psychologically for the sacrifices which were necessary during the next few years to establish undisputed British domination in North America. No governor better appreciated than Benning Wentworth the difficulties confronting his countrymen from a desperate and determined enemy, or showed a greater devotion to British interests and comprehension of British war aims, or worked harder to arouse the provincial citizenry to a sense of responsibility equal to the challenge.[1]

The lack of enthusiasm for war among the people of New Hampshire was reflected in the lethargy with which their representatives prosecuted it at times. But the assembly did insist on a large share in its management, which at times amounted to mis-management and only created another obstacle which the aging but resolute governor attempted to overcome. Besides, the executive and legislature did not share a common view of the scope of war. Perhaps this was natural, for Wentworth, as an imperial administrator of the crown, had to consider his province as a cog in a greater wheel which surely and inexorably had to function in harmony with other parts of the machine to achieve a common end product. The old personal animosity did not rear its ugly head during the Great War, and a reasonable harmony existed between Wentworth and his assembly, but the latter

quite naturally assumed its primary function to be of service to its own citizens and defense of their frontiers quite apart from any cooperation with the other colonies. Whereas Wentworth, by disposition, training, and the nature of his office, was bound to serve the crown and empire, the assembly comprehended the crown's position as one of service to the province of New Hampshire and its people, to allow it to prosper and advance in time of peace, and to protect it in time of war. Such a position might appear short-sighted and irresponsible, but it was a genuine sentiment that was an outgrowth of the crown's neglect for the previous century. Wentworth's main function was to win over the people of his colony to appreciate and accept an imperial view of the relationship of colony to mother country and, if he could not succeed in this, at least to prevent the one from interfering with the other. He was a strong enough executive to achieve the latter, and only with the greatest exertion, but even he could not reverse in twenty-five years the habits of thought that had been nurtured for a hundred years.

Wentworth watched with concern the Indian depredations along the entire English frontier. Their vicious attacks around the Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina border and along the Ohio valley concerned him as much as the rumor of French penetration into the northern part of his own province and the building of a fort there.[2] He advised the Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Robinson, that the activities of the French were designed to confine the English along the seaboard and in this would have the full support of the various Indian tribes if left unchecked.[3] He had done what was in his

power in the last war to wean the Iroquois Confederacy away from an alliance with the French but was handicapped by the indifference and lack of understanding of the assembly. In 1750, when he was at odds with the lower house over the rights of the prerogative, and with Governor Clinton over jurisdiction of the Vermont lands, he was still active in promoting a greater unity between the English and the Indian. The assembly was not a legally-constituted body at the time and could not act upon his proposal to send commissioners to Albany to treat with the Iroquois Confederacy, and from its past performance probably would not have anyway, so the governor turned to his council for advice. Some felt that the province was secure from attack and others could not agree to participate in the meeting since all the colonies were not planning to attend. Fearing a split in his council, the governor dropped the matter so far as it concerned them. In such a time of crisis for the prerogative he could not risk alienating some of his councilors. He believed the Albany meeting to be of such consequence that he would have attended personally had it not been for the rebellion of his assembly. Instead, he proposed to send some councilors to represent New Hampshire, but they refused, some feeling it unnecessary to bring presents and all afraid that the personal expense would not be reimbursed by the lower house. The governor next turned to Clinton and asked him to name a reputable person of Albany to attend for New Hampshire with full power from Wentworth to act in his name and concur in all agreements made by the other colonies. It was the best he could do in such a "melancholy" situation, and he deplored the fact that he had to resort to such

artifices to do the King's business.[4]

Once they had taken up the tomahawk in support of their French allies, the Indians would have to be met and crushed. So would the French menace. Pitt's bold plan for the conquest of Canada in 1759 was greeted with joy by Wentworth. It was the surest way of securing the safety of his and the other English colonies, and he believed it to be less of a drain of blood and treasure upon the empire than an attempt to destroy the French fortresses piecemeal. So long as it was accomplished it did not matter that he had made the same suggestion to no avail a decade before. Furthermore, he advised Pitt, when it was an accomplished fact, that Canada in English possession would be of inestimable value to Great Britain as a market for manufactured goods, especially coarse woolens and ironware of all sorts.[5]

Wentworth made sure that New Hampshire contributed to British war aims. Not only did he lay an embargo on the principal port, Portsmouth, but he kept constant watch that none of its citizens took part in the contraband trade, as existed in some of the other colonies, which allowed the French to carry on the war with greater vigor than they could have otherwise.[6] Much of it was carried on under flags of truce, ostensibly for the exchange of prisoners, but in reality much more was profitably exchanged by the American colonists. Wentworth absolutely refused to grant any flags of truce to New Hampshire vessels and made it his business to inquire who in the other colonies was using this device to aid the French and reported it to the Board of Trade. He told Pitt that he probably could have made a good deal of money had he succumbed to the tempta-

tion, but such traffic was treason in his mind and could not be justified as a usual form of business. So good was his record as a watchdog of commerce, he was able to write Halifax in 1764 that only since 1741 had one vessel been suspected of dealing in contraband trade and that he detained under the guns of Fort William and Mary.[7]

The problem of securing men and money to carry on its just share of the war was only aggravated in New Hampshire by the short-sightedness of a factious assembly. Though the old family contest for office was not a motivating factor, nevertheless the lower house made the appointment of commissaries, chaplains and surgeons a requisite for voting appropriations and passed many bills creating committees responsible to itself which would dispose of the money and perform the services to which it applied.[8] Some of the representatives preferred to let their actions be dependent upon the initiative of the neighboring colonies, especially Massachusetts, and could not see their way to cooperate in the military operations any more or less than the other colonies.[9] Another faction, particularly the representatives from Exeter, could not see their way to make appropriations at all and were perfectly willing to let the other colonies and the mother country bear the burden of war by themselves.[10] They refused to support the Crown Point expedition in 1755, and consistently refused to vote troops for frontier defense, and if they failed to carry a vote, later refused to approve paying the troops. They refused to honor Lord Halifax's order for troops for service in the southern colonies, insisting that such an order was inconsistent with the King's instructions. Supplies were always mismanaged and

disposed of regardless of orders from the home government, and at other times they were held back, seriously impeding the operations of New Hampshire troops. So flagrantly and frequently had the assembly's poor judgment and mismanagement interfered with imperial policy that Wentworth was prompted to say that he knew of no such record of similar occurrences in the annals of Parliament. It refused to cut roads to the north and west and especially to the connecticut River to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies, even though urged by various British commanders. Nor would it build a fort in the Coos region far up the Connecticut River to stop French penetration into that rich and fertile land. It even failed to provide uniforms for the New Hampshire regiment. Even an old opponent of the governor like Meshech Weare, who now had a command of his own, was appalled at its conduct.[11] As one authority has pointed out, the governor's messages were eloquent enough to have produced better results from the assembly, but they went unheeded.[12] So also did his plea to the home government to increase the powers of American governors that they might effectively execute the King's commands.[13]

The burden of recruiting soldiers fell squarely upon the governor's shoulders. After designating the number to be raised, fixing the pay rate and the disposition of the forces, the assembly left to the governor the task of actually meeting the quotas. It was an extremely difficult task to fulfill the frequent calls to arms for the war had little popular appeal among the men of New Hampshire. The council was of little assistance as it usually passed the buck to the assembly, which in turn passed it back to the governor.

Wentworth resorted to a series of drafts, sometimes in rapid succession, to meet his quotas of men since volunteers simply would not come forward. On one occasion he sought one hundred volunteers, and after he waited a reasonable time, one came forth. Wentworth would then turn to one impressment after another in a steady series, but quite often the draftees could pay the £4 fine, provincial currency. The assembly professed a willingness to comply with the governor's pleas for an alteration of the militia law making the fine for non-appearance sufficiently high to command obedience to the King's commands, but it evaded action because it did not consider it necessary at the time.[14]

Wentworth never could convert his assembly or his countrymen to seeing the importance of distant operations. When he was commanded to send one hundred troops to Albany, he proposed transporting them by water because they could not be trusted to march overland. In Portsmouth sailors of the royal navy were attacked by a mob while the irate citizens of Exeter, armed with axes, chased the recruiting party four miles beyond the town limits. The assembly reflected this aversion to foreign service by restricting the field of operations of the New Hampshire militia. On one occasion it provided for troops so long as they were not employed south of Albany or west of Schenectedy.[15]

Notwithstanding these obstacles Governor Wentworth by superhuman efforts succeeded in putting a respectable military force from New Hampshire into the field each year. The fear of a French invasion in 1754 stimulated the assembly to vote the raising of five hundred men for an attack against the French fort at Crown Point. Wentworth,

anxious about rumors of the French building a fort in the Coos valley along the upper reaches of the Connecticut River and fearing for the security of this fertile land, dispatched a company of Rangers to build a fort there while the regiment was being organized. At the juncture of the Amanoosic and Connecticut Rivers the Rangers constructed Fort Wentworth and then joined the regiment to rendezvous with General Johnson encamped near Lake George. Some eighty New Hampshire troops engaged the French the following year when eight hundred levies were raised, but most of them spent the remainder of the year in scouting the frontier or in garrisoning Fort Edward. For the second time the Crown Point attack was not pursued, and the troops were sent home.[16]

For the 1757 campaign Lord Loudoun contemplated another drive against Crown Point and the capture of the French fortress at Louisbourg. For this purpose New Hampshire raised another regiment of five hundred men, part of which with three companies of Rangers and one hundred carpenters accompanied Loudoun to Halifax, Nova Scotia, The remainder of the regiment rendezvoused at Charlestown only to be deployed under Colonel Monroe of the 35th British regiment in defending Fort William Henry near Lake George. Here Montcalm attacked them and after six days and nights of resistance the fort capitulated. Under a flag of surrender the garrison was marched out of the fort, the New Hampshire troops in the rear, when the Indians pounced upon them. Montcalm was powerless to restrain them before eighty out of two hundred New Hampshire men were murdered. Later that year Wentworth secured an additional two hundred and fifty men

to fortify the fort at Charlestown in case the French should return.[17]

A promise of reimbursement by Pitt secured eight hundred men for the 1758 campaign. Wentworth had requested a thousand men but the assembly refused to augment the quota. It also refused to strengthen the militia law, and half the troops had to be raised by draft. Wentworth was also unable to have the period of service extended beyond nine months.[18] It was not until the following year that the governor secured his thousand troops and with them his road to the west. After they had served under General Amherst in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga, Wentworth dispatched them to join in the reduction of Crown Point. To reach the objective he employed the troops in cutting a road from Charlestown to the northwest, some twenty-six miles, where it connected with a pass over the mountains and linked up with a good road to Crown Point which the French had constructed as far as Otter Creek. The road greatly facilitated the movement of supply wagons for the expedition. So well was the project carried out that the New Hampshire regiment arrived at the rendezvous point twelve days before General Amherst. Meanwhile Wentworth employed Rangers to cut another road from Concord to Charlestown providing almost continuous passage from Portsmouth to Lake Champlain.[19]

After the fall of Crown Point, Amherst sent Major Robert Rogers and two hundred of his Rangers to punish and destroy the troublesome St. Francis Indians. The Rangers took twenty-one days to march from Crown Point to their village, arriving the night of October 3, 1757. After scouting the village Rogers determined upon a pre-dawn attack. The Indians were taken by surprise, their village burnt to

ashes, and few escaped alive. Rogers lost one Ranger with six or seven wounded. He lost seven more in falling back to the fort at Charlestown, but the St. Francis Indians had been completely crushed and their threat to westward expansion forever removed.[20]

The Ranger was a particular type of soldier which Wentworth created for service in the New Hampshire forests against the Indian. Frontier duty was extremely hazardous and took the hardiest of men to endure the cold winter service. British regulars or the ordinary provincial troops proved inadequate for such duty and either did not return to the settlements or came back without their scalps. Wentworth had worked hard to expand and encourage the western settlements and knew that lack of proper protection for them would cause the inhabitants to "part with all than Risque their Lives."[21] What was necessary to "watch and ward" the frontier was a soldier who was also a woodsman with a thorough working knowledge of the Indian's character and his habits. Not only must he be a marksman but also a hunter who could follow the most elusive trail of man or beast, make long marches without fatigue, do without fire or shelter, subsist on a light diet and sleep with only a blanket for warmth. Such a man was Major Robert Rogers whom Wentworth commissioned to organize what became known as the Rangers.

Rogers recruited his men principally from the vicinity of Amoskeag Falls or present-day Manchester. For clothing the average Ranger wore coarse underwear, leggings, a close-fitting jacket, a warm cap and moccasins. On his back was buckled a blanket with a moderate supply of dried salt pork and bread wrapped in a knapsack.

His weapons consisted of a good musket, and an over-sized powder horn. Strapped to his belt was a large knife, a hatchet and a small flask of rum. He was especially adept at skirmishing with the Indian in his own habitat and on his own terms and proved remarkably successful in spying on his enemies' camps and driving him from the forest.[22] Indeed, so diligently did he ply his trade that scarcely an Indian was to be found in the province after the war.[23]

The fall of Canada in 1760 ended the war so far as the American colonies were concerned, although they did raise troops for the Cuba campaign in 1762. The problem of debts hung over the royal governors like a bogyman. During the war New Hampshire subsisted almost entirely on its own paper currency which steadily declined in value. The cost of everything doubled between 1754 and 1757, and it was met by printing more and more currency. For example, in 1754 a soldier's monthly pay was £13:10, but by 1757 it had jumped to £25. Wentworth was particularly averse to approving the emission of paper currency since it was prohibited by act of Parliament in 1751. Both the assembly and some of his council felt the governor was adhering too rigidly to his instructions and argued that the war emergency made an allowance for issuing paper currency. The governor was never convinced by such arguments but had to give his consent to increasing the supply of paper in circulation since it was practically impossible to obtain specie in exchange for the New Hampshire currency.[24] Furthermore, the assembly made grants of men conditional upon his approval of such money bills.[25] On several occasions he secured sterling on his own credit from the province agent in London or from

Massachusetts, but neither his credit or the resources of a sister colony were sufficient to meet the soaring costs of war. Between April 11, 1755, and March 22, 1762, Wentworth was forced to consent to emitting provincial currency to the amount of £130,750 in addition to what he could borrow from other sources.[26]

To sink this enormous amount of paper money and to meet rising costs Wentworth resorted to extreme forms of taxation. Export taxes along with head and property taxes were advanced at an incredible rate. For example, the tax on bar iron rose from £3 in 1756 to £6 in 1761; that on codfish from £1:10 to £4; white pine boards per thousand from £2:15 to £7; oak planks from £10 to £25 and beef from 3 pence a pound to 9 pence.[27] Head and property taxes were increased to bring in annually £6,000 in 1756, £10,000 in 1757, £20,000 in 1758, £15,000 in 1759 and the unheard of amount of £30,000 in 1760.[28] If one takes into consideration that the provincial currency was inflated out of all proportion to sterling and that the population had about doubled since Governor Wentworth first took office, these figures are less oppressive than they appear at first glance. In some cases the individual tax rates of certain towns were actually lower than they had been twenty years before. The Portsmouth tax rate per £1,000 evaluation was £187 in 1729, dropping to £140 in 1743, and by the close of the war rested at £77.[29] The problem of financing the war further was complicated by the laxity of many towns in paying their taxes. By 1763 ten towns were in arrears for taxes to the amount of nearly £7,000, and Wentworth, after much difficulty, secured stiffer legislation from the assembly to make these towns pay up.[30] The

assembly, late in 1755, attempted to alleviate the financial plight of the province by proposing a tax of one cent an acre on all lands in the province. The council unanimously vetoed it as unjust and an unreasonable burden upon the poor landowners. It is perhaps a coincidence that they numbered among the largest landowners in the province, and a tax at a penny an acre would have cost some of them dearly.[31] At the war's end the New Hampshire debt stood at the equivalent of £67,000 sterling money and there is recorded for certain only two instances where Parliament made reimbursement; one in 1756 to the amount of £8,000 after charges, and another grant in 1762 to the amount of £1,500 sterling. Possibly there were other grants, for the unpaid debt was reduced by £49,000 to £18,000 at the time of the Stamp Act. Even that was a heavy debt for the province to carry.[32]

After the fall of Canada in 1760 the lack of enthusiasm for the war increased in New Hampshire, and it was accompanied by no less a desire to return to business as usual. The frontier, now out of danger of Indian ravagings, caused many a soul to look westward in search of new land. Some went in pursuit of the rapidly retreating fur trade but most settlers pulled up stakes in search of the broad meadows of untilled soil that abounded further inland.[33] The lack of fertilizers and the unscientific methods of farming had so depleted the soil along the coast that it was no longer capable of supporting the mushrooming population. These factors, coupled with Wentworth's low prices, drew many settlers from the surrounding colonies, also seeking good land and a bargain at two cents an acre. The governor

was amenable to honoring the mounting applications for grants of land and seemed anxious to resume his program for settlement of the province which already had been subjected to too many interruptions.

Joseph Blanshard of Dunstable was commissioned by the governor to survey and mark out the territory on both sides of the Connecticut River. It was a superficial job with trees marked at six mile intervals to designate the three tiers of townships on each side of the river stretching from Charlestown up to the Coos country. Wentworth showed the plan to his council in July, and it advised him to proceed with the grants.[34] On the Vermont side of the river Wentworth granted sixty-three townships in 1761, nine in 1762, thirty-seven in 1763 and two early in 1764. In addition to these he made fewer but nevertheless considerable grants on the New Hampshire side.[35] During July and August, 1764, he granted a total of fourteen thousand acres to six officers of the late war, including Major Rogers, on the authority of the King's proclamation of October 7, 1763.[36] So much pressure was the governor under for granting cheap lands that his surveyors and settlers had begun to penetrate the Lake Champlain-St. John's River area, and were stopped only when General Gage protested to the Board of Trade. Wentworth obeyed the order but could not see the harm of being instrumental in settling these lands as the King would benefit by it even if he decided they were without the jurisdiction of New Hampshire.[37]

By the middle of 1764 Wentworth had bargained away some three million acres of land west of the Connecticut River, or approximately one-half of the area of the present state of Vermont, to some

six thousand grantees.[38] He himself could lay claim to some 64,000 acres in this area plus some 40,000 acres on the other side of the river which were subject to the same conditions of improvement as the other grants.[39] He did not live long enough to derive any financial gain from his own lands, but he realized great profits from the other grants by charging a fee for each that varied anywhere from £20 to £100 and probably averaged about £30 per grant.[40]

These grants, like the ones made prior to the war, contained similar provisions with two exceptions: an annual tax was to be laid by each town for the building of a church and settling a minister, but there was no share allowed for the first settled minister. Such a provision in the earlier grants was designed to encourage the prospects of the Anglican Church but in fact had the opposite effect of spreading Congregationalism. While he never exhibited opposition to this or any other denomination, Wentworth did not wish unwittingly to encourage its spread over his own church. Therefore the post-war grants omitted a share for the first settled minister and instead provided a share for the first one "in communion with the Church of England."[41]

The New York protests to the Board of Trade increased in crescendo as the number of Wentworth's grants steadily mounted. His confidence that the King would confirm an accomplished fact and that actual possession would carry his point in law caused the governor to pursue his grants quietly while ignoring the well-lubricated propaganda machine of New York, which more and more came to engage the Board's ear. Had Wentworth not been so sure of himself and had he

not forgotten the circumstances surrounding his own appointment twenty-three years before, he would not have allowed the initiative to slip to New York. He was charged with selling land at such low rates as to indicate he had no confidence in his title. It was hinted that this showed that the grantees had no intention of settling either, and like peddlars travelled through New England "hawking and selling" their titles "on trifling considerations." The New York petitions to the King made full use of the heresay that was rampant at the time and misrepresented the New Hampshire position especially to the amount of lands granted. But New York also offered some sounder arguments for being given jurisdiction over the Vermont lands. It could supply them more conveniently from Albany by way of the Hudson River and offer a better market for their produce than could the port of Portsmouth. Furthermore, the quitrents accruing to the King would be double that of New Hampshire since it was fixed in the latter colony at one shilling per hundred acres whereas the King allowed New York to collect two shillings six pence per hundred acres.[42]

It is not clear whether the King was motivated by a desire to do justice to the New York claims or merely wished to take the governor of New Hampshire down a peg. Whatever the reason he issued a restraining order July 20, 1764, declaring that the western banks of Connecticut River from Massachusetts north to the forty-fifth degree of latitude "to be the Boundary Line between the said two Provinces of New Hampshire and New York."[43]

The order in council was so unexpected by the New Hampshire interests that they looked upon it as only tentative, and rather than

settling the dispute it gave rise to another one. So far as the New York authorities were concerned "to be" meant that the river had always been the eastern boundary of its province, and therefore the Wentworth grants were invalid and might be regranted under its own authority. The vested interests in New Hampshire and especially the settlers on these lands interpreted "to be" to mean future tense and therefore offering no challenge to the validity of their titles. Had not Lieutenant-Governor Colden and his council tried to dispossess these people the matter might have quietly subsided to New York's advantage, but the settlers refused to accept her jurisdiction, and their opposition held out a hope to the proprietors of large tracts sitting on the New Hampshire council and in the assembly that the King's decision might be reversed in favor of them.[44] Such a possibility brightened New Hampshire's prospects and go a long way in explaining her conduct during the Stamp Act controversy which unleashed itself the following year.

CHAPTER VII

THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF THE KING'S WOODS

The office of surveyor general was an important position in colonial America. It was important to the King that his navy have an ample reserve of timber, and especially quality masts, to meet and fulfill its ever expanding task of serving and defending the growing empire; and it had long been recognized that these needs only could be met with security if the source of supply was situated in an area friendly to the crown and supervised by an individual working in harmony with its goals. Since New Hampshire was a primary supplier of such materials, which constituted the chief export and source of wealth for the province, it was important to her that the surveyor general also be a person who understood and appreciated this fact and conducted himself with reasonable restraint and tact. Under the circumstances it was quite natural that the office be combined with that of governor of New Hampshire; but to serve both King and colony with equal ardor imposed undue hardships upon the holder of such a position and subjected him at all times to the stress and strain of conflicting forces pulling in opposite directions.

The jurisdiction of the surveyor extended over all white pines exceeding 24 inches in diameter growing in New England, Nova Scotia, New York, and New Jersey that were not privately owned. The surveyor was to reserve the choicest of these for the exclusive use of the King, prosecute all persons found cutting such trees without special license from the King, and at the same time encourage the

settlers by the best legal means and most efficient methods to produce naval stores of all sorts.[1]

Portsmouth, located at the mouth of the Piscataqua River, was the outlet for this important and lucrative business. Indeed, lumbering had made it the most important center north of Boston until the transference of lumbering operations to Maine around the middle of the eighteenth century threatened its primacy. At all times the lumbermen in this area confronted the surveyor and his deputies in the performance of their duties, and they were inclined to look with complacency and even hostility upon the timber regulations. The diabolical cleverness with which they evaded these regulations and sought to escape prosecution by the surveyor engaged him in a continuous struggle to preserve the King's woods.

If the surveyor was at all conscientious about his job but lacked tact in executing it, he easily aroused the antagonism of the people he was supposed to supervise. They were not willing that the crown should reserve to itself the pick of the mast trees, and the difficulties which the surveyor labored under to secure favorable judgments for the King are indicative of their determination to nullify the crown's claims. This was especially true during the 1730's when David Dunbar was both surveyor and lieutenant governor of New Hampshire. The many instances in which the King's trees were felled and conveyed to the saw mills, only to be seized by Dunbar, resulted in ensuing riots which obliged him to desist in the performance of his duty. If he did not, as happened on one occasion, violence was done to his person and those of his deputies. Because he was a

member of the party in opposition to Governor Belcher, he did not receive cooperation or support from that quarter. Furthermore, the difficulties of his task were increased because Belcher and his "Massachusetts Party" were in the process of taking the best timber lands in New Hampshire away from the King's jurisdiction by granting them as private property. So rapidly did this procedure increase and with it the tempo of mast depradations that by the late thirties the coast of New Hampshire was pretty well cleared of its forests, and lumbermen found their business becoming increasingly less profitable for lack of roads and the inaccessibility of timber to water transport. The convenient location of the Merrimack and Connecticut Rivers could offer a solution to this problem by which the rich interior of the province could be profitably tapped, but Portsmouth would no longer figure in this trade and its days as an important center of export would be permanently ended.[2]

By 1742 the hopelessness of Dunbar's position came home to the Board of Trade. It wanted someone who could protect the King's masts with a minimum of hostility from the inhabitants. Dunbar, for some time now residing in England and desperately in need of money, was willing to relinquish the position for one that offered a little more peace and security. John Thomlinson, the province agent in London, seized the opportunity to give Dunbar his quietus, with the proper financial inducement, and satisfy the anxiety of the Board of Trade. As a contractor for the admiralty in conjunction with his agent, Mark Hunking Wentworth, Thomlinson had a deep financial interest in the New Hampshire forests. By act of Parliament he received a

bounty of one pound sterling over and above the sale price for each ton of ship timber he exported to the mother country. A seventy-five foot mast would command some £14 sterling at sale whereas hundred-foot masts, which grew profusely in the interior, brought in about £90 sterling. Thomlinson's only expenses as a contractor were the costs of cutting and transporting the timber plus a commission to the surveyor or his deputy who selected the site of the lumbering operations and supervised them to insure that felling did not damage other valuable trees or crack the mast sticks. One can appreciate the remunerative value of having such a contract if it is considered that such a one might call for delivery of as many as 1500 masts to the admiralty.[3]

Benning Wentworth was delightfully surprised when Thomlinson secured his commission as surveyor general in 1743. Not only was the salary a welcome addition to the disappointing grants he had received from the assembly, but the authority now conferred on him would make it possible to exercise some control over the chief source of wealth to his family and the province, and the importance he attached to this office, so far as each was concerned, is best demonstrated by the involved mathematical computations the governor used to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problems confronting both in 1743. Dunbar was induced to resign in favor of Wentworth for the sum of £2000 sterling which the latter borrowed from Thomlinson and his relatives. In addition, Wentworth was obliged to give up his claims against the crown of Spain, which had been pending for a decade, claims which amounted to some £11,000 sterling and which the governor

personally assumed and agreed to pay his creditors in London. Thus, for thirteen thousand pounds the bankrupt governor assumed the additional headaches entailed in the office of surveyor for a salary which amounted to only £200 sterling annually, an indication of the desirability of having the office under the jurisdiction of the Wentworths.[4]

The surveyorship fitted in beautifully with the governor's plan for improving the fortunes of family and province. For some time now he had been disturbed by the rapid disappearance of conveniently located timber along the coastal rivers. He was concerned about the future prospects of the province because interior operations made the cost of lumbering prohibitive, and yet if it was not pursued, New Hampshire would sink into insignificance entirely. In a report to the Board of Trade, December 8, 1742, he mentioned this and said that though there was still a great quantity of trees fit for masts left in the province they were not in any single area to make their cutting financially profitable but rather were scattered over the whole area.[5]

Wentworth took a number of steps to regain New Hampshire's prominence as an exporter of timber and put it on a sound self-supporting basis. To achieve this he could tolerate no serious competition to his family's timber operations within the province nor could he allow the neighboring colonies to pursue their operations without greater restraint. For his deputies in New Hampshire he appointed his son Foster and his brother-in-law Theodore Atkinson to look out for the interests of family and province. Christopher

were the falls at White River and Waterqueechy, and Wentworth located his roads in a manner to circumvent them.[9] The roads would serve to transport the masts to Portsmouth but when, in the distant future, the forests had been stripped of their best specimens, these roads would serve to connect the western settlements with Portsmouth and be a means of exchanging food for manufactured imports from England. By 1763 Wentworth had convinced the assembly of the practical consequences of western settlement and secured approval of the first farm-to-market road from Portsmouth to the fertile Coos county far up on the Connecticut River.[10] Further evidence that Wentworth's plan of western expansion was not entirely speculative is offered by the fact that one of his deputy surveyors resided in Northern Ireland. This fact has been used in the past as proof that the surveyor did not take his job seriously in protecting the King's woods,[11] but it has been overlooked that the hardy Scotch-Irish made a success of settling Londonderry and keeping it prosperous after 1719, and Wentworth proposed to induce more of them to immigrate to the western part of the province to produce naval stores and take up agriculture in a serious way. It is more than probable that the primary function of the deputy resident in Ireland was to secure these highly desirable workmen and lend an air of permanence to the settlements once New Hampshire shifted from the lumbering business to agriculture.[12]

By the time of war in 1754 Wentworth perhaps could look with mild satisfaction at the progress he had made in achieving his goals for province and family. Massachusetts influence in New Hampshire had been checked and her attempts to alter the boundary

settlement permanently stunted. The Mason purchase did appear to be something of a setback to him, for it interfered with his plans to regrant the lands on behalf of the King, thereby increasing the province's revenue to the crown, but at least the lands and whatever timber they contained remained in the family so that it was not a serious setback in the long run. Massachusetts lumbering operations in Maine had not been sufficiently brought under control to lend security or primacy to the kindred interests working in New Hampshire, but the governor was confident that the proposal to make a nursery out of a large portion of the Maine woods would, in time, be adopted by the Board of Trade. The vast and rich territory of Vermont was being developed, and every indication was that it would be forfeited by New York to the exclusive use and benefit of New Hampshire and the Wentworths. Finally, roads were surely and steadily being pushed into the wilderness, linking it with Portsmouth, maintaining not only the primacy of that town as the trading port in New Hampshire, but actually increasing its importance and wealth during the governor's administration. The wars tended to retard the progress of his program, but the governor's inflexible determination did not allow them to do any permanent damage. Furthermore, he had achieved, amidst some grumbling, undisputed leadership of provincial affairs, and his clan had come to occupy, also with some grumbling from competitors, first place in the political and economic life of the province. Exclusive of the constant threat of war, the most foreboding cloud appeared in the west in the form of the colony of

Connecticut which threatened to nullify all of Governor Wentworth's accomplishments during the first half of his tenure in office.

The economic problems confronting Connecticut colony were of a more serious consequence even than those of New Hampshire when Wentworth assumed office in 1741. At least New Hampshire had one good exportable item, timber, and the major problem confronting government officials was to secure ways and means of getting it to market cheaply. On the other hand, Connecticut had no exportable staple that could be profitably exchanged for English manufactures. It depended upon the coasting trade and commerce with the West Indies for a market for its surplus products and as a means of securing badly needed specie. Under these circumstances, then, it is not surprising that some of the colony's more enterprising men attempted to resolve Connecticut's lack of an exportable staple by tapping the rich pine belt growing along the upper Connecticut River.[13]

In 1745 the surveyor general commissioned William Prout as a deputy for the colony of Connecticut to prevent the cutting and waste there against the King's woods which had come to his attention.[14] But Prout was cautioned "to behave prudently and discreetly in his office" and not to antagonize the people and to cooperate as much as possible with officials of the colony.[15] Apparently, Prout's efforts were not too successful, and the surveyor added Daniel Blake as a deputy in January, 1753. Along with his appointment, Wentworth sent a request to Governor Wolcott to appoint an advocate to try mast offenders that Blake apprehended because Wentworth did not consider the New York advocate as having any authority in Connecticut.[16]

Wolcott attempted to put off the surveyor's request for an advocate by saying that such an official was entirely new to his province and requested information about how to proceed in meeting the surveyor's request.[17] To set up a court which operated without a jury and derived its authority exclusively from the Crown of Great Britain was so foreign to the people of Connecticut that the assembly greeted the request with extreme coolness for the next two years.[18]

The surveyor maintained that all property in Connecticut not under actual improvement was under his jurisdiction so far as masts were concerned and urged his deputies to continue their seizures. Blake's efforts to obey his superior met with stiff resistance, and on one occasion he was "thrown into the water with intent to kill" when he attempted to apprehend Daniel and Seth Whitmore in the act of cutting timber illegally. On another occasion Blake was unlawfully imprisoned by one William Pitkin for attempting to carry out Wentworth's orders.[19] The surveyor protested angrily to Governor Wolcott for redress of these offenses; otherwise he would be obliged to place the matter before the King. In an attempt to browbeat the Connecticut governor into submission to his authority, Wentworth warned that his representation would be constructed in such a manner as "may be injurious to your Colony."[20]

By 1754 Wentworth was becoming alarmed at the attempts of Connecticut to tap his western lands of timber and float it down the Connecticut River to that colony. To fortify his position and make it clear that he would not give way in the face of resistance,

Wentworth appointed Hezekiah Summer of Middleton, Connecticut, to act with Blake and seize any timber taken from New York, New Hampshire, or Massachusetts which had a habit of piling up in that town.[21] But neither an additional deputy nor several threatening letters to the governor achieved any satisfactory results any more than his request to the Board of Trade for a separate court of vice-admiralty for Connecticut, except that the latter suggestion was adopted by a group of Connecticut capitalists as a means of aiding their speculative project to give their colony a staple export.[22]

Jared Ingersoll was the leader of a group of men who sought to divert at least a part of the masting trade away from Portsmouth, away from New Hampshire, and away from the Wentworths. His scheme involved convincing the Board of Trade to transfer mast contracts to his own colony, which would utilize the Connecticut River as a more logical and proper means of transporting the masts to port, a Connecticut port. By advocating the establishment of a separate admiralty court for his colony and packing it with friendly officials, Ingersoll envisioned it as a means of carrying on this profitable traffic clear of any effective interference by the surveyor or his brother, "the timber king," Mark Hunking Wentworth.[23]

Wentworth was not slow to appreciate the import of Ingersoll's promoting his own suggestion for a separate court for Connecticut. To forestall Ingersoll's efforts, the surveyor countered with another suggestion, eventually adopted by the Board of Trade, for the creation of a court of vice-admiralty with superior jurisdiction over all of the lesser courts in the North American colonies

as pertained to the King's woods. Clearly, Wentworth had confidence in the power and influence of his family to secure the appointment of the judge of this superior court which would nullify Ingersoll's efforts in Connecticut and insure the primacy of the Wentworths and New Hampshire in the masting trade.[24]

Ingersoll succeeded in securing a contract to deliver 80 masts to the admiralty in 1761. Wentworth had no choice but to honor it and grant him a license to begin cutting. The surveyor, however, by virtue of his authority to assign the area in which they must be cut, saw a chance to defeat Ingersoll's efforts and at the same time get across to the Board of Trade the idea that the Connecticut River was an impractical means to transport the masts to port by virtue of its obstructions. Judging from the difficulties he encountered, Ingersoll's operations must have been confined to an area above one of the great falls on the river. One of the surveyor's deputies, Gideon Lyman, observed the difficulty of getting the masts to the river and the further difficulty of trying to float them because of the low water level that year. The deputy further observed that to insure the safe arrival of the 80 sticks at Middletown, Connecticut, Ingersoll's crew was forced to cut a total of 160 sticks to allow for damage and cracking.[25]

Mark Hunking Wentworth, who personally had more at stake than any of his clan, collected his own evidence against Ingersoll by dispatching an agent to view the sticks at Middletown where they had piled up. The report which resulted suggested that the sticks collected by Ingersoll were anything but desirable or fit for the

navy's use.[26] This report, plus the testimony of Gideon Lyman and whatever other evidence the Wentworths could muster to promote their case and defeat Ingersoll, had two general effects. It prevented Ingersoll from securing a separate court of admiralty for Connecticut with himself as judge; and it instilled a reasonable doubt in the home government's mind as to the value of using the Connecticut River as a means of transporting masts, so much so, that Ingersoll's sticks still awaited transport at New London as late as 1764.[27]

The victory of Wentworth over Ingersoll and the establishment in 1764 of the former's proposal of a vice-admiralty court for all America, located at Halifax and possessing concurrent jurisdiction with all other American admiralty courts, suggests the power and sway of the Wentworths with the home government. To be sure, it was great, but the surveyor had not entirely escaped criticism, and there were interests, particularly in New Hampshire, that loudly protested Wentworth monopoly of the masting trade. To protect their interests and strengthen the ties with the ministry, the Wentworths dispatched the governor's nephew, John Wentworth, to London in 1762 to exhibit his charming and agreeable nature and to display his thorough knowledge of the lumbering business to the right people.

After 1761 Governor Wentworth's relatives expected his removal from office, either by retirement or by death, an event which without a proper spokesman in London would allow two vacancies dear to them to come up for grabs. In the event of either, John Wentworth was at his station to see that no changes were made by the home government which would compromise the Wentworths' preeminence

in New Hampshire. It was a shrewd and necessary measure, for by the middle of 1765 the Board of Trade questioned Benning Wentworth's ability to preserve the King's woods and gave vocal expression to their dissatisfaction by considering not only a change but one that would never again allow the two offices to reside in the same person.[28]

John Temple, the governor's cousin, who was also Collector of Customs in New England, seemed particularly interested in this position and sought it, if not for himself, at least for his brother. His hope of success resided principally in Lord Grenville, and when the ministry changed hands in July, both the plans of Temple and the changes anticipated by the Board of Trade were dashed to pieces by the incoming Newcastle government with which John Wentworth had securely entrenched himself.[29] For another two years Benning Wentworth would continue to execute both offices, and they would remain under the control of his clan, residing in the same person, until the outbreak of revolution in 1775.

CHAPTER VIII

CONGRESSES AND CRISIS

In the decade between 1754 and 1765 opportunities presented themselves on two occasions for New Hampshire to engage in cooperative efforts with the other American colonies. The first occasion, the Albany Congress, New Hampshire participated in by sending four of its leading citizens as commissioners, but later the work of the congress was rejected by the provincial authorities who exhibited a pronounced lethargy in promoting inter-colonial union. On the second occasion, the Stamp Act Congress, New Hampshire was enthusiastic in its support of a cooperative effort by the colonies to protest the odious act of Parliament and yet it failed to participate in the congress held in New York. Does this change in attitude for cooperative colonial effort suggest that between the years 1754 and 1765 New Hampshire achieved a certain political maturity that had come to outweigh its own particular interests? Or had New Hampshire's own particular interests come to weigh so heavily upon it as to be a prime motive for its conduct regardless of sentiment? It is here suggested that the latter more properly explains why the province rejected the results of one congress and failed to participate in the other; that irrespective of sentiment for or against cooperative effort, the leaders of New Hampshire felt that the interests of province could be served best if New Hampshire played the lone wolf.

Governor Wentworth always had been amenable to inter-colonial cooperation to secure the friendship of the Indians,

especially the Six-Nation Confederacy, and to destroy the French enemy that threatened his frontier. Removal of the French and pacification of the Indian held one practical consequence; it would promote the expansion of the province to the west and, therefore, promote the Wentworth interest in land and lumber and allow the prosperity of the new towns to develop rapidly and profitably with the influx of new settlers.[1] By a slow and painful process the governor would educate his assembly to accept such an idea and promote it with success, but in 1754 it had not come that far as yet. Indeed, that year it would seem that the people it represented wanted no part of union and even no part of the war. The King's recruiters were driven out of Exeter and attacked in Portsmouth where the mob also broke into the prison and released two provincials awaiting trial for the murder of some St. Francis Indians. The street lamps of Portsmouth were smashed with such regularity that the sheriff complained with alarm to the governor about the "Mobbish tumultuous Spirit prevailing in the Common People in many Places in this Province. . . Inclining them to resist & oppose all the Officers of Justice for several Instances of this nature have lately happened. . ."[2] Provincial officials frowned upon such outbursts, and though the assembly was pushed by the governor in the direction of colonial cooperation and unity for military purposes, there is no indication that he would be willing to go so far as to accept a permanent political union of the colonies such as was proposed at Albany.

To strengthen the English alliance with the Iroquois Confederacy, the Board of Trade transmitted its plan to the American

governors in a letter dated September 18, 1753, ordering each to send commissioners from their colonies to Albany to treat with the Indians and conclude one general treaty of peace with them. Wentworth presented it to the assembly for consideration January 2, 1754, his only recommendation being that favorable action would insure the safety of the new western settlements.[3] On the 26th the council rejected the assembly's bill as inadequate, principally because it allowed for sending only two commissioners. The bill was revised so that the council would appoint two of its own members as commissioners to act in conjunction with the two appointed by the assembly. Each commissioner was allowed expenses of £3 a day for as long as the congress lasted, and provision was made for presents to the Indians not exceeding £250 New Hampshire currency.[4]

During February, March, and April the bill was passed back and forth between the two houses with no general agreement. The principal point of contention was the council's objection to the money provisions. The amount seemed adequate enough, but it preferred that the commissioners be provided with bills of exchange for sterling to be drawn on the London agent rather than subjecting them to exchanging the almost worthless New Hampshire currency in New York. The council also drew the assembly's attention to the meager grant of power to the commissioners, suggesting that "If the House intended anything should be done by the commissioners more than what related to the five Nations, it was not expressive enough."[5] The loose wording of such a statement suggests that the council was preparing to participate in a congress that would promote greater designs than

merely an Indian treaty, possibly even a permanent political union of the colonies. In all probability, however, it reflected Governor Shirley's suggestion to Wentworth that the powers allowed the commissioners be broad enough "to settle the Quota of each Government either in men or money for carrying what shall be agreed upon into Execution."[6] Therefore, the assembly's request for broader powers for the commissioners probably encompasses its desire to agree on the means and extent of joint military operations against the French once the loyalty of the Indians had been secured and no more. Shirley's correspondence with Wentworth never suggested anything beyond that, and there is no indication that either Wentworth or his legislature was aware of any grander designs or was prepared to discuss them.[7]

The assembly was willing to retract its vote, but the council would not return the bill until another was forthcoming, obviously, afraid the lower house was seeking to increase its bargaining power with the executive. If a new bill was passed that was preferable to the old one, the council could dismiss the latter and approve the new one. By refusing to return the original, it could pass it in case the new one further wrung concessions from the executive or greatly compromised the position of the commissioners.[8] That the council correctly assessed the true intent of the assembly is borne out by the fact that the latter refused to make another vote. Instead, it appointed Speaker Meshech Weare and Henry Sherburne to go to Albany with the two commissioners from the council, instructing them to cooperate in the effort to retain the friendship

of the Six Nations "and in consulting on any Plan or Projection that may be proposed for the safety and Benefit of this Province & of the British Colonys in general."[9] This would have been a sweeping grant of power to the commissioners, allowing them complete freedom of movement had it any legal basis. The fact remains that the original bill made no such grant but confined New Hampshire's participation to an Indian treaty only; and since the assembly had not thought fit to amend the bill, the governor's instructions to Theodore Atkinson, Richard Wibird, Weare, and Sherburne could not militate against it. For this reason Wentworth's instructions to the commissioners confined them ". . .to agree upon, consult and conclude what may be necessary for establishing a sincere and lasting friendship and grand harmony with the said Six Nations of Indians, and, if necessary, for us and in our name to sign everything so agreed upon and concluded, and to do and transact all matters and things that may appertain to the finishing the abovesaid work."[10] Atkinson had attended many such meetings on earlier occasions, although they had not so broad a representation, and must have considered the Albany Congress as routine business. To escape the boredome of the evenings, he took along his good friend and servant, Doctor Joseph Moses, lately a house carpenter from England. Over the punch bowl Moses treated the Chief Justice and provincial Secretary to the tall stories and exaggerated humor which delighted his master, but his familiarity tended to increase proportionately to the amount of punch consumed. One evening between sessions he told Atkinson "You ain't fit to carry garbage to a bear." This was too much for his

staid employer who demanded that Moses either retract the bold words or be fired. Moses replied with the kind of answer to which Atkinson's sense of humor was particularly susceptible. Said he, "Well, I will take them back, You are fit."[11]

Atkinson's sense of humor did not include any sort of union with the neighboring colonies. Indeed, all his efforts for the past twenty years had been devoted to freeing New Hampshire from the influence and confinement which its neighbors attempted to impose upon it. Earlier in the year he attended a meeting with other colonials at Boston to listen to proposals for promoting the war and to communicate them to Portsmouth. At the meeting a quota system of colonial troops was discussed. Atkinson resented the imposition of any troop quotas upon his province, and with Rhode Island, attempted to form an alliance against the "insinuations of the Greater Provinces," insisting instead that troop proportions were properly within the jurisdiction of each colonial assembly.[12] A further example of the particularism under which the New Hampshire commissioners labored at Albany occurred when the delegates assembled. The first order of business was to agree upon the position in which the colonies would be grouped at the conference table. Someone made the suggestion that the delegates should be seated according to geographical location, with the most northern colony placed at the head of the table. Atkinson and his associates made immediate claim upon the favored position only to be outbid by Massachusetts which claimed its territory of Maine as the most northern province. It was a serious blow to the pride of the New Hampshire delegates.[13]

The conduct of the New Hampshire commissioners at Albany seems somewhat erratic at first glance. Though they had no authority to agree to anything beyond a peace treaty, yet they recognized the authority of Parliament to impose union upon the colonies, as suggested in Franklin's plan, but tended to support a plan apparently submitted by Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts.[14] Sherburne and Weare perhaps retained some sentimental attachment for Hutchinson as they had all been members of the "Massachusetts Party" which would have kept New Hampshire under the direction and influence of that colony, but Atkinson and Wibird shared no such attachment. Not only had Hutchinson sought to undermine the Wentworth bid for power in the 1730's, but he attempted to have the boundary settlement reversed after it had been an accomplished fact, a decision which would have adversely affected Atkinson and Wibird and the Wentworths in general as purchasers of the Mason claim. Furthermore, Atkinson had close religious ties with Franklin, who was an early supporter and contributor to the Anglican chapel in Portsmouth. Exclusive of the fact that Hutchinson's plan assigned to New Hampshire a greater representation than Franklin's plan, one must seek other reasons to explain the conduct of the New Hampshire commissioners.

It should be remembered that at the time of the Albany Congress New Hampshire was engaged in a desperate struggle with New York for control of the Vermont lands and with Connecticut to retain control of the timber lands bordering the Connecticut River. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the province would reject any proposed plan to come out of the congress. Furthermore,

the plan of union that was finally presented to the colonial legislatures would allow the president and council to buy Indian lands for the crown not specifically within the bounds of particular colonies.[15] Since the land between the Connecticut and Hudson Rivers was in dispute, it is quite possible that the New Hampshire interests construed this as a device whereby the lands could be settled to the satisfaction of the crown but which would overlook their own designs. Another provision of ominious portent for the tiny province would allow representation on the basis of yearly sums each colony paid into the general treasury.[16] Obviously, New Hampshire could not match the resources of such colonies as New York or Pennsylvania; and since it could contribute only a small portion, and from a niggardly assembly probably not even that would be voted, New Hampshire would be doomed to a relatively insignificant position among her sister colonies. Governor Wentworth had used his best endeavors for the past thirteen years to reinstate the province as an important factor in the affairs of the empire, and in 1754 his dream was slowly coming to be more and more accepted by the leaders in the assembly and the people of the province in general. It is no wonder, then, that New Hampshire was unwilling to participate in any form of colonial union beyond military operations. So much was at stake and the prospects for success so great in 1754 in achieving the goals first laid down by Wentworth that the plan of union received little or no consideration by the legislature let alone being brought to a vote for acceptance or rejection. Wentworth addressed the assembly July 23, 1754,

stating he had directed the secretary to lay the Albany proceedings before it for consideration. On December 11 he addressed the assembly in similar fashion, indicating that Secretary Atkinson was in no hurry to place the Albany Plan of Union before the assembly. The point is the latter never requested or insisted that the plan be laid before it and the plan was never mentioned in the journal. In all probability, Sherburne and Weare informed their associates about it, and that is all they cared to have to do with it.[17]

If the leaders of the province had no intention of binding themselves into a union with their competitors, it brings us to the question of why the New Hampshire commissioners bothered to support the Hutchinson plan at Albany. There are several possible explanations for this. First of all, Massachusetts and New York were locked in a struggle for control and leadership of the congress. By supporting the Hutchinson plan, New Hampshire won the warm affection of Massachusetts and, at the same time, was happy to utilize every opportunity to embarrass and humiliate New York, which was contesting its western boundary claims. New Hampshire needed the support and cooperation of Massachusetts in the war and especially needed it as a source for borrowing badly needed specie to carry on its own war efforts. Furthermore, Massachusetts continued to support and defend Fort Dummer on the Connecticut River, protecting some of the western settlements. New Hampshire dared not risk the displeasure of Massachusetts for fear of her withdrawal from this important frontier outpost, and by supporting her plan it retained her friendship and help without making specific commitments.

The particular interests of New Hampshire became more pronounced as the decade wore on. The greatest number of Vermont land grants was made between the Albany Congress and passage of the Stamp Act, with a corresponding increase in the number of individuals possessing a vested interest in these lands and, therefore, being more active in promoting the province's interests which had come to coincide with their own. Therefore, in 1765, the crucial issue for many colonials in New Hampshire was not stamps but jurisdiction of the Vermont lands. The Stamp Act manifested itself as a crisis to the established authorities only insofar as any degree of violent outburst might jeopardize the position of favor which they sought from the King, because they hoped to utilize this crisis to further ingratiate themselves with the crown to secure specific objectives over and above repeal of the odious law.

Unlike her sister colonies, the opposition to the Stamp Act was comparatively mild and most orderly in New Hampshire in the summer of 1765. There were no riots, no destruction of government property, no menacing mobs of any consequence; and, most important of all, the provincial leaders maintained control of the powers and direction of government. Yet there was genuine concern by both leaders and led, concern that one would resort to some form of violence to manifest its opposition, and concern by the other that the law would receive strict enforcement. Subsequent events proved the uneasiness of both to be unfounded, principally because the provincial leaders themselves were opposed to enforcement of the law and took steps which won the confidence and support of the common

people.

George Meserve, son of Portsmouth's most famous shipbuilder, arrived in Boston September 9, 1765, with his commission and instructions as stamp distributor for New Hampshire. Feelings were running high in Boston, and Meserve could not disembark for two days until he had placated the mob by resigning his commission. He had done this on the written advice of his friends in Portsmouth who feared similar outbursts there.[18] The news of this gesture did not arrive in time to prevent a group of people from assembling in the market square of Portsmouth the following morning to hang him in effigy along with Lord Bute, the originator of the Stamp Act, and the Devil. Through the day the effigies remained on display and at night were paraded through the town by torchlight and finally burned. The high-strung distributor arrived home on the 18th only to be confronted by a mob which demanded his resignation in public as an act of good faith. Meserve was only too happy to comply in exchange for his safety, and the mob jubilantly carried him through the town like a hero.[19]

The Stamp Act was due to take effect on November 1. Apprehension was great in the countryside surrounding Portsmouth that the act would be enforced, and it prompted a large number of people to march on that town the last day of October. To avoid any unnecessary complications a group of Portsmouth citizens marched out to intercept their countrymen, and after assuring them that Governor Wentworth had no intention of enforcing the act, they peaceably returned to their farms.[20] The incident did not prevent the people of Portsmouth

from putting on their own display the next day. The Gazette appeared with a black border mourning the death of liberty, bells tolled at a heavy pace, and vessels in the harbor flew their colors at half-mast. About three o'clock in the afternoon, a funeral procession wound its way through the narrow streets bearing a coffin with the inscription LIBERTY, AGED 145, STAMPT. As it passed the parade ground, muskets cracked in salute, and the usual sermon was delivered at the place of interment, reciting the good deeds of a lifetime and warning the assembled of the uncertainty of the future. As Liberty was about to be placed in the grave, it showed signs of life and a number of its Sons rescued it, changed the inscription to LIBERTY REVIVED, and carried it off in triumph to the joyous pealing of the bells.[21]

By such demonstrations the popular clamor against the act was kept alive, particularly in Portsmouth. But these demonstrations could not be pursued indefinitely nor could they achieve a steady pitch of enthusiasm of great intensity. What was needed was a better means of communication upon which enthusiasm for the cause could feed and be nourished, especially during the winter months when only the most radical could be prompted to demonstrate in the chill air and frozen streets, and then only after being well fortified with rum. Apparently, the sympathy of the only Portsmouth newspaper, the New Hampshire Gazette, founded in 1756, could not be relied upon to keep the cause alive in its pages. To answer the need, the Portsmouth Mercury was established in January, 1765, promising that "neither opposition, arbitrary Power, or publick Injuries may be expected to

be screened from the Knowledge of the People, whose Liberties are dearer to them than their lives." It was a noble and dramatic gesture, however unnecessary, for the distrust of the older paper proved to be unfounded and the Gazette joined in the clamor against the Stamp Act which, if enforced, probably would have put it out of business.[22]

In spite of the spirit displayed in the earlier demonstrations, in spite of the newspapers' pouring out their weekly venom against the Stamp Act, the cause of liberty needed bolstering by January, 1766, and the anxiety of the people needed some additional assurance, some act of faith that would put their minds at ease concerning non-enforcement of it. What better way to achieve this than another visit to the distributor, George Meserve. The past few months had been trying times for him, too. He did not pursue his private business interests for fear that the citizenry of Portsmouth would destroy his property, and nights he slept, sometimes not too well, with pistols close at hand expecting a visit from the Sons of Liberty.[23] They obliged him on January 12. After holding a meeting on the parade ground in front of the court house, they selected a committee to visit the distributor shortly after three o'clock, to demand another public resignation of him. Rather than have the townspeople visit his house, Meserve immediately accompanied the committee back to the parade ground and swore disavowal of his commission and instructions "on the drum head" before the assembled multitude. Three cheers rang out the approval and satisfaction of the crowd who now began to disperse quietly to their homes "without

Daniel Pierce who, though a cousin to the governor, like Sherburne, received his appointment as provincial Recorder from the assembly. Not only did they possess opposition to the Stamp Act in common, but it seems they had religious ties; most of them were ardent Congregationalists who used the Old North Church as a meeting place to formulate their plans under the guidance of the Reverend Samuel Langdon.[29] The younger men had another thing in common; they had received their education in Portsmouth's one-story, wooden school located on State Street and presided over by Major Samuel Hale. Hale was a graduate of Harvard, served at Louisbourg in 1745, and later came to Portsmouth. A staunch Congregationalist and opposer of the Church of England, he early became prominent as an organizer of the Sons of Liberty. As moderator of the town meeting, he boldly put forth the views of the Sons in defiance of royal authority.[30]

The opponents of tyranny did not exclusively comprise the opponents of the Wentworth oligarchy. If they did not count among their members some of the inner circle of Wentworths, they at least were aided and abetted by them. Daniel Warner became a Son even though he sat on his majesty's council. Together with Daniel Rindge, whose father initiated proceedings that led to the appointment of Benning Wentworth as governor, and who would join Warner on the council the following year, he served on a committee with other Sons to draw up a set of instructions to guide the assembly, instructions which complained of the Stamp Act and its danger to liberty.[31] Included on this committee was the staunch defender of royal authority and King's attorney in Portsmouth, Wyseman Claggett, who, like

Theodore Atkinson and others, talked about "the priviledges of Englishmen."[32] Even the provincial agents in London supported the cause of the Sons. At the time the governor's nephew, John Wentworth, was acting with his cousin, Barlow Trecothick, a prominent merchant, member of Parliament, and sometime Mayor of London, to secure repeal of the act. Wentworth, like his relatives in Portsmouth, deplored the violence and destruction of property which had occurred in some of the other colonies but, nevertheless, hoped that the congress in New York would issue a "firm, decent, loyal, and expressive" protest against the act. He was of the opinion that the colonists were justified in such a protest and approved all "prudent" measures to reverse it.[33]

Perhaps no one was more prudent at this time of crisis than the governor himself. He had never received an official notification of the act or the instructions by which he was to enforce it and, therefore, made use of this technicality to avoid stirring up unnecessary trouble. He had lodged the stamps in Fort William and Mary under guard, and when Meserve attempted to turn over his commission and instructions to the old governor, the latter refused them for fear of an attack on his person and home.[34] To protect property in Portsmouth, he kept soldiers on duty at night, and the King's peace was substantially maintained, so much so that even Guy Fawkes day was unusually quiet.[35] But he could not depend on the militia if there was need for it "because the militia are the very people on the other side of the question."[36] Though there was some question at first as to the legality of doing business as usual

without the stamps, it was soon overcome. The custom house remained open and the ships of the Langdons and other merchants departed for West Indian ports that would receive them without stamps.[37] Newspapers circulated freely, marriage licenses were advertised without stamps, and the courts remained open and issued writs and summonses without stamps under the guidance of Chief Justice Atkinson because of the "Necessity and Expediency for the Preservation of the Peace and good Order of the Province. . . ."[38]

Was it fear for his person and property that prompted Governor Wentworth to avoid enforcing the Stamp Act in the face of opposition? If so, it would seem that he was not the same man who arose on previous occasions to defend the interest of the crown. It has been customary to explain his conduct during the crisis as a result of his poor health, his impending removal and his accumulated wealth, a combination which made it in his interest not to enforce the unpopular measure.[39] Such assertions are, of course, true if however unsatisfactory an explanation. His health had declined steadily, and the periods of disablement by gout increased so that he was confined to his house, two miles from town, for over three years and could not attend the public business as he should.[40] His associates had expected his removal for some years past, either by the King or by death, and it is one reason they dispatched his nephew to London in 1762. Now it was more than a rumor, and official confirmation came from the London agents that such a plan was contemplated by the ministry.[41] That he had made his fortune is undeniable. If these were the sole reasons for his refusing to enforce

the Stamp Act, then it would seem that he was willing to retire and abandon the interests of the family which he had so laboriously nurtured and leave it to the uncertainty of the future. He was not.

One thing the governor wished to avoid was any form of violence that would have the appearance of rebellion at home. During his controversy with the assembly fifteen years before, that label had been attached to the province and it cost the Wentworths and the province many friends in the home government. It was essential at this juncture to create the appearance in London that New Hampshire, though opposed to the Stamp Act, was a province settled by peaceful and loyal subjects of the crown in contrast to her neighbors. There were several matters at home on which the Wentworths wanted favorable decisions which prompted this plan of action by the provincial leaders and which go a long way in explaining the cordiality between the Wentworths and the Sons of Liberty. In the first place, if the governor was to be removed, it was essential to the Wentworths that his successor be in sympathy with their interests, and the only way to assure this was to have another Wentworth as governor and surveyor of the King's woods. This was admirably accomplished by John Wentworth in 1766 when he rode into favor with his countrymen by working for repeal of the Stamp Act, and into power with the Rockingham ministry.[42]

Secondly, the surveyor and his deputies had seized a great number of illegally-cut masts in Maine. They won their case in the admiralty court, but an appeal had been made to the King for a reversal of the decision, the outcome of which "his Majestys Interest

[would] greatly be Affected by. . ." and, therefore, the Wentworth lumbering interests also.[43]

In the third place, the New Hampshire officials were seeking to obtain from Parliament a reimbursement for their expenses incurred in promoting the late war, especially for the year 1756, for which no reimbursement had been forthcoming. The New Hampshire currency, as usual, had declined to a deplorable state, and any reimbursement in specie could be used to sink the paper and restore the province to a hard money basis.[44]

Lastly, and perhaps most important, the King issued his decision July 20, 1764, regarding jurisdiction of the Vermont lands in favor of New York and making the Connecticut River the western boundary of New Hampshire.[45] Wentworth informed the assembly of the decision May 23, 1765, but it waited until June 28 to request a copy of the decision, which the governor forwarded on June 29. The same day the assembly received a letter from the speaker of the Massachusetts assembly, in which he proposed a meeting of all the colonies at New York to draw up a protest against the Stamp Act. The assembly "Resolved, That notwithstanding we are sensible such a Representation ought to be made & approve of the proposed method for obtaining thereof, yet the present situation of our government affairs will not permit us to appoint a Committee to attend such a meeting but shall be ready to joyn in any Address to his Majesty & the Parliament. . . ."[46] It has been asserted that the reason New Hampshire did not participate in the Stamp Act Congress was due to the governor's proroging the assembly before delegates could be appointed.[47] In

view of the assembly's resolve of Saturday, June 29, and the fact that it continued to sit until Thursday, July 4, before being prorogued, offering plenty of time to appoint delegates if it so desired, this position is no longer tenable.[48] But still to be answered are questions of what occurred between May 23 and June 29 that prompted the resolve of the assembly not to attend the congress though in sympathy with its objective. If it did not intend to send delegates, why did the governor bother to prorogue it on July 4, or for that matter, why not sooner? And, what was the connection between the arrival of the boundary decision with the resolve not to send delegates?

The New Hampshire assembly did not intend to participate in the Stamp Act Congress, or more properly, it was persuaded by the governor and council that its interests and the interests of the Wentworths and the province, in general, could be served best by following a policy of passive resistance. Perhaps it did not share an outlook designed to retain the Wentworths in power and even increase their monopoly of provincial affairs, but the fact remains the province had done very well by them during the past twenty-five years, and at least so far as land grants were involved, the governor had tied the interests of the assembly closely to those of his own family. Each representative held, in addition to numerous properties on the east side of the Connecticut River, substantial shares of real estate in the Vermont area which now might become forfeit and subject to regranting by the government of New York.[49] Not only did the representatives stand to lose title to their property

holdings beyond the new boundary, property which was increasing in value,[50] but in all probability they were bought off by the Wentworths with a promise of additional holdings if they would cooperate with the scheme to present New Hampshire as a peaceful and loyal province of the crown which should be rewarded by a younger Wentworth as governor, be reimbursed for its war contribution, and have jurisdiction of the Vermont lands restored to it.

The decision not to attend the Stamp Act Congress was made by the New Hampshire officials to avoid any appearance of rebellion which might stigmatize the participants and especially New York where it was to be held. If it had been held anywhere else, perhaps New Hampshire's reaction would have been different; certainly, the Wentworths might not have obtained the cooperation of the assembly so easily; but in 1765 the controversy was with New York, over three million acres of rich granted and ungranted lands were at stake, and the province, under Wentworth leadership, hoped to use the opportunity to place its chief adversary in as bad a light as possible with the home government.

In view of the success of John Wentworth in inheriting the mantle of leadership from his uncle the following year and ingratiating himself with the new ministry, the plan, if such it was, is not so far-fetched as it would first seem. But it was not merely vain hope that prompted the provincial leaders to play up to the home government to secure favors from it. There was a sound legal reason. It was customary for the king to appoint a commission to settle inter-colonial boundary disputes. He had done this to settle

the Massachusetts-New Hampshire boundary controversy in 1737 and also to settle the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut dispute in 1758, to cite only two examples. Therefore, his boundary demarcation between New York and New Hampshire in 1764 in "original Judicial proceedings" was considered not only temporary by provincial authorities, but "it was even questioned whether the King in Council could demarcate a temporary boundary line pending final determination by commission proceedings and appeal therefrom."[51] That New Hampshire anticipated a return of the Vermont lands to its jurisdiction is brought out by the fact that the settlers there refused to submit to the jurisdiction of New York,[52] and in 1767 the king issued an order prohibiting New York from regranting the lands first granted by Governor Wentworth.[53] It was for these reasons, then, that Atkinson explained to the London agents April 18, 1766, that "we in this Province have kept off all the irregularity too much practized in many other Places tho as much against the Stamp as any. I hope & Doubt not this Province will gratfully resent any Favours they may receive either from his Majesty or the Parliament. As yet we have received no certain intelligence of the event of. . .our affairs pending before his Majesty or Parliament but your Letter to Mr. Wentworth gives great hopes."[54]

The New Hampshire assembly eventually endorsed the resolutions adopted at the congress in New York,[55] and when news of repeal reached the province May 22, 1766, the cannon of Fort William and Mary signaled the joyous occasion at noon by order of the governor. Later in the day he entertained "a large number of gentlemen" in the

council chamber of his house at Little Harbor, and of the many toasts that were proposed, no doubt some included congratulations to themselves for weathering the storm unscathed.[56] Two weeks later the assembly forwarded three separate addresses, one to King, one to Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and one to the Commons expressing its gratitude for repeal and instructed the provincial agents to "make the proper Use of them."[57] At the same time it sent the following address to Governor Wentworth: "We thank your Excellency for your wise and compassionate conduct in the times of our Greatest Distress by which the Honor of the Crown and safety of the subjects were promoted and Peace and good order Preserved."[58]

CHAPTER IX

FAMILY GOVERNMENT

The conclusion of the Stamp Act controversy enabled the home government to devote a greater measure of attention to a review of the imperial relationship between itself and its colonies. Within this framework it was natural that the function and duties of the royal governors in America should receive consideration commensurate with the primary importance it attached to such officials and that their conduct would be subjected to a closer scrutiny than heretofore. That there was decided dissatisfaction with the administration of these officials was apparent before 1765, but the storm over stamps tended to intensify this dissatisfaction and at the same time postpone any inquiry or measures designed to improve the situation.

One topic of complaint to the home government was the manner in which some of the governors engaged in land speculation to the exclusive interest of their relatives and friends in government and the exorbitant fees they charged to those seriously seeking land for settlement and improvement. So vocal had these protests become by 1764 that the King was prompted to direct a "cease and desist" proclamation against governors guilty of such practices, threatening them with removal if they did not; and Governor Benning Wentworth was one of the individuals at whom the proclamation was directly aimed.[1]

In corresponding with the Board of Trade about his land grants, the governor spoke in general terms and avoided supplying specific information about the number and extent of the grants and the conditions upon which they were made. So vague was the information he supplied the Board that it thought fit to question his nephew then in England, John Fisher, who not only was a proprietor of some of these grants but was also Naval Officer for Portsmouth. Fisher estimated that his uncle had made some thirty grants since the end of the war to the west of the Connecticut River. Each grant was divided usually into sixty shares, according to province custom in making such grants, but that many of the grantees were proprietors in other townships as well, himself included. Furthermore, Fisher said the governor possessed a share in each of the grants and also exhibited a keen interest in the Masonian proprietors claim which took a respectable portion of unimproved lands out of the King's jurisdiction and therefore denied him quitrents and mast reservations within this private property.[2]

Wentworth was not only not candid with the Board about his grants but at times exhibited a tendency to twist or at least exaggerate the truth to present his case in a more favorable light. In each of the charters, he stated, he critically examined the names of the grantees before approving them, and in each case he was satisfied that at least fifty of the grantees, as required by his instructions, "were able men brought up in the farming business on whom I could rely to make Immediate Settlement."[3] Judging

from the list of proprietors in these towns, most of them, even if they had been brought up in the farming business, had no intention of leaving their comfortable positions in Portsmouth, Boston, or New York to settle a wilderness, and the statement is as much a fabrication as the governor's exaggerated claim that over two thousand men were clearing the lands in these new townships.[4]

When queried about his fees for the grants, Governor Wentworth justified his taking five hundred acres for himself in each township on the basis of custom. All his predecessors had enjoyed such a reservation, he stated, and the lands were subject to the payment of quitrents and the same conditions of improvement as the other grantees. He did not tell the Board that such a custom was initiated and practiced exclusively by his father as lieutenant governor some thirty years before, but he did hope it would approve his conduct since no other colony could boast "of such a Rapid Progress made in settling the Wilderness Lands in any of the King's Dominions. . ." If it did not approve, he was willing to forfeit as much of his vast holdings as the Board demanded.[5]

In connection with the land grants, the Board exhibited a decided dissatisfaction with Wentworth's laxity in protecting the King's masts. The governor defended his conduct as surveyor of the woods by referring his critics to the numerous advertisements in Gazette by which he announced public auctions to dispose of illegally-cut timber which he and his deputies had confiscated. The difficulties in apprehending and convicting mast offenders was of little

consequence to the Board, and Wentworth's best efforts apparently were not sufficient to satisfy it that he should retain the position or that it should reside in the same person as the governor of New Hampshire.

Another source of dissatisfaction with Governor Wentworth's administration was the laxity he had exhibited in making the assembly pay a due obedience to the King's instructions regarding legislation. Any act of an unusual or extraordinary nature, or acts which repealed other acts or other wise affected private property, required of the governor by instruction to pass only with a suspending clause, which meant that such acts would have no effect until confirmed by the King in council. Of late the assembly persisted in passing acts which fell into one or another of these categories, and the governor approved them without insisting upon the suspending clause. The assembly was particularly aggressive in circumventing the provincial courts by presuming to pass judgment upon the validity of contested land titles. To discourage such unconstitutional practices, the Privy Council disallowed wholesale some sixteen such acts assented to by the governor between 1758 and 1761 and warned him that nothing but "necessity" could justify his conduct in approving acts without a proper clause of suspension.[6]

Wentworth could probably have justified his approval of such acts on the necessity of securing the cooperation of the assembly to promote the war effort and thereby securing public sentiment favoring his administration of it. Again, he could have, but he did not bother with such a justification, and here again the home

government found a cause for dissatisfaction with his conduct. After 1752 the Board of Trade renewed efforts to increase and centralize imperial control of the colonies. To succeed in this and make legislative recommendations thereto it was essential that a close communication be maintained with the colonial governors as they were the principal source of information. For one who grasped the imperial idea as well as Wentworth it is somewhat surprising that he should increasingly neglect his reports to the Board at a time when it was more anxious than ever to receive them. Possibly his age and failing health were contributing factors to his procrastination, or possibly he entrusted the task to subordinates, particularly Secretary Atkinson, who never liked the office and continued in it only because of the governor's insistence.[7] More than likely, however, Wentworth was repaying in kind the Board's laxity on former occasions when Wentworth sought its support and advice in the name of the King's business and his pleas fell on deaf ears and did not even receive the courtesy of an acknowledgement.[8] Whatever the reason, the governor's laxity in corresponding with the Board hampered its activities to bring about a closer imperial control of the colonies and it sometimes had to wait two or three years before hearing from Wentworth on conditions within his government.[9]

It is no wonder, then, that there was serious consideration being given to the removal of Wentworth by the time of the passage of the Stamp Act. But the dissatisfaction with his administration did not reside exclusively with the home government. In the province itself, as in other colonies, there was a rapidly increasing tendency

by the commercial coastal centers to dominate the political, economic and social life of the province to the exclusion of the expanding agricultural interests of the interior. As the century advanced the control of province affairs by Portsmouth tightened under Benning Wentworth, and the disproportionate share of power and profit that was enjoyed by the merchant-speculators of that town began to arouse resentment among their less-fortunate countrymen clearing and settling the wilderness. The gap between the interests of the small farmer, the frontiersman, and the landless man of the older settlements, on the one hand, and the opulent merchants of Portsmouth, on the other, was widening; and the divergence between rich and poor, proprietor and settler, voter and disenfranchised, brought into sharp relief a growing conflict of interests that was forming itself along class and sectional lines.[10]

The oligarchy in Portsmouth had reached the summit of its power under Governor Wentworth and was not about to relinquish or share it with others. There was scarcely a provincial office that was not filled by some brother or cousin or nephew of the governor, and more often than not individual members of his clan held several positions. The roster of the council read like a family reunion gathering to administer its own interests. There were Theodore Atkinson, Mark H. Wentworth, Daniel and Jonathan Warner, Richard Wibird, Daniel Rindge, George Jaffrey, Daniel Pierce, Samuel Solley, Daniel Rogers, Nathaniel Barrell, John Downing, and Paul Wentworth. The only councilor who was not related to the governor for certain

was Joseph Blanshard of Dunstable, and he was intimately connected to the clan as the surveyor for the Masonian proprietors and later surveyor to the governor in laying out the Vermont townships. In 1766 cousin Henry Sherburne was admitted to the council, but it is a mistake to consider him as an intimate friend and supporter of the governor. If anything, he was Wentworth's arch antagonist during his entire administration, and his elevation was probably designed to remove him from his position as leader of the opposition in the assembly and seat him at the council where he would be harmless.

The pluralism practiced by the Wentworths left few openings in the government available to outsiders. Theodore Atkinson was province secretary and chief justice of the superior court as well as a deputy surveyor of the King's woods. For a time his son, also a councilor, succeeded him as province secretary, but with his premature death Atkinson resumed the office. George Jaffrey was clerk for the Masonian proprietors and later clerk of the superior court and provincial treasurer. Richard Wibird had been a justice of the court of common pleas and for a time filled the offices of secretary and later was treasurer, and was a judge of probate at the time of his death in 1765.

There were relatives of the governor in other positions of power and profit as well. John Fisher, a nephew, held the lucrative office of naval officer for Portsmouth and possessed properties in eight townships. Samuel Solley was collector of customs for Portsmouth and later was succeeded by James Nevins, who also became a

member of the council. The governor's younger brother, John, also occupied the position of naval officer for a time and later became a judge of the court of common pleas and a judge of probate. Another brother Hunking, was clerk of the court of common pleas, while brother-in-law Thomas Packer was high sheriff of the province. In 1765 Peter Livius was admitted to the council. Though not related to the Wentworths in any way, he had journeyed from England to accept his place among the council and among the oligarchy and become a judge of the court of common pleas as well. His marriage to the daughter of John Tufton Mason gave him much in common with the Wentworths, most of whom were also purchasers of Mason's claim to New Hampshire. In England the province agent, John Thomlinson, though not related to the governor, was a personal friend of his and closely connected to his family as a mast contractor for the Royal Navy and a proprietor of the Masonian patent. When his health became impaired, he was assisted by Barlow Tracothick, also married to a Wentworth, and by the governor's nephew, John Wentworth. This personally-erected edifice of related officeholders was the work of Benning Wentworth, to be sure, but the demands of his relatives for jobs and favors became so insistent that even he was prompted to confess that ". . .I am obliged to gratify every body that applies. . ."[11]

It was very difficult for an ambitious young man to gain admittance to this exclusive circle, and it caused increasing resentment among the rising merchants whose protests became more vocal

and more critical as they increased their wealth but not their standing. About the only means left open to them for public office and power was a seat in the assembly, and they secured admission to it as the only organized body that could offer any effective resistance to the monopoly of the oligarchy and as the most proper means by which to voice their grievances to the home government for redress. That they did not consider the governor or his clan as enemies of political liberty is apparent from their conduct during the Stamp Act controversy. However, they did resent the Wentworths operating as a closed corporation, and their efforts were directed to breaking or at least loosening the stranglehold which the governor and his family maintained over provincial affairs. Shortly after Wentworth's reappointment as governor by George III in 1761, the assembly sent an address to the home government via the Prime Minister, William Pitt. Pitt was too busy to read it and instead forwarded it to Lord Bute for consideration. Apparently it recited all the grievances against the Wentworth administration that would eventually lead the ministry to ask for the governor's removal, and Bute was so shocked by the charges that he "Askt if there was Noe Governor in the Province. . ." Bute suppressed the address for fear its contents, if made known, would disrupt the harmony within the ministry necessary for promoting the successful conclusion of the war against France. The address was obviously the work of those who would break the Wentworth monopoly only to replace it by one of their own making, and Henry Sherburne seems to have been the leader of this group of ambitious and aggressive individuals.[12]

The attempt to change the leadership of New Hampshire in 1761 failed primarily because it was ill-timed, but it did not end efforts within the province to infiltrate the oligarchy, Circumstances for such action were most propitious during the storm over stamps, and for the reasons already mentioned, the Wentworths were particularly anxious to avoid trouble and therefore willing to come to some sort of agreement with the rising new families in the province and especially those of Portsmouth. Henry Sherburne and his sons-in-law, John and Woodbury Langdon, and others used the Sons of Liberty as much to protest and jeopardize Wentworth supremacy and leadership, and thereby gain admission to its exclusive ranks, as they did to express opposition to the act of Parliament. That they succeeded in shaking the Wentworth primacy in political leadership is apparent from the way the two forces cooperated during the controversy to maintain relative peace and harmony in the province, and it was no accident that Sherburne was admitted to the council shortly after the storm subsided.

Another source of grievance of long standing against the Wentworth administration which reflected the increasing sectional nature of the struggle was the matter of the provincial courts. There was great distrust and dislike by the assembly and the people it represented of the only appellate court in the province which sat in Portsmouth and comprised the governor and council, not only because it operated without a jury, but because judgments regarding controversial land titles could not be expected to be equitable as all the judges invariably were interested parties. Because this was the one

court which was erected and proceeded exclusive of legislative sanction the assembly sought on several occasions to remodel or abolish it, but its attempts proved unsuccessful.[13]

Even more distressing was the fact that all of the provincial courts were located exclusively in Portsmouth. With the number of inland settlements increasing it was argued that some of them should be relocated outside Portsmouth as being more convenient and less expensive to the people they would serve in the interior, as being better for trade that was reaching further to the west, and as fostering a sense of local pride in the new communities. The arguments were not new but were probably more legitimate in the 1760's than when first propounded during Governor Belcher's administration because the cost of travelling to and from court in Portsmouth invariably was greater than the damages claimed or the judgments received.[14] On the former occasion the Privy Council rejected all efforts to remove the courts from Portsmouth as was recommended by the Board of Trade on the grounds that it would be difficult if not impossible to secure judgments against mast offenders from juries in these lumbering towns.[15]

The superior court was in particularly bad straits by 1755, and it was difficult to staff it with qualified persons because of the small fees and perquisites attached to it. Chief Justice Huske proved incapable of reorganizing it and resigned rather than assume such a difficult task in his declining years. The governor could find no one who cared to succeed him in this important office and the condition of the court became further disorganized

and justice delayed when the other justices threatened to tender their resignation. Under the circumstances, it was natural that Wentworth should turn to his most trusted associate, Theodore Atkinson, to take on the task of presiding over the province's highest court possessing original jurisdiction and at the same time reorganize it so that justice might be dispensed with greater speed and economy. Atkinson was perhaps better qualified for the task than any other man in the province, but he had no desire to add to his already numerous official duties and accept another position that was both troublesome and not too profitable. The governor's pressure and insistence broke down his timidity, and he accepted the post pending the appointment of a permanent chief justice.[16] As with his office of provincial secretary, such appointments tended to be permanent once made, and Atkinson felt uncomfortable in a post that depended upon legislative grants over which he might become embroiled in a dispute between the executive and the assembly. However much he disliked his new office he knew that the morale and efficiency of the court could be greatly improved if the justices' salaries were raised.

The assembly welcomed the governor's request for competent salaries for the justices of the superior court because it gave them a point on which to bargain with him in the hope of securing approval for one of its pet projects, the division of the province into counties, which of necessity, would entail the setting up of courts elsewhere than in Portsmouth. Accordingly, a bill was drawn up and submitted to the governor and council providing for the

division of the province into two counties with proper courts therein. To it was attached a rider

> That in case the. . .aforesaid, shall be carryed into execution, that there shall be allowed and paid. . .unto the Justices of the Superior Court. . .the sum of one hundred and fifty pounds. . .one year from the time the act aforesaid shall take place, the better to enable them to attend the business of the County. 17

The governor and council cited the King's disallowance of a similar bill in 1735 removing some of the courts from Portsmouth as their reason for rejecting it at this time, and strenuously protested the manner in which the salary increase was "granted conditionally and tacked to the other vote."[18]

For the next four years the struggle continued sporadically between the governor and assembly with nothing accomplished. Wentworth insisted that the question of counties and justices' salaries were two distinct and unrelated matters and would not consider any bill which encompassed both. The assembly was equally adamant in refusing to separate the issues and Wentworth was powerless to impose his view on the stubborn representatives because of the necessity to secure their cooperation in promoting the war. To forestall the resignation of Atkinson and the other justices and to keep the court open, the governor was forced to contribute to their salaries out of his own pocket, in the meantime hoping for specific instructions from the King. The issue was further confused by the representatives' disagreeing among themselves as to how many counties into which they wished to divide the province.

Wentworth's position was upheld by the King in 1759 when an instruction was issued which practically commanded the assembly to provide a competent salary for the justices of the superior court and ordered it to reimburse the governor for the sum he had advanced to keep them on the bench.[19] In presenting the instruction to the assembly, the governor warned that neglect to obey it might bring consequences "severer than you can conceive."[20] Apparently Wentworth based his opposition on the assembly's persistence in considering the issues of counties and salaries in a single bill. Certainly the representatives acted under the impression that he was not unalterably opposed to a division of the province into counties and seized upon it as a means of removing some of the courts from Portsmouth, choosing to ignore the King's commands by adhering to its original position that justices' salaries be conditional upon the establishment of a county system.[21] Wentworth never persuaded his assembly to consider the issues separately, and the controversy still had not been resolved when he left office in 1767.

Though it was never specifically mentioned, another source of grievance against the governor and most, but not all, of his relatives, was the staunch Anglicanism which they not only flouted in the face of a predominently Congregational province but which they hoped to impose upon it by ever so subtle means.

The Church of England had never fared well in the province because of the influence of and close attachment to Massachusetts, which formally ended in 1741. Wentworth and his relatives took the first step toward a revival of Anglican influence by building Queen's

Chapel in Portsmouth in 1735. During the next twenty-five years three more chapels were added elsewhere in the province, and though its foundation became impressive, Anglicanism never made serious inroads upon the religious life of the people of New Hampshire. Perhaps the official church of Great Britain might have achieved a greater measure of success had not Wentworth exhibited such a strong aversion to the type of enthusiasm with which George Whitefield invaded the province in 1740. Certainly this revival acted as a powerful stumbling block to the spread of his own religious preference, and while his attachment to Anglicanism gave it a powerful boost, in the long run it also made certain that this church would never receive wide acceptance by the populace.

Benning Wentworth's patronage of the Anglican Church was sufficient reason for some strenuously to oppose its spread. The very fact that he endeavored to impose a due obedience to royal authority by elected officials gave cause for concern among many that, should he succeed, the next logical step would be to impose the Anglican Church upon them. An object of particular distrust and dislike was the Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts. Organized in 1701 to send missionaries to colonies where members of the Anglican Church were in a minority, it was particularly favored by Governor Wentworth, who had been a member of the corporation since 1743.[22] Since land became one of the governor's most powerful means to create incentive, he offered it gratis to the Society if it would prevail upon the King to establish an American Episcopate. Both the Society and the Church of England were further favored by

a share of five hundred acres in every township which Wentworth granted, and because no similar encouragement was given to the Congregationalists, they could not but look upon such partiality as a challenge to the sovereignty of their own religious views.[23]

An allied matter which also chafed the Congregational interests in New Hampshire was the governor's policy toward education, and here again one can see how inflexible he could be on occasion. By the terms of his commission Wentworth was exhorted to use his best efforts to strengthen the ties between religion and education.[24] For him there was only one true, enlightened religion, that propounded by the Church of England. He had hoped to encourage it and its teachings by reserving shares in his early township grants for the first settled minister and for the erection of schools. It was, however, a boon to Congregationalism, which benefitted chiefly under the provision, and to correct his miscalculation, the governor made specific provision only for those of the Anglican persuasion in his post 1761 grants.

Upon appeal from President Holyoke, Wentworth secured an appropriation to replace over seven hundred books for the Harvard library after it was destroyed by fire in 1764.[25] In his own province the governor was not quite so amenable to aiding education outside the jurisdiction of the Church of England. In 1758 he refused to honor the petition of a group of Congregational ministers for a charter authorizing them to establish a college in New Hampshire because they would not bow to his insistence that it be under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of London.[26] In convention the

following year the ministers again approved the draft of a charter and appointed a committee, of which the Reverend Samuel Langdon of Portsmouth was a member, "to do every Thing which to them shall appear Necessary in the aforesaid matter in Behalf of the Convention."[27] The ministers were confident that "maturer Consideration & advice of council" would prompt the governor to approve the charter, obviously depending upon support from those councilors who were either Congregationalists themselves or at least not imbued with the governor's implacable hostility to their religious views.[28] They were mistaken. Wentworth would not authorize a college under Congregational auspices, and the project had to be abandoned during the remainder of his administration.

Wentworth had become interested in the efforts of Eleazer Wheelock to christianize and educate the Indians in his school at Lebanon, Connecticut. The governor had hopes of securing the school for the Church of England and in 1763 offered Wheelock a sizeable tract of land if he would relocate it in the western part of New Hampshire. Wheelock did not avail himself of the proposal because of the Anglican implications even though Wentworth had increased the inducement by 1767 to a township six miles square.[29]

The governor's unbending subservience to the crown, a positive virtue during the earlier part of his administration, by 1767 had become an impediment to progress, at least so far as development of the educational system of New Hampshire is concerned. Without his realizing it, rapid change was accompanied by a new generation of men that not only continued to challenge the authority of the

crown in certain matters but did so more boldly and vocally than had their fathers. Possibly the tenor of his commission and instructions, which he tended with slight exception to interpret in the strictest literal sense, placed limits on his freedom of movement too severe to keep pace with the gowing needs of the province. Indicative of this is his granting his own share of five hundred acres in the township of Hanover toward the establishment of Dartmouth College in 1769 under the same auspices he had rejected only a few years before. What made the difference was not a change in heart by Wentworth but a change in position, for at this time he was retired from active service to the crown and no longer bound by instructions from the King.[30] But in 1764 Wentworth's rejection of a college free of the Church of England delayed the start of this important institution, and in the process he crossed swords with an influential and united Congregational clergy. The consequences to the Wentworth interests might have been more serious during the Fall of 1765 when the ministers chose Portsmouth for their annual meeting and elected the fiery Samuel Langdon as their moderator. Fortunately there were members of the oligarchy either in union with Congregationalism or at least aware of the necessity of placating its leaders so that there was no wholesale effort to eject the Wentworths from power at that time.[31]

The dissatisfaction with Benning Wentworth's administration as governor of New Hampshire reached beyond that of the home government and certain elements within the province and was even shared by some members of his own official family as well. They had not

always supported his views or agreed with his conduct in certain matters though they rarely openly defied him. Some of them opposed his early efforts to settle and develop the land on the west bank of the Merrimack River because it would have conflicted with their own design to purchase it from Mason for their own exclusive profit. Though they thought his position correct in the controversy with the assembly during 1749-1752, they would not have been so obstinate and unbending as the governor; nor did they appreciate the strict interpretation he lent to his commission and instructions, especially regarding the issue of paper money. When he most needed their support for his policy of pacification of the Indians in 1752 they deserted him.

As the governor's administration wore on he was increasingly able to insulate himself from an undue influence by the oligarchy, which he had raised to the pinnacle of its power and wealth, and free himself from a dependence upon the assembly except as regards appropriations to finance war. Yet he was unable to enjoy this independence. Advancing age, coupled with declining health and possibly disillusionment at the failure of his plans for the future of his sons, incapacitated him for strong executive leadership during the last decade of his administration. More and more he tended to submit to the wishes of his clan, and the moderating influence of his closest associates, Theodore Atkinson and Mark Hunking Wentworth, is clearly discernible in directing provincial affairs during a most critical period.

Following the Connecticut River boundary decision in 1764 plans were made to contest it and possibly even to reverse it in favor of New Hampshire. As already noted, the council and assembly actively promoted the scheme as they stood to lose tremendous profits in land should the boundary remain fixed. Nowhere is the governor's interest discernible in promoting the scheme. The council records do not indicate that he discussed a course of action with it. No messages or instructions were sent to the assembly on the matter. Neither did he advise the province's agent in London to take up the cause nor did he seek the aid of influential friends in the home government or prominent merchants trading with the province. On the other hand, his correspondence with Governor Colden of New York indicates that he accepted the decision, had no intention of contesting it, and entreated Colden not to be vindictive towards the settlers in the area.[32]

During the Stamp Act controversy the governor was persuaded not to display his fighting spirit by enforcing the unpopular act. If he had chosen to do so, at most he stood to be ejected from office by the populace, but already the same possibility was hanging over his head from the home government. The real losers would have been his relatives and the province as both stood to gain by a reversal of the boundary decision should they secure the good graces of the King. Furthermore, Wentworth was incapable of actively consorting with Henry Sherburne, the Congregational clergy, or other leaders of the Sons of Liberty, which was necessary to maintain the peace.[33] They were the ones who had actively opposed his every

effort to establish undisputed royal authority in the province and who had resented his every move to instate his family as the chief guardians and dispensers of this authority.

There are many possible explanations why Wentworth abruptly allowed leadership of his clan and the province to be assumed by his close associates. He was in his seventies, and failing health confined him to his house at Little Harbor for years at a time. If he did not die he expected to be removed from office by the home government at any moment so that the storm over stamps could not affect him in this regard.[34] In addition to what money he kept in his house he had deposited with Barlow Tracothick in London some ten thousand guineas, more than enough to sustain him in comfort his few remaining years, so that no matter how the boundary decision was finally to be resolved it would not affect him.[35] All of these reasons help to explain his lack of executive leadership in the final years of his administration; but one must look into the personal tragedy of his life to find the ultimate explanation.

It would seem that Governor Wentworth, like many other ambitious colonials at the time, entertained a hope that he could establish a landed aristocracy among his relatives presided over by his immediate heirs.[36] Early in his administration he made son Foster a deputy surveyor of woods possibly with the view that Foster would someday succeed him as the surveyor for all the American colonies. With Foster in command of that important office, his favorite son, Benning, could succeed him as governor of the province. It cannot even be conjectured what plans he had for his third son,

John, for by nature he was not shrewd or tough enough to survive the rough and tumble of provincial politics and be a success in either capacity or in any high office which entailed controversy or tenacity.[37] He would have made an ideal bishop for the established church should the King ever consent to an American episcopate.

Whatever plans Wentworth entertained for his sons ended in dismal tragedy. The death of Foster and Benning, followed closely by that of their mother in 1755, left the governor ". . .almost Inconsolable. . ." and he was so "incapacitated to think or Transact Business. . ." that Atkinson, for all practical purposes, was acting governor for some time and assumed leadership in prosecuting the war.[38] Benning Wentworth's grief was complete with the death of his only remaining son, John, in 1759.

The tragedy of his wife and sons was too much for the old gentleman to bear alone. Sickly, disillusioned, and nearly heart-broken, the governor sought the companionship of Martha Hilton, the one bright spot in his dotage. She had been orphaned at an early age and forced to support herself by working in a tavern, and Wentworth some years before had taken her into his house as a servant girl. Apparently she took good care of his precarious health after the death of his wife and so dispelled the loneliness of the dismal great house that he made her mistress of it in 1760. This May-December marriage might have seemed comical to the socially conscious aristocracy of Portsmouth had not Martha come from such humble circumstances. It was in fact, however, a rude shock to them that Wentworth, whom they had traditionally looked to for social direction,

should marry "A Dirty Slute of a Maid. . ." a characterization which even circulated among polite circles in London.[39] That she had lived in poverty and had worked in a tavern, and therefore was socially beneath any Wentworth, caused them to overlook the fact that she was descended from Richard Hilton, one of the first settlers of the province, and related to ex-Governor Dudley of Massachusetts.

The marriage only served to strain relations between the governor and his clan and acted as a crucible to distinguish among the many recipients of his patronage those who were his true friends. The governor's nephew, John, was dispatched to London the following year to protect the interests of the clan should Wentworth's marriage prove to be the final straw in prompting his removal from office.[40] As already noted, John Wentworth succeeded in attaching himself to the Rockingham ministry when it came into power in 1766 and prevailed upon the Marquis to grant him a commission as governor of New Hampshire, thus making it appear that Benning was retiring in favor of his nephew without being tainted with the disgrace the Wentworth clan attached to removal.[41]

When John Wentworth arrived in New Hampshire to assume his duties, June 13, 1767, all the provincial officers were on hand to greet him but one, Benning Wentworth. It has generally been contended that Benning's absence on this occasion was due to incapacity rather than any grievance against his nephew.[42] His health probably was a factor; certainly it was a convenient excuse for not attending the new governor. The fact remains that neither John Wentworth nor

certain other members of the oligarchy approved of Martha Hilton's occupying the great house or sharing in the governor's estate. At one time Benning had so devised his will that John would have inherited about three-fourths of his uncle's vast estate.[43] The manner in which the oligarchy snubbed the governor's lady was an affront to her husband's own sense of dignity, and the ingratitude of his relatives for his many favors to them could not but fill him with resentment. He manifested it by making a new will leaving his entire estate to Martha Hilton, and when its contents became known upon his death in 1770, the Portsmouth oligarchy was shocked and incensed with rage. It was Benning Wentworth's farewell address to an ungrateful family.

CONCLUSION

Benning Wentworth's twenty-five years of service to crown and colony constituted the longest continuous administration of any royal governor in American colonial history. Because of the dual nature of his office, that of representative of the King and governor of the people of New Hampshire, his administration must be measured by how well he served both concurrently, keeping in mind that so far as service to the latter is concerned it also involved promoting the interests of his family, and that he looked upon Wentworth-New Hampshire as a singular and indivisible concept.

The task of such an evaluation would be relatively simple if his administration could be measured by any one standard. Unfortunately this is impossible because the dual nature of his office necessarily involves a dual set of standards by which to measure his performance in one capacity or the other. As an imperial administrator he must be considered within the framework of his commission and instructions, and his conduct must be measured by the extent to which he honored them in carrying out the wishes of King and Parliament. The same standard can be applied, but with much less success and results that are far from satisfactory, to his function as chief executive of the province. In this connection the problem can be resolved more happily if his administration is evaluated according to the goals which he set for himself when taking office in 1741.

The task confronting Benning Wentworth in 1741 was formidable enough to test the ability and perseverence of the most seasoned

administrator. He assumed an office that was not considered profitable or worthwhile by many gentlemen seeking favor with the crown. Not only was the salary meagre, but it was entirely uncertain as the assembly, upon whose good graces it depended, had hitherto been loathe to settle it upon a permanent basis, and by 1741 the custom of withholding it and other appropriations for governmental expenses pending submission of the executive to the wishes of the legislature had been firmly established.

Not only had Wentworth the task of securing his own financial independence from the assembly and thereby placing himself in a position to command obedience to the crown's policies, but he was confronted also with a province that was economically incapable of sustaining itself independently of Massachusetts, upon which it had depended for a century. Trade had steadily shrunk, especially in the lumbering business because of the disappearance of the forests along the coast. The population had increased only slowly and was confined along the seaboard with no great push to settle the interior and develop farming. The progressive decline of the province's major staple of export, coupled with a population confined to an area too small to feed it because of the Indian threat along the frontier, promised the eventual decay of New Hampshire, either by slow starvation, financial insolvency, or economic stagnation.

Benning Wentworth set about to rescue New Hampshire from this gloomy prospect and develop it into a first-rate province, loyal to the King and profitable to his family. The first logical step in this program was to secure his own economic independence

from the assembly and at the same time extract from it cognizance that as the King's representative he was the fountain from which all authority flowed. Since he and his family had been instrumental in securing territorial independence from Massachusetts and with it a settlement of the southern boundary, it was quite natural that he should expect an early and generous determination of his salary on a permanent basis, even though none of his predecessors had been so honored. The assembly had enjoyed much too long its power of the purse to give it up so easily, even for a friend, and Wentworth's haughty manner only nettled the representatives into a most unsatisfactory compliance. His position, further compromised on the matter of salary by the war of 1744, became precarious at its conclusion when even his authority came to be questioned in certain matters. The bold stand he made from 1749 to 1752 ended in a complete victory for the royal prerogative and remains as a unique monument in American colonial history to one of the King's most faithful and courageous servants. Unfortunately, the Great War for Empire and the need for money and troops from the assembly favored a resurrection of its encroachments upon the executive power which tended greatly to qualify the extent of his earlier success over the representatives. But this too shows his devotion to his King and the empire, for had he so desired to keep the assembly in its humbled position, he could have done so by not extracting a full measure of service from the province towards the successful conclusion of the war against the King's enemies. The latter, he determined, was of

more immediate consequence to crown and province, and the respectable performance by New Hampshire in these two wars was directly the result of his tireless efforts and outstanding devotion to what he considered his first duty, service to the King.

A part of this service entailed gaining a foothold for the Church of England in the religious and educational life of the province, which he pursued as stubbornly as opposition to the increase of paper currency in circulation. He was more successful in promoting the interests of the established church than in controlling the value of his money, and his pursuit of these goals won the continued hostility, however moderated it had become, of the assembly and the people it represented while failing to gain the appreciation or approval of the crown. Furthermore, his devotion to the crown's policies, as dictated by his commission and instructions, at times conflicted with the insatiable demands of his family for power and profit even though it enjoyed both under his administration to a degree never before achieved by any other family in the province.

The extent of his victory for the royal prerogative in 1752 was never fully appreciated or comprehended by the home government, and his approval of huge sums of paper money during both wars did not evoke anywhere near the degree of dissatisfaction as his equally obvious violation of instructions regarding the granting of lands, his laxity as surveyor general of the King's woods, or his failure to maintain a regular correspondence with his superiors.

A sovereign who chose to ignore his good services to the crown to the exclusive consideration of his faults as an imperial

administrator, combined with a council and assembly pursuing their own narrow self-interests, caused him to neglect in his final years an active prosecution of those material goals which he had so vigorously pursued in an earlier time. Approval or dissatisfaction of his conduct by the crown or a due obedience from the assembly had as little meaning for him in his last years as the vast amount of wealth he had accumulated. In all of these things he had sought to establish precedents favorable to his sons' carrying on after him, but all became meaningless by 1759 with the death of his last son. From this point on can be traced his decided lack of interest in the affairs of crown and colony and family, except that he acquiesced in the interests of the latter to salvage what it could for maintaining its position in the province.

Despite his neglect of duty to royal interests in some matters, despite his violation of royal instructions at times, the fact remains that the authority of the crown in New Hampshire enjoyed a more favored and secure position when Benning Wentworth left office than at any previous time in the province's history.

In general, the province itself greatly changed, expanded and reaped much permanent benefit from his tenure in office. With the settlement of the boundary bordering Massachusetts, Wentworth prepared to claim and settle all the land west to twenty miles of the Hudson River and north to the Canadian border. If he could make good his extreme western claims the province would be more than quadrupled in size. If the Connecticut River was to remain as the western boundary, as so happened, he can be credited with more than

doubling the limits of the province. Because of this expansionist policy, he granted more territory than all his predecessors combined, and the population was encouraged to break loose from its coastal confines and settle the interior along with land seekers from the neighboring colonies. As a result New Hampshire, along with Massachusetts, registered the greatest population increase of all the colonies during the period under consideration. It jumped from eleven thousand when he took office to something in excess of fifty-two thousand inhabitants by 1767; literally hundreds of new townships were being settled, and farming had come to assume major proportions. The permanence and importance of the new western settlements could be assured only by adequate roads linking them to the coastal cities, especially Portsmouth, and Wentworth wisely made use of his troops in constructing them during the wars. By 1763, however, the assembly had come to appreciate the governor's long-range planning and itself appropriated money to construct a major highway from Portsmouth to the fertile Coos country in the north marking the first farm-to-market highway in the province.

Wentworth's western land policy and road construction had other important consequences than the expansion of agriculture. It enabled lumbermen to tap the rich hinterland, thus revitalizing the export business in timber, increased New Hampshire's prominence in the shipbuilding industry, and reaffirmed Portsmouth as a prominent coastal center for trade.

Governor Wentworth did not succeed in getting contracts for building warships for the Royal Navy as he had anticipated (only

the America was constructed in 1749), but the shipbuilding industry did expand, thanks to the availability of roads to the interior forests, so that by the time he left office New Hampshire and Massachusetts constructed slightly more than half of all the tonnage of the colonies, which was somewhere in the neighborhood of ten to twelve thousand tons annually.

The province maintained its lively coastal trade with Boston and the West Indies, and because of increasing demand for manufactured goods by a rapidly expanding population, actually increased its trade with England, with timber as a major staple of export for exchange. Portsmouth remained the center of this thriving business, and its many elaborate and beautiful mansions bear witness to its success and prosperity.

It was Benning Wentworth's patronage that enabled his family to participate in this expansive growth and reap the profits from it. Not only did they occupy all the important provincial offices, but they had become the largest landowners, principal mast contractors and chief carriers of commerce to and from the province with between one-half and two-thirds of all ships clearing Portsmouth harbor registered to them.

These, then, were the goals which Benning Wentworth set about to achieve and for which he must be accounted largely successful. It was no easy task to administer the interests of crown, colony, and family concurrently to the satisfaction of all concerned and to reconcile them. Yet reconcile them he did, and though there was a general dissatisfaction with his administration from all by

1767, nevertheless each had come to occupy vastly better circumstances than at any previous time. So successfully did Wentworth combine and promote the interests of all three factions that it is tempting to wonder if New Hampshire would have been one of the first colonies to embrace rebellion in 1775 had he been governor and in his prime.

1 Representation of Province Secretary Richard Waldron in Isaac W. Hammond, et al., eds., Provincial and State Papers of New Hampshire, (1890), XVIII, 79; hereafter referred to as Province Papers.

2 Frank B. Sanborn, New Hampshire, An Epitome of Popular Government (1904), 166.

3 Lands granted as "private property" were exempt from reserving mast pines for the King's use.

4 Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings (1912), VL, 201. For the Kingswood charter see Province Papers, (1875), IX, 456.

5 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, February 28, 1734, Province Papers (1870), IV, 837.

6 Thomas Bailey Aldrich, An Old Town by the Sea (1917), 30.

7 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution (1936), III, 44.

8 Leonard W. Labaree, "The Royal Governors of New England," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts (1937), XXXII, 129.

9 Collections of the New York Historical Society (1923-27), I, 480, 491, 497; II, 613, 642, 886; LV, 85. See also "Belcher Papers," Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (1893), 6 Series VI, 395; hereafter referred to as Belcher Papers.

10 Jonathan Belcher to David Dunbar, September 3, 1733, Ibid., 364.

11 Michael Kraus, Intercolonial Aspects of American Culture On the Eve of the Revolution (1928), 40.

12 John Farmer, ed., History of New Hampshire, by Jeremy Belknap (1831), 234. See also James Truslow Adams, Provincial Society, 1690-1763 (1928), 232.

13 Albert S. Batchellor, ed., Laws of New Hampshire (1913), II, 454; hereafter referred to as N. H. Laws.

14 Frank B. Sanborn, op. cit., 169.

15 Ernest Caulfield, "Some Common Diseases of Colonial Children," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts (1951), XXXV, 16-17.

16 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, December 20, 1740, Province Papers (1890), XVIII, 167.

17 William Armstrong Fairburn, Merchant Sail (1945), I, 269. See also Lawrence Shaw Mayo; "The Kings' Woods," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings (1922), LIV, 52.

18 Jonathan Belcher to the Board of Trade, April 4, 1737, Lawrence Henry Gipson, Op. Cit., 44,

19 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (1926), 274-5. See also William Armstrong Fairburn, op. cit., I, 271.

20 Clifford K. Shipton, Biographical Sketches of Those Who Attended Harvard College in the Classes 1713-1721 (1942), VI, 118; hereafter referred to as Sibley's Harvard Graduates.

21 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, March 4, 1737, Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings (1911), XLIV, 191.

22 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, V, 163; VII, 140; VIII, 530. See also [Paul Wein], A Concise Historical Account of all the British Colonies in North-America (1775), 136-137.

23 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, December 10, 1734, Province Papers, IV, 841. See also N. H. Laws, II, 452; Belcher Papers, 6 Series VI, 58.

24 Ibid., VI, 84, 119; VII, 100.

25 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VI, 224.

26 The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, (1852), VI, 165.

27 In addition to a large amount of bills outstanding on £15,000 issued before his administration. N. H. Laws, II, 451.

28 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, February 28, 1734, Province Papers, IV, 836.

29 Ibid., 835.

30 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, February 28, 1734, Province Papers, IV, 836.

". . .at present whatever is proposed by the house for the good of the Province is not concurred by the Council who is so entirely swayed and influenced by the Governor [Belcher] that any thing that seems in the least to clash with the Massachusetts Interest is Imediately rejected and this we fear will always be the case while we are governed by a Massachusetts man, which we are fond of believing is near at an End. . ."

31 Province Papers, XVIII, 166.

32 Frank B. Sanborn, op. cit., 169; Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 445; Province Papers, V, 87; XVIII, 64-65; Ayer MSS nos. 625 and 886 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

33 Board of Trade Journal, 1734/5-1741 (1930), VII, 301; Belcher Papers, 6 Series VII, 379; Nathaniel Adams, Annals of Portsmouth (1825), 168-169.

34 Jonathan Belcher to Richard Waldron, December 21, 1737, Belcher Papers, 6 Series VI, 439.

35 Jonathan Belcher to his son, August 25, 1740, Ibid., 326. See also Belcher to Richard Partridge, December 24, 1739, ibid., 6 Series VII, 497; and Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, May 22, 1738, Province Papers, IV, 846.

36 Shirley succeeded Belcher as governor of Massachusetts but later denied complicity in the plot to remove him. See Province Papers, XVIII, 159-160; and Charles A. Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of William Shirley (1912), I, 7, 13, 15-16, 26.

37 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VIII, 527.

38 Jonathan Belcher to his son, November 26, 1739, Belcher Papers, 6 Series VII, 495.

39 Paul Wein, op. cit., 137.

40 John Thomlinson to Theodore Atkinson, June 23, 1740, Province Papers, XVIII, 162; see also 115-116; and V, 918. The boundary was established in 1741 just prior to Benning Wentworth's arrival in New Hampshire as governor.

41 John Thomlinson to Theodore Atkinson, July 14, 1738, Province Papers, XVIII, 157.

42 Leonard W. Labaree, op. cit., XXXII, 129, note 3. See also Jonathan Belcher to Richard Waldron, October 22, 1739, Belcher Papers, 6 Series VII, 222.

43 N. H. Laws, II, 636; Belknap, op. cit., 257-258; Province Papers, IV, 843; Lawrence Shaw Mayo, op. cit., LIV, 52.

1 In a letter to Richard Waldron, August 25, 1740, Governor Belcher said he remembered Benning repeating an oft-told story of his dangerous crossings of the mountains of Granada to Madrid, Spain, and concluded that "For the future. . .let him have the honourable title of Don Granada. . ." This is perhaps the most complimentary name that Belcher coined about Wentworth and by which he was called behind his back. See Belcher Papers, 6 Series VII, 515.

2 Belknap, op. cit., 262-263.

3 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VI, 113.

4 Province Papers, XXXX, 270.

5 Ibid., XXXX, 273, 355, 381, 384, 396.

6 Ibid., XVIII, 75.

7 Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings (1911), XLIV, 199. See also Belknap, 237.

8 Province Papers, XXXII, 813-814.

9 Province Papers, V, 929-930; Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, July 11, 1741, ibid., XVIII, 172-173. Brothers Samuel and Mark each advanced £100, and his brother-in-law Theodore Atkinson advanced the other £100. In a letter to Thomlinson, July 16, 1742, Benning forwarded a draft from Mark for £200 to be applied to his account, promising to send more when he was able. Ayer MSS #39 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

10 Province Papers, XVIII, 187, 374.

11 Belknap, op. cit., 237, 327. See also Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John Wentworth, Governor of New Hampshire, 1767-1775 (1921), 5.

12 Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, August 19, 1735, Province Papers, IV, 845. The desire to spread the primacy of the Anglican Church became more urgent after the Great Awakening, when ". . .revival enthusiasm tended to be identified. . .with social unrest and the aspirations of less priviledged classes." See Stow Persons, American Minds: A History of Ideas (1958), 91; N. H. Laws, II, 452.

13 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, March 23, 1751, Province Papers, XVIII, 396.

14 Ibid., V, 137.

15 Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., op. cit., I, 229. Before 1740 province shipping was rated at only 500 tons and outside vessels at 400 more. See Frank B. Sanborn, op. cit., 192.

16 William A. Fairburn, op. cit., I, 270-271. See also Wentworth to Thomlinson, July 16, 1742, Ayer MSS #622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

17 N. H. Laws, II, 701; III, 60; Province Papers, V, 412; XVIII, 142.

18 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, January 23, 1744, Province Papers, XVIII, 198-201.

19 Ibid., V, 624.

1 Province Papers, V, 135-137.

2 Richard Waldron to Robert Pepperell, March 26, 1742, New England Historical and Genealogical Register (1865), XIX, 223.

2 Province Papers, V, 139, 143.

4 Ibid., V, 148.

5 Ibid., V, 150, 159, 615, 619, 629; XVIII, 146.

6 The value of "New Tenor" was established in 1742, probably by royal authority, and thus also known as Proclamation Money. Six shillings and eight pence was equal to one ounce sterling silver, Troy weight, and the ratio between "Old" and "New Tenor" was set at four to one, that is four shillings "Old" equalled in value one shilling in "New Tenor." See Province Papers, V, 619, 647, and Note, 672; N. H. Laws, II, 684, 693.

7 Province Papers, V, 151.

8 Ibid., XVIII, 139-141.

9 Ibid., V, 654; XVIII, 147-148.

10 Ibid., V, 217, 474, 486, 515, 583, 623, 681, 815, 855, 905; VI, 233, 674, 692, 695-696, 716, 744, 751, 759, 791, 802-803, 807, 826, 828, 878; VII, 79, 103.

11 As early as December 4, 1742, Wentworth sent Josiah Willard and Ebenezer Hinsdale with four others to the Connecticut River to survey and lay out a road west to Merrimack River and investigate the resources of the land in that area. He informed the assembly of this action May 10, 1743, and six days later it made an appropriation for such a road conditional upon the governor's approving the £25,000 loan bill. See Province Papers, V, 652, 656; XVIII, 142.

12 Ibid., VI, 187, 328.

13 Benning Wentworth to the Board of Trade, January 23, 1744, Ibid., XVIII, 198; Wentworth to Governor Clinton, November 17, 1749, Ibid., X, 199; Theodore Atkinson to John Thomlinson, May 9, 1744, Ibid., XVIII, 188.

14 Ibid., V, 187.

15 Ibid., V, 188, 223, 255-256; XVIII, 189, 203, 211, 715, 716, 734-736. See also Board of Trade Journal, January 1742 to December 1749 (1931), VIII, 122.

16 Province Papers, V, 235, 237, 245-249. The number of workers proved inadequate and the leading citizens of Portsmouth sent their servants to man the gondolas transporting sods to the fort. Ibid., XVIII, 207.

17 Ibid., V, 235-237.

18 Ibid., V, 236, 245, 713. Between April, 1742 and January, 1744, Wentworth had consented to paper emissions totaling L31,786:13:4.

19 Ibid., V, 252; XVIII, 210-211.

20 Ibid., V, 724; XVIII, 189-190. See also William H. Fry, N. H. As A Royal Province, op. cit., 484.

21 Province Papers, V, 933. See also Shirley Correspondence, I, 192, Note 1.

22 Samuel Wells to Roger Wolcott, December 4, 1747, "Law Papers," II, 295; III, 168, in Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society (1907, 1914), XIV, XV. See also Shirley Correspondence, I, 154, Note 1.

23 Wentworth to William Shirley, April 12, 1745, Province Papers, V, 950.

24 Wentworth to the Duke of Newcastle, November 14, 1746, as cited in Leonard W. Labaree, Royal Government in America (1930), 310.

25 Province Papers, V, 271-273.

26 Ibid., V, 279,

27 Ibid., V, 287.

28 Ibid., V, 289-291.

29 John G. Palfrey, History of New England (1890), V, 182. See also Shirley Correspondence, I, 187-188. Wentworth's enemies believed that he was to be made governor of Cape Breton, "which is to be a place of refuge to him from his creditors." See Belknap, op. cit., 271, note.

30 Province Papers, V, 102-104, 294; XVIII, 218, 228-230.

31 Ibid., V, 330, 333, 336. See also N. H. Laws, II, 15.

32 Province Papers, V, 116, 310, 352, 410, 487, 585, 906; XVIII, 223-224.

33 Ayer MSS #622 and 625 (Newberry Library, Chicago). See also Province Papers, V, 539-540.

34 William H. Fry, N. H. As a Royal Province, 141.

35 Wentworth justified this action on the basis of these towns paying one-fifth of the total province tax. See James Munro, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series, 1745-1766 (1911), IV, 31.

36 Province Papers, V, 260.

37 Ibid., V, 263.

38 Ibid., V, 264.

39 William Shirley to Benning Wentworth, March 27, 1745, Ibid., V, 227. See also Collections of the New Hampshire Historical Society (1824), I, 145-146; hereafter referred to as Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc.

40 Province Papers, V, 227.

41 Ibid., V, 302, 312.

42 Ibid., V, 220-222.

43 Ibid., V, 308-310.

44 Ibid., V, 320-322.

45 Ibid., VI, 47.

46 Ibid., V, 332-339.

47 Herbert M. Sylvester, Indian Wars of New England (1910), III, 300, 359-360.

48 Province Papers, V, 162, 164.

49 Ibid., V, 95-96.

50 Ibid., V, 220-221.

51 Ibid., V, 224.

52 Ibid., V, 713.

53 Ibid., V, 412, 709-713.

54 Ibid., V, 371, 374.

55 Ibid., V, 491, 587, 712.

56 Ibid., V, 500-501, 516.

57 Number Four (Charlestown) had to be abandoned during the winter of 1746, but Governor Shirley had it reoccupied as soon as the snows melted. See John H. McClintock, History of New Hampshire (1889), 206, 209; and Belknap, op. cit., 291-292.

58 Province Papers, V, 429.

59 Ibid., XVIII, 243-244; Shirley Correspondence, I, 319-320.

60 Province Papers, XVIII, 188, 245.

61 Ibid., V, 108, 111, 463-464, 836-838, 845.

62 Ibid., V, 845; XVIII, 245.

63 Ibid., V, 845; XVIII, 245, 299-300, 310. See also "Law Papers," op. cit., II, 361-362.

64 William H. Fry, N. H. As A Royal Province, 395; Province Papers, XVIII, 362.

65 Leo F. Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliament Respecting North America, 1739-1754 (1941), V, 271, 416, As late as January 20, 1755, Governor Wentworth had received no information about the reimbursement for the Canada Expedition. Wentworth to John Thomlinson, January 20, 1755, Ayer MSS #622 (Newberry Library, Chicago). The amount reimbursed by the crown was considerably less than the bill submitted. For example, the charge for the Canada Expedition was £31,298:8:11 3/4, but the sum allowed came only to £21,446:10:10 1/2. Province Papers, XVIII, 383.

66 Ibid., V, 238, 290, 293, 296, 299-300, 371, 382, 384, 424-425, 432-433, 438, 443, 472, 558, 713, 742, 744, 776, 813, 819, 821, 826.

1 Richard Waldron to Richard Pepperell, March 26, 1742, New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XIX (1865), 222-223. Jonathan Belcher to Richard Waldron, April 3, 1742, Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., IV, 99.

2 Province Papers, V, 611; XVIII, 397. Waldron was also a judge of probate and Wentworth removed him from this office also and installed Andrew Wiggin in his place.

3 Province Papers, VI, 43; XVIII, 179, 181; Ayer MSS Number 622 (Newberry Library, Chicago); Sibley's Harvard Graduates, IX, 232, 234.

4 Province Papers, VI, 51.

5 Ibid., V, 558-562.

6 Ibid., V, 176-177, 191, 269, 335-336, 440, 522.

7 Ibid., VI, 801; VII, 3. See also Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VIII, 490-495.

8 Ayer MSS Number 622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

9 Ayer MSS Number 623, Wentworth to John Thomlinson, September 2, 1749 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

10 Ayer MSS Number 622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

11 Board of Trade Journal, January 1742/3 to December 1749, VIII, (1931), 471.

12 James Munro, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial Series, 1745-1766, IV (1911), 100. See also Province Papers, VI, 892; XVIII, 332-335, 374.

13 Ayer MSS Number 623 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

14 Province Papers, VI, 40, 47-48.

15 Ibid., VI, 49.

16 Ibid., VI, 49, 63.

17 Ibid., VI, 42, 52.

18 Ibid., VI, 53, 62.

19 Ibid., VI, 50.

20 Ibid., XVIII, 340.

21 Belknap, op. cit., 304.

22 Province Papers, VI, 86.

23 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, October 23, 1754, C.O. 5: 926, folio 222; as cited in Leonard W. Labaree, Royal Government in America (1930), 439.

24 Ibid., 432, 438. See also William H. Fry, New Hampshire As A Royal Province, op. cit., 168.

25 The "patriot" party was composed of Richard Waldron, Henry Sherburne, Junior, James Clarkson, Eleazer Russell, Thomas Millet, Peter Gilman, Zebulon Giddings and Meshech Weare. All of the Portsmouth representatives belonged to this party. See Province Papers, VI, 887; XVIII, 355-356.

26 Ibid., VI, 71-72, 75-76, 78, 80, 123.

27 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, March 23, 1751, ibid., XVIII, 397. See Governor Cranfield's commission in Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., VIII (1866), 81.

28 Province Papers, VI, 81, 84, 86.

29 Ibid., XVIII, 340.

30 Ibid., VI, 85.

31 Ibid., VI, 63, 87.

32 Ibid., VI, 63, 92, 94, 100.

33 Ibid., VI, 887-888; XVIII, 404.

34 John Thorpe to Slingsly Bethell, July 5, 1749, Province Papers, VI, 65-66. In a letter to the province agent, Thomlinson, June 11, 1749, Wentworth desired him only to get copies of the complaints that he might answer them and "block up every point I am Charged with To your & every bodys else satisfaction." So confident was the governor in his ability to meet these charges that he specifically urged the agent not to appear on his behalf before the Board of Trade. See Ayer MSS Number 622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

35 Province Papers, VI, 3, 66-68.

36 Furthermore, Thomlinson cautioned Wentworth that if he tried to transact business with the assembly without waiting for the new representatives to be admitted, he would do so only at his "peril" so far as the King was concerned. See Province Papers, XVIII, 386.

37 Ibid., VI, 108-109, 112, 124.. See also N. H. Laws, III, 41-44.

38 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VI, 125; Leonard W. Labaree, Royal Government in America, 182-183.

39 Ibid., 184. See also Province Papers, VI, 18.

40 Ibid., VI, 129, 141. Richard Waldron, whose Grand Design and party lay in shambles, was reelected to the assembly but declined taking his seat and died the following year.

41 Labaree, op. cit., 183-184; Belknap, op. cit., 302-305; Province Papers, VI, 886-887.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

1 John H. McClintock, History of New Hampshire, op. cit., 175.

2 Frank B. Sanborn, New Hampshire: An Epitome of Popular Government, op. cit., 170-171.

3 Province Papers, V, 823-825; XXIX, 193-196.

4 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, December 8, 1742, Province Papers, XVIII, 145; ibid., January 23, 1744, Province Papers, XVIII, 197.

5 Ibid., V, 88.

6 Ibid., XXIX, 223.

7 Ibid., XXIX, 200-201.

8 Ibid., XXIX, 202-205.

9 Ibid., XXVIII, vii.

10 Ibid., XXVIII, vii.

11 Ibid., XXIX, 275-276.

12 Ibid., V, 240, 260, 834.

13 Ibid., XXIX, 239.

14 Ibid., XXIX, 240-243.

15 Councilors Atkinson and Wibird were the only ones who protested Wentworth's making the grants. See Province Papers, 243, 263.

16 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, March 23, 1751, ibid., XVIII, 395.

17 Ibid., XXIX, 252.

18 Ibid., XVIII, 398.

19 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, January 23, 1744, Province Papers, XVIII, 198-200. See also N. H. Laws, II, 62-621 for Wentworth's thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth and fortieth instructions.

20 Province Papers, XXIX, 291.

21 William H. Fry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province, op. cit., 265. See also E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, IV (1853), 547.

22 Matt B. Jones, Vermont in the Making, 1750-1777 (1939), 25.

23 Province Papers, V, 202.

24 O'Callaghan, supra, IV, 332.

25 Province Papers, X, 203; O'Callaghan, supra, IV, 334ff; Mary G. Nye, ed., State Papers of Vermont, VII (1947), 1-6.

26 Province Papers, XVIII, 398-400. See also O'Callaghan, supra, IV, 341.

27 Province Papers, XVIII, 399-400; XIX, 536-538. See also Matt B. Jones, Vermont in the Making, op. cit., 28-29.

28 "Letter Book of John Watts, Merchant and Councillor of New York," Collections of the New York Historical Society (1928), 317.

29 Wentworth to John Thomlinson, January 20, 1754, Ayer MSS Number 622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

30 Charles B. Kinney, Church and State: The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630-1900 (1955), 67-70.

31 George P. Anderson, "New Hampshire Land Grants to Boston Men," Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXV (1924), 34-38.

32 John Thomlinson to Theodore Atkinson, March 4, 1750, Province Papers, XVIII, 370.

33 Belknap, op. cit., 325.

34 Matt B. Jones, Vermont in the Making, op. cit., 50.

1 Stanley M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (1933), 261.

2 Wentworth to Pitt, December 9, 1760, Gertrude S. Kimball, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt, II (1906), 362.

3 Wentworth to Robinson, October, 1754, as cited in John G. Palfrey, History of New England, V (1890), 189, note 1.

4 MSS ltr, Wentworth to George Clinton, January 23, 1750/1, Clinton Papers (William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor).

5 Wentworth to Pitt, October 19, 1760, as cited in George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (1923), 147.

6 Kimball, Pitt Correspondence, op. cit., II, 362. See also Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, op. cit., 265.

7 Wentworth to Pitt, February 3, 1758 and December 9, 1760, Kimball, Pitt Correspondence, op. cit., I, 179-180 and II, 362-363. See also Beer, British Colonial Policy, op. cit., 78-79, 90-91, 238. The Portsmouth merchants did not suffer greatly during the war because the ships they lost, even though considerable in number, were insured far above their value. See Andrew Burnaby, Travels Through the Middle Settlements in North-America, 1759-1760 (1960), 109.

8 William H. Fry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province, op. cit., 188-190, 200.

9 Province Papers, VI, 739; XVIII, 454-455. MSS ltr, Wentworth to Lord Loudoun, August 6, 1756 (Huntington Library, San Marino). "Lloyd Papers," Collections of the New York Historical Society, II (1927), 547. Beer, British Colonial Policy, op. cit., 264.

10 Province Papers, VI, 608-613.

11 Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of William Shirley, op. cit., II, 143, note 3. See also Province Papers, VI, 340-343 and VII, 28-30; Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1 Series I (1792), 75-76; Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 126.

12 Sibley, supra, VI, 127.

32 Ibid., XVIII, 440-443, 550. See also Oliver M. Dickinson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (1951), 61. In Chapter II, "Parliament Reimburses the Colonies, 1756-1765," of his forthcoming Volume X on The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Lawrence H. Gipson shows that New Hampshire received reimbursement also in 1758, 1759, and 1760, which amounted to £6,830. Therefore, it would seem that the total reimbursement to New Hampshire amounted to £16,330.

33 MSS ltr, Wentworth to General Gage, December 26, 1764, Gage Papers (Clements Library, Ann Arbor). Wentworth admitted that the fur trade of the province was small and that he had issued only two licences to traders, each of whom did business with about thirty Indians apiece.

34 Province Papers, VI, 627. See also Jones, Vermont in the Making, op. cit., 45.

35 See Province Papers, XXVI, for the New Hampshire grants and X for the grants west of the Connecticut River.

36 Province Papers, I, 207.

37 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, August 14, 1763 and Board of Trade to Wentworth, October 21, 1763, as cited in Jones, supra, 43-44, 54.

38 Province Papers, XXVI, lists the number of grantees, but allowing for the indexing system whereby different individuals with similar names are not distinguished, the number of grantees would probably exceed six thousand.

39 "Memorial of Peter Livius" (Newburyport, Massachusetts), Essex Journal, March 2, 1774. Governor John Wentworth coroborated this testimony and used it as a basis for confiscating his uncle's lands for regranting after the latter's death in 1770.

40 Jones, op. cit., 51-53. See also Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 128.

41 Charles B. Kinney, Church and State: The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630-1900, 68-69, 72, 82, note 71.

42 Representations of Lieutenant-Governor Colden to the Board of Trade, January 20 and February 8, 1764, in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, IV (1853), 349-351. See also Province Papers, X, 310.

43 O'Callaghan, supra, IV, 355.

44 Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., op. cit., II (1828), 281. See also Belknap, op. cit., 326.

1 Eleanor L. Lord, Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North America (1898), 90. See also Lawrence H. Gipson, Jared Ingersoll: A Study of American Loyalism in Relation to British Colonial Government (1920), 89.

2 Nathaniel Adams, Annals of Portsmouth (1825), 165. See also Lord, supra, 100, 119; and Belknap, op. cit., 188.

3 Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, III, The Northern Plantations (1936), 43-44. Bowsprits sold at two pounds ten shillings to around fifty-two pounds, depending upon the demand. Yards commanded prices that ranged from six and one-half pounds to over thirty-two pounds. See also Lawrence Shaw Mayo, "The King's Woods," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, LIV (1922), 52.

4 Province Papers, VI, 914. See also Adams, supra, 175; Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 117-118; and Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (1926), 253.

5 Province Papers, XVIII, 143.

6 Ibid., V, 224; XVIII, 143, 187, 374-375, 516. See also Albion, supra, 269.

7 Province Papers, XVIII, 178-179.

8 Ibid., XVIII, 530-531.

9 See map, Appendix B.

10 N. H. Laws, op. cit., III, 338, 351.

11 Mayo, supra, 55.

12 Province Papers, V, 412; XVIII, 142, 198-201.

13 James Truslow Adams, Provincial Society, 1690-1763 (1928), 297-298. See also Oscar Zeichner, Connecticut's Years of Controversy, 1750-1776 (1939), 36-37.

14 Wentworth to Jonathan Law, October 11, 1745, Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, XIII (1911), 91.

15 Ibid., May 30, 1747, XV (1914), 41-42.

16 Ibid., XVI, (1916), 231-233.

17 Ibid., XVI, 236.

18 Gipson, Jared Ingersoll, op. cit., 84-85.

19 Lord, op. cit., 122.

20 Coll. Conn. Hist. Soc., op. cit., XVI, 310. In an effort to strike back at Wentworth, Connecticut announced that New Hampshire currency would not be acceptable within its borders after November 1, 1756. Governor Thomas Fitch to Wentworth, November 10, 1755, Coll. Conn. Hist. Soc., XVII (1918), 177.

21 Ibid., XVII, 2-3.

22 Gipson, Jared Ingersoll, op. cit., 87-91.

23 Ibid., 94.

24 Ibid., 106. See also Board of Trade Journal, 1759-1763, XI (1935), 420.

25 Gipson, Jared Ingersoll, op. cit., 106.

26 Ibid., 108.

27 Ibid., 106-109.

28 Thomas Whately to John Temple, May 10, 1765, "Bowdoin and Temple Papers," Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 6 Series IX (1897), 54-55.

29 Joseph Harrison to John Temple, July 12, 1765, and Thomas Whately to John Temple, July 12, 1765, ibid., 64-65. Wentworth's second commission as governor, from George III in 1761, named John Temple as his Lieutenant but, apparently, he never exercised this office and preferred to live in Boston. See Province Papers, VI, 629-630.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1 Province Papers, VI, 233.

2 Ibid., XVIII, 426. See also N. H. Laws, op. cit., III, 72, 77.

3 Province Papers, VI, 232-233.

4 Ibid., VI, 249, 251.

5 Ibid., VI, 282.

6 Shirley to Wentworth, March 5, 1754, ibid., VI, 279.

7 Ibid., VI, 283.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., VI, 284-285.

10 Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 3 Series V (1836), 11.

11 Charles W. Brewster, Rambles About Portsmouth, I (1859), 182.

12 Province Papers, VI, 556-558.

13 Beverly McAnear, ed., "Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIX (1953), 729-739.

14 Lawrence H. Gipson, "The Drafting of the Albany Plan of Union," Pennsylvania History, XXVI (October, 1959), 303 note 22, 311 note 33, 315-316. See also Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VII, 141.

15 Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, V, Zones of International Friction (1942), 136-137.

16 Ibid., 136 note 63.

17 Province Papers, VI, 292, 325.

18 Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis (1953), 154.

19 Province Papers, VII, 104.

20 Belknap, op. cit., 331.

21 Thomas Bailey Aldrich, An Old Town by the Sea (1917), 18-19.

22 Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp Act," New England Quarterly, VIII (1935), 71.

23 Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, op. cit., 154.

24 Pennsylvania Gazette, January 30, 1766.

25 Portsmouth Sons of Liberty to Boston Sons of Liberty, February 8, 1766, as cited in Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 203.

26 William C. Abbott, Conflicts with Oblivion (1924), 205-206.

27 Ibid., 206. See also Sanborn, New Hampshire: An Epitome of Popular Government, op. cit., 199; and Charles H. Bell, The Bench and Bar of New Hampshire (1894), 31-32.

28 Bell, supra, 138.

29 Brewster, Rambles About Portsmouth, op. cit., I, 329. See also Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, op. cit., 182.

30 Morgan, supra, 224-225.

31 Brewster, op. cit., 234.

32 Ibid., 232-233. See also Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 229.

33 John Wentworth to Daniel Rindge, November 29, 1765, as cited in Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John Wentworth, Governor of New Hampshire, 1767-1775 (1921), 19-20.

34 Benning Wentworth to Charles Lowndes, January 10, 1766, as cited in Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VI, 131.

35 Belknap, op. cit., 332.

36 Benning Wentworth to Board of Trade, October 5, 1765, as quoted in Morgan, Stamp Act Crisis, 197-198.

37 Ibid., 163.

38 Ibid., 176-177.

39 Belknap, 332. See also John H. McClintock, History of New Hampshire, op. cit., 253.

40 Benning Wentworth to John Wentworth, January 14, 1767, Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., op. cit., III (1832), 283. The council met only upon five occasions in 1765: March 1, April 24, May 23, June 1 and September 30.

41 Theodore Atkinson to Barlow Trecothick and John Thomlinson, June 7, 1765, Province Papers, XVIII, 568.

42 The influence of the Wentworth family should not be minimized with respect to its efforts to repeal the Stamp Act. John Wentworth, Barlow Trecothick and the Marquis of Rockingham were related to each other. Trecothick was married to a Wentworth and the Marquis, Thomas Watson, was related through his mother, the daughter of the elder Marquis, Thomas Wentworth. Rockingham assumed the Wentworth name to inherit the family title and fortune. See The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, IV (1850), 322.

43 Atkinson to Trecothick and Thomlinson, June 23, 1766, Province Papers, XVIII, 570.

44 Atkinson to John Wentworth and Trecothick, July 12, 1766, ibid., XVIII, 575. See also VII, 106.

45 Ibid., X, 243.

46 Ibid., VII, 61-62, 81.

47 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, VI, 131.

48 Province Papers, VII, 84.

49 Of the 31 representatives, all but three possessed holdings on the west side of the Connecticut River. The three non-proprietors were new members of the assembly, having begun their legislative careers with the session of May, 1765. The average holding ran between 340 acres and 500 acres in any given township, and the extent to which the interest of the representatives were committed to a reversal of the King's boundary decision can be appreciated by the number of holdings each possessed. Speaker Henry Sherburne possessed property in eleven townships; John Wentworth in twenty; Clement March in eleven; Meschech Weare in eight; Thomas Bell in seven; John Chamberlain in seven; John Goffe in seven; Richard Jenness in five; Joseph Wright in four; John Hale in four; Samuel Bass in three; Richard Downing in three; Andrew Wiggin in three; Jonathan Carleton in two; Andrew Clarkson in two; Zebolon Giddings in two; Peter Gilman in two; Jonathan Moulton in two and Howard Henderson in two. Josiah Bartlett, John Barleigh, Jonathan Church, Jacob Sheafe, Joseph Smith, Christopher Toppan, Thomas Westbrook Waldron, John Wester and Ezekial Worthen possessed property in one town each. James Knowles, Eliphalet Merrill and James Underwood were the freshmen representatives who did not possess holdings in the Vermont lands.

50 John Wentworth stated that though no revenue could be expected from these lands for the first ten years, their annual increase in value amounted to ten per cent above the cost, and that within fifteen years after purchase would return an annual profit of fifteen per cent over and above the purchase price. See Jones, Vermont in the Making, op. cit., 39-40.

51 Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council From the American Plantations (1950), 421 and note 16. It was not until 1773 that the right of the King in council to exercise original jurisdiction in boundary disputes was recognized.

52 Province Papers, X, 216, 219, 310, 336, 346. See also James Munro, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series, 1766-1783, V (1912), 88-89. See also Province Papers, VII, 350. As late as 1774 the New Hampshire assembly appointed Paul Wentworth as special agent to secure restoration of the Vermont lands to the jurisdiction of New Hampshire.

53 Munro, supra, IV, 673. "His Majesty. . .doth hereby strictly Charge, require and command, that the Governor Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Province of New York, for the time being, do not, upon pain of his majesty's highest displeasure, presume to make any grants whatsoever, or any part of the lands. . . [in Vermont] until his Majesty's further pleasure shall be known, concerning the same." See Province Papers, X, 243.

54 Atkinson to Trecothick and Thomlinson, April 18, 1766, Province Papers, XVIII, 569.

55 Ibid., VII, 92.

56 Nathaniel Adams, Annals of Portsmouth (1825), 217.

57 Province Papers, XVIII, 574.

58 Ibid., VII, 104.

1 Belknap, op. cit., 335.

2 Representation of the Board of Trade, July 10, 1764, concerning the boundary line between New Hampshire and New York, as cited in Matt B. Jones, Vermont in the Making, op. cit., 399, Appendix A.

3 Wentworth to the Board of Trade, November 28, 1764, as quoted in Jones, supra, 58.

4 Ibid., 56.

5 Ibid., 57-58.

6 Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations (1950), 605, 640, 626 note 535. See also Elmer Beecher Russell, The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council (1915), 191; William Shirley to the Duke of Bedford, February 18, 1748, in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of William Shirley, op. cit., I, 475. For the acts in question and the reasons for their disallowance see James Munro, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, op. cit., IV, 674-680. The necessity of securing appropriations forced the governor to consent to bills against his better judgment. On one such occasion in 1761 he told the assembly "I am astonished at your pressing me to assent to the Bill before me, when it is so repugnant to the Laws of Great Britain, the only standard I am to measure all Laws by that I assent to . . . When you critically consider the Bill, you will find that it repeals a Law now in being, that it militates with your Constitution, that it supersedes officers in power, that it is a great indignity to the King, that it is derogatory of the Libertys & Priviledges of his Majesty's subjects, so that in fine, if you would drive me to the necessity of assenting to it, or that his Majesty's service must suffer, it may be a means of debarring the Province of the recompence you might otherwise have merrited." See Province Papers, VI, 785.

7 Atkinson to John Thomlinson, August, 19, 1761, Province Papers, XVIII, 542.

8 Among provincial circles it was rumored that the Board of Trade had lost its power and possibly this helps to explain Wentworth's ignoring it at this time. See James Nevin to Theodore Atkinson, November 14, 1761, Province Papers, XVIII, 543.

9 Elmer B. Russell, supra, 206.

10 Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776 (1955), 212. See also James Truslow Adams, Provincial Society, op. cit., 112, 254-255, 314; and Matt B. Jones, supra, 26.

11 Wentworth to John Thomlinson, January 20, 1754, Ayer MSS #622 (Newberry Library, Chicago).

12 James Nevin to Theodore Atkinson, November 14, 1761, Province Papers, XVIII, 543.

13 William H. Fry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province, op. cit., 458.

14 John F. Burns, Controversies Between Royal Governors and Their Assemblies in the Northern American Colonies (1923), 274.

15 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power, op. cit., 267.

16 Atkinson to Meshech Weare, January 16, 1756, Province Papers, XVIII, 435-436.

17 Ibid., VI, 342.

18 Ibid., VI, 343.

19 Ibid., XVIII, 496. See also Fry, supra, 463; and Munro, supra, 394-395.

20 Province Papers, VI, 759.

21 Ibid., VI, 766. The only change in the assembly's position was in regard to the number of counties to be established. Originally it asked for two counties comprehending only the territory east of the Merrimack River with Portsmouth and Exeter as the seat in each one. Later it was decided to include the territory west of Merrimack River as a third county with Dunstable as the seat of the courts. See Province Papers, VI, 722.

22 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 119-120.

23 Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John Wentworth, op. cit., 111-112.

24 N. H. Laws, op. cit., II, 627; III, 447.

25 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXV (1924), 32-33. See also Province Papers, VII, 51.

26 Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., op. cit., IX (1889), 36-39.

27 Ibid., 39.

28 Ibid.

29 Leon Burr Richardson, History of Dartmouth College, I (1932), 80.

30 Mayo, John Wentworth, op. cit., 110.

31 Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., supra, IX, 39.

32 Wentworth to Governor Colden, April 26, 1765, "Colden Papers," Collections of the New York Historical Society, LVI (1923), 28.

33 Province Papers, VI, 856; XVIII, 543.

34 So certain was Atkinson of the governor's removal in 1762 that he directed the province agent to secure a permanent commission with the broad seal from the King to insure that his son would remain as province secretary ". . .that he may not be moved at the Pleasure of Another Governor." Atkinson to John Thomlinson, July 24, 1762, Province Papers, XVIII, 549-550. To show how this attitude had changed from the previous year see ibid., XVIII, 542.

35 Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 133.

36 Belknap, op. cit., 327. See also Wilbur C. Abbott, Conflicts With Oblivion, op. cit., 211.

37 Boston Weekly Post-Boy, November 26, 1759, as cited in Sibley's Harvard Graduates, op. cit., VI, 126.

38 Province Papers, XVIII, 429.

39 James Nevin to Theodore Atkinson, November 14, 1761, ibid., XVIII, 544.

40 Nathaniel Adams, Annals of Portsmouth (1825), 222.

41 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 6 Series IV, 498. See also Province Papers, XVIII, 560-567 for John Wentworth's defense of his uncle.

42 Coll. N. H. Hist. Soc., op. cit., III, 282-283. See also Mayo, John Wentworth, supra, 29.

43 Memorial of Peter Livius (Newburyport, Massachusetts) Essex Journal, March 2, 9, 1774.

APPENDIX A

Plan showing (in black) the township grants made by Benning Wentworth in the Vermont area. Based on the Amos Doolittle map of 1789.





APPENDIX B

Road development and boundary changes during Governor Benning Wentworth's administration, 1741-1767.



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VITA

John Francis Looney, fourth of five children of George Barry Looney and Agnes Caroline (Griffin) Looney, was born in Manchester, New Hampshire, September 25, 1928. After attending local primary and secondary schools he entered St. Anselm's College, graduated Bachelor of Arts in 1951, and spent the following year in graduate study at the University of New Hampshire.

In 1952 he interrupted his studies in American colonial history to enter the armed forces, saw service in Korea, and upon discharge resumed his studies at the University of New Hampshire. Completing the course requirements for a Master of Arts degree in February, 1955, he reentered St. Anselm's College to acquire additional education credits for teacher certification and completed his preliminary student training in a local high school.

In September, 1955, he became social studies teacher at Milford High School, Milford, New Hampshire, where he remained until his resignation in 1958. In 1957 he received a Master of Arts degree from the University of New Hampshire upon completion of his thesis, and the following year entered Lehigh University to commence his doctoral studies.

Since then he has been honored twice by Lehigh, first as a George Gowen Hood Fellow in history for 1959-1960, and again as a James Ward Packard Fellow in history for the academic year 1960-1961. He is unmarried.