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PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CONDITIONS OF WORK
FOR TEACHERS

by

Thomas Earl Persing

A Dissertation

Presented to the Graduate Committee

of Lehigh University

in candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

in

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Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	1
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.....	4
CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.....	25
CHAPTER III RATIONALE EMPLOYED FOR THE SELECTED CONDITIONS OF WORK.....	41
CHAPTER IV PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY.....	53
CHAPTER V PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS.....	67
CHAPTER VI SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	100
APPENDICES.....	104
GLOSSARY.....	110a
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	111
VITA.....	120

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
I ILLUSTRATION OF THE BASIS FOR PAIRING SCHOOL DISTRICTS	56
II PAIRS OF DISTRICTS AS TO TYPE OF REPRESENTATION	64
III BACHELORS DEGREE AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS WITH RESPECT TO EXPERIENCE	68
IV MASTERS DEGREE AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICT WITH RESPECT TO EXPERIENCE	69
V BACHELOR'S SALARY COMPARISONS FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	70
VI MASTER'S DEGREE SALARY COMPARISONS FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	71
VII AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS WITH RESPECT TO BACHELOR'S DEGREE, MASTER'S DEGREE, AND OVERALL AVERAGE ...	72
VIII AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA - BACHELOR'S DEGREE 0-5 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE ..	73
IX AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE 6-10 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	73a
X AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE 11-16 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE.....	74
XI AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE 16+ YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	74a

XII	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE 0-5 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	75
XIII	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE 6-10 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	75a
XIV	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE 11-16 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	76
XV	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE 16+ YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE	76a
XVI	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE NO TEACHING EXPERIENCE	77
XVII	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE MAXIMUMS	77a
XVIII	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE MINIMUMS	78
XIX	AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE MAXIMUMS	78a
XX	AVERAGE SALARY: BACHELOR'S DEGREE	79
XXI	AVERAGE SALARY: MASTER'S DEGREE	79a
XXII	OVERALL AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS	80
XXIII	AVERAGE "PROFESSIONAL STAFF ADEQUACY" SCORES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	82
XXIV	AVERAGE "CLASSROOM TEACHER ADEQUACY" SCORES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	83
XXV	PROFESSIONAL STAFF ADEQUACY	84
XXVI	CLASSROOM TEACHER ADEQUACY	84a

XXVII	AVERAGE TEACHER-TURNOVER IN PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	86
XXVIII	AVERAGE TEACHER-TURNOVER	87
XXIX	AVERAGE "FRINGE BENEFITS SCORES" FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	88
XXX	AVERAGE "FRINGE BENEFITS SCORES"	89
XXXI	AVERAGE "PERSONNEL POLICY SCORES" FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	90
XXXII	AVERAGE "PERSONNEL POLICY SCORES"	91
XXXIII	AVERAGE "GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SCORES" FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS	92
XXXIV	AVERAGE "GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SCORES"	93
XXXV	SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL COMPARISONS	99a

ABSTRACT

PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CONDITIONS OF WORK FOR TEACHERS

Thomas Earl Persing, Ed.D.
Lehigh University, 1968

Problem

This was a study to determine if school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania which have professional negotiations agreements tend to have more favorable situations relative to six conditions of work for teachers than districts which do not have professional negotiations agreements. The conditions tested were:

1. Salary
2. Fringe benefits
3. Professional staff adequacy
4. Development of personnel policy
5. Teacher-turnover
6. Grievance Procedure

Procedure

The data collected on salary, professional staff adequacy, and teacher-turnover was taken directly from the Bureau of Research, Department of Statistics, Department of Public Instruction located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The data collected on fringe benefits, development of personnel policy, and grievance procedure were secured by

questionnaires sent to the district's chief administrator and the presidents of the local associations.

The districts were matched on the basis of wealth and size, thereby being a randomly stratified sample. The "t" test was applied to test if a significant difference existed as to salary, teacher-turnover, and professional staff adequacy. The sign test was utilized to test the conditions of fringe benefits, development of personnel policy, and grievance procedure.

Findings

The only condition where a significant difference existed was salary. Three classifications of salary tested had a negative correlation, Bachelor's Degree minimums, Master's Degree minimums and Master's Degree maximums. All of the other categories of salary tested, 0-5 years experience, 6-10 years experience, 11-15 years experience and 16+ years experience had significant differences or the "t" value was very close to being significant. The .05 level was used to determine significance.

Conclusions

The focus of attention for teachers in districts which have professional negotiations agreements is on salary.

The lack of legislation has delineated the agreements to being merely procedural.

Recommendation

Legislation is needed to guide collective negotiations in Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study will be in the area of personnel administration, specifically, that of Professional Negotiations Agreements and their relationship to selected personnel policies and procedures. It will be the purpose of this study to determine whether or not a Professional Negotiations Agreement works more favorably for teachers relative to six conditions of work: salary, professional staff adequacy, fringe benefits, personnel policy development, grievance procedure and teacher-turnover.

Background of the Study

A growing trend in the administration of public school systems is the signing of Professional Negotiations Agreements between Boards of Education and local associations. The American Association of School Administrators (1966) stated:

Professional negotiation may be defined as a process by which teachers and other professional employees exert formal and deliberate influence upon school board policy. Properly viewed, professional negotiation is an orderly step in the steady evolution of democratic school administration, which has been in the process of development throughout this century at least.¹

The National Educational Association also stated:

Evidence is rapidly accumulating that professional negotiation can raise staff morale, increase teacher effectiveness, contribute to better community support of the schools, enhance educational leadership, and stimulate educational change. Nearly a fourth of the teachers in this country are now in school systems which use professional negotiations of one kind or another and that percentage is expected to double during the current school year.²

Professional Negotiations Agreements are a product of the times and are here to stay. The importance of such agreements cannot be underestimated, but the ability that these agreements have to solve vital problems in education is one which needs investigation. There has been disagreement as to how much is negotiable. However, there is no question that school-district personnel welfare policies are negotiable with the teachers' associations.

But, it should be noted that not all members of the educational community feel the same way. A 1965 statement by the National School Boards Association reads as follows:

School boards, subject to the requirements of applicable law, should refrain from compromise agreements based on negotiation or collective bargaining, and should not resort to mediation or arbitration, nor yield to threats of reprisal on all matters affecting local public schools, including the welfare of all personnel. They should

also resist by all lawful means the enactment of laws which would compel them to surrender any part of their responsibility.³

The Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration (1967) stated:

Teachers as a group are now demanding a greater voice in policy formulation, especially on matters which relate to instruction and teacher welfare.⁴

The Problem

The burgeoning number of Professional Negotiations Agreements lends credence to the proposition that this new approach to policy procedures will enhance the welfare conditions of the public school teacher.

It will be the problem of this study to determine the relationship between signed Professional Negotiations Agreements and selected conditions of teacher welfare.

RELATED RESEARCH

Comparisons: AFT* and NEA** Approaches

While there is some question whether or not teachers in "organized" school systems actually have higher salaries than those in unorganized districts,⁵ both the

*American Federation of Teachers is also referred to as AFT.

**National Education Association is also referred to as NEA.

American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association are pushing their locals to achieve signed written agreements. But before teachers rush into these bargaining sessions, Healy (1965) showed that, as has been shown in private bargaining during the last decade, employers are increasingly exploiting the bargaining situation to win concessions.⁶ For the teachers to think of PN agreements* as a sole vehicle to push their own demands on the board would indeed be unwise.

All PN agreements are not the same. There are three different levels or types of agreements to be found in school districts at the present time.⁷

Level I: Recognition of the local association as representative of the staff;

Level II: Recognition, plus an outline of negotiation procedures;

Level III: Recognition, plus an outline of negotiation procedures, plus a provision for resolving disagreement.

Level III is that which the NEA has urged the local association to secure. The position of the NEA is:

If it is necessary to accept Level I or Level II agreement as a first step toward

*Professional Negotiations Agreements also referred to as PN agreements.

obtaining a professional negotiation agreement (Level III), future revision of the document should be a priority of the association.⁸

Thus, it is obvious to the NEA that a Level III recognition is an agreement and anything less is not an agreement.

Lieberman and Moskow (1967) make the following observations:

The NEA has been urged to prepare for some type of collective negotiations as early as 1956. At that time, it was apparent that collective negotiations in education would provide the AFT with major organizational opportunities if the NEA did not make some changes in its traditional policies on teacher-school board relationships. But five years passed before the New York City election and its aftermath eventually convinced NEA leaders that new policies were needed. New York City employs more teachers than all but ten states in the Union. The NEA's defeat there simply could not be ignored.

Although a need for change was accepted, there was widespread confusion and disagreement among NEA leaders as to the nature and direction of this change. The heterogeneous nature of NEA membership, the Association's policies and tradition-minded personnel made change as difficult as it was necessary. The period from 1962 to 1966 was one of agonizing reappraisal in the NEA, and the outcome is far from clear at this time. There is no doubt, however, that the Association has already undergone some major changes as a result of the collective negotiations movement. In fact, it has gone from resistance in 1961 to support in 1965.⁹

The NEA has also altered its stand in reference to the means which it suggests its members should utilize to accomplish their objectives. That is, the word sanctions made its first official appearance in 1962:

The National Education Association believes that, as a means of preventing unethical or arbitrary policies or practices that have a deleterious effect on the welfare of the schools, professional sanctions should be involved. These sanctions would provide for appropriate disciplinary action by the organized profession.

The National Education Association calls upon its affiliated state associations to cooperate in developing guidelines which would define, organize, and definitely specify procedural steps for invoking sanction by the teaching profession.¹⁰

Furthermore, the NEA's position on the use of strikes has evolved from an absolute aversion to the use of the term:

Under no circumstances should the resolution of differences between professional associations and boards of education be sought through channels set up for handling industrial disputes. The teacher's situation is completely unlike that of an industrial employee. A board of education is not a private employer, and a teacher is not a private employee. Both are public servants. Both are committed to serve the common, indivisible interest of all persons and groups in the community in the best possible education for children. Teachers and boards of education can perform their functions only if they act in terms of their identity of

purpose in carrying out this commitment. Industrial-disputes conciliation machinery, which assumes a conflict of interest and a diversity of purposes between persons and groups, is not appropriate to professional negotiation in public education.¹¹

In contrast, the use of the term as well as support for the action itself is now in evidence, as reported in Educator Negotiating Service (1968):

The reorganization of the NEA under its new executive secretary, Dr. Sam Lambert, was a significant development of 1967. Although only a few months have gone by since Dr. Lambert's assumption of office, he has obviously moved to streamline and strengthen the Association's efforts in support of urban areas where they are seeking recognition for bargaining purposes in negotiations. Dr. Lambert's statement and the statement of the NEA Board of Directors that where strikes occur NEA locals will be given every support, has had far-reaching impact.¹²

American Federation of Teachers

It would be difficult to assess the exact relationship between the new, militant role of the NEA and the growing influence of the AFT in public education. Nonetheless, the pressure of the AFT cannot be ignored. The AFT was formed in 1916 and constantly interested in the welfare of the classroom teacher.

In an article by Jerrold K. Footlick it was stated:

More than any other single factor, the AFT is responsible for a new militancy among American teachers, whether or not they are union members. A teachers' strike, which not many years ago would have shocked almost everyone--even teachers--is no longer shocking; it can happen almost anywhere these days, which is always a last resort; teachers are proving tougher to deal with about salaries and educational conditions than they have ever been.¹³

The 142,000 member AFT held its 1967 convention in Washington, D.C. and could well glow over the gains it had made in a year. It increased membership by 15 percent. Its leaders were consulted by universities and civic groups, evidence of growing recognition. It moved its headquarters from Chicago to Washington, the better to exert pressure on Capital Hill.

Although it is not a new group, almost no one had ever heard of the AFT until 1960. Founded in Chicago, in 1916, the union grew unimpressively to a total of 50,000 members in 1950 and 60,000 by 1960. During the 1930's it was invaded by Communists, like dozens of other unions, and did not complete the purge of Communist influence until 1941.

The turning point in AFT's history took place in New York City. In the 1950's the city's teachers belonged to at least 93 organizations,¹⁴ the union, the NEA affiliate,

grade-school teachers, Catholic teachers, Jewish teachers, and so on. But after a long struggle, the Guild (union) made a deal with the high school teachers' organization and formed the United Federation of Teachers, and won the exclusive bargaining rights by a vote of 20,045 to 9,770 for the NEA affiliate, Teachers' Bargaining Organization.¹⁵

The most succinct comment on the relationship of the AFT to action by the NEA was by Lieberman and Moskow:

One crucial fact about the UFT's victory was not overlooked within the Federation. The constituent organizations which formed the TBO enrolled 30,000 members from the city's professional staff, yet received only 9,770 votes in the election. The UFT enrolled only about 5,200 members, yet it received 20,045 votes in the election. This tremendous disparity between organizational membership and organizational support in an election was and is extremely important to Federation adherents; it suggested they could win representation elections even in school systems where only a small fraction of the teachers were AFT members. The tremendous publicity accorded the New York City election was its most important single victory since the AFT was founded in 1916. Finally, the New York City election stimulated the AFL-CIO to show much more interest in and support for the AFT's organizing efforts. This development, as much as anything else, jolted the NEA into action after the New York City election.¹⁶

National School Boards Association

The NSBA* has taken a position that professional

*National School Boards Association is also referred to as NSBA.

negotiations agreements are consistent with the area of effort in which public schools are engaged. The NSBA in 1965 stated:

School boards, subject to the requirements of applicable law, should refrain from compromise agreements based on negotiation or collective bargaining, and should not resort to mediation or arbitration, nor yield to threats of reprisal on all matters affecting local public schools, including the welfare of personnel. They should also resist by all lawful means the enactment of laws which would compel them to surrender any part of their responsibility.¹⁷

Pennsylvania School Boards Association

Mr. Fred M. Heddinger, First Vice-President of the Pennsylvania School Boards Association has made their position amply clear:

The Pennsylvania School Boards Association and the National School Boards Association have taken positive positions with regard to collective negotiations which are consistent with the roles that school boards must play and also consistent with morally reasonable relationships of school boards with a group of high-order professionals such as teachers.

Recently, the executive board of the PSBA unanimously adopted a resolution which pointed out that Pennsylvania school boards are not required to hold bargaining rights elections nor are they required to recognize any group as bargaining agents for employees nor enter into contracts with any group which claims to represent school employees. The resolution noted that "Pennsylvania

school boards and their administrators run the risk of being swept into precipitous action which may not be in the best overall interest of education."¹⁸

Local Pennsylvania School Districts

It would seem that local school districts are not heeding the advice of the national and state school board associations, as one-hundred-eleven districts in Pennsylvania as of February 12, 1968, had Professional Negotiations Agreements.¹⁹ Therefore, locals are moving toward formalized procedures.

Negotiations and Public Employees

The traditional rule is that there is no right on the part of teachers, or any other group of public employees, in the absence of a statute or executive order, to have accorded to a majority representative either exclusive bargaining rights or the cognate rights of a bilateral determination of working conditions.²⁰ But these are times of change and the public employee's status is in a state of flux.

The bulk of the next portion of this paper must be credited to Time magazine whose informative essay appeared on March 1, 1968.²¹

Relations between management and organized labor in

the private sector of the U. S. economy have been maturing for decades. Out of negotiations, intermittent conflict, legislation, and court decision, there has emerged a generally workable system that breaks down on some spectacular occasions but, in the main, serves the cause of both sides as well as the public good. Not so in the crucially-important and rapidly-expanding public sector, which embraces everyone who works for government at any level--federal, state, county, and municipal--and embodies every conceivable skill, from school teaching to garbage disposal. In that area, labor relations are in a primitive stage.

Some twelve million Americans, one-sixth of the national labor force, now work in the public service. In the next seven years this figure is expected to reach fifteen million. Until relatively recent years, the widely-held public point-of-view was that these government employees--whatever their number and whatever their classification--had no right to organize, let alone a right to strike. In 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt called public strikes "unthinkable and intolerable." United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther said in 1966 that "society cannot tolerate strikes that endanger the very survival of society" and proposed finding a new "mechanism

by which workers in public service can secure their equity without the need of resorting to strike action." Half of the fifty states have laws prohibiting strikes by government employees, and in all of the others the mood is clearly against them. Yet, with increasing truculence, public employees are striking.

The first state-wide public-employee strike in the U. S. closed one-third of Florida's 1,800 public schools. The stench of January's illegal strike by New York City's sanitation men, which heaped 100,000 tons of garbage on the streets, offended the nation's nostrils, and was quickly followed by another strike of trash haulers in Memphis, Tennessee. Scranton, Pennsylvania garbage haulers went out on strike on March 11, 1968. Detroit's epidemic of "blue flu," in which 700 policemen reported sick, deprived that city of 30 per cent of its on-duty law-enforcement force. A 1967 walkout of firemen in Youngstown, Ohio, emptied all but one of 15 fire stations. In fact, Ohio, which has a tough law calling for the firing of every public employee who goes on strike, has had at least 30 strikes--involving police, nurses, city-service employees, teachers, and other government workers--in the past year.

There is every indication that the situation is

growing progressively worse. The 142 work stoppages called by public employees in 1966 exceeded the total for the four previous years combined; informed estimates of the 1967 figure place it upwards of 250. Dr. Sam M. Lambert, executive secretary of the National Education Association which represents one million teachers and administrators, has predicted 250 strikes by teachers alone during 1968. Says Pennsylvania University Industry Professor George W. Taylor, principle source of New York State's public-employee labor law: "It's going to be a mess for generations."

The Time essay made three recommendations: First, the right of the growing millions of public employees to organize and bargain collectively must be recognized; second, urgent and continuing work should be undertaken to develop bargaining procedures and machinery aimed at preventing strikes, rather than banning them and punishing strikers. While situations will differ widely from one state and city to another, some forms of fact-finding, conciliation, mediation, arbitration and injunction, to work in the public sector must be devised; third, despite all the complications involved, it must be recognized that there are differences among various kinds of public service--that some are more essential than others. Certainly no strike of policemen, firemen or prison guards

can be tolerated. But a strike of clerical workers in a state accounting office, for example, can be considered in an entirely different context.

Summary of Basic Positions

- NEA: The NEA has made a decision to seek exclusive negotiation rights and the use of strikes and sanctions to resolve local impasse concerns.
- AFT: Acknowledges collective bargaining as the only means of securing teacher welfare rights. It endorses the use of strike and in many cases will exclude all other professional employees from local membership except classroom teachers.
- AASA*: Acknowledges the need for bilateral discussions of the use of sanctions but does not endorse strikes.
- NSBA and PSBA**: Believe it is illegal to enter into any type of binding agreement and advise local school districts against such procedures. They are firmly against sanctions or strikes.
- PSEA***: Committed to securing agreements and more recently exclusive representation. It has endorsed sanctions but has not signified its approval of the use of strikes. Many new regional offices have been formed in 1967.

*American Association of School Administrators is also referred to as AASA.

**Pennsylvania School Boards Association is also referred to as PSBA.

***Pennsylvania State Education Association is also referred to as PSEA.

Local Associa-

tions: Several locals have struck their boards in Pennsylvania. A total of 112 have agreements and nineteen of these districts are of the second class.

Need for the Study

On March 4, 1968, over 20,000 Pennsylvania teachers marched on the State Capital in Harrisburg. The teachers were seeking action on two measures that were introduced in the 1967 General Assembly. One (H2039) would increase the minimum annual salary from \$4,500 to \$6,000 in three annual steps. The other (H1812) allocates some \$62 million in higher subsidies to local districts.

Further, the first teachers' strike in San Francisco was suspended on March 4, 1968, pending study of demands for education reforms, but in Pittsburgh and Florida the teachers returned voluntarily after talks aimed at ending strikes staggered and stuttered. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Labor and Industry Secretary, John Tabor, presided over talks during a Sunday meeting on March 3, 1968. The Associated Press²² reports the Pittsburgh situation is still unresolved.

These actions of teachers in Pennsylvania and throughout the country have prompted many local boards of education to move with increasing haste to the securing of

PN agreements. Of equal consequence, local professional associations, affiliate of PSEA, have pushed with substantial vigor the signing of PN agreements. Both seem to feel that these agreements are a form of a panacea which, by some magical and as yet unexplained powers, cause the cessation of teacher militancy and educational turbulence. At the other end of the spectrum, some local boards of education have fought the PN issue as if they were Texans at the Alamo with resounding echoes for illegal violations of sovereignty, excessive costs and the like. It is the purpose of this research to shed some light in this milieu of darkness with the sincere desire that what has been learned from the facts will cool the fires of emotions.

Major Hypothesis

Local professional associations with signed Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have more favorable situations relative to six conditions of work for their membership than professional associations which do not have signed agreements.

Minor Hypotheses

1. Teachers in associations with PN agreements tend to receive higher salaries than those who do not have PN agreements.

2. Teachers in associations with PN agreements tend to have better professional staff adequacies than those in associations who do not have a PN agreement.

3. School districts which have PN agreements tend to have more definite grievance procedures than districts which do not have PN agreements.

4. Teachers in associations with PN agreements tend to receive more fringe benefits than those teachers who do not belong to associations with PN agreements.

5. School districts which have PN agreements tend to have less teacher-turnover than districts which do not have PN agreements.

6. Teachers in associations with PN agreements tend to have a more favorable situation in regard to the development of personnel policy than those in associations who do not have a PN agreement.

Limitations of the Study

The school districts to be studied will be those of the second-class in Pennsylvania. The districts will be matched by size (pupil population) and wealth; that is, true market value divided by pupil population, also Aid Ratio will be considered. Following this, a district will be compared; that is, one which is relatively the

same size and has the same wealth, with a PN agreement with that of one which does not have a PN agreement. Since there are fifty-seven districts of the second-class in Pennsylvania and twenty-three of these have PN agreements, the representation should be adequate. In an attempt to eliminate bias, the names of districts will not be considered. Also, the quantity of districts should provide ample geographic distribution.

FOOTNOTES

1. American Association of School Administrators, School Administrators View Professional Negotiations (Washington, D. C.: The Association, 1966), p. 7.
2. National Education Association, Professional Negotiations for Improving Education (Washington, D. C.: NEA Journal, December, 1966).
3. National School Board Association, Information Services Bulletin (Washington, D. C.: III, No. 2, June, 1965).
4. Center for the Study of Educational Administration, Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 9.
5. National Education Association, Guide Lines for Professional Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: The Association 1965), p. 3.
6. Educators Negotiating Service, (Washington, D.C.: Educational Service Bureau, Inc., 1968).
7. National Education Association, op. cit., 1965, p. 3.
8. National Education Association, op. cit., 1965, p. 4.
9. Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1967), p. 42.
10. National Education Association, Addresses and Proceedings (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1962), p. 81.
11. Ibid., p. 178.
12. Educators Negotiating Service, op.cit., p. 64.

13. Jerrold K. Footlick, Teachers' Union Wins Elections, Ruffles Feelings (Boston: The National Observer, 1967).
14. Lieberman and Moskow, op.cit., p. 35.
15. Ibid., p. 40.
16. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
17. National School Boards Association, Beliefs and Policies, as adopted by NSBA Delegate Assembly, April 3-6, 1965. Reprinted in National School Boards Association Information Service Bulletin, III, No. 2, June, 1965.
18. Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc. School Boards and Collective Negotiations (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Association, 1965), pp. 11-13.
19. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
20. Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Obere, Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1968), p. 52.
21. "The Worker's Rights and the Public Weal," Time, March 1, 1968, pp. 43-44.
22. Associated Press dispatch, The (Lancaster, Pennsylvania) Era. April 25, 1968, p. 49.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Purposes for the Review

The purposes are: to find out if the problem has been studied before and to discover information relative to the study which could be utilized to pursue the problem to a logical conclusion.

Sources Consulted

1. Dissertation Abstracts, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
2. Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, H. W. Wilson Company, New York, New York.
3. Education Index, H. W. Wilson Company, New York, New York.
4. Encyclopedia of Educational Research, American Education Research Association, The Macmillin Company, New York, New York.
5. Review of Educational Research, American Research Association (NEA), Washington, D. C.
6. Card catalogs in the main libraries of the following institutions:
 - a. Lehigh University
 - b. Lafayette College

- c. Moravian College
- d. Muhlenberg College
- e. University of Pennsylvania
- f. Temple University

7. Communications with various organizations.

Time Limits

The rash of recent PN agreements in Pennsylvania is no different from that in the rest of the nation. The UFT victory in New York City in December, 1961, was the catalyst which caused the ferment of activity in the NEA which filtered to the state affiliates and finally to the locals. But it would not be adequate for the purposes of this study to begin in 1961 as the real movement of teachers in Pennsylvania began in the 1930's with establishment of tenure and a concurrent development of national labor laws which will conceivably be connected to PN agreements if the present movement continues. Therefore, this study will include a historical overview of labor laws relating to collective bargaining since 1930. However, the statistical data concerning the Pennsylvania school systems gathered will be concerned with the 1967-68 school years.

Studies Related to the Major Hypothesis

It would appear that, in Pennsylvania, and indeed, the United States, there exists a shortage of documented

information concerning this specific area of Professional Negotiations Agreements and conditions of work. This lack of information has been verified by inquiries to the National Education and the Pennsylvania State Education Association.

The Research Division of the NEA indirectly broached this problem in 1946, when it conducted a study which was concerned with the status and the practices of boards of education.¹ This study showed larger districts had a higher percentage of teachers attending board meetings than did smaller districts. Also, larger school districts had a higher percentage of staff participation in board meetings than did smaller districts.

In 1948, the NEA Research Bulletin reported on activities of local education associations in all the states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Although many association activities were cited, none could be found which dealt with teacher representation at school-board meetings.²

The Pennsylvania State Education Association attempted to determine to what extent teacher representatives from the local education associations in Pennsylvania attended school-board meetings during the 1961-1962 school year.³

However, because of the recency of the emergence of Professional Negotiation Agreements in Pennsylvania and after an examination of possible information sources, this study will concern itself from about the period of 1960 to 1968. Moving along these lines, Eklund did a historical study on local teacher associations and found that there has been an emergence of teacher group-action and processes of collective negotiations in American education.⁴ Also, teachers want a strong voice in determining those issues which are directly concerned with their own welfare and believe these should be subject to negotiation.⁵ Hubbard, in a review of research on teacher's organizations, stated that, in recent years, most of the supporting arguments for more militant collective bargaining has been negated by demonstrations that both welfare and education activities can be carried out effectively through cooperative relationships between professional associations, school boards, and the general public.⁶

Stephens, in his study, found that teachers were more concerned with having it understood they had a right to enter into salary negotiations and to determine what their salaries would be, and local conditions have a great influence on the strategy of the teachers' associations and the

outcomes of the negotiations.⁷

National Labor Laws

Although federal laws do not apply to organizations of public school teachers, this study would be remiss if it did not include a section on national labor laws as it is possible that education will be influenced by decisions made concerning these laws over the last several decades. Time and time again, teachers have been urged to adopt a policy because it works in private employment or to avoid a policy because it cannot be transplanted from private employment into public education. Thus in order to profit from experience in private employment while simultaneously avoiding invalid analogies to it, educators must try to achieve some understanding of its development and present status.⁸

Historical Background of Legal Implications

The Philadelphia Cordwainers case in 1806 involved a confrontation between the Master Shoemakers Guild and the Master Craftsmen. The businessmen desired an extension of market in the western areas of Pennsylvania and the United States and were desirous of keeping the price of shoes static. Whereas the Shoemakers Guild banded together

in a concerted effort to exercise some force on the owners to pay higher wages. The Guild was found guilty of conspiracy to raise their wages.

However, in 1842, by virtue of the case of the Commonwealth v. Hunt in Massachusetts, a major point was established, that the mere act of combination did not make a labor organization an unlawful body. Whether a combination was criminal depended upon the nature and purpose of such concerted efforts.⁹

Then came the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 by which the Congress attempted to deal with the growth of monopoly powers of business trusts. This act also applied to union and the federal courts showed no hesitation in relying on the Sherman Act to find unions guilty of conspiring to restrain trade.¹⁰ In 1914, the Clayton Act was passed which should have removed unions from the Sherman Act, but it was not until the 1940's when a series of Supreme Court cases accomplished this.¹¹

With passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 came the neutralization of the role of the federal courts in union-management relations by removing the power of the courts to interfere with or restrict a wide range of union activity not involving fraud or violence. This

greatly reduced the employers' opportunity to get a court injunction and instructed the federal courts not to enforce yellow-dog contracts, guaranteed labor the right to engage in strikes, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, picketing by persons not employees and other activities which would permit nonemployees the right to put pressure on a third party.¹² This act essentially attempted to keep government neutral in labor-management disputes.

The Congress in 1935 passed the National Labor Relations Act which was sponsored by Senator Wagner of New York and is referred to as the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act, in effect, put the government on the side of labor. This Act resulted partly because of the failure of American employers to modernize their concepts of employment relations.¹³

The Wagner Act strongly encouraged collective bargaining and constituted a fundamental change in attitude of the public toward organized labor. However, the Wagner Act was not fully accepted until April 12, 1937 when the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to uphold the Wagner Act's constitutionality.

On June 23, 1947, Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act, more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act

over President Truman's veto. Although the Wagner Act strongly encouraged collective bargaining, the Taft-Hartley Act placed government in a more neutral position. Overall, the Taft-Hartley Act was a recognition that the long struggle for union rights required corresponding measures to ensure union responsibilities, and that individual employees and union members needed protection from certain union practices, just as employers did." This is an important point to remember in the current emphasis upon achieving certain rights for teacher organizations.¹⁴

In 1958, the McClellan Committee investigated labor unions and issued its recommendations in March 1958. The Landrum-Griffin Act followed these recommendations rather closely. In essence, the Landrum-Griffin Act was a major effort to regulate the internal officers of unions. It is beyond the scope of this study to include all of the features of this Act or any of the others previously mentioned or which will be mentioned later. However in passing it should be noted that teacher organizations are not subject to the Acts herein described. But many states are taking a closer look at teacher organizations. As the organizations seek more power, it is reasonable to assume that more responsibility will have to accompany this

power. This is a fundamental characteristic of our democracy and there is no reason why teachers should be exempt from it.

Also, legally speaking, school boards are exempt from the coverage of federal legislation since they are political subdivisions of the states. Therefore it will be up to each individual state to pass such legislation as it deems necessary covering teacher organizations.

Pennsylvania: Legal Implications

The legal basis of Professional Negotiations Agreements has not yet been established. Regardless of the legal basis, twenty-three of a possible fifty-seven school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania have signed agreements with their local professional association.

The Philadelphia Teachers Association developed some pertinent legal basis by virtue of entering into litigation with the Philadelphia Board of Education which is commonly referred to as the LaBrum Case. This issue involved the refusal of the Board to involve itself in the selection of an exclusive collective bargaining representative for the teachers. It was determined by the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, Eastern District, that the Board did not need to so involve itself and further that this act of the Board did not constitute a "grievance" within the meaning of the Public Employees Anti-Strike Act. Also, the Court rendered an opinion that a serious doubt exists as to the Board's authority to recognize any organization as an exclusive bargaining agency.¹⁵

Executive Order 10988

President John F. Kennedy on January 17, 1962, signed an Executive Order¹⁶ which makes it clear in its preamble that it is in the government's interest to develop "orderly and constructive relationships" between "employee organizations and management officials." It requires the head of each agency to advise employees of their rights to organize and to see to it that "no interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is practiced within such agency to encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization." Just as the Wagner Act of 1935 greatly strengthened labor's position in the private sector, so does this Executive Order usher in a new era for public-employee unions.¹⁷

Proposed Legislation

House Bills Nos. 1268 and 1269, which were introduced during June 19, 1967, manifest the concern the legislature has for this vital area of professional negotiations.

House Bill No. 1268, introduced by Messrs. King, Zord, Walker and Musto on June 13, 1967, and referred to Committee on Judiciary on June 19, 1967, states:

Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation of any other provision of the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of mediation boards, panels or commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes between professional employees of school districts and boards of school directors shall be binding upon all parties and shall constitute a mandate to the chief school administration and board of school directors of the employing school district to take the action necessary to carry out such findings.¹⁸

House Bill No. 1269, which was referred to Committee on Basic Education on June 19, 1967, states:

Section 527. Professional Negotiations.--

(a) Any professional or temporary professional employee or any group of professional or temporary professional employees in person or by his or their designated representative, after failing to resolve a problem through the office of the chief school administrator of the school district, shall have the right to meet and confer with the board of school directors of his or their school district to present for discussion any matter involving --

conditions and obligations of employment or any other matter of mutual concern.

(b) An organization of professional and temporary professional employees in which a majority of the professional and temporary professional employees hold membership shall have the right to negotiate with the board of school directors of his or their school district any matter involving conditions, and obligations of employment or any other matter of mutual concern.

(c) Where a majority of professional and temporary professional employees of the school district hold membership in one organization of professional and temporary professional employees, the board of school directors shall negotiate with the representatives of such group and may enter into a written agreement with such organization of professional and temporary professional employees to establish negotiation procedures leading to a determination of conditions and obligations of employment or any other matter of mutual concern.

(d) The organization in which a majority of the professional and temporary professional employees hold membership shall be determined by a verified list of such membership submitted to the board of school directors by such organization, listing by name the current professional and temporary professional employees of the school district who are members in good standing of such organization.¹⁹

It is anticipated by the Pennsylvania State Education Association that both of these bills will be enacted into law during the 1968 General Assembly.

Also, House Bill No. 1584²⁰ which places the channels of public employee mediation and arbitration in the control of the Labor Department would indeed be of vital importance.

Some readers, especially if they are school board members, may wonder why such legislation is necessary, why guidelines could not have functioned just as well. Robbins W. Barstow²¹ answers this question very well in his study. This is a study of the effectiveness of the voluntary guidelines for teacher-school board negotiations developed in Connecticut prior to the 1965 negotiation statute enacted in that state. The author, a field representative of the Connecticut Education Association, concludes that voluntary guidelines without legislation, "were highly effective in producing joint teacher-school board meetings and deliberations, but they were relatively ineffective in producing bona fide negotiations and written agreements."

School Laws of Pennsylvania

Currently in Pennsylvania, the public school employee is forbidden to strike and his grievance is processed to point of advice only.²² The salient features of Section

3302 of the School Code are:

1. School employees cannot strike.
2. When a grievance is presented to the Board of School Directors and it cannot be resolved, then the employee may petition to have a panel of three members review his case. This panel shall consist of one representative selected by the board, one representative selected by the public school employee and the third the Superintendent of Public Instruction or his representative.
3. The panel shall meet within fifteen days (15) and the findings shall be advisory only.

The number of cases processed by this means are very small, only one in 1967.* Thus, since there are 103,000 public school employees, it seems that this procedure is not adequate.

*Conference with Dr. Burt L. Dunmire, Department of Public Instruction, March 1968.

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CHAPTER III
RATIONALE EMPLOYED FOR THE SELECTED
CONDITIONS OF WORK

Industrial Research on Job Satisfaction

At one time, industry, like public education, placed a heavy emphasis on the financial rewards of a job and did very little about other important factors. It assumed that "man did live by bread alone" and that nothing else mattered to him.¹ In time, however, this assumption was changed. As early as 1915, Hoxie stated that Taylor dealt with only the mechanical and not the human aspects.²

The Hawthorne studies,³ which started originally to measure the effect on workers' production of different intensities of illumination, and which was conducted at Western Electric Company, Hawthorne plant in Chicago in 1925-27, showed that regardless of what was done to the physical environment, whether conditions were improved or made worse, the production of the workers increased. The conclusion formulated by the investigators was that in the usual working environment the girls were under strict supervision, but in the test situation they were allowed to talk freely, and changes in working conditions were discussed with the girls in advance instead of being arbitrarily announced by superior authority; the girls received

more attention and they became a tight-knit group. They cooperated with one another and the experimenters. They grew more and more to enjoy their interpersonal relationships at work, and out of this grew new group loyalties and solidarities. In short, the conclusion was that people work better if treated like human beings, with some specification as to what is meant by "human beings."

So, in time, industry has learned that wage increases did not ensure high morale, nor did they guarantee job satisfaction or freedom from strikes, for indeed, Berrien⁴ indicated that many of the strikes which took place after World War II occurred in the highest paid industries.

Convinced that money was only one of many factors, industry broadened its approach to industrial problems by including human factors as well as financial. Consequently, studies were made to identify job factors or conditions of work which influenced employee morale and employee job satisfaction. Once the factors were known, it was then possible for industrial leaders to initiate corrective measures.

Although morale and job satisfactions were difficult concepts to define and continue to be, industry did not use this as a basis for avoiding such studies, for it

realized the non-monetary conditions of work were too important to be neglected or treated lightly.

The Teaching Profession and Conditions of Work

In a monumental study of personality, Murray described a "need" as "a hypothetical process the occurrence of which is imagined in order to account for certain objective and subjective facts."⁵ He more fully defined it as "a force which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying situation."

To continue the quotation:

A need is sometimes provoked by internal process of a certain kind...arising in the course of vital sequences, but more frequently (when in a state of readiness) by the occurrence of one of a far commonly effective press... Thus, it manifests itself by leading the organism to search for or to avoid encountering or, when encountered, to attend and respond to certain kinds of press.⁶

This investigator holds that the conditions of work researched for this study satisfy, to some degree, the needs of teachers. This is not to say that other organizations in society do not have the same needs. The performance of the personnel task in an educational institution has much in common with its performance in

other organizations of society. People are people, regardless of where they work, subject to common stimuli, aspirations, and frailties. Researchers in education can utilize a considerable portion of the body of knowledge which was accumulated in industrial corporations where much of the research was pioneered earlier in the twentieth century. However, all of the knowledge is not applicable to the school environment because of certain conditions and practices which are unlike those of any other organization.⁷

Salary

The most sensitive and controversial area of staff personnel administration is the determination of financial rewards for the service. There never has been agreement on the worth of a teacher; there likely never will be. Practically, the worth is reached at a compromise point where the taxpayers and the employees meet.

Most salary schedules in Pennsylvania school districts -- employ the "single salary concept." This means, in effect, that the two variables which are utilized are years of experience and the number of graduate credits accumulated. To be sure, the acquisition of a Master's degree affords a monetary reward in all school systems. There is

considerable doubt that, with the coming of the compulsory fifth year before licensing, the single salary schedule concept is still a valid one.⁸

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the present monetary rewards system, it is the only one that can be measured and thus it is of little consequence at this point in time to debate its structure and syntax.

Professional Staff Adequacy

The ratio of the number of classroom teachers to the number of pupils in a school district will show, to a degree, what the work load is. In general, work load is taken to mean the time and energy expended in the performance of tasks assigned in a position. The factors which determine the amount of time and energy that constitute a work load differ greatly among school positions.⁹

Both in New Jersey¹⁰ and Pennsylvania¹¹, the trend is to measure class load by determining the ratio of teachers and total professional employees to the number of weighted number of pupils per district. This study will use this system of evaluation.

Teacher Turnover

Lindenfeld¹² reported his study showed that the factors

which may contribute to the greater holding power of school systems of the same size as utilized in this study are working conditions and salary. Therefore if a Professional Negotiations Agreement tends to retain teachers within the system, it would be a valuable vehicle for those administrations and boards found with a teacher recruitment problem each year.

Grievance Procedure

Employee grievances in the private sector are generally governed by procedures established through collective bargaining. The usual grievance procedure is designed to assure the prompt administration of the agreement, and it is the agreement itself which provides the rationale for the disposition of the grievance. Although management and labor differ on whether the agreement is the source of all rights or is merely a curb on management's otherwise unlimited prerogatives, most grievances stand or fall on whether or not the agreement supports them. For this is the rule of the shop.¹³

This system is eminently workable because there are very few limitations which keep the parties from negotiating whatever clauses they feel are necessary. They can

and often do cover every conceivable area affecting the employee. Whatever frustrations they suffer come from bargaining weakness, not because certain areas are off limits.¹⁴

Both parties are also free to adopt any system they please to provide the sanctions necessary to enforce the agreement. In the vast majority of cases they choose binding arbitration by impartial outsiders. Robert Coulson,¹⁵ reports that: "almost 95 per cent of over 100,000 collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration clauses."

Benjamin H. Wolf¹⁶ states that because of the following reasons many employee grievances are never placed on the bargaining table: teachers are civil servants, teacher's employment is covered by state laws, local laws and board of education bylaws, few employment situations are so intimately influenced by public opinion, teachers are professionals and have more than an employee's concern with the production process and teacher employment is segmented by the school year.

Notwithstanding the complications of grievance procedures in public education vis-a-vis the recency of evolution, this area demands investigation in Pennsylvania.

Fringe Benefits

Fringe benefits may be regarded as those immediate or delayed compensations which are not included in the regular pay check.¹⁷ A further indication of the cost of fringe benefits in industry is found in the statement by Scott, Clothier, and Spriegel. They write:

When an employee is put on the payroll today, the labor cost is not the contract price, neither is he solely paid for the number of hours worked; his fringe benefits in all manufacturing are about 22 percent of payroll, and he is paid for hours not worked by a substantial vacation period.¹⁸

The continuous inclusion of more and wider fringe benefits in collective bargaining agreements is an indication of the relative importance which union officials place on this one aspect of employee welfare. Apparently, in the minds of union officials, if employers rather than workers assume the payments for such necessities as hospital care, medical care, pension plans, sick leave, and life insurance, etc. employees will have more take-home pay as a result.

It is reasonable to assume that teachers need such security benefit also, since they too must face sickness, surgery, retirement and death. In these respects they are exactly like industrial employees. Sowers and Boyer¹⁹

express a similar point of view when they say:

Your teachers and other school employees are no different from other salaried and hourly employees in their wants for adequate retirement, insurance coverage, and sick leave provisions.

Yet, Paul Stone studied 222 selected districts in Pennsylvania to determine the benefits and employment conditions offered to teachers in second, third, and fourth class districts, and the effects of these benefits on securing and retaining teachers.²⁰ The conclusions drawn by Stone were that the larger districts offered more extensive fringe benefits. Also, school districts in general, made little or no contribution to the insurance premium payments of teachers. Finally, 71 percent of the women teachers indicated that they preferred a higher base pay to fringe benefits, while 69 percent of men made the same indication.

It would be difficult today to substantiate Stone's study in light of the changing attitudes in teachers, vis-a-vis employment conditions, but this aspect of working conditions of teachers is worthy of pursuit.

Personnel Policy Development

One of the fundamental tenets of the democratic

process is that those who are affected by policies and decisions be entitled to participate in making them.²¹

The importance which Elsbree and Reutter attach to teacher participation in policy-making is reflected in the following terms:

One of the means by which on-the-job satisfaction can be achieved is through employee participation in policy formulation. The principle of participation, if adopted and consistently followed, will tend to develop a team spirit and in the long run will result in better policies and procedures.²²

If the administrative official responsible for the personnel function had the time to counsel personally with each staff member upon all problems arising from his relationship with the organization, the formulation of detailed personnel policies would be unnecessary. However, such a practice would be impossible in most school systems. Furthermore, it would not be desirable in most cases. Although a rule-of-thumb approach may be workable in a small-sized situation, it still lacks consistency and definition as an administrative technique. The formulation of definite policies covering problem areas is the best present answer for this administrative matter.²³ Ideally, in all organizations there should be definite, meaningful, and planned participation by the staff in policy formulation and development.²⁴

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CHAPTER IV

PROCEDURES EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY

Securing Relative Data

The questionnaire technique was employed to acquire data relative to development of personnel policy, fringe benefits and grievance procedure. Data on teachers' salaries, teacher turnover, and professional staff adequacy were secured from the official personnel records of the Bureau of Research, Department of Public Instruction, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; specifically, Forms: PIR-1, 1A, and 1B entitled: "Professional Personnel Record." These forms contained the actual salary, level of education, names of new teachers and years of teaching experience of every teacher in the state of Pennsylvania for the 1967-68 school year.

Defining District Classes in Pennsylvania

Section 202 of the School Laws of Pennsylvania dictate the various sizes of school districts.

Each district having a population of one million five hundred thousand (1,500,000) or more, shall be a school district of the first class. Each district having a population of five hundred thousand (500,000), or more, but of less than one million five hundred thousand (1,500,000), shall be a school district of the first class A.

Each school district having a population of thirty thousand (30,000), or more, but of less than five hundred thousand (500,000), shall be a school district of the second class.

Each school district having a population of five thousand (5,000), or more, but of less than thirty thousand (30,000), shall be a school district of the third class.

Each school district having a population of less than five thousand (5,000) shall be a school district of the fourth class.¹

The map supplied by the Pennsylvania School Boards Association in Appendix A, shows the geographical distribution of school districts of the second class. This study separated the districts in order to utilize this information and compare as often as possible districts from different areas of the state.

Rationale For Selecting School Districts of the Second Class as a Representative Sample

Philadelphia is the only district of the first class and Pittsburgh the only representative of class 1A, therefore it is obvious that these classes are self excluding by number of possible districts to be studied. The third class and fourth class districts have a range of population too close to be truly representative and their wealth patterns are not as diversified as those districts of the second class.

However, with the broad range of population, 30,000 to 500,000, and the wide spectrum of wealth (aid ratio, .1000 to .8367) it seemed most reasonable to pursue this study with school districts of the second class as the logical choice. A further consideration was the relatively high percentage of PN agreements (40%) utilized in these districts as compared with 19% of the other districts.²

Procedures Utilized in Pairing the Districts

The districts used in this study were paired on the basis of four variables: market value per pupil resident, weighted average daily membership, aid ratio and actual instruction expense per weighted average daily membership. Numbers of teachers were left out as a pairing factor because of its relationship to wealth. In short, wealthy districts can afford more teachers and educational materials than those with limited funds. Consequently, to include the number of teachers as a pairing condition would tend to operate unfairly against poorer districts.

Weighted average daily membership does not operate against poorer districts as all students in Pennsylvania must attend school until their seventeenth birthday.³ Weighted average daily membership (WADM), means that all kindergarten students, who attend one-half day sessions

have a value of .5, elementary students (grades 1-6), have a weighting factor of 1.0, and all secondary students (7-12), have a value of 1.36. Thus since this value system is applied to all districts studied and also since it has been determined that it costs more (financially) to educate secondary students, it is obvious that the system is fair to all districts studied.

An illustration of the basis for the procedure used in pairing the districts in this study is seen in Table I.

TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION OF THE BASIS FOR PAIRING SCHOOL DISTRICTS

School District	Type of Representation	Market Value Per Pupil Resident	WADM	Aid Ratio	AIE/WADM*
A	PNA	20,500	12,989	.2343	\$648
B	NPNA	22,000	14,234	.2166	595
C	PNA	19,500	17,811	.3426	623
D	NPNA	21,590	15,735	.3790	572

*Actual Instruction Expense per WADM.

Thus it was finally determined, on the relative closeness of each of the variables, just which districts could be paired. However, the pairs were matched finally on whether they had or did not have a PN agreement.

A Description of the Questionnaire Sent to the Chief School Administrators Relative to Fringe Benefits

The questionnaire which was utilized in this study was originally designed by Paul L. Stone.⁴ This questionnaire

was modified to bring it up to date and better represent the modern thinking on fringe benefits. A copy of the questionnaire is found in appendix B.

This questionnaire referred to as "employment benefits" has twenty-three items giving a total score of fifty-three possible points. Therefore by using this total score for each district used in this study, a comparison of paired districts was made.

This modified questionnaire was sent to all school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania. It was necessary to follow up with another letter in some cases and also a personal phone call to the chief school administrators in several cases but finally all questionnaires were received.

A Description of the Questionnaire Sent to the Chief School Administrators and to the Presidents of Local Associations Relative to Personnel Policy Development and Grievance Procedures

The names and addresses of the presidents of the local association were supplied by PSEA. The names and addresses of the chief school administrators were supplied by the Pennsylvania School Boards Association. In order to give a fairer viewpoint and to cut down on personal bias, it was suggested by Dr. Burt L. Dunmire, Director

of Administrative and Leadership Services, Department of Public Instruction, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, that both the presidents and the chief school administrators be contacted. This suggestion was followed.

Part I of the questionnaire is designed to show whether or not policies concerning the teaching staff were stated in writing and distributed to all the teachers in the district. The most important segment of the questionnaire was designed to reveal if the teachers had any function relative to the creation of new policies and revision of old policies.

Part II of the questionnaire was used to ascertain the grievance procedures followed in each district. This part of the study was designed to measure whether or not a district had a systematic procedure for handling grievances, if the grievance procedure was reduced to writing and distributed to all teachers and the length of time necessary to process each grievance. This questionnaire is shown in appendix C.

Again, a follow up letter was necessary and then a personal telephone call to ensure all forms would be returned. The final tally resulted in all of the forms utilized in the study being returned.

Procedures for Analyzing the Data in this Study

Data on Salary

The actual salaries, which are available from the "Professional Personnel Record" of the Department of Public Instruction, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, were used this way:

First, the average salary for each of the fifty-seven districts was computed for the following classifications of teachers:

1. Bachelors degree with no teaching experience.
2. Bachelors degree with 0-5 years teaching experience.
3. Bachelors degree with 6-10 years teaching experience.
4. Bachelors degree with 11-15 years teaching experience.
5. Bachelors degree with 16+ years teaching experience.
6. Bachelors degree maximum.
7. Masters degree with no teaching experience.
8. Masters degree with 0-5 years teaching experience.
9. Masters degree with 6-10 years teaching experience.
10. Masters degree with 11-15 years teaching experience.
11. Masters degree with 16+ years teaching experience.
12. Masters degree maximum.

Secondly, the data were statistically analyzed to determine whether or not there is a significant difference

in average salaries between PNA and NPNA districts with respect to the twelve previously mentioned classifications of teachers. Also, the average of all teachers with a bachelors degree, masters degree and over-all salary average were statistically analyzed.

Data on Professional Staff Adequacy

In order to figure professional staff adequacy the following calculations were utilized:

PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS PER 1,000 WEIGHTED PUPILS

<u>Weighting Factors</u>	<u>Formula</u>
Kindergarten pupils 0.5	Prof. Staff
Elementary pupils K-6 1.0	Per 1,000 = $\frac{\text{Prof. Staff} \times 1,000}{\text{WADM}^*}$
Secondary pupils 7-12 1.36	Weighted Pupils

Illustration of Weighting - District X

	ADM**	Weighting	WADM
Kindergarten	389.6	0.5	194.8
Elementary	2,195.6	1.0	2,195.6
Secondary	1,939.1	1.36	<u>2,637.2</u>
Total			5,027.6

*Weighted Average Daily Membership is WADM.

**Average Daily Membership is ADM.

Total Professional Staff Members = 211.1
(Equated to Full-Time Positions)

Prof. Staff
Per 1,000 = $\frac{\text{Prof. Staff} \times 1,000}{\text{WADM}} = \frac{211.1 \times 1,000}{5,027.6} = 41.968$
Weighted
Pupils

The above method was applied in the same manner to determine classroom teacher adequacy for each district.

Data on Teacher-Turnover

Average teacher-turnover was computed in this way: First, the average teacher-turnover was calculated for each of the two categories of districts on the basis of the number of resignations for the total teaching staff.⁵ Secondly, the data were statistically analyzed for proportions to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the PN and NPN districts with respect to average per cent of teacher-turnover.

Data on Fringe Benefits

Data relative to fringe benefits were acquired through the use of Paul L. Stone's questionnaire, and were treated in this manner: First, a total "Fringe Benefits Score" was derived from the questionnaire. Its construction is such that a "yes" response could be given one point, and

a "no" response no points. In this way a maximum "Fringe Benefits Score" of fifty-three could be derived for each district. Secondly, the data were statistically analyzed to determine whether there was or was not a significant difference in the average "Fringe Benefits Scores" of the two categories of districts.

Data on Personnel Policy

Data secured from Part I of the questionnaire on personnel policy were employed as follows: First, a total "Personnel Policy Score" was made from the responses in the questionnaire. The same process which was used to develop the "Fringe Benefits Score" was used to develop the "Personnel Policy Score." Namely, one point was given for a "yes" response, and no points for a "no" response. This means that a district could achieve a total "Personnel Policy Score" of eight. Secondly, the data were statistically analyzed to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the average "Personnel Policy Scores" of the two categories of school districts.

Data on Grievance Procedure

Part II of the questionnaire for presidents of associations and chief school administrators dealt with grievance

procedure. The data were employed as follows: First, a total "Grievance Procedure Score" was derived in the manner already stated for "Fringe Benefits Score" and "Personnel Policy Score." Using a point system, it was possible for a school district to receive a total "Grievance Procedure Score" of eight. Secondly, the "sign" test for significance of difference was administered to the differences in average "Grievance Procedures Scores."

Procedures for Protecting the Identity of the School Districts Involved in the Study

This investigator is indebted to the PSEA, NEA, and Department of Public Instruction and various school districts for the information supplied. This information was treated in a confidential manner. No attempt was made in this study to add or detract from the prestige which most school districts so rightfully deserve. The data were treated on a group basis and reported that way. It is necessary, therefore, for discussion purposes, to refer to the paired school districts in this study as follows:

1. Each pair was assigned a Roman numeral such as: Pair I, Pair II, Pair III, etc.
2. Comparisons were made by comparing one group of districts with another.
3. Each district within a pair was identified by the presence or absence of a PN agreement.

It was now possible to refer to pairs and individual school districts without identifying any particular school system. As a point of illustration, the bases of the procedure just mentioned are shown below:

TABLE II
PAIRS OF DISTRICTS AS TO TYPE OF REPRESENTATION

Pair Number	Type of Representation	
Pair I	PNA X*	NPNA Y**
Pair II		
Pair III		

The Statistical Analyses Involved In This Study

The sample, school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania, was randomly stratified on the basis of two primary variables, wealth and size. The measurements used to determine statistical significance were the "t" test for related samples⁶ which was employed to measure the quantitative data accumulated and concerned with salaries, teacher turnover, and professional and classroom teacher adequacy. The "sign" test⁷ was employed to determine if a significant difference existed in the fringe benefit,

*X refers to mean scores associated with districts which have a PN agreement.

**Y refers to mean scores associated with districts which do not have a PN agreement.

grievance procedures and personnel policy scores as accumulated in this study. The level of significance employed in this study was 5 per cent.⁸

FOOTNOTES

1. School Laws of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Instruction. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 1965) Section 202, p. 33.
2. Pennsylvania State Education Association. Research Department. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 11 February 1968).
3. School Laws of Pennsylvania, op.cit., Sections 1326 and 1327, pp. 204-205.
4. Paul LeRoy Stone, "Benefits and Employment Conditions Offered by Pennsylvania Schools and Their Effects Upon Serving and Retaining Teachers," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1962).
5. James A. Van Zwoll, School Personnel Administration, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1964.) pp. 314-315.
6. James E. Wert, Charles G. Neidt, and J. Stanley Ahmann, Statistical Methods in Educational and Psychological Research, (New York: Appleton-Century-Craft, Inc. 1954), pp. 141-142.
7. Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics For The Behavioral Sciences, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1956), pp. 68-75.
8. Merle W. Tate, Statistics in Education and Psychology, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 224-225. (Also based on suggestions of Dr. Paul Van Miller of Lehigh University and Dr. Martin Yanis of the Department of Public Instruction.)

CHAPTER V

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

Professional Negotiation Agreements

There are two types of agreements which are presently receiving the attention of the National Education Association. These are comprehensive and procedural. The only comprehensive agreement in Pennsylvania is held by Philadelphia's Teachers Association, all of the other agreements are procedural. The procedural agreements may contain recognition, negotiation procedures, and an impasse resolution procedure, or any combination of the three. The comprehensive agreements contain, in addition to any or all of the procedural content items, such additional negotiated content as a salary schedule, leaves of absence, a grievance procedure and curricular items.*

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Salary

This study attempted to determine whether or not there was a significant difference in average salaries for two types of school districts of the second class -- PNA and NPNA. To do this, the data in Tables III, IV, V, VI and VII were used as a basis.

* Letter dated March 20, 1968 from the Research Division NEA.

TABLE III
BACHELORS DEGREE
AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS
WITH RESPECT TO EXPERIENCE

Pair Number	0-5		6-10		11-16		16+	
	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y
I	6245	6185	7813	8272	9579	9836	10080	9955
II	6200	5900	7500	7050	7500	7100	7500	7100
III	5714	6146	7016	7270	8183	8325	8900	8750
IV	5600	5450	6800	5937	7500	8000	7500	8011
V	6060	6855	7850	8275	8421	8800	8480	9800
VI	6300	5974	7650	6892	8600	7864	8800	8941
VII	6291	5782	8136	7193	9858	8086	9858	8819
VIII	5961	6237	7994	7340	9100	7850	9383	7850
IX	6030	5655	7527	7312	8575	7946	9020	8215
X	6550	6600	8300	8400	8850	9000	8900	9000
XI	5750	5712	7300	7216	7980	8500	8300	8500
XII	5900	5720	7500	7350	8000	7800	8200	7950
XIII	6342	6300	8175	7410	8925	8740	9400	9061
XIV	5521	5794	6928	7150	8100	8500	8100	9000
XV	6252	6150	7645	7550	8435	8200	8900	8600
XVI	5717	5620	7230	6673	8357	7977	8721	8140
XVII	6680	5973	8350	7228	8640	8100	8640	8100
XVIII	5419	5509	6814	7400	7460	7760	7500	8075
XIX	6799	6869	8006	7818	8842	8550	10090	9466
XX	5517	5616	7083	7175	7756	7800	7633	7657
XXI	6068	6133	7293	7220	8086	7700	9140	7700
XXII	6060	6002	7856	7473	8421	8087	8480	8542
XXIII	6150	5786	7550	6955	7900	8114	7900	8600

TABLE IV
MASTERS DEGREE
AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS
WITH RESPECT TO TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Pair Number	0-5		6-10		11-16		16+	
	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y	Yrs. X	Exp. Y
I	8189	8205	9103	9132	10695	10643	11592	11452
II	6200	6200	8000	7850	8100	8200	8100	8200
III	6480	6575	7509	8083	8558	8850	9600	9962
IV	5900	6500	7100	7587	7800	8333	7800	8500
V	6602	7150	8109	8421	9215	9650	9563	10120
VI	6700	6784	8050	7261	9000	8294	9400	9530
VII	7314	6148	9037	7102	9726	8409	9858	9711
VIII	6976	6708	8927	8710	10075	9990	10408	10100
IX	7300	6600	8223	7649	10133	8545	10535	9018
X	7400	7500	9450	9500	10750	11000	11000	11000
XI	6900	7050	7914	7800	8800	9171	9100	9200
XII	6650	6850	7580	7730	8560	8880	8700	9300
XIII	6600	6700	8250	8160	9560	9300	10100	9800
XIV	6350	6925	7700	7828	8620	9510	8633	9510
XV	6970	6830	8927	8750	10075	9890	10408	10350
XVI	6504	6850	7874	7598	9011	8416	9130	8707
XVII	6850	6300	8690	7700	9640	8483	9640	8940
XVIII	6300	6625	7211	8085	8100	9093	8125	9175
XIX	7575	7491	8758	7981	9353	9420	11383	10966
XX	6540	6600	7035	7250	8750	8600	8325	8487
XXI	7299	6350	8688	7780	9264	8529	10049	8788
XXII	6650	6712	8127	8089	8840	8731	8990	8878
XXIII	6150	6366	7950	7332	8500	8549	8500	9177

TABLE V
BACHELOR'S SALARY COMPARISONS FOR
PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>Minimum</u>		<u>Maximum</u>	
	<u>X</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>Y</u>
I	5600	5600	11000	10000
II	5100	5000	7500	7500
III	5300	5800	8750	8900
IV	5000	5100	7500	7800
V	5300	5400	9116	8950
VI	5400	5300	8800	8600
VII	5300	5100	8613	8450
VIII	5600	5600	9700	9600
IX	5300	5000	9100	8400
X	5600	6000	9000	9000
XI	5600	5300	9000	8650
XII	5200	5400	8400	8100
XIII	5500	5600	10325	9100
XIV	5200	5300	8600	9200
XV	5500	5600	8900	9320
XVI	5200	5300	8700	8800
XVII	5400	5100	8640	8200
XVIII	4800	5000	7500	7900
XIX	6000	6000	10100	9700
XX	5300	5300	7800	7850
XXI	5400	5400	9200	7700
XXII	5100	5400	7900	8700
XXIII	5400	5300	7900	7850

TABLE VI
MASTER'S DEGREE SALARY COMPARISONS FOR
PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

Pair Number	Minimum		Maximum	
	X	Y	X	Y
I	6216	5800	11780	11500
II	5100	5300	8100	8600
III	5600	6600	9600	9850
IV	5300	5400	7800	8100
V	5100	5800	8800	10300
VI	5600	5600	9600	9400
VII	5724	5600	9858	9800
VIII	6100	6300	12100	11200
IX	5600	5600	10500	9100
X	6500	6500	11220	11000
XI	5800	5600	9200	9200
XII	5100	6000	8800	8100
XIII	6325	6500	10985	9800
XIV	5600	5950	8400	9850
XV	5800	5900	10500	9980
XVI	5600	5400	9300	9400
XVII	5778	5800	9660	9600
XVIII	5100	5900	8100	9200
XIX	6500	6500	11500	11200
XX	5800	5995	10500	10845
XXI	6500	6400	10670	10500
XXII	5400	5400	8500	9000
XXIII	5400	5700	8500	8900

TABLE VII
AVERAGE SALARIES FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS
WITH RESPECT TO BACHELOR'S DEGREE,
MASTER'S DEGREE, AND OVERALL AVERAGE

Pair Number	Bachelors		Masters		Overall Average	
	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y
I	8429	8562	9858	9873	9143	9217
II	7175	6787	7600	7612	7387	7199
III	7453	7622	8036	8367	7744	7944
IV	6850	6849	7150	7730	7000	7109
V	7884	8432	8327	8785	8105	8608
VI	7837	7417	8287	7967	8062	7692
VII	8535	7418	8963	7842	8759	7630
VIII	8109	7319	8973	8877	8541	8098
IX	7783	7281	9047	7953	8415	7617
X	8150	8250	9650	9750	8900	9000
XI	7289	7482	8173	8305	7731	7893
XII	7400	7205	7872	8190	7636	7697
XIII	8210	7877	8627	8490	8418	8183
XIV	7164	7611	7825	7825	7494	7718
XV	7808	7625	9045	8955	8426	8290
XVI	7506	7103	8129	7892	7817	7497
XVII	8077	7350	8705	7855	8413	7602
XVIII	6798	7186	7325	8250	7061	7718
XIX	8434	8175	9267	8964	8850	8569
XX	6995	7062	7662	7734	7328	7398
XXI	7646	7188	8975	7861	8310	7574
XXII	7704	7526	8151	8102	7927	7814
XXIII	7375	7363	7775	7856	7575	7609

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree with 0-5 Years Teaching Experience

A comparison of the average salaries of PNA and NPNA districts was made on the basis of 23 pairs of school districts (Table VIII). A "t" of 0.7477 at the .05 level was found indicating a lack of a significant difference between PNA districts and NPNA districts in regard to teachers having a bachelor's degree and having 0-5 years teaching experience.

TABLE VIII

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA - BACHELOR'S DEGREE
0-5 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$6,048.74	\$66.75	0.7477*
NPNA	23	5,998.83		

*Not significant.

Note: - On this and subsequent tables the following abbreviations are used: Number of Districts (N), Mean Salary (M), Standard Error of Difference (S.E.D) Between the Means, Statistical Value ("t").

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree with 6-10 Years Teaching Experience

A comparison of the average salaries between PNA and NPNA districts was made on the basis of 6-10 years experience (Table IX). The "t" of the difference between the PNA and NPNA means was 2.5066 which was significant at the .05 level. This meant that PNA districts had higher salaries for teachers with a bachelors degree and 6-10 years experience.

TABLE IX

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE
6-10 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$7,578.96	\$99.85	2.5066*
NPNA	23	7,328.62		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree with 11-16 Years Teaching Experience

A comparison of the average salaries between PNA and NPNA districts was made on the basis of 23 pairs of school districts (Table X). The "t" difference between the PNA and NPNA districts was 1.6447 which was significant at the .05 level. This meant that PNA districts had higher salaries for teachers with bachelor's degrees and 11-16 years experience.

TABLE X

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE
11-16 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$8,394.00	\$117.03	1.6447*
NPNA	23	8,201.52		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree with 16+ Years Teaching Experience

As shown in Table XI, a "t" of 1.069 was found, which did not indicate a significant difference between the mean salaries of PNA and NPNA districts of teachers with a bachelor's degree and having 16+ years of teaching experience.

TABLE XI

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE
16+ YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$8,670.65	\$146.00	1.069*
NPNA	23	8,514.43		

* Not significant

Average Salary: Master's Degree with 0-5 Years Teaching Experience

The findings relative to PNA and NPNA districts for this classification of salary were derived from 23 pairs of school districts (Table XII). A "t" value of 0.1740 was found which was not significant at the .05 level in regard to the mean salaries of PNA and NPNA districts holding a master's degree and having 0-5 years experience in teaching.

TABLE XII

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE
0-5 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$6,799.87	\$94.41	0.1740*
NPNA	23	6,783.43		

* Not significant

Average Salary: Master's Degree with 6-10 Years Teaching Experience

As reported in Table XIII, a significant level of difference exists in mean salaries of teachers with a master's degree and having 6-10 years teaching experience by virtue of a "t" value of 1.6515.

TABLE XIII

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE
6-10 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$8,183.13	\$127.34	1.6515*
NPNA	23	7,972.83		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)

Average Salary: Master's Degree with 11-16 Years Teaching Experience

A comparison of the average salaries between PNA and NPNA districts was made on the basis of 23 pairs of districts (Table XIV). The "t" value of 0.8379 was not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE XIV

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE
11-16 YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$9,179.35	\$136.93	0.8379*
NPNA	23	9,064.61		

* Not significant

Average Salary: Master's Degree with 16+ Years Teaching Experience

As shown in Table XV the "t" value was only 0.0225, therefore there was not a significant difference between the mean salaries of the compared salaries in this category of a masters degree with 16+ years experience.

TABLE XV

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE
16+ YEARS TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$9,519.09	\$130.83	0.0225*
NPNA	23	9,516.13		

* Not significant

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree with No Teaching Experience -

This category shows the first of three negative correlations in salary comparisons. The "t" value was -0.801 which indicates that districts which did not have PN agreements did offer arithmetically higher average salaries for beginning teachers although it was not significant statistically as shown in Table XVI.

TABLE XVI

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE
NO TEACHING EXPERIENCE

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$5,360.00	\$45.37	-0.801*
NPNA	23	5,386.36		

* Not significant.

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree Maximums

The 23 pairs of districts were compared and a "t" value of 1.419 was found indicating that the average salaries of those teachers who teach in districts which have PN agreements are higher. (Table XVII).

TABLE XVII

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - BACHELOR'S DEGREE MAXIMUMS

Type of Representation	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$8,784.52	\$115.56	1.419*
NPNA	23	8,620.43		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)

Average Salary: Master's Degree Minimums

The 23 pairs of districts were statistically analyzed as to their Master degree minimums and a "t" value of -2.296 was found. This indicates that starting salaries for teachers holding a master's degree in districts with PNA's were significantly lower than the NPNA districts. (Table XVIII).

TABLE XVIII

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE MINIMUMS

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$5,719.26	\$363.30	-2.296*
NPNA	23	5,893.26		

* Not significant.

Average Salary: Master's Degree Maximums

Table XIX shows a "t" value of -0.129 which indicates that teachers who teach in NPNA districts have higher average Master's degree maximum salaries. However the difference in the means is not significant.

TABLE XIX

AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS - MASTER'S DEGREE MAXIMUMS

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$9,737.96	%152.23	-0.129*
NPNA	23	9,757.61		

* Not significant.

Average Salary: Bachelor's Degree

The "t" value for this salary category was 1.989 (Table XX). This indicates that the average teacher's salary in PNA districts who hold a bachelor's degree is significantly higher than those who do not teach in a PNA district.

TABLE XX

AVERAGE SALARY: BACHELOR'S DEGREE

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$7,678.74	\$85.68	1.989*
NPNA	23	7,508.26		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)

Average Salary: Master's Degree

The 23 pairs of districts were compared and analyzed as to master degree maximums and a "t" value of 0.801 was calculated which indicates that the difference in the mean salaries of teachers holding a master's degree was not significant. (Table XXI).

TABLE XXI

AVERAGE SALARY: MASTER'S DEGREE

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	\$8,394.00	\$110.78	0.801*
NPNA	23	8,305.22		

* Not significant.

Overall Average Salary

The average salary for each of the 23 pairs of districts was calculated and a "t" value of 1.626 was found (Table XXII). This indicates that teachers who teach in PNA districts have significantly higher average salaries than those teachers in NPNA districts.

TABLE XXII

OVERALL AVERAGE SALARY: PNA vs NPNA DISTRICTS

Type of Representation	N	M	S.E.D.	"t"
PNA	23	\$8,045.30	\$89.95	1.626*
NPNA	23	7,898.96		

* Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test).

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis on Salary

As a result of the findings just presented, the investigator accepts the hypothesis that teachers in districts having Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to receive higher salaries than teachers in districts not having Professional Negotiations Agreements.

Professional Negotiations Agreements: Professional Staff Adequacy and Classroom Teacher Adequacy

An attempt was made in this part of the study to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between professional staff adequacy for the two categories of districts, PNA vs NPNA. Also an attempt was made to determine if a significant difference existed as to classroom teacher adequacy. The data which were used as a basis for the findings are found in Tables XXIII and XXIV.

TABLE XXIII
AVERAGE "PROFESSIONAL STAFF ADEQUACY" SCORES
FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>
I	47.56	44.78
II	37.35	37.40
III	44.82	40.99
IV	41.58	38.19
V	46.58	46.91
VI	42.96	44.21
VII	51.08	44.74
VIII	53.71	48.19
IX	50.82	43.38
X	42.34	49.86
XI	43.88	54.31
XII	38.97	39.13
XIII	42.13	43.84
XIV	46.71	48.25
XV	41.48	42.06
XVI	50.39	37.92
XVII	44.74	50.60
XVIII	41.36	37.92
XIX	49.61	48.41
XX	40.97	38.47
XXI	41.61	41.09
XXII	52.68	41.91
XXIII	42.60	48.05

TABLE XXIV
AVERAGE "CLASSROOM TEACHER ADEQUACY" SCORES
FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>
I	44.84	42.15
II	35.76	33.19
III	42.36	35.61
IV	38.38	35.72
V	40.47	43.82
VI	36.52	41.86
VII	44.84	42.68
VIII	43.58	45.92
IX	42.71	41.30
X	39.85	46.62
XI	41.30	40.30
XII	37.25	36.90
XIII	40.16	40.51
XIV	35.68	43.33
XV	35.36	39.63
XVI	43.80	36.39
XVII	42.68	47.12
XVIII	33.28	36.39
XIX	46.79	46.03
XX	38.31	36.49
XXI	46.79	38.37
XXII	48.92	34.45
XXIII	40.30	45.74

Professional Staff Adequacy

Using the data from 23 pairs of school districts, no significant difference was found at the .05 level between the professional staff adequacies of PNA and NPNA districts (Table XXV).

TABLE XXV
PROFESSIONAL STAFF ADEQUACY

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	45.040	1.142	0.964*
NPNA	23	43.939		

* Not significant.

Classroom Teacher Adequacy

Using the data from 23 pairs of school districts, no significant difference was found at the .05 level between the classroom teacher adequacies of PNA and NPNA districts (Table XXVI).

TABLE XXVI
CLASSROOM TEACHER ADEQUACY

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	40.866	1.121	0.364*
NPNA	23	40.457		

* Not significant.

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis on Professional Staff Adequacy and Classroom Teacher Adequacy

As a result of the findings just presented, the investigator rejects the hypothesis that teachers in districts having Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have better professional staff adequacy and classroom teacher adequacy than teachers in districts not having Professional Negotiations Agreements.

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Teacher-Turnover

The purpose of this part of the study was to determine whether or not there were significant differences in teacher-turnover between PNA and NPNA districts. As a means for determining this, the data in Table XXVII were used.

TABLE XXVII
AVERAGE TEACHER-TURNOVER
IN PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>
I	9.00	6.76
II	2.70	9.06
III	7.56	7.04
IV	15.12	3.84
V	17.38	15.02
VI	10.09	12.16
VII	9.87	7.23
VIII	8.28	8.59
IX	5.26	10.92
X	7.67	16.67
XI	10.92	8.52
XII	13.02	6.71
XIII	9.03	6.02
XIV	13.41	5.27
XV	18.76	7.06
XVI	21.83	13.01
XVII	7.23	9.56
XVIII	8.31	5.71
XIX	2.33	6.31
XX	6.93	5.68
XXI	2.33	10.45
XXII	9.07	7.62
XXIII	7.48	2.22

Average Teacher-Turnover

The analysis of the data showed a "t" value of 0.5083 (Table XXVIII). This indicates no significant difference in teacher-turnover between PNA and NPNA districts.

TABLE XXVIII
AVERAGE TEACHER-TURNOVER

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>S.E.D.</u>	<u>"t"</u>
PNA	23	9.77	0.95	0.5083*
NPNA	23	8.28		

* Not significant.

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis on Teacher-Turnover

On the basis of the findings just reported, the investigator rejects that hypothesis that school districts which have PN agreements tend to have less teacher-turnover than NPNA districts.

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Fringe Benefits

This part of the study had its purpose to determine whether there was or was not a significant difference between the average "Fringe Benefits Scores" of PNA and NPNA districts. The basic data employed are found in Table XXIX.

TABLE XXIX
AVERAGE "FRINGE BENEFITS SCORES"
FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>	<u>Sign</u>
I	34	44	-
II	21	25	-
III	35	32	+
IV	43	29	+
V	30	31	-
VI	35	33	+
VII	32	29	+
VIII	34	34	0
IX	40	28	+
X	34	31	+
XI	34	32	+
XII	32	41	-
XIII	36	15	+
XIV	29	25	+
XV	24	36	-
XVI	28	41	-
XVII	33	26	+
XVIII	28	33	-
XIX	43	44	-
XX	37	33	+
XXI	39	29	+
XXII	38	41	-
XXIII	26	34	-

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Fringe Benefits

A comparison of the average "Fringe Benefits Scores" of PNA and NPNA districts was made on the basis of 23 pairs of school districts (Table XXX). No significant difference at the .05 level was found between PNA and NPNA mean scores.

TABLE XXX
AVERAGE "FRINGE BENEFITS SCORES"

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Probability</u>
PNA	23	.416*
NPNA	23	

* Not significant.

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis on Fringe Benefits

The findings presented lead the investigator to reject the hypothesis that teachers in school districts which have PN agreements tend to receive more fringe benefits than teachers in NPNA districts.

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Development of Personnel Policies

The concern of this part of the study was to determine whether or not there was a significant difference between the average "Personnel Policy Scores" of PNA and NPNA school districts. Table XXXI includes the data which were employed.

TABLE XXXI
AVERAGE "PERSONNEL POLICY SCORES"
FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>	<u>Sign</u>
I	8	8	0
II	6	8	-
III	8	3	+
IV	0	4	-
V	8	8	0
VI	6	8	-
VII	5	3	+
VIII	8	8	0
IX	5	3	+
X	8	8	0
XI	3	8	-
XII	3	0	+
XIII	8	4	+
XIV	8	8	+
XV	3	5	-
XVI	8	2	+
XVII	3	8	-
XVIII	2	3	-
XIX	8	8	0
XX	5	5	0
XXI	8	8	0
XXII	4	6	-
XXIII	6	5	+

Personnel Policy Development

The average "Personnel Policy Scores" were compared on the basis of 23 pairs of school districts (Table XXXII). By means of the sign test a "p" of .500 was found which indicates that the scores were not significant.

TABLE XXXII
AVERAGE "PERSONNEL POLICY SCORES"

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Probability</u>
PNA	23	.500*
NPNA	23	

* Not significant.

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis Regarding Personnel Policy Development

As a result of the findings, the investigator rejects the hypothesis that teachers in districts which have a Professional Negotiations Agreement tend to have a more favorable situation with respect to the development of personnel policy than teachers in districts which do not have a Professional Negotiations Agreement.

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Grievance Procedure

An attempt was made in this section of the study to determine whether or not a difference exists between the average of PNA and NPNA school districts with respect to "Grievance Procedure Scores." The data which were used are found in Table XXXIII.

TABLE XXXIII
AVERAGE "GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SCORES"
FOR PNA AND NPNA DISTRICTS

<u>Pair Number</u>	<u>PNA X</u>	<u>NPNA Y</u>	<u>Sign</u>
I	8	8	0
II	5	3	+
III	8	0	+
IV	0	5	-
V	5	8	-
VI	5	8	-
VII	4	3	+
VIII	8	8	0
IX	4	3	+
X	8	6	+
XI	3	8	-
XII	3	2	+
XIII	8	5	+
XIV	8	0	+
XV	4	6	-
XVI	8	3	+
XVII	3	8	-
XVIII	5	0	+
XIX	8	8	0
XX	6	4	+
XXI	8	8	0
XXII	6	6	0
XXIII	6	6	0

Professional Negotiations Agreements and Grievance Procedure

The average "Grievance Procedure Scores" of the PNA and NPNA districts were compared on the basis of 23 districts. No difference significant at the .05 level was found between the mean "Grievance Procedure Scores" of the PNA and NPNA districts (Table XXXIV).

TABLE XXXIV
AVERAGE "GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SCORES"

<u>Type of Representation</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Probability</u>
PNA	23	.166*
NPNA	23	

* Not significant.

Acceptance or Rejection of the Minor Hypothesis on Grievance Procedure

The investigator, using the findings just mentioned as a basis, rejects the hypothesis that school districts which have PN agreements tend to have more definite grievance procedure than NPNA districts.

ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

Major Hypothesis

The major hypothesis that school districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have more favorable situations relative to six conditions of work was accepted for one and rejected for five others.

Analysis by the Investigator

Due to the lack of legislation to support negotiation by public school professional employees on a formal basis, the conferences held by professional organizations and boards of education have resulted in significant advances in the area of salaries only. The low salaries of teachers have consistently resulted in virtually all of the energies of the professional organizations being spent on this singular item with the net result that little advance in the other areas of working conditions has materialized. Also, with the lack of a power base for the teachers, which can only realistically be accomplished by legislation, it seems remarkable that anything has effectively been accomplished.

Minor Hypothesis on Salary

The minor hypothesis on salary was accepted. This means that school districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to receive higher salaries than teachers in districts which do not have Professional Negotiations Agreements.

Analysis by the Investigator

The findings revealed that PNA districts had more

favorable situations than NPNA districts in the following salary classifications: (a) Bachelor's Degree with 6-10 years experience, (b) Bachelor's Degree with 11-16 years experience, (c) Master's Degree with 6-10 years experience, (d) Bachelor maximum salaries, and (e) Bachelor's Overall Average Salary. The Bachelor's Degree with 0-5 years experience, Bachelor's Degree with 16+ years experience, Master's Degree 0-5 years experience, Master's Degree 11-16 and Master's Degree with 16+ years experience did not show a significant difference in the mean salaries but in most cases the average salaries were very close to the value of 1.17 for the "t", which would show significance at the .05 level. Negative correlations revealed themselves in the categories of Bachelor's Minimums, Master's Minimums, and Master's Maximums, which show a definite lack of emphasis of professional organizations who have PN agreements to confer on these areas or it shows the willingness of NPNA districts to emphasize minimum salaries at the expense of career teachers.

Minor Hypothesis on Fringe Benefits

The minor hypothesis that teachers in districts which have PN agreements tend to receive more fringe benefits

than teachers in districts which do not have PN agreements was rejected.

Analysis by the Investigator

There was little difference in the Average "Fringe Benefits Scores" between PNA and NPNA districts.

The findings confirm what Paul LeRoy Stone had found in 1962 in Pennsylvania. Specifically that teachers do not seem to be much concerned about fringe benefits. The attention given to such benefits in business and industry has not yet "caught on" in public education. A reason for this may be that teachers, unlike industrial employees, have not "passed through" the money phase of negotiations as yet.

Minor Hypothesis on Professional Staff Adequacy and Classroom Teacher Adequacy

The minor hypothesis that teachers in districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have better professional staff adequacy and classroom teacher adequacy was rejected.

Analysis by the Investigator

The professional staff adequacy "t" value was 0.964 which was approaching significance at the .05 level,

whereas the classroom teacher adequacy "t" value was 0.364 and thus was farther from a significant value of 1.17. The data suggest that staff services in PNA districts are moving to levels of significant differences as compared to NPNA districts.

Minor Hypothesis on Personnel Policy Development

The minor hypothesis that districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have more favorable situations with respect to the development of personnel policies than teachers in NPNA districts was rejected.

Analysis by the Investigator

As suggested earlier, because of the lack of comprehensive agreements in Pennsylvania and legislation to support personnel policy development participation the difference between PNA and NPNA districts is not significant.

Minor Hypothesis on Teacher-Turnover

The minor hypothesis that school districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have less teacher-turnover than districts which do not have Professional Negotiations Agreements was rejected.

Analysis by the Investigator

Although there is less teacher-turnover in PNA districts than NPNA districts, the difference is not significant. Apparently, there are factors other than those mentioned in this study which contribute to the holding power of NPNA districts. These results illustrate that even though PNA districts paid higher salaries, the teacher-holding power was no better than that of NPNA districts.....a further illustration of the point that it takes more than money to keep good teachers.

Minor Hypothesis on Grievance Procedure

The minor hypothesis that school districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements tend to have more definite grievance procedure than districts which do not have Professional Negotiations Agreements was rejected.

Analysis by the Investigator

Again the lack of comprehensive agreements coupled with the lack of definitive legislation contributes to the lack of any significant difference in grievance procedure in PNA districts and NPNA districts.

A Brief Summary of the Statistical Comparisons

In all, there were twenty-one statistical comparisons made in this study and the findings were as follows:

1. The results of five statistical comparisons were more favorable to PNA districts. These were only in the salary category.

2. There were three negative statistical comparisons. Again, these were all in the salary category.

3. There were twelve statistical comparisons which did not favor the PNA districts.

TABLE XXXV

SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL COMPARISONS

AVERAGE SALARY BACHELOR'S DEGREE	<u>"t" Value</u>	Significant at <u>.05 level</u>
Minimums	-0.8010	No
0-5 Years Teaching Experience	0.7477	No
6-10 Years Teaching Experience	2.5066	Yes
11-16 Years Teaching Experience	1.6447	Yes
16+ Years Teaching Experience	1.0690	No
Maximums	1.4190	Yes
Average Salary	1.9890	Yes
AVERAGE SALARY MASTER'S DEGREE		
Minimums	-2.2960	No
0-5 Years Teaching Experience	0.1740	No
6-10 Years Teaching Experience	1.6515	Yes
11-16 Years Teaching Experience	0.8379	No
16+ Years Teaching Experience	0.0225	No
Maximums	-0.1290	No
Average Salary	0.8010	No
OVERALL AVERAGE SALARY	1.6260	Yes
PROFESSIONAL STAFF ADEQUACY	0.9640	No
CLASSROOM TEACHER ADEQUACY	0.3640	No
TEACHER-TURNOVER	0.5083	No
	<u>Probability (Sign Test)</u>	
FRINGE BENEFITS SCORES	0.4160	No
PERSONNEL POLICY SCORES	0.5000	No
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SCORES	0.1660	No

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of the Study

The purpose of this investigation was to compare school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania which have signed Professional Negotiations Agreements with school districts of the second class in Pennsylvania which do not have Professional Negotiations Agreements with respect to six conditions of work: salary, fringe benefits, professional staff adequacy, the development of personnel policy, teacher-turnover, and grievance procedure. Forty-six school districts of a possible fifty-seven districts were included in this study. Salary data, teacher-turnover data, and professional-classroom teacher adequacy data were secured from the official records of the Department of Public Instruction; namely, Forms: PIR 1, 1A, and 1B entitled "Professional Personnel Record." Data relative to fringe benefits were secured from a questionnaire sent to the chief school administrators of each district. Data on grievance procedure and personnel policy development were secured by means of questionnaires sent to the chief school administrators and the local teachers associations presidents.

In Chapter V the major and minor hypotheses were tested and analyzed. Briefly, the findings were these:

1. On the basis of twenty-one statistical comparisons, (a) five were in favor of districts having Professional Negotiations Agreements (all of these in the salary category), (b) twelve categories did not show a significant difference between districts having Professional Negotiations Agreements and those districts not having Professional Agreements, and (c) there were three statistical comparisons (all salary) which resulted in a negative relationship.

Conclusions

1. The only area of this study which tends to work more favorably for districts which have Professional Negotiations Agreements in Pennsylvania is in salary. And even here, only for the career teacher. The other conditions of work do not show significant differences.

2. The length of time which Professional Negotiations Agreements have been in effect may have detracted from the influence which they could have on conditions of work other than salary.

This writer has gleaned from the study more than can be represented statistically. Therefore, the following suggestions are drawn from the experiences and personal conferences on the subject of collective negotiations. While not in the nature of conclusions, these seem to represent matters of concern to all boards and professional organizations. They also represent other areas in need of further study.

Suggestions

1. Professional organizations and boards of education should consider increased efforts to have legislation passed which will enhance collective negotiations between the professional organization and local boards of education. Such legislation should include impasse procedure which includes public fact finding and a punishment clause for lack of good faith negotiating. The legislature should recommend areas of working conditions which can be negotiated but allow the local boards and organizations to resolve specifics.

2. Professional organizations and boards of education should carefully consider the type of channels which are being developed in the several states for solving impasses.


3. Professional organizations and boards of education will have a joint interest in written grievance procedures which are easily initiated, definitive, simple and result in handling grievances in a most expeditious manner.

4. Some professional organizations are engaging full-time or part-time negotiators to represent their members. Some boards of education are following a similar pattern.

5. The negotiation unit should be resolved on a local level since each district has its unique differences.

6. A study is needed to show what relationship, if any, Professional Negotiations Agreements have in school districts of the third and fourth class in Pennsylvania to conditions of work for teachers.

REGIONAL DISTRICTS
Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc.
With Districts of the Second Class (*)
March 8, 1968



-104-

APPENDIX A

Allegheny	Baldwin Whitehall SD Chartiers Valley SD Highlands SD Keystone Oaks SD McKeesport Area SD Mt. Lebanon SD North Hills SD Penn Hills Twp SD Shaler Twp SD Wilkinsburg Boro SD	Centre Chester	State College Area SD Coatesville Area SD West Chester Area SD West Shore SD Central Dauphin SD Harrisburg City SD Chester City SD Haverford Twp SD Ridley SD Upper Darby Twp SD Erie City SD Albert Gallatin Area SD Connellsville Area SD Uniontown Area SD Chambersburg Area SD Scranton City SD Lancaster City SD New Castle Area SD Lebanon SD	Lehigh Luzerne	Allentown City SD Hazleton Area SD Wilkes-Barre City SD Wyoming Valley West SD Williamsport Area SD Mifflin County SD Abington SD Cheltenham Twp SD Colonial SD Lower Merion SD Norristown Area SD North Penn SD Bethlehem Area SD Easton City SD Warren County SD Ringgold SD Hempfield Area SD New Kensington Arnold SD York City SD
Armstrong Berks Blair Bucks	Armstrong SD Reading SD Altoona Area SD Bristol Twp SD Centennial SD Neshaminy SD Pennsbury SD Butler Area SD Greater Johnstown SD	Cumberland Dauphin Delaware		Lycoming Mifflin Montgomery	
Butler Cambria		Erie Fayette		Northampton	
		Franklin Lackawanna Lancaster Lawrence Lebanon		Warren Washington Westmoreland	
				York	

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire on Employment Benefits

Name of School System _____

Directions: Please answer the following questionnaire concerning employment benefits for teachers in your school system by placing a check mark (x) in the appropriate spaces.

1. Does your school system grant annual sick leave beyond that mandated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
 Yes___ No___
 (a) If so, how many additional days? _____
 (b) Are these additional days at full or part salary?

2. Does your school system grant leave beyond that mandated by state law for death in the immediate family? Yes___
 No___
3. Does your school system grant leave beyond that mandated by state law for death of a near relative? Yes___ No___
4. Does your school system grant absence with pay for the following reasons?
 (a) Jury duty Yes___ No___
 (b) Subpoena for court trials Yes___ No___
 (c) Community or civic duties Yes___ No___
 (d) Voting Yes___ No___
5. Does your school system grant absence without loss of pay for the following purposes?
 (a) Attending funeral of a friend Yes___ No___
 (b) Religious Holidays Yes___ No___
 (c) Personal reasons Yes___ No___
6. Does your school system grant maternity leave? Yes___
 No___
7. Does your school system grant payment above the fifteen days required by state law for brief tours of active military duty? Yes___ No___

8. Does your school system permit teachers to attend the following without loss of pay?
- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| (a) Conventions | Yes___ No___ |
| (b) Professional meetings | Yes___ No___ |
| (c) School visitations | Yes___ No___ |
| (d) P.S.E.A. Meetings | Yes___ No___ |
| (e) N.E.A. Meetings | Yes___ No___ |
| (f) School evaluations | Yes___ No___ |
9. Does your school system pay necessary expenses beyond salary payments for teachers attending conventions, conferences, and professional meetings? Yes___ No___
- (a) If answer is "yes" indicate whether or not full or part payment of expenses is made. Full payment___ Part___
10. Does your school system have a medical-surgical group insurance plan for teachers (such as Blue Shield)? Yes___ No___
- (a) If answer is "yes" what part of the premium is paid by the school system? All___ None___ One half___ Other___
- (b) The total cost of premium payments to the school system amounts to an estimated (figure) _____ dollars per year.
11. Does your school system have a hospitalization group insurance plan for teachers (such as Blue Cross)? Yes___ No___
- (a) If answer is "yes" what part of the premium is paid by the school system? All___ None___ One half___ Other___
- (b) The total cost of premium payments to the school system amounts to an estimated (figure) _____ dollars per year.
12. Does your school system have a group health and accident insurance plan for teachers? Yes___ No___
- (a) If answer is "yes" what part of the premium is paid by the school system? All___ None___ One half___ Other___
- (b) Total cost of premium payments to the school system amounts to an estimated (figure) _____ dollars per year.

13. Does your school system have a group life insurance plan for teachers? Yes___ No___
(a) If answer is "yes" what part of the premium is paid by the school system? All___ None___ One half ___ Other___
(b) The total cost of the premium payments to the school system amounts to an estimated (figure) _____ dollars per year.
14. Does your school system have a group major medical insurance plan for teachers? Yes___ No___
15. Does your school system provide liability insurance covering the teacher while on the job? Yes___ No___
16. Does your school system make any reimbursement for tuition payment for graduate courses of study taken by teachers? Full___ Part___ None___
17. Does your school system grant salary increases upon completion of blocks of credit for college or university courses? (Do not include increments for a Master's Degree.) Yes___ No___
18. Does your school system grant extra pay for extra duty? Yes___ No___
(a) If answer is "yes," check one of the following:
Teachers are paid for all extra duties___
Teachers are paid for most extra duties___
Teachers are paid for some extra duties___
Teachers are paid for a few extra duties___
19. Does your school system offer summer work to interested teachers? Yes___ No___
20. Does your school system provide clerical assistance for teachers? Full___ Part___ None___
21. Does your school system have a credit union for teachers? Yes___ No___
22. Does your school system grant additional pay for local workshop days when schools are closed? Yes___ No___

23. Does your school system reimburse teachers who pay their own expenses while engaged in official school business? Yes____ No____

Name_____

Position_____

APPENDIX C

Personnel Policy and Grievance Procedure

Name of your school district _____

Do you have a Professional Negotiations Agreement? Yes _____

No _____

If yes, date signed _____

If yes, please forward a copy.

Part I: Questions Relative to Personnel Policy

1. Are personnel policies in your school district stated in written form and distributed to all teachers? Yes _____
No _____

IF ANSWER TO #1 IS "YES", PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS WHICH FOLLOW.

2. Are personnel policies written in simple, clear, and easily understood language? Yes _____ No _____
3. Are the personnel policies written in general or detailed form? General _____ Detailed _____
4. Do teachers in your school district have a voice in the creation of personnel policies? Yes _____ No _____
5. Are the personnel policies in your district periodically reviewed and revised to fit present conditions? Yes _____
No _____
6. (a) If answer is "yes," how often are personnel policies revised? Every year _____ Every other year _____ Other _____

Part II: Questions Relative to Grievance Procedure

1. Does your school system have a simple, orderly step-by-step procedure to handle complaints and grievances of teachers? Yes _____ No _____

IF ANSWER TO #1 IS "YES", PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS WHICH FOLLOW.

2. Is the grievance procedure to be followed stated in written form and distributed to all teachers? Yes____
No____
3. Does the grievance procedure have adequate steps for appeal? Yes____ No____
4. Is every effort made to settle grievances or complaints at the first step? Yes____ No____
5. How promptly are teachers' grievances settled in your school district? Days____ Months____ Indefinite____
6. Are teachers kept informed by appropriate officials concerning the status of their complaints or grievances? Yes____ No____
7. Does your school system have a systematic plan for bringing to light conditions which need corrections before they become grievances? Yes____ No____

GLOSSARY

Actual instruction expense per WADM

$$\frac{\text{Total School District Actual Instruction Expense}}{\text{Total WADM}}$$

Agreement

See Collective negotiations; Professional negotiation. A written agreement between an employer (or an association of employers) and an employee organization (or organizations), usually for a definite term, defining conditions of employment (wages, hours, vacations, holidays, overtime payments, working conditions, etc.), rights of employees and the employee organization, and procedures to be followed in settling disputes or handling issues that arise during the life of the agreement.

Aid ratio

$$1.000 - \frac{(\text{School District MV/WADM})}{(\text{Statewide MV/WADM})} \times .50$$

Arbitration (voluntary, compulsory, advisory)

Method of settling employment disputes through recourse to an impartial third party, whose decision is usually final and binding. Arbitration is voluntary when both parties agree to submit disputed issues to arbitration, and compulsory if required by law. A court order to carry through a voluntary arbitration agreement is not generally considered as compulsory arbitration. Advisory arbitration is arbitration without a final and binding award.

Collective negotiations (collective bargaining; professional negotiation)

A process whereby employees as a group and their employers make offers and counter-offers in good faith on the conditions of their employment relationship for the purpose of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, and the execution of a written document incorporating any such agreement if requested by either party. Also, a process whereby a representative of the employees and their employer jointly determine their conditions of employment.

Executive Order 10988

Titled "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service," this federal order, issued by President Kennedy in 1962, guarantees the right of employees of the executive branch of the government to join employee organizations. The order also defines the scope of participation by such organizations in the determination of personnel policies and working conditions.

Fringe benefits

Generally, supplements to wages or salaries received by employees at a cost to employers. The term encompasses a host of practices (paid vacations, pensions, health and insurance plans, etc.) that usually add to something more than a "fringe," and is sometimes applied to a practice that may constitute a dubious "benefit" to workers. No agreement prevails as to the list of practices that should be called "fringe benefits." Other terms often substituted for "fringe benefits" include "wage extras," "hidden payroll," "nonwage labor costs," and "supplementary wage practices."

Grievance

Any complaint or expressed dissatisfaction by an employee in connection with his job, pay, or other aspects of his employment. Whether such complaint or expressed dissatisfaction is formally recognized and handled as a "grievance" depends on the scope of the grievance procedure.

Impasse

A persistent disagreement that continues after normal negotiation procedures have been exhausted.

Market Value per pupil resident

$$\frac{\text{Total Market Value in School District}}{\text{Total Pupils in School District}}$$

Professional negotiation

A term developed by the NEA referring to a set of procedures, written and officially adopted by the local association and the school board, which provides an orderly method for the school board and the local association to negotiate on matters of mutual concern.

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