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QUAY, William L., 1934-
PHILADELPHIA DEMOCRATS: 1880-1910.

Lehigh University, Ph.D., 1969
History, modern

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PHILADELPHIA DEMOCRATS: 1880 - 1910

by

William L. Quay

A Dissertation
Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of Lehigh University
in candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History

Lehigh University

1969

Approved and recommended for acceptance as a
dissertation in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Acknowledgements

It is impossible to cite here the many people who have contributed to the completion of this work. A general acknowledgement of appreciation must suffice at this time.

However, special recognition is made to Dr. Joseph A. Dowling who supervised this study and to Mr. David C. Amidon, Jr. and Dr. William G. Shade who both offered valuable advice and criticism. All three men have given liberally of their time and have also been a source of constant inspiration during the preparation of this work.

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An Abstract
of
A Dissertation

PHILADELPHIA DEMOCRATS: 1880 - 1910

by
William L. Quay

During the Cleveland-Bryan era the Democratic party in Philadelphia experienced an almost phenomenal decline in both leadership strength and grass roots support. At a time when the Democrats built strong and successful organizations in other Eastern cities like New York and Boston, Philadelphia Democrats recorded constant losses which resulted in the collapse of the party in 1910. This study traces the events and analyzes the factors which contributed to this prodigious decline.

Many new works have appeared recently which focus on municipal politics and urban reform movements but there is a dearth of material on the role of the major political party in an urban setting. Consequently this study concentrates on a major, albeit a minority, party in an important Eastern city and how that party responded to the national issues of the period.

In the decade of the 30's the Philadelphia Democrats, as a united organization, threatened the Republicans who had, since the Civil War, produced strong pluralities for the G.O.P. national ticket. The extraordinary leadership of Congressman Samuel J. Randall contributed to the success of the Philadelphia Democrats who elected a mayor in 1881. A year later a Philadelphian, Robert E. Pattison, won election as the only Democratic governor of Pennsylvania from the Civil War to the New Deal. Throughout the first years of the Cleveland Era Philadelphia Democrats demonstrated solidarity and aided the national ticket as a strong minority party.

In contrast to the optimistic decade of the 80's the Democrats experienced chaos, confusion and turbulence during the 90's. Shortly after Randall died, his congressional district was torn apart by party fighting which led to city wide schism by the mid 90's. In 1894 a significant shift in voting strength occurred when all the normal Democratic wards, except one, went Republican in the gubernatorial election. Two years later the Democrats suffered another great loss when the leadership of the party divided over Bryan. The loss of grass roots strength in 1898 and the defection of most of the leading Philadelphia Democrats in 1896 were the two most important events in the decline of the party in Philadelphia.

From 1900 to 1910 this once vital minority party suffered defeat after defeat. In 1900 Philadelphia's only Democratic congressman, William McAleer, lost his bid for reelection. Though a conservative resurgence occurred in 1904 when most of the Gold Democrats returned to the party to support Parker, the Democrats had already lost their grass-roots support as evidenced by Parker's failure to match the Bryan vote of 25%. By 1910 the party collapsed completely when it could only muster 6% of the vote for its gubernatorial nominee.

During this thirty year period the Philadelphia Democrats underwent radical shifts in party leadership. During the 80's some socially prominent families, bankers, middle-class businessmen as well as Irish and German politicians were party leaders. By the end of the period the Democratic party had become an Irish club dominated by two political bosses, Charlie Donnelly and Tommy Ryan.

The major changes in the ethnic fabric of the city also weakened the Democratic party at the grass-roots level. In the 80's the old Irish and German neighborhoods were solidly Democratic but when the Russian Jews and Italians moved into these areas the Republicans gained control of these wards. Hence, both political and ethnic factors contributed to the sharp decline of the Democracy during the Bryan years.

INTRODUCTION

The Philadelphia Democracy during the decade of the 80's was a vigorous, hard working minority party which occasionally defeated the Republicans and maintained a strong challenge to G.O.P. dominance. By 1910, however, the Democrats lay prostrate before the powerful Republican city machine. The purpose of this study is to trace the events and analyze the causes of the Democratic collapse in Philadelphia.

The long Republican domination in Philadelphia has obscured the one-time power of the Democrats as well as the national prominence of many of the party leaders in the city. Samuel Jackson Randall, Philadelphia's most distinguished Democrat, served as Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1876 to 1881 and was on two occasions considered seriously as a presidential nominee. His political lieutenant, William F. Harrity, managed Cleveland's successful reelection in 1892. Robert E. Pattison, another Philadelphian, was Pennsylvania's only Democratic governor from the Civil War to the New Deal. He too, was considered presidential timber during the Cleveland-Bryan era.

From 1880 to 1910 the national democracy experienced a radical shift in ideology that confused and perplexed many

of the old Jeffersonian Democrats. The response of these "Constitutional" democrats and other factions of the party must be examined to determine the pattern of democratic politics.

Though many new works have appeared recently which analyze urban reform movements, there is a dearth of material on the major city political party and how it responded to the broader, contemporary issues of the Cleveland-Bryan period.

However, several regional studies have appeared recently which interpret the indigenous responses to national parties, platforms and candidates. Geoffrey Blodgett in The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era (published in 1968) explains how the Yankee aristocrats and Boston Irish responded favorably to Cleveland's administrations. Blodgett analyzes the impact of Bryan on the Massachusetts Democratic party and traces the major defections in the party which occurred in 1896. His observation that Bryanism weakened the party in Boston shows some striking similarities to the situation which developed in Philadelphia.

In his unpublished doctoral dissertation: "The Winning of the Mid West: A Social History of Mid Western Elections: 1888-1896" (Yale, 1967), Richard J. Jensen analyzes the cultural inter-action of ethnic groups as well as economic issues in six states of the Mid West. Jensen's thesis that the liturgical groups (Roman Catholics and German Lutherans)

were attracted to the Democratic party because the Republicans sponsored bills favorable to Prohibition and tried to regulate the parochial schools does not, however, apply to the Philadelphia political situation of this time. But Jensen's analysis of the election of 1896 in Chicago, in which the Democrats kept the support of the Irish but lost the Germans, shows a similarity between Philadelphia and Chicago in this particular aspect of the campaign.

Frank B. Evans' Pennsylvania Politics, 1872-1877: A Study in Political Leadership (published in 1967) is a useful state study for the period preceding the Cleveland-Bryan era. Evans analyzed the political machine of the Camerons and also discusses the role of the Pennsylvania Democracy under the leadership of William A. Wallace and Samuel J. Randall. His exhaustive use of the Randall papers gives a new perspective to Randall as both a state and national leader.

The unpublished doctoral dissertation by Lewis W. Rathgeber entitled: "The Pennsylvania Democratic Party, 1880-1896" (University of Pittsburgh, 1955) is a helpful chronological study. Rathgeber neither analyzes the social origins of the Democratic leaders nor the origins of the grass roots or ethnic support of the party, but his discussion of the political events of this period serves as a good reference work.

Two new works dealing specifically with urban politics were published in 1968: Zane L. Miller's Boss Cox's

Cincinnati and James B. Crooks' Politics and Progress: The Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore, 1895-1911.

Since both of these works deal with municipal issues, they are of limited value in determining the response of these cities to national issues. Nevertheless, these works are useful in describing the cities of Cincinnati and Baltimore and in analyzing the power and methods of the machine. Miller, in his study, tends to discount ethno-cultural factors in favor of geographic considerations in the determining of political behavior and Boss Cox's rise to power. Geography may have determined political behavior in Cincinnati but it certainly did not in Philadelphia where neighborhoods shifted their political allegiance as new ethnic groups replaced the old ones.

Finally, two important interpretative works which analyze the inter-action of cultural and political forces in determining voting behavior, namely, Benson's Concept of Jacksonian Democracy and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan's Beyond the Melting Pot are indispensable in the examination of the Philadelphia situation. Benson's negative reference theory (e.g. the Italians were Republicans because they reacted against the Irish who were Democrats) is an extremely important concept which helps to explain the reasons for the decline of the Democratic party in Philadelphia.

Glazer and Moynihan's Beyond the Melting Pot runs the whole gamut of immigrant attitudes, cultural differences and political preferences in New York City. Though this study focuses on present trends and characteristics, the authors have analyzed the origins of the various ethnic sub-cultures in New York. The chapters on the Jews and Irish are especially germane to this dissertation since these two groups also had large populations in Philadelphia.

Though the foregoing works do not deal with the subject of this dissertation, they are related to this study. The first six chapters of this dissertation are devoted to political chronology. An attempt is made here to explain and analyze the course of events which accounted for Democratic decline and collapse in Philadelphia, as Blodgett has done in analyzing the decline of the Cleveland Democrats of Massachusetts. In the 1880's the Democrats had an effective and united organization which continually elected Randall to Congress and succeeded in electing Samuel King as mayor in 1881. In the 90's, however, the Democrats suffered major losses in 1894 and 1896 when national issues hurt local Democratic candidates. In addition, the party suffered from internal wrangles, factionalism and schism. In 1900 the Democrats lost their only congressional seat when McAleer failed to win reelection in Sam Randall's old river ward. The first decade of the new century brought only defeat and despair for the once-vital Philadelphia Democracy.

In the seventh and eighth chapters the leadership of the Democratic party and its grass roots strength are analyzed. During the decade of the 80's Democratic leaders represented broad and diverse segments of Philadelphia society. At the grass-roots the party depended upon the support of both the Irish and Germans. In the first decade of the new century, however, two Irish political bosses dominated the party which had, by this time, lost most of its German support and much of its Irish grass-roots strength. Further, the party failed to attract two new immigrant groups: the Russian Jews and the Italian Catholics. The works of Benson and Glazer and Moynihan are helpful in analyzing ethnic conditions and how these relate to political behavior. Much of what these authors have said about minority groups in other cities also applies to Philadelphia.

CHAPTER I

THE REIGN OF RANDALL AND DEMOCRATIC HARMONY

A. The Presidential Campaign of 1880

"And now the Democratic Party comes forth
with fresh gifts of repentance."

John W. Forney¹

The 80's became for the Philadelphia Democrats a decade of hope as demonstrated by their new strength, vitality and unity. Though party harmony was no facile accomplishment, the Democrats did achieve unity prior to the election of 1880 and thereby threatened the all-powerful Republican organization in the city. As the Philadelphia Democrats campaigned vigorously for General Hancock in the presidential election of 1880, Samuel J. Randall emerged the most dominant party leader in the city. In 1880 the Democrats could also boast of the return to the Democracy of pre-Civil War leaders who had defected to the Republicans during Lincoln's presidency. It was also in this decade of hope that the Democrats successfully elected a mayor in Philadelphia in 1881 and a governor in Pennsylvania in 1882 by effecting a coalition with the reform element of the Republican party.

¹Forney's Progress, 3 July 1880, p. 723.

The Young Men's Democratic Association, an organization of select Philadelphians, met for a festive gathering on 19 March 1881, to honor a leader of the party, one who brought national fame to Philadelphia and one who ranked as the leading spokesman of the party, if not the undisputed head of the organization. Samuel Jackson Randall² thanked his fellow Democrats for their invitation to attend a reception in his honor, and in his acknowledgement to the planning committee he touched upon the nature and role of the Democracy. His simple and direct statement contained no new pronouncement, no new ideas, no radical theories. Rather, it epitomized, to a large degree, his conservative constructionist political philosophy in a series of propositions which constituted his governmental credo. That statement of faith, believed so fervently by the 196 Philadelphians of the Young Men's Democratic Association, reveals the ethos and mentality of the city's minority party. The Ex-Speaker of the House of Representatives said:

The rights and the sovereignty of the States should be guarded and defended by all who believe in the original purpose of the federal government, as created here in our own city by the great convention over which Washington presided.

The entire subordination of the military to the civil power of the country is a fundamental doctrine of the Constitution, and cannot be departed from without endangering popular

²See Chapter VII, pp. 200 for a biographical sketch of Samuel J. Randall.

government. The limitations of the powers of Congress which the Constitution ordains should be preserved, and the Jeffersonian interpretation should be made the test of Democratic orthodoxy. Attempted combinations, chartered or otherwise, which seek to deplete the Treasury for corporate or sectional, personal or political objects, require both vigilance to detect and courage to prevent. Legislation that aims at benefits or advantages which are special in their operation is neither wise nor patriotic. Such a policy creates unrest and distrust in the public mind and puts to risk the stability of business, both industrial and financial. Legislation, to be stable and healthful, should be general, equitable, philosophical and practical, and only in this way can it permanently receive public commendation. The money of the Constitution is the only money the people need, and moneyed corporations will find their certain safety in regarding themselves as the obedient servants of the popular will.

It is but too manifest that the doctrine lately proclaimed, that the Federal Congress is equal in authority to the British Parliament, will, if established as the true interpretation, lead to the most unfortunate and perilous consequences. Our Constitution is a written instrument delegating limited powers; Parliament is the unwritten Constitution of Great Britain. There is, therefore, no just comparison between the two.

The Democratic party is now confronted with these questions. It is of the highest necessity, therefore, that the young men of the United States should carefully and seriously study and thoughtfully discuss them, for on this generation will be imposed the sacred duty of sustaining unimpaired that system of constitutional representative government which has, but its foundation in Democratic principles, made the power, glory and prosperity of the people of these United States. 3

³"Reception to the Honorable Samuel J. Randall," 19 March 1881.

Even though Sam Randall lost the Speakership of the House because of the national congressional Republican sweep of the previous November, he and his friends could, nonetheless, rejoice in his political success. For, in the 1880 presidential campaign, harmoniously conducted, Randall emerged the dominant leader of the Philadelphia Democratic party. Prior to 1880 the struggle between Congressman Randall and Senator Wallace for control of the state party had a divisive effect upon both the state and city organizations. Senator William A. Wallace of Clearfield, the only Pennsylvania Democrat to be elected to the U. S. Senate from the time of the Civil War until the New Deal, was Randall's chief opponent within the party during the decade of the 70's.⁴

⁴ During the 1870's Randall and Wallace both struggled for mastery of the Democratic state organization. Wallace was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1875, and in the following year Randall won election as Speaker of the House of Representatives. Each tried to prevent the other from attaining a superior position in the leadership of the state Democratic party. Their political feud had little, if any, ideological basis. At the time Randall attained his greatest national prominence as Speaker of the House (1876-1881), Wallace dominated the state party organization. In 1880 the state went Republican thus causing Wallace to lose his Senate seat. Randall, however, retained his seat in the House, even though the Speakership went to the Republicans. For a full discussion by a contemporary observer of the Randall-Wallace feud in the 70's see A. K. McClure's Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, pp. 17-30. Also, for a full treatment of this feud by a recent Pennsylvania historian see F. B. Evans' Pennsylvania Politics, 1872-1877, pp. 23; 148ff; 188; 263ff. The salient fact is that the feud waned in the 1880 presidential contest. Wallace still controlled the state organization during the Hancock canvass but Randall cooperated with the Wallace men in both the city and state organizations. After Wallace's defeat for reelection to the Senate Randall controlled the city organization and subsequently got control of the state party.

In the coming 1880 presidential campaign, both men began to take opposite corners again in what portended another struggle over domination of the state party organization. This time the conflict focused on the Hancock vs. Tilden match, with Wallace advocating the nomination of the former and Randall advancing the candidacy of the latter. Randall, in fact, expended much of his time and energy in Tilden's behalf during the first few months of 1880 as his many letters to the New Yorker indicate. From Iowa, Arkansas, California, Ohio, Maryland, Tennessee, Virginia and other states came reports to Randall on the activities of his political friends in support of Tilden.⁵ Randall's efforts in Pennsylvania were no less intense. On 30 April, the day after the State Democratic Convention, Randall wrote to Tilden⁶ that there were 32 county leaders for and 13 against him. Optimistically, he further estimated that Tilden would get the support of 45 to 50 of the county leaders and that the leading Democrats of Philadelphia would be evenly divided between Hancock and Tilden, a significant indication of the factional state of the Philadelphia Democracy. Thus, in April it appeared that the Randall and Wallace factions were getting ready for another round of fighting both in the state and in the city.

⁵See letters from Randall to Tilden (in Tilden Papers): 3 March, 18 & 19 March, 18 May, 7 June 1880. Also during the months of April and May seventeen letters received by Randall on the progress of the Tilden movement were forwarded to Tilden and are in the Tilden collection.

⁶Randall to Tilden, 30 April 1880, Tilden Collection.

During the early part of 1880 and extending up to late April when the State Democratic Convention met, the division within the Philadelphia Democracy not only crippled the party but also created doubts and anxieties as to whether it would even be an effective minority force in the city. I. J. Wistar, president of the Pennsylvania Canal Co., pleaded with Randall in December of 1879 to rescue the party from further defeat. The Democracy, he asserted, had to stand on principle and unite or pass into oblivion. Wistar wrote:

The American people are tired of adroit dodgers. They now want a bold and honest leader.

.

The negative policy of behaving like good little boys, not quarreling with anybody, nor killing any niggers, nor having any troublesome principles is not only despicable but played out.⁷

Wistar's criticism, directed primarily to the state of affairs of the national party, also applied to the local situation except that one could hardly accuse local Democrats of "acting like good little boys, not quarreling with anybody." Wistar's remedy for party decline simply called for a restoration of "sound principles" which he defined as a reaffirmation of hard money. But, while Wistar admonished his friend to give the party, nationally and locally, a set of working principles, Randall was busy working for Tilden

⁷I. J. Wistar to S. J. Randall, 12 December 1879, Richard Vaux Papers.

and trying to settle the factional quarrels in his native city.

As the State Democratic Convention approached, the Democratic dispute got more intense. Both the Randall and Wallace Philadelphia factions headed by Richard Vaux and George McGowan, respectively, sent delegations to Harrisburg. Wistar added to the prestige of the Randall group by agreeing to be a Philadelphia delegate to the convention.

Fortunately for the party, Randall and Wallace mended political fences during and after the state convention. First, it was agreed that the unit rule would not be followed by the Pennsylvania delegation in the coming national convention. This action averted a clash over presidential candidates; in fact, no presidential nominee was discussed, considered or endorsed by the convention. Second, Wallace and Randall participated in harmony meetings during the state convention and effected a compromise for the seating of the Philadelphia delegates in which each faction got an equal number of places. Finally, when Tilden withdrew as a presidential candidate on the eve of the opening of the National Convention, his decision

obviated a potential split in the Pennsylvania delegation.⁸ Hence, under harmonious conditions, the presidential campaign of 1880 opened in Philadelphia.

On 1 September the Democrats opened the Philadelphia presidential campaign with a rally at 6th and Locust streets, right in the heart of Sam Randall's congressional district. The enthusiastic crowd cheered the speakers who addressed them from the steps of the residence of John W. Forney, founder and one-time editor-publisher of the Philadelphia Press, a pre-Civil War Democrat and postwar Republican. Judge James H. Otterson, another former Democrat who returned to the party to support Hancock, introduced Forney as the most abused man in Philadelphia for deserting the party of Lincoln. Forney rapped the Republican party and went on to exalt the virtues of Hancock, the "man who . . . saved Philadelphia from fire and destruction."⁹ He then proceeded to the tariff

⁸For a full discussion of the Wallace-Randall factional struggle before and during the State Democratic Convention of 1880, see Albert V. House, "Political Career of Samuel Jackson Randall," pp. 179-185. Also it should be noted that when Tilden pulled out of the race that there was a belated boom for Randall for president. The New York delegation supported Randall while the Pennsylvania delegation, under the domination of Senator Wallace, supported Hancock by a vote of 32-25. However, Professor House observes: "There is little to show that he [Randall] ever seriously thought of himself as a presidential candidate." *Op.cit.*, p. 188. Randall's subsequent efforts in Hancock's behalf would certainly indicate that Randall was not unduly upset by the outcome of the Cincinnati Convention.

⁹Philadelphia Record, 1 September 1880. N.B. The speaker was referring to Hancock's successful war record as the general in charge of the 2nd Corps at the battle of Gettysburg.

issue and attacked Garfield for being a "free trader" and condemned "Pig Iron" Kelley for presenting Garfield as the "ne plus ultra of protectionists."¹⁰

Forney returned to the Democratic party after twenty years of Republican activity. He had parted ways with the Democrats in 1860 over the slavery issue. Before then, he suffered a humiliating political defeat when he lost his campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1857 to Simon Cameron. In the 1857 Legislature the Democrats had a majority of three but the Cameron forces cunningly and secretly got three Democrats to cast their votes for Cameron in a surprise first ballot move which startled the majority party.¹¹ Forney founded his independent journal, Progress, which supported Hancock in the 1880 presidential campaign. As a former active Republican, he deserted that party when it failed to nominate U. S. Grant in 1880 for a third term. Many of his editorials condemned the peculations of the Republicans, yet he inconsistently supported Grant and praised the former Civil War hero for his presidential leadership!¹² He contended that Grant was exploited by underlings and party bosses. Even though Forney was a maverick, he was, nevertheless, one of Philadelphia's outstanding journalists during this period.¹³ In a city in which the Republicans

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹See A. K. McClure, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 264-73.

¹²See Forney's Progress, 10 July 1880, p. 743, and 17 July 1880, p. 764.

¹³Makers of Philadelphia, p. 162.

dominated the press, the return of Forney to the Democrats and the editorial support of his weekly journal added significantly to Democratic optimism.

Daniel M. Dougherty, another important Philadelphian, returned to the Democrats in 1880, and also campaigned for General Hancock. Like Forney, Dougherty had left the Democratic Party at the outbreak of the Civil War to become a strong Lincoln man. A lawyer by profession, Dougherty had developed rare oratorical powers which he used in the 60's to convince audiences in Philadelphia and Boston to support Lincoln. In 1862 he helped found the Union League in Philadelphia. In 1880 he returned to the Democratic fold because he could no longer stomach the venality of Republican control. In fact, at the Democratic national convention he gave the chief nominating address¹⁴ for Hancock and continued to speak for Hancock throughout the campaign.

Three days after the rally at Forney's house, Sam Randall addressed a meeting at the Samuel J. Randall Club in the fifth ward.¹⁵ The old Democratic stalwart, Ex-Mayor Daniel M. Fox presided at the successful rally marred only by the interruption of an exploding coal oil lamp. Randall addressed himself to the Republican charge that a Democratic

¹⁴A. K. McClure states in his Old Time Notes that Dougherty's speech was "as faultless as it was beautiful" and that it "was received with the wildest enthusiasm." Vol. II, p. 517.

¹⁵Philadelphia Record, 4 September 1880.

victory would only lead to the domination of the United States by the South. He discounted as utterly absurd the attack that if the Democrats won, the national coffers would be emptied to pay Southerners compensation for losses incurred by the abolition of slavery. He concluded his remarks by criticizing the extravagances of Garfield during his tenure as chairman of the Appropriations' Committee of the House and cited the fact that under four years of Garfield's chairmanship one-hundred thirteen million dollars more were expended than during the previous four years under the leadership of a Democrat. To Randall the Democracy stood for cheap government which he equated with good government.¹⁶

These two speech making rallies in early September constituted the prelude to the spectacular political parade, an institution that has long since expired. Nearly all the major campaigns (presidential and sometimes gubernatorial) were kicked off by gigantic parades to demonstrate to the whole city the strength of the party. Not unlike pep rallies before athletic events, these parades served to whip up the enthusiasm of the faithful party workers by a mass demonstration of party solidarity. Vast sums of

¹⁶Of this speech, Forney's Progress commented: "We are glad to see the distinguished Speaker of the House rallying energetically to the support of General Hancock," 11 September 1880. This is another indication of the cooperative spirit within the Philadelphia Democratic Party.

money were spent on these emotional extravaganzas, considered to be essential in the conduct of political campaigns. The Democratic and Republican parades in 1880, for example, cost in excess of one half million dollars.¹⁷

On Saturday night, 18 September, 20,000 Democrats paraded jubilantly down south Broad street. Thousands of party workers and other interested listeners heard both Congressman Randall and Senator Wallace speak from the same platform in front of the Americus Club house. Lewis Cassidy,¹⁸ the prominent lawyer, city Democratic leader (in the Wallace faction) and chairman of the 1880 Philadelphia campaign, presided at the tumultuous gathering. He introduced Randall who, in turn, introduced the chief speaker, Senator William A. Wallace. Wallace addressed the crowd and reiterated essentially what Randall said two weeks earlier; that the Democratic Party was not a sectional party; therefore, the South would receive no special compensation for the loss of slaves when the government returned to the hands of a Democratic chief executive.¹⁹ After the several orations, the crowd began their parade which lasted until 1 a.m. Down Broad street and ultimately to their respective ward headquarters the Democrats carried banners inscribed

¹⁷Philadelphia Record, 24 October 1880.

¹⁸See Chapter VII, pp.208 for a biographical sketch of Lewis C. Cassidy.

¹⁹Philadelphia Record, 21 September 1880.

with the quotation from General Hancock's acceptance speech: "The bayonet is not a fit instrument to collect the ballots of free men." But while their banners condemned violence, their parading only created it. Paraders were stoned at Broad and South, Broad and Callowhill; and at 6th and Spruce a fracas occurred when several Negroes attacked the demonstrators as they returned home.²⁰

The Republicans began to worry about the impact of the Democratic parade and, therefore, started their plans for an even bigger demonstration of 35,000 men.²¹ A week after the Democratic spectacle, the Republican mob marched about the city in much the same fashion. The guest speaker, James G. Blaine, rapped the Democrats for their stand on the tariff and declared that "the issue tonight between General Garfield and General Hancock is whether the industrial system of Americans shall be retained or whether it shall be destroyed."²² Blaine continued with an emotive appeal to the Irish by linking the Democratic position of tariff for revenue only as part of a scheme to advance free trade, a policy which would only benefit English financial interests at the expense of American industry and American workmen.

At the end of September the Philadelphia Democrats met at various nominating conventions to choose congressional

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., 27 September 1880.

and municipal nominees. In the congressional district conventions, rival candidates fought for the nominations in the First and Second districts. In the First district George Snowden defeated Dallas Sanders by a vote of 66-46. Snowden was a Wallace man and Sanders a Randall man, but there is no evidence to show that either Wallace or Randall in any way got involved in this contest. In the Second district Daniel Dougherty defeated W. W. Dundas. Randall, of course, had no opposition in the Third district. George Bull and John K. Folwell received their party endorsements for the Fourth and Fifth districts.²³ In describing the Democratic nominees for Congress and the State Senate the Record shrugged its shoulders, called the candidates fair to mediocre and concluded: "There is satisfaction in knowing, however, that in most instances, they might have been worse."²⁴

The congressional contests, though lively, were not bitter and did not impair party unity. However, in the municipal nominations a fight raged over the nomination of a District Attorney and created a temporary split which, in early October, threatened the unity of the party. When the delegates assembled to nominate a District Attorney, the Record reporter described a number of them "as being anxious and disposed to turn the whole affair into a cat concert."²⁵

²³Ibid., 29 September 1880.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., 30 September 1880.

The patrician Democrat, John Cadwalader, Jr.,²⁶ had his seat contested by Billy Revel, "a notorious man about town."²⁷ After the chairman of the convention refused to accept bogus credentials by the insurgents, they went to the south end of the hall and proceeded to nominate their own candidate for District Attorney. Squire McMullen,²⁸ the semi-literate but astute Irish leader of the fourth ward, and Sam Randall's right-hand man, conducted the rump session which nominated Furman Sheppard for District Attorney. The regular organization stood by Henry Hagert, the incumbent. The infuriated Philadelphia Record castigated the action of McMullen in a double barreled shot at him and his political superior and said in an editorial: "If Mr. Randall would call off Mr. McMullen, Mr. McMullen would call off Mr. Sheppard."²⁹ In an earlier editorial Philadelphia's major Democratic journal simply listed the names of the leading "Regulars" and the chief "Bolters" as

²⁶See Chapter VII, pp. 211 for a biographical sketch of John Cadwalader, Jr.

²⁷Philadelphia Record, 30 September 1880.

²⁸See Chapter VII, pp. 238 for a biographical sketch of Squire McMullen.

²⁹Philadelphia Record, 4 October 1880.

follows:

Regulars

John Cadwalader, Jr.
Samuel Dickson
S. Davis Page
Col. Chas. H. Banes
John H. Camphill
John B. Nill
Charles H. Townsend

Bolters

Squire McMullen
"Bill" Gallup
"Joe" Tatem
"Charley" Burke
"Billy" Revel
"Joe" Burns
William J. Gallagher
"Ned" Hastings

The above list prompted the Record to conclude its editorial saying: "On the one hand is culture, intelligence, refinement; on the other ignorance, brutality, crime."³⁰

During the next two weeks the conflict got no better until Sheppard announced his withdrawal from the race. On 16 October Hagert was named the official party nominee and a sub-committee was set up to iron out difficulties with the bolters. The bolters agreed to cooperate with this committee and the fighting stopped thus permitting a united party to get on with the campaign.

It is curious to note that this fracas was the only one in the party during this period of relative harmony (1880-1890) in which the Irish ward heelers of the lower level of the party leadership were pitted against the regular organization. Further, despite the participation of Randall's lieutenant, Squire McMullen, there is no evidence to support the involvement of Randall in this squabble, notwithstanding the sarcastic slur by the Record, a paper never sympathetic

³⁰Ibid., 30 September 1880.

to Randall. Finally, the details of the agreement which brought the Irish insurgents back to support Hagert for District Attorney were not revealed in the press. But the fact that the bolters did come back to cooperate with the organization and thereby terminated their feud, underscores the nature of the conflict as being ephemeral and not deep seated.

The Republicans stepped up their campaign for Garfield with a mass meeting of businessmen at the Academy of Music in early October. John Welsh, ex-minister to England under Hayes, denounced the Democrats and accused them of financial heresy for their friendship with the Greenback party. Joseph Wharton harped on one of the most habitual Republican themes: That the South would control the nation if the Democrats won the presidency. Finally, Alexander Jones warned that the Democrats would ruin the economy of the country by tampering with the tariff.³¹

The Democrats also tried to appeal to the business community by sponsoring a mass meeting of business men at the Academy. At the Republican gathering, the hall was packed to overflowing to hear the speakers. Outside the hall campaign chairman, Lewis C. Cassidy, addressed a crowd of 10,000 workers. Senator Thomas Bayard of Delaware, the featured speaker of the evening,³² stressed the good business sense and economical leadership of the Democratic House of

³¹Ibid., 5 October 1880.

³²Ibid., 11 October 1880.

Representatives under the influence and leadership of Sam Randall. He broadened his appeal to the audience by enunciating the laissez-faire economic argument to assert that the government ought to get out of the commercial sphere by abolishing the protective tariff. The government had no right to manipulate the economy of the nation; nor did the economic or commercial interests have the right to run the government, Bayard declared. Hence, he justified the Democratic platform calling for "tariff for revenue only." The Record commended Bayard for his "straight and forward" treatment of the subject as well as his rational presentation "unmarked by appeals to passion, vituperation, etc."³³

By mid-October the Democratic enthusiasm in Philadelphia began to dampen. No doubt the October victories of Garfield in Ohio and Indiana contributed to the decline of party optimism in Philadelphia. The Record observed on 16 October that: "The chances are now favorable to the election of General Garfield" and went on to rue the possibility of Republican control of the House because, under Democratic rule: "Conservatism has ruled; expenses have been reduced; good faith has been established."³⁴

The Democratic strategy throughout the 1880 campaign remained defensive and negative. Plagued by the Republican

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., 16 October 1880.

"Bloody Shirt" tactic, Democratic speakers constantly assured the voters what the party would not do if successful at the polls. In answer to the charge that economic chaos would only result from "Democratic free trade theories," the Record said: "It is not proposed to accomplish this [Tariff revision] at a jump."³⁵ Again, the Democrats defended their strength in the South by trying to reassure voters that no compensation would be given to former slave owners. The conservative constructionist mentality of the party, both nationally and locally, also helps to explain this attitude. If one believed in small, cheap government, downward revisions in the protective tariff, and local enforcement of voting rights, he voted Democratic. The Record, the only really important Democratic paper in the city, articulated the conservative constructionist nature of the minority party. Two weeks before the election the Record reprinted an old critique by President Eliot of Harvard condemning a proposal that the federal government should construct a National University in Washington. The choice of Eliot's excerpts and their conspicuous place on the first page of the paper illustrated the particular fear of the Record as well as the general attitude of the Democrats regarding the scope of the federal government's power.

President Eliot says that 'the fatal flaw to the subsidizing process is that it saps the

³⁵Ibid., 29 September 1880.

foundation of public liberty.... The habit of being helped by the Government even to things good in themselves is a most insidious and irresistible of republicanism: for the very essence of republicanism is self-reliance'.

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He shows that the true theory is not 'protection' whether through direct subsidies or in the guise of a tariff, but, on the contrary, that 'government is to do nothing not expressly assigned to it, that it is to perform no function which any private agency can perform and that it is not to do a public good which any private agency can perform and that it is not to do a public good even unless that good be otherwise unattainable'. These are golden words. 36

On the eve of the election Senator Wallace predicted Democratic victory in the state by a slim 10,000 votes; Republican State Chairman Cessna predicted that Garfield would carry the commonwealth by 32,000. The Record urged a strong Democratic vote but refused to support the popular and youthful Robert E. Pattison in his bid for reelection as City Controller because of his alleged disloyalty to the ticket. The Record said: "In a hot presidential campaign and in an important legislative contest, upon which depend many interests of great importance, not a word has come from Mr. Pattison except

³⁶Ibid., 21 September 1880.

for himself."³⁷ In urging a heavy vote for Hancock the Record also reported the activities of several employers who called in their workers to "urge their men to support Garfield."³⁸

On 3 November, the day after the election, the result was quickly known: the Republicans carried the city with comfortable majorities for all their candidates except one: Robert E. Pattison³⁹ won reelection as City Controller by 13,593 votes. Hancock lost the city by 21,000 votes polling 43% of the total presidential ballots cast. Hancock got strong backing from the traditional Democratic river wards in Sam Randall's congressional district. Of the nine wards that Hancock carried, six were in the Third congressional district. He did especially well in the third and fourth wards which were inhabited by the poorest people in the city, most of whom were Irish workers. He also

³⁷Ibid., 1 November 1880. It should be noted that the Record was a staunch party paper. Pattison gained much of his support from the independent and reform Republicans and, therefore, played down his Democratic party affiliation, a successful tactic but one viewed as being disloyal by the Record.

³⁸The Record reported on 1 November 1880 that on the previous Saturday employees of John A. Riter, carpenters and builders (617 Cherry St.) were detained from 5:30 to 6:30 p.m. at which time they were lectured on the attributes of Garfield. Similar activities were reported at the Thomas Dolan Mills at Oxford & Hancock Streets and by several manufacturers in the Manyunk section of the city.

³⁹See Chapter VII, pp.220 for a biographical sketch of Robert E. Pattison.

performed very well in the eleventh and sixteenth wards which were largely populated by Irish and German workers. He ran only slightly behind Randall in the Third congressional district as the following tally shows.

1880 Vote: Third Congressional District

(Ward tallied in nearest hundred;
totals in full amounts.)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>President</u>		<u>Congressmen</u>	
	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>
3	13	22	23	12
4	16	25	27	15
5	21	17	18	20
6	10	13	13	10
11	10	19	19	10
12	16	17	17	15
16	16	21	21	16
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	10,140	13,410	13,639	9,912

Outside Randall's Democratic stronghold, Hancock carried only three wards: the second, seventeenth and nineteenth. These wards were also made up of the working class, though the inhabitants were not as poor as those in Randall's river wards. The Garfield-Hancock vote in these wards was (in nearest hundred):

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>
2	24	34
17	14	26
25	35	37

Hancock's total city vote came to 76,331 as contrasted with Garfield's 97,219. (Voting tables with analysis and comparisons are found in Chapter VIII on the "Grass Roots Strength of the Democratic Party in Philadelphia.")

Hancock got his support from the established Democratic districts in the city and managed to make limited gains in other sections of Philadelphia. In retrospect, General Hancock placed second in Philadelphia among the Democratic candidates for the presidency during the thirty year period of 1880-1910. Only Grover Cleveland did better than Hancock when in 1888 he polled 46% of the vote.

As usual Randall won easy reelection, despite a three cornered race in his old River ward district. Both Benjamin Berry, the Republican candidate and DeWitt Davis, the Prohibition candidate distributed tracts throughout the Randall wards accusing the incumbent of being soft on the tariff issue and of advocating the first step toward free trade by endorsing the Cincinnati platform plank: "tariff for revenue only." The highly emotive appeal to the Irish to vote against the Democrats because they favored free trade, a doctrine which exalted England and abased "Old Ireland" had

little if any impact in Randall's safe district.⁴⁰

The post mortems after the Democratic defeat in November indicated neither a pessimistic nor cynical spirit; in fact, underlying Democratic commentaries were signs of continued optimism. On 13 November Forney announced, for example, that his journal which supported Hancock, would now be officially and editorially an Independent Democratic publication. Further, he delighted in the good showing of the Democrats in the recent canvass.⁴¹ A week later Forney

⁴⁰Copies of these tracts can be consulted in the Randall papers. The first tract entitled "Irish Voters, Attention!" labeled the Democratic Party the Free Trade Party. Among other points, the nameless author of this polemical handbill states: "While the Irish prosper in every land, at home there is NOTHING FOR THEM TO DO, and the idleness caused by British Free Trade gives them over as a prey to RAPACIOUS LANDLORDS." The author concludes with the following plea: "They /i.e., the Democrats/ want a 'Tariff for Revenue Only' and to get rid of Protection. Will you let them? Let Ireland and America join hands in refusing to be accomplices in the iniquities perpetrated by England in the name of Free Trade. GOD SAVE OLD IRELAND." In a second tract Benjamin Berry, Republican candidate for Congress accused Randall of supporting "'Tariff for Revenue Only' which means the reduction of wages." In the third tract DeWitt Davis appealed to the "Workingmen of the 3rd District" to vote for the Prohibition Party which "believes in a Protective Tariff ...but wants the tariff so regulated that it will benefit both Workingmen and Manufacturer."

⁴¹"We recollect that over 76,000 votes were cast for General Hancock in the city of Philadelphia alone on the 2nd of November, and in Pennsylvania 400,000 and in the country at large about five million votes, there ought to be ready and liberal response to the scheme of an Independent Democratic weekly paper of the highest class in Philadelphia." Forney's Progress, 13 November 1880.

declared that: "The Philadelphia Democrats have an even chance this year for a fair deal in politics if only they will be true to themselves . . . the clear thing for the Democrats to do is to make a good ticket, to stand by it, to live by it or to die by it."⁴²

B. King's Election: 1881

The comparative good showing of the party in the 1880 presidential election gave cause for restrained optimism; but the successes of the next two years gave the Democrats reason to be jubilant. In the municipal campaign of 1881 the Democrats successfully elected their candidate for mayor, Samuel G. King,⁴³ the only Democrat to hold that office during this period (1880-1910). And in the following year Robert E. Pattison won the gubernatorial election and distinguished himself by being the only Democrat elected Governor of Pennsylvania from the Civil War to the New Deal.

The significance of King's victory in 1881 was that The Democrats skillfully cooperated with independent and

⁴²Ibid., 20 November, 1880.

⁴³See Chapter VII, pp. 235 for a biographical sketch of Samuel G. King.

reform Republicans⁴⁴ who could no longer tolerate the predatory practices of the Stokely administration. King's election aided in the rejuvenation of the Democratic party but it did not signify any shift on national issues or Democratic ideology. Originally John Cadwalader, Jr. was slated to be Democratic nominee for Mayor and William V. McGrath the candidate for Receiver of Taxes.⁴⁵ However, Sam Randall saw the possibility of Democratic success if an entente could be made with the reformers. He emphatically urged cooperation with the reform group in a letter read at the nominating conventions.⁴⁶ Three days after the conventions, John Cadwalader withdrew from the race, leaving the field open to King.⁴⁷ A week later McGrath withdrew,

⁴⁴These reformers were almost exclusively Republicans of the upper middle class. They channeled their political activities through the Committee of 100, an organization dominated by businessmen, most of whom were members of the Union League. This organization included merchants like Rudolph Blankenburg, John Wanamaker, Justus Strawbridge, et.al. A. J. Drexel was the most aristocratic businessman who was on the Committee of 100. Henry Charles Lea, the renowned Medievalist at the University of Pennsylvania, was the most conspicuous leader in this reform organization who was not a businessman. In national politics nearly all the reformers of the Committee of 100 were Republicans. Their concept of reform was limited solely to the movement to ameliorate corrupt municipal practices.

⁴⁵Philadelphia Record, 24 January 1881.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 27 January 1881.

thus opening the way for the nomination of John Hunter, an independent reform Republican, for Receiver of Taxes.⁴⁸ The subsequent support of the coalition ticket by the Committee of 100, the energetic work of reform Republican businessman Rudolph Blankenburg, and the journalistic efforts of Forney's Progress and McClure's Times all contributed greatly to the success of the ticket. King's election by 5,500 votes gave cause for celebration by both Democrats and reform Republicans throughout the city. In an article entitled "The Bosses Death Knell"⁴⁹ the Times gloried in the defeat of corrupt boss rule and predicted the advent of clean city government under King. The successful coalition effort in 1881 to elect King produced added strength to the Democrats. The party gained as a respected political force in the city by its flexibility in cooperating with reform Republicans on municipal issues. Even though the King election had no relationship to national issues, the Philadelphia Democratic party was strengthened by his election--in 1881.

C. Pattison's Successful Campaign for Governor.

The reformers, elated by Mayor King's victory, began to look to the 1882 gubernatorial campaign as the opportunity to throw out the Cameron Machine and elect a reformer as

⁴⁸Ibid., 5 February 1881.

⁴⁹The Times (Philadelphia), 16 February, 1881. N.B. All subsequent footnotes citing the Times refer to the Philadelphia newspaper unless otherwise noted.

Governor. Randall, who actively pushed cooperation with the reformers in the 1881 campaign, continued to work toward the construction of the Democratic party in Philadelphia along reform lines.⁵⁰ Again, he was an important organizer in the second successful scheme to wed the Democrats to the reform Republicans by his advocacy of Pattison for governor.⁵¹ At the Democratic state convention four Philadelphia Democrats worked energetically to secure the nomination of Pattison. Two young men, James Gay Gordon and John R. Read along with veterans Lewis C. Cassidy and William F. Harrity carefully planned Pattison's winning strategy.⁵²

In September the Democrats convened to choose their slate for municipal, state and congressional offices. Despite the fact that a broad policy of cooperation with the reform Republicans had been worked out in King's campaign for Mayor, there was the usual political infighting at the conventions. Their choice for sheriff, John L. Grim, considered by many to be just another party hack, practically assured the election of George deB. Keim, the Republican

⁵⁰Writing to Richard Vaux on 8 March 1882, Randall indicated his intention "to lift up . . . a Democratic organization which would command respect and promote reform by pure administration within our household." Vaux Collection.

⁵¹Philadelphia Record, 16 June 1882.

⁵²See The Times, 29 June 1882 (clipping in the Gordon Scrapbook 1881-1884) for the account of the strategy of the Philadelphia Democrats at the State Convention.

nominee. The Times castigated the Democrats for this action and accused them of selling out to the Cameron machine.⁵³

In the congressional nominations the Democrats made a more serious attempt to choose men who would attract the "better element" in the city. John Cadwalader, Jr. got the nomination in the First district; Randall was again nominated in the Third; in the Fifth the Democrats endorsed T. J. Martin, an independent reform candidate. In the Second and Fourth districts, both solid Republican strongholds, W. W. Dundas and C. M. Swain were nominated.

Shortly after the nominating conventions were over the campaign got underway. In order to spend campaign funds more effectively, the Democrats dispensed with the traditional parade. Other public meetings and rallies, etc., were cut to the barest minimum in order to concentrate on a grass roots campaign in which greater emphasis would be placed upon personal solicitations in each ward and district of the city. This important shift in policy was effected by the new Democratic city chairman, William F. Harrity,⁵⁴ a man of rare executive ability whose recognized accomplishments ultimately led to his selection as Democratic national chairman to manage Cleveland's third campaign for the presidency in 1892.

⁵³The Times, 29 September, 1882.

⁵⁴See Chapter VII, pp.218 for a biographical sketch of William F. Harrity.

Pattison wisely chose to avoid national issues such as the tariff and concentrated on the issue of statewide reform and better government. A devout Methodist, he personified rectitude and honesty to many of the independent and reform Republicans. As City Controller of Philadelphia he gained the reputation of being an honest administrator who clamped down on unnecessary and unauthorized expenditures by venal underlings in the Republican Machine. Pattison also benefited from the state Republican split of 1882. The Cameron-Quay organization hand-picked General James A. Beaver, a Machine rubber stamp, to head the party ticket. A state faction of Independent Republicans bolted and nominated State Senator John Stewart of Franklin County for Governor.⁵⁵ As the three way race developed, Pattison's chances got brighter.

Despite the general Democratic enthusiasm for Pattison, the old guard Philadelphia Record, the organ of party chauvinism in the city, did nothing to advance his campaign. The Record constantly belittled Pattison, called into question his loyalty to Democratic principles and became an irritant to the thoughtful party men who continued to seek non-Democratic support for Pattison.⁵⁶ But, the Republican split and the reform campaign of the Democrats made victory

⁵⁵See A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes, Vol. II, pp. 531-41.

⁵⁶See Philadelphia Record, 8 July 1882 for an example of this attitude.

for Pattison inevitable. Pattison campaigned hard in the city and state and won victory by a comfortable plurality over Beaver. In the state he polled 355,791 to Beaver's 315,589 while Stewart, the Independent Republican, placed a poor third with 43,743 votes.

In the city the quiet campaign supervised by Harrity yielded handsome dividends. The normal 15,000 to 20,000 Republican vote plurality was cut to 3,000. The small Stewart vote points to the fact that most of the reform Republicans voted directly for Pattison. The city vote was:

Beaver (R)	70,875
Pattison (D)	67,411
Stewart (IR)	7,992

The Philadelphia Pattison vote reached 46%, an all time high Democratic gubernatorial percentage for the 1880-1910 period. Pattison carried every single ward in the river ward district and, in fact, he performed slightly better than Randall, as the following tally shows:

1882 Vote: Third Congressional District

(Ward tallies in nearest hundred;
totals in full amounts.)

Ward	<u>Governor</u>		<u>Congressman</u>	
	Rep.	Dem.	Dem.	Rep.
3	10	19	19	11
4	10	21	21	10
5	14	15	15	14
6	6	11	11	7
11	6	16	16	7
12	10	16	15	11
16	12	20	20	13
	<u>6,835</u>	<u>11,819</u>	<u>11,688</u>	<u>7,302</u>

Outside Randall's district, Pattison (like Hancock in 1880) carried only the second, seventeenth and twenty-fifth wards as follows:

(Votes in nearest hundred.)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>
2	19	28
17	11	23
25	29	34

But the significant fact is that, while Pattison lost twenty-one traditional Republican wards, he cut into the normal machine majorities in every single one. His tremendous gains among Republican voters accounts for his loss of Philadelphia by only 3,400 votes whereas Hancock, two years earlier, lost the city by 21,000 votes.

In the congressional elections, Randall again swept to victory, while all the other Democratic candidates suffered defeat. However, the Democratic congressional nominees did better than in the previous election of 1880. In retrospect, it was the second best year for the Democratic congressional candidates for the thirty year period of this study. In the Fifth district, the Democratic-Independent candidate came within 2,300 votes of defeating the Republican incumbent. The results in the city were evenly divided with the Republicans electing the Sheriff and the City Treasurer while the Democrats, aided by the reformers, elected a Judge and the Register of Wills. All of the contests were close.

Thus, in the two year prelude (1880-1882) to the Cleveland era the Philadelphia Democrats demonstrated strength and vitality as a forceful and effective minority party.

CHAPTER II

CLEVELAND AND THE PHILADELPHIA DEMOCRACY

A. The Campaign of 1884

After twenty-four years of presidential defeats the national Democracy received a new lease on life when the young New York Governor, Grover Cleveland, won election to the presidency over the "Plumed Knight," James G. Blaine. Philadelphia Democrats, jubilant over Cleveland's victory, looked enthusiastically to the future of the party, both nationally and locally. For they had watched, waited and kept their vigil for nearly a generation. Though victories at home had been diminutive, the Democrats of Philadelphia could glory in the accomplishments of Sam Randall and Robert Pattison. And now with Cleveland in the White House they could look forward to receiving a few plums of federal patronage for Philadelphians.

But, the political events in Philadelphia leading up to Cleveland's election produced neither the optimism nor enthusiasm that the candidacy of Hancock evoked in 1880. Even though no schism or intensive factionalism impaired the Democratic organization in 1884, it could not muster an all-out effort for Cleveland. Several political factors help to explain why the Democrats slipped in Philadelphia

in 1884, the year of Democratic national victory.

In February 1884 the Democrats lost the mayoralty when Samuel G. King failed in his bid for reelection. While King stands out as the first mayor of Philadelphia to hire Negro policemen, that innovation constituted his only major accomplishment. It is remarkable that such a breakthrough for Philadelphia Blacks was effected by a Democrat. His act prompted a formal letter of thanks by a group of colored citizens, but the black community did not shift its loyalty from the Republicans to support King for reelection.

King failed to be reelected because of his ineptitude as mayor. He seemed to be oblivious of the problems of the city, and, therefore, offered no solutions for them. Forney's Progress, which supported King vigorously in 1881, made the following observation a year after he entered office:

Mayor King is often astonished. Every month or so a newspaper tells him about something that is going on and then His Honor raises his hands and asks, 'Can it be so? Why I never heard it.' Mayor King should imitate other rulers, and acquaint himself personally with the peculiarities of the people of his domain. ¹

The businessmen who made liberal contributions to King's election in 1881, simply ignored him when he ran for reelection. All in all, King failed to be a dynamic reform mayor and, therefore, lost the support he had won in 1881.

¹Forney's Progress, 1 April 1882, p. 322.

His narrow victory by 5,500 votes in 1881 elated the Democrats, but his defeat in 1884 by 8,600 votes only added to the Democratic doldrums.²

The political misfortune of Sam Randall further dampened Democratic hopes in Philadelphia. In 1880 Randall, as Speaker of the House, reached his peak of national prominence. Had it not been for the dalliance of Tilden, Randall probably would have been nominated for the presidency over Hancock.³ The Democrats lost control of the House in the 1880 elections which meant that Randall lost the Speakership. When the Democrats regained the House in 1883 Randall confidently expected to wield the Speaker's gavel again, but that expectation was crushed by John G. Carlisle of Kentucky. Carlisle stood for tariff reform and managed to get most of the votes of Southern and Western congressmen who could not follow Randall's high tariff position.⁴ The fact that

²Commenting on the outcome of the King-Smith election of 1884, Forney's Progress observed on 1 March 1884, concerning the participation of "many gentlemen of influence and wealth. . . ." "They did not care a rap under the circumstances, which party triumphed, and they cast no ballots. It was a contest of the 'ins' and the 'outs' and a most unpleasant contest of the kind at that--nothing more."

³See A. K. McClure's Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 24 and also Chapter I, p. 8 of this study.

⁴See James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle, pp. 68-74. Also, it should be noted that, while Randall appeared confident of being elected Speaker, he was well informed of the Carlisle campaign. For example, a Texas friend wrote to inform Randall that Judge Reagan, the local congressman, was wrapped up in the "Carlisle business." Randall's informant wrote knowledgeably about the political situation in the South and urged Randall to get busy lest Carlisle capture the Old Confederacy. Hand to Randall, 28 November 1882, Randall Papers. Also see Chapter I, p. 8 of this study.

Randall lost the South and West on the tariff issue and could depend only upon the Northeastern states seriously hampered his presidential aspirations for 1884.

Randall's poor showing at the 1884 national convention depressed Philadelphia Democrats. After the first ballot Randall withdrew his candidacy (he polled 78 votes to Cleveland's 392) and threw his support to Cleveland. Even though the Randallites could take comfort in the fact that they did manage to keep the tariff revision plank an ambiguous one, the important fact remains that the leader of the protectionist Democratic forces was rejected at the Chicago convention.

As a consequence of Randall's defeat, the Philadelphia Democrats lost the support of Forney's Progress, which shifted its endorsement to the Republican presidential nominee, James G. Blaine. Forney's Progress, now edited by John Forney, Jr., who inherited the journal upon the death of his father in 1881, in July urged the nomination of Randall.⁵ After the Chicago convention the editor abandoned the Democratic party, made the paper "strictly independent," criticized the nomination of Cleveland and characterized him "a young Democrat without any Democratic record."⁶ In declaring for the Blaine-Logan ticket, Forney's

⁵Forney's Progress, 5 July 1884.

⁶Ibid., 19 July 1884.

Progress admitted its displeasure at the shabby treatment given to Randall:

Progress has advocated the nomination of Mr. Randall by the Democrats, and it would have earnestly supported that nomination. . . . Mr. Randall represents all that is best in the Democratic Party, and that party, having turned its back upon him, it must be willing to be judged by the policy it has embraced. ⁷

Thus, the course of events beginning in February with King's defeat, including Randall's unsuccessful fight for the presidential nomination, and the defection of Forney's Progress, all had a real and psychological influence in dampening Democratic spirits in the 1884 campaign.

As the Democratic city campaign progressed the party suffered the embarrassment of a serious scandal which threatened to impair further its cooperation with reformers and independents. William N. Hirst, the incumbent City Controller, was renominated for a second term by the Democrats. In October it was discovered that he had forged notes at the Philadelphia National Bank in order to relieve his personal financial distress. The Times carried full coverage of the story,⁸ thus forcing the withdrawal of Hirst from the ticket. But to complicate matters Hirst's sympathizers on the Democratic City Committee renominated

⁷Ibid.

⁸The Times, 23 October 1884.

him after his withdrawal, an action The Times condemned as "suicidal folly"⁹ for the party. Fortunately, however, Hirst realized that his continued candidacy would do him or the party no good; so he withdrew again; this time he made his action unequivocal.¹⁰ In this very close call the Democrats managed to snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat by offering the nomination to Col. Robert P. Dechert, whose rectitude and impeccable reputation in Philadelphia equalled that of Robert Pattison. Many businessmen who had been attracted to Pattison and King came to Dechert's aid in the campaign.¹¹ Hence, the Democrats again earned the confidence of the independents who saw in the party a viable means of effecting reform and establishing good government in the city.

Aside from the personal scandals associated with the two presidential nominees and the stupid anti-Catholic jab of the Reverend Dr. Burchard, the only issue discussed with any seriousness during the campaign was the old tariff question. The Republicans, as usual, contended that the protective tariff operated for the benefit of both workers and manufacturers, while the Democrats again

⁹Ibid., 26 October 1884.

¹⁰Ibid., 28 October 1884.

¹¹The Times on 1 November 1884 reported the following concerning the Businessmen's rally for Dechert at Horticultural Hall: "The speakers were all Republicans and all men who have given much time and thought and effort to secure good government for Philadelphia."

called for a "tariff for revenue only." The Democratic plank came far short of free trade, a policy they were constantly being accused of advancing. The Democrats also maintained that a policy of "tariff for revenue only" would reduce taxes and be beneficial to all the people. A strong belief in the concept of a limited government undergirded this tariff plank. The Democrats maintained that the government should govern only when absolutely necessary, and it should conduct its business as economically as possible thereby saving the citizenry tax money.

To Forney's Progress the Democratic tariff plank was but another "straddle" between a clear position of protection (which it supported) and the anarchistic doctrine of free trade (which it abhorred). Forney's Progress remained true to Randall because of his stand on the tariff but castigated the Democratic middle position for being a "cowardly one."¹²

Both the Democratic Record and the independent Times gave vigorous support to Cleveland and the Democratic position on the tariff. In a dispassionate discussion of the tariff issue The Times summed up its position in the following paragraph:

Let capitalists, workingmen, financiers, businessmen and all interested in the prosperity of industry and trade, read and judge for themselves. Both parties declare that the Tariff must be reduced; both declare for the protection of labor; but the Democratic platform

¹²Forney's Progress, 2 August 1884.

alone demands for reduction of all needless taxes and the repeal of all oppressive taxes upon our industry. 13

As the campaign dragged on, it became increasingly apparent that the Democrats could not carry the city for Cleveland. The Times predicted that the Republicans would poll 100,000 votes for Blaine while the Democrats could expect their vote to reach 80,000.¹⁴ On 16 and again on 28 October The Times surveyed the national situation and forecast on both occasions that Cleveland would be elected but that he could not carry Pennsylvania.

In an age before the advent of "scientific pollsters" The Times' predictions were amazingly accurate. Blaine carried the city by a vote of 101,288 to Cleveland's 71,288. Sam Randall won again, but all the other Democratic congressional candidates went down to defeat. The decisive victory of Col. Dechert for City Controller by nearly 24,000 votes produced the only bright spot for the Democrats.

Cleveland failed to excite Philadelphia Democrats. He carried only eight wards in the city, six of them in Randall's district. In the river wards Randall out-pollled Cleveland by about 500 votes. Randall defeated his Republican opponent by a vote of 12,340 to 9,055 while Cleveland carried the district 11,838 to 9,551. Outside the old river wards Cleveland carried only wards two and seventeen, both adjacent

¹³The Times, 29 October 1884.

¹⁴Ibid., 26 October 1884.

to the Third district and both inhabited by the working class. Cleveland's poor showing of 41% of the total Philadelphia vote placed him five percentage points behind the 1880 Hancock vote. Cleveland failed to cut into the normal Republican middle-class wards where Hancock registered limited support. Thus, for the Philadelphia Democracy, the Cleveland era had a sluggish start.

B. Loss and Gain: 1886 Elections

As the 1886 campaign approached, the Philadelphia Democrats showed no sign of rejuvenation. In fact, the '84 and '86 campaigns together constituted the decline of the party during the decade of the 80's, but, fortunately, that decline was short-lived and had no permanent ill effects on the struggling party, which would soon enjoy a resurgence more dramatic than the one experienced in the 1880-82 period.

Pattison's administration was widely hailed by the independents (even though some of them objected strenuously to the appointment of Philadelphia politician, Lewis C. Cassidy, as Attorney General).¹⁵ But he could not, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, serve a second consecutive term. The Democrats nominated Chauncy Black, of Lancaster, a strong Randall man, for Governor. From the very beginning

¹⁵The major objection to Cassidy was his image of a party politician of the boss type. See A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 542ff.

his campaign was doomed to failure because the Republicans mended fences and united in their support of James Beaver.

The apathetic Democrats began the '86 canvass shortly after the conventions in late September. Only one primary fight occurred when William McAleer, a young Irish businessman won the nomination for the second State Senatorial district over Squire McMullen's hand-picked candidate, John Donohue.¹⁶ That party fight caused no split in the party, but it is significant because it signaled the beginning of the rise of McAleer as a major leader in the Philadelphia Democratic party. In September the Democrats also nominated another rising young leader, James Gay Gordon,¹⁷ who was unanimously named for a full term as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 3. He had been appointed to the bench by Governor Pattison in 1885 to fill an unexpired term. In his short judicial tenure before the 1886 election, he won the confidence of the respectable middle-class of the city by closing bawdy houses and dealing harshly with gamblers.

Despite the lively candidacy of McAleer and the general popularity of Gordon, the Democrats were plagued by apathy. In the congressional nominations the Democrats chose weak nonentities to oppose the Republican candidates except, of course, in the Third congressional district where Randall won unanimous renomination. The Sunday Item observed:

¹⁶The Times, 28 September 1886.

¹⁷See Chapter VII, pp. 222 for a biographical sketch of James Gay Gordon.

Against Henry H. Bingham in the First Congressional District, the nomination of Michael J. Ryan is a mere formality. William S. Thomas in the Second district scarcely expects to fill the seat of Charles O'Neill. Sam'l S. [sic] Randall, is, of course assured re-election by the mere fact of his renomination. 18

The Philadelphia Evening Call described the lethargic state of the party in an editorial entitled: "The Demoralized Democracy" in which the author stated, "Democracy and demoralization are synonymous terms in Philadelphia at present."¹⁹ The editorial pointed out the difficulty the Democrats had had in getting the necessary quorum for nominating conventions and blamed the party for squabbling too much over federal patronage.

While the Democrats began the campaign of 1886 half-heartedly, the Republicans waged an all-out offensive to regain the gubernatorial chair. The G.O.P. shrewdly injected the tariff issue into the contest for Governor and invited James G. Blaine as chief speaker at a mass rally in Philadelphia on 16 October. Blaine began his address to the tremendous crowd at the Academy of Music by flattering

¹⁸The Sunday Item (Philadelphia), 3 October 1886, (Gordon Scrapbook). The Times, however, was more complimentary when it said on 1 October 1886, about the nominating conventions: "The Democrats did a very good day's work yesterday in the selection of their general city ticket." But the editorial went on to say: "The Congressional nominations are not particularly important except to the Third district, where Mr. Randall was unanimously nominated."

¹⁹The Evening Call (Philadelphia), 1 October 1886, (Gordon Scrapbook).

the audience and unctuously greeting "Pig Iron" Kelley:

'I feel that I am carrying coals to Newcastle when I discuss protection before a Pennsylvania audience, especially in the presence of the Congressional Nestor of protection,' and the Speaker turned to Judge William D. Kelley. 20

Blaine then went on to rap the Democrats for espousing tariff revision and for supporting free trade theories. He based his argument on the familiar facts of the economic growth and development of the U.S. since the Civil War and then posited a cause-effect relationship to prove that protection produced the fruits of economic development in both eastern and western states. In his chauvinistic appeal he castigated foreign financial interests, especially those of England and Russia, and asserted that free trade in England worked to the detriment of the Irish.

Blaine was preceded by a plethora of speech makers, the most significant of whom was John Stewart, the Independent Republican nominee for Governor in 1882. Stewart sounded the keynote of party unity when he stated: "I am here simply for the purpose of uniting with you in declaring the unwavering fidelity of the people of Pennsylvania to the Republican party and its principles."²¹

Against these formidable obstacles of Republican party unity and the protective tariff, the Democracy had to contend. The Democrats, too, had their rally night of speeches at the Academy of Music. The party brought out their best

²⁰The Times, 17 October 1886.

²¹Ibid.

speakers on 29 October when such notables as Daniel Dougherty, Samuel Randall, Chauncy Black and Governor Hill, of New York, harangued the enthusiastic crowd. Randall denied that the Democrats advocated free trade and stated: "The tariff will be revised but from a standpoint which interests the wage earners of the United States."²² Hill followed Randall and rebutted Blaine's earlier speech defending protection. The other speakers concentrated on the issue of clean government pointing to the exemplary record of Pattison and the corruption of the Republican party. Daniel Dougherty created a sensation when he rapped State Treasurer "Matt" Quay as the "vile leader of the Republican party of the state."²³

The ephemeral outburst of Democratic enthusiasm could not turn back the inevitable tide of defeat. As usual, the tariff issue played havoc with the Democrats, who managed again to elect only one congressman from the city. At least one of Randall's followers saw that the Democrats in Philadelphia were on the wrong side of the tariff issue. Arthur M. Burton, writing early in the campaign to congratulate Randall on his renomination, said: ". . . your policy on the tariff question is the only safe one for the Democratic party to pursue with any hope of success."²⁴ Since the Republicans declined to nominate any candidate to

²²Ibid., 30 October 1886.

²³Ibid.

²⁴A. M. Burton to S. J. Randall, 2 October 1886. Randall Papers.

oppose Randall, invincible Sam swept to victory with 98% of the vote in the Third congressional district.

But the Democratic vote for Governor indicated the real decline of the party in the city. Chauncey Black carried only eight wards, the same identical wards that Cleveland won in 1884. Outside the Randall district he managed to win in only the second and seventeenth wards. He, like Cleveland, failed to attract any voters from the traditional Republican sectors of Philadelphia. Black lost the city by 25,000 votes, a significant drop from the Pattison vote in the previous gubernatorial election of 1882. The city total was:

Black (D)	64,135
Beaver (R)	89,820

The united state-wide Republican party regained the office of Governor with a comfortable 53,000 vote plurality. The state total was:

Black (D)	369,634
Beaver (R)	412,285

The Times merely accepted the defeat as inevitable and observed ". . . that no degree of Democratic unity or enthusiasm could have materially affected the result."²⁵ The only bright spot in Philadelphia was the election of Judge James Gay Gordon, who defeated his Republican opponent by 10,000 votes.

²⁵The Times, 3 November 1886.

C. Democratic High Water Mark: The Presidential Election of 1888

The significance of the 1888 campaign defies logic because of the curious outcome which revealed the anomaly of the election. As the 1888 campaign was being waged, the party leaders did not see any extraordinary significance in the Cleveland reelection campaign in Philadelphia. But, in the lore of the struggling Democrats, the '88 campaign became the symbol of near success for the old party. In fact, '88 became the battle cry of the contending and contentious factions in the 90's who looked back to Cleveland's second campaign for the presidency and saw in it the "high water mark" for the Philadelphia Democracy.

Once again the tariff question became the central issue of the campaign. But this time the issue was devoid of ambiguity. The old intramural Democratic tariff dispute could no longer be constrained or contained. Cleveland's famous tariff letter in 1887 proclaimed, in effect, that the party would stand four-square for downward revision, a decision which all but excommunicated the Randallites from the party. Not only was Randall excluded from the Oak View conference of Democratic leaders conducted by Cleveland to formulate a new tariff policy,²⁶ but the President also began to divert patronage from Randall to William M. Singerly, publisher of

²⁶See Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage, p. 372.

the Philadelphia Record.²⁷

The campaign opened with the Philadelphia Democracy being in the ambivalent and unenviable position of having its most powerful vote getter at odds with the President on a fundamental issue which could spell the life or death of the party. The obstacles in Randall's path seemed insurmountable. He was out of step with the national party; his political lieutenant, Postmaster William F. Harrity, became a staunch Cleveland man; and William M. Singerly, his politician antagonist, who published the city's largest daily morning paper, was handling the federal patronage in Philadelphia. In addition to these difficulties, Randall suffered from the debilitating symptoms of incurable cancer and did not even have the strength to campaign for reelection. On the other hand, the tariff issue also portended problems for Cleveland in Philadelphia. The Democrats did, after all, draw their greatest strength from Randall's river ward district, a district in the "protectionist" camp. Laboring under this fundamental inconsistency on the chief issue of the campaign, the Philadelphia Democrats conducted the election of 1888.

The national Democrats opened the campaign in September on the occasion of the publication of Cleveland's Acceptance Letter. The President addressed his fellow party

²⁷See Lewis W. Rathgeber, "The Democratic Party in Pennsylvania, 1880-1896," pp. 91-92; 194-198.

men and the people of the nation on the issues of currency, immigration and the tariff. He denied that the party would enter into a "crusade for free trade" but cogently asserted that a condition not a theory now confronted the nation. He cited the treasury surplus, which amounted to \$130 million, as being detrimental to the nation's economy and especially to the working class. With impeccable logic he pointed out that the protective tariff rates imposed during the Civil War constituted a hidden tax which fell unevenly on the consumer class. Thus, he made it crystal clear that the need for tariff revision was the cardinal issue in his reelection campaign.²⁸ In responding to Cleveland's letter the Record in an editorial said: "Mr. Cleveland's letter reveals the economist and the philosopher no less than the statesman and the practical man of affairs," and further declared it to be: "a true and authoritative exposition of Democratic doctrine" and predicted that Cleveland, "will materially increase the majority by which he will be reelected next November."²⁹

In Philadelphia very little was said of the immigration issue. Cleveland's position that immigration should be restricted in order to protect American workers went virtually unnoticed in the campaign.

The Democrats began the Philadelphia campaign with an open air meeting attended by over 5,000 people at Solar Tip

²⁸Philadelphia Record, 10 September 1888.

²⁹Ibid.

Base Ball field. William M. Singerly presided while the featured speaker, Congressman William M. Springer of Illinois, addressed the crowd. Springer stressed the fact that high tariffs created hidden taxes for consumers. Since the taxes were not needed, he argued that the average citizen paid dearly into the coffers of big business to subsidize vested economic interests under the guise of protecting American labor and capital.³⁰ As Springer spoke on the current tariff rates and the need for revision, Henry George addressed a Philadelphia audience on the same night and advocated a radical policy of free trade rather than patching up the old tariff system. In the middle of his address someone from the audience shouted: "I call you a Cobden" to which George replied: "You cannot give me a better name."³¹

Each party staged the traditional mass meeting and rally at the Academy of Music followed by a parade. The Republicans celebrated their gala event on 29 September when Senator Joseph Hawley of Connecticut blasted the Democrats for advancing free trade theories and criticized Cleveland for vetoing so many Civil War pension bills.³² A week later the Democrats gathered at the same hall to hear John C. Bullitt and Senator George Gray of Delaware defend

³⁰Ibid., 16 September 1888.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., 30 September 1888.

the party tariff plank and the administration of Grover Cleveland.³³ Even though the parade was rained out,³⁴ Democratic enthusiasm was not dampened. The front page announcement in the Record of 6 October (the morning of the Democratic rally) that Carl Schurz would vote for Cleveland, helped put Philadelphia Democrats in a jubilant mood. To Schurz the question was not whether but when tariff reform should come. He said: "It is sure to come either now or in the future. The question really is whether it shall come in the temperate and prudent shape proposed in Mr. Cleveland's message, tending to strengthen rather than to endanger the manufacturing industries."³⁵

Since the tariff issue, unlike previous campaigns, was so clearly defined by Cleveland, the Philadelphia business community demonstrated more concern in this canvass than in the previous presidential elections of 1880 and 1884. The high tariff businessmen took the offensive and opened a campaign with a mass meeting at the Academy on 13 October³⁶ when they heard addresses by leading Philadelphia businessmen, Wharton Barker and Rudolph Blankenburg. Blankenburg waved the flag when he declared: "The Union must and will be

³³Ibid., 7 October 1888.

³⁴The Democrats postponed their parade a week when 30,000-40,000 men outdid the earlier Republican spectacle of 20,000 men. See the Times, 14 October 1888, for an account of the Democratic parade and the Record, 30 September 1888, for a description of the Republican parade.

³⁵Philadelphia Record, 6 October 1888.

³⁶Ibid., 14 October 1888.

preserved, and the American system of protection must be preserved." Barker asserted that capital could adjust to free trade but that labor could not.

In the final week of the campaign the Democrats sponsored a rally for businessmen who favored Cleveland and his tariff revision policies. Earlier the Record tried to convince Philadelphians that many businessmen supported tariff reform, and in an article on 22 October it reported that four respected Republicans in the city, three of whom were businessmen, would vote for Cleveland.³⁷ William M. Singerly presided over the many long speeches at the "Businessmen's Meeting" on 2 November. Most of the speakers concentrated on the Mills' bill, tariff reform and Cleveland's policy of civil service reform.³⁸ Despite its ostensible purpose of being a rally for businessmen, hundreds of non-businessmen attended this gathering. Nearly all the businessmen who did attend were small merchants.

With the rallies over and the bombastic speeches ended, Philadelphia Democrats awaited the results of the campaign with quiet resignation. The Democrats never really hoped to carry the city for Cleveland but they worked for a good showing. The organization, united and harmonious,

³⁷These four Cleveland converts were: E. T. Steel, president of the Board of Education; Edward Baugh, a fertilizer manufacturer; Frederick Taylor, a grain elevator proprietor; and William Runk, an importer. All four said they planned to remain Republicans but that they would vote for Cleveland because they favored his tariff position. Philadelphia Record, 22 October 1888.

³⁸See Philadelphia Record, 3 November 1888.

experienced only one primary dispute.³⁹ Two weeks before the election The Times predicted, with its usual political sagacity, that Harrison would poll 110,000 votes to 90,000 for Cleveland.⁴⁰

The congressional prospects were somewhat brighter than usual. Sam Randall, unable to campaign, had no opponent in the Third district. When notified of his renomination by a committee of Democrats, who called at his Berwyn residence, Randall praised (no doubt, perfunctorily) Cleveland and went on to say that he believed in tariff reduction in order to reduce the Treasury surplus but that such reductions should be made "without disturbing the business and trade of the country."⁴¹ In his final election Randall held tenaciously to a protective position regarding the tariff. In the other congressional districts the Democrats hoped for a good showing in the Fourth, "Pig Iron" Kelley's district, because of the candidacy of William Ayres, a popular businessman, who waged a vigorous fight. And, in the Fifth district the Democrats even entertained the hope of winning. In the latter district F. A. Herwig fought hard to unseat Alfred C. Harmer. Herwig, a longtime advocate

³⁹In the Third State Representative district there were two Democratic nominees, an Independent and a Regular. James Lee, Independent, defeated Joseph McCullen, Regular.

⁴⁰The Times, 21 October 1888.

⁴¹Philadelphia Record, 14 October 1888.

of tariff reform, took his fight directly to the textile workers who thickly populated this district.

When all the votes were counted the familiar Democratic pattern was repeated. Randall was again the only Democrat elected to Congress from Philadelphia. However, the other Democratic congressional candidates polled more than the normal Democratic vote. The aggregate number of votes cast for Democratic candidates for Congress amounted to 46% of the total, the all-time high for the period 1880-1910. In the Fifth congressional district, populated by thousands of textile workers, F. A. Herwig, the Democrat, came within 6,500 votes of defeating the Republican incumbent, A. C. Harmer, while William Ayres fell only 9,500 votes behind "Pig Iron" Kelley in the Fourth district.

Cleveland scored as the most popular Democratic candidate for president in the 1880-1910 period by polling over 93,000 votes. Even though he failed to carry the city he performed better than Hancock in 1880. He carried seven of the eight wards in the river district⁴² and fell only 500 votes behind Randall's count. Outside the Democratic Third district, Cleveland carried the second and nineteenth wards. The nineteenth ward was also primarily inhabited by

⁴²In 1887 the seventeenth ward was added to Randall's district thus bringing the total number of wards to eight rather than seven. Cleveland lost only the fifth ward in district Three. He carried the district 16,975 to 10,028 for Harrison. Randall, who ran unopposed, polled 17,642 votes.

mill workers. Throughout the entire city Cleveland cut into the normal Republican majorities. The city totals were:

Cleveland	92,786
Harrison	111,358

Ironically, Randall and Cleveland, political antagonists, both established new records in voting strength. Philadelphians, harangued for two and a half months about protection of the tariff and revision of the same, cast aside the issues when they went to the polls. The personality of Cleveland characterized by honesty, directness and manliness appealed to Philadelphians as did those same personal qualities found in Sam Randall, Robert Pattison and James Gay Gordon. Another factor which aided Cleveland was Republican cock-sureness. They thought, as did most observers, that Pennsylvania would surely go to Harrison, hence their minimal effort in the Keystone state.⁴³ Despite the curious election results, the Philadelphia Democrats demonstrated that they could be a lively, aggressive minority party in the contented Republican citadel of Philadelphia.

⁴³A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 568. Also it should be noted that the Republicans carried Pennsylvania by a comfortable plurality. Harrison polled 526,091 votes to Cleveland's 446,633.

CHAPTER III

THE LEADERSHIP OF WILLIAM F. HARRITY AND PARTY SCHISM

A. Vaux vs. McAleer: The Party Conflict of 1890

Shortly after Sam Randall's death the Democrats started fighting over his seat. Unhappily for the party the primary fight in 1890, though finally averted, was the prelude to a decade of infighting and wrangles which eventually led to schism in the Philadelphia Democracy. After the announcement that a special congressional election would be held on 20 May to elect a successor to Randall, a free-for-all started which the Record aptly called a "Kilkenny cat fight."¹ The party organization in the third, fourth, fifth, and eleventh wards stood behind State Senator William McAleer² for the nomination, while the organization in the sixth, twelfth, and sixteenth wards advanced the candidacy of State Representative Charles R. Gentner.

For a full week and a half the opposing factions fulminated at each other while Matthew Dittmann, the boss of the seventeenth ward, who also hoped to be nominated,

¹Philadelphia Record, 6 May 1890.

²See Chapter VII, pp. 239 for a biographical sketch of William McAleer.

held the balance of power and refused to declare for either candidate. Gentner, favored by the Democratic City Executive Committee, was accused by Squire McMullen of being a tool in a devious plot to annex the party to the Quay machine. The contest reached a climax when the McAleer forces went to the courts on 10 May, and obtained a restraining order prohibiting the continuance of the nominating convention because of the alleged illegal seating of pro-Gentner delegates.³

The Republicans cheerfully applauded the Democratic folly, realized they could capture the district if split by the Democratic infighting, and chose Robert Adams Jr., the Minister to Brazil, as their candidate. In the meantime, the McAleer faction received a setback at the court hearing when the judiciary refused to intervene in the Democratic convention dispute because it was a "political matter."⁴

There seemed to be no way out of the Democratic dilemma until McAleer suddenly announced his withdrawal in favor of Richard Vaux,⁵ the elder statesman of the party. Dittmann then withdrew from the race, the Gentner forces evaporated, and Vaux won the nomination by acclamation.⁶

³Philadelphia Record, 10 May 1890.

⁴Ibid., 11 May 1890.

⁵Ibid., 12 May 1890. Also see Chapter VII, pp. 208 for a biographical sketch of Richard Vaux.

⁶Ibid., 13 May 1890.

The Republicans, seeing that they were doomed to defeat, withdrew Adams' name and submitted no nominee to oppose Vaux. With the Kilkenny cat fight ended, the Record editorialized about "A Happy Deliverance" and lauded the action of the Democrats: "In Mr. Vaux the Democrats of Philadelphia have picked out a man of brains, courage, experience, and unsullied character."⁷

In an election so dull and quiet that "few people seemed to know that an election was being held" Vaux polled 8,001 votes to 617 votes distributed among three other names.⁸ Even though this "Happy Deliverance" proved to be short-lived, it was remarkable for several reasons. First, Vaux, an old man, did not seek the office and was surprised to learn of his selection as the compromise candidate.⁹ Second, he got the unqualified and warm support of McAleer's outstanding protagonist, the late Sam Randall's devotee, Squire McMullen. In fact, the Squire, in writing to Vaux on 21 May, lamented the light vote in the special election:

The District did not do what it ought of [sic] done yesterday. 10,000 votes should be [sic] polled yesterday. I know where it came from and I will get even. I will call and see you to morrow. I have got a little stiff (as

⁷Ibid.

⁸Philadelphia Record, 21 May 1890.

⁹See a handwritten rough draft of a speech by Vaux in which he states: "Without my knowledge I was elected...." Miscellaneous Papers-Democratic Party Papers, 1890 (Vaux Collection).

the saying goes one are not as young as one used to be.) /sic/ Will be pleased to shake the hand of our next Congressman. 10

Finally, Vaux stood for tariff reform, an unconcealed fact that did not hurt him in Randall's old district. The Record, waiting for years for a tariff-revisionist Democrat to be elected to Congress from Philadelphia, declared in an editorial a week before the election:

The election of Richard Vaux in the Third Congress district would give our manufactures and merchants a spokesman and an advocate who believes in their capacity to protect and take care of themselves in a fair and open contest, against all competitors upon even terms. . . . He is an old fashioned Democrat, bless him! 11

The candidacy of Richard Vaux saved the party from a bitter clash in the only Democratic stronghold in Philadelphia. But even though Vaux won, a leadership vacuum still existed. At best the sudden spurt of enthusiasm for Vaux could only be a stop-gap for the party problems. The larger question remained: Who would take Randall's place in the party? Who could effect coalitions, please the various elements in the party, and help shape policy at state conventions? And finally, who would bring the Philadelphia Democracy to face up to the critical issues of the nineties? That responsibility fell upon the shoulders of William F. Harrity, whose organizational skills extended beyond Philadelphia to Harrisburg and Washington.

¹⁰McMullen to Vaux, 21 May 1890. Vaux Collection.

¹¹Philadelphia Record, 14 May 1890.

B. The Pattison Gubernatorial Campaign of 1890

Harrity's great triumph came in 1890 when he almost single handedly put Pattison back in the gubernatorial chair. At the state convention at Scranton, Harrity worked incessantly to secure the nomination of former Governor Pattison over the old party war horse, former Senator William A. Wallace. Wallace, who in this fight sought his last political office, had the support of the old timers in the party. When the delegates gathered to select a nominee, the outcome was in doubt as each side claimed victory. Eckley B. Coxe, a neutral in the contest, presided as temporary chairman over the divided convention. Even the Philadelphia delegates split on the choice of a candidate, though a majority favored Pattison. Wallace's old right hand man in Philadelphia, George McGowan, again led the drive for his long time friend, while Harrity and City Chairman Charlie Donnelly worked for Pattison.¹²

After two days of maneuvering behind the scenes, the real break-through for Pattison came when the committee on permanent organization recommended unanimously to the delegates that Harrity be named permanent chairman of the convention. Wallace realized the hopelessness of his campaign and boarded a DL&W train for home even before the balloting commenced. Pattison won easily on the first

¹²The Times, 2 July 1890.

ballot by a vote of 200 to 132 for Wallace,¹³ and Chauncey Black, Pattison's former Lt. Governor, was chosen again to be Pattison's running mate. The finishing touch to Harrity's successful political efforts came after the convention adjourned when the State Democratic Committee elected him its chairman.¹⁴ Thus when he returned from Scranton not only had he accomplished the nomination of Pattison, but he came back as Chairman of the Democratic State Committee with the task of getting his nominee elected.

From the beginning of the campaign, prospects looked bright for Pattison's reelection. Compared to Pattison, Matt Quay's hand picked candidate, George Delamater, looked like a third rate political hack. The Ex-Governor's earlier record won him support again from independents and reform Republicans who wanted to unseat Quay and end the machinations of his organization. In fact, the striking contrast between Delamater, the puppet, and Pattison, the reformer, helped convince the delegates at Scranton that Pattison not Wallace, could best beat Quay's candidate.¹⁵

The victory of the Harrity forces at Scranton also signified the official orientation of the party toward Cleveland Democracy. In Pattison's first campaign of 1882

¹³Ibid., 3 July 1890.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵See editorial in The Times, 3 July 1890 for analysis of this. Had Hastings got the GOP nomination for Governor, then Wallace would have gotten the Democratic nomination, so the editorial states.

national issues were avoided, but in the 1890 campaign the Democrats praised Cleveland and advocated tariff reform in the party platform. However, the central issue upon which the Democrats waged the campaign was the need to reform the state government by throwing out the Quay machine. The platform declared: "We accept the issue of Quayism as now tendered by the Republican state convention,"¹⁶ and went on to advocate ballot and tax reform.

As the gubernatorial campaign progressed, Democratic optimism increased. The first potential party problem, namely, the possible defection of the old timers who carried Wallace's banner, never materialized. Early in the campaign, Harrity very wisely stepped down as State Chairman in order to pave the way for the election of Congressman James Kerr, of Clearfield, a staunch Wallace man.¹⁷ This created a spirit of unity and cooperation which eased the apprehensions of the Wallace men. Second, Pattison began an aggressive campaign in which he proposed to speak in every section of the state. Even though he had remained passive in the fight for the nomination (Harrity was the active agent), Pattison very early embarked upon an active canvass to win the election. Finally, as the campaign got underway, Pattison got the support of many influential independent Republicans, many of them businessmen. In Philadelphia a

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., 15 and 16 July 1890.

group of leading independent Republicans organized the Lincoln Independent Republican Committee and began to help Pattison. Important Philadelphians like Herbert Welsh, Justus Strawbridge, George Wharton Pepper, and Owen J. Wister headed the list of anti-Quay Republicans who proposed to work for Pattison.

C. The 1890 Split in the Third District

But while the Pattison ship sailed along in calm waters, the Vaux vessel experienced a rocky and perilous sea. McAleer, smarting from his defeat in May for Randall's old seat, began shortly after Vaux left for Washington to conspire to force Vaux out of Congress. Vaux remained somewhat aloof and demonstrated little concern when it became known that McAleer's campaign was in full swing. Squire McMullen expressed alarm over McAleer's subversive activities and warned the Democrats of the Third District that an attempt to deprive Vaux of his seat would only spell disaster for the party and the district.¹⁸

After two weeks of intra-party skirmishes, barroom politics and secret meetings, the Squire surveyed the situation in the district, discovered the widespread popularity of McAleer and quickly dropped Vaux to jump on the McAleer bandwagon. By early September McAleer successfully managed to win enough delegates to assure his nomination.

¹⁸Ibid., 18 August 1890.

But the Vaux people were not idle. Vaux abandoned his neutral position about running for reelection and definitely threw his hat in the ring. In early September Harrity announced his opposition to the plot to dump Vaux when he stated: "Ever since the suggestion of opposition to the return of Congressman Vaux for the full term was first made, I considered the movement as bad politics and I have never hesitated to say so."¹⁹

As the nominating convention approached, the McAleer faction got stronger. In every ward except Major Tommy Ryan's sixth and Matthew Dittmann's seventeenth and the sixteenth, McAleer managed to snatch a majority of the delegates. His support came from the political hacks who saw their own advantage in McAleer's success. A party worker summed it up when he said: "Billy always looks after the boys. If there's anything going Billy always gets his share. Dick Vaux is a good enough Congressman, but he ain't posted. We want a man that'll take care of the boys."²⁰ When the delegates assembled on 25 September, they quickly endorsed a resolution naming McAleer as the Democratic candidate for Congress, adjourned, and went home.

Though outfoxed by the ward heelers, the friends of Richard Vaux refused to abide by the verdict of the convention. Two days later the "People's Convention" met and enthusiastically nominated Vaux as the Independent Democratic

¹⁹Ibid., 5 September 1890.

²⁰Ibid., 19 September 1890.

candidate for Congress. Tommy Ryan presided over the enthusiastic but orderly crowd who heard such notables as S. Davis Page and Emanuel Furth laud the qualifications of Richard Vaux.²¹ And so the campaign started. In five short months after the burial of Sam Randall, his great Democratic district was torn apart by two rival factions.

The schism in the Third Congressional District, fortunately, did not deter the city wide canvass for Pattison. Charles Donnelly, Democratic City Chairman, announced on 1 October, the formation of the Democratic Committee of 100, an ad hoc group of the most prominent Democrats in the city who pledged support to Pattison's cause. This committee, made up of men like Biddle, Banes, Page, Sanders, Bullitt, Read, Dallas and Gowen, paralleled similar successful committees which operated in 1887 to aid in Charles Krumbhaar's election as Sheriff, and also in 1888 when Cleveland polled over 93,000 votes for President.²² The city Democrats also got busy purchasing tax receipts, and on 2 October, the City Committee bought 44,000 tax receipts in anticipation of a big Democratic vote.²³

²¹Ibid., 28 September 1890.

²²Philadelphia Record, 1 October 1890.

²³Ibid., 3 October 1890. It should be noted here that people who did not pay county or city taxes (i.e. non-property owners) had to pay a poll tax of fifty cents which entitled them to vote for two years, thus making the poll tax twenty-five cents per year. It was the practice of the political parties to purchase poll tax receipts to distribute to non-property owning voters.

As the Pattison campaign began to accelerate, Democratic optimism increased. The Record in an editorial entitled "Ready for Action" commented on the prospects for victory:

The Democrats of Philadelphia have never had a more complete, harmonious and effective organization than they have this year. . . . Nothing stands between the party and victory but a refusal to go to the polls and earn it. It is within our grasp if we reach for it. 24

The Democratic mass rally at the Academy on 11 October, also signified the harmony and optimism of Pattison's second campaign for Governor. The chief issue the Democrats focused on was Quayism and corruption. The lofty motto "For Pennsylvania's Honor" became the Democratic byword in 1890, and was displayed on the festooned bunting hanging from the galleries of the Academy of Music. Party unity was epitomized by the presence and speech of ex-Senator William A. Wallace. Wallace commended Pattison and memorialized Randall, and also took the opportunity to reaffirm the essential constitutional conservatism of the Democratic party. He associated corruption in government with the concept of a "strong centralized government," a Republican heresy, and declared:

We govern from the base, the individual man is the unit. All rights are his save those he has given up for the protection of himself and to perpetuate the government. . . . A strict construction of the Federal constitution has always been a cardinal doctrine of the Democracy. 25

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., 12 October 1890.

Like the Democrats, the Lincoln Republicans also continued their active campaign for Pattison in Philadelphia. They sponsored rallies on 20 and 25 October and hammered away at Matt Quay and the Republican machine in Pennsylvania. At the first rally John B. Garrett, vice-president of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, presided and announced that Pattison would be the first Democrat for whom he would vote. The Reverend Charles Wood, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Germantown, a well-known advocate of reform, was the main speaker.²⁶ The second rally was planned by Philadelphia businessmen Justus Strawbridge, Wharton Barker and Rudolph Blankenburg.²⁷

In the meantime the factional fighting got intense in the Third district. In early October the Record endorsed McAleer and maintained that the Vaux forces should have abided by the decision of the nominating convention.²⁸ (The Record had favored Vaux for renomination.) Both Vaux and McAleer campaigned hard for Randall's old seat. McAleer got the support of Peter Monroe and Squire McMullen, the Irish leaders of the third and fourth wards, respectively. He also got the endorsement of First Hebrew Delamater Club, composed of some 274 Jewish Republicans of the fifth ward, and the Union Labor Party, a workingmen's organization with headquarters in the eleventh ward.

²⁶Ibid., 21 October 1890.

²⁷Ibid., 26 October 1890.

²⁸Ibid., 8 October 1890.

Vaux's strength came from the upper wards (11, 12, 16, 17) and from Tommy Ryan, leader of the sixth. In addition, the "decent" people in the district supported Vaux for reelection. Unfortunately for the Democrats, Ryan worked a deal with Elwood Becker, Republican candidate for McAleer's State Senate seat. Ryan agreed to support Becker over the Democratic candidate, James Lee, in return for which Becker agreed to get Republicans to support Vaux. The arrangement worked for Becker, who carried the Second Senatorial district (wards 3, 4, 5, 6, 11) by a vote of 6,959 to Lee's 6,890. Tommy Ryan's sixth ward went for Becker by the lopsided vote of 1,276 to 651.

However, the Ryan deal could not turn back the McAleer tide. McAleer won by a vote of 13,121 to 10,037 for Vaux. However, Vaux did carry the sixth, eleventh, twelfth, and sixteenth wards, but the tremendous pluralities in the lower wards for McAleer assured his victory. Ryan's boys cut the McAleer Democrats, while the McAleer Democrats went a step farther and cut Pattison because he had favored Vaux for the Congressional nomination. The cutting in the third and fourth wards by Peter Monroe and Squire McMullen was so blatant that the City Committee met on 10 November and voted 33 to 6 to expel both of these men from the City Committee.²⁹

²⁹Ibid., 11 November 1890.

The Republicans won all the other congressional contests and swept the city for Delamater. The city vote was:

Delamater:	106,014
Pattison:	84,126

Pattison could not match his 1882 vote but he did manage to carry ten wards in the city, seven of which were in the river district. All the wards he carried were populated by the working class except the thirty-fourth, a middle-class residential ward in West Philadelphia.

Despite his loss of Philadelphia by 21,000 votes Pattison carried the state and won the gubernatorial race by 16,000 votes. Many independents and reform Republicans refused to vote for Delamater because Quay had forced Delamater's nomination over the more popular Dan Hastings. The disgruntled elements in the Republican party protested Quay's domination by abandoning their party and voting for Pattison. The Pittsburgh vote indicated the widespread defection of Republicans. In that veritable GOP stronghold, Delamater only won by a slim plurality of 2,000 votes.³⁰

D. Cleveland's Third Campaign

Cleveland's third campaign for the presidency in 1892 did not create among Philadelphia Democrats the enthusiastic

³⁰See A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, pp. 576-578 and L. W. Rathgeber "The Democratic Party in Pennsylvania: 1880-1896," pp. 252.

response that his 1888 canvass had produced. In part, the tariff issue failed to excite people. The national campaign in Philadelphia could only be described as peripheral to the local battles, the most important of which raged with intensity for months in Sam Randall's old district.

William F. Harrity, recently elected chairman of the Democratic National Committee, planned Cleveland's successful reelection campaign. On 27 September 1892, Cleveland issued his Letter of Acceptance which marked the official beginning of the campaign. In a moderate and concise letter, Cleveland again pointed to the need of reforming the tariff. The Times supported Cleveland and commented on his letter: "It is a concise, clear-cut statement of the Democratic position in the present contest and will command wide attention and generous appreciation."³¹ But the "wide attention and generous appreciation" never manifested itself in Chairman Harrity's home town.

The Philadelphia Democrats never got the Cleveland bandwagon started. In early July the number of eligible Democratic voters shrank to the unbelievable low of 13,010 in the entire city. Only thirteen per cent of the 100,000 Democrats in the city had presented the necessary tax receipts to qualify for voting.³² The alarmed City

³¹The Times, 27 September 1892.

³²Democratic Executive Committee Report, July 6, 1892 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

Executive Committee sent an impassioned plea to all party workers admonishing them to get busy lest the Republicans win by default. The situation got better in the next two months since, the Democrats still lagged behind the Republicans, who, at first, were also lethargic in purchasing tax receipts. The Democrats were handicapped in that, unlike the Republicans, they only purchased tax receipts for their men in a limited number of wards where they expected hot contests. They depended upon party workers to urge Democratic voters to purchase their receipts individually.³³ On the last day in which tax receipts could be purchased, the Republican City Chairman bought 57,200 while only a few were bought by Democratic ward leaders for a handful of select wards in the city.³⁴

The tax receipt problem serves to illustrate the general and more serious apathy of the campaign. In early October when the campaign should have been in full swing

The Times observed:

While the politicians and the marching clubs are trying to arouse the people, there is really little response from any section of the city. We have had ten times more earnest effort and enthusiasm in many local contests, and the only thing that can now be predicted with safety is that the vote will be unusually

³³The Times, 9 October 1892.

³⁴Ibid., 10 October 1892. Also on 23 October, The Times estimated that 25,000 Democrats did not have the necessary tax receipts to qualify them for voting.

light for a national contest in November next, and the majority will be known only when the votes are counted. 35

Hence, unlike previous elections, McClure offered no definite prediction about the outcome in Philadelphia. But he did predict that nationally ". . . the success of Cleveland seems to be even more than probable and likely by the largest majority given any Presidential candidate during the last twenty years."³⁶ The Philadelphia Democrats could not concentrate on Cleveland's campaign because they were too busy fighting among themselves for mastery of the city organization.

E. The Anti-Harrity Movement

Before the factional struggle in the '92 campaign can be discussed, it is necessary to go back to 1890 to explain briefly the circumstances and events which led to the wrangles in 1892 which, in turn, resulted in the schism that followed. When Pattison appointed Harrity the Secretary of the Commonwealth in 1891, he alienated Judge Gordon, who wanted to be Pattison's confidant in his second administration as he had in his first. Over the years an intense personal rivalry (probably based upon professional jealousy) had developed between Harrity and Gordon. After Harrity's appointment as Secretary of the

³⁵Ibid., 9 October 1892.

³⁶Ibid., 23 October 1892.

Commonwealth, Gordon also grew to dislike Pattison.³⁷

Further, Harrity's power in the state and national party was a source of irritation to Gordon and to two other Democratic leaders, George McGowan and William McAleer. McGowan had been a leader of the Philadelphia Wallace faction in the party before 1880. While Randall managed to keep him quiet for a decade, he reasserted himself when he led the Philadelphia Wallace delegates at the 1890 State Convention. He, too, distrusted Pattison and hated Harrity. So, he repeated his earlier strategy, gathered together his supporters and established a rival Democratic organization in February of 1892 called the Democratic Committee of Philadelphia County. Ostensibly this committee functioned to reform the party rules, but its real purpose was to dump Harrity.³⁸

Finally, Congressman McAleer was still angry at Harrity because he supported Vaux for Congress in 1890. These three major dissidents, though complementing each other, had not in 1892 created a schism in the party. But McAleer and his followers did establish a faction which functioned during the '92 elections, and it was upon the

³⁷See the Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 December 1890 and the Sunday World (Philadelphia), 4 January 1891. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1890-97).

³⁸See "Letter to the Democracy of Pennsylvania" circulated by the Democratic Committee of Philadelphia County, 18 February 1892 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1890-97).

McAleer faction that a full scale schismatic Democratic organization would soon be built.

In 1892 Democratic party discord centered in McAleer's congressional district. In a sense, the controversy of 1892 was an extension of the Vaux-McAleer fight of 1890. The party regulars still considered McAleer an insurgent who had by devious means deprived Vaux of his seat. The City Democratic Executive Committee composed of people like Donnelly, Ryan, Harrity, Furth and Dittmann lined up to oppose McAleer. In the third district the anti-McAleer group began to build an organization to beat McAleer in the 1892 primary. At the convention in early September the regulars had a clear majority and proceeded to nominate Assistant District Attorney W. W. Ker for Congress. The dissidents, under Squire McMullen's direction, did not even bother to attend the convention but organized their own meeting and nominated McAleer.³⁹ Now the fight was on.

With two Democratic nominees in the field, the Republicans had a golden opportunity to capture Sam Randall's district, the only district in Philadelphia that had never gone Republican. And, they did precisely that, but in an unorthodox way. They nominated McAleer on the Republican ticket! For the first time since the dissolution of the

³⁹The Times, 2 September 1890.

Pilgrim Club,⁴⁰ the Republicans annexed part of the Democracy in Philadelphia. The political ambitions of Senator Matt Quay and Congressman William McAleer motivated the formation of the annex in 1892. McAleer ran for re-election as an Independent Democrat and as a Republican. In exchange for the Republican nomination, the McAleer boys agreed to support the Republican candidates for the legislature instead of the regular Democratic nominees. This would assure a few more seats in the legislature for Matt Quay, who liked Washington and wanted to return to the Senate, since his first term expired in 1893.⁴¹

The horrified Times lamented the deal between McAleer and Quay and labeled it: "The Pilgrim restoration."⁴² The regulars, astounded by the deal, tried to avert the annex by effecting a rapprochement with McAleer, but it was too late. Ker consented to withdraw to permit the organization to be in a better bargaining position, but McAleer had already consummated the deal.⁴³

⁴⁰The Pilgrim Club was organized in the 70's and functioned until 1880. Its ostensible purpose was social. Its membership included Col. Mann, a leading Republican and Lewis Cassidy, a leading Democrat. The two men and others in the Pilgrim Club entered into political deals which assured the continuation of Republican machine in exchange for patronage given to a select number of Cassidy Democrats. See A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes, Vol. II, p. 387ff.

⁴¹The Times, 8 September 1892.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 17 September 1892.

While the Philadelphia Democrats were fighting, William Harrity busily conducted Cleveland's successful national campaign for reelection. The national prospects for victory were bright, but only apathy greeted the Cleveland canvass in Philadelphia. Neither Philadelphia nor Pennsylvania could claim any of the credit for Cleveland's dramatic political comeback in the November election. Harrison carried the city by over 32,000 votes, a decisive sweep when contrasted to his plurality of 18,000 in 1888. The city vote was:

Cleveland (D)	84,470	(42%)
Harrison (R)	116,685	(58%)

The Ex-President carried only eight wards in the city, seven of which were in the river district. The only other ward he carried was the second, another working class ward. Cleveland showed no signs of strength in the traditional middle-class Republican neighborhoods.

For the first time in the city's history the old river ward district elected a Republican candidate to Congress. McAleer's combined Independent Democratic and Republican vote reached over 15,000 while Ker polled an all time low Democratic vote of 5,500. McAleer swept every single ward in the district. In the State Representative districts, McAleer's boys sent Republicans to the legislature from the third, fourth and twelfth wards. McAleer had, indeed, honored his deal with Quay.

F. The Party Schism

Since only McAleer among the Democrats (he was really a Democrat and remained one though in 1892 he was a titular Republican) won a major office in 1892, he became even stronger among the insurgents. When the dissidents first organized (after being defeated at the party primaries in January 1892) their strength could not be determined. But, the success of McAleer and his deal with the Republicans in 1892 gave the anti-Harrity group a boost. The result of the '92 fiasco, in fact, confirmed the reality of the party schism. In addition to McGowan, McAleer, and Gordon, another leading Democrat, Dallas Sanders, who also distrusted Harrity, lent aid and support to the rival organization. Political ideology or ethnic identification played no role in the dispute. The controversy which lasted well into middle of the decade focused only on personalities, jurisdictional questions, and party rules. Underneath all of the rhetoric there remained intense opposition to the dominant leadership of William F. Harrity. The '92 victory only served to increase the hopes of the new organization which claimed to represent the pure Democracy in the city. Thus when the "County Democracy" met after the election they gloried in the fact that McAleer got 6,778 Independent Democratic votes, and passed resolutions lauding McAleer and condemning "Boss" Harrity.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Philadelphia Press, 6 December 1892. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

McAleer's Republican candidacy in '92 could only be termed a temporary expedient. When he assumed his seat in the Fifty-third Congress, he joined his colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle, participated in the Democratic caucus and further upset his Republican friends when he voted for the Wilson tariff bill. By his vote on the tariff he cut irrevocably his tie with the Republicans. The Philadelphia Press, for example, criticized McAleer for not being as courageous as Randall on the tariff issue and said: "Mr. McAleer has taken his place among the cuckoo members and has voted with the free-traders of the South."⁴⁵

McAleer probably thought he could drop his affiliation with the Republicans and suffer no ill effects because of his victory in '92 and because of the expansion of his own Democratic organization. The insurgents, unable to get their delegates seated at the regular conventions, decided in January 1894, to create a grandiose new state Democratic party⁴⁶ called the "Pennsylvania Democracy." This Philadelphia based organization, which had strength only in the river wards and attracted no important state leaders, set out to ruin Harrity. Earlier, when McAleer had the audacity to submit nominations to Cleveland for some of

⁴⁵Ibid., 3 February 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁴⁶Ibid., 12 January 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

the coveted patronage plums for Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, the President ignored the requests and appointed regulars recommended by Harrity.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, this new organization approached the coming 1894 elections anticipating the entry of its candidates in the state and city contests.

William Singerly,⁴⁸ a regular, saw the gravity of the situation and set out to be the party peace-maker. In a display of journalistic jealousy, The Times sarcastically stated that: "Brother Singerly is always waltzing around as a missionary of peace and good will."⁴⁹ But Singerly did perform a minor miracle in effecting a compromise between McAleer and Harrity which obviated the entry of candidates from both organizations in the February elections. Under the terms of the compromise, the McAleer faction was to participate in all party conferences, and the McAleer delegates in the river wards were recognized as the official ward representatives. Further, nominees for Federal jobs recommended to Cleveland were to be neutrals not identified with either faction.⁵⁰

With the acceptance of the Singerly compromise of January 1894, the "Pennsylvania Democracy" agreed to disband and to support the regulars in the February elections.

⁴⁷The Times, 14 February 1894.

⁴⁸See Chapter VII, pp. 225 for a biographical sketch of William Singerly.

⁴⁹The Times, 28 January 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁵⁰Philadelphia Press, 25 January 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

Even though united, the Democrats suffered a stunning defeat at the polls on 21 February, when Galusha Grow whipped J. P. Hancock for congressman-at-large by a plurality of 160,000 in the state and 52,000 in the city. The Times analyzed the defeat and blamed it on the unhappy fact that the Democrats happened to be in office during a depression:

The trouble with the Democrats is that the country is suffering from hard times and as their representatives in power in Washington have done nothing for its relief, the people are not voting to sustain Democratic rule. That is the whole story. 51

As the Democrats faced the '94 election campaign, the obstacles in their path seemed to be simultaneously harder and easier; easier because of the new harmony in the party but harder because of the national depression. Democratic optimism was, therefore, very restrained. No one seriously entertained any notions of victory for state or city ticket except for the old faithful river ward district. Even though Philadelphia Democrats did manage to pull together the two factions, they faced the November campaign with resignation.

G. Singerly's Campaign for Governor: 1894

William M. Singerly won the Democratic nomination for Governor by acclamation in late June. His nomination, in a real sense, confirmed his earlier successful compromise

⁵¹The Times, 21 February 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

efforts for party unity, but it also signified the hopelessness of the Democratic plight in 1894. Singerly's paper analyzed the meaning of his candidacy shortly after the nominating convention:

Because his Democracy is broad gauge, he feels bound to lead where he has besought other men to follow. He represents no faction and would not accept the call of a faction. He despises faction and contemns [sic] it; but the spontaneous desire of the whole party in a time of doubt and distress admits of no denial. If the Democracy in Pennsylvania were in a position to elect the next Governor of the State, Mr. Singerly would feel it his duty to insist upon a stronger and more experienced candidate for the Governorship. 52

Hence, Singerly's candidacy served to unite the minority party in a year of inevitable defeat. The united party, though resigned, began to increase its activities for the campaign. The various Democratic clubs of the city passed resolutions praising Singerly and determined to work hard for his candidacy.⁵³ In the meantime as Singerly planned for a gala Democratic rally at the Academy on September 29, concurrent political activities in the Third district went along in an amiable fashion. McAleer was to receive the support of both factions and run as the regular Democratic nominee for Congress. With the compromise agreed upon by both factions, it appeared that the coming nominating convention in the Third district would be merely pro forma.

⁵²Philadelphia Record, 28 June 1894.

⁵³Ibid., 8 July 1894.

H. McAleer Jilted

Then, with no warning, out of the clear, placid Democratic sky shot a bolt of lightning which created turbulence and chaos in the old Randall district. In a surprise eleventh hour move, the anti-McAleer men, under the leadership of Major Tommy Ryan and councilman Peter Monroe, conspired to defeat McAleer. All the months of peace talks disintegrated at the coup d'etat of 20 September 1894. Even the delegates did not know of the conspiracy until they got their voting instructions just as the nominations were being made. The Bulletin reported that: "Up until the last moment the general idea was that McAleer's renomination was reasonably assured; but his enemies with sleepless persistency worked for his undoing in silence, while lulling his friends into a position of fancied security."⁵⁴

Chairman Harrity met with Messrs. Ryan, Monroe, and Dittman the night before the convention and made an earnest plea for McAleer's candidacy. But after the three ward leaders in the Third district left Harrity's office, they worked swiftly to undo the many months of painful progress toward party unity. The next morning the delegates met at National Guards' Hall and got their quiet but firm orders to vote for Joseph McCullen, a young lawyer from

⁵⁴The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia) 20 September 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

the twentieth Ward, for Congressman. When the vote was counted, McCullen, a former resident of the third ward, had eighteen votes to McAleer's ten. When McAleer heard the news, he said he was not shocked, but refused to make a statement and proceeded directly to Singerly's office for a conference with the party peace-maker.⁵⁵

Harrity voiced his disappointment at the Ryan move to dump McAleer,⁵⁶ and further denied to a Bulletin reporter his involvement in the conspiracy. Harrity said:

I know that nothing could move Ryan or Monroe who resisted outside interference, and I have reason to believe that my name was used to further their plans. In one case Mr. Monroe stated to a delegate--who, however, voted for McAleer--that I was indifferent as to how the delegates voted. This is not true and the assertion was entirely unauthorized. 57

The Times lamented the effect of the surprise move on Singerly's campaign but could not sympathize with McAleer, who was "beaten at his own game," and whose "defeat can cause regret to few friends of honest politics."⁵⁸ The Record, however, did not engage in any criticism of McAleer but rather called the actions of the Democrats of the Third district a "brutal political blunder," the consequences of

⁵⁵The Times, 21 September 1894.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), 20 September 1894. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁵⁸The Times, 21 September 1894.

which could only destroy an already "deplorable minority party" in Philadelphia.⁵⁹ To Philadelphia's leading Democratic paper the coup d'etat in the Third district was the "beginning of the end" for the party. For days the leading papers of the city editorialized about the tragedy of the Democratic wrangle. In retrospect, that unfortunate squeeze play was the most significant political event of the campaign of 1894.

Discouraged and depressed, Singerly pushed on with fortitude in his campaign for Governor. He prepared for a mass meeting including his speech of acceptance at the Academy on 29 September. Though the rally exhibited great enthusiasm, the Evening Star reported that "our estimable fellow citizen, Mr. Singerly offered himself up in sacrifice as Democratic candidate for Governor."⁶⁰ Singerly, in a very brief address, reaffirmed the Democratic platform calling for tariff reform, honest money, and a frugal government. He asserted that the government should get out of business by stopping all aid to manufactures and trusts via tariffs and once again called for: "A resumption of simpler Jeffersonian methods in which nothing should be undertaken by the government which may be accomplished by individual exertions. . . ." ⁶¹

⁵⁹Philadelphia Record, 21 September 1894.

⁶⁰The Evening Star (Philadelphia), 29 September 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁶¹The Times, 30 September 1894.

Underneath the pomp and pageantry of Democratic enthusiasm the real ingredients of defeat manifested themselves. Singerly suffered a setback in early October when Michael Ryan, one of the McAleer men, refused (in a public letter to the Philadelphia Press) to campaign with Singerly throughout the state. Michael Ryan maintained that, inasmuch as the Harrity wing broke the peace agreement, he (Michael Ryan) could not, therefore, aid Singerly.⁶²

But Singerly, with nerves of iron, pressed on. The Democrats of Philadelphia sponsored another mass meeting at the Academy on 20 October, at which time Singerly and McClure addressed the overflow audience on the tariff and the money issue. The Times, not given to wild or extravagant enthusiasm, termed the meeting a great success and optimistically stated that there "is little doubt that the Democratic revival now fairly started in Philadelphia will produce the best results on election day."⁶³

There was a spurt of Democratic hope in the city, but the Third congressional district remained a veritable shambles throughout the campaign. The G.O.P. busily prepared to elect a real Republican to Congress in the Third district. They nominated the popular Councilman from the twelfth ward, Frederick Halterman, who made a big play for

⁶²Philadelphia Press, 7 October 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1894-1895).

⁶³The Times, 21 October 1894.

the German vote and the disgruntled McAleer supporters. The Republicans also decided to spend quantities of money in the district to assure success on election day.

An overflow crowd of Germans jammed into National Guards' Hall on 25 October, to hear and cheer for Halterman. Rudolph Blankenburg, one of the featured speakers, praised Halterman and scored the Democrats for the hard times. Mayor Lentoof Newark defended the Republican tariff policy and appealed to the Germans to demonstrate their solidarity by voting for Halterman.⁶⁴

In addition to the defection of the Germans, the Democrats also faced the additional loss of Irish McAleer Democrats. For they could not forget the fact that their leader got the sharp end of the knife at the nominating convention. The quiet, behind-the-scene movement to dump McCullen went on for a few weeks until it became open and obvious in early November when Squire McMullen announced that he planned to vote for Halterman. Before a cheering fourth ward crowd McMullen declared:

I told the Inquirer man on the night of the day they turned McAleer down that they might just as well have nominated Halterman as McCullen. You see it's just as I said. Halterman will carry every ward in the district. Of that there isn't the slightest doubt. ⁶⁵

⁶⁴Philadelphia Press, 25 October 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁶⁵Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 November 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1894-1895).

As the city Democrats came to the final phase of the campaign, they faced another major problem, the tax receipt situation. From October 1893 to November 1893, the Republicans bought over 113,000 tax receipts while the Democrats only purchased about 36,000. To compound this problem, almost 10,000 of these tax receipts for Democrats were invalid because many were bought for people who were dead, others for people who owned property and did not need the receipts, and for others who were Republicans!⁶⁶ The Democrats could not have complicated the situation any more even if they had tried. The organization of the party proved itself to be utterly incompetent in this regard. Democratic City Chairman Maurice Wilhere estimated before the election that Philadelphia had some 80,000 Democrats, 30,000 of whom he listed as "doubtful."⁶⁷

Despite all these handicaps, Singerly energetically campaigned in the last week of the canvass. He spoke to enthusiastic crowds in Allentown, South Bethlehem, Doylestown, and Norristown during the last days of the fight. While The Times saw the impending defeat, it congratulated Singerly for his vigorous campaign and lamented the fact that the publisher of the Record was a victim of circumstances. The Times cited the upsurge of business activity

⁶⁶Ibid., 29 October 1894.

⁶⁷Ibid.

and the reopening of factories and shops but admitted that it was too late to change the outcome of the election. In a bit of wishful thinking The Times in an editorial entitled "The Skies Are Brightening" said: "If Col. Singerly with his exceptionally impressive and unanswerable arguments on the political issues of day, could be heard for two months more, he would carry the banner of tariff reform to victory."⁶⁸

It is doubtful whether two more months of Singerly's oratory could have averted the slaughter of '94. The ticket in the city and state (as nationally) suffered a tremendous defeat. Hastings defeated Singerly in Philadelphia by a vote of 139,201 to 54,069. His state vote reached nearly 575,000 to Singerly's weak showing of only 333,000 votes. Singerly carried only one ward in the city, the seventeenth, by only thirty-eight votes. The defeat in the Third congressional district was even worse. Halterman whipped McCullen two to one and carried every ward in the district. The McAleer boys had their knives sharpened and knew how to use them. For the first time in the history of Philadelphia, the old river ward elected a regular Republican to Congress. The Republican tidal wave which swept the nation also had a big impact in Philadelphia. While there was a great deal of concern expressed

⁶⁸The Times, 3 November 1894.

over fraudulent voting, the Republican sweep was, nonetheless, decisive. The Record, for example, admitted that the city went Republican but estimated that if a fair vote had been made the plurality would have been about 25,000.⁶⁹

The hopeless disorganization of the Democratic party also aided their Republican opponents. The McAleer double-cross by Tommy Ryan back at the September convention spelled defeat for the Democrats in the Third district.

The debilitating defeat of '94, unfortunately, extended the factional fighting and recreated the party schism. Instead of burying the hatchet, the Democrats of Philadelphia armed themselves for more warfare. Of course, both sides were guilty in the conflict. But the whole fight which dragged on and on, reflected most unfavorably on Harrity's leadership. For he had risen to the position of a major party leader in the city, state, and nation. He was justified in backing Vaux in 1890, but his opposition to McAleer in 1892 contributed to the split in the party. As a seasoned politician, he should have realized that McAleer was the most popular Democratic vote getter in the district. His aloof statement criticizing Ryan and Monroe for the double-cross of '94 was wholly inadequate and appeared insincere. Singerly did yeoman's service for the party by trying to heal the wounds of the past three years.

⁶⁹Philadelphia Record, 7 November 1894.

But Harrity did not exert himself to pressure McCullen, a political nonentity, to withdraw after Ryan and Monroe duped him into running. McCullen did not even live in the district and had not even voted in the last two elections!⁷⁰ In effect, all Harrity did was to indicate his sorrow at the turn of events in the Third district the day after McAleer was jilted. Harrity had, at least, committed the sin of omission. The whole bloody affair revealed the limitations of Harrity's leadership.

I. The Controversy Over Party Rules

In early December the "Pennsylvania Democracy" resumed operation again by announcing plans to call a state convention to nominate a full slate. The dissident Democrats also announced that they would refuse any cooperation with the regulars until they agreed to revise and reform the party rules. The dissidents had long advocated new rules for the party and during the month of December they emphasized these demands.⁷¹

In the meantime, enough regulars realized the gravity of the situation and began to work for the revision of the rules. A convention of the regulars met on 13 December, under the leadership of the judicious and widely respected George W. Biddle, who presided as temporary chairman. The convention issued a mandate to a select committee to revise

⁷⁰Philadelphia Press, 19 October 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1892-1894).

⁷¹Ibid., 7 December 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1894-1895).

the rules. John Cadwalader, Jr., the new peacemaker of the party, negotiated with George McGowan of the dissident group and both men agreed to a scheme to create a joint committee of each organization of the party to draw up a revision plan.⁷²

The insurgents advocated that division representation replace ward representation. They claimed that division representation would be more democratic and that it would avoid boss control of the party. They also demanded primaries in each division to elect division representatives. Finally, they demanded that convention temporary chairmen should have their authority carefully defined, in fact circumscribed, in order to avoid arbitrary and vindictive management of the party from the top.

Fortunately for the Democrats all of these demands were met on 30 December,⁷³ when the committee published the new rules. The Record called these new rules "a step in the right direction,"⁷⁴ but The Times cautioned its readers that rules revision would not be the panacea for the difficulties which plagued the party and reminded the Democrats that divisional representation could lead to

⁷²Ibid., 22 December 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1894-1895).

⁷³Philadelphia Record, 30 December 1894.

⁷⁴Ibid.

mob rule and fist fighting at the conventions, as was the case in the 70's when divisional representation was employed.⁷⁵

J. Pattison's Defeat For Mayor

As the nation experienced a severe depression, and the Democratic party in the South and West was turning to silver, the Philadelphia Democrats went on fighting over control of the party. The agreement reached in the rules controversy was not the panacea for the party's problems, as the sagacious Philadelphia Times pointed out. Although it is not the purpose of this study to focus upon municipal elections, the mayoralty campaign of 1895 did relate to the broader problems of Philadelphia Democrats as they faced the great Bryan storm of 1896.

In February 1895 Robert E. Pattison ran for mayor and took a tremendous beating from his Republican opponent Charles Warwick, who rolled up a plurality of over 56,000 votes. The Evening Bulletin commended Pattison's effort but went on to analyze the smashing defeat:

. . . the fundamental cause was the deep rooted distrust of the Democratic party, not simply in its character as an agent of non-partisan reform, but as an instrument for the ordinary administration of public affairs. ⁷⁶

⁷⁵The Times (Philadelphia) 23 December 1894 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1894-1895).

⁷⁶Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), 20 February 1895 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1890-1897).

The Bulletin editorial succinctly pinpointed the basic deficiencies of the Philadelphia Democrats, deficiencies which manifested themselves throughout the 90's. First, Pattison did not get the united support of his own party. Despite the pious statements about party unity and rules revision, the dissidents continued their war against Harrity and the regulars, and, therefore, cut Pattison when he ran for mayor. In the river district Pattison managed to carry only the sixth and seventeenth wards, the wards generally aligned with the regular organization.

The election revealed that the dissidents, who were unhappy with the regular organization, overtly cooperated with the Republican machine to prevent Pattison from winning. At this time the G.O.P. also experienced factional wrangles. Dave Martin and Charles Porter, who dominated the Republican machine, picked Charles Warwick to be the mayoralty candidate. Boies Penrose, a young Philadelphia aristocrat, with the support of Iz Durham, a local Republican ward leader, and of Matt Quay, challenged Warwick in the primary. After Penrose's defeat by Warwick, the time was ripe for the Democrats to exploit the split in the G.O.P. by uniting behind Pattison. Matt Quay even considered a scheme to support Pattison in the general election in order to break the power of Martin and Porter. Alexander McClure went to Washington to discuss the Pattison candidacy with Quay and found him willing to back Pattison. But before

Quay would agree to proceed he contacted several Philadelphia Republican friends, all of whom were influential businessmen, to get their support. It was at this time that many Democratic senators and congressmen were openly advocating bi-metallism as the means to pull the country out of depression. The Philadelphia businessmen were so adamant about the currency question that they informed Quay they would not support any Democrat for mayor because they did not want to add any strength to the party which nationally was flirting with financial heresy. Quay, therefore, dropped the scheme.⁷⁷

Although the whole plan fell through, it indicated that the impending silver issue was beginning to frighten the Philadelphia business community. In addition, the mayoralty election demonstrated the willingness of the regular Democrats (the "in" faction) to cooperate with the Philadelphia Quay Republicans (the "out" faction) even though the national silver issue prevented an entente in 1895. Finally, the vote in the Third congressional district graphically showed that a definite alliance existed between the Republican Martin-Porter Combine (the "in" faction) and the dissident McAleer Democrats (the "out" faction).

⁷⁷A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, pp. 592-594. It should also be noted that Harrity was in full agreement with the McClure-Quay plan.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRYAN STORM

The 1896 presidential battle in Philadelphia caused a storm within the Democratic party such as it had never experienced before. While factional wrangles went on before and after '96, only the Bryan campaign created the controversy which resulted in another schism, one based, however, on political doctrine not on political power. The Commoner's campaign put the upper level of the party in a veritable frenzy. All of the establishments of respectability in Philadelphia were caught up in a collective fear of Bryan that permeated the entire city and all of the mass media. Shocked and beleaguered, the press fulminated in daily attacks upon the "Pauper of the West." Not a single daily paper supported Bryan. Neither the independent Times, a friend of the Democracy, nor the Democratic Record supported him or the Chicago platform. Only one minor weekly, the Sunday Item, edited by Sam Hudson, carried the Bryan banner in Philadelphia.

Six weeks before the Democrats convened to nominate a presidential ticket, National Chairman Harrity expressed the optimistic hope that the sound money men would control

the convention and that Ex-Governor Pattison had a good chance of winning the presidential nomination. He perceived correctly that the fight over the platform would determine the whole future orientation of the party.¹

However, being a staunch party man, Harrity said later in an interview that he would stand by a silver platform if adopted, even though he would oppose it at the Convention: ". . . if a silver plank is put in the Democratic platform I will accept it as the will of the majority of the party and will stand by it."²

By the time the convention opened the gold forces lost their optimism. On the eve of the first session, Harrity admitted the hopelessness of the gold cause.³ While, as national chairman of the convention, he was busy preparing the agenda, his fellow Pennsylvanians boomed the Pattison candidacy. Their efforts in Pattison's behalf were only symbolic because no one seriously thought that any gold candidate had the slightest chance of winning the nomination. Since the Pennsylvania Democrats agreed earlier at the Allentown state convention to support the gold standard and to use the unit rule, the sixty-four delegates voted en bloc

¹Philadelphia Record, 22 May 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

²Philadelphia Press, 1 June 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

³Philadelphia Record, 2 July 1896.

for gold and for Pattison. Though an attitude of resignation characterized Harrity's reaction to the predominance of the silver forces, the Record boiled with vituperation because, ". . . anarchistic Governor Altgeld," tried "to assume the role of dictator at Chicago."⁴

Though the most dramatic scene at the '96 convention came when Bryan delivered his great speech, the fact is that the gold people saw the handwriting on the wall and gave up the ghost before the delegates convened for the first session. The Record complained about Altgeld five days before the convention opened. The Bulletin also saw the end of Democratic conservatism when it declared in an editorial on the day of the opening of the convention: "The convention of the Democratic party, which opened its session in Chicago today, marks a great turning point, if not a revolution, in the history of that ancient organization."⁵

As the first act of the Chicago drama moved to its Cross of Gold climax, the Philadelphia papers completely lost their sanity and objectivity and fired all the heavy artillery at Bryan. The Record called Bryan's speech, "the most extraordinary scene of this extraordinary convention. As if by a magic touch of the wand, delegation

⁴Ibid.

⁵The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia) 7 July 1896.

after delegation rose in one solid phalanx and gave vent to the most enthusiastic demonstration in honor of the Nebraska orator."⁶ But the Record also carried a large front page photograph of Bryan; underneath the photo appeared the following statement: ". . . it was his radical Socialistic and Anarchistic speech that penetrated to the hearts of the Populists and extreme silverites and kept his name fresh in their minds after a night's rest."⁷ The Bulletin exclaimed in an editorial that: "The wild Jacobins assembled in Chicago have launched a new party,"⁸ while the Press, in a front page news story, called Bryan's nomination "a spasm" and went on to say: "It has been a convention of spasms, insane, destructive and uncontrollable."⁹

While the Philadelphia papers were united in opposition to Bryan, the Philadelphia Democrats were divided over his candidacy. When asked if he would support the decision of the convention, Squire McMullen said: "We are Democrats and have to abide by its action."¹⁰ Pattison, the defeated

⁶Philadelphia Record, 12 July 1896.

⁷Ibid., 11 July 1896.

⁸Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), 10 July 1896.

⁹Philadelphia Press, 11 July 1896.

¹⁰Philadelphia Record, 11 July 1896.

gold Democratic nominee, when asked if he would support silver platform and silver candidates, said: "I have been a Democrat for a good many years and the doctrine is strong within me. It seems to me I should be willing to accept the wisdom of a convention representative of the Democracy of the nation."¹¹ But other Democrats in Philadelphia were not so resigned. These old guard Democrats who defended their principles of Jeffersonian Democracy as tenaciously as orthodox religionists defend the articles of their faith, made Philadelphia one of the centers of revolt against Bryan.

A. The Jeffersonian Bolt

On 18 July, a group of upper crust Democrats met in the office of John C. Bullitt to plan a strategy to oppose Bryanism. That meeting marked the beginning of the Jeffersonian movement in Pennsylvania. Henry D. Welsh presided at the meeting, and George W. Norris acted as secretary. The participants included: Emanuel Furth, William M. Singerly, George F. Baer and Henry M. Dechert.¹² John gadwalader and Collector of the Port John Read heartily endorsed the formation of this committee but could not attend the first meeting. These self-appointed guardians

¹¹Philadelphia Press, 9 July 1896.

¹²See Chapter VII, pp.227-32 for biographical sketches of the Jeffersonian Democrats.

of the Democracy passed a resolution declaring the Chicago platform to be "neither honest nor patriotic, and therefore not Democratic." They went on to declare their secession: ". . . we can not, as honest Democrats, accept its wide departure from true Democratic doctrine, and we believe that the highest duty of true Democrats is to make every effort to defeat the ticket nominated at Chicago."¹³

The regulars did not remain idle during the Jeffersonian threat. The Democratic City Committee met in early August and endorsed the Bryan-Sewall ticket by a vote of 41-0. The resolution in which they pledged their "earnest support" was introduced by Magistrate Charlie Donnelly, Councilman Tommy Ryan, and Peter Monroe.¹⁴ The silver forces got a boost a few days before the City Committee met when Pattison answered a Press reporter who asked if he still planned to support the Chicago ticket. Pattison replied: "Unquestionably; and I shall do my part as a citizen to bring success to the candidates."¹⁵

But as the regulars fought to keep the party intact, the Jeffersonians prepared for an all-out effort to save

¹³Philadelphia Record, 18 July 1896.

¹⁴Public Ledger (Philadelphia) 10 August 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

¹⁵Philadelphia Press, 2 August 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

Democratic orthodoxy by organizing, nominating, and supporting a gold ticket. Philadelphians were well-represented at the National Democratic (Gold) convention at Indianapolis. Buttlitt, Baer, and Cadwalader, served on the Credentials committee. The delegates, pure and righteous, stood firmly on principle in their struggle to save the party, the country, and their banks. Elated by the spirit of the convention, George Baer said: "The delegates were animated by patriotic motives and, being thoroughly aware that the ticket could not win, they did not resort to any vote catching phrases."¹⁶ The Record paused for a moment and temporarily stopped the attacks on Bryan to praise the delegates at the bankers' convention at Indianapolis who brought forth: "a day of deliverance for the Democracy."¹⁷

With a national ticket now in the field, the Jeffersonians began their campaign. Before they launched their canvass in Pennsylvania, they tried unsuccessfully to keep the Pennsylvania Democratic organization in the gold camp. Since the Democrats, at the state convention in April, had declared for gold, they were now in the awkward position of supporting a platform which was subsequently repudiated by the delegates at Chicago. Another convention was called for 10 September, at Harrisburg to settle this dilemma. The gold men attended and hoped to keep the party on the gold side of

¹⁶Philadelphia Record, 5 September 1896.

¹⁷Ibid.

the issue. The convention, however, overwhelmingly supported the Chicago platform and rescinded its earlier stand for gold. Harrity also got a slap in the face for his gold activities. He had announced on 1 August, that he planned to retire from politics, and made it clear that, even though he opposed the silver men at the Chicago convention, he would support the silver ticket. Many of the delegates suspected that Harrity was not being wholly loyal to Bryan, so a motion was introduced to declare his seat on the national committee vacant. The attempt to unseat Harrity lost by a close vote of 171-167¹⁸ and demonstrated the intense feeling within the convention on the issue of party loyalty.

The Jeffersonians organized their City Committee under the chairmanship of William Findley Brown, a Germantown businessman (Director of the Kitson Heating and Lighting Company), on 16 September. The first order of business included planning a mass meeting at the Academy on 26 September to greet Palmer and Buckner who would address Philadelphians at that time. This rally was the most important public meeting that the Philadelphia Jeffersonians sponsored. Over 5,000 people filled the music hall to hear the speeches of the gold Democrats. A very genteel and respectable audience, which looked more like the congregation of Holy Trinity, Rittenhouse Square, enjoyed the

¹⁸The Times, 11 September 1896.

evening even though an occasional cat call by a Bryan enthusiast did grate on their ears.

Palmer attacked the Bryan cause for creating a class struggle and went on to make an absurd denial of the very existence of classes:

Here we have no classes but are united as one people, with one purpose and one ambition-- to succeed as individuals and to contribute toward making our common country what it is-- the greatest country on earth. The man who goes about the country teaching the people that we are divided into classes is an enemy of the common weal. 19

Palmer proceeded to the money question and admitted that there was not enough money but blamed this situation on the fact that: "there is a shadow of dishonesty and repudiation hanging over the country."²⁰ In other words, according to Palmer, the depression occurred because people agitated for cheap money and not the other way around: that, the depression caused people to turn to silver as the solution of the problem of scarce money and mortgage foreclosures. To that select group of Bourbon Democrats, Palmer's logic, no doubt, seemed sound or, at least, his comments comforted them as they witnessed the turbulent storm raging in the Old Democracy.

On 7 October the Jeffersonians successfully got the select Young Men's Democratic Association to endorse the

¹⁹Ibid., 27 September 1896.

²⁰Ibid.

Palmer-Buckner ticket. About one-third of the members of this select Democratic club voted to endorse the Chicago platform, but since most of the members were bankers or businessmen, the movement to support Bryan failed.²¹

While the Jeffersonians were an impressive group of affluent, influential and socially prominent Philadelphia Democrats, they could not get their movement to take hold at the grass roots level. It is true that they never expected to win the election. If anything, they had a martyr complex about losing because they believed they stood for principle rather than expediency. Their formalistic political dogma, which looked backward and denied the very existence of the struggling lower classes in American society, had no impact upon the real politicians like Ryan and Donnelly,²² and still less upon their constituents. The upper class Jeffersonians offered absolutely no viable political alternatives or solutions to the working class who constituted the bulk of Democratic party support.

The most important Democrats to embrace the Jeffersonian creed were John Cadwalader and William Singerly. Next in importance were: George F. Baer, John and William Bullitt, George W. Biddle, Samuel G. King, Henry D. Welsh,

²¹Philadelphia Press, 7 October 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

²²See Chapter VII, pp. 240 for biographical sketches of Charley Donnelly and Tommy Ryan.

S. Davis Page, John M. Campbell, John E. Faunce, and Emanuel Furth. Others who deserted Bryan included General I. J. Wistar, Collector of the Port John Read, United States District Attorney James M. Beck, Col. Charles H. Banes, a banker; A. J. Cassatt, Pennsylvania railroad executive; Samuel Dickson, financier; Samuel J. Martin, insurance company president; Walter G. Smith, a banker; et. al.

By mid-October the Jeffersonians made all the converts they were going to make and settled down to their quiet campaign conducted in private conversations in club houses and fashionable churches. They conducted only one more public meeting for the cause. On 30 October, the Jeffersonians heard James M. Beck and Emanuel Furth reiterate the principles of the true Democracy at a rally at Odd Fellows Hall. In a long speech Beck defended Cleveland and condemned Altgeld in the Pullman strike controversy and pointed out that the Bryan Democrats were really Populists. Furth entertained the audience with his several witticisms about the silver movement and concluded his speech on a serious note when he condemned the Chicago platform: ". . . the honest citizens of America will stand beside the grave of such principles with the ardent and fervent prayer that their like will never rise again and agitate the country."²³

²³Philadelphia Record, 31 October 1896.

B. The Campaign for Bryan

As the Jeffersonians conducted their genteel debate on the issues of '96, the two major parties prepared for the real battle. Both Republican factions in the city, of course, advanced the McKinley campaign. But most of the activity for McKinley came from the Republican business community. Rudolph Blankenburg helped form the McKinley-Hobart League and John Wanamaker was a prime mover in the Businessmen's Committee for McKinley. These two organizations campaigned vigorously and distributed pamphlets and tracts by the thousands which reached the hands of workers throughout every section of the city.

The Democrats pushed onward with great enthusiasm for Bryan. Had enthusiasm been the means of determining the winner in Philadelphia, Bryan would have carried the city handily.

On 22 September, Bryan stormed Philadelphia and spoke at one of the biggest public meetings ever held in the city. The Times grudgingly reported that: ". . . it could be announced in all truth this morning that William Jennings Bryan yesterday attracted the attention and curiosity of more people than any other visitor to Philadelphia in recent years."²⁴ The Academy of Music filled to capacity several hours before Bryan spoke. All the available police in the

²⁴The Times (Philadelphia), 23 September 1896.

city patrolled Broad Street to restrain the thousands of people who mobbed the area around the Academy to get a glimpse of the Commoner. Bryan called his Philadelphia speech "memorable" and recalled how he and his party avoided the crowds when leaving the hotel by making their "exit through the cellar . . . down a back alley" so they could enter the hall via a rear door.²⁵

Without a note in his hand, the Boy Orator preached his message of free silver salvation to the tumultuous crowd. With oratorical skill he debunked those who attacked him for conducting a campaign that "lacked dignity" and asked: "What other presidential candidates did they charge with lack of dignity?" When those in the audience shouted "Lincoln," "Jackson," and "Jefferson,"²⁶ Bryan made his point. He attacked the gold standard because it favored the financiers at the expense of the common people. All in all, Bryan's appearance in Philadelphia was the most important single event in the '96 campaign. His meeting created more of a sensation than all the other rallies combined. He was the man to cheer for but not to vote for.

As the national campaign was being waged in Philadelphia by Bryan and his advocates, the professional politicians of both party factions secretly plotted to gain control of their respective parties. The plays and counter

²⁵William Jennings Bryan, The First Battle, p. 476ff.

²⁶Ibid.

plays of the McAleer Democrats with the Martin-Porter Combine and of the Durham-Quay faction with the regular Democrats (reminiscent of the '95 mayoralty race) pushed the national issues to the background. The old Third congressional district again became the scene of conspiratorial politics.

The Republicans of the Third district met on 18 September to renominate the popular Frederick Halterman for another term in Congress. They transacted all their preliminary business and were just ready to begin the nominations when a messenger slipped a note to the presiding officer, who announced that the nominations for congressman would be postponed for a week. This surprise move left Halterman and the delegates completely in the dark.²⁷ For a full week the nomination was held in suspense while Halterman's backers could only speculate about the chances for his renomination.

Five days later the Democrats convened to nominate their candidates. Only one major contest took place when Tommy Ryan defeated Charlie Donnelly for County Commissioner. All of the conventions were harmoniously conducted under the new scheme of divisional representation.

The quiet primaries in September were, at least, a hopeful sign for the minority party. In the Third congressional district McAleer received the unanimous endorsement of the convention even though he stated his rejection

²⁷The Times, 19 September 1896.

of Bryan and the Chicago platform. While shunning the Jeffersonians, McAleer clearly stated his opposition to a bimetallic standard: "I am convinced that its adoption as a financial policy would precipitate a period of calamity and distress." He went on to say that he would not accept the "free coinage doctrine of the Chicago platform as a test of Democracy," and cited a convincing precedent regarding party loyalty in the Third district:

I am happy to recall that my distinguished predecessor, Samuel J. Randall, though publicly and aggressively in antagonism to the dominant sentiment of his party upon an important economical principle, was nevertheless, for term after term returned to the National Legislature by the sterling Democracy of this District....²⁸

After McAleer's letter was read, a delegate rose and nominated him. Since no one else was nominated, McAleer won the party endorsement by acclamation, an action which the Record warmly endorsed and said: "The old Third Congress district of Philadelphia renewed its title to sturdy and staunch Democracy and covered itself with fresh honor."²⁹ Since Singerly's paper equated gold with honor and silver with dishonor, the expansive statement by the Record of McAleer's candidacy came as no surprise.

The Times, however, looked at the development in the Third district with a cynical eye and accused McAleer of

²⁸Evening Telegraph (Philadelphia), 23 September 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-97).

²⁹Philadelphia Record, 24 September 1896.

conspiring with the Martin-Porter Combine to regain his congressional seat.³⁰ Though McClure could only speculate about the details of the deal there is abundant circumstantial evidence to support the charge that a deal between Dave Martin and Bill McAleer existed. Several circumstances point to the veracity of such an assertion by McClure. First, there did exist a deal between these two factions in the '95 mayoralty race, as pointed out earlier. Second, the postponement of the Republican convention and the subsequent nomination of McAleer gave additional credence to the charge that a deal had been consummated. Finally, McAleer's position on bimetallism but his refusal to identify with the Jeffersonians, was a clever political tactic designed to get maximum support. By advocating gold he could get Dave Martin's support, and by shunning the Jeffersonians he could get the continued grass roots support in the river district. McAleer's statement equating his position on gold with that of Randall's on the tariff probably sounded plausible to the undiscerning Democrats in the Third district.

As the Martin-McAleer plan unfolded, two revolts shook the Third district. The Halterman Republicans (especially the Germans) clamored for Halterman's renomination which they successfully achieved at the adjourned Republican convention on 26 September. In the meantime the Silver Democrats, incensed by McAleer's repudiation of the Chicago

³⁰The Times, 24 September 1896.

platform, announced plans to nominate a Silver Democrat for Congress.³¹ In a few days the National Silver party announced the candidacy of Sam Hudson, the well known journalist and editor of the Sunday Item, the only Bryan Democratic paper in the city. Hudson, in a vitriolic attack upon McAleer, the Jeffersonians and the Republicans, issued his acceptance letter on 7 October. He condemned McAleer for casting "his political lot with Mark Hanna, John Bullitt's income tax dodgers and with the rich as against the poor."³² He also paid homage to the leadership of Randall and stated that he (Hudson) favored both protection and free silver. Hence, the Third district, with three contending candidates, once again became a battleground for Philadelphia Democrats.

The Third district, however, did not have a monopoly on factional alliances, deals and plots. The struggle within the Republican party for control of Philadelphia created a city-wide political conflagration which centered on the race for sheriff. The Martin-Porter Combine named James L. Miles, president of the Select Council, for sheriff, while the anti-Combiners nominated Alexander Crow. The Crow candidacy attracted support from various and unrelated sources, political odds and ends dedicated to the overthrow of the Combine. Reform Republicans like Henry

³¹Evening Telegraph (Philadelphia), 26 September 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

³²Ibid., 8 October 1896 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

C. Lea, John Wanamaker and Herbert Welsh rallied to support Crow. On the other hand, professional politicians like Matt Quay,³³ Boies Penrose and Iz Durham carried Crow's standard because they wanted to wrest party control from Martin and Porter. Finally, the regular Democrats dropped their nominee for sheriff and supported Crow,³⁴ thus completing the anti-Combine coalition.

Since the Combiners realized they could not win against such an array of formidable forces, they withdrew Miles' candidacy and called another convention hoping that this move would placate the dissident Republicans. But the anti-Combiners refused to attend this special convention on 19 October, in which Samuel Ashbridge was unanimously nominated in place of Miles. As the war raged between the Combiners and anti-Combiners, the national issues and candidates were displaced by the Ashbridge-Crow race.

In the meantime the Bryan campaign limped along without support from any of the daily papers. The Sunday Item

³³As the independent and reform Republicans campaigned for Crow, they tried to dissociate Quay from the anti-Combine movement. For example, The Times said on 25 October 1896: "The battle for Mr. Crow is not Mr. Quay's battle; it is a battle made solely and distinctly by the Republican people of Philadelphia regardless of all factional interests and solely for the purpose of getting an honest Republican organization that reflects the sentiments of the honest Republican voters."

³⁴In exchange for backing Crow, the Democrats were promised half the jobs in the sheriff's office if Crow won the election. See The Philadelphia Press, 4 October 1896.

courageously stood alone in the fight for Bryan. Week by week the Item reported on the national issues, exposed the intimidation of workers, revealed that the plutocrats were running scared and confidently predicted Bryan's victory. In answer to the sneering charge by the New York Herald that Bryan was the "Pauper of the West," the Item said, "the cry 'the pauper candidate' will arouse a thrill of inspiration in millions of American homes," because, "with few exceptions this is a nation of paupers."³⁵ The Item stressed the national significance of the campaign and paid little attention to the local situation. However, in the last issue before the election, the Item did castigate the management of the Baldwin Locomotive Works for prohibiting the distribution of silver literature among their employees. In the same issue this weekly journal still predicted Bryan's victory though Pennsylvania was considered hopeless for the Commoner.³⁶

All the other papers worked vigorously for Bryan's defeat both in editorial policy and biased news reporting. Even the independent Times could not avoid such pejorative terms as "silver craze" and "popocratic." The Public Ledger gave wide coverage to the gold forces and republished in toto J. Sterling Morton's emotive speech on 21 August, condemning bimetallicism. Morton's concluding remarks of his speech

³⁵The Sunday Item (Philadelphia), 25 July 1896.

³⁶Ibid., 31 October 1896.

illustrates clearly the state of frenzy into which the gold men were thrust:

The Republic is not a Judas Iscariot among civilized nations. It refuses to betray honest dealings. It scorns over 30 million times 30 pieces of silver and is compelled by its judgement and its conscience to reject the importunities of those who would deliver the safety and perpetuity of this nation into the hands of socialism, zealotry, fanaticism, and dishonesty. 37

By mid-October the Philadelphia Bryan men threw in the towel. No one took seriously the optimism of the Sunday Item. As early as 21 September, The Times predicted a McKinley victory by 100,000 votes; a month later, in a revised prediction, the same paper put the McKinley vote between 150,000 and 160,000 to 50,000 and 80,000 for Bryan.³⁸ In the final bitter editorial before the election the Record called for a big vote for the Jeffersonians so that "Riot and Repudiation should be more than beaten," and that Bryan's "pernicious teachings should be so utterly condemned as to make an end of them."³⁹

Realizing that the race for sheriff occupied the pre-eminent place in the balloting in Philadelphia, The Times tried to refocus the emphasis to the national issues. In an editorial on 2 November the Times urged a big vote for Crow over Ashbridge but hastened to point out that the

³⁷Pamphlet Collection: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, "Philadelphia Politics: State Pamphlets."

³⁸The Times, 25 October 1896.

³⁹The Philadelphia Record, 2 November 1896.

"supreme issue" centered in the Bryan-McKinley battle and admonished Philadelphians to get out the vote for McKinley.⁴⁰

When all the votes were counted, Bryan polled scarcely over 63,000 to McKinley's 177,000. More votes were cast in this election (215,000) than in any other presidential campaign in Philadelphia up to this time. Bryan suffered a most humiliating defeat and carried only Tommy Ryan's sixth ward in the entire city. The Jeffersonians could muster only 2,600 votes for Palmer. In the hot race for sheriff the Combine was defeated since Crow won over Ashbridge by 20,000 votes. In commenting upon the election The Times, in its characteristic independence, commended Bryan for his "wonderful campaign" and called the 1896 battle "the most remarkable campaign ever known in the history of politics in this or any other country in the history of the world."⁴¹

With mixed reactions the Democrats could, at least, point to their victory in Randall's old district which returned to the Democratic column in 1896. McAleer won a decisive victory as a regular who supported the gold standard. He polled over 11,000 votes to Halterman's 9,500. Sam Hudson, the National Silver party candidate, placed a poor third with about 2,000 votes. Most of McAleer's strength came from the lower Irish wards while Halterman performed best in the upper wards where there was a higher concentration

⁴⁰The Times, 2 November 1896.

⁴¹Ibid., 4 November 1896.

of German voters. Shortly after the election Hudson charged that McAleer won only because of fraudulent voting and announced his intention of initiating legal action to call for another election. Halterman, however, declined to protest so Hudson finally dropped his legal fight.

With the Bryan storm over, businessmen and bankers, Jeffersonians and Republicans could all breathe a sigh of relief. But Bryan's devotees, who came under the spell of his charismatic power, continued steadfast in the belief that the Commoner lost only because of Republican trickery⁴²: fear, intimidation and fraudulent voting. Philadelphians were also counted among the thousands of letter writers who wrote to express their feelings to Bryan after the defeat of 1896. A real estate agent on Filbert Street said simply: "I believe you to be the dearest and greatest friend of the American people since the days of Washington."⁴² A physician looked to the next campaign in 1900 and stated: "Four years hence I trust the success withheld this year, will be yours and the people's."⁴³ Among the hundreds of resolutions that Bryan received was one from the officers of the Schulykill Democratic Association who pledged their support for 1900.⁴⁴

⁴²Marshall G. Stevens to W. J. Bryan, 31 October 1896, Bryan Papers.

⁴³Solomon Solis-Cohen to W. J. Bryan, 4 November 1896, Bryan Papers.

⁴⁴Resolution to W. J. Bryan, 6 November 1896, Bryan Papers.

With the absence of any effective Democratic daily paper in the city it is impossible to pin point in Philadelphia specific instances of coercion, fear, and intimidation so frequently complained about by so many Bryan voters from so many sections of the nation. Nonetheless, that impression (of widespread coercion) was shared by some Philadelphians. For example, the City Editor of The Times, writing just before the election characterized it "the greatest in the political history of this country" and went on to state: "In this corporation-ridden state, it is not expected that you will receive a big vote, for laboring men, mechanics, and even the clerical forces in the big commercial houses are being bulldozed [sic] and threatened with the loss of their positions in the event of them [sic] failing to put themselves on record against you."⁴⁵ Perhaps even more convincing was the testimony of a man who identified himself as a roofer: "I know lots of firms that compelled their employers to vote for McKinley or be discharged."⁴⁶ It is impossible to determine how widespread were cases of coercion and intimidation. If there was wholesale fraudulent voting and if coercion was widely used, the moral conscience of the reformers and independents, most of whom were businessmen, was not aroused.

⁴⁵Jerome J. McGarvey to W. J. Bryan, 1 November 1896, Bryan Papers.

⁴⁶R. A. Mays to W. J. Bryan, 6 November 1896, Bryan Papers.

D. Harrity's Fall and More Party Conflict

After the commotion created by the Bryan storm had subsided, the Democrats of Philadelphia resumed with alacrity their favorite activity of intramural fighting. Only infrequently did they pause to give faint opposition to the Republicans. From Bryan's defeat until the '98 gubernatorial race, they fought incessantly over control of the party. Only occasionally did the question of ideological loyalty enter into these controversial factional disputes. The real problem was that the Philadelphia Democrats could not agree who would control the party, for Democratic disunity did not grow out of any substantive disagreement regarding political issues.

Harrity had announced his retirement from politics in an ambiguous letter on 1 August 1896. He said that he wanted to give more time to his business interests and, therefore, wished to bow out of political life. But he did not resign from his post on the Democratic National committee representing Pennsylvania; neither did he disengage himself from the political affairs of Philadelphia. During the next year and a half (1896-1898) he still maintained an important though declining influence over party workers and leaders in Philadelphia. His name still denominated a wing or faction in the party, but before the gubernatorial campaign of 1898 started his real retirement was forced.

In January 1897 the party again resumed its internal squabbles. Major Tommy Ryan announced his opposition to the

renomination of Charlie Donnelly for magistrate and argued for younger blood in the party while denying any intention to create factions. But a full scale battle soon developed in which Ryan gained support of the Gordon-McAleer faction against the Harrity followers. The "retired" Harrity got into the fight⁴⁷ and managed to swing enough votes to Donnelly, who won renomination by a vote of 496-453 over his opponent.⁴⁸ The whole fight only created more fragmentation within the minority party as the Philadelphia Press observed:

The Democrats of this town have very interesting ways. Having in a few years reduced their vote by about one third, bringing it down to such proportions as no longer to be detected without the aid of a microscope, they are engaged in a hand to hand fight to determine who shall boss the remnants. 49

The Press went on to assert that the fight was not "a contest for principle" and that the Bryan issue had no connection to the factional wrangling.

Ryan's defeat in January only made him fight harder in his next battle, a battle to gain the city chairmanship. Ryan again got the support of the Gordon-McAleer faction and opposed James E. Gorman, the Harrity candidate. When the

⁴⁷The Times, 9 January 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

⁴⁸Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 January 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

⁴⁹Philadelphia Press, 13 January 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

election was held in early April, Ryan squeezed out a narrow victory and won the chairmanship by a vote of 19-17.⁵⁰ That vote effectively ended Harrity's political career. Since he had lost his power base in Philadelphia, the State Democrats felt no obligation to keep him on the national committee. In August the Democratic State Committee, by a vote of 53-26, declared his office on the national committee vacant.⁵¹ A few days later the State Convention meeting in Reading ratified the action of the committee by a vote of 290-134. The Record castigated the decision and said: "There never has been a convention so disgraceful to the day and age as the Democratic State Convention held at Reading yesterday."⁵² The Times feared that the action of the convention would only serve to annex the Democratic party in Philadelphia to the Republican Combine because of the working relationship between the Gordon-McAleer faction and Dave Martin's Republican Combine.⁵³ Finally, when National Democratic Chairman James K. Jones recognized James M. Guffey as Pennsylvania's representative on the national committee on 30 January 1898, Harrity's political career came to a close.

⁵⁰Public Ledger (Philadelphia), April 13, 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1895-1897).

⁵¹Philadelphia Record, 30 August 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

⁵²Ibid., 1 September 1897 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

⁵³The Times, 1 September 1897.

The disintegration of the Harrity faction did not, however, bring unity to the party. Tommy Ryan wore no man's mantle, and even though he got the support of the Gordon-McAleer faction in his campaign for City Chairman in 1897, he was no tool of that faction. Hence, the Gordon-McAleer faction, desiring to control the party, opposed Ryan's candidacy for reelection as City Chairman in March 1898. Dallas Sanders, Sam Randall's old lieutenant, entered the race against Ryan. National issues were injected into this race as the Ryan men hastened to point out that Sanders supported McKinley in 1896 as did Judge Gordon, the leader of the anti-Ryan faction.⁵⁴ The Times warned that the success of Sanders' campaign would only result in a complete annex of the Philadelphia Democratic party to the Martin Combine.⁵⁵ Ryan's reelection as chairman was assured after the party primaries of 7 March when it was determined that Sanders had the support of only twelve ward leaders. But, unfortunately, the Gordon-McAleer faction did not accept the verdict of the Democratic ward representatives.

In April the Democratic ward leaders formally met to elect a city chairman. While the outcome was already determined by the earlier ward elections in March, the Gordon-McAleer faction still fought to control the party. This faction first tried to contest several of the ward

⁵⁴Ibid., 24 February 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

⁵⁵Ibid., (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

elections and sought legal redress by having the courts nullify the election of several Ryan delegates, but the attempt failed when the courts refused to intervene.⁵⁶

After the convention got under way, the Gordonites walked out to conduct a rump session. The regulars elected Ryan, and the Gordonites adjourned to Dooners' Hotel, where they were greeted by Congressman McAleer and Ex-Judge McCarthy. There they met and elected Thomas Delahunty of the thirty-eighth ward as chairman of the rival Democratic City Committee.⁵⁷ Hence, the Philadelphia Democracy had two rival city committees each claiming to represent the party.

Very few Philadelphians gave any serious attention to the validity of the claims of the Gordonites, which the newspapers called a rump organization. On 14 April when William Jennings Bryan visited the city to meet with local Democratic leaders, he conferred with Tommy Ryan, Charlie Donnelly, George McGowan, Peter Monroe, Michael J. Ryan, William Murphy, and John Keenan. Not a single Gordon Democrat was represented at the meeting with Bryan.

Then, by a strange twist of political circumstances, the Gordon faction, under the chairmanship of Thomas Delahunty, gained recognition by the state organization as the official Philadelphia Democratic organization! State Chairman Garman's long dispute with William F. Harrity

⁵⁶Ibid., 25 March 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

⁵⁷Ibid., 5 April 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

complicated the recognition of the Philadelphia Democratic organization. Harrity had protested to National Chairman Jones about his (Harrity's) being pushed off the national committee by the state committee under Garman's domination. In the midst of that controversy, Tommy Ryan (for reasons unknown) wrote to Jones urging him not to drop Harrity. Harrity was dropped and Garman was so angry at Ryan that he persuaded the state committee to recognize the Gordon faction as the official Philadelphia Democratic party.⁵⁸

E. Losses of 1898

When the Democrats met in Altoona in late June to nominate a Governor, James M. Guffey of Pittsburgh had full control of the state organization. There was a faint boom for Judge Gordon of Philadelphia, but the vast majority of delegates voted for George A. Jenks, one-time Solicitor General of the United States in Cleveland's first administration and a former congressman. Jenks, at the age of sixty-three, unfortunately did not appear to possess the vitality necessary to conduct an aggressive campaign. The independents and reform Republicans hoped the Democrats would put up a man of Pattison's stature so that the victories of 1882 and 1890 could be duplicated, but the nomination of Jenks at Altoona only gave credence to the charge that Quay, through Guffey, bought off the Democrats in order to assure

⁵⁸The Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 21 April 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898).

the success of his candidate for Governor, W. A. Stone.⁵⁹ By a slim margin the delegates voted to keep national issues (i.e. silver) out of the election, and to concentrate on the issue of the corruption of the state Republican party. However, despite the formal omission of national issues, the convention and the state party were overwhelmingly pro-Bryan in outlook. Prudence dictated that the silver issue be dropped for tactical not ideological reasons.

Henry Charles Lea, the independent reform Republican and renowned Medievalist at the University of Pennsylvania, despaired of the situation in the two political parties of Pennsylvania. In a letter attacking "Boss" Quay and "Boss" Guffey, he announced his support of the Reverend Dr. S. C. Swallow, Prohibitionist candidate for Governor, whose platform simply called for following the Eighth Commandment: "Thou Shalt Not Steal." Lea concluded his analysis of the political situation in Pennsylvania with the following paragraph:

Those who desire a continuance of existing evils will vote for Mr. Stone; those who simply yearn for a change in bosses, with Bryanism thrown in, will vote for Mr. Jenks; those who want honest government and the redemption of the state from its plunderers will vote for Dr. Swallow. 60

⁵⁹See "The Altoona Convention" by M. K. S. in City and State, pp. 10-11, 7 July 1898: "That the convention is controlled by Quay is admitted by many shrewd observers with whom I talked. Guffey had the delegates under his thumb and they obeyed orders without a murmur."

⁶⁰City and State, p. 11, 7 July 1898.

The Philadelphia Democrats, in the meantime, started their plans for the gubernatorial campaign with two organizations in the field. Both the regulars (Ryan Democrats) and the Gordonites (Delahunty Democrats) endorsed Jenks at separate meetings. The state Jeffersonians also met and endorsed Jenks and decided not to enter a Jeffersonian ticket, per se, in the election. This cooperative spirit and attitude of the Jeffersonians gave the Record cause to be optimistic concerning Jenks' prospects for victory. With the Jeffersonians back in the party and with the hope of attracting some independents, the Record anticipated a Democratic victory in 1898.⁶¹

As the campaign progressed in Philadelphia, the political situation got more confused. The independents and reform Republicans became less attracted to Jenks and more and more enthusiastic about the Prohibitionist candidate, Dr. S. C. Swallow, since he possessed the necessary vitality and strength to deal the death blow to Quay and Republican boss control of the state. Herbert Welsh's reform journal, City and State, actively pushed Swallow's candidacy, and many thought in early October that he could win the election. The Times, for example, predicted that Swallow would poll 60,000 votes in Philadelphia and run second to Stone who would poll about 100,000 while Jenks

⁶¹Philadelphia Record, 20 July 1898.

would come in third with 35,000 to 50,000 votes.⁶² But in the last two weeks of the campaign Swallow ran out of steam in much the same way that Bryan did in the last month of his canvass. On the eve of the election The Times called it a toss-up between Stone and Jenks and predicted that Swallow would make a poor showing.⁶³

Additional complications made the political situation in Philadelphia even more chaotic. Both Democratic factions entered full slates in the general election, though the regulars (Ryanites) finally did get sole recognition on the ballot by a court ruling. Second, a new reform party called the Citizens' Party was organized in July and got the support of Republicans under the leadership of Sheriff Alexander Crow and Clinton Rogers Woodruff, of the Fifteenth Ward and attorney for the Municipal League, another reform organization in Philadelphia. Third, another organization called the Honest Government Party was formed to advance the candidacy of Dr. Swallow in Philadelphia. This perplexing situation caused The Times to observe that: "Never before was Philadelphia politics so confused and jangled and results as to state and local tickets so difficult to estimate."⁶⁴ In the meanwhile, the Philadelphia Republicans, cognizant of the preeminence of the issue of bossism and corruption, sagaciously chose a ticket of "unusual

⁶²The Times, 9 October 1898.

⁶³Ibid., 6 November 1898.

⁶⁴Ibid., 9 October 1898.

character and merit,"⁶⁵ thus confusing and dividing the various opposition splinter groups. In addition, they had a united party going into the election because the Martin-Porter Combine and the Quay-Durham faction agreed to bury the hatchet. Hence, the parties lined up as follows in the gubernatorial campaign: the Republicans supported Stone; the Democrats (both factions) supported Jenks; the Prohibitionists and Honest Government men, Swallow; while the Citizens' and Municipal League parties confined their activities to local issues and took no official position in the gubernatorial race.

The municipal situation was even more chaotic. In the race for sheriff a fusion was effected. The regular (Ryan) Democrats nominated James M. Beck, Harrity's former law partner, who was also endorsed by the Prohibitionists and the Honest Government party but not by the Gordon Democrats. Therefore, when the court ruled that the Gordon or Delahunty Democrats were not entitled to a place on the Philadelphia ballot, this group of dissidents openly cut Beck and supported Rothermel, the Republican, for sheriff.⁶⁶

With the Democrats hopelessly fragmented and the Republicans happily united, only gloomy prospects faced the minority party. But, at least, the old Third district could again be counted as Democratic. McAleer won renomination

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., 6 November 1898.

with no opposition even though some of the Ryan people did not like his association with Judge Gordon. But McAleer also had many friends among the Ryan Democrats in the district. His interest in Philadelphia commerce and his advancing of the League Island Navy Yard project also added to his strength and prestige. Finally, his persistent opposition to bimetallism won for him the continued support of the business community. He was a businessman as well as a politician and had served in various executive capacities in the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. In the 1896 campaign, for example, 119 Republican businessmen who operated firms in his district circulated a petition calling on the Republicans not to oppose him for election to Congress. Since McAleer won easily in 1896, and continued to support Philadelphia commercial interests, the Republicans in 1898 decided not to run a candidate against him, thus assuring his reelection. Even The Times, which had long been hostile to McAleer and Gordon for their deals with Dave Martin, commended McAleer in 1898 for being: "thoroughly sound on the honest money issue, and we would be glad to have a dozen such Democrats elected to the next Congress from this State."⁶⁷

Despite the fusion effort at the local level and the issue of Quayism at the state level, the Democrats suffered their worst defeat of the decade in the 1898 campaign. Beck

⁶⁷Ibid., 29 October 1898.

lost as the Democratic fusion candidate by 132,000 to 57,000 votes and managed to carry only one ward, the sixth, by a 200 vote majority. Jenks polled only twenty-two per cent of the vote in Philadelphia, falling four percentage points behind Bryan in his '96 campaign. Swallow placed a poor third. The city vote was:

(Governor)	Stone (Rep.)	125,467
	Jenks (DEM.)	42,906
	Swallow (Pro.)	22,242

Jenks, like Beck, carried only the sixth ward. In the state-wide canvass Stone polled 476,000 to Jenks' 358,000 while Swallow polled about 130,000 votes. If the Democratic and Prohibitionist vote had been combined, Matt Quay's candidate could have been defeated. The Times lamented this fact and asserted that if the Democrats had run Pattison they could have repeated the victory of 1890. For in that year the "Democracy then stood for honest money, and for honest government and for an honest ballot and their candidates clearly typified their faith."⁶⁸ City and State, however, did not see the relevance of the money issue at all and made the depressing observation that ". . . it seems as though nothing could account for it except the strange apathy and disregard of the people for their own interests."⁶⁹

⁶⁸Ibid., 10 November 1898.

⁶⁹City and State, 17 November 1898, p. 305.

CHAPTER V

1900: THE END OF DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS IN PHILADELPHIA

The death of Randall in 1890 was a turning point in the history of the Philadelphia Democratic party. His death signalled the end of a decade of hope for a strong and vital minority party, a party that could boast of the support of some of Philadelphia's outstanding families. The 1900 election, too, was a turning point, but it marked the end of a decade of turbulence, party schism, and discord. But, the 90's, depressing as the political events were during that decade, still had occasional glimmers of hope for the Democrats.

In the 1900 elections that hope of victory vanished. The defeat of McAleer in 1900, like the death of Randall in 1890, brought to a close the end of an era. When the safe, old river ward district left the Democracy in 1900, it was the beginning of a long period of decadence for the Democratic party in Philadelphia.

The pre-election political signs of 1900, however, all pointed to a Democratic resurgence. While no serious Democrat expected the minority party to carry Philadelphia for Bryan, nonetheless, the Democrats expected to bounce back to become a political force in the city. Even the factional

differences subsided during the campaign. The Gordon-McAleer faction, at least, remained dormant and offered no opposition to the Donnelly-Ryan organization, which controlled the party. The mid-September party primaries, "passed off . . . almost without a conflict between candidates," a Times reporter observed.¹

Ideological harmony and newspaper support in Philadelphia also accounted for what appeared to be renewed strength for the Democrats. The short-lived Jeffersonian movement only functioned during Bryan's first battle, and by 1900 the Times estimated that ninety per cent of the gold Democrats planned to return to the old party to vote for Bryan in 1900.² The Philadelphia Record (Jeffersonian in '96) and The Times (McKinley in '96) gave vigorous support to Bryan and the city Democratic ticket throughout the election of 1900.

Finally, the Democrats showed some sign of getting on the right side of the reform issue. As the hot issues of ballot reform, fraudulent voting and the alleged peculations of Matt Quay became the paramount state issues, the Philadelphia vote became all the more important in 1900. Matt Quay, now an Ex-Senator, fought hard to get his candidates elected to the Legislature so that he could go back to Washington. Hence, the Philadelphia Republican

¹The Times, 18 September 1900.

²Ibid., 7 October 1900.

machine made an all-out effort in Quay's behalf. In both the city and the state, the issue of Quayism created near apoplexy among the "decent" people who pushed for reform. The Democrats in Philadelphia capitalized on this anti-Quay sentiment and effected a fusion with the reformers on the city ticket. Thus, under these favorable conditions the Democrats started the 1900 campaign.

A. The Second Bryan Campaign

In early July the nation's Democrats convened at Kansas City, adopted a platform, nominated Bryan by acclamation and began their second enthusiastic campaign for the famous Commoner of Nebraska. The Philadelphians who attended that convention gave their solid support to Bryan though they opposed the insertion of the 16 to 1 plank in the 1900 platform. Their opposition was not, however, hostile. When the committee on resolutions recommended the 16 to 1 plank, but placed it in a subordinate position under the planks condemning imperialism, trusts and militarism, the Philadelphia delegates followed the national party without dissent. Nine of the eleven Philadelphia Democrats who voted against 16 to 1 at the state caucus included Pattison, Ryan and Donnelly.³ The subsequent acceptance of both the platform and the nominee by acclamation meant that the party would enter the contest united, and not divided as it was in 1896. Shortly after the Philadelphia delegates

³Ibid., 6 July 1900.

returned from Kansas City, the Democratic City Committee met and gave enthusiastic endorsement to Bryan and the platform. Resolutions were passed commending the work of the delegates and supporting the platform. The Philadelphia Democrats did not even mention the silver plank but they did declare that the paramount issues were "imperialism" and "the preservation of a constitutional form of government and a republic as against an empire."⁴ Thus the party wisely avoided the monetary issue.

Even though the Bryan movement of 1900 tried to be more palatable to the conservatives by stressing "imperialism" as the chief issue, many still got the jitters over the second Bryan candidacy. The respectable Public Ledger was frightened more by the 1900 campaign than the '96 campaign and revealed its fear in an editorial condemning the action at Kansas City:

At Chicago in 1896, even though the convention was swept off its feet by a Socialist outburst of frenzy, there were present, tried and able statesmen and safe conservative Democrats. The Kansas City convention was a mob of erratic untrustworthy and dangerous men. It was more than that. In addition to the singularly obstinate and perverse cranks who insisted upon revising the 16 to 1 shibboleth the next most important element was the malign Tammany Hall contingent. . . . 5

James M. Beck, United States District Attorney and former law partner of William F. Harrity, was also upset by

⁴Ibid., 13 July 1900.

⁵Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 7 July 1900.

the Kansas City convention and announced his plan to join the Republicans:

I have not left the Democratic party, for there is none to leave. It died an unnatural death in Chicago in 1896, slain by a Populist orator from Nebraska, aided by an Altgeld and a Croker, and while the Populist party today used the term "Democratic," it has nothing in common with the Democratic party of Jefferson, Jackson and Cleveland. ⁶

Most gold Democrats, however, quietly returned to the party and supported Bryan in 1900. The National (Gold) Democrats assembled in convention at Indianapolis after the regulars met at Kansas City. The gold men, in effect, voted to go out of business. They first reaffirmed the gold standard and then proceeded to endorse Bryan because they viewed imperialism as the paramount issue.⁷ Of the Philadelphia gold Democrats only Beck made a dramatic conversion to the Republicans, and he could not be classified a leading Philadelphia Democrat.

B. The Anti-Quay Movement

The state-wide anti-Quay fusion movement of 1900 made Democratic prospects for victory bright. The chief aim of the movement was to fuse Democrats and independent Republicans in key legislative districts in order to prevent Quay from gaining control of the Legislature. While the general fusion movement focused on state politics and the corruption

⁶Ibid., 12 July 1900.

⁷Ibid., 27 July 1900.

issue, it also aided the Democrats in Philadelphia and elsewhere in the state because of the necessary role they played in effecting fusion. The Times, a supporter of fusion, stated: "The Democrats have everything to gain by giving hearty and earnest support to the Fusion movement in every county in the State where machine leadership dominates in the choice of candidates."⁸

In Philadelphia the fusion movement made encouraging progress. City Chairman Donnelly in late September began negotiations with anti-machine Republicans to effect fusion for legislative nominees and for the city offices of Treasurer and Register of Wills. National Committeeman Guffey added his blessing to the plan when he visited Donnelly in September.⁹

On 25 September the fusion candidates were announced. The Democrats, independent Republicans, and Municipal League fused in most of the contests for the State Senate and State House of Representatives in the city. In addition, Democrat Frank A. Hartranft got the endorsement as candidate for City Treasurer, and G. Harry Davis, a Republican, was endorsed by all three groups for Register of Wills.

On 1 October the Bryan movement got a boost in Philadelphia when The Times announced its full support of the

⁸The Times, 12 August 1900.

⁹Ibid., 21 September 1900.

Commoner. The Times' new publisher, Charles Kindred, bought the paper from Alexander McClure in 1899 but retained McClure as editor.¹⁰ When The Times came out for Bryan it also declared its intention to be a Democratic rather than an independent journal. In a long editorial The Times recounted its political support of McKinley in 1896, rued that decision and confessed: "It is repented and recanted." The author carefully avoided the 16 to 1 issue but hammered at imperialism, the trusts and centralism in government as the key issues of the campaign:

Imperialism and militarism are the natural outgrowth of commercialism in politics, of the power of the few over the many, the elevation of money above mankind, with all the system of special privileges and corrupt control that the Republican party since the civil war has increasingly fostered. 11

The Times probably did more to promote Bryan in Philadelphia than any other organization in the city. It advanced a convincing argument that Bryanism stood for a pure egalitarianism characteristic of the eighteenth century theorists who framed the Bill of Rights. Hence, the Republicans were the heretics while the Bryan Democrats were the true sons of the Enlightenment who fought relentlessly against privilege and the commercial elite. Thus The Times quoted from Bryan when he spoke at Winona,

¹⁰For an account of the sale of The Times by Alexander McClure to Charles Kindred see A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 406.

¹¹The Times, 1 October 1900.

Minnesota, on 2 October: "I care not whether a trust is good or bad. I hate a private monopoly." It added the following editorial comment:

Hate is a strong word, but it is one easily understood, doesn't admit of compromise, and exactly fits the case. . . . Hating a monopoly and striving to give every man an equal chance in life cannot truthfully be called arraying class against class. Trusts and monopolies are the prolific breeders of class distinctions. Their destruction will furnish the most complete defense against the separation of the people of this country into fixed and well-defined classes. . . . Mr. Bryan has used exactly the right word in defining his attitude toward the trusts that seek to make the few enormously rich and the many hewers of wood and drawers of water. ¹²

The Times throughout the campaign continued to advance the Bryan cause. During final phase of the canvass, it featured essays by W. Bourke Cockran, the New York gold Democrat who enthusiastically endorsed Bryan in 1900, and John Peter Altgeld, the Bryan advocate of 1896 and 1900. Cockran, a conservative, saw in Bryan in 1900 a true expression of Jeffersonian principles as manifested in his (Bryan's) response to the issue of imperialism. Cockran said:

Outside of the naked fact that Jefferson took territory, there is no resemblance between the two policies. On the contrary, in every element that distinguishes them there is a radical and irreconcilable difference. Jefferson took territory to avoid war. McKinley is making war to take territory. Jefferson took contiguous territory to do justice and avoid the

¹²Ibid., 4 October 1900.

provocation of war in the future. McKinley is taking remote territory, which if he succeeds in subduing will cause future contests without number. 13

Cockran concluded by justifying Jeffersonian expansion because it carried with it an extension of constitutional government to the annexed land whereas the McKinley expansion did not include statehood for the annexed territories.

Altgeld, in a compassionate plea, urged a big vote for Bryan because he stood for the people against the trusts and monopolies. Altgeld again demonstrated his fidelity to Bryan's cause in 1900 as he had in 1896 when he reminded his readers: ". . . that amid all the vilification, amid all the misrepresentation, no man has yet arisen who had the hardihood to assert that the trusts and the syndicates could control William J. Bryan." Altgeld concluded his inspirational homily when he graphically depicted the alternatives open to the people in Bryan's second great battle:

Two ways lie open before you, one leading to an ever lower and lower plain, where are heard the cries of despair and the curses of the poor, where mankind shrivels and possession rots down the possessor; the other leading off to the highlands of the morning, where are heard the glad shouts of humanity, and where honest effort is rewarded with immortality. As you sow, you shall reap. 14

¹³The Times, 24 October 1900.

¹⁴Ibid.

Bryan visited Philadelphia on 25 October, and addressed a throng larger and more enthusiastic than his 1896 Philadelphia audience. Again The Times played a major role in the Bryan campaign, not only by promotion and coverage of the speech, but by helping with the arrangements for Bryan's visit. After Bryan arrived at the Broad Street Station, his procession went to The Times building at 8th and Chestnut Streets. After meeting privately with Charles Kindred, publisher of The Times, Alexander McClure, Herbert Welsh, Charlie Donnelly and Tommy Ryan, the Nebraskan spoke to a mob of people who jammed the streets of Chestnut and 8th. From the balcony of The Times building in a speech dealing with the industrial problems of the nation, Bryan declared: "The Republican party stands today for industrial despotism here and for political despotism in the Philippine Islands. (Applause) Our party stands for industrial independence and for the Declaration of Independence."¹⁵ Bryan went on to attack syndicates and trusts but completely avoided the 16 to 1 issue. From The Times building Bryan and his party paraded to Society Hill, where he again spoke before boarding a ferry to go over to Camden.

The Times' flawless journalistic reputation for fairness, objectivity and accuracy unfortunately got a jolt as the campaign came to a close. On 30 October a front page headline story entitled: "LANDSLIDE FOR BRYAN, SAYS FORMER PRESIDENT CLEVELAND" caused a political sensation not only in

¹⁵Ibid., 26 October 1900.

Philadelphia but throughout the nation. A "special correspondent" who signed his initials R.J.B., later identified as R. J. Black, reported that Cleveland told him in a private interview: "My young man, you will see a landslide for Bryan the morning after the election. Of that I am confident."¹⁶ Cleveland immediately issued a denial, but Black made a deposition before a Philadelphia magistrate affirming that he had the interview with Cleveland and that the account in The Times was accurate.¹⁷ No doubt Cleveland was right because he had long opposed Bryan and did not change his mind in 1900. Further, R. J. Black, an adventurer, had no connection with The Times or any other paper for that matter. He walked into The Times office with his story on a day that McClure happened to be out of the office. The assistant editor should have checked the veracity of the facts before running the story, but the whole account was too juicy to be turned down.

C. McAleer's Fight for Reelection

As the national campaign progressed, McAleer conducted a strenuous reelection canvass in the Third congressional district. The Democrats realized the hopelessness of the congressional contests in the other districts, but naturally were optimistic about McAleer's reelection drive. The Times

¹⁶Ibid., 30 October 1900.

¹⁷Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman, Volume II, pp. 297-299.

observed that the Democratic "Congressional conventions were perfunctory affairs, delegates and candidates being fully aware that, except in the case of the Third District, Democratic success is neither probable nor possible."¹⁸ However, McAleer soon realized that he would have to fight hard to keep his seat. The Republicans nominated Henry Burk, a leather manufacturer; shortly after his nomination, Mayor Ashbridge announced that the Republicans simply had to carry the Third district for Burk.¹⁹ The Times called for the reelection of McAleer, who served the interests of the people of the district, and criticized Ashbridge for his plan to use ". . . all the machinery and all the political power of the city administration . . . to defeat Mr. McAleer and elect Mr. Burk."²⁰

At a mass rally at Kelly's Hall, 8th and Christian Streets, on 27 October, the friends of McAleer cheered their congressional candidate. The Democrats of the district, fortunately, were united for this fight. Ex-Governor Robert E. Pattison gave a rousing speech and optimistically predicted the election of Bryan and McAleer. Over a thousand people jammed the hall to hear Pattison, Sam Randall, Jr., Matthew Dittmann, Tommy Ryan and McAleer all speak enthusiastically of victory. McAleer jabbed at Ashbridge and

¹⁸The Times, 21 September 1900.

¹⁹Ibid.,

²⁰Ibid., 11 October 1900.

said: "I sometimes wonder who my competitor is. I always hear of the Mayor and but seldom of Mr. Burk."²¹ A few days later McAleer addressed another rally, this time at the Mannerchor Hall at 6th and Vine, and expressed optimism in the contest. Both Donnelly and Ryan spoke and urged a solid vote for Bryan and McAleer.²² A third rally conducted in Matthew Dittmann's sector of the district at Keystone Hall, 3rd and Girard, brought another full house, over a thousand persons cheering and hailing McAleer. The last rally for McAleer during the 1900 campaign took place on 4 November, at Standard Hall, 4th and Bainbridge, where over a thousand Jews hailed their congressman. When McAleer likened the despotic policies of Mayor Ashbridge to those of the Czar of Russia, he brought the house down. Rabbi Lowenthal of the Sons of Jacob congregation at 3rd and Bainbridge made what he called his first political speech when he urged his fellow Hebrews to vote for McAleer.

Hence, all looked well in the safe, old Randall district for the Democrats.

While the Democrats worked for the success of Bryan in the city and for McAleer in the Third district, the issue of Quayism vs. reform occupied a major place in the election of 1900. The fusionists held rallies and tried to get the support of the independents so that anti-machine men would

²¹Ibid., 27 October 1900.

²²Ibid., 31 October, 1900.

be elected to municipal offices and anti-Quay men to the legislature. The fusionists rallied at Literary Hall in Germantown during the closing days of the campaign and listened to speeches denouncing "Little Caesar" Ashbridge and "Boss" Quay. But Matt Quay did not remain inactive during these assaults. For the first and only time in his entire political career, he took to the stump and campaigned throughout the state for a strong Republican vote for presidential electors, congressmen and legislators who could elect him to fill his own unexpired term in the Senate.

The odds were against Quay. Yet, he refused to give up and fought with a tenacity that amazed his enemies and gratified his friends. His speeches were unique in that no other politician of that day spoke with so poetic a style and was so facile with classical illustrations. In his whole political career he chose to be silent, not loquacious. But in 1900 he fought like a bear to regain his seat in the Senate. Most of the papers opposed him. His chief opponent, "Pious" John Wanamaker, spared no expense in the struggle to send Matt Quay to his political grave. Quay concluded his campaign in Philadelphia on 3 November when he summarized the significance of the campaign both for the nation and the state. About Bryan he said:

Mr. Bryan is courageous, brainy, and eloquent. He is sincere to the verge of fanaticism. He is honest. It is impolitic folly to deny his ability, to charge him with corrupt motives with the silver plank of the Bryan party. But

his convictions are at war with the American establishment and the conservative thought of the country. 23

Quay continued by pointing out that the real issues of the campaign were protection vs. free trade and sound currency vs. silver. He then discussed the state issue and the election of a United States Senator, and condemned the fusionists: "They have no argument except personal detraction and falsification and wanton defilement of the fair name of the great state which gives them shelter. They have in common only personal malice and certain political miseries."²⁴ Finally, Quay launched into an attack on the papers of Philadelphia and the complicity of "Pious" John Wanamaker. He had campaigned throughout the state and this was his last address. He demonstrated remarkable restraint in all his speeches while the papers continued to crucify him. Then in the last three paragraphs of his last speech, he hurled a rejoinder that they would not quickly forget:

Without the Democratic party they are helpless, even with the aid of the five suborned newspapers of Philadelphia--the Press, the Times, the Record, the Ledger and the Evening Telegraph. I have no desire to flutter the cote of these soiled doves of Pennsylvania journalism. It is scarcely necessary to direct the attention of this audience to the absolute similarity of their utterances, and their complete servility to one man and one influence. They wire in and wire out at the heel of their charmer, everywhere slobbering

²³Matthew Stanley Quay, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 169-170.

²⁴Ibid., p. 182.

venom in their slot. They are

"Five souls with but a single thought,
Five hearts that beat as one."

If "the heart of the angel Israfil is a lute," as Arabian legend says, the heart of each of them is the dollar, and the single thought of all the full-page advertisements. Of one of them--in rural Pennsylvania when intending to convey the idea of absolute mendacity--we say of a man: "He lies like the Philadelphia Press."

You must pardon the coarseness of the quotation. It is the truth given in the plain vernacular of honest old Horace Greeley. 25

Throughout the campaign the Democrats realized that they could not carry the city for Bryan, but they hoped to be able to poll 80,000 votes for him.²⁶ Both the state and the city were early conceded to the Republicans, but the Democrats hoped to turn the corner to start that long journey back to becoming an important and powerful force in Philadelphia politics. The added support of the fusionists even helped inflate Democratic hopes.

The results of the 1900 elections only confirmed the worst fears of the Philadelphia Democrats. Bryan did worse in this campaign than the last, polling only 58,000 votes to McKinley's 174,000. Again, he only carried one ward: Tommy Ryan's Sixth. The fusionist candidates for city offices went down to defeat by pluralities of about 50,000 votes. In only one legislative district in the city did the fusion candidate win. But the biggest blow to the Democracy occurred in the Third district, where McAleer lost

²⁵Ibid., pp. 182-183.

²⁶The Times, 4 October 1900.

his seat by 1,300 votes in an election replete with irregularities. He managed to carry only the sixth and seventeenth wards. The fraudulent voting and the use of the police for partisan purposes by the mayor in the district contributed to McAleer's defeat. McAleer at first decided to contest the election but later withdrew and eventually retired from politics. The loss of the Third district to an all-out Republican represents the second great turning point in the Philadelphia Democratic party during the Cleveland-Bryan era. Needless to say, Matt Quay got enough legislative seats to assure his return to the Senate.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICS OF DECADENCE

After the defeat of 1900, which ended a full decade of turbulence for the Philadelphia Democrats, the old minority party entered the twentieth century crippled and ineffectual. The first ten years of the new century brought only defeat, despair and decadence for the once vital opposition party. During the next few years of the new decade Philadelphians increasingly focused their political concerns upon the problems of municipal reform; national issues were, thus, pushed to the background. Even though this study does not concentrate on municipal questions, it is necessary to deal in part with the reform issue because of its preeminence during this period, especially with the 1905-06 "Philadelphia Political Revolution." Therefore, an explanation of that movement will be made in the chronological survey of this period.

A. 1902: Failure of Reform Fusion

Fortunately, Philadelphia Democrats were united in the 1902 gubernatorial campaign, but unification did not come easily. Prior to the 1902 canvass in which Robert E. Pattison ran for governor for the third and last time, the

Philadelphia Democrats fought so hard among themselves that the state organization had to intervene and, in effect, put the party in quasi-receivership.

The new struggle for party organization mastery which flared up again before the 1902 gubernatorial race was but another manifestation of the almost unending fight between the Gordon faction and the Donnelly-Ryan faction. Each faction blamed the other for the decline of the party. In August 1901 Charley Donnelly stepped down as city chairman and Pattison was elected to take his place.¹ This shift did not please the Gordon men because of Pattison's association with the Donnelly-Ryan faction. A few days after Pattison's election as city chairman, the state Democrats convened at Harrisburg to nominate candidates for the State Supreme Court and State Treasurer. At that convention Ex-Judge Gordon made an eloquent plea for party harmony and convinced the delegates that a committee of six should be set up "to assist Chairman Pattison" in the operation of the party in Philadelphia. Despite the objections raised by Pattison, the convention voted for the Gordon proposal. The effect of the Harrisburg resolution was to put the party in receivership since this six-man committee was given ". . . full power and authority to hear and determine

¹Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 August 1901 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1901-1903).

all differences, adopt rules for the government of the party and provide a method of holding primary elections. . . ."2

Shortly after the 1901 municipal elections, in which the Democrats performed so poorly, this special committee got busy and prepared a scheme for unity which actually pleased all the contending party elements! New primaries were held in which all Democratic voters were invited to elect representatives to ward committees; these ward committees then elected the new members of the Democratic City Committee. This plan guaranteed representation by all major interests in the party and assured a united front against the Republicans in the coming state battle for governor.³

In late June 1902 the state Democrats met at Erie and nominated Robert E. Pattison for governor by a lopsided vote of 232 1/2 to 52 1/2 for Ex-Congressman James Kerr of Clearfield.⁴ From the outset the major issues were reform and Quayism. National issues were ignored completely in the Democratic platform, which declared that in Pennsylvania: ". . . the powers of government are prostituted to the purposes of public thieves." The platform went on to castigate M. S. Quay, whose election to the Senate, ". . . was

²Philadelphia Record, 16 August 1901 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1901-1903).

³Philadelphia Press, 16 July 1902 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1901-3).

⁴The North American (Philadelphia), 26 June 1902 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1901-1903).

accomplished in a carnival of corruption and bribery."⁵ The Democrats, under the Pattison banner, laid aside both ideological and organizational divisions and sent to the stump to slay the personification of all evil in the Commonwealth, Matthew Stanley Quay.

But Matt Quay knew the disadvantages of a defensive political fighting strategy and chose as the Republican gubernatorial nominee Judge Samuel W. Pennypacker, a man whose flawless citizenship and rectitude were known throughout the commonwealth. The Democratic railings against Quay and the Republican machine had a hollow sound when applied to Pennypacker. At first, Pennypacker indicated his reluctance about being a candidate because he had no funds to contribute toward the campaign, but when Quay put up all the necessary cash, Pennypacker agreed to run for governor.⁶

Even though Democratic rhetoric focused on the corruption issue, the reformers themselves were divided. Alexander McClure, for example, supported Pennypacker⁷ while independent Republicans like Henry C. Lea and Clinton Rogers Woodruff backed Pattison for a third term. Lea was irked by Quay's clever tactic of running Pennypacker for governor

⁵Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1903, pp. 574-575.

⁶S. W. Pennypacker, Autobiography of a Pennsylvanian, pp. 264-267.

⁷Philadelphia Record, 5 September 1902.

and announced his support of Pattison on 12 August, when he said:

. . . it seems incomprehensible that any advocate of a higher standard of political morals should accept the transparent device of Senator Quay in setting aside Mr. Elkin and substituting Judge Pennypacker as the Republican Gubernatorial candidate. . . . Judge Pennypacker's nomination is self-evidently a scheme to save the Machine from the popular condemnation which it has so richly earned. 8

Early in the campaign the Philadelphia Democrats organized an auxiliary committee made up of all stripes, colors, and factions of the party to work exclusively for Pattison in the city. The harmony and unity of the Philadelphia Democrats during this campaign was reminiscent of the old Randall days.⁹ Henry Budd was chosen chairman of the auxiliary committee which included men like Harrity, Delahunty, Cadwalader, Page, McAleer, Campbell, Donnelly, Ryan, and Gordon. Budd promised to wage a vigorous fight for Pattison and reiterated the centrality of the reform issue in the election.¹⁰

With their own household in good order, the Democrats courted the independent Republicans in order to effect a reform coalition to elect Pattison. In the previous municipal elections of 1901 the independent Republicans

⁸Ibid., 12 August 1902.

⁹Ibid., 2 August 1902.

¹⁰Ibid., 5 August 1902.

formed the Union Party in opposition to the Republican Machine. Even though this new party failed to win any contests in 1901, it remained very active and aided Pattison in 1902. On 31 August, Pattison, National Committeeman Guffey and State Chairman Creasy met with Union Party Chairman Riter and Secretary Mapes to lay the foundation for fusion.¹¹ A few days later the Union party met in a stormy convention marred by several outbursts and fist fights instigated by Quay Republicans, and endorsed Pattison for Governor, George W. Guthrie for Lt. Governor and Lewis Emery, Jr., an independent Republican, for Secretary of Internal Affairs.¹²

In this favorable atmosphere of cooperation, the independent and reform Republicans perfected their plans for complete fusion. After the Union party convention, the leaders of both parties met several times to work out the details of the fusion scheme. By the middle of September the master political coalition plan was accepted by the state and city leaders of both parties. While there was give and take on the legislative nominees, the Union party gave its unequivocal support to Pattison for Governor. But, the most curious aspect of the whole plan centered on the congressional nominations in Philadelphia. To reaffirm their intention to keep national issues out of the state race of

¹¹Ibid., 31 August 1902.

¹²Ibid., 4 September 1902.

1902, the Democrats agreed not to run any candidates for Congress in Philadelphia!¹³ Thus, the Democratic party lost or, at least, suspended its identity with the national party during the 1902 campaign. The move was obviously a concession to the conservatives in both parties who still shuddered at the thought of advancing in any way the principles of a national party which in two previous presidential campaigns nominated a radical for the highest office in the land. It is also curious to note that this agreement got the full approbation of Democratic leaders like Ryan and Donnelly, who had given loyal support to the national party during two preceding presidential races. The Record was delighted by this decision and called it a "Wise determination on the part of the Democrats of Philadelphia"¹⁴ and saw in it the signs of victory in November.

The Philadelphia Democratic organization worked efficiently and enthusiastically for Pattison. City Chairman Donnelly recruited a solid corps of party workers to analyze the voting lists in order to detect padding. He also reported at a state committee meeting in Pittsburgh on 29 September that at every polling place in the city Democratic and Union party workers would watch scrupulously for election irregularities.¹⁵ Hence, for the first time in

¹³Ibid., 12 September 1902.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

many years, no segment of the Democratic party organization was annexed to the Republicans.

As the campaign progressed, it became apparent that the Philadelphia vote would be crucial for Pattison.¹⁶ The Philadelphia Democrats did all within their power to advance Pattison's cause and by mid-October they began to wage a strenuous campaign in every section of the city for the former Governor. Two great mass rallies were conducted during the last week of the campaign and at each an optimistic spirit pervaded the throngs who hailed the fusion reform movement. The Academy of Music was packed on 25 October when the chief speeches were delivered by state leaders, W. U. Hensel and Robert L. Wright, and by the Reverend C. C. Albertson, pastor of the First Methodist Church of Germantown.¹⁷ A week later the Academy overflowed as a tumultuous crowd heard James Gay Gordon and Robert E. Pattison lambast Quay and the Republican Machine.¹⁸

While Pattison and his political friends in both parties campaigned throughout the state monotonously reiterating the issue of Quayism, Pennypacker went on an informal speaking tour and charmed his audience at every village post. As a student and writer of Pennsylvania history, Pennypacker knew the culture and lore of the vast commonwealth and made

¹⁶Ibid., 14 October 1902.

¹⁷Ibid., 26 October 1902.

¹⁸Ibid., 1 November 1902.

generous allusions to the characteristics of the various regions wherever he spoke. Pattison, in the meantime, harped too much on the issue of state reform. In reflecting on the election, Pennypacker observed that: "Pattison had a stereotyped speech which he had committed to memory telling of the many ills which had befallen the state under Republican rule."¹⁹

The Democrats and reform Republicans hoped for a vote of 85,000 in Philadelphia,²⁰ which they believed would secure victory; but they feared that their hard won prize would be snatched from them on election day by illegal voting and the political trickery of the Quay machine. Three of Philadelphia's judges, therefore, agreed to hold office hours during election day to hear complaints and to act immediately in cases of reported irregularities.²¹ But the Democrats, reformers and "decent people" of Philadelphia could not sweep back the great Republican tidal wave of 1902. Pennypacker carried the city by nearly a 100,000 vote plurality, whipping Pattison by a vote of 171,000 to 74,000. In the statewide tally Pennypacker had a plurality of 147,000 votes beating his Democratic opponent by a vote of 593,328 to 450,978. In the city Pattison managed to carry only one

¹⁹S. W. Pennypacker, Autobiography of a Pennsylvanian, p. 269.

²⁰Letter from C. P. Donnelly to campaign workers, 30 October 1902 (McCrossin: Democratic Scraps, 1901-1914).

²¹Philadelphia Record, 4 November 1902.

ward, the sixth. The Record blamed the Democratic failure on the illegal use of the police in the election and reported the following on the day after the election:

With the aid of the police, perhaps, more than the usual amount of fraudulent work was done in the river front and central wards, where voters were intimidated at will, and charges by Democratic watchers of flagrant violations of the election law were ignored or laughed at. ²²

In all the other elections in the city the Republicans swept to victory. Despite the decisive defeat of the Democratic fusion ticket, the party leaders hailed the fact that Pattison polled 74,000 votes which exceeded Bryan's city vote in 1900 by over 15,000.²³ Even though the Philadelphia Democrats dropped national issues, declined to nominate congressional candidates, and became an annex to the independent Republicans, who constantly harped on Quayism, they still lost the city as well as their own identity in the elections of 1902.

B. Judge Parker's Stunning Defeat: 1904

At least the defeat of Pattison in 1902 in no way marred the harmony of the Philadelphia Democrats, who now focused on local reform and were convinced that, once an honest ballot was secured, victory would be achieved. In addition to party unity at the local level, the Philadelphia Democrats also experienced doctrinal unity on the national issues as

²²Ibid., 5 November 1902.

²³Ibid., 7 November 1902.

the 1904 election approached. One by one the old Jeffersonians crawled out of their closets to support Parker for the presidency.

In early May 1904 the new Democratic Club of Pennsylvania was formed. It expressed the desire of the old Democrats who wanted to return to those Cleveland days, even those ante-Lincoln days when life was simpler and the federal government was but a passive agent in the governance of the people. John Cadwalader, Jr., the first president of the Democratic Club of Pennsylvania, delivered the dedication address at the opening of the new club house in Philadelphia on 6 May 1904. Cadwalader attacked the "centralism and corruption" of the Republican party, happily reported "the many signs of a restored and united Democracy," and declared that:

The assertion of the great principles of States rights, local self government, obedience to the laws, and an absolute regard for the rights of all the people before the law which the party of Jefferson has always advocated, never was more loudly called for.

Cadwalader went on to assert that recent Democratic failures could be attributed to the fact that the party became, "too much the party of Cleveland and Bryan," and that the Democrats should reaffirm the "principles of the constitutional party of the country" instead of stressing, "temporary issues involving many and varied opinions" which were "unwisely substituted." As Cadwalader proceeded, point by point, his arguments got even more reactionary. He quoted

liberally from Jefferson and advocated a return to states rights (despite his opening comment calling for: "an absolute regard for the rights of all people") by returning to the "Strict adherence to the plain language of the Constitution, the repeal of the fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments. . . ." ²⁴ Cadwalader concluded his address by making a strong plea for Judge Parker's candidacy for the presidency. Cadwalader pointed out that among Parker's outstanding attributes was his advocacy of the repeal of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments!

Cadwalader's speech sounded the clarion call to all the old surviving 1896 Jeffersonians who jumped on the reactionary band wagon to hail Parker's candidacy. Of this group of superannuated Democrats, Cadwalader and Emanuel Furth were the most active workers for Parker in Philadelphia. Both went to the Democratic national convention as Parker delegates.

Charley Donnelly led the Philadelphia delegates at the 1904 Democratic national convention at St. Louis while Col. James M. Guffey of Pittsburgh controlled the state delegation. Guffey insisted that no article of the Bryan creed be inserted in the 1904 platform since he was firmly

²⁴"Address by the Honorable John Cadwalader, President of the Democratic Club of Pennsylvania, delivered at the opening of their Club House, 6 May 1904." Cadwalader Papers.

committed to Parker.²⁵ But Bryan, who was also a delegate at the convention, tried to block the Parker movement by splitting the Pennsylvania delegation. Bryan advanced the presidential candidacy of Ex-Governor Pattison, hoping that his tactic would cause the defection of Parker delegates. The attempt failed miserably when only five of the sixty-eight Pennsylvania delegates voted to support Pattison at the party caucus.²⁶ Since Pennsylvania followed the unit rule, all sixty-eight votes were cast for Parker, who won the nomination on the first ballot. The Pattison move evaporated leaving only William Randolph Hearst to oppose Parker. Hearst could muster only 200 votes to Parker's 658, thus assuring a decisive first ballot victory for the New York Judge. Finally, the deletion of silver and the reaffirmation of gold in the Democratic platform made victory complete for the reactionaries. The Record saw the return of the "good old days" and lauded the action of the St. Louis delegates:

After eight years of political nightmare the Democratic party has shaken off its delusions, recovered possession of itself and of its faculties and resumed its historical place as the conservator and defender of the rights and interests of the common people. 27

²⁵Philadelphia Record, 4 July 1904.

²⁶Ibid., 5 July 1904. It should be noted here that all of the Philadelphia delegates supported Parker.

²⁷Ibid., 10 July 1904.

But the happy Philadelphia Jeffersonians resumed their interest in the Democratic party only to face the slaughter of 1904.

As the campaign got underway the Democrats of Philadelphia deluded themselves into thinking that victory could be won in November. They overlooked the insurmountable barriers that lay before them and averted their eyes from the past record of their party as well as from the great popularity of Theodore Roosevelt. In an editorial entitled: "The Trend of Twelve Years" the Philadelphia Press saw early in the campaign, even before Parker's nomination, that nothing short of a miracle could return the Democrats to power. The Press observed:

It is 12 years since conservative men have voted for a Democratic candidate for president. Through 12 years every year has brought forward a body of new voters to most of whom the Democracy of the day was repellant.

The Press went on to point out that after Cleveland's election in '92, a depression followed, and after Cleveland's second term the "fantastic Bryan craze took possession of the party." The editorial concluded with the following observation:

Since 1892 there has been nothing in the Democratic record, attitude of impression to attract the ardent, intelligent young man who has come to the rights, duties and privileges of citizenship. 28

²⁸Philadelphia Press, 28 June 1904.

Despite these obstacles the Democrats prepared for a vigorous campaign by first trying to prevent fraudulent voting in the coming election. Constantly plagued by the problem of padding the voters' lists, the Democrats set up a Lawyers' Committee in September to analyze the voters' lists and to investigate irregularities.²⁹ The addition of over 16,000 names to the registry since May of 1904 caused alarm in Democratic circles and prompted a concerted effort to curtail the padding and to assure an honest vote.

The nominations for city posts, state legislative seats and for congressional seats next occupied a major place on the party agenda. The united party, fortunately, suffered no serious splits during the various nominating conventions. The conservative reaction so swept every corner of the party leadership that there was an enthusiastic desire to identify with the national party. Therefore, the Democrats (unlike the 1902 campaign) put up congressional candidates for every district in the city.

In 1902 the congressional district boundaries were changed and a sixth seat added. Since the Democrats ran no candidates that year, the 1904 election was the first one in which they competed for the redistricted congressional seats. In the old Third district, for example, wards eighteen and nineteen, adjacent to wards sixteen and

²⁹Philadelphia Record, 20 September 1904.

seventeen, were added. The new Sixth district comprised parts of Pig Iron Kelley's old Fourth district.

The Record called all the Democratic congressional nominees of 1904, "strong, representative candidates." The most well-known men put in the congressional field included ex-legislator John Fow of the seventeenth ward, who ran in the Third congressional district, and John Cadwalader's son, John III,³⁰ who ran in the Second district. The younger Cadwalader, a committeeman in the eighth ward, was considered an up and coming young Democrat. The other candidates were political unknowns, two being lawyers one an undertaker and one a physician.³¹ The Record conceded that the chances for most of the nominees were "slender" but did point out that Fow's chances were good in the old Third district.³²

In the middle of the campaign the Democrats got a boost when civil service reformer Herbert Welsh, editor of City and State, announced his support of Alton Parker.³³

³⁰Actually John III was John, Jr. I have used the III to designate him because his father was John Jr. The elder Cadwalader dropped Jr. when his father died. So as not to confuse the elder Cadwalader, who earlier was known as Jr., I have called the younger Cadwalader the III.

³¹Philadelphia Record, 22 September 1904.

³²Ibid., 23 September 1904.

³³Ibid., 17 October 1904.

To Welsh Roosevelt's support of, and friendship with, the late Matthew S. Quay was too bitter a pill to swallow. In the meantime the Democrats campaigned strenuously in all the major sections of the city. The congressional candidates were especially busy conducting rallies and making speeches in their respective districts. This enthusiastic outburst, the Record observed, demonstrated some of the "old time vim"³⁴ of the party. The continued support of the ticket by all the former factional leaders of the party created an atmosphere of sustained enthusiasm and confidence which carried through until election day.

The City Committee and the Democratic Club of Pennsylvania waged a vigorous campaign for Parker while the congressional nominees concentrated on their own districts. On Friday before the election the Academy overflowed with Democrats who came to participate in a rally sponsored by the Democratic Club of Pennsylvania. John Cadwalader, Jr. presided at the meeting and introduced the four speakers: retired national chairman William F. Harrity; Michael J. Ryan of Philadelphia; Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware (son of Cleveland's secretary of state); and John R. Dos Passos, the eminent New York lawyer. The most significant aspect about the rally was not the oratory or the enthusiasm but the fact that the entire first row of the auditorium was

³⁴Ibid., 24 October 1904.

filled by gold Democrats who had deserted the party in 1896 and 1900.³⁵

As the campaign closed the reform advocates urged all people to vote and to be on their guard against ballot fraud. At a meeting at the Spring Garden Unitarian Church on Sunday night before the election, Rabbi Berkowitz admonished the audience to: "Go to the polls and vote, and if your vote is not recorded, get together and make another fight against the vile creatures who dare to throw your vote out!" Dr. Hawes of the Germantown Unitarian Church advocated more militant action and declared: "If you must, shoulder a musket when you go to the polls."³⁶ Little did these well-intentioned reformers realize that no ballot system, however honest, could sweep back the great impending Roosevelt tide of 1904.

Despite the return of the silk stocking set, the Democrats in 1904 suffered their worst presidential defeat during the entire Cleveland-Bryan period. In Philadelphia Parker got only 48,000 votes to Roosevelt's 227,000. The conservative New York Judge, like Bryan, carried only the sixth ward but fell far below the Commoner's voting strength of the two previous presidential elections. Parker polled only seventeen per cent of the vote as contrasted with Bryan's twenty-five per cent in 1900 and twenty-six per cent

³⁵Ibid., 5 November 1904.

³⁶Ibid., 7 November 1904.

in 1896. In the state returns Roosevelt rolled up nearly 841,000 votes to Parker's 358,000. The stunned Record deferred its analysis of the defeat for several days, and finally placed the blame on the labor vote in an editorial on Saturday after the election. The Record pointed to the popularity of Roosevelt among the working class throughout the nation and came to the following conclusion:

In Philadelphia, barring a Machine fraud of at least 50,000 votes, the same influences /i.e. labor/ are seen at work in the great increase in the Republican vote and in the decline of that of the Democrats. 37

The Republican congressional candidates did even better than Roosevelt. Throughout the entire city the Democrats polled only sixteen per cent of the congressional vote as contrasted with seventeen per cent of the presidential vote. In the Third district John Fow polled only 7,700 votes to Castor's near 40,000! The only other important Democratic congressional candidate, John Cadwalader, III, polled only 7,000 votes to Adams 42,000 in the Second district. All in all, the 1904 conservative movement resulted in a veritable slaughter for the Democratic party in Philadelphia.

³⁷Ibid., 12 November 1904.

C. Philadelphia's "Revolution" and the Democracy: 1905-06

With shouts of civic pride
 Thy streets shall ring
 New Philadelphia
 To Thee we sing. 38

Between the presidential campaign of 1904 and the gubernatorial election of 1906, the Philadelphia advocates of municipal and state reform accelerated their efforts, exposed corruption, established a new party and actually brought about Philadelphia's great political awakening called the "Revolution." It all started when the city treasury was on the brink of bankruptcy, and Iz Durham, the Republican city boss, pushed through Councils a new gas lease bill which assured UGI of continuing to provide gas until 1980 for which the gas company agreed to pay the city twenty-five million dollars. This absurdly low price would relieve the city's financial distress; but, it also meant that the gas company cronies who were in league with Iz Durham were about to pick up some handsome profits at the expense of the public. In addition to the terms of sale, the city agreed to surrender its right to fix the gas rates for the consumer. Philadelphians seemed to be content with machine corruption until they realized that they would have to pay dearly for the peculations of machine rule. Mayor Weaver vetoed the gas lease bill in May of 1905, and

³⁸The song of the reformers in the 1905-06 campaign of the City Party (sung to the tune of the Russian national anthem).

shortly afterward the city was swept up in a tidal wave of reform.³⁹ Rallies were held throughout the city supporting Weaver as Republicans began to desert their party in favor of the newly created City Party.

In the meantime, a new reform organization, the Committee of 70, was started under the chairmanship of John C. Winston. Among other leading Philadelphians, Clinton Rogers Woodruff, Rudolph Blankenburg, E. A. Van Valkenburg and a host of reform Republicans joined this new movement to clean up the city. These two organizations, the City Party and the Committee of 70, effected far reaching reforms which transcended the immediate municipal issues centering around the awarding of contracts and the gas lease controversy.

The organization of the City Party, however, antedated the gas lease controversy of May 1905. But, it was the gas lease give-away which pushed this reform party to success in the November elections. The City Party did run candidates for several magisterial vacancies back in February 1905 but were unsuccessful because the Durham machine threw quantities of votes to the Democrats in order to prevent minority party representation from going to the City Party. Under the Philadelphia Charter, one third of the magistrates had to be elected from a minority party. Durham, therefore,

³⁹Isaac F. Marcossou, "The Awakening of Philadelphia," World's Work, Vol. 10, 1905, pp. 6,649-6,651.

ordered his party hacks to produce twenty-five votes for Democratic magisterial candidates in all the election divisions of the city. By so doing, the Machine still rolled up tremendous majorities, put the Democrats in second place and pushed the City Party to an insignificant third place. Hence, the ten Machine Republicans polled 131,000 to 151,000 votes; five Democrats polled 74,000 to 80,000 votes; while the City Party candidates polled 29,000 to 36,000 votes.⁴⁰ This tactic assured the defeat of the City Party and also put the Philadelphia Democrats into a position of subservience to the Durham Machine. Franklin S. Edmunds, chairman of the City Party of Philadelphia, described this dilemma of the Philadelphia Democrats:

The Democratic party, as a minority national party, must have done much to arouse public sentiment on municipal questions, but through the judicious use of minority patronage, the organization seemed to be as securely entrenched in one party as in the other.⁴¹

There was another major reason why Philadelphia Democrats did not participate in the reform movement. Much of the impetus for reform came from the business community and especially from that segment committed to high tariff. It

⁴⁰Louis Seaber, "Philadelphia's Machine in Action," The Independent, Vol. 58, 1905, p. 586.

⁴¹Franklin S. Edmunds, "The Significance of the Recent Reform Movement in Philadelphia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 27, 1906, p. 181.

was not until after the 1904 presidential election that the Committee of 70 was founded and the Republican businessmen began their major effort to fight the machine. They waited until after Roosevelt's landslide of '04 because they feared the possible implications that a reform movement would have on Roosevelt's candidacy. These Republican businessmen did not want municipal reform associated in any way with the Democratic party, which favored tariff revision.⁴² Hence, the Democrats were shunned by the reformers and befriended by the machine Republicans.

The reform or anti-machine movement was also given national attention by Arena magazine, which published serially the articles of Rudolph Blankenburg from February through August 1905. These articles entitled, "Forty Years in the Wilderness" analyzed and exposed the machinations of boss rule in the city and state. Blankenburg's exposé of the Camerons, Quay, Penrose, Lane, Martin, Porter, Durham and their methods, gave wide publicity to the degenerate state of Pennsylvania politics and advanced the objectives of both the Committee of 70 and the City party.

The gas lease controversy so enraged the people of Philadelphia that they turned to the City Party in the off-year municipal elections of 1905. Rudolph Blankenburg and Edward A. Anderson were elected county commissioners on the City Party ticket and won by majorities of 45,000. Other

⁴²Franklin S. Edmonds, op. cit., p. 182.

less important municipal posts also went to the City Party. In the same election, William H. Berry, a reformer-Democrat from Chester, was elected State Treasurer. Indeed, the clean government movement was gaining strength in both the city and state.

The reformers continued to expose fraudulent voting practices and vowed to continue their fight for honest elections. Estimates of fraudulent names on Philadelphia voting lists ranged between 70,000 and 90,000 in 1905. The reformers busily uncovered fraud and published their findings much to the chagrin of the governor, who, while personally honest, owed his success to the Quay Machine. The frauds were so blatant to be ludicrous. For example, at 805 Race Street 122 names were registered in a boarding house that could lodge only sixty persons. Two persons lived at 824 North 8th Street from which fifty-one persons were registered to vote! Even names like William Cat and John Canine were discovered on the voting lists.⁴³

Governor Pennypacker finally called a special session of the legislature in January of 1906 to deal with the whole issue of political corruption and reform. The legislature in one month (January 15 to February 15) passed some

⁴³Isaac F. Marcossou, "The Awakening of Philadelphia," World's Work, Vol. 10, 1905, p. 6,648. For additional documentation of fraudulent voting see: Clinton R. Woodruff, "Some Permanent Results of the Philadelphia Upheaval of 1905-06," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 13, 1908, pp. 253-263.

amazingly comprehensive reform measures which changed the complexion of political activity in the city and state.

The more important reforms included:

1. The Personal Registration Act ended the use of assessors' lists and provided for the personal registration of every qualified voter, thus obviating the padding of voting lists.
2. The Sheatz Uniform Primary Act provided for the direct election of all party nominees on the same day under the supervision of the general election officers.
3. The Political Assessment Act prohibited the solicitation of campaign funds among city employees.
4. The Shern Act prohibited the police from engaging in political activity.
5. The Roberts Act made it mandatory for all political candidates to give an accounting of their campaign expenses.

Other reforms passed by the legislature included the Jackson Act, which regulated the deposits of state funds, and the Gable Civil Service Act for Philadelphia, which established a merit system for many of the city employees.⁴⁴ The first five acts enumerated above were most important in the regulation of elections, candidates and political parties and, therefore, were significant to the Democrats. Since fraudulent voting had been blatant, many Philadelphians assumed, quite logically, that the Democrats suffered most at the hands of the corrupt machine. The results of the 1906

⁴⁴Clinton R. Woodruff, "Philadelphia's Revolution," Yale Review, Vol. 15, 1906, pp. 8-23.

gubernatorial election, "which was practically free from fraudulent voting"⁴⁵ should, therefore, reveal more accurately the true strength of the long abused minority party.

D. The Gubernatorial Defeat of 1906

The 1906 gubernatorial campaign was an extension of the political reform movement started in 1905, when William H. Berry won his election as Treasurer of the Commonwealth. The earlier municipal victories in Philadelphia and the later reforms adopted by the Legislature under Governor Pennypacker provided the impetus for a full scale reform movement to elect a reform Governor in 1906. In May State Treasurer Berry began to uncover major irregularities in the expenditures for the construction of the new state capitol in Harrisburg.⁴⁶ Hence, the opportune time finally came to strike the fatal death blow to the Republican State Machine. National issues, therefore, played no significant part in the 1906 canvass except, insofar as the Republicans tried to convince the public that a vote for the GOP would vindicate the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt.

The Democrats nominated Lewis Emery, a wealthy, independent Republican oil man from Bradford, for governor.

⁴⁵Clinton R. Woodruff, "Some Permanent Results of the Philadelphia Upheaval of 1905-06," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 13, 1908, p. 264..

⁴⁶Fortenbaugh and Tarman, Pennsylvania: The Story of a Commonwealth, p. 309.

Fusion was effected when the Lincoln Republican party (the state-wide reform Republican party which took the name City Party in Philadelphia) also nominated Emery for governor. The Republicans, realizing that the chief issues of the campaign would be corruption and reform, nominated Edwin S. Stuart for governor. Stuart served as Mayor of Philadelphia from 1891-1895 and earned a good reputation as an honest businessman who worked his way up from a stock boy to proprietor of Leary's Book Store. No one could point the finger of corruption at Stuart. Stuart, in fact, advocated reform but the Record commented that he "could not be induced to take part in the popular uprising which brought the gang Legislature to its knees. He hung back. He is in favor of reform after it is accomplished," whereas "Lewis Emery was never anything else but a persistent and consistent friend of reform."⁴⁷

Prospects for a reform victory got brighter when the City Party and the Democrats successfully effected fusion in Philadelphia. D. Clarence Gibboney, the City Party candidate for District Attorney, and William W. Allen, the City Party nominee for city Treasurer, got places on the Democratic ticket while Magistrate A. H. Ladner, a Democrat, got the City Party nomination for Register of Wills. The Democrats, however, chose to name their own candidates for Congress. By so doing, they kept the national and

⁴⁷Philadelphia Record, 15 September 1906.

municipal issues separate and distinct. The presiding officer of the Democratic nominating convention for District Attorney declared:

Democrats demand the separation of national politics from municipal affairs. The wise and patriotic course of our allies, the City Party, yesterday assures us another great victory for good government. 48

This political dichotomy of municipal issues, on the one hand, and national issues, on the other, manifested itself even further when the City Party fused with the Republicans on the congressional nominees. No City Party man had to fear that fusion with the Democrats could in any way affect adversely his loyalty to Roosevelt or advance indirectly the Democratic national policy of tariff revision. The congressional races, therefore, promised to give some indication of the extent to which Philadelphians would respond to the policies of the national Democracy.

In September the Democrats and Lincoln Republicans opened their campaign for Emery and stressed from the outset the great overriding importance of the reform issue. The evidence that State Treasurer William H. Berry unearthed about gross irregularities in connection with monies allocated for the construction and furnishing of the new state capitol became the repeated battle cry of the Emery

⁴⁸Philadelphia Record, 20 September 1906.

campaign.⁴⁹ On 23 October Emery addressed a throng of the Academy of Music, where he displayed pieces of mahogany finished wood panels used in the new capitol for which the commonwealth paid the price of solid mahogany.⁵⁰ The next day he toured the city, delivered six speeches and continued to hack away at the capitol scandal.⁵¹

In the meantime the Republicans in both the city and state continued to stress the importance of electing Stuart in order to reaffirm the leadership of Roosevelt. Joseph Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives, addressed the Republican rally for Stuart at the Academy of Music on 18 October and admonished the audience not to rebuke Roosevelt by voting against Stuart. He further asserted that a vote for Emery would only advance the cause of William Jennings Bryan. Cannon's speech and an address by Senator Philander Knox, who argued similarly, were both reprinted in pamphlet form and distributed widely throughout the state.⁵²

As the campaign came to a close, many of the clergy of Philadelphia preached to their flocks about the obligations

⁴⁹S. W. Pennypacker, Autobiography of a Pennsylvanian, p. 433.

⁵⁰Philadelphia Record, 24 October 1906.

⁵¹Ibid., 25 October 1906.

⁵²See pamphlet entitled: "Indorse Roosevelt, Continue Prosperity By Supporting The Whole Republican Ticket" (Pamphlet collection of the Pennsylvania Historical Society: Pennsylvania Politics, 1901-15).

of Christians to support the reform movement. From the pulpit of the fashionable Holy Trinity Church, Rittenhouse Square, Dr. Floyd W. Tompkins made a plea for the support of the reform candidates. Other pastors of important churches like Old Pine Street Presbyterian, St. Matthew's Lutheran, Tioga Presbyterian, Trinity Lutheran (Germantown), and Market Square Presbyterian, all called for a reform victory.⁵³ Not a single important speech was made during the entire campaign by a Democrat advancing a Democratic national policy! The reform issue predominated over all other issues in the campaign of 1906.

Despite the cries of the reformers, the fusion with the Democrats, the homilies from the pulpits and the honest election procedures, the reformers went down to defeat. In the state Stuart polled over 506,000 votes to Emery's 458,000. In the city Stuart got 126,639 votes to Emery's 91,803. But Emery polled only 26,922 Democratic votes as contrasted with 64,881 Lincoln Republican votes. Hence, only twelve per cent of the votes cast for governor were Democratic. The old faithful sixth ward proved to be disloyal to the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in 1906. Tommy Ryan's little ward machine delivered the vote to Stuart in an overt and obvious annex to the Penrose Republican Machine.

The congressional races were equally disastrous for the Democrats. The percentage of the aggregate number of

⁵³Philadelphia Record, 5 November 1906.

Democratic votes cast for congressional nominees also amounted to a scant twelve per cent. All of the Democratic congressional candidates were political nonentities. In four of the six congressional districts (2, 4, 5, and 6) the Lincoln Republicans fused with the regular Republicans, and in only one district, the old Democratic Third, did the Lincoln party fuse with the Democrats. Despite the fusion, J. H. Moore (R) defeated W. J. O'Brien (D. and L.R.) by a plurality of 10,000 votes. Not a single Democratic congressional candidate made a respectable showing.

In commenting on the defeat of '06, the Record said: "There is no need of crying over the November spilt milk in Philadelphia," and looked to victory in the February municipal election. The Record attributed the Republican victory to the pro-Roosevelt feeling in the city and predicted that: "The election in February will be uncomplicated by the choice of Federal or State officers or the intrusion of Federal or State issues."⁵⁴ However, the Record also saw that one positive accomplishment would result from the November defeat:

Self interest alone will prompt the Organization leaders to walk the chalk line of propriety for a while in an effort to rehabilitate themselves in the estimation of the independent element of their party. 55

⁵⁴Ibid., 8 November 1906.

⁵⁵Ibid.

E. Bryan's Third Battle

The political circumstances and events of 1908 created a quite different response by Philadelphia Democrats to Bryan's third battle to gain the presidency. The ideological differences within the party at last had vanished. If anything, the 1908 canvass was the most palatable of Bryan's three campaigns to the Philadelphia Democrats of conservative temperament. John Cadwalader III, like his father, an avowed conservative, announced his luke warm support of Bryan in early September:

I now believe that the preservation of Democratic principles requires every Democrat to support him. . . .

Taft's indorsement of the things that Roosevelt stands for, including the ideas of centralization of Government, makes Bryan's candidacy preferable. ⁵⁶

The Democratic platform of 1908, while thoroughly progressive, did not upset the conservatives of the party, because the old guard could not find anything obnoxious in the various planks which condemned the Republicans for exalting the privileged classes by their policies on railroads, trusts and the tariff.

While the scars of previous ideological battles were healed, unfortunately, a major organizational controversy developed which threatened to impair the Bryan campaign in both the city and state. That controversy called into question the leadership of National Democratic Committeeman

⁵⁶Ibid., 4 September 1908.

James M. Guffey as well as Charley Donnelly and Tommy Ryan in Philadelphia.

Prior to and during the Democratic National Convention of 1908, anti-Guffey sentiment began to grow among Pennsylvania Democrats who found the dictatorial tactics of "Boss" Guffey obnoxious. Guffey's liberal contributions to the party coffers made many state Democrats feel that he had bought the party organization. This growing resentment began to jell into an anti-Guffey movement concurrent with the beginning of the pro-Bryan movement within Pennsylvania. Since Guffey dragged his feet on Bryan's third candidacy and declined to commit himself to Bryan, the Bryan men began to clamor for Guffey's removal. The Record hailed the Bryan movement and saw that it could be the vehicle for retiring Guffey:

The first Bryan nomination marked the beginning of the end of what was once a Democratic Organization in this State. The third nomination of the Nebraskan, strangely enough, holds out a hope for the rebuilding of an effective agency for good. There are enough Democrats in this State, if properly organized, to accomplish much good for themselves and their fellow citizens. 57

Bryan, too, worked overtly for Guffey's removal from the national committee. For the first time in his political career he got involved in state politics when he denounced Guffey to a group of 150 Pennsylvanians who visited him at Lincoln, Nebraska en route to the Denver convention. Bryan

⁵⁷Ibid., 6 July 1908.

called for an end of Guffey's leadership because he "had willfully conspired to defeat what he knew to be the expressed wishes of the Democrats of Pennsylvania." To that group Bryan also announced that he had notified Guffey: "In my opinion your reelection would be unfortunate and your presence on the national committee embarrassing to me and my friends."⁵⁸

As the fight for control of the party commenced, Ex-Congressman James Kerr of Clearfield led the opposition to Guffey while Donnelly and Ryan of Philadelphia supported the boss. The Donnelly-Ryan faction was set back at the national convention when eight of its Philadelphia delegates were refused seats and replaced by pro-Bryan men. The Philadelphia Bryan men protested the seating of these Donnelly-Ryan delegates because the Republicans had actually helped to elect them! In April 1908 the first primaries were conducted under the provisions of the new Uniform Primary Act of 1906. Since there was no provision prohibiting voters from crossing over to the opposition party under this new act, thousands of Machine Republicans voted for Donnelly-Ryan delegates in the Democratic primary. This deal between the Republican Machine and the Donnelly-Ryan Democrats was a blatant example of the manipulation of the Philadelphia Democratic organization by the Machine, and when the committee on credentials at

⁵⁸Ibid., 5 July 1908.

the Denver national convention heard the story they refused to seat the Donnelly-Ryan delegates.⁵⁹

The final blow to Guffey came during the convention when the Democratic national committee declared his seat vacant. In calling the roll of states, the convention presiding officer announced a vacancy for Pennsylvania and asked the Pennsylvania delegation to caucus in order to elect a new chairman. Forty of the sixty-eight delegates caucused and elected James Kerr to Guffey's position. The Guffey men realized the imminence of defeat and did not even bother to attend the caucus.⁶⁰

The convention quickly and enthusiastically adopted the platform and nominated Bryan for the presidency. Judge Parker spent hours writing the platform which Bryan endorsed with enthusiasm. At last, the party came together and managed to fuse both its progressive and traditional principles into a coherent platform which satisfied the extremists and attracted the middle of the roaders. After the convention ended the Record announced its support of Bryan but still mourned the passing of the old Democratic faith based upon the strict construction of the Constitution:

There is a drift in both parties away from safe constitutional moorings. But on immediate and vital issues that divide the political opinion of the nation the Democratic party is most firmly rooted in the faith of the fathers. 61

⁵⁹Ibid., 10 July 1908.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., 11 July 1908.

Ideological harmony, at long last, characterized the party's national campaign in 1908; but, unfortunately, organizational discord impaired the progress of the campaign in Philadelphia. Both Donnelly and Ryan clung tenaciously to the coat tails of James M. Guffey and refused to accept the decision of Pennsylvania Democrats to replace Guffey with Kerr. This caused utter confusion among the Bryan Democrats in Philadelphia who followed Kerr's leadership. The supporters of Bryan and Kerr feared that the Donnelly-Ryan organization would cut the Commoner in the November election; so they formed a separate organization called the Bryan League.

During the next six weeks the Philadelphia Democrats engaged in a furious tug of war over the Bryan-Guffey issue. The Bryan Leaguers organized supporters in every ward in the city and decided to put a Bryan League ticket on the ballot.⁶² The Donnelly-Ryan City Committee met and bitterly attacked Bryan for his interference in the Pennsylvania organization and then went on to "pledge" their "sincere support to William Jennings Bryan."⁶³ As the struggle continued, support began to grow for the Bryan League advocates. On 30 July the large Central Democratic Association of 1415 Locust Street voted 50-1 to support Kerr and the efforts of the Bryan League.⁶⁴ On the same day the Record gave its

⁶²Ibid., 19 July 1908.

⁶³Ibid., 19 July 1908.

⁶⁴Ibid., 30 July 1908.

support to the Bryan League and called for an end of the "Donnelly-Ryan gang annex."⁶⁵ On 5 August the Bryan League opened their campaign headquarters at Dooner's Hotel and began preparations for the nomination of a complete independent Democratic ticket.⁶⁶ Concurrent with the formation of the Bryan League in Philadelphia a similar movement developed throughout the state. The state Bryan League Committee met in Philadelphia on 7 August and agreed to run a full slate of Bryan Democrats in order to end party control by the Guffey men.⁶⁷ The Philadelphia Bryan League Democrats were especially disturbed over the fact that thirteen state legislative Democratic nominees in Philadelphia districts gained their nominations by Machine Republican votes.

On 15 September Bryan again dazzled Philadelphians when he made a quick campaign tour throughout the city en route to New Jersey. Before a crowd of 5,000 in front of the Record Building, Bryan attacked the Republican Machine and called for a large Democratic vote in November. This rally was planned by the leaders of the Bryan League: National Committeeman James Kerr, Ex-City Chairman John Thornton, and State Bryan League Chairman Jere S. Black. From the Record Building Bryan proceeded to the Bellvue

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., 6 August 1908.

⁶⁷Ibid., 8 August 1908.

Stratford Hotel, where he addressed a crowd of 4,000. At this rally he conferred with regular organization men including State Chairman Dimeling, City Chairman O'Donnell and State Superior Court candidate Webster Grim. During a press conference which followed the rally he made his desire for party unity clear and refused to answer questions regarding his previous falling out with Guffey.⁶⁸ The careful, skillful and amicable way Bryan conducted himself in Philadelphia aided in the subsequent coming together of the two Democratic organizations.

Fortunately both factions realized the urgency of getting together to avert the impending party schism which could only hurt the Bryan cause in the city. The Bryan forces made the first move toward unity by appointing Charles H. Dougherty as chairman of the Bryan campaign in Philadelphia. This move, prompted by Bryan and Kerr, pleased all the segments of the party because of the high regard that all Philadelphia Democrats, including Donnelly and Ryan, had for Dougherty. A real-estate broker by occupation, Dougherty had long been active in the affairs of the Democratic party.⁶⁹ He served in the Legislature back in the 1871-72 session and continued through the years to be knowledgeable concerning party affairs. Through his

⁶⁸Ibid., 16 September 1908.

⁶⁹Ibid., 21 August 1908.

leadership and the cooperation of both factions, an agreement was finally reached whereby all regular Democratic nominees would be accepted and supported by both groups except those legislative candidates who gained their nominations by Republican support. The Democrats decided to fuse with the reformers by supporting some of the Philadelphia Party and City Party nominees in these legislative districts. After a long summer of intra-party conflict, both Ryan and Donnelly predicted a big vote for Bryan which would exceed 90,000.⁷⁰ As the campaign moved to its most intense phase (starting in October) the Philadelphia Democrats began to consolidate their divergent forces to give Bryan their full support.

Back in mid-July, the national Democratic movement got a boost when John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers, and Samuel Gompers, president of the A. F. of L., announced their support of Bryan. This, no doubt, helped create a favorable response to the Democratic party by Philadelphia workers. Ex-City Chairman John A. Thornton and Magistrate Joseph S. Boyle reported on 18 September great Bryan gains in the northern part of West Philadelphia where many railroad employees lived. They also estimated that one fourth of the textile workers in the northeastern section of the city, men who normally voted Republican, were supporting Bryan. They further reported the significant fact

⁷⁰Ibid., 31 October 1908.

that the workers could not be intimidated or bamboozled into voting against Bryan.⁷¹ Bryan's last campaign was the only one in which the factor of intimidation can be dismissed, at least, in Philadelphia.

There were, of course, some isolated instances of economic pressures being exerted upon employees to vote for Taft, but the absence of complaints by workers or party leaders proves that coercive tactics were rarely used in the 1908 campaign. In an editorial entitled: "Bryan, Taft and the Trusts," the Record reported that S. S. Eveland, president of a trust in Philadelphia, posted a notice stating that recently decreased wages would not be increased if Bryan were elected. But that fact was not the main point of the editorial. The Record compared Taft's position to Bryan's position on trusts and pointed out that Taft assured his audiences that he advocated the regulation of the trusts. But, the Record went on to assert that the trusts were supporting Taft, who could not, therefore, be relied upon to curb the trusts.⁷²

In late October several hundred unemployed textile workers congregated at a vacant lot in Kensington to hear several Democratic orators blame the hard times on the Republicans. Edward McNulty, a textile worker, presided and

⁷¹Ibid., 18 September 1908.

⁷²Ibid., 28 September 1908.

estimated in his opening remarks that 20,000 textile workers in Philadelphia were unemployed. Michael Donohoe, the Democratic nominee for Congress, blamed the unemployment on the high tariff and the trusts, and concluded his remarks by declaring: "I stand where the Democratic party stands and where Samuel Gompers stands. . . ." The workers also heard Samuel J. Randall, Jr., the late congressman's son who left the party in 1896. Randall blasted the Republicans and said: "The panic was unnecessary but it was brought on by the barons of Wall Street, who, under the Republican tariff, are able to say whether or not the country shall prosper or starve."⁷³

For their campaign wind-up, the Republicans brought Uncle Joe Cannon, Speaker of the House, for a whirlwind speaking tour of the city. Cannon addressed large crowds in West Philadelphia, Kensington and at the Academy of Music. In all his speeches he advocated tariff revision but insisted that the revised schedules had to be based upon a solid, protective foundation. He conceded that Bryan had ability but pointed out that his chief ability was the facile way in which he deceived the people. To the workers he argued that the Republican party could be trusted for following a safe policy but "Lord only knows" what would happen if the Democrats gained power.⁷⁴

⁷³Ibid., 26 October 1908.

⁷⁴Ibid., 27 October 1908.

The Democrats realized that they could not carry Philadelphia, but in the final days of the campaign their optimism increased as they saw signs of greater support from the working class. William S. Vare, Recorder of Deeds and a leader in the Republican Machine, made the startling proclamation at a political rally on 29 October, that if Bryan were elected, the Southward Mills would close. He stated that John Burt, secretary-treasurer of the Southward Mills, told him of the plan to shut down. Burt, an active Republican, publicly denied the statement and explained that Vare misunderstood him in a previous conversation. Burt announced that as long as orders continued to come in that the mills would remain open and that their 5,000 workers would continue to have their jobs. The Record in commenting on the incident observed: "That favorite Republican argument for coercing reluctant workmen . . . was exposed in all its hollow falsity."⁷⁵ The whole episode signified that, while businessmen did not follow Bryan in 1908, they were not so frightened to resort to coercion or intimidation in his third canvass.

As the businessmen assumed a moderate stance on Bryan, organized labor stepped up their efforts in his behalf. Charles Hope, secretary of the Central Labor Union, called upon Philadelphia's 90,000 union members to give Bryan a big vote and also asked all union members to assist the Democratic

⁷⁵Ibid., 31 October 1908.

party workers at the polls on election day.⁷⁶

Despite the efforts of organized labor, Bryan again went down to defeat. He polled 75,000 votes to Taft's 185,000, which amounted to twenty-five per cent of the vote and equaled his 1900 percentage. As usual, only the sixth ward voted for Bryan. None of the congressional candidates did well. The aggregate number of votes cast for Democratic congressional candidates amounted to only twenty-one per cent of the total votes cast. In all the city contests the Machine swept to victory. Neither the Record nor the party leaders offered any excuses for the defeat in Philadelphia. Philadelphia Republicanism had become so habitual that everyone merely accepted it.

F. Thwarting Reform: The Political Fiasco of 1910

Even though the 1910 gubernatorial campaign related in no direct way to national issues, it did signify, however, the utter depths to which the Democratic party in Philadelphia had declined. The 1910 state-wide issue centered exclusively upon reform. The important factor about this campaign regarding the Democrats is that they thwarted the reform movement by refusing to cooperate with it and thereby indirectly aided the machine Republicans both in the city and state.

In November 1908 National Committeeman James Kerr died. Shortly after his death the Guffey people regained control

⁷⁶Ibid., 1 November 1908.

of the state organization and Col. Guffey assumed his old post as National Committeeman. Donnelly and Ryan continued to control the Philadelphia organization since the Bryan League simply disintegrated after the 1908 election. The old party bosses, therefore, controlled the Democratic organization and planned the 1910 campaign. The test of strength came when the state Democrats convened at Allentown in June to nominate a gubernatorial ticket. William H. Berry the reform Democrat and former State Treasurer, who exposed the Capitol scandal, made a valiant fight for the nomination, but the Guffeyites chose to confer the honor upon Webster Grim of Bucks County.⁷⁷ Grim epitomized rectitude and respectability. A very handsome man, he served in the state Senate and advocated all the right reform measures. In addition to his political activities, he served as a church organist, composed music, and enjoyed the fellowship of his lodge as Grand chief of the Knights of the Golden Eagle. On paper he had all the right qualifications and connections which prompted the New York Sun to observe that as State Senator he had been, "both useful and ornamental at Harrisburg."⁷⁸

The Berry forces carried a majority of the counties at the State Democratic convention but could not overcome the

⁷⁷See full account in the Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia) 16 June 1910 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1907-1913).

⁷⁸The New York Sun, 17 June 1910 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1907-13).

strength of the Democratic Machine in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia. Thus, Grim clinched the nomination when Philadelphia cast fifty of its fifty-two votes for him. The Berry Democrats, independents and reform Republicans, incensed at the results of the convention, accused Guffey of putting up a weak candidate and annexing the Democratic Machine to the Penrose Machine, thereby assuring the election of John Tener, the Republican nominee. The anti-Machine men of both parties quickly formed the Keystone party and nominated Berry for governor.

As the campaign progressed, the Keystone movement gained strength and the Democrats got weaker. Unfortunately, attempts during October to fuse the Democratic and Keystone parties failed. In the final weeks of the campaign the Democratic State Committee considered dropping its ticket and substituting Ex-Mayor Guthrie of Pittsburgh as the new nominee for Governor if the Keystone party would join in support of Guthrie. Grim even cancelled many speaking engagements in anticipation of a favorable response by the Keystoners. The Keystone party, however, chose to have no part in any plan which proposed to drop Berry from the top place on the ticket and, therefore, they refused to cooperate with the Democrats.⁷⁹

As the campaign came to a close, enthusiasm and support ran high for the Keystoners. Rudolph Blankenburg campaigned

⁷⁹The Philadelphia Record, 21 October 1910.

vigorously for a Keystone victory and predicted at a Philadelphia rally on 4 November that Berry would be elected Governor.⁸⁰ In addition to the Donnelly-Ryan organization, the only other support in Philadelphia for Webster Grim came from the Philadelphia Record, which had to fall back on the weak argument that party regularity necessitated supporting Grim.⁸¹

The devastating Democratic defeat of 1910 pushed the party in Philadelphia to its all time low during the whole Cleveland-Bryan era. In Philadelphia Webster Grim polled only 16,000 votes or six per cent of the total cast! Berry polled 86,000 or forty per cent while Tener carried the city polling 130,000 or fifty-four per cent of the vote. In the state Tener defeated Berry 412,000 to 382,000, while Grim placed a pitiable third with 129,000 votes. The net effect of the Democratic strategy and the Democratic canvass actually retarded reform. Had the Democrats nominated Berry, who himself was a Democrat, they would have won the gubernatorial race in 1910.

The Philadelphia vote made the Democratic party sicker than ever. Grim carried only Tommy Ryan's sixth ward while Berry carried twelve wards and demonstrated amazing strength throughout the city. The old Democratic Machine chose to back Grim, a figurehead, and thereby assured the dominance

⁸⁰Ibid., 4 November 1910.

⁸¹Ibid.

of the Republican Machine. The Democrats missed the opportunity for party resurgence in 1910 and, instead, chose to hang onto the small, insignificant sixth ward, the "old Sarum" of the Philadelphia Democracy.

In the congressional races the Democratic candidates fared slightly better than Grim because they managed to elect one congressman, Michael Donohoe, in the Fifth district. However, his election was accomplished by fusion with the Keystone party. He defeated Foulkrod by about 2,000 votes but he polled 16,866 Keystone votes to only 2,032 Democratic votes. In four of the remaining five districts the Democratic candidates for Congress polled fewer votes than the Keystone candidates. Only in the Fourth district did a Democratic candidate come in second place; but in that district no Keystone candidate ran! The aggregate number of Democratic votes cast for congressional candidates amounted to only eight per cent of the total, another all time low for the party.

CHAPTER VII

PHILADELPHIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERSHIP

In 1880 the Democratic party leadership in Philadelphia comprised many diverse but coherent elements. In religious affiliation, ethnic background, economic and social status the leaders of the Philadelphia Democracy, in varying degrees, epitomized the catholicity of the party. Irish politicians, middle class businessmen, Philadelphia blue bloods, native Americans, German Lutherans and the old Philadelphia Jewish community were all represented within the leadership levels of the party. Throughout the 80's, a decade of party unity, these many diverse leaders cooperated to make the Democratic party a vigorous minority force in the city. But, thirty years later the leadership of the party had changed dramatically since all the characteristics of catholicity had disappeared by 1910. It is the purpose of this chapter to focus on the shifts within the leadership levels of the party and to analyze the fundamental changes which occurred during the Cleveland-Bryan era in the Philadelphia branch of the national Democracy.

While the 80's can properly be characterized as the decade of hope, the next decade was a turbulent and critical

one for the struggling Democrats. Randall's death in 1890 not only ended an era in the life of the national Democracy, it also signalized the beginning of major leadership shifts in the Philadelphia party. The fight for Randall's congressional seat by William McAleer was the first step toward the Irish takeover of the Democratic party. In the next six chaotic years (1890-1896) the McAleer faction gained control of Randall's old district. But it was in 1896 that control of the entire Philadelphia party organization by the Irish was accomplished. Bryan's first battle dealt the death blow to those diverse elements of Democratic leadership which had so successfully contributed to the effectiveness and unity of the party in the 80's. At the leadership level the Bryan fight of '96 was the great turning point in the life of the Philadelphia Democracy because the Irish leaders gained complete mastery of the party when the businessmen and aristocrats walked out to join the Jeffersonian movement.

Through the first ten years of the new century, the decade of Democratic dissolution, the party merely limped along under the domination of two Irish political bosses, Charley Donnelly and Tommy Ryan. During this decade the Democrats suffered recurring defeats and became only a microscopic and ineffectual political force in the city. The Donnelly-Ryan Irish political club failed to attract leaders with diverse ethnic backgrounds. The crippled Democracy of

Philadelphia in this decade no longer had the support of patricians, middle class Protestants or businessmen who had contributed so much to the life of the party from 1880 to 1896.

Any attempt to rank political leaders invariably raises the question of what objective criteria were used to derive such rankings. It is, of course, impossible to point to a specific, concrete, objective test which would place Harrity above McMullen or Furth below Randall. The rankings, then, are arbitrary in the first definition of that word: "subject to individual will; discretionary."¹ A reading of the biographical references, obituaries and contemporary newspaper accounts of their activities, seems to make it clear that the eight men named as the most important Philadelphia Democrats during the 80's, deserved to be in that category. At the second level, the term leading Democrats of Philadelphia is used rather than the second level of Democratic leadership. Thus, some men who had little to do with the actual leadership of the organization were placed in this category because of their importance and influence in either the social life or business activity of the city. That some of the socially prominent men of Philadelphia and

¹American College Dictionary, text edition, 1948. Also, it should be noted that Professor Benson in his chapter "New York Party Leadership, 1834-1844" states that his top Democrats are: "Ranked somewhat arbitrarily. . . ." Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy, p. 64.

and some of the important businessmen of the city were Democrats reveals, in part, the nature of the Philadelphia Democracy.

A. The Upper Level: 1880-1890

In the 1880's the Democratic party in Philadelphia demonstrated strength and vitality as an effective minority force in the city. Part of that strength can be attributed to the upper level leadership of the party during this period. Eight men, in varying degrees, exercised the greatest influence in the development and orientation of the Philadelphia Democracy during this decade of hope. Their various backgrounds, their social standing, ethnic characteristics, political skills and ideological positions all reveal much about the nature of the Democratic party as it was represented in Philadelphia.

Of the eight Democrats classified in this study as the upper level leaders of the party in Philadelphia, Samuel Jackson Randall, Philadelphia's only Democratic congressman in the 1880's, attained a position of national prominence which ranks him above all the other Philadelphia Democrats of this period. Two of the eight leaders, John Cadwalader, Jr. and Richard Vaux were Philadelphia blue bloods and descendants of famous colonial families. Another two, Lewis C. Cassidy and William F. Harrity, were highly sophisticated Irish politicians who worked their way up and out of old Irish neighborhoods to positions of power in the party. A third

pair, Robert E. Pattison and James Gay Gordon, came from respectable middle class antecedents, worked together as lawyers and earned the respect of the independent and municipal reform elements in the city. William M. Singerly, an affluent businessman, wielded a great influence in the party as publisher of the Philadelphia Record, the city's most popular morning newspaper.

In religious affiliation two were Catholics, two were Presbyterians, one was a Methodist, one a Quaker and one an Episcopalian. Most of these men were active in their respective churches, though Cadwalader and Pattison stand out as being the most devout. Randall was least active in religious affairs since he did not join the church until a year before his death. William Singerly's religious affiliation is unknown.

All of these men, if not born wealthy, became affluent except Randall, who died a poor man. Of these eight upper level leaders five engaged in business activities, especially banking, concurrent with their political and legal careers. All eight names were recorded in Boyd's Blue Book, and each enjoyed the privilege of membership in Philadelphia clubs, though only Vaux and Cadwalader claimed membership in the very exclusive clubs. (Vaux was a member of the Philadelphia Club, while Cadwalader was affiliated with the Rittenhouse Club.)

Samuel Jackson Randall

On 13 April 1890 the ailing Sam Randall died in his small, frame house in Washington. His expected death brought to a close an era in the Philadelphia Democratic party. After a simple Presbyterian funeral service in Washington, a special train, furnished by the Pennsylvania Railroad, bearing Randall's remains, made its lugubrious journey back to his home town for the final rites and burial. His obsequies were as simple as his style of living. No magnificent state funeral, no long procession, no eloquent eulogies were offered for one whose rank, influence and station in life deserved all that. Yet, thousands of Philadelphians lined the streets to see the six-car funeral train wend its way across the Schuylkill until it reached Ridge Avenue and the Laurel Hill cemetery. The loyal men in Randall's river ward district, joined by party workers from other sections of the city, formed a line along Ridge Avenue to await the arrival of the cortege. Behind them were crowds of Philadelphians who came to honor the dead statesman.²

An imposing congressional delegation including Carlisle, Quay, McKinley and Cannon travelled with the funeral train. But more significant were the pall bearers, because each was a personal friend of Randall's and each, in his way, tells us something of the kind of support the late congressman

²Philadelphia Record, 18 April 1890.

had during his political career. The men who carried Randall to his grave included: Anthony J. Drexel, Philadelphia's most prestigious financier; Postmaster General John Wanamaker, the city's most important merchant; Samuel Bell, president of the Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank; George B. Roberts, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad. From his congressional district: William "Squire" McMullen, Randall's right hand man at the ward level, and Dallas Sanders, who helped plan party strategy in the city and the state for Randall. Other political leaders included: Ex-Governor Andrew Curtin, Senator Gorman of Maryland, Ex-Congressman William H. Sowden of Allentown, Congressman Blout of Georgia and Senator Barbour of Virginia. Finally, two journalist-friends and confidants, Alexander K. McClure of The Times (Philadelphia) and Charles A. Dana of the New York Sun, completed the list.

The final tribute given Randall reveals the complete confidence and trust that he inspired. The common Irish workers standing along Ridge Avenue did not come to honor a protectionist; they came to honor a friend; the businessmen did not come to honor a plutocrat (Randall died with no money),³ they came to honor one in whose judgment they had trusted almost implicitly. These rare qualities of leadership

³See A. K. McClure, Recollections of Half a Century, p. 449 for an account of the efforts of George Childs and A. J. Drexel in setting up a trust fund for Randall's wife necessitated by Randall's impoverished condition.

exhibited by Randall made him the peerless leader of the Philadelphia Democrats during the last decade of his life.

Born the son of a middle class Philadelphia lawyer and politician, Samuel Jackson Randall received his education at the University Academy at 4th and Arch streets.⁴ Though considered by his teachers to be intelligent, young Randall disliked books and never continued his formal education after he graduated from the academy at the age of seventeen. From early maturity he was drawn to the active rather than to the contemplative life. After working four years for a dry goods firm, he went into the wholesale iron business. In 1854 he followed in his father's political footsteps and won election to Councils as a Whig representing the old Locust ward. In 1856 he attended the Democratic national convention with his father, who, as a delegate campaigned vigorously for his personal friend James Buchanan. From henceforth the Randalls embraced the Democratic party. The next six years were exciting ones for Sam: he won election to the State Senate in 1858, lost in his reelection campaign of 1860, served a brief stint in the Civil War from 1861 to 1862 and won a seat in Congress in 1862, a seat he held until death.

Randall stood out among the small group of Democrats elected to the House during the war. Although not a lawyer,

⁴See Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. XV, pp. 350-351.

he quickly mastered the procedures of the House and soon got the reputation of being a strong and highly efficient committeeman. He gained national political recognition when, during the 43rd Congress (1873-75), he effectively thwarted the Republican attempt to pass the Force Bill.⁵ In what seemed a hopeless fight, Randall maneuvered successfully to defeat this measure, and thereby gained recognition as a clever parliamentary tactician.

The Democrats won control of the House in the 1874 elections thus making Randall a major contender for the Speakership. Even though he lost to his senior, Michael C. Kerr of Indiana, Randall accepted defeat with equanimity⁶ and took, as a consolation prize, the chairmanship of the Committee on Appropriations. In this position he mastered the minute details of the various governmental departments and was able to save the government some thirty million dollars during the 44th Congress (1875-76). When Speaker Kerr died in the summer of 1876, Randall was elected Speaker of the House over Cox of New York by a vote of 73 to 63 in the Democratic caucus. As the new Speaker he became centrally involved in settling the disputed election of 1876.

⁵See Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. III, p. 18.

⁶Randall said to the caucus: ". . . let the wish of the majority be the voice of all. From this moment the differences among ourselves must be at an end and we must thus present a united front to our adversaries. Our mission on this floor must be . . . to restore the government to its constitutional purposes and to expose the corruptness of the administration." Philadelphia Record, 14 April 1890 (obituary).

Although a staunch Tilden man, Randall persuaded his fellow Democrats to avert a national conflict by accepting the formation of a special commission to adjudicate the disputed election.⁷

The Democrats lost the House in 1880 but regained control in the 1882 elections. Randall, confident of being reelected Speaker, lost to John G. Carlisle of Kentucky. The pivotal tariff issue worked to Randall's disadvantage. The new men in the party wanted major revisions in the tariff and could no longer accept the "straddle" of the 1880 platform which Randall helped devise. The election of Carlisle over Randall proved that Randall's position on the tariff alienated the Western and Southern segments of the party in the same way that Cleveland's position on the currency issue did in the next decade.⁸

Despite his defeat for the Speakership in 1883, Randall remained a power in the national party. He effected a coalition of some forty Democrats in the House with the Republicans to thwart tariff reform during the 80's. As chairman of the Committee on Appropriations he ranked next

⁷See Frank B. Evans, Pennsylvania Politics, 1872-77, pp. 300-309.

⁸For a full account of the Speakership contest see James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle, Financial Statesman, pp. 64-75. Barnes quotes Henry Watterson as saying: "He /Carlisle/ stood for a principle and that principle has prevailed The South and the West elected Carlisle tonight on a principle. . . . It is the tariff and how it shall be revised." P. 72.

to Carlisle as the most influential Democrat in the House.⁹ His national influence began to wane in the summer of 1887 when Cleveland excluded him from the Oak View discussions on tariff reform.

Randall's district was normally Democratic when he first ran for Congress in 1862. However, he had to work and fight to keep the district. Some of his detractors (like William M. Singerly, publisher of the Philadelphia Record) asserted that Randall was a "kept" politician by the Republicans and the high tariff businessmen. It will probably never be revealed to what extent John Wanamaker, George Childs or Anthony J. Drexel contributed to Randall's campaign chest. But it is significant to observe that neither these men nor any of the other plutocrats with whom Randall was friendly lived in the Third congressional district. Randall's wealthy admirers in the Philadelphia business community were not his constituents. His constituents were Irish and German workers of the lowest economic strata in the city. (This point is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII "The Grass Roots Strength of the Party.")

As the city and the state were becoming strongly Republican, Randall actually feared that he would lose his seat by reapportionment. That is why he demonstrated interest

⁹Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. III, p. 19.

in Emanuel Furth's candidacy for the legislature in 1882.¹⁰ Randall wanted to make sure that a sufficient number of Democrats would be elected to the legislature in order to prevent the Republicans from carving up his congressional district.

There is not, at present, any concrete evidence to prove that Randall ever entered into a deal with the Republicans to keep his congressional seat. It is, however, abundantly clear that many influential Republicans liked him and opposed changing the lines of the Third district. In 1884 Thomas V. Cooper, chairman of the Republican State Committee, wrote to Randall:

You are one of the few Democrats I like. An effort will be made to deprive you of your district in the coming Congressional apportionment and it will be more difficult to resist owing to the large Republican majority. I will resist it, and think you can aid me without political or other impropriety by re-asserting to me and to others, in you way, that tariff interests will be safe in your hands.

This letter Randall passed on to one of his confidants, Alexander McClure, publisher of the Philadelphia Times, who advised him to "answer courteously and say nothing."¹¹

Three years later in 1887 when the legislature did pass a reapportionment act, Republican Senator J. Donald Cameron

¹⁰Randall expressed his interest in Furth's campaign in a letter to John Doyle on 1 November 1882. Randall Papers. Furth did win the election to the lower house as the representative from the sixteenth ward.

¹¹Thomas V. Cooper to S. J. Randall, 29 November 1884, Randall Papers.

intervened to preserve Randall's district.¹² There is no doubt that the high ranking state Republicans, as well as the high tariff businessmen, had ulterior motives in keeping Randall in Congress. There is, however, no evidence to support Randall's participation in the scheme in 1887 which assured his return to Congress.

In 1888 Randall's health began to fail, the same year that the Republicans gained control of the House in the November elections. These two circumstances contributed to the ultimate decline of his political power both nationally and locally.

Randall's tenacious defense of the protective tariff won for him a small but devoted band of followers. Conversely, he lost support nationally by refusing to support the Democratic position of tariff reform and thereby lost the Speakership in 1883¹³ and won little support for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1884.

As a city political leader Randall helped to effect coalitions with the independent and reform Republicans who stood for clean city government, as demonstrated by his advocacy of Samuel G. King for mayor in 1881 and of Robert E. Pattison for governor in 1882. (These two campaigns are described in Chapter I.)

¹²Sidney I. Pomerantz, "Samuel Jackson Randall: Protectionist Democrat, 1863-1890," pp. 242-245.

¹³James A. Barnes, "Protection, Politics and Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania History, Vol. 31, pp. 10-11.

Throughout the 80's Randall remained the leading and most important Democrat in Philadelphia, as his continual reelection to Congress gave him a power base from which to operate. He circulated with ease among Philadelphia blue bloods and financiers, yet he was not born an aristocrat and owned little property. At the opposite end of the social scale, Randall could work with the semi-literate boss of the fourth ward, Squire McMullen, whose devotion to Randall equalled John Wanamaker's.¹⁴ In short, Randall's political and personal friendships were broad and diverse. In his native city he was respected by all sorts and conditions of men, a reputation which aided him immeasurably in his political career. Unfortunately for the Democrats, only a few weeks after his death the vultures in the party began to swoop down upon the Third district for the pickings. In fact, after 1890 the Third district was never the Democratic stronghold it had been during the twenty-eight years that Randall represented it. While his death was only one cause of the decline of the Democratic party in his district and throughout the city, it was, nevertheless, an important one.

Richard Vaux

Richard Vaux moved in the circles of the socially elite of Philadelphia. Born into an old Philadelphia Quaker family,

¹⁴When McMullen heard of Randall's weakened condition in April 1890, he (like John Wanamaker) went to Washington to spend a week at Randall's bedside.

he inherited wealth and also the Quaker concern for social questions, a characteristic of his sect. His father Roberts Vaux was a penologist and a jurist. The younger Vaux received his education from private tutors, read law and passed the bar examination at the age of twenty! In 1838, at the age of twenty-one, he visited London and called upon Andrew Stevenson, the American Minister at the Court of St. James. Stevenson had just lost his private secretary and was so impressed with Vaux's ability that he appointed him to fill the vacancy.¹⁵

After serving as Stevenson's secretary for a year, Vaux returned to Philadelphia in 1839, engaged in a successful law practice, ran several times for mayor and finally got elected in 1856. When defeated for reelection he turned to the chief interest of his father: prison reform. Along with his law practice and his duties as Inspector of the State Prison, he wrote profusely on the subjects of crime, punishment and the rehabilitation of criminals.¹⁶ His careful reports written over the years on the conditions at Eastern State Penitentiary number more than fifty volumes.

A Bourbon Democrat, Vaux did not depart from what he considered a fundamental principle regarding the Constitution during the Civil War. He held that the Union was created by the States, and therefore, the States had the right to sever

¹⁵Makers of Philadelphia, p. 144.

¹⁶Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. I, p. 246.

their connections with the Union. Needless to say, he was a very quiet Democrat during the war.

Even though he held no elective office during the eighties, Vaux was a power in the councils of the Democratic party. Prior to 1880 he served as chairman of the Philadelphia County organization, made up of the Randall Democrats as contrasted with the rival Wallace faction headed by George McGowan. With the rapprochement of 1880, the two organizations merged, and Vaux continued to be a man of influence in the party. He was both friend and confidant to Randall, as the correspondence between them clearly indicates. Randall depended heavily upon Vaux's judgement concerning the upper level of the party as he depended upon Squire McMullen for his grass roots contact.¹⁷

Vaux remained a conservative constructionist all of his life and constantly fought against a strong central government. In a speech in 1882 he declared the Democrats to be, "the only party that can work for real reform. It is the party of cheap, real and honest government."¹⁸

¹⁷Randall and Vaux corresponded frequently about political matters. Sometimes Randall would ask Vaux's advice in answering letters from important Philadelphia Democrats. When General Isaac Wistar wrote to Randall on 12 December 1879 to suggest a course of action for the Democratic party, Randall passed the letter on to Vaux for his evaluation. (See Chapter I, p. 6 for excerpts of this letter.)

¹⁸See Speech by Richard Vaux in "Pennsylvania Politics--Local After 1860" (Pamphlet Collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

He sought no other elective office after his defeat for reelection to the mayoralty in 1858; yet in 1890, when he was an old man, his party chose him to be the candidate for the unexpired congressional term of his late friend, Sam Randall. He did not, however, follow the Randall position on the tariff. He justified his support of lower tariffs by invoking his Jeffersonian conviction that the government ought not involve itself in the economic life of the nation to advance the vested interests of certain businessmen. In the campaign of 1890 the Philadelphia Record enthusiastically endorsed him because he believed: ". . . in his city and in his country and in the ability of the American people to manage their own affairs with very little governmental assistance."¹⁹

John Cadwalader, Jr.

Though patrician and conservative, John Cadwalader, Jr. could not be accused of being aloof. He participated actively in the life of the Democratic party and served for many years as president of the Young Men's Democratic Association, an organization he helped to found in 1880. In 1881 he declined the Democratic nomination for mayor in favor of Samuel G. King, who was popular with the independents and municipal reform Republicans. In 1882 he was the unsuccessful Democratic nominee for Congress from the First district. He enjoyed a good relationship with the Irish

¹⁹Philadelphia Record, 14 May 1890.

segment of the party, as attested by his strong support of William F. Harrity.²⁰

Cadwalader was conservative, if not reactionary, in both temperament and political ideology. He lived in the past as indicated by his patriotic interests, his church activities and his staunch conviction that strict Jeffersonian constitutional government had to be restored in the Republic. His papers in the Pennsylvania Historical Society deal mostly with his work in the Society of the Sons of the War of 1812. His continued membership in and loyalty to S. Peter's Church, 3rd and Pine, also reveal his unwillingness to change because of new fashions or styles. When the aristocrats were leaving the old Anglican parishes of Christ Church, S. Peter's, and S. Paul's to join the newer more fashionable parishes of Holy Trinity, S. James and S. Mark's, Cadwalader remained an active communicant and vestryman at the parish of his baptism located in a neighborhood no longer fashionable or elite.

Cadwalader graduated in 1862 from the University of Pennsylvania, then the socially elite Philadelphia institution of higher learning. As an undergraduate he joined Delta Phi, one of the most exclusive social fraternities on

²⁰On 21 July 1892, Harrity wrote to thank Cadwalader for his recent "courteous and cordial" letter and "expression of approval of my selection as chairman of the Democratic National Committee" and went on to say: "I am sure you can and will be useful during the coming campaign. . . ." Cadwalader Papers.

the Penn campus. Throughout his life he maintained a strong interest in the university, and followed in the family tradition of serving on its board of trustees.²¹

A reactionary in political ideology, Cadwalader exalted the Jeffersonian concept of states' rights and the restrictive provisions in the Constitution regarding federal authority. As late as 1904 he advocated the repeal of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution.²² A strong Cleveland man, he served as Collector of the Port (by presidential appointment) from 1885 to 1889 and kept up cordial relations with the ex-President after his retirement from the White House.²³ In 1896 he left the party of Bryan to support the Gold Democratic ticket, but returned to the Democrats after the Bryan storm subsided.

A wealthy man both by birth and continued financial activity (from 1889-97 he was president of the Trust Company of North America and later was president of the New York and Baltimore Transportation Line and the Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamship Co.), he contributed generously

²¹Evening Bulletin, 12 March 1925 (obituary).

²²See "Address by Hon. John Cadwalader," 6 May 1904, Cadwalader Papers.

²³In a birthday letter to Cleveland, Cadwalader called Cleveland's reelection after his defeat: "The greatest public expression of confidence ever extended to any citizen." Cadwalader to Cleveland, 16 March 1906. Cadwalader Papers.

to the coffers of the Democratic party.²⁴

Cadwalader deserves a place among the leading Democrats of Philadelphia even though he does not appear to have been as influential as the seven other men who were the upper level party leaders of the 1880's. His social position in Philadelphia, his financial contributions to the party, and his active political involvement add up to a combination of attributes which justify his inclusion into this group of upper level Democrats. Vaux was a more influential party leader with aristocratic connections as impressive as Cadwalader's, but Cadwalader's combined attributes of leadership are more impressive than those exhibited by the leaders of the second level of party leadership.

Lewis C. Cassidy

Lewis C. Cassidy fought his way out of poverty and the old Moyamensing district to become one of the most feared and admired politicians in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. Both of Cassidy's parents emigrated from Ireland and settled in New York City, where their son was born. They moved to Moyamensing (later the fourth ward in the city after the consolidation) when Lewis was only three

²⁴No doubt that Harrity was referring to Cadwalader's financial support when he said: "I am sure you can be useful during the coming campaign." See footnote 20. Cadwalader also contributed to the campaign fund of Senator Gray of Delaware in 1894. See Gray's acknowledgement to Cadwalader dated 21 October 1894, Cadwalader Papers.

months old. When Lewis was ten his father died thus increasing the already heavy burden upon this working-class Irish family. Despite these obstacles, Cassidy graduated from Central High School in 1847 at the age of eighteen; and in two short years he was admitted to the Philadelphia Bar after studying law under Benjamin Harris Brewster. Very rapidly he became the popular idol of the Moyamensing Irish and more especially of the Moya Boys, the young Irish toughs who controlled the Moyamensing Hose Company. In 1851 he was elected to the State House of Representatives and in a short time his legal ability was recognized by the members of that body when he was named Secretary of the Judiciary Committee. He declined renomination in order to devote all of his energies to his law practice and to the politics of his home district. In 1856 he was elected District Attorney for the consolidated City of Philadelphia, when only twenty-seven years of age. Although that was the last elected position he held, his power in the party increased until he became one of the key leaders in the city, a position he securely retained until his sudden death in 1889.²⁵

Cassidy has left no papers and during his life he wrote no discursive essays on his political philosophy or ideology. Yet from his career and political action, his ideology seems quite clear. Unlike Randall or Vaux or Cadwalader, he was not a traditional conservative Jeffersonian.

²⁵Public Ledger, 19 November 1889 (obituary).

He was fundamentally a tough ward boss who, through education and native ability, rose to a high level of political sophistication in the staid Philadelphia Democracy. He supported Douglas vigorously in 1860; in fact, he led the Pennsylvania Douglas faction at the convention, an act which separated him from Sam Randall. He had no use for Southern sympathizers in the party and helped recruit troops in Philadelphia for the war against the South.²⁶

Among the major leaders of the Democracy in Philadelphia Cassidy stands out as the one who supported Negroes both in their efforts to be freed from slavery and in their later attempts to be accepted politically as equals. As a member of the Board of Education he labored for schools for the colored, and in his political manipulations he was the only Democrat who could deliver a significant segment of the black vote for Democratic candidates. He accomplished this for Robert E. Pattison when he ran for City Controller and for Governor, and for James Gay Gordon when he ran for the Court of Common Pleas.²⁷

While he may have had a sympathetic concern for Negroes, Cassidy could in no way be classified as a reformer dedicated to the broad uplift of society. Although he worked diligently

²⁶Makers of Philadelphia, p. 182.

²⁷See Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. III, p. 34 and also Samuel Hudson, Pennsylvania and Its Public Men, pp. 341-342 for an account of Cassidy's popularity among Negroes.

for the rights of Negroes and succeeded in 1871 in having the State Democracy endorse in its platform a reaffirmation of the constitutional rights of Negroes, he was, nevertheless, primarily a boss politician who cleverly played the power game to his advantage.

Cassidy managed to get his former law student, Robert E. Pattison, nominated for Governor in 1882,²⁸ a major accomplishment for the party because Pattison put together a coalition of independents, reform Republicans and Democrats which assured his election. Ironically, however, it was Pattison's appointment of Cassidy as Attorney General that alienated the independents and reform Republicans from the new governor, for they wanted no Irish boss politician in Pattison's cabinet. Both the Times and the Record vehemently denounced Cassidy's appointment as being inimical to the cause of reform. Notwithstanding these criticisms, Cassidy proved to be a superior Attorney General. Alexander McClure, who earlier attacked Cassidy in the Times had to admit that: "Not one of the many eminent men who have filled the office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania made a cleaner or better record as law officer of the Commonwealth than did Lewis C. Cassidy."²⁹

Though he followed a familiar pattern of moving out of the old Irish neighborhood into the fourth ward to a

²⁸Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. III, p. 34.

²⁹A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 545.

commodious mansion on 6th Street near Chestnut and later to Germantown, he never lost touch with his supporters at the ward and district level. An ardent Catholic, who opposed loose divorce laws when a legislator, he died in the faith of his people.

William F. Harrity

The son of an Irish immigrant father, William F. Harrity was born in Wilmington in 1850. As a young man he moved to Philadelphia and was graduated from LaSalle College in 1870. He taught Latin and Mathematics at his alma mater for a year and was awarded the A.M. degree in 1871. After his short teaching stint, he subsequently studied law under Lewis Cassidy and was admitted to the bar in 1873. In 1880 he formed a law partnership with James Gay Gordon which lasted four years. Under Cassidy's tutelage he learned not only law but the inner workings of the Philadelphia Democratic party.³⁰

Harrity made his political debut in 1882 when he successfully united the Philadelphia Democratic delegation behind the move to nominate Robert E. Pattison for governor. There were split delegations in thirteen of the city wards and it was to Harrity that Cassidy delegated the responsibility of uniting these delegates to support Pattison. Earlier Cassidy had succeeded in getting Harrity elected chairman of the Democratic City Committee. It was in his

³⁰Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. III, p. 161.

capacity as chairman that Harrity worked adroitly for Pattison without causing factional schism.³¹

In 1884 Harrity became a staunch ally of Sam Randall and, as a delegate to the Democratic national convention, he stood steadfast behind Randall and refused to support Cleveland. On the final ballot, after Randall had withdrawn, Harrity voted for Senator Bayard of Delaware, a symbolic gesture of his final and irreversible support of Randall.³²

In 1885 Harrity was appointed Postmaster of Philadelphia by Cleveland and discharged his duties with exceptional executive skill. Upon his retirement as Postmaster (after Cleveland's defeat for reelection), many prominent businessmen of Philadelphia sponsored a testimonial dinner for him, at which time he was praised by John Wanamaker and others for his efficient running of the postoffice.³³

Sam Randall once said of Harrity: "He is possessed of executive ability of the highest order, and as a political organizer he has no superior in Pennsylvania."³⁴ That brief summary explains much about Harrity. He had no political philosophy or ideology. He was a political opportunist in the best sense of that term and managed to influence the councils of the mighty by walking the Democratic Party tightrope. Harrity seemed to know instinctively

³¹Evening Bulletin, 17 April 1912 (obituary).

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, p. 164.

the opportune time to shift his political allegiance. He started his political career in Cassidy's office. In the early 1880's he became a staunch Randall man, and by the middle of the decade he was one of Cleveland's leading supporters in Philadelphia. An influential and leading Philadelphia Democrat in the 1880's, he reached the pinnacle of his political power in the 1890's when he served as national chairman of the party and managed Cleveland's national campaign in 1892.

Robert E. Pattison

Robert E. Pattison stands in sharp contrast to the patricians Cadwalader and Vaux and to the professional Irish politicians Cassidy and Harrity in the Philadelphia Democratic party. Born in a middle class Methodist parsonage, Pattison remained throughout his life a model of respectability and rectitude. Pattison (along with Cadwalader) continued to be a devout churchman until death. Frequently he served as a delegate to the various Conferences of the Methodist Church, and when he died both his pastor and the local bishop officiated at the funeral.³⁵

Pattison graduated in 1870 from Central High School with honors and then went to study law under Lewis Cassidy.

³⁵The statement by David Pivar in his article "Theocratic Businessmen and Municipal Reform 1870-1900" in Pennsylvania History, Vol. 33, 1966, p. 295 that "Pattison was a Catholic" is incorrect. See Public Ledger, 2 August 1904 (obituary).

In 1873, at the age of twenty-three he passed the bar examination and in four short years he won election as City Controller by a slim majority of 1,962 votes. Even though Cassidy taught him the art of politics and promoted his candidacy, Pattison managed to escape any connection with the rough-and-tumble side of ward politics associated with Cassidy. In 1880 Pattison won reelection by 15,000 votes, the year Hancock lost the city by 20,000 votes. Two years later, by Cassidy's design and Harrity's strategy, Pattison won the Democratic nomination for governor and went on to defeat his Republican opponent in the November election.³⁶

Both as Controller of Philadelphia and as Governor, Pattison advanced the interests of reform by practicing frugality and not by advocating sweeping changes in the structure of the government. The Public Ledger in commenting upon his administration as City Controller said: "He sat upon the chest," and "The effect of his firmness and simple business honesty was felt even in Councils."³⁷

After his first retirement as governor he turned to banking and accepted the presidency of the Chestnut Street National Bank. Also, during this interlude of political retirement, Cleveland appointed him chairman of the Pacific Railway Investigation Commission in 1887.

³⁶Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 397-398.

³⁷The Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 2 August 1904 (obituary).

Pattison continued to be a power in the Philadelphia Democratic party throughout the next decade of the 1890's. He was elected to a second term as governor in 1890 but failed to be elected mayor of Philadelphia in 1895. He suffered his only gubernatorial defeat in 1902. Even though Pattison remained an influential Philadelphia Democrat until his death in 1904, he made no lasting contribution to public life except for his example of good, clean government. In short, his administrations as City Controller and Governor were honest, businesslike, and pedestrian. The Public Ledger accurately described his characteristics of leadership in an editorial on the day of his death:

The conspicuous place which Pattison held in the popular respect and confidence through this long period was due to no personal advantages of wealth or social position, to no extraordinary intellectual endowments, nor yet to the power of political influences or intrigue. It was due simply to his simple integrity of character and the conscientious duty he brought to every public trust. 38

James Gay Gordon

James Gay Gordon was born in Philadelphia in 1855 and came from Scotch-Irish stock, an inheritance of which he was proud. His father, a grocer, ran a shop in the fourteenth ward at the corner of 13th and Poplar streets. He graduated from Central High School, read law under Lewis Cassidy and was admitted to the bar in 1876. Like his two political

38 Ibid.

contemporaries, Harrity and Pattison, he learned the art of politics from Cassidy.³⁹ As a young man he moved to 1732 North 13th Street in the 20th ward. From this Republican ward Gordon launched his political career when he won election to the State Senate in 1880. From the beginning of his political career Gordon lined up with the reform elements in the party. Speaking before the Young Men's Democratic Association in 1882, Gordon described the Democratic Party as being progressive because it took to heart the phrase in the preamble of the Constitution in which the government was 'to "promote the general welfare." He applied this to two contemporary issues: the reform of corrupt governmental agencies and the regulation of corporation and trusts. Therefore, he rallied to Pattison in his gubernatorial bid, and after Pattison's election in 1882 Gordon became a leader of the Pattison Democrats in the State Senate and also one of the Governor's most trusted confidants.⁴⁰ He declined renomination to the State Senate in order to return to the practice of law. In 1885 Pattison appointed Gordon to fill an unexpired term as Judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 3 in Philadelphia and in the following year he ran for a full term and was elected by over 10,000 votes when the rest of the Democratic ticket

³⁹Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 246-247.

⁴⁰See the Philadelphia Record, 7 October 1910, for a reprint of Gordon's speech of 1882 (Gordon Scrapbook: 1907-1913).

went down to defeat. He appealed to independents, municipal reformers and to a fair number of business men. E. W. Clark, the banker; Justus Strawbridge, the merchant; and Henry C. Lea, the historian, all supported him in the 1886 campaign.

As a judge Gordon was admired by Philadelphia middle-class Protestants for his moral rectitude. He soon got the reputation of being the tough judge on dives, bawdy houses and gamblers who promoted illegal boxing matches in the city.

Though Gordon considered himself a reformer and a progressive in the 80's, in retrospect his role as reformer was quite limited and his role as a progressive was negligible. In the decade of the 80's he was young and energetic, which explains why the Record took him to task in an editorial for criticizing the old leaders of the party whom he attacked for not being progressive.⁴¹ Gordon, however, never specifically defined his progressivism.

Though he was a good example of his middle class Protestant upbringing, he could never rise above that position. In discussing immigration, for example, he was not content in using the old economic argument to protect workers as the reason for restricting incoming foreigners. Rather, he indicated his ethnic bias by opposing the opening

⁴¹Concerning this speech on the need for a progressive Democratic Party the Record termed it "the language of a young man who feels his oats." Philadelphia Record, 8 July 1882.

of American gates to new immigrants because they did not practice good American virtues. "Read the census statistics," he declared, "as to the growing illiteracy of your foreign population. Morality! Go dredge the slums of your cities; go spend the day in the criminal courts; go visit the prisons and poor houses. Respect for the law! Ask New Orleans, ask Chicago, ask New York."⁴²

An influential Democrat in the 1880's, Gordon became a major power in the next decade as leader of the insurgent Democrats who tried to capture control of the regular party organization.

William M. Singerly.

William M. Singerly held no official position in the Democratic party during the 80's, but he exercised a great influence in the circles of the party. His influence remained constant during this period and reached its peak in 1894 when he became the Democratic nominee for governor.

An affluent businessman, Singerly was born to wealth and used it to advance his political aspirations. His father owned controlling interest in the Germantown Passenger Railway Co., and when he died Singerly inherited \$750,000 worth of equity in the company. Prior to his father's death, Singerly managed this street railway, put it on a firmer financial basis and made more money for the company. In 1877 he purchased the Philadelphia Record and started his publishing

⁴²Speech before the Scotch-Irish Association as reported in the Philadelphia Press on 12 February 1892. (Gordon Scrapbook, 1890-97.)

and journalistic career. Under his leadership the Record became the morning paper with the largest circulation in the city.⁴³

An avowed Democrat, Singerly made the Record a chief exponent for the Democracy, a unique position among the major Philadelphia papers. The only other major paper in the city which ever gave the Democrats any support was Alexander McClure's independent Times. The Record not only reported on the activities of the Democrats, it helped shape policy and mould public opinion through its editorial page. In party disputes, whether ideological or factional, the Record always took a position. In general political outlook the Record lined up for the traditional Democratic position of a very limited, non-interfering government which would permit maximum freedom for the citizenry.

The Record was always somewhat embarrassed by the strength of Sam Randall. Singerly continually opposed Randall's protectionist position, and the columns of the Record frequently reminded the readers that tariff revision was the cardinal principle of the Democracy. Often the Record charged that Randall was a Republican in disguise, which, no doubt, contributed to the suspicion that Randall worked a deal with the Republicans to keep his seat in Congress. As a leading Cleveland Democrat, Singerly worked

⁴³Makers of Philadelphia, p. 192.

closely with Harrity in successfully wresting the control of patronage from Randall during the last two years of Cleveland's first administration.

With the political decline and finally the death of Randall, Singerly's prestige increased and reached its height in the decade of the 1890's.

B. Leading Philadelphia Democrats: Second Level - 1880-1890

Some twenty men could be classified as leading Philadelphia Democrats of the second level because they made significant contributions to the strength of the party but did not during the 80's, achieve the status of their contemporaries described above. However, their influence within the party tells something about the kind of men the Democrats attracted.

Rittenhouse Square Democrats

Eight of the twenty men in this second level of leadership can properly be classed as blue bloods or Rittenhouse Square Democrats. They circulated in the upper level of Philadelphia Society, belonged to the prestigious clubs and could also be called the "silk stocking set." Five were Episcopalians, the proper religion for Philadelphia gentlemen, and two were Catholics. All were members of the bar.

James and John Campbell,⁴⁴ father and son, were part of the Catholic aristocracy in Philadelphia. Judge James Campbell's fidelity to both the Catholic church and to the Democratic party was as regular and consistent as the daily routine of eating and sleeping. His political career reached its peak before the Civil War, when he served as Postmaster General in President Pierce's cabinet. He was an active member of S. Mary's, the old Catholic parish in Society Hill, of the Hibernian Society and, of course, of the Democratic Party. He attended nearly every State and National Democratic Party Convention as a delegate since the time of his entrance into politics. His son John followed in his footsteps, became active in politics in the 70's when he succeeded Lewis Cassidy on the Board of Education in 1875. Like his father, he attended nearly every Democratic State National Convention since the beginning of his political career. He was appointed Surveyor of the Port in 1885, a position he held throughout Cleveland's first administration. He was also active in Catholic charities as well as in social and political affairs. The elder Campbell died in 1893 but his son remained an active Democrat throughout the turbulent decade of the 90's.

George W. Biddle,⁴⁵ one of Philadelphia's outstanding lawyers, came from a distinguished blue blood family, one as

⁴⁴See the Public Ledger, 28 January 1893, for the obituary of James Campbell; see Who's Who in Pennsylvania (1904) for a biographical sketch of John Campbell.

⁴⁵See the Public Ledger, 30 April 1897 (obituary).

important as the Cadwalader family. He studied law under his father and is primarily known for his talent in the legal profession. He represented the Mormons before the Supreme Court when they contested the Edmunds Act, which prohibited polygamy. He also was one of the lawyers who represented Samuel J. Tilden in the disputed election of 1876. He maintained a life-long interest in the Democratic party, though the only public office he held was delegate to the State Constitutional Convention of 1873. Widely respected for his intellectual ability and balanced judgement, Biddle served as mediator between the two rival factions of the party and presided over meetings of reconciliation in December, 1894. Like most of his aristocratic contemporaries, he moved from his childhood residence in Society Hill to 1226 Spruce Street and later to 1624 Walnut Street, but, like Cadwalader, he kept his church membership at old S. Peter's.

S. Davis Page,⁴⁶ another pewholder at S. Peter's, was politically a much more active Democrat than George Biddle. A prominent member of the Philadelphia bar, Page graduated from Yale College ('59) and Harvard Law ('62) and commenced his political career in 1876 when he won election to the Common Council from the fifth ward. He ran unsuccessfully for City Treasurer in 1879, but won his bid for re-election to Councils in 1882. From 1883-84 he served Robert

⁴⁶ See Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I, pp. 336-338; also the Philadelphia Record, 12 October 1921 (obituary).

E. Pattison's unexpired term as City Controller but was unsuccessful in winning a full term in 1884. In 1886 Cleveland appointed him Sub-Treasurer of the U.S. at Philadelphia, a post he held until 1890. In 1890 he became president of the Quaker City National Bank and also a director of the Merchants' Trust Company. While very active in party affairs in the 80's, Page turned to banking in the 90's and dropped most of his political interests then. He, too, held membership in the right social clubs (Rittenhouse, University, Harvard, etc.) and also maintained an interest in several patriotic societies.

John and William Bullitt,⁴⁷ father and son, had almost identical political careers though the elder (John) is more famous because of his sponsorship of the new Charter for Philadelphia, popularly known as the Bullitt Bill. Both were conservative politically and both deserted the Democratic party in 1896 to help form the Jeffersonian party.

Born on a Kentucky plantation, John C. Bullitt received his education at Centre College and the University of Lexington. He came to practice law in Philadelphia in 1849, where he began his legal, business and political careers. When the Whig party folded he joined the Democrats and remained an ardent political conservative for the rest of his

⁴⁷For further information on John C. Bullitt see the following: Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the Nineteenth Century, Vol. II, pp. 79-81; Makers of Philadelphia, p. 15; the Public Ledger, 26 August 1902 (obituary). For a biographical sketch of William C. Bullitt see the Public Ledger, 23 March 1914 (obituary).

life. He defended the doctrine of states' rights and believed fervently that the Civil War could have been averted.

As a corporation lawyer John Bullitt gained an unsurpassed reputation in Philadelphia. He supervised the major task of reorganizing the giant banking house of Jay Cooke and Co., when it collapsed in 1873. John Bullitt's legal firm also served as counsel to the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad.

John Bullitt's son, William, was born in Philadelphia and graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Virginia Law School. In 1882 he won election to the Legislature from the fashionable eighth ward and introduced his father's famous charter for Philadelphia which provided for the centralization of several municipal departments under the Mayor's office. Like his father, he also turned to a business career. In 1885 he joined the Norfolk & Western Railway and rose to the position of vice-president. He could not withstand the Bryan storm and, therefore, helped to organize the Jeffersonians in 1896. His allegiance to the Gold Democrats was short-lived; after the '96 campaign he became an independent Republican.

Even though of Southern aristocratic origin, the Bullitts circulated freely among the Philadelphia aristocracy and became part of it. They had no connections with the old Anglican Society Hill aristocracy, but they rented their pews at the fashionable Rittenhouse Square parish of

the Holy Trinity.

Dallas Sanders⁴⁸ tried to convince Philadelphians that he was no "silk stocking Democrat."⁴⁹ But his proper Episcopalian affiliation at S. Stephen's Church, his membership in the Philadelphia Club, his residence at 1225 Locust street, all reveal his identification with Philadelphia's upper crust. A staunch and devoted Randall man, Sanders retired from politics after his friend and mentor died in 1890.

Sanders graduated from Western Pennsylvania University and then went to study law under his cousin George M. Dallas. His successful election to the Common Council from the seventh ward in 1882 marked the beginning of his short political career. Known for his competence and honesty, he received the endorsement of the Committee of 100, a municipal reform organization, in the 1882 campaign. In 1885 he lost his bid for Sheriff. His close association with Randall resulted in his election in 1887 as chairman of the State Democratic party, a position he held for one year. After Randall's death, Sanders turned to business and eventually became president of the Wayne Title and Trust Co., and also of the Union Dime Bank of Philadelphia.

⁴⁸See Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the Nineteenth Century, Vol. III, pp. 368-370; Who's Who in Pennsylvania (1908), p. 537, and the Public Ledger, 28 May 1907 (obituary).

⁴⁹See the column "Men and Things" by Penn in the Evening Bulletin, 31 May 1907, for a description of Sanders and his attempt to identify with the common people of Philadelphia (Gordon Scrapbook: personal papers, 1907-13).

The Businessmen

Three of the men at the second leadership level of the party were primarily leaders in the business community. They were highly respected members of the Philadelphia community, but none descended from an aristocratic family.

Franklin B. Gowen⁵⁰ and George F. Baer⁵¹ both held the position of president of the Reading Railroad. Gowen, born in Mt. Airy, pursued a law education, was legal counsel for the Reading road and became president of the company in 1870. He actively supported the Democrats in the 1880's. George F. Baer was a much more important figure in business and politics. He came from German Reformed stock and, after his appointment as legal counsel to the Reading Railroad, he became a dual resident of Philadelphia and Reading. Most of his social and family life centered in Reading, but he maintained a strong interest in the politics of Philadelphia. His vast business influence can be attributed, in part, to the good working relationship he had with J. P. Morgan. With Morgan's backing he reorganized the Reading Co. in 1895. In 1901 he became president of this road as well as the Jersey Central. He supported the Democratic party up to 1896 when he joined the Jeffersonians. When the Jeffersonian movement expired he became a Republican.

⁵⁰See Biographical Encyclopedia of Pennsylvania of the Nineteenth Century, p. 627.

⁵¹See Who's Who in Pennsylvania (1908) p. 28 and the Public Ledger, 27 April 1914 (obituary).

As a young man Henry D. Welsh⁵² left his native town of York to come to Philadelphia to look for a job. With only a few pennies in his pocket, he began employment as a salesman in a dry goods firm and worked his way up in the company. After years of hard work and good luck, he became a prominent businessman in the city. By the 1870's he served on the boards of directors of some half dozen corporations. An active Democrat, he was offered by Cleveland the post of Controller of the Currency during his first administration. Welsh declined the appointment because he did not want to curtail his business activities. He could not follow Bryan and chose to support the Jeffersonians in 1896.

Welsh was also active in charitable and church affairs, serving as a trustee of the Northern Dispensary and of the Lutheran Church of the Holy Communion.

The Politicians

Nine of the men at this second level of leadership could properly be classed as politicians in that they actually sought and held political office and were involved in the almost daily operation of the party. None was an aristocrat. All belonged to social clubs but not the exclusive ones. There wasn't an Episcopalian in the group. Two were Lutherans; one was a Presbyterian; four were Catholics; and one was a Jew.

⁵²See Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, p. 224.

Samuel G. King,⁵³ a respectable middle-class Lutheran, left the brushmaking business to enter politics. He served in the Select Council for twenty years and gained the support of reform Republicans and independents for his advocacy of such measures as: improving the schools, restricting municipal expenditures to conform with the money collected for taxes, and fixing the city's indebtedness. He won election as Mayor in 1881, the only Democrat during this period (1880-1910) to hold that office. His successful election to the mayoralty can be attributed to the work of many of the independents and reform Republicans on the Committee of 100 who campaigned for him throughout the election canvass. He was an honest mayor who lacked personal magnetism. Though not an innovator he did make one major contribution in his administration by hiring the first Negro policeman in Philadelphia. After his defeat for reelection in 1884 he retired from politics.

Daniel Fox,⁵⁴ another middle-class Lutheran, was the last Democrat elected Mayor before Samuel King. Elected mayor in 1868, Fox is known for his efforts in upgrading sanitation and establishing the first paid fire department in the city. He retained his interest in Democratic politics both in the twelfth ward and in the city until he died in 1890. Frequently

⁵³The Public Ledger, 22 March 1899 (obituary).

⁵⁴See Contemporary Biography of Pennsylvania, Vol. II, pp. 43-46 and the Public Ledger, 21 March 1890 (obituary).

he addressed rallies and worked for the party during election campaigns. His last public office, Superintendent of the Mint, he held by presidential appointment during Cleveland's first administration. Born and raised in Northern Liberties, he lived in the environs of his old neighborhood all of his life and was buried from S. John's Church, 6th and Race, the old English Lutheran congregation in which he had served as a member of the Church Council and Superintendent of the Sunday School.

Robert P. Dechert,⁵⁵ a patriotic middle-class Presbyterian, served with distinction in the Civil War, and continued his military activities in the National Guard. He attained the rank of Brigadier-General of the Pennsylvania National Guard in 1890, four years before his death. As a popular orator, he spoke frequently at political and patriotic rallies. In 1884 he ran ahead of the Democratic ticket and was elected City Controller by over 16,000 votes; three years later he was reelected. Like King, Gordon and Pattison, he received the support of many of the city's independents.

John Faunce⁵⁶ and Emanuel Furth⁵⁷ rose to positions of leadership in the party by their successes in the state

⁵⁵See Makers of Philadelphia, p. 92 and the Public Ledger, 13 May 1894 (obituary).

⁵⁶See Prominent and Progressive Pennsylvanians of the 19th Century, Vol. II, pp. 154-156.

⁵⁷See Who's Who in Pennsylvania (1908), p. 284 and Henry S. Morais, The Jews of Philadelphia, pp. 394-395.

political arena. Faunce, a lawyer by profession, won his first term in the State House of Representatives in 1874, and served in that body for 14 years. He reached the pinnacle of his political career when he was elected Speaker of the House in 1883. As a state representative he supported reform movements and sponsored legislation designed to prevent cruelty to children. Besides his political affairs, he maintained a law practice and engaged in business activity as a director of the Clearfield, Conemansh & Western Railway.

Emanuel Furth, an able lawyer and legislator, was the outstanding Jew among the leaders of the Philadelphia Democracy. Of German-Jewish descent, Furth was born in Reading and came to Philadelphia at the age of six. He graduated from Central High School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and became a well respected member of the bar. He was one of the few Jews who enjoyed membership in the Lawyers' Club and became secretary of that organization. He served two terms in the legislature being elected in 1880 and again in 1882. He served as chairman of the Committee on Municipal Corporations, and in that capacity he aided in the framing of the Bullitt Bill. He retired from political office in 1885 but remained an active Democrat until 1896 when he bolted to support the Jeffersonians. An upper middle-class Jew, he originally lived in the sixteenth ward (from which he was elected to the legislature) and later moved to

1707 Jefferson Street. He held membership in the Mercantile Club, a select social organization for Philadelphia Hebrews. Later in his life he recounted his early experiences as a lawyer and politician in the following humorous books: Wit of Bench and Bar (1924) and The Democrat at the Supper Table (1931).

Four Irish Catholic politicians wielded sufficient power in the party to qualify them for secure positions at this second level of leadership in the Philadelphia Democracy. All four were powers in the 80's; three of the four (McAleer, Donnelly and Ryan) rose to the top level of leadership in the party during the 90's. The fourth, Squire McMullen, simply retained his second place position until his death in 1901.

William "Squire" McMullen,⁵⁸ one of the most picturesque politicians in Philadelphia, was born at 7th and Bainbridge Streets, the old Moyamensing district which became the fourth ward after the consolidation. The fourth ward became the Squire's domain where he ruled as ward boss from the mid 70's until his death. A Central High School drop-out, the Squire remained semi-literate for the rest of his life. In 1854 he opened a liquor business in his ward and two years later he was elected the ward alderman. In 1874 he began his life tenure in the Councils. A benevolent ward boss, he distributed alms to the poor of the fourth ward and thus kept control of his domain. A staunch devoted Randall follower he worked feverishly for Sam in his every

⁵⁸ See obituaries in the Public Ledger, 1 April 1901 and the Philadelphia Record, 1 April 1901.

election canvass in the Third Congressional District.

A rough-and-tumble Irish politician, Squire McMullen left no papers for historians to analyze. He attained no position in society to warrant even a biographical sketch in one of the standard contemporary biographical volumes. Nonetheless, he was a power in the party. The delegates always listened to the Squire when he spoke at the nominating conventions. In his earlier days he used his fists in bar-room brawls for diversion and in his later days he always attracted attention by his balloon ascensions from Fairmount Park. After Randall's death he shifted his political allegiance to William McAleer.

William McAleer⁵⁹ was born in Ireland in 1838 and came to Philadelphia with his parents in 1851. He attended school until the age of fifteen when he began working in a grocery store. Later he went to work for his father who ran a produce business at 2nd and Bainbridge Streets. In 1861 the McAleers relocated to 618 South Street and confined their business to flour, an enterprise which grew to become the largest business of its kind in the city.

In 1870 McAleer started his political career, being elected to Councils from the fifth ward. He declined re-nomination to Councils but was elected, instead, to the Board of the Guardians of the Poor. In 1886 he reentered active politics when he successfully ran for the State

⁵⁹See Biographical Directory of American Congress, p. 1281; Makers of Philadelphia, p. 205; and the Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 April 1912 (obituary).

Senate. In 1890 he became a major political power in the Philadelphia Democratic party when he won election to Congress from Randall's old district.

Throughout his political career, he remained active in the family business and also served as director of the Commercial Exchange and the Chamber of Commerce.

"Charlie" Donnelly⁶⁰ was born in Philadelphia, and received his education at St. Michael's School, 2nd and Jefferson, and at LaSalle College. He entered politics in the early 80's representing the twenty-fifth ward on the Democratic City Committee. Later he moved to Germantown and represented the twenty-second ward on the City Committee. He was active in both of Pattison's campaigns for governor, but his most important triumph occurred when he served as chairman of the City Committee in 1888, the year the Democrats set a record in presidential elections (for the 1880-1910 period) by polling 46% of the Philadelphia vote for Cleveland. In the 80's Donnelly, like McAleer, was a rising young leader destined to become a major power in the party in the next decade.

The last Irish Catholic in this group, Thomas J. Ryan,⁶¹ was born, raised, and died in S. Augustine's parish in the sixth ward, the most consistent Democratic ward in the city.

⁶⁰Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 15 November 1926 (obituary).

⁶¹Ibid., 7 October 1912 (obituary).

Tommy Ryan or the "Major," as he was sometimes called, was elected to Councils in 1881 and kept his seat in that body until his death in 1912. Like the Squire of the fourth ward, the Major ran the sixth ward with his tough Irish fists. During this decade he was merely a ward boss, but in the 90's he rose, with Charlie Donnelly, to a position of pre-eminent power in the Philadelphia Democratic party.

C. Major Leadership Shifts During the Turbulent 90's

During the critical and turbulent decade of the 90's the Democrats experienced dramatic and fundamental shifts in the party leadership. As pointed out earlier in Chapter III, William McAleer gained the support of his Irish political friends when he unseated the patrician Richard Vaux in the congressional election of 1890. McAleer's rise to power was but the beginning of the Irish domination of the party. This domination by the Irish originating in 1890 was completed in 1896 when the businessmen and patricians left the party of Bryan to form the Jeffersonian party. At the leadership level the 1896 national battle was the great turning point in the Philadelphia Democracy.

As the new decade of turbulence and confusion for the Democrats commenced, Randall and Cassidy were resting in their graves. Richard Vaux served a very short term in Congress, retired after being defeated by McAleer in 1890 and died three years later in 1893. During the last three years of

his life, he exercised no influence upon the party. William F. Harrity remained the strongest of the Philadelphia Democrats up to the time of his semi-retirement in August 1896. While he still maintained some influence in the party after '96, his power had diminished significantly. In fact, even during the period of 1890-1896, he never had full control of the Democratic organization in Philadelphia. William Singerly gained in influence throughout the years 1890-96. His influence reached a peak in 1894 when he received his party's nomination for governor. After he deserted the regulars in 1896 to become a Jeffersonian, he lost his influence with the party. He died suddenly in 1898 after the exposure of irregular practices which resulted in the failure of his bank. John Cadwalader, Jr. also left the Democratic party in 1896 to support the Jeffersonians. However, he remained a Democrat, even though inactive, and quietly refused to vote for Bryan in 1900. When Parker was nominated for the presidency in 1904, Cadwalader once again became a staunch national Democrat.

Thus during the 1890's the Democrats lost the following men who had been part of the backbone of upper-level party leadership during the preceding decade: Richard Vaux, William F. Harrity, William M. Singerly, and John Cadwalader, Jr.

The most important Democrats who retained upper-level positions of leadership during the decade of the 90's included: Robert E. Pattison, James Gay Gordon, William McAleer,

Charles P. Donnelly, and Thomas J. Ryan. The first two men were influential leaders in the preceding decade while McAleer, Donnelly, and Ryan, all Irish Catholics, worked their way up to positions of prominence during the stormy decade of the 1890's.

Robert E. Pattison remained a major influence in the party during the 90's. His successful reelection as Governor in 1890, of course, put him in a preeminent position of party leadership. His choice of Harrity as Secretary of the Commonwealth made his ties to the Philadelphia Democratic party even stronger. In 1895 he suffered his first political defeat when beaten for Mayor of Philadelphia by Charles Warwick. Though conservative on the monetary question, he, nevertheless, supported Bryan in 1896 as he wanted to remain loyal to the Democratic party. Throughout this decade and until his death in 1904 he continued to be an active, regular Democrat.

Judge James Gay Gordon, Philadelphia's enigmatic politician, exercised a great deal of influence in the Democratic party though most of his efforts added to the divisive condition of the party in the 90's. The only elected position that he held during this decade was that of Judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 3, to which he was unanimously reelected in 1896. He never ran for another political office. In fact, he resigned his judgeship in 1898 to return to private law practice and stated at that time

because of the low salary he could not afford to stay on the bench.⁶² His unexpected resignation in the midst of the Quay trial caused no small amount of speculation concerning Gordon's involvement in the prosecution of Quay. Gordon presided at the trial in which Senator Quay was accused of illegally using state funds to his personal advantage in 1886 during his tenure as State Treasurer. In a few months, after Gordon's surprise resignation, the real reason for his stepping down came out. Gordon had gained access to Quay's bank records and shared this information to his political enemies: David Martin, John Wanamaker and James M. Guffey. Since Gordon became a partisan in the anti-Quay movement, he could hardly retain his position as a disinterested judge. Just before Quay was acquitted his lawyers called former Judge Gordon to the stand. When Gordon confessed to his involvement while serving as the judge of the trial, it caused a sensation in the trial chamber.⁶³

While the Quay trial is not directly related to Gordon's activities in the Democratic party, this episode tells something of his character and political methods. Throughout the 90's he practically controlled the faction of dissident Democrats called the Gordon and sometimes the Gordon-McAleer wing of the party. Since he chose to work

⁶²Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 November 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1898-1901).

⁶³City and State, 20 April 1899, p. 257.

from behind the scenes he never sought political office except for his election as Judge. In 1898, his "friends" advanced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for Governor, but by that time Guffey had full control of the Democratic state organization and Jenks got the nomination.

The Gordon wing by itself had but a few followers. However, Gordon's alliance with McAleer gave the dissidents a power base in the Third congressional district. While Gordon in the 80's enjoyed the reputation of being a young, aggressive and even progressive, upward-bound Democrat, none of these adjectives could be applied to him in the 90's. He voted for McKinley in 1896⁶⁴ and his chief political activities were motivated by a desire to block the advance of his two former colleagues, Pattison and Harrity, with whom he had a falling out. In short, he made no contribution to the thought or the progress of the Democratic party in Philadelphia during this decade; rather, if anything, he helped to retard its growth.

William McAleer's power and influence in the Philadelphia Democratic party is clearly shown in the preceding chapters which deal with the political chronology of the 1890's. His influence, however, was always limited to his own congressional district. In the river district he

⁶⁴Pittsburgh Leader, 19 April 1898 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1897-1898). Also see: "A Record of 13 Years of Party Perfidy," a pamphlet published by the Democratic City Committee, 12 August 1901, p. 6 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1898-1901).

struggled to keep his power as indicated by: the opposition of Vaux in 1890, his failure to be renominated in 1894, the silver split in '96 and his eventual defeat in 1900. During this period he served four terms in Congress, though his contributions in the lower house were quite limited.

McAleer thought and acted more like a middle-class Protestant businessman than an Irish Catholic politician. He identified with the Irish in the district because he was born in Ireland and lived in the Third district, where his father operated a prosperous flour business. He voted for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, and consistently opposed any free silver measure. In 1896 he did not join the Jeffersonians but did announce his opposition to Bryan and free silver. Thus, he ran on the regular ticket but opposed the regular platform.

He made no mark on Congress as had his predecessor, Samuel Jackson Randall. He made no famous speeches and contributed in no way to the creation or development of new legislation. He served on the Committee on Naval Affairs and, through his influence, the League Island Park and Navy Yard was developed in Philadelphia.

McAleer and Gordon formed an alliance early in the 90's to oppose the leadership of William F. Harrity. In so doing they helped to contribute to the party wrangles which so plagued the Democrats during this period. The Gordon-

McAleer faction commanded few votes outside the Third district but it could and did wield significant influence in elections when annexed to the Martin-Porter Republican Combine. After his defeat in 1900, McAleer retired from politics and died twelve years later at his home in Mount Airy.

The names Donnelly and Ryan became synonymous terms with the Philadelphia Democratic party after the retirement of William F. Harrity from politics. Donnelly served only two elected positions: Magistrate and County Commissioner. Ryan was elected to the Common Council in 1881 and moved into the Select Council in 1884. In 1891 Governor Pattison appointed him Harbor Master. In 1896 he was elected a County Commissioner and was reelected in 1899 and in 1903 he returned to the Select Council and remained in that body until his death.

Both Donnelly and Ryan served as chairmen of the Democratic City Committee. Together they ran the Democratic party in Philadelphia from 1897 until 1912 when Ryan's death ended the boss partnership.

Neither Ryan nor Donnelly left any papers or letters for analysis. Both operated as boss-politicians, though Donnelly liked to consider himself a "political philosopher,"⁶⁵ a term hardly descriptive of his role in the Philadelphia

⁶⁵Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 15 November 1926.

Democratic party. Both were pragmatic politicians with no ideological orientation. Therefore, questions of strict construction of the Constitution or of free-silver did not bother these men. They remained loyal to Bryan when the other more respectable, more learned Democrats left the party. Both fought hard to rise to a position of pre-dominance in the party. By the time they achieved their objective they controlled only a remnant of a decadent Democratic organization.

D. Second-Level Shifts: 1890-1900

The shifts in the second level of leadership were no less dramatic than those in the upper level. Among the blue bloods the infirmities of old age and resultant death removed James Campbell, who expired in 1893, and George W. Biddle, who died in 1897. Biddle lived to experience the Bryan storm and joined the Jeffersonians for that battle. Every other remaining silk stocking Democrat, except one, became a Jeffersonian in 1896! John Campbell, S. Davis Page, and John and William Bullitt actively supported the Jeffersonian movement, while Dallas Sanders backed McKinley in 1896. Thus, not a single "Rittenhouse Square" Democratic party leader supported Bryan. After the '96 campaign William C. Bullitt became a Republican. All the other aristocratic Democrats returned to the party but remained inactive. In addition, the party failed to attract any new blue bloods. By 1900 this important segment of the party had simply retired, never to be heard from again.

The businessmen, Franklin Gowen, George F. Baer and Henry D. Welsh, all left the party to join the Jeffersonians in 1896. After 1896 Welsh and Gowen dropped their interest in the Democratic party. Baer became a Republican and remained one through the Bryan years, but when Wilson was elected in 1912, he returned to the old party.

Among the professional politicians in the second-leadership level, Daniel M. Fox died at the beginning of the decade in 1890 and Robert Dechert died in 1894. Samuel G. King joined the Jeffersonians in 1896; three years later he died. Emanuel Furth also became a Jeffersonian in 1896, but later returned to the party and was known to be a Democrat for the rest of his life, but a very inactive one. John Faunce also remained a Democrat but played no active role in the party during the 90's.

Of the professional politicians who had achieved places of influence in the party in the 80's only four continued their efforts in the turbulent 90's.. All four were Irish Catholics: Squire McMullen, William McAleer, Tommy Ryan and Charlie Donnelly. The last three actually became upper-level leaders during the 90's, especially after 1896. Within the decade of the 90's, the national election of 1896 was the major turning point in the Philadelphia Democratic party leadership. (The question of how Bryan appealed to the Democrats at the grass roots level will be discussed subsequently.) What is significant here

is that the Bryan storm of 1896 reshaped the party leadership. When the Bourbons, the bankers and the businessmen as well as the respectable middle-class Protestants pulled out, the Irish remained loyal and they, therefore, captained the sinking Democratic ship. After the old guard abdicated, Ryan and Donnelly picked up the pieces of the wrecked party. In the subsequent reorganization, the Philadelphia Democratic party became staffed entirely by the hard working ward and division leaders. Therefore, it was rapidly becoming an Irish organization with little or no support from the other segments of Philadelphia society. This development was a direct result of the 1896 campaign and the desertion of the silk-stocking set, who were frightened to death by the Boy Orator of the Platte.

The Irish take-over of the Democratic party leadership in Philadelphia was not unique. Geoffrey Blodgett in his work, Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era, points out that the Irish gained control of the Boston party when the Cleveland Democrats defected in 1896. While the Boston-Irish party leaders were not avowed Bryanites, the fact is they captured the organization when the party was disrupted by the Bryan storm. Blodgett observes that: "By 1898 no Yankee Democrat could thwart the Irish and

survive."⁶⁶ Hence, the rise of the Irish Democrats in Philadelphia was similar to the Boston Experience.

E. The Irish Democratic Machine of Donnelly and Ryan

Throughout the first decade of the century, Charlie Donnelly and Tommy Ryan dominated the Democratic party in Philadelphia. No other Philadelphia Democrat exercised the overwhelming influence that these two politicians held over the party organization. On only one occasion, the Bryan campaign of 1908, was their leadership contested. And, in that campaign the Bryan Democrats merely worked outside the framework of the organization to aid Bryan in his third campaign.

It is true that during the conservative Democratic resurgence of 1902-1906 the old blue bloods injected a spurt of enthusiasm and leadership into the rapidly decaying Democratic corpse. Cadwalader, Page and Furth came back to work for Pattison in his gubernatorial campaign of 1902; in 1904 they and other Bourbons jumped on the bandwagon for Judge Parker. But their interest and enthusiasm was, at best, a romantic flash-back to a bygone age that could never be retrieved. Their romantic fancies and reactionary policies could be only ephemeral because they were so

⁶⁶Geoffrey Blodgett, Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era, p. 258. Also for the account of the Irish in the 1896 election in Boston see Blodgett, op.cit., pp. 230-233.

utterly anachronistic. Despite their vigorous support of the party in the election of 1904, their activity made no essential mark upon the real direction or management of the party in the twentieth century. The days were gone when the upper level of party leadership comprised several strong men of varied backgrounds: ethnic, social, religious and economic.

For the first few years of the new century (until his death in 1904) Pattison exercised some influence on the party, but his power never approximated that of Donnelly or Ryan. In fact, what power he did have came from his association with Donnelly and Ryan. Pattison's old political ally, William F. Harrity, who retired from politics during the '96 Bryan campaign, did serve on the auxiliary committee to aid Pattison in the 1902 campaign. Nevertheless, Harrity had very little influence on party affairs during the first decade of the twentieth century.

William McAleer also served on the 1902 Pattison auxiliary committee, but he remained throughout the rest of his life a retired politician. His political ally, James Gay Gordon, delivered occasional speeches during the years 1900-1910, but neither did he possess the power he had in the 90's. Gordon was never identified with the Jeffersonians, but he advocated a political philosophy as reactionary as any Jeffersonian tenet of political faith. In 1907, in a speech at the Manufacturers' Club he condemned Theodore

Roosevelt for advocating greater regulation of corporations engaged in interstate commerce and declared: "Yet, what man who has any respect for fundamental law believes that there should be left to the federal government a power vaster than the Czar enjoys?"⁶⁷ Like Cadwalader and the Bourbons, Gordon reacted against the changes taking place in American society and in the political parties.

When the leaders in the upper level of the party in Philadelphia died, retreated or simply retired, no new men of comparable standing in Philadelphia took their places. Hence, the whole organization was inherited by Donnelly and Ryan. Both of these professional politicians were skillful ward-level manipulators, but neither possessed the breadth of leadership necessary to direct the party throughout the city. Under Donnelly and Ryan the terms 'Machine' and 'Boss' were applied equally to the Democrats as well as to the Republicans. The unfortunate degeneration of the Democratic organization into a 'Machine' resulted in the bypassing of the old minority party by the reformers during the great struggle in this decade for honest government both at the city and state level.

By 1900 the Philadelphia Democratic party at the leadership level had become almost exclusively an Irish club, a characteristic which prevailed throughout the first decade

⁶⁷The North American (Philadelphia) 15 April 1907
(Gordon Scrapbook: 1907-1913).

of the twentieth century. This development, which had its genesis in the Vaux-McAleer congressional fight of 1890, became full-grown when the Irish leaders captured control of the party during the Bryan storm of '96. The consequences for the Democrats were, unfortunately, severe. For the whole first decade of the new century was one of lost opportunities for the minority party. Daniel P. Moynihan, in commenting upon the Irish take-over of the party in New York City during the era of Richard Croker observes: ". . . the Irish didn't know what to do with their opportunity. They never thought of politics as an instrument of social change--their kind of politics involved the processes of a society that was not changing."⁶⁸ This static view of politics prevented bosses like Ryan and Donnelly from participating in and leading the great Philadelphia Revolution of 1905.

Ironically the Irish leaders fell into the same trap that the Jeffersonians fell into in 1896 when their static view of the Constitution prevented them from following Bryan, whose financial heresy they viewed as a facade to his more insidious populist and socialistic teachings. Neither the Jeffersonians like Cadwalader, Page or Furth nor the Irish like Ryan and Donnelly had a sufficiently broad set of working political principles to enable them to solve the contemporary problems which faced the city or the nation.


⁶⁸Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, p. 229.

CHAPTER VIII


GRASS ROOTS STRENGTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN PHILADELPHIA, 1880-1910

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the decline of the Philadelphia Democracy from 1880 to 1910. Though unquestionably a minority party during the 80's, the Democrats were strong enough to challenge Republican control of the city. During the turbulent decade of the 90's, however, the Democrats lost major segments of their normal ward strength. In the general Democratic debacle of 1894, the Philadelphia Democrats suffered a severe setback which signaled the beginning of a long irreversible down-hill trend. In 1900 the Republicans captured Randall's old district defeating William McAleer's bid for reelection. From 1900-1910 the Democrats grew progressively weaker in the entire city as well as the old river ward district as the charts on the next two pages indicate.

Many complex factors help to explain this tremendous, almost phenomenal, decline in so short a period. During the 80's the Democrats could rely upon the support of the traditional Irish and German neighborhoods in the poorest section of the city. During the turbulent 90's Russian Jews and Italian Catholics replaced the Irish and Germans in these



Philadelphia Democratic Presidential and Gubernatorial
Vote: 1880 - 1910



Percentage of All Regular Democratic Votes for All
Candidates for Congress: 1880 - 1910

areas. The great ethnic transformation in the river wards profoundly affected the Democracy. These newcomers, who now occupied the lowest rung on the economic and social ladder once held by the Irish and Germans, were not attracted to the Democratic party. By 1900, the year McAleer lost his congressional seat, the Italian Catholics and Russian Jews overwhelmingly predominated in the river wards. Nor did the Democrats gain any significant new support elsewhere in the city. In short, the party suffered a decline in the absolute number of voters at a time when the population was rising at a normal rate of twenty-five per cent each decade. In fact, the 1888 Democratic vote of 93,000 for Cleveland was actually the high water mark for the Democracy in Philadelphia.

The Democratic inability to attract the new immigrants was paralleled by the decline in German and Irish support which occurred ironically during the period of domination by Charlie Donnelly and Tommy Ryan. By 1900 Irish leaders ran the party but at the grass roots the Democrats could not command the full support of any ethnic group in the city. The Benson theory of negative reference probably does apply to the decade of the 90's when the Russians and Italians (Republicans) pushed the Irish and Germans (Democrats) out of the old river ward district. However after the Irish and Germans left the old neighborhoods many of them slipped into the GOP, the party which had attracted the Italians

and Russians in the old Third district. It is impossible to determine why the Irish, especially, left the Democratic party. It is plausible to assume that as the Irish moved into the more affluent middle-class neighborhoods they lost much of their distinctive ethnocentrism and therefore identified with the Republicans who predominated in these new neighborhoods.

Philadelphia, New York and Boston

During the period from 1880-1910 the nation experienced continuous waves of immigration which changed the complexion of many of the Eastern cities. At the beginning of this period the Irish and Germans came to America by the thousands; by the end of these three decades Italians and Russian, Polish and Hungarian Jews were arriving in numbers as great as the Irish and Germans of the earlier years. Philadelphia, of course, felt the impact of this immigration. However, Philadelphia, a conservative city which shunned innovation and tried hard not to be too cosmopolitan, did not experience the great upheaval in population as did cities like New York and Boston. In the 1880 census Philadelphia recorded only 24.1% of her citizens as being foreign born while Boston reported 30.9% and New York had a foreign population of 39.68%. Further, Philadelphia comparatively low foreign born population remained characteristic of the city throughout the 1880-1910 period. Philadelphia was more of an American native city than either Boston or New York.

<u>Philadelphia</u> ¹	<u>1890</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>1910</u>
Foreign born	25.74%	22.82%	32.07%
Natives with foreign parents	<u>30.94</u>	<u>32.00</u>	<u>24.69</u>
	56.68	54.82	56.76
<u>New York</u> (Manhattan & Bronx)			
Foreign born	42.23	41.49	63.4
Natives with foreign parents	<u>36.63</u>	<u>39.03</u>	<u>19.5</u>
	78.86	80.52	82.9
<u>Boston</u>			
Foreign born	35.2	35.1	35.8
Natives with foreign parents	<u>32.8</u>	<u>36.8</u>	<u>38.3</u>
	68.0	79.9	74.1

The percentages for the various groups of foreign born also reveals Philadelphia's low rank compared to that of New York and Boston. The following tables for 1890 and 1910 show the gap between Philadelphia and these two other major Eastern cities.

¹The percentage of foreign born is derived from the U.S. Census Reports for 1890, 1900 and 1910. In subsequent tables foreign born percentages are derived from these reports and from the 1880 U.S. Census Report.

1890 (percentage of foreign born)

	<u>Irish</u>	<u>Germans</u>	<u>English</u>	<u>Russians</u>	<u>Italians</u>
Philadelphia	10.6	7.16	3.72	0.75	0.65
New York	12.53	13.85	2.36	3.17	2.63
Boston	16.72	2.45	3.34	0.89	1.11

1910 (percentage of foreign born plus natives with foreign parents)

Philadelphia	13.84	9.69	3.74	8.84	4.78
New York	12.19	11.04	0.31	16.28	12.37
Boston	22.9	2.83	2.83	9.39	7.15

In New York and Boston, both heavily foreign cities, the Democratic party flourished throughout the Cleveland-Bryan era, but in Philadelphia the Democrats were but a declining minority party as the following summary indicates:

(Percentage of Democratic Vote for President)

	<u>Boston</u>	<u>New York</u>	<u>Philadelphia</u> ²
1880	50.4	50.0	43
1892	50.6	50.8	42
1900	52.7	52.5	25
1908	45.8	51.8	25

²The voting percentages for Boston and New York are derived from election returns in W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892 and Edgar D. Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932. The voting percentages for Philadelphia are derived from election returns in Smull's Legislative Handbook (1881, 1893, 1901, and 1909). In subsequent tables listing the Democratic vote percentage per ward, the rank is derived from the above editions of Smull's Legislative Handbook unless otherwise noted.

City-Wide Trends and Shifts: 1880-1910

From Hancock's presidential campaign of 1880 to Cleveland's successful reelection in 1892 the Democratic party in Philadelphia performed consistently above the forty per cent level in voting strength in the major elections. An examination of the presidential vote for these two elections (1880 and 1892) shows only slight variations in the roots of Democratic strength in the city. Throughout this twelve-year period the overwhelming support for the Democrats came from Randall's congressional district.

The following tables for the elections of 1880 and 1892 show the ranks for all the wards in the city for both Democratic performance and foreign population. From this information it can be concluded that the Democrats performed best in the wards with the highest number of foreign inhabitants.

Presidential Election of 1880

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>	<u>Democratic Rank</u>
1	27	12
2	16	5
3	8	3
4	4	4
5	10	11
6	1	6
7	18	30
8	15	28
9	11	14
10	19	29
11	3	2
12	9	8
13	22	22
14	28	20
15	21	18
16	5	7
17	2	1
18	24	23
19	7	10
20	25	17
21	14	19
22	17	26
23	30	25
24	29	13
25	13	9
26	20	16
27	23	31
28	16	24
29	31	21
30	6	15
31	12	27

Presidential Election of 1892

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>	<u>Democratic Rank</u>
1	23	9
2	11	7
3	3	2
4	4	8
5	14	20
6	5	5
7	28	34
8	30	33
9	19	26
10	24	30
11	1	3
12	7	6
13	18	19
14	31	22
15	17	17
16	6	4
17	2	1
18	25	28
19	9	15
20	20	13
21	15	14
22	26	24
23	29	27
24	33	23
25	13	11
26	16	21
27	32	31
28	21	18
29	27	16
30	10	25
31	12	29
32	34	32
33	8	10
34	22	12

N.B. In 1892 there were actually thirty-five wards in the city. In order to make an accurate correlation of the foreign born based on the 1890 census, the thirty-fifth ward vote is added to the twenty-third ward vote because in the ward changes of 1892 the thirty-fifth ward was created from the twenty-third ward.

When the seven strongest and seven weakest Democratic wards are listed an even clearer picture of the concentration of Democratic strength in the heavily populated foreign wards is seen. Conversely, in the seven weakest Democratic wards the foreign born population was significantly lower than the average for the city.

Seven Strongest Democratic Wards: 1880 (total number of wards - 31)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>% For. Born</u>	<u>For. Rank</u>
17	64.0	33.58	2
11	63.8	33.55	3
3	63.6	29.04	8
4	61.9	31.33	4
2	58.6	24.93	16
6	56.5	34.49	1
16	55.6	30.60	5

Seven Weakest Democratic Wards: 1880

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>% For. Born</u>	<u>For. Rank</u>
23	37.9	18.36	30
22	37.6	24.00	17
31	37.3	27.54	12
8	35.0	25.42	15
10	34.4	23.70	19
7	31.9	23.87	18
27	31.1	21.43	23

Notes: The sixth ward had the highest percentage of foreign born (34.49%).

The twenty-ninth ward had the lowest percentage of foreign born (18.20%).

Seven Strongest Democratic Wards: 1892 (total number of wards - 34)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>Combined % For. Born and natives with foreign parents</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>
17	65.4	76.1	2
3	60.9	74.1	3
11	60.6	76.4	1
16	58.7	72.3	6
6	57.2	73.4	5
12	56.68	69.67	7
2	55.2	66.0	11

Seven Weakest Democratic Wards: 1892

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>Combined % For. Born and natives with foreign parents</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>
18	36.7	50.8	25
31	34.9	65.1	12
10	33.0	51.0	24
27	32.5	44.2	32
32	32.3	35.0	34
8	31.3	46.02	30
7	25.3	47.3	28

Notes: The seventeenth ward had the highest foreign percentage (65.4%).

The seventh ward had the lowest foreign percentage (25.3%).

By 1900 the Democrats lost all of their traditional wards except the sixth. Although the strongest Democratic wards in the city were still located in the old river district, in none of these wards (except the sixth) did the Democratic vote reach 45%. At the grass-roots the Democrats never recovered from the losses of 1894 when all the normal Democratic wards swung over to the GOP. The vote of 1900 is but another example of the decline of the Democracy during the Bryan era.

Presidential Election of 1900

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>	<u>Democratic Rank</u>
1	15	6
2	2	14
3	1	4
4	3	3
5	5	13
6	8	1
7	37	40
8	33	41
9	26	36
10	28	34
11	4	16
12	9	5
13	22	32
14	32	20
15	19	12
16	6	7
17	7	2
18	25	21
19	12	22
20	21	23
21	17	27
22	27	35
23	23	37
24	36	18
25	11	15
26	24	9
27	38	39
28	35	31
29	41	25
30	16	17
31	14	30
32	39	38
33	10	19
34	30	11
35	40	26
36	13	8
37	31	24
38	18	28
39	20	10
40	34	29
41	29	33

Seven Strongest Democratic Wards: 1900 (total number of wards - 41)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>Combined % For. Born and Natives with foreign parents</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>
6	58.9	71.9	8
17	44.7	72.2	7
4	40.1	79.8	3
3	35.29	83.0	1
12	34.31	69.45	9
1	34.2	57.2	15
16	34.2	72.8	6

Seven Weakest Democratic Wards: 1900

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem. Vote</u>	<u>Combined % For. Born and Natives with foreign parents</u>	<u>Foreign Rank</u>
22	18.36	48.20	27
9	17.78	48.3	26
23	17.20	51.4	23
32	16.7	34.4	39
27	16.24	37.9	38
7	13.25	38.5	37
8	12.62	42.53	33

Notes: The third ward had the highest foreign percentage (83.0%).

The twenty-ninth ward had the lowest foreign percentage (33.5%).

Though the national losses of 1894 were a turning point in the Philadelphia Democracy, the ethnocultural changes reveal deeper reasons for this decline. Major population changes occurred in Randall's old district which McAleer represented during most of the decade. Year by year the Italian and Russian populations increased while the Irish and German populations declined.

In 1910 the census reports for the first time enumerated the foreign born for each ward in the city. Hence, it is possible to identify specifically the number of foreigners and the relationship of the strength of the Democratic party to these immigrant wards. The census reports and election returns prove conclusively that the Democratic party had little or no appeal to the Russians and Italians. Further, the party had declined greatly among the Germans and even lost a good deal of its Irish support. In the following tables the seven strongest and seven weakest Democratic wards for 1908 are listed with the Irish, German, Italian and Russian percentages as based on the 1910 census figures. This indicates that by 1908 the collapse of the Democratic party throughout the city was complete.

Seven Strongest Democratic Wards: 1908 (total number of wards - 47)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>% Irish</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>% Ger.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>% Ital.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>% Russ.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
6	73.8	16.66	8	16.66	8	U	U	33.33	5
44	39.8	17.94	7	5.12	34	2.56	9	2.56	29
17	39.3	11.76	25	23.53	1	U	U	17.64	12
25	36.0	16.27	12	11.62	13	U	U	9.30	16
33	35.3	13.46	19	15.38	10	U	U	1.93	34
28	34.8	10.20	29	1.42	44	U	U	2.04	32
36	34.7	27.80	1	4.91	35	1.63	11	3.27	28

Seven Weakest Democratic Wards: 1908

2	15.5	2.43	47	2.43	43	48.70	1	36.50	3
3	15.3	3.84	46	3.84	39	34.60	2	30.76	8
10	14.8	21.05	4	6.26	37	U	U	5.26	21
5	12.9	5.88	43	5.88	30	U	U	47.06	2
8	12.8	21.42	3	U	U	U	U	U	U
4	11.1	4.54	45	4.54	36	27.27	3	36.36	4
7	10.9	14.81	15	U	U	U	U	7.40	17

N.B. "U" = under one per cent

Seven Most Irish Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Irish</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
36	27.80	34.70	7
15	25.50	33.53	8
8	21.42	12.81	45
10	21.05	14.83	43
30	20.68	25.80	34
9	20.00	18.25	39
44	17.94	39.80	2

Seven Least Irish Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Irish</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
16	6.25	29.88	23
1	6.25	29.60	24
5	5.88	12.92	44
13	5.00	22.07	37
4	4.34	11.17	46
3	3.84	15.37	42
2	2.43	15.52	41

Seven Most German Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% German</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
17	23.53	39.30	3
45	23.08	27.00	29
19	21.15	30.27	18
43	20.93	30.80	14
12	20.00	29.89	22
16	18.75	29.88	23
37	17.39	30.50	16

Seven Least German Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% German</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
30	3.44	25.80	34
29	2.66	31.30	11
2	2.43	15.52	41
28	1.42	34.80	6
7	U	10.97	47
8	U	12.81	45
9	U	18.25	39

N.B. "U" = under one per cent

Seven Most Italian Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Italian</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
2	48.7	15.52	41
3	34.61	15.37	42
4	27.27	11.17	46
26	21.8	30.2	19
1	8.33	29.6	24
38	6.12	30.0	21
34	4.00	31.2	12

Seven Most Russian Wards: 1908

<u>Ward</u>	<u>% Russian</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1	50.0	29.6	24
5	47.06	12.92	44
2	36.5	15.52	41
4	36.36	11.17	46
6	33.33	73.82	1
11	33.33	26.44	31
12	33.33	29.89	22

N.B.: Since the Italian and Russians were concentrated in only a few wards in the city, only the strongest Italian and Russian wards are listed for analysis.

When the economic status of the wards in the city are correlated with the voting records it would appear, at first glance, that the Democrats appealed more to the "have nots" in Philadelphia during this period. The two tables which follow list all the wards for 1880 and 1897 with the economic rank for each one based on the real estate valuation of taxable property in the ward. In addition the Democratic ranks and the percentage of Democratic votes for the 1880 and 1896 presidential elections are included.

1880

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Real Estate Value in Millions</u>	<u>Ward</u>	<u>Dem. Rank</u>	<u>Dem. %</u>
1	38.6	8	28	35.0
2	35.6	6	6	56.5
3	30.6	15	18	40.8
4	30.2	9	14	42.7
5	26.6	24	13	43.7
6	25.3	29	21	39.8
7	25.1	20	17	41.4
8	23.0	5	11	45.8
9	22.9	22	26	37.6
10	22.1	28	24	39.2
11	20.5	10	29	34.4
12	19.4	7	30	31.9
13	19.1	27	31	31.1
14	17.0	19	10	46.6
15	15.2	1	12	45.4
16	15.0	25	9	51.5
17	14.5	26	16	41.4
18	13.5	14	20	40.1
19	12.8	13	22	39.7
20	12.7	23	25	37.9
21	11.3	30	15	41.6
22	10.9	2	5	58.6
23	10.2	18	23	39.7
24	10.1	31	27	37.3
25	8.8	11	2	63.8
26	8.3	12	8	52.1
27	7.5	4	4	61.9
28	7.5	21	19	40.4
29	7.3	16	7	55.6
30	6.8	17	1	64.0
31	6.6	3	3	63.6

N.B. At first glance it appears that the Democrats attracted wealthy inhabitants in the sixth ward. However the source of wealth in this ward was not from dwellings but from commercial buildings and manufacturing plants. See pp. 282.

1897

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Real Estate Value in Millions</u>	<u>Ward</u>	<u>Dem. Rank</u>	<u>Dem. %</u>
1	64.7	8	37	10.7
2	61.5	9	29	21.6
3	46.6	22	34	17.4
4	45.7	28	25	22.5
5	38.9	6	1	58.3
6	38.8	29	24	22.7
7	37.2	15	19	26.2
8	34.1	27	33	18.0
9	33.6	24	21	25.2
10	29.1	20	28	21.9
11	28.1	32	35	14.9
12	27.6	1	9	34.5
13	26.8	5	16	27.4
14	26.1	19	23	23.5
15	25.7	33	14	28.6
16	24.5	10	22	24.5
17	22.7	7	36	14.9
18	19.2	25	10	32.1
19	17.5	26	13	30.2
20	16.4	34	12	30.7
21	16.2	36	11	31.8
22	14.7	14	17	27.4
23	13.1	30	15	28.2
24	12.7	31	27	21.9
25	12.5	13	30	21.2
26	12.5	37	20	25.6
27	12.1	18	18	27.0
28	11.5	2	6	38.9
29	11.4	21	26	22.5
30	10.2	23	32	18.1
31	9.8	35	31	21.1
32	8.8	11	5	39.7
33	8.18	16	8	35.4
34	8.16	4	2	49.8
35	7.9	12	7	35.7
36	7.5	17	3	46.2
37	6.9	3	4	45.9

N.B. In 1897 there were thirty-eight wards in the city. For purposes of comparison the twenty-eighth and thirty-eighth wards are combined, since the thirty-eighth was created out of the twenty-eighth ward.

The 1880 figures, as enumerated above, indicate that the Democratic party's greatest appeal was to workers on the lowest rung of the economic ladder because the strong Democratic wards were those in which the population comprised an overwhelming majority of workers. However, when the 1897 figures are analyzed some mitigating factors cancel the assumption that economic status determined voting behavior. In 1880 the strongest Democratic wards were lowest on the economic scale. Further, it is significant that in these wards the Democrats held a majority of the voters. But the same situation did not exist in the 1896 election. Even though the Democrats performed best in the economically poor wards, they had lost control of these wards by 1894. For example, in 1896 the Democrats polled 45.9% of the vote in the third ward, the poorest ward in the city. Hence, the poorest ward in the city had become by 1896 a Republican ward. In short, the economic status of the ward remained unchanged from 1880 to 1897 while the politics of the ward had changed. The only other major change in this ward was its ethnic composition. Poor workers still lived in the third ward but they were now Italians and Russians and not Irish. The key to the shift of the 90's in political allegiance was not the economic status but rather the ethnic characteristic of the working class in many of these former Democratic strongholds.

Description of the Third Congressional District:1880 - 1890


Randall's river ward district comprised seven wards in the old section of the city clustered near the Delaware River, and remained intact during the decade 1880-1890 with only one change. As a result of the reapportionment act of 1887, the seventeenth, a normally Democratic ward, was added to this district.

Throughout the decade of the 80's the district did not suffer a declining population,³ as the following figures show:

	<u>1880 Census</u>	<u>1890 Census</u>
Ward 3	18,174	19,925
4	18,854	20,384
5	16,372	16,987
6	10,004	8,712
11	12,929	12,953
12	14,690	14,110
16	17,802	17,087
	<u>108,885</u>	<u>110,218</u>
		Add 17th <u>19,546</u>
		129,764

However, though the city-wide population increased by 25.7%, i.e. from 847,170 in 1880 to 1,046,964 in 1890, the old river front wards remained constant. The reason for the lack of proportionate increase was that the over population restricted space for expansion in this section of the city. In 1890 the

³Professor Bomerantz, in his study "Samuel Jackson Randall: Protectionist Democrat" observes: "As the establishments of the city's merchants increased in numbers, the residential population decreased proportionately." P. 245. This statement is inaccurate if applied to Randall's last five terms in Congress (1880-1890).



Map Showing Sam Randall's River Ward District
(Shaded Wards)

population density for the whole city (excluding parks and cemeteries) was 13.32 persons per acre. The number of dwellings in the city amounted to 187,052 with an average of 5.60 persons living in each dwelling. The following table shows the density of the population for the wards in Randall's district for 1890. Complete figures are not available for 1880, but all available information is included.⁴

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Dwellings</u>	<u>1890</u>		<u>1880</u>	
		<u>Persons per Dwelling</u>	<u>Persons per Acre</u>	<u>Persons per Acre</u>	<u>Persons per Acre</u>
3	3,221	6.19	164.67	143	
4	3,120	6.53	141.56	153	
5	2,271	7.48	88.94	N.A.	
6	1,280	6.56	44.68	N.A.	
11	1,931	6.71	95.95	111	
12	2,332	6.08	114.27	128	
16	3,052	5.60	94.93	123	
17	3,360	5.82	122.93	135	
<u>City Totals</u>	187,052	5.60	13.32	N.A.	

N.A. = Not Available

While the lower wards suffered more congestion in 1890 than in 1880 and the upper wards experienced slight relief from overcrowding during the decade of the 80's, the salient fact is that this entire congressional district had an extremely dense population.

⁴See Vital Statistics for Boston and Philadelphia, pp. 89-101 for the 1890 figures. See Social Statistics of the Cities 10th Census of the U.S., Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 828 for the 1880 figures.

The district abounded in wealth if measured by the number of businesses, manufacturing plants and banks located within its precincts. The taxable real estate in city of Philadelphia amounted to \$529 million in 1880 whereas the taxable real estate for the wards in the Third congressional district amounted to \$97.1 million.⁵ But most dwellings in the district were occupied by poor workers. The ward with the smallest population, the sixth, had taxable real estate valued at \$35.6 million. In 1886 one of Randall's friends sent him an economic survey of the Third congressional district and reported that twenty-five of Philadelphia's thirty-nine national banks were located in the district which accounted for 79.551% of the capital invested in the city.⁶

Within the shadow of these magnificent Grecian temple-like banks, manufacturing houses and busy wharves lived the greatest concentration of Philadelphia's lower income working class. Some of these workers were fortunate enough to live in a two-and-a-half story brick row house; others lived in side alley three-room, three-story houses, popularly known as Father, Son and Holy Ghost houses; still others lived in dilapidated frame shacks. In 1890 these houses were described

⁵Manual of Councils, 1880, p. 107.

⁶William B. Wilson to Samuel J. Randall, 6 October 1886. Randall Papers.

as follows:⁷

- Ward 3 - Most dwellings were of medium character; some old frame houses remained as did some old alleys and courts.
- Ward 4 - "No fine residences were found in this ward; old style 2 and 3 story brick houses predominated with numerous dilapidated frame houses." Small streets, alleys and courts were also common in this ward.
- Ward 5 - The slums of the fourth ward extended into this ward, which contained "magnificent business structures" along with the famous historical buildings of Independence Hall, Carpenter's Hall, etc. N.B. There is no reference to any of the wealthy living in this old Society Hill ward.
- Ward 6 - The houses in this ward were "compactly" built. Most houses were jammed adjacent to the many business and manufacturing houses located in this ward.
- Ward 11 - Most of the houses were of the small brick type and located in many small streets, alleys and courts.
- Ward 12 - Houses were very old and similar to those in Ward 11. This is the old Northern Liberties section.
- Ward 16 - An old section of the city with only a few modern dwellings.
- Ward 17 - Houses were old, mostly brick with many situated in alleys, courts and small streets.

Thus, Randall's district had an overwhelming concentration of the working class and lower middle class for the river wards (with the possible exception of the fifth) did not have a notable silk-stocking section or a genteel

⁷Vital Statistics for Boston and Philadelphia, pp. 89-101.

upper middle-class section. While Randall commanded the respect and admiration of such influential Republican capitalists as Wanamaker, Bell, Drexel and Childs, these men were not his constituents.

The identification of the various ethnic groups in Philadelphia during this period poses several problems. The census reports did not list the foreign born per country of birth for each ward until 1910. The previous census reports list only the total number of foreign born without identifying the country of birth for each ward. It is, therefore, impossible to pinpoint exactly the number of Jews, Irish, Italians, Germans, etc. for the political subdivisions of the city before 1910. The only minority group for which there is complete information for this entire period are the Negroes.

Compared to city wide figures the Third congressional district had more than an average percentage of Negroes:⁸

(Figures in nearest hundred):

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1890</u>
3	6	9
4	26	26
5	27	24
6	2	1
11	U (under 100)	U
12	5	3
16	1	1
17	X	1
	67 or 6.2% of population	65 or 5% of population
Total number of Negroes in the city:		
	31,699 or 3.8% of population	39,371 or 3.7%

⁸Ward totals for the Negro population for 1880 are found in Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1883, pp. 296-297. For 1890 these statistics are found in the 11th Census of the U.S., Vol. IV, Part I, p. 551.

In only two wards, the fourth and fifth, was the Negro population over 10% of the ward population.⁹

Foreign Born

The total foreign born population in the district was higher than the city average for both 1880 and 1890 as the following indicates:¹⁰ (Figures in nearest thousand.)

Ward	1880		1890	
	<u>Total Popula.</u>	<u>Foreign Born</u>	<u>Total Popula.</u>	<u>Foreign Born</u>
3	18	5	20	8
4	19	6	20	9
5	12	5	17	6
6	7	3	9	3
11	9	4	13	5
12	10	4	14	5
16	13	5	17	6
	<u>108</u>	32 or 30%	110	42 or 38%
			Ward 17 <u>200</u>	<u>7</u>
			130	49 or 37%
City Totals	643	204 or 23%	777	269 or 27%

In addition to the above general information about the foreign born, other source materials give some indication, though, unfortunately, not precise, of the composition of the wards regarding national origin. For example, in the special census report on Boston and Philadelphia for 1890 the

⁹In 1880 the Negro population was 14% in the fourth ward and 17% in the fifth ward. In 1890 the percentages declined to 13% in the fourth ward and 14% in the fifth ward.

¹⁰For the 1880 figures see Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1883, pp. 296-297; for 1890 see 11th Census of the U.S., Vol. IV., Part I, pp. 551-552.

following observations provide some clues:¹¹

- Ward 3 - Population mixed, but Russian and Polish Jews and Italians predominated.
- Ward 4 - Russian and Polish Jews and Italians predominated.
- Ward 5 - "Blacks and whites" of the lowest strata were prevalent.
- Ward 6 - Population mixed; mostly old residents.
- Ward 11 - Germans predominated.
- Ward 12 - Germans predominated; many important breweries located in this ward.
- Ward 16 - Most inhabitants were of German descent.
- Ward 17 - Mostly Irish and German.

The most curious aspect of this official report is the exclusion of the Irish, except for one reference concerning the seventeenth ward. Yet, there are many factors which demonstrate the existence of a strong Irish population in Randall's district. In the 1880 election a pamphlet entitled: "Irish Voters, Attention!" circulated throughout the district in opposition to Randall.¹² That circular had little impact on the Irish voters, who knew that in Randall they had a friend and advocate. When the question of Irish fidelity toward the Democratic party came up in 1882, Randall declared at a political rally in the fourth ward: "They [i.e., the Republicans] say that they are going to buy the

¹¹Vital Statistics for Boston and Philadelphia, pp. 89-101.

¹²See Chapter I, p. 24, footnote 40.

Irish. I know something about the Irish. They have been trying to buy them for the last twenty years and have not been able to get any of them yet. I know that the Irish Democratic vote is the last vote that can be bought."¹³

The district also had a quantity of Irish politicians living within its boundaries. Both Squire McMullen, and William McAleer were Irish Catholics. An inspection of the names of the Select and Common Councilmen for the wards in this district during the 80's reveals names like McMullen, Ryan, Monroe, Carlin and McDevitt.

Since the Archdiocese of Philadelphia has no records to indicate the strength of Irish Catholics in the city for these years, it is impossible to determine the actual number of Irish Catholics in the river wards. However, the church strength can be approximated by the number of parishes within the borders of the "old city" which comprised Randall's district. Two parishes, Holy Trinity in the fifth ward and S. Peter's in the seventeenth, were official German national parishes. In all of the other eight parishes the Irish predominated: S. Paul's, S. Philip de Neri and S. Teresa's in the third ward; S. Joseph's and S. Mary's in the fifth; S. Augustine's in the sixth; Immaculate Conception in the sixteenth, and S. Michael's in the seventeenth. While the Italian population began to

¹³The Times, 17 October 1882.

increase in the southern part of the river ward district during the 80's, the large influx came in the 90's. The Italian newcomers caused a major change in the complexion of S. Paul's at 8th and Christian. Joseph L. J. Kirrlin, in writing about Father Donovan's pastorate at S. Paul's, which commenced in 1893 states: "During Father Donovan's administration whole streets formerly occupied by Irish-American families, have become populated by Italians."¹⁴ Another indication to show that the Irish predominated in the lower wards comes by way of a report by a leading Methodist preacher. In 1881 the Presiding Elder of the South Philadelphia Methodist Conference wrote his gloomy annual report and lamented the changes in ". . . the eastern portions of the 'old city proper' . . . where formerly the comfortable homes of thousands of Christian people, many of them members of our church, are now manufactories and business blocks, while the remaining population, crowded into obscure streets and tenement houses, is largely composed of Papists, Jews and semi-infidels, who never attend our churches and are rarely accessible to our missionary efforts."¹⁵ The Papists, Paxson referred to had to be Irish because the Italians numbered only 6,800 in the entire city in 1890. Italians were so insignificant in the population in

¹⁴J. L. J. Kirrlin, Catholicity in Philadelphia, p. 449.

¹⁵Report of William J. Paxson, Minutes of the 94th Annual Philadelphia Methodist Conference, 1881, pp.37-40.

1880 that they were not even listed in the census for that decade.

Voting Strength in the Third District: 1880-1890

The voting records for Randall's congressional campaigns in the 1880's underscore and confirm the source of his strength among Irish and German workers in his district. At no time did he fear defeat in the 80's. He polled 58% of the vote in 1880 and 1884; in 1882 his percentage climbed to 61%; in his last two campaigns (1886 and 1888), owing to the fact that the Republicans did not even enter a candidate to oppose him, Randall polled 98% and 99% of the vote respectively. Only the fifth ward could be considered Republican during this period, since Randall carried it only in 1882, the year a split occurred in the Republican party over the gubernatorial nominee. Of all the wards in the district only the fifth (Society Hill) had been of the upper and upper-middle classes. In sharp contrast, the fifth had the highest percentage of Negro residents of any ward in this district (17% in 1880; 14% in 1890). The vestigial remains of the upper class plus the Negroes, probably contributed to the Republican character of this

ward.¹⁶ The following tables show Randall's voting strength as contrasted to the presidential and gubernatorial nominees for this period.

¹⁶Despite the fact that Vital Statistics of Boston and Philadelphia, as cited before, does not mention the existence of an upper or upper middle-class in the fifth ward, there is reason to believe that, in fact, this old Society Hill district had a small upper and upper middle-class population. Two fashionable Anglican churches, S. Peter's and S. Paul's, both located in the fifth ward, had flourishing congregations during the 80's. Many of their communicants had moved west to the Rittenhouse Square area (e.g. John Cadwalader, Jr.), but it is also likely that some of the remnants of the old families still lived in Society Hill. Also, men like John Forney and Lewis Cassidy lived on 6th Street in commodious residences. While neither was an aristocrat, the former was in the upper middle-class and the latter worked his way out of the tough fourth ward to earn a place in the upper middle class. It is impossible to determine just how many people of these two classes lived in the fifth ward, but there were segments of these two classes in ward five in the 80's. The fifth ward was unique in the Third district in that no other ward in the district had aristocratic antecedents.

Gubernatorial Campaigns1882

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Governor</u>			<u>Congress</u>		
	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>
3	10	19	65.5	19	63.3	11
4	10	21	67.7	21	67.7	10
5	14	15	51.7	15	51.7	14
6	6	11	64.7	11	61.1	7
11	6	16	72.7	16	69.6	7
12	10	16	61.5	15	57.7	11
16	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>62.5</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>60.6</u>	<u>13</u>
	68	118	63.4	117	61.5	73

N.B. Stewart (Ind. Rep.) polled 405 votes for governor in the whole district in 1882.

1886

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>
3	11	20	64.5	21	
4	11	21	65.6	20	
5	17	14	45.2	15	
6	7	10	58.8	10	
11	9	16	64.0	15	
12	11	14	56.0	14	
16	<u>14</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>57.6</u>	<u>18</u>	
	81	115	58.7	113	X

In all three presidential years Randall performed slightly better than the Democratic nominee for president, and in both gubernatorial campaigns he performed slightly under the Democratic candidates for Governor. Only in 1882 did ticket splitting occur and then it was slight. The Independent Republican nominee for Governor, though polling only 405 votes in the district, did detract from the normal Republican vote in the fifth ward. But his slight vote of only 50 indicates that the dissatisfied Republicans voted directly for Pattison or did not vote at all. Randall, therefore, carried the fifth ward riding on Pattison's coattails.

Since the tariff issue was played down by the Democrats in the 1880 and 1884 national campaigns, it is not surprising to note the comparable strength of Randall with Hancock and Cleveland during these elections. In short, Randall's tariff position was compatible with the presidential nominees of his party in 1880 and 1884. But in 1888 the President and the Ex-Speaker stood in opposite corners on the tariff issue. Yet, in "Protectionist" Randall's district "Tariff Reformer" Cleveland polled over 16,000 votes and fell only 847 votes behind Randall.

Probably one of the reasons why the workers voted for Randall was that they followed his position on the tariff-- and believed that a protected industry also protected their interests. Since Randall was ill and could not campaign in

1888, there was no opportunity for a Democratic clash on the tariff issue in the river ward district. When interviewed in the summer of 1888 on Cleveland's tariff position, Randall wisely avoided any criticism of the President.¹⁷ But even if there had been open warfare on the tariff issue per se, it is doubtful that this single issue would have detracted a great deal from the Democratic presidential vote in the river wards. As V. O. Key has pointed out in his article "Secular Realignment and the Party System,"¹⁸ voters are frequently influenced more by the personality of the candidate than by the political issues he represents. In the 1888 election, the dominant personalities of Randall and Cleveland tended to push the tariff issue in the background.

Professor Lee Benson in his provocative study, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy, contends that economic factors in voting behavior constitute but one consideration in determining the strength of a political party. Ethnic, cultural and religious factors also help to explain why a particular minority group, like the Irish, for example, are loyal to the Democratic party. Benson argues convincingly that historians have too quickly posited causal relationships when they observe only the economic status of minority groups

¹⁷See Chapter II, p. 54 of this study.

¹⁸V. O. Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, p. 208.

and overlook cultural factors which may even be more important than economic considerations.

As pointed out earlier, the two most important minority groups in the river district in the 80's were the Irish and Germans, both of whom supported the Democracy. It was in this very congressional district that two Irish Catholic churches were burned down and a third bombarded in the anti-Catholic riots of 1844.¹⁹ Benson's negative reference theory explains why the Irish reacted against the American party, made up of anti-Catholic, nativistic elements. With the creation of the Republican party, the old Protestants moved into the new party while the Irish remained intensely loyal to the Democrats. Even though a generation had elapsed, it was hard for the Irish, who took religion seriously, to forget that their houses of worship were reduced to ashes by nativistic mobs.

The Germans were also attracted to the Democrats, though it is difficult to estimate the percentage of Democrats within the German community. However, the upper wards of the district had a large German population as evidenced by the strength of the German Catholic parish of S. Peter's in the seventeenth ward and the German Lutheran congregation of S. Paulus in the eleventh ward. The Lutherans also had a parish in the seventeenth ward, S. Luke's, an English speaking

¹⁹See J. L. Kirlin, Catholicity in Philadelphia, p. 304ff; p. 330ff. for an account of the burning of S. Michael's and S. Augustine's and of the bombardment of S. Phillip de Neri.

congregation which no doubt was comprised of second generation Germans. In these upper wards with a strong German population, the Democrats performed very well which leads to a reasonable assumption that a majority of the Germans voted Democratic. It is also significant to note the Democrats of German stock in the upper wards who rose to important positions within the city party. Daniel M. Fox, Samuel G. King, Albert H. Ladner and Matthew Dittmann all came from the upper end of the river ward district. Fox and King both won the mayoralty while Ladner was the Democratic party's unsuccessful nominee for that office in 1891.

In the upper section of the district the Democrats performed weakest in the twelfth ward. The available evidence indicates that this ward had the smallest number of Irish and Germans among the upper wards. No Catholic or Lutheran church was located in the twelfth ward but the Baptists and Presbyterians had very strong congregations and the Methodists and Episcopalians also had smaller but flourishing parishes.²⁰ The Germans, like the Irish (though to a lesser degree), probably identified with the Democrats as a reaction against native Americans who opposed immigration and who were, for the most part, Republicans.

²⁰The following churches were located in ward twelve in the 1880's. The number of communicants for 1881 are included in parentheses: Fourth Baptist (815), Advent Episcopal (241), Fifth Street Methodist (394), First Presbyterian, N.L. (345), North Presbyterian (429). Total = 2,224.

During the 80's the Third district did not experience any divisive religious conflicts, a fact which explains the absence of the polarization of religious groups in voting behavior.²¹ The divisions within the district, if anything, were ethnocultural with the Irish Catholics and Germans being Democratic and the native stock Americans and Negroes being Republican. This assumption, however, must be carefully qualified because some mitigating political facts point to its relative worth in analyzing the voting patterns in Randall's district. The success of two Philadelphia Democratic politicians, Randall and Pattison, reveals the limitation of the ethnocultural hypothesis. Throughout his life, Randall was identified with the upper middle-class business community, a segment of Philadelphia society with a quite different ethnocultural orientation from either the Irish or Germans. In addition, he had no church connection until a year before he died, when he joined the Presbyterians. Neither did Pattison have much in common with the Irish or Germans, yet he, too, had a powerful vote-getting record in the river wards.

Finally, though economic and cultural factors do give some explanations for Democratic success in the river wards, political factors can not be overlooked. Randall was a

²¹Richard J. Jensen in his recent study, "The Winning of the Mid-West," points out that local issues like Prohibition and parochial schools created polarized voting behavior among the religious groups in many mid-west counties. These local issues did not occur in Philadelphia. Hence, there was not, in Philadelphia, a clear political division based upon religious affiliation.

highly efficient congressman who took care of his constituents. Not only did he distribute political jobs to the boys back home, he also got many of them jobs with firms in Philadelphia. His letter files are filled with job requests by constituents. With his business contacts it is safe to assume that Randall placed many of his job seekers at Wanamaker's Department store, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Public Ledger, etc. The smooth running Randall organization in the river wards also explains why the Democrats were successful in that sector of old Philadelphia.

Other Sources of Democratic Strength, 1880-1888

The following table which examines the voting results for all the wards in the city for every presidential and gubernatorial election during the 80's, indicates the very limited appeal the Democrats had outside of Randall's district.

<u>Democratic Wards - 1880-1888</u>				
<u>1880</u>	<u>1882</u>	<u>1884</u>	<u>1886</u>	<u>1888</u>
(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4
	5			
6	6	6	6	6
11	11	11	11	11
12	12	12	12	12
16	16	16	16	16
(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)	17
<u>(25)</u>	<u>(25)</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>(19)</u>
9	10	8	8	9

Parentheses = outside District III

Description of Democratic Wards Outside
the Third District²²

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Population (in thousands)</u>		<u>No. of persons per acre</u>	<u>Description</u> <u>1890</u>
	<u>1880</u>	<u>1890</u>		
2	28	32	115.62	One of the oldest sections of the city; many small streets, courts, & alleyways. Many poor inhabitants. About 1/4 of inhabitants were poor Italians.
	(Ward lies just south of the third ward in Cong. Dist. III.)			
25	36	36	14.41	Semi-rural section in the northeast; population mixed; mostly Irish and German.
19	44	56	126.53	One of the major mill sections of the city; about 60% of the inhabitants worked in the various mills. Houses compactly built; many of them owned by workers.
	(Ward lies just north of 17th ward in Dist. III.)			

The voting records for these three wards are as follows:

Democratic Percentage (in thousands)

	<u>Pres.</u> <u>1880</u>	<u>Gov.</u> <u>1882</u>	<u>Pres.</u> <u>1884</u>	<u>Gov.</u> <u>1886</u>	<u>Pres.</u> <u>1888</u>
Ward 2	58.6	59.6	56.1	56.0	58.6
Ward 25	51.4	53.1	40.0	46.7	49.6
Ward 19	46.4	47.9	43.8	45.3	50.4

²²vital Statistics of Boston and Philadelphia, pp. 88-89; 107-108; 102-103.

Finally, the original hypothesis that the Democrats appealed at the grass-roots to the poorest Irish and German workers in the city is further supported by the performance of the party outside the old river ward district.

As the Democratic party faced the new decade of the 90's it had lost its outstanding leader, Sam Randall, himself a member of the middle class but one who understood both the workers and the affluent, and had the confidence of both. It had the solid support of the poor whites as well as a fair number of blue bloods. In the business community it could boast of the support of one outstanding publisher and several bankers. But its connections among the businessmen did not include any of Philadelphia's important manufacturers. Its most severe deficiency was the almost complete absence of the undefined, but nonetheless real, middle class. In municipal elections, the party did appeal to this segment of the population in the successful campaigns of Pattison for Controller and Governor; King for Mayor; Dechert for Controller; and Gordon for Judge. The embryonic support by the middle class existed but the question was: Could the party build upon this foundation in the next ten years?

Description of the Third District: 1890-1900

The boundaries of the Third district remained unchanged during the decade of the 90's while the population changed only slightly.²³

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1890</u> (11th Census)	<u>1900</u> (12th Census)
3	19,925	24,693
4	20,384	22,562
5	16,987	16,868
6	8,712	8,042
11	12,953	11,843
12	14,170	13,850
16	17,087	15,788
17	19,546	17,908
	<u>129,546</u>	<u>130,554</u>

Though the population of the district remained constant, slight gains were made in the lower wards and slight losses were recorded in the upper wards. In the entire city the population increased from 1,046,964 in 1890 to 1,293,697 in 1900 for a gain of 23.6%. In only one river ward, the third, did the population increase compare favorably with the city-wide average.

Economically the district also remained static. The property values for each ward showed very little change from the 80's through the 90's. In 1880, the total taxable valuation in Philadelphia amounted to \$529 million. In 1897 that figure climbed to \$773 million, but very little of that gain

²³U.S. Census Reports (1890) Vol. IV, Part 1, pp. 551-552; U.S. Census Reports (1900) Vol. I, Part 1, p. 639.

occurred in the river wards as the following table shows:

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Real Estate Taxable in Millions</u>	
	<u>1880</u> ²⁴ (millions)	<u>1897</u> ²⁵ (millions)
3	6.6	6.9
4	7.5	8.1
5	23.0	26.8
6	35.6	38.9
11	8.8	8.8
12	8.3	7.9
16	7.3	8.1
17	6.8	8.5
	<u>97.1</u>	<u>114.0</u>
	City Total: 529	City Total: 773

It is significant to note that the third ward, which recorded the greatest population gain for the 1890-1900 decade, was, in 1897, the poorest ward in the entire city in real estate value. Hence the population density in the district remained essentially unchanged during the 90's, except that the living conditions got worse in the third and fourth wards, remained the same in the fifth and sixth wards and probably improved slightly in the upper wards where fewer people lived in less congested neighborhoods.

The foreign born population, especially in the lower wards, increased significantly during this decade. The total

²⁴Manual of Councils, 1880, p. 107.

²⁵City and State, July 14, 1898, p. 18.

percentage of foreign born in the entire city amounted to 23% in 1900, but in the old river ward district the percentage was 40%.

(Population in Thousands)

Ward	1880		1890		1900	
	Total Pop.	For. Born	Total Pop.	For. Born	Total Pop.	For. Born
3	18	5	20	8	25	12
4	19	6	20	9	23	11
5	12	5	17	6	17	7
6	7	3	9	3	8	3
11	9	4	13	5	12	5
12	10	4	14	5	14	5
16	13	5	17	6	16	5
17	x	x	20	7	18	5
	108	32 or (30%)	130	49 or (37%)	133	53 or (40%)
City Totals:	643	204 (23%)	777	269 (27%)	998	295 (23%)

During the 90's the Jewish population increased dramatically both in the city and especially in the Third district. The persecution of the Jews by the Russian government resulted in a great wave of immigration to America during this decade. The number of native born Russians and Poles living in Philadelphia in 1890 amounted to 7,000 and 2,200 respectively. By 1900, these figures soared to 29,000 and 7,300! Very few of these Russian immigrants were Christians since no Russian Orthodox church existed in Philadelphia at this time. Many of these Russian and Polish Jews settled in

the third, fourth, and fifth wards and some lived in the eleventh and sixteenth wards of the district. Writing in 1894, Henry S. Morais observed:

The Russo-Jewish population mostly inhabits southern districts of this city, between Front and Tenth Streets (east and west) and from Pine Street to Washington Avenue (north and south). Second, Third, Fourth, and intermediate streets, Arch, Girard, Lehigh Avenue, and Frankford, and a considerable number dwell in Port Richmond. The central points are, however, on South Street, and its immediate vicinity. ²⁶

The strength of the Jewish population in these neighborhoods can also be documented from bank records. During this period three banks²⁷ shared most of the Jewish business: People's, run by the Lipshitz Company, at 7th and Girard; Blitzstein's at 4th and Lombard; and Rosenbaum's at 2nd and South. It was to these banks that Jews came to purchase passage on steamships for friends and relatives who wanted to get out of Poland, Hungary, and Russia. Since the names and addresses of the purchasers were recorded by the banks, an indication of the location of the Jewish population in Philadelphia can, therefore, be obtained from these records. Since the records for the Lipshitz bank do not begin until 1906, the following information is from Blitzstein's and Rosenbaum's.

²⁶H. S. Morais, The Jews of Philadelphia, p. 215.

²⁷All three of these banks failed during the depression of 1929; their records are now housed in the offices of the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society in Philadelphia.

The Rosenbaum Bank records go back to 1894. From the years 1894-1908 approximately 1,200 to 1,500 passages were being purchased annually for European Jews. During 1900, an especially heavy year, 2,500 passages were bought at Rosenbaum's. Among the 2,580 entries in the passage order book 264 were sampled; of the 264, 191 of the purchasers lived in Philadelphia. Identifiable ward designations for 171 of these 191 could be determined as follows:

<u>Ward</u>	
3	22
4	26
5	20
6	7
11	7
12	1
16	4
17	0
	<hr/>
	87

Of the 84 who lived outside the district, 21 lived in the second ward, the ward adjacent the third with boundaries running from Christian Street to Wharton Street and from Broad Street to the Delaware River. Thus, the records of the Rosenbaum bank further document the large number of Jews, mostly Russians, who lived in the old southern sector of the city as described by Morais.

Blitzstein's had a much smaller business than Rosenbaum's. In 1900 this bank sold 494 passages for Jews coming

to the United States. Of the 71 sampled, 56 lived in district Three as follows:

<u>Ward</u>	
3	16
4	12
5	19
6	5
11	3
12	1
16	0
17	0
	<hr/>
	56

An additional seven lived in the second ward, while the remaining eight were scattered. Again, this illustrates the large Jewish population in the lower river wards of the city. It was also during the 90's that three new synagogues were established in the lower wards of the district: Beth Hammedrash (Russian) at 5th and Lombard, Beth Jacob (Polish) at 412 Lombard Street and Emunath Israel (Hungarian) at 5th and Gaskill.

The next most important group to come into the district were the Italians, who also inhabited the lower river wards. The Italian population started in the fourth ward and extended beyond the district to the second and first wards. According to the eleventh Census (1890) only 6,800 native born Italians lived in the city; by 1900, that figure jumped to 17,800. The third and fourth wards in district Three changed considerably as a result of the influx of Russian Jes and Italian Catholics.

As pointed out earlier, S. Paul's, an Irish parish on Christian Street near 8th, began to open its doors to the Italians who moved into the neighborhood in the 1890's.²⁸ In addition to Father Donovan's work among the Italians at S. Paul's, which commenced in 1893, Italian Catholic life centered in two exclusively Italian parishes: S. Mary Magdalene de Pazzi and Our Lady of Good Counsel. The former parish was founded in 1852 as the first Italian Catholic parish in the United States. The growth of this parish necessitated the building of a new church in 1891.²⁹ Though this church was located in the second ward just below Christian Street, it drew many of its communicants from the third and fourth wards. By 1897, the Italian population got so large that another Italian parish was needed and resulted in the founding of Our Lady of Good Counsel at 8th and Christian, directly across the street from S. Paul's.

These newcomers in the district disrupted the life of the older, established churches, many of which relocated or simply went out of existence. In 1880 the Reverend Dr. Henry Percival, a wealthy Anglican priest and an able scholar and theologian, assumed the rectorship of the Church of the Evangelists, at 7th and Catherine Streets. In that parish, Percival worked tirelessly to establish a congregation of

²⁸Joseph L. J. Kirlin, Catholicity in Philadelphia, p. 449.

²⁹Historical Sketches of the Catholic Churches and Institutions of Philadelphia, pp. 99-100.

working class Episcopalians. It was also to the Church of the Evangelists that Percival attracted a great deal of attention for the establishment of Philadelphia Anglo-Catholicism. Even though the parish flourished in the 80's and 90's the changing neighborhood prompted Percival to establish a new parish in which the Anglo-Catholics could continue their work when the Evangelists' closed. Hence, in 1889, S. Elizabeth's was founded at 16th and Mifflin Streets, some ten blocks from 7th and Catherine Streets. The short tenure of the Church of the Evangelists was lamented by a young English priest who came to Philadelphia in 1904 to visit the beautiful romanesque church which Percival had built. Father Hawks observed:

Dr. Percival had been dead a year, and the church was in its last days. The streets around it resembled those of Naples; the pavements being cluttered with stalls of street merchants; and the characteristic sights and smells of pre-Mussolinian Italian habitation everywhere in existence. Some attempt was being made to use the clergy-house as a choir-school, but nothing was being done for the neighboring people; proselytism was a matter of scorn to the Anglo-Catholics of those days. 30

After his tour of the Evangelists and other churches in the city, Father Hawks visited old S. Peter's, 3rd and Pine, and recorded the following interesting impression:

Even in its days of humiliation--for it has been encircled by the hosts of Jerusalem and Italy, to say nothing of Africa--it holds up

³⁰Edward Hawks, William McGarvey and the Open Pulpit, p. 77.

its head proudly. Its congregation is a silent but distinguished one, resting in the carefully kept graveyard. There is no spot in America so truly Georgian and reminiscent of Hogarth. 31

The following table³² shows the shifting strength of the various non-Catholic churches in the Third congressional district:

WARD 3	<u>1881</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>
<u>Baptist</u>				
Third	263 (263)	320 (320)	re-located	
<u>Episcopal</u>				
Evangelists'	150	270	327	145
L'Emmanuello	---	186	287	145
Trinity	150 (300)	250 (706)	322 (936)	re-located (290)
<u>Methodist</u>				
Ebenezer	505 (505)	495 (495)	171 (171)	---
<u>Presbyterian</u>				
First, Southwark	178 (178)	60 (60)	---	---
	<u>1,246</u>	<u>1,581</u>	<u>1,107</u>	<u>290</u>
 WARD 4				
<u>Baptist</u>				
Union Colored	---	313	1,402	2,714
<u>Episcopal</u>				
Crucifixion (Black)	184	280	280	345
All Saints'	400 (584)	500 (780)	300 (580)	re-located (345)
<u>Presbyterian</u>				
First African	66 (66)	re-located		
	<u>650</u>	<u>1,093</u>	<u>1,982</u>	<u>3,059</u>

³¹Ibid., p. 79.

³²These figures are taken from the official records of these church bodies as listed in the bibliography under the heading "Church Records."

WARD 5	1881	1891	1901	1911
<u>Baptist</u>				
Spruce St.	289	350	170	140
Union Colored	400	re-located		
	(689)	(350)	(170)	(140)
<u>Episcopal</u>				
St. Paul	211	112	158	---
St. Peter	754	738	931	1,033
St. Thomas African	133	re-located		
	(1,098)	(850)	(1,089)	(1,033)
<u>Presbyterian</u>				
Mariner's	75	107	125	71
First	566	528	788	538
Scots	351	re-located		
Old Pine St.	440	400	400	400
	(1,432)	(1,035)	(1,313)	(1,009)
	3,219	2,235	2,572	2,182
WARD 6				
<u>Episcopal</u>				
Christ	392	355	566	487
	(392)	(355)	(566)	(487)
<u>Lutheran</u>				
Zion (German)	700	388	338	391
St. John (Engl.)	300	290	235	266
	(1,000)	(678)	(573)	(657)
<u>Methodist</u>				
St. George	259	211	260	102
Union	233	re-located		
	(492)	(211)	(260)	(102)
	1,884	1,244	1,399	1,246
WARD 11				
<u>Episcopal</u>				
Calvary	34	re-located		
St. John	107	138	196	414
	(141)	(138)	(196)	(414)
<u>Lutheran</u>				
St. Paulus	400	430*	460*	520
	(400)	(430)	(460)	(520)
	541	568	656	934
*estimated				

WARD 12	<u>1881</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>
<u>Baptist</u>				
Fourth	815 (815)	652 (652)	599 (599)	507 (507)
<u>Episcopal</u>				
Advent	241 (241)	300 (300)	286 (286)	85 (85)
<u>Methodist</u>				
Fifth St.	394	255	125	64
Zoar Colored	? (394)	re-located (255)	(125)	(64)
<u>Presbyterian</u>				
First, N.L.	345	468	192	100
North	429 (774)	318 (786)	re-located (192)	(100)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2, 224	1,993	1,202	756
 WARD 16				
<u>Baptist</u>				
First German	335 (335)	377 (377)	302 (302)	359 (359)
<u>Methodist</u>				
St. John	780 (780)	450 (450)	320 (320)	223 (223)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1,115	827	622	582
 WARD 17				
<u>Lutheran</u>				
St. Luke	278	749	780	798
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	278	749	780	798
 <u>Summaries for all of District III</u>				
Baptists	2,102	2,012	2,473	3,720
Episcopalians	2,756	3,129	3,611	2,754
Lutherans	1,678	1,857	1,833	1,975
Methodists	2,371	1,572	999	1,211
Presbyterians	<u>2,099</u>	<u>1,966</u>	<u>1,505</u>	<u>1,109</u>
TOTALS	11,006	10,536	10,421	10,769

Though the actual figures shown above do not indicate a major decline in the non-Catholic bodies, they do indicate significant shifts in the population. The Baptists, for example, did so well because of the strength of one parish, Union Colored, which had over 1,400 communicants in 1901 and over 2,700 in 1911. The relocation of that church to the fourth from the fifth ward also indicates the fact that Negro population was moving to the lower section of the district during this period. By 1911 not a single white church remained in the fourth ward.

In the third ward, the non-Catholic population also declined rather dramatically. During this period three churches relocated while the Episcopalians established a new parish, L'Emmanuello, for Italians. It is clear that the old white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were moving out of the third ward during the 1890's. The fifth ward also experienced shifts in the population, since the non-Catholic church members were moving out as the Jews moved in. The sixth ward remained relatively stable, though the Methodists did decline while Lutherans and Episcopalians held their own. In the upper wards the Lutherans and Episcopalians managed to keep their position while the Presbyterians and Methodists lost heavily. Hence, the great wave of immigration coming in the 90's disrupted the ethnic fabric of the Third district, especially its southern sector, the third, fourth, and fifth wards.

The Problem of Fraudulent Voting

In an analysis of the voting strength of the Democratic party the extent of fraudulent voting must be considered. There were only occasional complaints about fraudulent voting in the 80's, but in the 90's these complaints became more frequent and emphatic. Reformers like Alexander McClure, Henry C. Lea, and Clinton Rogers Woodruff campaigned vigorously for an honest ballot. The major ballot reforms did not occur, however, until the first decade of the twentieth century. In the meantime, Philadelphians merely tolerated the prostitution of the ballot box as one of the negative features of the democratic process.

Before the Uniform Registration Act of 1906, the lists of eligible voters were compiled by tax assessors. Each division had one assessor who was chosen at the party primaries. The assessor, therefore, became as C. R. Woodruff observed: "A tool of the boss."³³ The assessor's job was to visit every dwelling in his district on the first Monday of May and the first Monday of December in order to certify and update the official list of eligible voters. This method opened the doors to all sorts of fraudulent practices, not the least of which was padding the official list as the

³³C. R. Woodruff, "Election Methods and Reforms in Philadelphia," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 17, 1901, p. 185.

following illustrates:

1900 - 18th division of Ward 13

307 N. 9th St. - 35 names recorded; only 9 residents
 309 N. 9th St. - 23 names recorded; only 4 residents
 307
 309 N. 9th St. - 80 names recorded; only 21 residents³⁴
 311
 313

Woodruff also pointed out in his article that the ballot box was just as corrupt in the old river wards of the Third district.

Others corroborated the report of Woodruff. The Times in 1894 estimated that 50,000 illegal names appeared on the assessors' lists, and in 1899, the Municipal League put the figure between 30,000 and 50,000. Even the Republican Philadelphia Press estimated that there were 80,000 illegal names on the voting lists.³⁵ The fifth ward was notorious in this regard. In 1894 Judge Hare struck 1,150 names from the list of 5,177 voters in the fifth ward.

The secrecy of the ballot was also violated by the political bosses during this period. In the 1893 ballot act a provision permitted disabled persons to receive assistance in filling out their ballots. In 1900 in a district of the second ward, which had 158 Italian voters and eight Irish voters, every single ballot of an Italian voter was filled out by an Irish voter.³⁶

³⁴Ibid., pp. 185-187.

³⁵Ibid., p. 189.

³⁶Ibid., p. 197.

The poll tax also contributed to the prostitution of the ballot. Those persons who paid neither a county nor city tax (i.e., those who did not own property) had to pay a poll tax of twenty-five cents per year to be able to vote. The organizations of both parties bought the tax receipts to distribute to their non-property owning voters. An 1897 statute stipulated that the elector had to purchase his own receipt, but this law was ignored and never enforced.

According to contemporary estimates, the number of eligible voters during this period should have equalled about one fifth of the population. The one to five "time honored ratio" as Woodruff called it, would have put Philadelphia's population in 1900 at 1,670,445 instead of its actual population of 1,293,697. In short, there existed in Philadelphia a one to four ratio of voters to population.

Unfortunately, much of the reporting of fraudulent voting was too generalized to be of any value. Newspapers like The Times rarely specified the charge of fraudulent voting. In the Third district there was much talk about illegal voters but little factual information to back it up. The Times did, however, expose the illegal activities of Assessor John Briscoe of the fifth ward in 1894. Thirty-four illegal names recorded as residents of a small Hurst Street house were stricken from the roll in early November.³⁷

³⁷The Times, 3 November 1894.

Voting Strength of the Party in District Three:
1890 - 1900

The voting strength of the Democratic party in the Third district reveals graphically its decline during the 90's. The factious state of the party destroyed Democratic solidarity in Randall's old district. McAleer's first congressional campaign in 1890 was marked by political deals and ticket splitting. As pointed out earlier, the Gordon-McAleer faction opposed Pattison's reelection in 1890 because he was a favorite of the Harrity organization. In the fourth ward, especially, the McAleer men cut Pattison as the following table³⁸ shows:

1890 Totals in nearest hundred:

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Delamater</u> (R)	<u>Pattison</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>McAleer</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Vaux</u> (ID)
3	13	20	60.0	20	61.8	12
4	16	17	50.8	26	78.5	7
5	19	13	39.6	22	69.7	10
6	8	11	56.5	5	25.3	14
11	10	14	59.3	12	49.5	12
12	11	16	58.4	12	46.9	14
16	14	18	55.6	15	47.8	16
17	13	24	65.2	20	56.0	16
	104	133	55.6	132	56.7	101

The 1890 ticket splitting and cutting of Pattison in key McAleer wards was blatant, but in the 1892 campaign the McAleer forces suffered a major setback when the regulars nominated Ker for Congress. This action only gave the McAleer

³⁸The figures are derived from Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1891.

faction further justification to cooperate with Republicans for which they were accused of being a Republican annex. Because McAleer was deprived of the regular nomination, he ran as an Independent Democrat and also as a Republican. He entered into a deal with the Republicans and agreed to support their legislative candidates in the third and fourth wards in order to get the Republican congressional nomination. In the solid Democratic third and fourth wards the McAleer votes assured the following Republican victories:

State House of Representatives:

Third District (3rd Ward)	Alphonse Richardson (4)	1,446
	William J. Reed (D)	638
Fourth District (4th Ward)	John Moore (R)	1,603
	John Donahue (D)	638

1892 Totals in nearest hundred:³⁹

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Harrison</u> (R)	<u>Cleveland</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>McAleer</u> (ID)	<u>Ker</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>
3	11	18	61.0	20	9	30.2
4	12	15	54.9	23	4	14.4
5	19	12	39.2	24	5	18.2
6	7	9	55.6	9	7	45.3
11	8	12	60.6	14	5	28.5
12	12	15	56.9	18	8	29.8
16	13	18	58.7	23	7	23.3
17	<u>12</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>65.5</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>28.9</u>
	94	122	56.3	155	55	26.2

In the 1894 campaign a major shift occurred in the voting pattern of the old river wards when this once normally Democratic stronghold for the first time returned a Republican

³⁹Ibid., 1893.

majority for the gubernatorial nominee. In fact, the district turned to the G.O.P. in 1894 and never came back to the Democratic party throughout the entire Bryan era. Hence, the shift to the Republican party antedated the Bryan take-over of the party. Several factors help to explain this. The nation was experiencing a severe depression for which the Democrats, as the national "in" party got the blame. The Republican shift of 1894 was national in scope and probably was more significant than the great Bryan defeat of 1896.⁴⁰ However, the local situation also helps to explain the 1894 defeat. McAleer failed to win the nomination because of the eleventh hour knifing by Tommy Ryan and Peter Monroe. Hence, the McAleer supporters refused to back Democratic nominee Joseph McCullen and instead supported Republican Frederick Halterman for Congress.

The national unrest over the Cleveland administration plus the defection of the McAleer Democrats spelled defeat

⁴⁰See V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" for an analysis of the proposition that the 1894 election was the Republican turning point rather than the 1896 presidential battle. In analyzing New England Democratic voting strength Key points out that seven of the eight New England Democratic congressmen failed to win reelection in 1894 and that the two New England Democratic governors also suffered defeats. Key concludes that: "The luckless William Jennings Bryan and the free silver heresy perhaps did not contribute as much as is generally supposed to the 1892-1896 decline in New England Democratic strength; New England Democrats moved in large numbers over to the Republican ranks in 1894." P. 13.

for both Singerly, the Democratic gubernatorial nominee and McCullen, the Democratic congressional nominee. Singerly was also hurt by his association with the regular organization of the party. Despite his efforts to get the factions together, Singerly was still part of the regular "establishment" of the party. The following summary shows the extent of the Democratic debacle of 1893. McCullen lost every ward to Halterman, while Singerly managed to carry the seventeenth ward, by a scant thirty-eight votes, his only ward in the entire city.

1894 Totals in nearest hundred:⁴¹

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Hastings</u> (R)	<u>Singerly</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>McCullen</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Halterman</u> (R)
3	14	12	44.8	12	43.9	15
4	14	12	45.0	7	26.1	19
5	23	8	26.2	8	24.9	24
6	8	7	47.1	7	49.5	8
11	13	7	34.4	5	27.6	14
12	16	9	37.2	8	31.9	17
16	16	11	39.9	9	33.0	18
17	16	17	50.5	14	41.1	19
	<u>110</u>	<u>83</u>	42.8	69	34.2	134

After being defeated by his own party, McAleer became even more cooperative with Dave Martin's Republican Combine and in 1895 McAleer helped to defeat ex-Governor Pattison when he ran for mayor. The ward tallies for the Third

⁴¹The figures are derived from Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1895.

district show the extent to which the McAleer Democrats were annexed to the Republican Combine:⁴²

1895: Election for Mayor

<u>Ward</u>	Warwick (R)	Pattison (D)
3	1,406	1,371
4	1,603	1,193
5	2,355	1,055
6	755	934
11	1,336	765
12	1,600	1,176
16	1,665	1,281
17	1,765	1,834

The 1896 campaign was unique in that it was the only campaign in the district in which a third party candidate made a serious attempt to be elected to Congress. After McAleer announced that he would not support the money plank of the Chicago platform, Sam Hudson announced his candidacy as a free silver nominee, and subsequently polled about nine per cent of the congressional vote. McAleer again worked a deal with the Martin Combine which resulted in his election over Halterman, who carried the upper German wards but lost overwhelmingly in the fifth ward, a traditional Republican stronghold. McAleer's forces, in exchange for Republican congressional support, gave their votes to Samuel Ashbridge, the Martin Combine candidate for Sheriff. The cutting of Alexander Crow in the old river wards was notorious as the following vote shows:⁴³

⁴²Ibid., 1896.

⁴³Ibid., 1897.

<u>Ward</u>	Ashbridge (Rep. - Martin Combine)	Crow (Dem. - fusion)
3	1,360	1,450
4	2,176	1,334
5	2,738	1,026
6	1,064	785
11	1,257	779
12	1,304	1,341
16	1,509	1,428
17	1,710	1,840

In the presidential race Bryan lost the district, carrying only the sixth ward, the only ward he won in the entire city. In an election notable for ticket splitting Bryan performed better in the Irish than the German neighborhoods.

1876 Totals in full amounts:⁴⁴

<u>Ward</u>	<u>McKinley</u> (R)	<u>Palmer</u> (J)	<u>Bryan</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>
3	1,566	22	1,329	45.5
4	1,763	18	1,755	49.6
5	2,735	46	1,037	27.1
6	865	26	988	52.6
11	1,225	13	809	39.5
12	1,707	52	948	35.0
16	1,957	36	1,077	35.0
17	<u>1,981</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>1,636</u>	<u>44.7</u>
	13,799	253	9,579	40.5

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Hudson</u> (FS)	<u>McAleer</u> (D)	<u>% Dem.</u>	<u>Halterman</u> (R)
3	399	982	34.3	1,482
4	222	2,419	68.6	881
5	217	1,543	54.8	1,053
6	131	1,101	59.2	627
11	157	1,056	51.8	822
12	197	958	36.1	1,501
16	328	1,186	38.8	1,540
17	<u>473</u>	<u>1,410</u>	<u>39.9</u>	<u>1,650</u>
	2,064	11,655	50.0	9,556

⁴⁴Ibid.

McAleer's continued working relationship with the Republicans paid him handsome dividends. In 1898 he got the Republican as well as the Democratic nomination for Congress, but little did he realize that in two short years his Republican "friends" would turn a deaf ear to his future political ambitions. In every ward in the district, McAleer polled more Republican than Democratic votes, while Jenks, the Democratic candidate for governor, carried only the fourth and sixth wards.

1898 Totals in nearest hundred:⁴⁵

<u>Ward</u>	Stone (R)	Swallow (P)	Jenks (D)	% <u>Dem.</u>	McAleer (D)	% <u>Dem.</u>	McAleer (R)	Marsh (P)
3	15	1	8	35.0	6	25.6	16	1
4	11	x	16	58.0	12	46.1	14	x
5	28	1	5	15.7	5	14.5	28	x
6	6	1	8	51.9	7	46.5	7	x
11	14	1	3	16.7	3	15.8	14	x
12	14	1	7	32.0	6	28.8	15	1
16	16	1	6	25.0	5	22.9	17	x
17	<u>15</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>40.9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>30.6</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>1</u>
	119	7	65	33.9	52	28.0	131	2

x = under 100

Since the old Randall district joined the ranks of the Republican party, it no longer needed the support of a superannuated Democrat. So, in 1900 McAleer was cut by the Republicans. He complained bitterly when "Little Caesar" Ashbridge, an old crony and ally, ran Burk's campaign for Congress. McAleer's protest was justifiable because Mayor

⁴⁵Ibid., 1899.

Ashbridge's use of the police cost him many votes.⁴⁶ It is impossible to determine whether or not it cost him the election. It probably did not because the district had already become Republican and even though McAleer complained bitterly, he dropped his plans to contest the election. In 1900 McAleer carried only the sixth and seventeenth wards while Bryan carried only the sixth. By 1900 the old Randall Democratic stronghold had disintegrated.

1900 Totals in nearest hundred:⁴⁷

<u>Ward</u>	McKinley (R)	Bryan (D)	% Dem.	McAleer (D)	% Dem.	Burk (R)
3	17	10	35.3	9	38.2	16
4	17	11	40.1	12	44.7	16
5	20	8	39.3	10	45.2	16
6	8	11	58.9	12	66.4	6
11	14	5	28.0	6	31.8	13
12	16	8	34.3	11	48.0	13
16	19	10	34.2	12	46.1	16
17	<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>44.7</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>54.7</u>	<u>16</u>
	129	75	36.7	91	47.0	111

In addition to the national issues of the tariff and free silver and the self-defeating wrangles of the party factions, the ethnocultural shifts also help to explain the loss of Democratic strength in the third congressional district.

⁴⁶C. R. Woodruff, op. cit., pp. 198-199.

⁴⁷The figures are derived from Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1901.

Throughout the 80's the Irish and Germans strongly favored the Democrats. Fortunately for the Democrats, these two groups worked harmoniously together under Randall's leadership. Such was not the case in the turbulent 90's. Though the Irish and Germans were not hostile, they began to divide over the congressional candidates in 1890. In the Vaux-McAleer election most of the Irish supported McAleer as the election returns from the lower wards so clearly indicate. Vaux, on the other hand, appealed more to the Germans as shown by his strength in the upper wards. Although there was no bloc voting, the 1890 election was the beginning of the Irish-German split. It should be noted, however, that McAleer did carry Dittmann's seventeenth ward with its large German population, while Vaux carried Tommy Ryan's sixth, an Irish ward. However, throughout the district most Irish supported McAleer and most Germans backed Vaux.

The big boost for German voters came in 1894 when the Republicans elected Fred Halterman to Congress over Joseph McCullen. Halterman was extremely popular with the Germans, but his election was made possible by a split of the Irish vote. When the McAleer Democrats cut McCullen in favor of Halterman they took about half of McCullen's potential votes in the district.

In the 1894 gubernatorial race Singerly lost more heavily in the Irish than the German wards, but in the

presidential race of 1896 the situation was reversed. Bryan did better in the Irish wards but lost heavily in the German wards. In other sections of the country Bryan also failed to carry the normal German Democratic vote. Stanley L. Jones in The Presidential Election of 1896 observes that " . . . in both the urban and rural areas . . . among German voters there was a decisive shift from the Democratic to the Republican party." Jones states that the Germans were " . . . repelled by the Democratic financial program."⁴⁸ In the Third district the German shift was also evident. In fact, 1892 was the last time (in the 1880-1910 period) that the German wards went Democratic in a presidential election.⁴⁹

In addition to the political change among the Germans, the district experienced profound population shifts during the 90's. The Irish moved out of the lower wards as the Italians and Russian Jews moved in. There was a great cultural upheaval in the old Randall district which explains, in part, why the Democratic party did not appeal to the new immigrants. The relationship between cultural identity and

⁴⁸Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896, p. 345.

⁴⁹A recent study by Richard J. Jensen entitled "The Winning of the Mid-West: A Social History of Midwestern Elections" further documents the observation of Jones regarding the defection of the Germans. In analyzing the Chicago vote of 1896 Jensen points out that 75% of the Germans voted for McKinley while 90% of the Irish voted for Bryan. P. 341ff.

political affiliation is a deep seated one as Samuel Lubell points out:

Ethnic groups do not now--if ever they did--act simply as cohesive voting blocs. Rather, their influence is exerted through common group consciousness, through the effect of common antecedents and cultural traditions which enable them to view developing issues from a common point of view. 50

If Benson's negative reference theory is applied to the political shifts in the third district, it is plausible that the poor Jews and poor Italians were not attracted to the party of the poor Irish. The Catholic Church, dominated by the Irish hierarchy and the Irish priests was enough to repel the Italians from identifying with the Irish Democratic party. Even though Italian work was done at Irish S. Paul's in 1893, the Italians could not be happy in an Irish parish; so they founded Our Lady of Good Counsel in 1897. It was in the Third district that the Italians gave visible signs of their unwillingness of associating with the Irish. Hence, when the Italians began to exercise the franchise, they voted for the Republicans.

Neither were the Russian Jews attracted to the Democratic party. They also reacted against the Irish. Lawrence H. Fuchs in The Political Behavior of American Jews⁵¹ points out that in New York City the Eastern European Jews became

⁵⁰Samuel Lubell, "Political Behavior of Ethnic Groups," quoted from Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, p. 168.

⁵¹See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews, pp. 44-7; 51; 124-125.

either Republicans or socialists, and had no association with the Irish Democratic party. In Philadelphia the Russian Jews shunned both the Democrats and socialists and became Republicans as the voting records of the new Jewish wards so clearly indicate.

The City Considered

The city-wide losses of the Democratic party were just as severe as the losses in the river ward district. In the 1890 gubernatorial race the Democrats managed to carry three wards outside the third district, and in 1892 Cleveland carried one ward outside district three. After 1892, no wards outside the Third district were carried by a Democratic presidential or gubernatorial candidate. The following table illustrates the sorry state to which the Democrats declined in the 90's.

<u>Democratic Wards</u>					
Pattison 1890	Cleveland 1892	Singerly 1894	Bryan 1896	Jenks 1898	Bryan 1900
(2)	(2)				
3	3				
4	4			4	
6	6		6	6	6
11	11				
12	12				
16	16				
17	17	17			
(25)					
(34)					
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
10	8	1	1	2	1

() = Outside District III

The second ward, like the third and fourth, was inhabited by the working class. The twenty-fifth ward was primarily a mill district and, stretched along the Delaware River from Lehigh Avenue to Frankfort Creek. The population was composed mostly of workers of Irish and German descent. The thirty-fourth ward, created from the twenty-fourth in 1889, was a residential section located in West Philadelphia.

When the Irish and Germans moved out of the river wards to more commodious homes in other sections of the city, they made no significant change in the political structure of their new neighborhoods. In fact, the Democratic strength declined in every section of the city after 1892. Unlike their predecessors, the new immigrants coming into the river wards were not attracted to the Democratic party. Yet they were part of the same lower, working class economic group. Nor can ballot fraud or other forms of dishonest voting irregularities account for the decline of the Democracy. The cry of fraudulent voting was greatly exaggerated. In 1896 Hudson and Halterman protested fraudulent practices by McAleer in the Third district, but neither pressed charges. In 1900 McAleer announced that he was going to contest Burk's election but never pressed charges. Matt Quay probably gave the most accurate description of the contemporary voting situation, when he said:

Doubtless frauds are committed in the city of Philadelphia, as elsewhere in great centres of population, but no sane man will believe that they obtain in Philadelphia to a greater extent

than elsewhere under like conditions, or to an extent sufficient to effect great results. It is difficult to perceive any motive for such crimes. No ballot law can be devised which will convert a minority into a majority, and no ballot law can be devised which will make Pennsylvania a Democratic State, or Philadelphia a Democratic city. ⁵²

Finally, two great turning points occurred in the decade of the 90's which affected tremendously the life of the Philadelphia Democratic party. First, at the grass-roots level, in 1894 the party suffered a debilitating loss of voting strength which crippled it throughout this period (through 1910). Second, at the leadership level, the loss of the blue bloods and middle-class Protestant leaders in 1896 effectively made the party a predominant Irish organization. These two factors together constituted the beginnings of the dramatic decline of a once vital minority force in Philadelphia.

Description of District Three: 1900-1910

The old river ward district changed geographically and politically during the first decade of the new century. The congressional redistricting of 1902 resulted in the addition of three new wards: the second, eighteenth, and nineteenth. The second, which touched the river and was adjacent to the third ward, ran from Christian to Wharton Street (North-South) and from the river to Broad Street (East-West). These additions in 1902 constituted the only geographic changes in

⁵²Matthew Stanley Quay, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 15 (Speech at West Chester, 1 October, 1900).

Randall's old district. But the continued political shifts in the district were even more significant as we shall see subsequently.

The addition of these three new wards doubled the population of the district as the following indicates:⁵³

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1900</u> (12th Census)	<u>1910</u> (13th Census)
2		40,536
3	24,693	25,747
4	22,562	22,316
5	16,868	17,006
6	8,042	6,374
11	11,843	11,619
12	13,850	15,152
16	15,788	16,175
17	17,908	17,848
18		27,134
19		52,283
	130,554	251,917

While the old wards in the district showed little sign of population growth, the population in the entire city increased by 19.7% and climbed to 1,549,008 in 1910 as contrasted with 1,293,697 recorded in 1900.

In every ward in the district, except the nineteenth, the foreign born population increased. In 1910, this district still had the highest concentration of low income inhabitants as demonstrated by the fact that no additional houses were built (there was no space to build) at a time

⁵³U.S. Census Reports (1900) Vol. I, Part 1, p. 639;
U.S. Census Reports (1910) Vol. III, pp. 605-606.

when the population increased slightly in the lower wards and remained just about the same in the upper wards. The following chart shows that the district had a disproportionately high immigrant population. The city immigrant population of 383,000 constituted twenty-five per cent of the entire city population, but in the third congressional district over forty-two per cent of the inhabitants were foreign born. In six of the eleven wards in the district (2, 3, 4, 5, 11, and 12) over fifty per cent of the dwellers were of foreign birth.

Comparison of the Foreign Born Population
for the Wards in the Third Congressional District
for the Years 1900 and 1910⁵⁴

	<u>1900 (12th Census)</u>			<u>1910 (13th Census)</u>		
	(figures rounded to nearest thousand)					
<u>Ward</u>	<u>Total Pop.</u>	<u>Foreign Born</u>	<u>% of For. Born</u>	<u>Total Pop.</u>	<u>Foreign Born</u>	<u>% of For. Born</u>
2	35	16	45%	41	22	53%
3	25	12	48	26	14	53
4	23	11	47	22	11	50
5	17	7	41	17	8	47
6	8	3	37	6	3	50
11	12	5	41	12	6	50
12	13	5	39	15	8	53
16	16	5	31	16	7	43
17	18	5	27	17	7	41
18	30	5	16	27	9	33
19	55	13	23	52	12	23

The Census of 1910 (13th) for the first time enumerated by ward the national origins of the foreign born for the major countries. Therefore, it can be determined accurately what

⁵⁴Ibid.

ethnic groups occupied the various political sub-divisions of the city during this period.

The statistics in the following chart confirm the earlier evidence of the influx of Italians and Russian Jews into the Third congressional district. Forty per cent of all the Philadelphia Russians lived in this district; and over twenty-five per cent of the total number of Russians in Philadelphia lived in the second, third, fourth and fifth wards of the district. Over fifty per cent of all the Philadelphia Italians lived in the lower wards of the third district.

District Three Foreign Percentages: 1910

(Combined percentage of foreigners and second generation foreigners.)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Russians</u>	<u>Italians</u>
2	36.5	48.7
3	30.7	34.6
4	36.3	27.2
5	47.0	U
6	33.3	U
11	33.3	U
12	33.3	U
16	18.7	U
17	17.6	U
18	7.40	U
19	1.92	U

N.B. "U" = under one per cent

The sixth ward had two unique characteristics: It was the only Democratic ward in the whole city during this decade, and it had the smallest population of any ward in the third district. The foreign born population in Tommy Ryan's sixth

amounted to forty-one per cent of the total. But the most significant fact was that in this thinly populated ward there were over 1,500 Russians, who constituted the largest group of foreign born and comprised twenty-five per cent of the ward population.

By 1910 Philadelphia Negroes had moved out of the river wards to better homes west of Broad Street and south of South Street, and to other places in the city, like German-town. Therefore, the black population in district three declined dramatically during this decade. In 1910, the percentage of blacks in the district declined to two per cent as contrasted with five per cent a decade earlier. Over two-thirds of the Negro population in the district was concentrated in the third and fourth wards, wards which also had large Italian and Russian populations.

Black Population in hundreds:⁵⁵

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>1910</u>
2	X	7
3	17	15
4	29	26
5	13	7
6	1	U
11	U	1
12	3	3
16	1	U
17	1	2
18	X	U
19	X	2
	65 or 5%	61 or 2%

X = not in district
U = under 100

⁵⁵Ibid.

The Problem of Fraudulent Voting

The various voting reform measures enacted by the Legislature in the winter of 1906 put an end to the flagrant fraudulent voting practices about which the reformers had harangued. The election reforms of 1906 also ended the monotonous excuse so frequently offered by the Democrats for their poor showing. As pointed out earlier, the 1906 gubernatorial election was hailed by Philadelphia reformers as being clean and honest. In neither the 1908 nor 1910 elections were any serious concerns about fraudulent practices recorded. Hence, we can assume that the elections of 1906, 1908, and 1910 were honestly conducted and that the voting results were accurate.

Only one problem resulted from the new legislation of 1906 and that grew out of the new Uniform Primary Act. The new act did not prohibit members of a party to cross over to vote for the candidates of an opposing party. The Machine boys soon caught onto the fact that they could very easily manipulate any minority or reform party in Philadelphia. In the 1910 primaries the Republicans managed to control several City Party nominations as they had in the Democratic party nominations of 1908. Therefore, in 1910, a new party called the Philadelphia Party was quickly organized by the reformers so that independent candidates could be entered in certain of the legislative districts where the Republicans controlled the City Party.

The Personal Registration Act of 1906, effectively ended the padding of voters' lists. Padding the assessors' voting lists constituted the most flagrant prostitution of the ballot in Philadelphia. In December, 1902, the list of eligible voters climbed to the absurdly high figure of 370,000. The one to five ratio of eligible voters to the population would have, therefore, put Philadelphia's population at 1,850,000 rather than its real population of 1,300,000.⁵⁶ Based on the 1900 population the number of voters in Philadelphia should have been 258,000. Hence, for the elections of 1902 and 1904 about 112,000 illegal names were put on the voting lists. The following shows the number of votes cast in the 1902 and 1904 elections in the city:⁵⁷

<u>1902 (Governor)</u>		<u>% of eligible voters who cast ballots, based on a registration of 370,000</u>
Pennypacker (R)	171,003	
Pattison (D)	<u>74,006</u>	64%
	245,009	
<u>1904 (President)</u>		
Roosevelt (R)	227,809	
Parker (D)	<u>46,875</u>	74%
	274,684	

⁵⁶Rudolph Blankenburg, "Forty Years in the Wilderness," Arena, May 1905, Vol. 33, p. 459.

⁵⁷The figures are derived from Smull's Legislative Handbook, 1903, 1905.

An examination of the voting strength of the Third district for the same elections shows the following disparities:

Congressional District Three

N.B. Population: 247,000

Using the 1-5 ratio the number of eligible voters should have been 49,000. Assuming there were 49,000 eligible voters who cast ballots the percentage of voters would be:

1902

Pennypacker (R)	36,024
Pattison (D)	<u>11,447</u>
	47,471

96%!

1904

Roosevelt (R)	41,498
Parker (D)	<u>8,293</u>
	49,791

100%!

Therefore, in the Third district if the average city percentage of voters is applied, the vote in 1902 should have totaled 31,360 and in 1904, 36,360. Thus, there were approximately 16,000 illegal votes cast in 1902 and 13,000 illegal votes cast in 1904 in the Third congressional district. The following table for the Third district shows the prevalence of vote padding. Only the second ward shows an acceptably clean record compared to the scandalous records of the Republican fifth ward and Democratic sixth ward.

Congressional District Three
(figures in nearest thousand)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>Ward</u>	<u>Pop.</u>	<u>Eligible Voters 1-5 Ratio</u>	<u>1902 votes cast</u>	<u>Vote should have been 64% of Col.2</u>	<u>1904 votes cast</u>	<u>Vote should have been 74% of Col.2</u>
2	35	7.0	4.4	4.4	5.1	5.2
3	25	5.0	4.0	3.2	4.0	3.7
4	23	4.6	3.8	2.9	4.0	2.9
5	17	3.4	5.5	2.2	3.7	2.5
6	8	1.6	2.1	1.0	1.9	1.2
11	12	2.4	2.4	1.5	3.0	1.8
12	13	2.6	2.7	1.7	2.7	1.9
16	16	3.2	2.9	2.0	3.1	2.4
17	18	3.6	3.2	2.3	3.4	2.7
18	30	6.0	5.9	3.8	6.3	4.4
19	55	11.0	10.0	7.0	12.5	8.1

When the Personal Registration Act of 1906 became effective, the political parties in Philadelphia were all put on an equal footing for the competition of votes in the city. While the population of the city increased during this period, the number of votes cast decreased reflecting the deletion of thousands of illegal names from the voting lists. The following figures indicate the impact of this new act for the 1902-1910 period.

Number of Votes Cast, 1902-1910 (in thousands)⁵⁸
(Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections)

	<u>The City</u>		<u>Congressional District III</u>
<u>1902</u>	Pennypacker (R)	171	36
	Pattison (D)	<u>74</u>	<u>11</u>
		245.	47
<u>1904</u>	Roosevelt (R)	228	41
	Parker (D)	<u>47</u>	<u>8</u>
		275	49
<u>1906</u>	Stuart (R)	127	22
	Emery (D+LR)	<u>92</u>	<u>11</u>
		218	33
<u>1908</u>	Taft (R)	185	26
	Bryan (D)	<u>75</u>	<u>10</u>
		260	36
<u>1910</u>	Tener (R)	130	23
	Grim (D)	16	5
	Berry (K)	<u>86</u>	<u>8</u>
		233	36

The most significant fact in the innovation of the honest ballot is that the Democrats did no better after the enactment of the Personal Registration Act. Though the Republican vote declined, the Democratic vote did not increase significantly.

Voting Strength in District Three: 1900-1910

An examination of the election returns in Philadelphia for the first decade of the twentieth century only reveals the magnitude of the decadence of the Democratic party. The party actually had no strength at all during this period for only the small, insignificant sixth ward controlled by Tommy

⁵⁸Ibid., 1903, 1905, 1907, 1909, 1911.

Ryan could be classified as a Democratic ward. When the old third district is examined the more significant question to ask is: Where were the Democrats less weak rather than where they were strong?

In focusing upon the Third district, we can get some clues regarding patterns of ethnic voting. The failure of the Democrats to attract the new immigrants, the Russian Jews and Italian Catholics, stands out in bold relief as one of the most important voting characteristics of the district. In the lower wards the foreign born population averaged fifty per cent while the number of second generation foreigners averaged twenty-five per cent. An overwhelming foreign ethnic culture existed in all the wards of the district except the eighteenth and the nineteenth, which had foreign born populations of thirty-three per cent and twenty-three per cent respectively. The striking fact is that the Democrats were weakest in the lower wards and a little stronger in wards eighteen and nineteen, as the following table so graphically indicates.

Gubernatorial and Presidential Vote in Hundreds

Ward	Population	1902	%Dem.	1904	%Dem.	1906	%Dem.	1908	%Dem.	1910	%Dem.
2	It-Ru. Rep. Dem.	37 7	15.9	46 5	9.8	21 2 L6	6.9	25 25	16.7	27 1 K3	3.2
3	It-Ru. Rep. Dem.	36 4	10.0	36 4	10.0	15 11 L3	5.3	19 3	13.6	23 1 K1	4.0
4	It-Ru. Rep. Dem.	35 4	10.3	35 5	12.5	18 1 L2	4.8	21 3	12.5	22 1 K2	4.0
5	Ru Rep. Dem.	52 4	7.1	34 3	8.1	16 2 L2	10.0	23 3	11.5	26 -- K1	
18	M Rep. Dem.	39 19	37.8	51 13	20.3	30 8	15.1	38 18	32.1	26 3 K20	6.1
19	M Rep. Dem.	76 30	28.3	108 17	13.6	57 12 L26	12.6	73 32	30.5	49 5 K36	5.6

Notes: It=Italian
Ru=Russian
M=Mixed
L=Lincoln Republican
K=Keystone

Even though the Democratic vote was miserably weak in the lower wards (the old Democratic stronghold of the 80's and early 90's) it is interesting to note that Parker performed slightly better than Bryan in this segment of the district, whereas Bryan did much better than Parker in the eighteenth and nineteenth wards, both of which had a fair Irish and German population, a very small Russian population and practically no Italian population. Bryan, a much stronger vote getter than Parker, had practically no appeal among Italian Catholics and Russian Jews.

At no time during this decade did the Democrats show any signs of rejuvenation in the Third district, as the following table demonstrates:

<u>Vote in thousands for Congressional District III</u> ⁵⁹						
	<u>Presidential Vote</u>		<u>%Dem.</u>	<u>Congressional Vote</u>		<u>%Dem.</u>
<u>1904</u>	Roosevelt (R)	41		Castor (R)	40	
	Parker (D)	8	16.3	Fow (D)	8	16.7
<u>1908</u>	Taft (R)	26		Moore (R)	24	
	Bryan (D)	10	27.7	Beerli (D)	7	22.6
<hr/>						
	<u>Gubernatorial Vote</u>			<u>Congressional Vote</u>		
<u>1902</u>	Pennypacker (R)	36		Burk (R)	39	
	Pattison (D)	11	23.4	- - - - -		
<u>1906</u>	Stuart (R)	22		Moore (R)	20	
	Emery (D)	4	12.1	O'Brien (D)	4	12.9
	Emery (L)	7		O'Brien (L)	7	
<u>1910</u>	Tener (R)	23		Moore (R)	24	
	Grim (D)	5	13.9	Hayes (D)	3	8.8
	Berry (K)	8		Ramsdell (K)	7	

⁵⁹Ibid.

City-Wide Democratic Strength

The decline and veritable collapse of the party manifested itself throughout the entire city. In 1906 Emery, the Democratic and Lincoln Republican candidate for Governor, carried six wards, but in every single Emery ward the Lincoln vote exceeded the Democratic vote as follows:⁶⁰

(Vote in Hundreds)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Lincoln</u>	<u>Democratic</u>
22	39	15
24	29	13
27	31	7
28	30	10
32	30	9
34	37	13

It is clear that the organization Democrats, dominated by Donnelly and Ryan, actually thwarted the party's hope for success in the 1906 gubernatorial race.

In 1910 the whole state Democratic organization with the Donnelly-Ryan appendage in Philadelphia gave the election to Tener by refusing to support Berry for Governor. Berry was the only Democrat (even though he used the Keystone label) to run for Governor during the whole Cleveland-Bryan era who cut into some of the traditional Republican wards, especially those with large upper middle class populations like the twenty-second (Germantown).⁶¹ When the people of Philadelphia looked for an alternative to the boss ridden

⁶⁰Ibid., 1907.

⁶¹Berry carried thirteen wards, viz., 22, 23, 28, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, and 46.

Republican Machine they did not look to the Democratic party because it operated as an adjunct to the Republican Machine.

The presidential election of 1904 shows conclusively that the reactionary campaign conducted by Parker, which appealed to the Jeffersonians, offered no viable political alternative for Philadelphians. Even though the conservatives were vociferous in 1904, they could not deliver even the normal presidential Democratic vote for Parker. In 1908 Bryan out-pollled Parker in all but four wards in the city. Ironically three of these wards were in the former Democratic bastion, the old Randall district. However, the Democratic vote in these wards was negligible. The difference between the Parker vote and Bryan vote was insignificant as the following shows:

<u>Ward</u>	<u>1904 Parker</u>	<u>1908 Bryan</u>
3	397	347
4	520	262
6	1,308	990

In all the other sections of the city the Bryan vote of 1908 far exceeded the Parker vote of 1904 as the following

sample shows:

(Vote in Hundreds)

<u>Ward</u>	<u>Parker: 1904</u>			<u>Bryan: 1908</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>%Dem.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>%Dem.</u>
22 (German-town)	19	87	17.9	30	91	24.8
24 (West Phila.)	21	75	21.9	35	72	32.7
25 (Kensington) ⁶²	22	74	22.9	38	67	36.2

Both Bryan and Parker lost tremendously in the sections of the city heavily populated by immigrants, especially by Italians and Russians. But in 1908 Bryan did much better than Parker in the middle and upper middle class neighborhoods. But, Philadelphia was not unique in this regard. Shortly after the defeat of 1908, Bryan wrote to many of his political friends for their analysis of his defeat. James K. McGuire wrote from Syracuse to report: "You gained 2,000 votes in this county over 1904--entirely in middle class residential and farming districts. You lost heavily among Italians, Jews, Poles, and Hungarians, who are either bought or influenced by power, employers or environment."⁶³ McGuire

⁶²In 1906 the 45th ward was created from part of the 25th. Therefore, to make an accurate comparison the figures for 1908 under ward 25 include both the 25th and 45th wards since these two wards comprised the territory of the 25th in 1904.

⁶³James K. McGuire to W. J. Bryan, 13 January 1909, Bryan papers.

wrote another letter to Bryan on January 25, 1909, in which he analyzed the New York City vote:

Of course, the most terrible blow was the loss of New York City to Taft by Sixteen thousand. Investigation shows that the Irish districts in the Borough of Manhattan held up their vote better than any other section of the City. The Italians, Jewish and Bohemian districts showed a large falling off. ⁶⁴

By 1910 the evidence to support the proposition that the Democrats did not attract the newer immigrants is overwhelming. At the leadership level the party had become an Irish organization, and at the grass-roots level the Democrats were unable to gain the support of the Jews and Italians who displaced the Irish in the old Democratic strongholds of the river ward district. Since the Russian Jews and Italian Catholics were just as poor as the former Irish inhabitants of the old Democratic wards, it is apparent that ethno-cultural rather than economic factors were more important in determining the political preference of these newcomers.

In addition to the failure to attract new voters, the Democrats even lost many of their supporters. As the population and number of voters were increasing, the number of Democratic voters declined. No presidential or gubernatorial candidate in the 1900-1910 decade equalled Cleveland's vote of 93,000 in 1888. Bryan came closest when he polled

⁶⁴James K. McGuire to W. J. Bryan, 25 January 1909. Bryan Papers.

75,000 in 1908, but that figure only amounted to 25% of the total votes cast. It is true, of course, that nationally the party was also in decline,⁶⁵ but the decline in Philadelphia was more severe than in other Eastern cities. In Baltimore Bryan lost by only 7,000 votes in 1900 and came within 3,000 votes of carrying the city in 1908. Parker, on the other hand, carried Baltimore by a thousand votes in 1904. Bryan managed to carry New York (Manhattan to the Bronx) by 29,000 in 1900 and 5,000 in 1908 while Parker gained a 45,000 vote plurality in 1904.

At the grass-roots the Philadelphia Democratic party was in a shambles in the first decade of the twentieth century. The foregoing voting statistics and charts, which document the weakness of the party, serve to underscore the loss of faith Philadelphians had in the ability of the Democrats to govern. In 1910 a Bulletin⁶⁶ columnist reminisced about the former glory of the Democracy and observed that the youngest man in the city who voted for the last successful Democratic governor (Pattison in 1890) had passed his

⁶⁵H. Wayne Morgan in From Hayes to McKinley points out that the Democratic party nationally could not adjust to the changing economy of the country. It got only limited support from immigrant groups and could enlist the aid of only a few laissez faire businessmen. Morgan concludes that: "The dogmas of localism, retrenchment, and anti-federalism reigned as the Democracy dozed through the warm prosperity and growing nationalism of the McKinley-Roosevelt years." pp. 525-526.

⁶⁶"Men and Things" by Penn, Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia) 31 May 1910 (Gordon Scrapbook, 1907-1913).

40th birthday while the youngest Philadelphian who voted for the last Democratic mayor (King in 1881) had reached his 50th year. To that columnist and to most Philadelphians the Democracy seemed but a mere vestige of the past, and one that could soon go the way of the horse-drawn carriage.

The collapse of the Democratic party in Philadelphia in 1910 was neither dramatic nor sudden. Rather, over the preceding twenty years the party suffered setbacks from which it could not recover. After Randall's death the Democrats were weakened by internal wrangles. Later, in the decade of the 90's, the major national crises of 1894 and 1896 further contributed to the deterioration of the Philadelphia Democracy. These political obstacles themselves do not fully explain why the party suffered an irreversible downward trend which led to decadence and collapse in the first decade of the new century. In Boston and New York the Democratic party could sustain these temporary losses.

In Philadelphia Democratic failure was compounded by the party's failure to attract a diversified corps of leaders. This failure resulted in the inability of the Democrats to respond to the great municipal reform movement of 1905-06 and to the state-wide reform candidacy of William H. Berry in the 1910 gubernatorial race.

In addition to these deficiencies of leadership the party failed to win the allegiance of the new immigrants who moved

into the city; and, in fact, even lost the support of most of the Germans and many of the Irish. Hence, by 1910 the Democracy was completely demoralized and nearly extinct.

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