"daniel Deronda": Eliot's Debt To Feuerbach.

Daniel Deronda:

Eliot's Debt to Feuerbach

by

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Abstract

Daniel Deronda, George Eliot's last novel, illustrates the degree to which the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach informed Eliot's thinking. In chapters I and II the author examines Feuerbach's new gospel for humanity which Eliot brings to life. Both thinkers embraced the empirical approach to life, with its acceptance of the validity of sense impressions verified by experience and the objective method, the assertion of the consummated self-consciousness as the goal of the fullest development of all human capacities, and the necessity of involving the reader's sympathies for a full comprehension of the human condition.

Feuerbach urged his readers to make Mankind the object of their energies: to destroy the old theological illusions which lead to servility and self-destruction; to recognize that the attributes given to God are really the qualities man most admires in his species; to pursue a humanly oriented goal; to understand the new trinity of Reason, Will, and Love; and to overcome the destructive force of subjectivity by setting the unity of the species as goal. Each of these philosophical ideas finds incarnation in Eliot's characters, themes, and images.

Man's subjection to time is singled out for study in chapter II. Eliot, in her selection of a systolic-diastolic narrative structure and her choice of a subject in which the interconnecting influences of past and present on the future reverberate through major and minor actions, has successfully transmuted into form and structure ideas shared with Feuerbach about the importance of human beings' choices as they evolve in time.

Although some critics have claimed that the structure of the book fails to unify the Gwendolen story and the Jewish portion, others have found unifying devices which suggest that the book is not so dichotomized. Eliot may have been exploiting conventions from comedy, romance, and satire that permitted her to present, as Feuerbach had done, the positive and the negative, the essence and the contradiction, within a strikingly new unity amid diversity.

In chapter IV are discussed those images, motifs, and references which expose the negative, the enemies to human freedom--the misdirection of reason, love, and will. To identify the positive, the growth into human freedom and responsibility, examined in chapter V, Eliot delineates the man of enlarged vision. Terminology drawn from Christian myth reveals how man can be the loving agent for his own and his brother's salvation. The necessity for man to build I-Thou relationships is stressed by Eliot's studies of characters in family, marriage, friendship, and community relationships.

In Daniel Deronda Eliot has transmuted the theoretical concepts of Feuerbach's philosophy into flesh and blood. Through her handling of the time sequences and organization of plot structure, through her courageous selection of characters and fictional modes, through her imaginative selection of motifs to convey both the enemies and nourishers of human reason, will, and love, Eliot has communicated her vision of the essence of humanity.

PREFACE

Daniel Deronda, George Eliot's last novel, demonstrates how fully the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach had informed her thinking, not only her preoccupation with major human themes but also her selection of form and rhetorical devices. By more fully comprehending Feuerbachian ideas, the reader may come to appreciate Eliot's achievement in what is so often called her "magnificent failure."[1] She has created a most unusual, yet believable world, not nearly so dichotomized as some critics would have us believe, and has explored the validity of Feuerbach's basic assumptions about the human condition. The two writers agree on the meaning of human freedom, the essence of existence and strength that obviates the crutch of fantasy, whether it be supernatural (God) or psychological (the Ego). Neither writer sets out to show the easy road; neither promises a blissful existence at the end of that road. Both writers are fully committed to unveiling existence, to helping the reader "to see correctly" and to accept the consequences of his actions.[2]

[1]U.C.Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel: George Eliot, Walter Pater, and Samuel Butler (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 119 (subsequent references will be identified in text by the abbreviation RHVN); Henry James, "Daniel Deronda: A Conversation,"Atlantic Monthly, 38 (December, 1876), rpt. in George Eliot: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. George R. Creeger (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 167 (subsequent references to this collection of essays will be cited as Creeger); and Leon Gottfried, "Structure and Genre in Daniel Deronda," in The English Novel in the Nineteenth Century: Essays on the Literary Mediation of Human Values (Urbana, Ill;: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1972), p. 175.

[2]Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (Second German edition), trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1957), p. 110. Subsequent references to this edition will appear in text under the abbreviation EC.

Feuerbach's main criticism of religion is that man, in projecting his own best qualities, his own subjectivity, into an object (God), to whom he then makes himself a subservient object, denies his own positive qualities. He selects out those qualities most admirable in himself--the power to think, to love, to will and achieve--or those he most wishes for--immortal existence, freedom from the limitations of existence in time, space, and a world of matter--and attributes them to a Being beyond himself at whose feet he prostrates himself, to whom he devotes his energy and attention, and to whom he addresses his unreasonable wishes and fantasies, denied in the world of natural law. The consequence of such a projection is to deny the powers within his own capability, to ignore his responsibilities to his fellow sufferers--to limit the fullness of being he could in reality achieve in the vague hope or wish for a glorious life in some timeless realm where failure and frustration do not intrude. Like a child, he imagines a life in which his every subjective whim and fancy will be fulfilled.

But, Feuerbach emphasizes repeatedly, man can be sure of only his life in the world here and now, and that world is characterized by existence in matter, space, and time, all of which resist his selfish impulses. "In the inmost depths of thy soul," he writes in The Essence of Christianity, "thou wouldest rather there were no world, for where the world is, there is matter, and where there is matter there is weight and resistance, space and time, limitation and necessity. Nevertheless, there is a world, there is matter" (EC, p. 110). And so the mature human being must learn to exist as fully as possible without seeking to escape into a dreamworld of wish-fulfillment. He

must accept the limitations imposed by an amoral universe, but he must realize that he, at least as a species if not as a single individual, has talents and capacities which can make life more bearable both for himself and for his fellow human beings. He must not shirk his duties to others, or there will be a price to pay in the stunted growth of his own consciousness, the failure and embitterment of his own objectives. He must learn to value his own reason, feelings, and will and to dedicate them, not to some abstract, arbitrary Other, nor to Self, but to humanity.

As Marian Evans completed her translation of Ludwig Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums (the second German edition) in the spring of 1854, she noted in a letter to Sara Hennell: "With the ideas of Feuerbach I everywhere agree . . . ."[3] The translation was completed about four years before her first fictional work, Scenes of Clerical Life, and five years before Adam Bede, in which U.S. Knoepflmacher has demonstrated so ably her employment of a Feuerbachian interpretation of the sacraments in the meal scenes. The question arises, was this just a passing phase in her well-known "religious upheaval," that break with orthodox Christianity which first occurred in 1842 when she refused to attend services with her father? A reading of Daniel Deronda (published 1876) testifies to the deep impression the German writer made on her basic outlook. With few exceptions she could be said to "everywhere agree" with Feuerbach more than twenty years after her translation.

[3]Gordon Haight, ed., The George Eliot Letters (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954-1955), II, 153. Subsequent references to the letters will appear as L in text.

Chapter I: The Gospel According to Feuerbach and Eliot

Feuerbach and Eliot were convinced that by the nineteenth century man had become alienated from his own best self. For Feuerbach, this alienation had been effected by religion, specifically Christianity, by the belief in a supernatural Being whose existence was imposed from without and to whom were attributed man's most admirable qualities, leaving the worst to represent human essence. Christianity taught that one's whole existence was to be centered upon, devoted to this Other, to God. Thus one's fellow man was to be loved only for Christ's sake, and to be loved for Christ's sake in order to assure the salvation of one's own soul and its eternal existence in heavenly bliss. Because of this promulgation of an individual God and individual salvation for the worshiper, Feuerbach believed that theological Christianity had as its moral core "the denial of humanity and its practical consequence, egoism."[4] While faith can free a man from envy, avarice, ambition, sensual desire--indeed from everything earthly, it does not instill morality within the believer's conscience:

> But in him good works do not proceed from essentially virtuous dispositions. It is not love, not the object of love, man, the basis of all morality, which is the motive of his good works. No! he does good not for the sake of goodness itself, not for the sake of man, but for the sake of God; --out of gratitude to God, who has done all for him . . . . The idea of virtue is here the idea of compensatory sacrifice. God has sacrificed himself for man; therefore man must sacrifice himself to God. The greater the sacrifice the better the deed. The more anything contradicts man and Nature, the greater the abnegation, the greater is the virtue. This merely negative idea of goodness has been especially realised and developed by Catholicism (EC, pp. 262-3).

[4]Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 126.

Feuerbach cites the example of virginity as the essence of the Catholic idea of sacrifice. Catholicism makes a virtue of denial of nature, and that which has no basis in Nature has no validity in Feuerbach's view. Mere negation, mere contradiction of human nature, a contradiction of one form of expression of love--is a poor virtue indeed.

In The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach directly attacked the monotheistic religious dogmas which alienated man from his fellows, from his species, and which fostered an ever restrictive preoccupation with the self; in Daniel Deronda Eliot indirectly attacked a social system, informed by this very Christianity, which nourished social and psychological tendencies promoting the same alienation and restrictive egoism. "Egoism," Feuerbach had noted, "is essentially monotheistic, for it has only one, only self, as its end. Egoism strengthens cohesion, concentrates man on himself, gives him a consistent principle of life; but it makes him theoretically narrow, because indifferent to all which does not relate to the well-being of the self" (EC, p. 114).

Feuerbach had noted how religion fostered alienation from reality itself by encouraging man to express his subjective wishes and fantasies by means of prayer to the Other: "Thus what is prayer but the wish of the heart expressed in confidence in its fulfillment?"(EC, p. 122). The supplicant, having duly subordinated himself to God, expected gratification of his wishes despite their variance from natural law as observed in the universe. This kind of easy self-indulgence, however, violated objective reality; it pled for exception to the consequences normally resulting from a given cause. For Eliot, the alienation had been augmented by the economic freedom of

man--at least man in the upper ranks of British society, depicted in DD---to be totally absorbed in the self. No longer highly dependent on his fellows for a subsistence level of existence, man could turn his attentions to satisfying the demands of his own ego with little or no concern for the welfare of the society beyond his own small clique. In that encapsulated existence--of paying visits and calls, riding to hounds, of joining in archery meets and musicales, of being well provided for by investments in distant companies in distant lands and by ranks of servants, valets, and governesses--it was all too easy to forget, or to grow up in ignorance of, the very concept of human interdependence which carries consequences for one's actions. Life for the upper class Christian lady or gentleman seemed there for the taking; one could choose to suit one's whims, and the world would readily accede to that choice. Yet neither Feuerbach nor Eliot could find evidence to rationalize the subjective expectation that the empirical laws of cause and effect might be set aside in a given individual's case. All men were subject to them, and to think otherwise was the most childish, the most dangerous of illusions.

Distinguishing between the subjective illusionist and the rational man, Feuerbach wrote:

> The man who does not exclude from his mind the idea of the world, the idea that everything here must be sought intermediately, that every effect has its natural cause, that a wish is only to be attained when it is made an end and the corresponding means are put into operation--such a man does not pray: he only works; he transforms his attainable wishes into objects of real activity; other wishes which he recognises as purely subjective he denies, or regards as simply subjective, pious aspirations. In other words, he limits, he conditionates his being by the world, as a member of which he conceives himself; he bounds his wishes by the idea of necessity (EC,p.123).

The passage is almost a summary of the contrasting approaches to life evinced by the main characters in Daniel Deronda. Mordecai Cohen (or Lapidoth), who has spent his lifetime working toward the goal of Jewish national unification in their ancestral homeland, and later Daniel Deronda, who picks up the consumptive man's standard after a long process of discerning his life's goal and preparing himself intellectually and psychologically to work for it, avoid the mere wishing-for-change to which Gwendolen Harleth resorts during the main crises of the book. She has acquired an extremely egoistic vision of the world--whose inhabitants live to admire her beauty and singing and to enable her always to do as she likes. It takes some very harsh knocks to smash the encapsulating illusion.

Feuerbach attributed the fall into subjectivity to "the victory of Christianity. The classic spirit, the spirit of culture, limits itself by laws,--not indeed by arbitrary, finite laws, but by inherently true and valid ones; it is determined by the necessity, the truth of the nature of things; in a word, it is the objective spirit. In place of this, there entered with Christianity the principle of unlimited, extravagant, fanatical, supranaturalistic subjectivity; a principle intrinsically opposed to that of science, of culture" (EC, pp. 132-133). Eliot's agreement with the notion that "Culture, in general, is nothing else than the exaltation of the individual above his subjectivity to objective universal ideas, to the contemplation of the world" (EC, p. 132) is embodied in her portrayal of Mordecai and eventually Daniel as characters who are able to rise beyond selfish desires to the supreme self-denying dedication of themselves to the cause of establishing a center for the revivification of Jewish culture--not that the

Jews alone might benefit but that Jewish culture might be made available to the entire species. Mordecai and Daniel exhibit the consciousness of species which requires that "man can and should raise himself only above the limits of his individuality, and not above the laws, the positive essential conditions of his species; that there is no other essence which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, love and adore as the absolute, than the essence of human nature itself" (EC, p. 270).

For Feuerbach and Eliot alike "Existence, empirical existence, is proved. . .by the senses alone. . ."(EC, p. 201). In his Preface to the second edition Feuerbach warned: ". . .for my thought I require the sense, especially sight; I found my ideas on materials which can be appropriated only through the activity of the senses" (EC, p. xxxiv). He went on to proclaim that his philosophy "generates thought from the opposite of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; it has relation to its object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before defining it in thought" (EC, p. xxxv).

The reader of Amos Barton (ch. 5) or Adam Bede (ch. 17) recognizes in the two famous passages the essence of Eliot's realism: the appeal to the reader's senses in her portraits of "commonplace people" of "insignificant stamp," the striving after "this rare, precious quality of truthfulness" exemplified by Dutch genre painters.[5] Daniel Deronda, critics have generally maintained, possesses less of

[5]The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton (Scenes of Clerical Life), Novels of George Eliot (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1873), IV, 42; Adam Bede (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., Riverside Editions, 1968), p. 152.

the power to appeal to the reader's senses than do her earlier "pastoral" novels. Yet even a superficial reading reveals the same deft touches of revelatory detail and telling gesture; the setting has merely shifted from English farm or village life to life amid the cosmopolitan upper classes. The description of Offendene, to which Gwendolen and her family move following her mother's financial ruin, presents an easily visualized country home of somewhat less than magnificent appointments; it also suggests the pretensions, the narrowness, and the actual mediocrity of Gwendolen's aspirations:

> The season suited the aspect of the old oblong red-brick house, rather too anxiously ornamented with stone at every line, not excepting the double row of narrow windows and the large square portico. The stone encouraged a greenish lichen, the brick a powdery grey, so that though the building was rigidly rectangular there was no harshness in the physiognomy which it turned to the three avenues cut east, west, and south in the hundred yards' breadth of old plantation encircling the immediate grounds. One would have liked the house to have been lifted on a knoll, so as to look beyond its own little domain to the long thatched roofs of the distant villages, the church towers, the scattered homesteads, the gradual rise of surging woods, and the green breadths of undulating park which made the beautiful face of the earth in that part of Wessex. But though standing thus behind a screen amid flat pastures, it had on one side a glimpse of the wider world in the lofty curves of the chalk downs, grand steadfast forms played over by the changing days.[6]

The cluttered home of the Meyrick family in Chelsea conveys the strong family love uniting its members in self-sacrificing cooperation:

> Mrs. Meyrick's house . . . looked on the river, and the backs on gardens, so that though she was reading aloud to her daughters, the window could be left open to freshen the air of the small double room where a lamp and two candles were burning . . . . [The Meyricks] all clung to this particular house in a row

[6] Daniel Deronda (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), ed. Barbara Hardy, p. 51. Subsequent references will be in text.

> because its interior was filled with objects always in the same places, which for the mother held memories of her marriage time, and for the young ones seemed as necessary and uncriticised a part of their world as the stars of the Great Bear seen from the back windows. Mrs. Meyrick had borne much stint of other matters that she might be able to keep some engravings specially cherished by her husband; and the narrow spaces of wall held a world-history in scenes and heads which the children had early learned by heart . . . .But in these two little parlours with no furniture that a broker would have cared to cheapen except the prints and piano, there was space and apparatus for a wide-glancing, nicely-select life, open to the highest things in music, painting, and poetry (pp.236-7).

Eliot's selection of premonitory gestures and mannerisms for Grandcourt sets before us lovelessness in its cold monstrosity:

> Fetch, the beautiful liver-coloured water-spaniel . . .sat with its forepaws firmly planted and its expressive brown face turned upward, watching Grandcourt with unshaken constancy. He held in his lap a tiny Maltese dog . . . and when he had a hand unused by cigar or coffee-cup, it rested on this small parcel of animal warmth. I fear that Fetch was jealous and wounded that her master gave her no word or look; at least it seemed that she could bear this neglect no longer, and she gently put her silky paw on her master's leg. Grandcourt looked at her with unchanged face for half a minute, and then took the trouble to lay down his cigar while he lifted the unimpassioned Fluff close to his chin and gave it caressing pats, all the while gravely watching Fetch, who, poor thing, whimpered interruptedly, as if trying to repress that sign of discontent . . . .But when the amusing anguish burst forth in a howling bark, Grandcourt pushed Fetch down without speaking, and depositing Fluff carelessly on the table . . .began to look to his cigar . . . .
>
> "Turn out that brute, will you?" said Grandcourt to Lush, without raising his voice or looking at him--as if he counted on attention to the smallest sign (p. 161).

While Eliot has little to say directly concerning the artist's obligation to appeal to his audience's senses, she implies by her practice the basic epistemological conception that knowledge of the

external world is relative and must be verified by consonance with experience and by the objective method.[7] Indeed she called her novels "experiments in life" (L, VI, 216).

In her lacerating criticism in 1857 of the poet Young--a poet whom she once admired--she bewailed his lapse from "genuine observation, humor, and passion" into typology: "His muse never stood face to face with a genuine, living human being . . . ." His work lacks "those living touches by virtue of which the individual and particular in Art becomes the universal and immortal"(Essays, p. 362). Instead, Young focused on the generality and failed to convey any "emotion [which] links itself with particulars" (Essays, p. 371). She concluded that he was guilty of "radical insincerity as a poetic artist" (Essays, p. 366) because he could not be "true to his own sensibilities or inward vision" or to "the truth of his own mental state" (Essays, p. 367). In contrast, she praised Cowper's poetry for "that close and vivid presentation of particular sorrows and privations . . . which is the direct road to the emotions," for "that melodious flow of utterance which belongs to thought when it is carried along in a stream of feeling" (Essays, p. 382). Her own character Mordecai, when caught up in his vision of a national Jewish center, speaks first in the gasping breaths of the consumptive, then in the rolling phrases of Old Testament prophets; the reader feels himself directly confronted

[7]See Bernard J. Paris, "George Eliot's Religion of Humanity," ELH, 29 (1962), rpt. in Creeger, p. 20, for a basic exposition of the positivist stance.

[8]Essays of George Eliot, ed. Thomas Pinney (New York City: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 324, 349. Subsequent references will be indicated in text as Essays.

with a real man's desperate yearning to move closer to his goal before death sweeps him away:

> "You will be my life [Mordecai says to Deronda]: it will be planted afresh; it will grow. You shall take the inheritance; it has been gathering for ages. The generations are crowding on my narrow life as a bridge: what has been and what is to be are meeting there; and the bridge is breaking. But I have found you. You have come in time. You will take the inheritance which the base son refuses because of the tombs which the plough and harrow may not pass over or the gold-seeker disturb: you will take the sacred inheritance of the Jew" (pp. 557-558).

The involvement of the reader at the level of sense-perception was a requisite preliminary step to arousing the reader's feelings. For to comprehend "feelingly" the condition of another human being requires both reason and emotion; neither alone is sufficient. In "Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming" she warned that if feeling were exalted above intellect, one's sense of truthfulness would be confused, that emotions can imprison the intellect (Essays, pp. 166 and 167). Feuerbach had claimed that "Feeling is only acted on by that which conveys feeling . . . .Thus also the will; thus, and infinitely more, the intellect" (EC, p. 6).

In her 1855 review of selections from the writings of Carlyle, Eliot stated that the most effective writer brings "into activity the feelings and sympathies that must issue in noble action" and "rouses in others the activities that must issue in discovery"; "he strikes you, undeceives you, animates you" (Essays, p. 213). Carlyle, her model of an effective writer, is praised for his "power in concrete presentation" (Essays, p. 215). A year later in her assessment of

Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl's Naturgeschichte des Volks, Parts I and II, she posited her view of the nature of the artistic experience: "Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellowmen beyond the bounds of our personal lot" (Essays, p. 271). The truly great artist "surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves" by his realistic, particularized pictures of human life (Essays, p. 270).

By 1859, when she had begun her own creative career, she claimed "the only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings, is that those who read them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and the joys of those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling erring human creatures" (L, III, 111). To Frederic Harrison in 1866 she confided the artist's "agonizing labour . . .to make art a sufficiently real back-ground, for the desired picture, to get breathing, individual forms, and group them in the needful relations, so that the presentation will lay hold on the emotions as human experience--will, as you say, 'flash' conviction on the world by means of aroused sympathy" (L, IV, 300-301). The ultimate effect was to be "aesthetic, not doctrinal." Eliot aimed at "the housing of the nobler emotions, which make mankind desire the social right, not the prescribing of special measures, concerning which the artistic mind, however strongly moved by social sympathy, is often not the best judge. It is one thing

to feel keenly for one's fellow-beings; another to say 'This step, and this alone, will be the best to take for the removal of particular calamities'" (L, VII, 44).

Such statements point to Eliot's basic belief that art is an experience equivalent in power to life itself: "Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot" (Essays, p. 271). It can provide man, restricted as he may be in space and time, with much larger conceptions; it can lead man out of his own existence and into that of another. The classical confidence in the formative power of art--in psychagogia (a leading out or persuading of the soul)--for the growth of human reason, feeling, and will is succinctly stated in a letter to Charles Bray (1859): "If Art does not enlarge men's sympathies, it does nothing morally" (L, III, 111). Art and literature, she felt, "imply the action of the entire being, in which every fiber of the nature is engaged" (Essays, p. 53).

Feuerbach urged his belief that man could move beyond the individual self, that in fact man couldn't understand his own being without going beyond it (cf. EC, p. 2). He could expand the self by moving towards nature (the objective physical world) through the physical senses and toward his fellow men through reason and love. "Love and sense-perception take man out of himself," he declared (Kamenka,pp. 119-120, from Samtliche Werke, II, 297-9). Commending a friend for helping a young woman get an education, Eliot said,

"But we are not shut up within our individual life . . . .[We] get more freedom of soul to enter into the life of others. . . .(L, V, 406). Both Feuerbach and Eliot had objected to religion because it celebrated in God what it took from man. Man, thus alienated from his own best qualities, is left a poor creature of little value. But, Feuerbach emphasized, " . . .it is our task to show that the antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory" (EC, p. 13), "not that a quality is divine because God has it, but that God has it because it is in itself divine" (EC, p. 21). Similarly, Eliot had noted as a corrective to Dr. Cumming's form of religion: "The idea of God is really moral in its influence--it really cherishes all that is best and loveliest in man--only when God is contemplated as sympathizing with the pure elements of human feeling, as possessing infinitely all those attributes which we recognize to be moral in humanity" (Essays, p. 187). Neither Feuerbach nor Eliot was opposed to the essence of religion, "to the longings and ethical valuations that man expresses in religion" (Kamenka, p. 54); they opposed the form of religious expression which theologians converted into essence. Feuerbach's mode of counteracting the damage religion had done was to write philosophical treatises. Eliot felt impelled, in Feuerbach's words, by an "inward necessity . . .to present moral and philosophical doctrines in the form of narratives and fables" (EC, p. 208), to convey her vision of humanity through her novels. Daniel Deronda is her most daring--and probably most unpopular--attempt to reveal how

human beings, at varying stages of egoism or escape therefrom, succeed or fail in achieving the full self-consciousness that necessarily implies a consciousness of others. The successful characters come to understand that "The fundamental faith for men is faith in the result of a brave, honest, and steady use of all his faculties . . ." (Essays, p. 189).

That Mordecai is an agent for the restoration of a theocratic state is never emphasized; his energies focus on preparing a new ground for the cultivation and growth of Jewish culture, the seed so widely dispersed over the centuries and suffering the stunted growth of a wayside existence. Thus, Mordecai stresses the need for a leader who is strong, intelligent, loving and responsive to the needs of others, and firm of will--a man in whom reason, feeling, and will unite in a new trinity for the good of all men.

Since Feuerbach and Eliot alike embraced the empirical approach to life, with its acceptance of the validity of sense impressions verified by experience and the objective method, the assertion of the consummated self-consciousness as the goal of the fullest development of all human capacities, and the necessity of involving the reader's sympathies for a full comprehension of the human condition--then the problem for them was how to liberate man from imprisonment within false creeds, how to raise human consciousness. During her task of translating The Essence of Christianity (and even earlier, in 1851, when she read Das Wesen der Religion [1845]) Eliot became intimately acquainted with Feuerbach's new gospel for humanity. Its tenets were

productive not merely for Feuerbach's attack on a repressive theological system but also for her own beliefs in the relations among human beings, soon to find dramatic incarnation in her novels, short stories, play, and poems. Six groups of ideas discussed by Feuerbach inform the theme, images, and character delineation in Daniel Deronda.

(1) Basic to Feuerbach's critique of religion was the exposure and destruction of illusions about the nature of God, illusions which debase and humiliate men, promise him rewards in some other life for shameful servility in this one. On the one hand, Feuerbach wrote, "What man praises and approves, that is God to him; what he blames, condemns, is the non-divine. Religion is a judgment" (EC, p. 97); on the other, because man cannot respond emotionally to absolute moral perfection and because religion creates a disunion between his inferior self and a perfect being who hates sinners, man has to regard the Divine Being "as a loving, tender, even subjective human being (that is, as having sympathy with individual man)" (EC, p. 47). In short, man has needlessly tormented, then solaced himself by illusory projections when he could have attended to the amelioration of his own positive qualities:

> (a) God is the reason expressing, affirming itself as the highest existence (EC, p. 36, italics added);
>
> (b) the divine love is only human love made objective, affirming itself (EC, p. 55, italics added); Hence love is reconcilable with reason alone, not with faith; for as reason, so also love is free, universal, in its nature . . .(EC, p. 257); Is not the love of God to man--the basis and central point of religion--the love of man to himself made an object, contemplated as the highest objective truth, as the highest being to man? (EC, p. 58);

(c) A man without understanding is a man without will; Only he who thinks is free and independent; To be without understanding is, in one word, to exist for another,--to be an object; to have understanding is to exist for oneself,--to be a subject (EC, p. 39, italics added).

These excerpts typify the kind of thinking which Eliot encountered repeatedly during her translation of The Essence of Christianity. Feuerbach's emphasis on the necessity of each individual's affirming, developing, and using his capacities of reason, love, and will found fertile soil in Eliot's imagination. For in Daniel Deronda major and minor characters alike exhibit debilitating illusions--illusions which temporarily satisfy egoistic cravings for power, adulation, or love or illusions about the demands of a vocation--which either are cast off by virtue of the character's exertion of his reason, love, and will or drag down the character because of his inability to assert one or more of his human capacities. Feuerbach's projections of man's desires into God are transformed in Eliot's fiction to the more naturalistic projections of the human ego which can be ultimately as debasing, crippling, and enslaving as the supernaturalistic ones of theology. Prominent among the illusions which take deep root in a person's psyche is that of power. A woman fancies that she can evoke at will a man's admiration or that she has firm control of her own existence; a man believes he has full command of his wife's obedience; a family rests assured in its economic prosperity; a youth feels confident in his ability to win his lady-love; a mother thinks she can defy the truth of her son's birth. In each instance, the believer discovers his power to be a chimera.

Gwendolen Harleth has reached her late teens totally convinced of her centrality in the world in which she moves. She is spoiled by a mother to whom she condescends, toadied to by sisters whose existence she considers utterly superfluous. Beautiful, quick-witted, graceful, she draws the eyes and attentions of the men at every party, fox-hunt, or archery match she attends. Having seen her mother twice widowed and grown melancholy, she resolves not to marry but to do just as she likes, unhindered by a husband's dictates. Or if she should marry, she intends to dominate her husband; his function will be to furnish her social rank, luxurious living, and opportunity for tasteful display. The question of love is not relevant. She places great confidence in her power to will the fulfillment of her wishes.

But Gwendolen's hopes lack a basis in reality. When the family fortune is lost by speculators, the unexamined source of money ceases to flow, and Gwendolen is faced with the first test of her nature. Either she must "take a situation" with a bishop's family (and thus subject herself to their wishes--something she has never had to do), or she must "marry well," as her uncle Gascoigne advises. At first she thinks that because she has won unadulterated praise of her singing and charade-posing in the drawing rooms of her mother's friends she can make her living by singing and acting professionally. Julius Klesmer, the music tutor for the neighboring Arrowpoint family, disabuses her of this illusion in a harsh, down-to-earth description of the deprivations and struggle through which even the most dedicated artist must go--and she is a mere dilettante: her dedication is to money and self-display, not to Art. It has never occurred to

Gwendolen to study music nor to learn what is demanded of a professional singer. She has relied solely on wishing and fantasy; emotion has imprisoned reason.

As a result of the crushing of this hope and her disgust at becoming a governess, she gradually succumbs to the lethargic but flattering attentions of the wealthy baronet, Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt--despite her knowledge, prior to the marriage, of his ten-year liaison with Lydia Glasher and the existence of four children. In a brilliant passage of dialogue Eliot exposes the egoistic illusion Gwendolen has of bringing Grandcourt under her sway while all along Grandcourt, by his unique pausing and calculated responses, slowly gathers her into his serpentine embrace (Book II, ch. 11, pp. 146-8). Grandcourt cleverly encourages her dream of domination during the courtship days. Only too soon after the wedding does she assess the suffocating degree of his control. She has met in Grandcourt the mirror image of her own will, and that image, because more loveless and more calculating, defeats her. She is provided for (and her mother as well) only to the extent that she remains the obedient ornament to his social existence. And since she has shared his value system--maintaining the proper "regal" appearance, she plays the role of sprightly wife to a wealthy baronet. In the second half of the book Gwendolen is flayed anew as Grandcourt throttles each feeble hope for a free self-centered existence. Life without giving and sharing love --not with mother, sisters, friends, or husband--and without a mature understanding of the consequences of one's decisions can bring no freedom or inner happiness.

Grandcourt never consciously faces the consequences of his way of life. His sense of power over others--Lydia Glasher and her children, his general factotum Lush, his uncle Hugo Mallinger, and Gwendolen--suffers hardly a twinge of diffidence. By virtue of his superior economic means and social rank he is able to pique his appetite for tyranny by letting his subordinates have a little head, then reining them in just at the moment they feel free. He revels in "that suppressed struggle of desperate rebellion" which he deliberately encourages in Gwendolen (p. 616). "He magnified her inward resistance, but that did not lessen his satisfaction in the mastery of it." Indeed, for him marriage "had really brought more of aim into his life, new objects to exert his will upon," and "what he required was that she should be as fully aware as she would have been of a locked hand-cuff, that her inclination was helpless to decide anything in contradiction with his resolve" (p. 645). He sets out to incite his wife's jealousy of Lydia Glasher, not because he wants to make her jealous but that he might "smite it with a more absolute dumbness. His object was to engage all his wife's egoism on the same side as his own" (p. 658). He is certain he will have his spirited wife "held . . .with bit and bridle" and no longer restive after a year of marriage (p. 744).

Compared frequently to an unmoving but ever-vigilant lizard, Grandcourt proves himself cold-blooded, loveless, completely incapable of the kind of sympathy which is a necessary concomitant of love (EC, p. 54), that "freedom of soul to enter into the life of others" which Eliot herself felt one grows into after years of sharing others'

sufferings (L, V, 406). He never once glimpses Gwendolen's inner turmoil. Grandcourt's is indeed the most encapsulated life in the book, entirely "shut up" within itself (L, V, 406). When he falls into the sea off the coast of Genoa, he drowns. "The man rising from the water," Feuerbach wrote of the symbolism of water in the baptism, "is a new, a regenerate man" (EC, p. 276), for water "'is the image of self-consciousness . . . .In water man boldly rids himself of all mystical wrappings'" (Barth's introduction, EC, p. xii). Grandcourt sinks beneath the surface of the waters, unregenerate, engulfed by his illusion that by sheer power of will he could command his wife's allegiance. The insight that "the true human love, which is alone worthy of this name, is that which impels the sacrifice of self to ancther" (EC, p. 53) eludes him completely. He has been a slave to his own ego without ever becoming conscious of it.

Other, less prominent characters in the book enslave themselves to wish-fulfilling illusions, but for them the process of enlightenment or revelation is not quite so devastating as for Grandcourt and Gwendolen. The Arrowpoints are painfully chagrined when their only heir, Catherine, refuses the proposals of their hand-picked candidates --men of "family," wealth, and English connections--and announces that she will marry Herr Klesmer, her German-Jewish music tutor! The confrontation scene takes on comic overtones because Catherine has enacted what Mrs. Arrowpoint had demanded of the dead Leonora in her translation of Tasso. But as the epigraph to the chapter has hinted, the parents in planning Catherine's future consulted their own wishes for the conveyance of their wealth to "the right hands", not reality.

They had allowed Klesmer and Catherine to see a great deal of one another, never realizing that two people with similar interests and sympathies, would be drawn more closely as each day passed: while fancy wove "ideal webs", life wove"the accustomed pattern" (p. 278).

Youth too may find life weaving patterns other than those fancied. Rex Gascoigne falls in love with Gwendolen partly because her beauty and daring would make him the envy of other men, should they become betrothed. But her inability to return his love--"'Pray don't make love to me! I hate it.' She looked at him fiercely" (p. 114)--or even to let him take her hand crushes his adolescent hopes. He gradually recovers from the heartbreak first by contemplating emigration to Canada, then by studying law. Hans Meyrick similarly misplaces his love: he hopes the beautiful Jewess Mirah Lapidoth will be won by his attentions, despite her assertions that she will marry only a man of her own religious faith. As with Rex, when assessing intellect sleeps, the feelings lead the ego in a concentric dance of fantasy. Hans fails to comprehend how much Mirah's religion has sustained her through years of exploitation and homelessness. Eventually, however, he does acknowledge her attraction to Daniel and, though deeply disappointed, manfully relieves Daniel's own anxiety about Mirah's love. He breaks through the capsule of his own ego to enter, for the first time, into Daniel's feelings.

Daniel's mother, Leonora Alcharisi, forms a parallel to Gwendolen, for as a young woman she too wanted a career in opera and theater where she could reign as queen and fulfill her desires. Unfortunately, her hopes contradicted the iron will of her father

who considered her a mere "makeshift link" to the next generation which would carry on his hopes for a Jewish homeland. Alcharisi's situation--"'to have a man's force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the slavery of being a girl'" (p. 694)--is especially appealing to the modern reader; we prize the sanctity of the individual and are not willing to see one <u>used</u> by others, as Daniel's grandfather wanted to use his daughter. Yet, Alcharisi in turn used her husband Ephraim, a gentle loving man who died shortly after Daniel was born, to deceive her father: she married but made Ephraim promise not to hinder her career, and ultimimately she gave her son away to be reared, not as a despised Jew but as an English gentleman. As fatal illness invades her body, however, she feels compelled, in revealing the truth to Daniel, to reunite the links between past and present--the links she had so defiantly broken. In restoring to Daniel his heritage, his sense of belonging and vocation, she too breaks through the walls of her own egoistic desires to acknowledge--if not condone--her father's and her son's sense of mission.

In these and other examples Eliot exposes the dangers of subjectivism, of devotion to the ego without the equal cooperation of reason and love with will. The individual is narrowed, enslaved by self-worship, all the time believing he is free. The self can be as blindly tyrannical as Feuerbach's God.

(2) To achieve a truly free existence, once the old illusions have been shucked off, man must courageously acknowledge that the attributes he has been giving to God are really to be found in his own species, if not in a given individual. Unfortunately, "God is . . .his relinquished self. . ." (<u>EC</u>, p. 36). "'Why then,"

Feuerbach asks, "dost thou alienate man's consciousness of a being distinct from man, of that which is an object to him?" Rather, "The true statement is this: man's knowledge of God is man's knowledge of himself, of his own nature. Only the unity of being and consciousness is truth" (EC, p. 230; cf. pp. 88, 118, 197). In the course of Part I of The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach "reduced the supermundane, supernatural, and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements" (EC, p. 184), and demonstrated that "The personality of God is nothing else than the projected personality of man" (EC, p. 226). Men in the early stages of religion saw "no qualitative or essential distinction whatever between God and man." The Jehovah of ancient Judaism differed only "in duration of existence; in his qualities, his inherent nature, he was entirely similar to man . . ." (EC, p. 197). In the later stages of the development of a religion God is separated from and set above man.

In order to allay his reader's doubts that God is really species-man, "the idea or essence of the species. . .freed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the individual" (EC, p. 153), Feuerbach went on to demonstrate that "the revelation of God is nothing else than the revelation, the self-unfolding of human nature" (EC, p. 118): ". . .the contents of the divine revelation are of human origin, for they have proceeded not from God as God, but from God as determined by human reason, human wants . . . . [E]very revelation is simply a revelation of the nature of man to existing men. In revelation man's latent nature is disclosed to him. . .(EC, p. 207).

If religion, by its stress on the importance of knowing God's nature, promoted ignorance of human nature and thus the alienation of man from consciousness of self, Eliot saw an equally strong enemy to the unified psyche in the kind of arrogant ignorance fostered by egoism--the constricted world-view which put the self at the center of the world's activities, prevented the unfolding of others' natures, and ignored others' rights, desires, or sufferings. Philosophically, Eliot concurred in Feuerbach's urging that man must do a turn-about: de-emphasize the negative and accentuate the positive. Her own method, however, could not be polemical. Feuerbach himself had suggested a way more appropriate: "There is within him [man] an inward necessity which impels him to present moral and philosophical doctrines in the form of narratives and fables, and an equal necessity to represent that impulse as a revelation . . . .Man, by means of the imagination, involuntarily contemplates his inner nature; he represents it as out of himself. The nature of man, of the species--thus working on him through the irresistible power of the imagination, and contemplated as the law of his thought and action--is God" (EC, p. 208). Imaginative narratives, in which an analysis of the way man chooses evil alternatives is balanced by the dramatization of struggles in behalf of choices for the good, provided the most compatible means of revelation of Eliot's insights to the public.

In Daniel Deronda Gwendolen enacts the slow, agonizing process of acknowledging, then ridding herself of choices and actions which harm not only others but her own self-development, and Daniel enacts the equally slow process of learning to focus his diffuse positive qualities on meaningful goals. The essence of the species--a species

"mixed and erring, and self-deluding, but saved from utter corruption by the salt of some noble impulse, some disinterested effort, some beam of good nature, even though grotesque or homely" (Essays, p.146) --is detected in the Meyricks, the Mallingers, the Gascoignes and the Arrowpoints, in all the characters save Grandcourt. Through them Eliot meant to convey her "conviction as to the relative goodness and nobleness of human dispositions and motives. . .to help my readers in getting a clearer conception and a more active admiration of those vital elements which bind men together and give a higher worthiness to their existence; and also to help them in gradually dissociating these elements from the more transient forms on which an outworn teaching tends to make them dependent" (L, IV, 472). To the characters in Daniel Deronda are given the revelation, in various ways, that "human beings, human parties, and human deeds are made up of the most subtly intermixed good and evil" (Essays, p. 130). Indeed, Book VI is titled "Revelations," and the revelations are not confined to that portion alone.

In the epigraph to the book as a whole--

> Let thy chief terror be of thine own soul:
> There, 'mid the throng of hurrying desires
> That trample o'er the dead to seize their spoil,
> Lurks vengeance, footless, irresistible
> As exhalations laden with slow death,
> And o'er the fairest troop of captured joys
> Breathes pallid pestilence.

--Eliot hinted that the reader was about to experience with the characters the education of the soul. In 1855 in her attack on Dr. Cumming we find a suggestion for Eliot's conviction that serious fiction could serve a valuable moral purpose--equal in power to that

heretofore attributed to the Gospels: "The best minds that accept Christianity as a divinely inspired system, believe that the great end of the Gospel is not merely the saving but the educating of men's souls, the creating within them of holy dispositions, the subduing of egoistical pretensions, and the perpetual enhancing of the desire that the will of God--a will synonymous with goodness and truth--may be done on earth" (Essays, p. 181). She had shared Robert William McKay's contention, in The Progress of the Intellect (1850), that

> divine revelation is not contained exclusively or pre-eminently in the facts and inspirations of any one age or nation, but is co-extensive with the history of human development, and is perpetually unfolding itself to our widened experience and investigation as firmament upon firmament becomes visible to us in proportion to the power and range of our exploring instruments. The master key to this revelation, is the recognition of the presence of undeviating law in the material and moral world--of that invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of physical science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social organization, our ethics and our religion. It is this invariability of sequence which can alone give value to experience and render education in the true sense possible. The divine yea and nay, the seal of prohibition and sanction, are effectually impressed on human deeds and aspirations, not by means of Greek and Hebrew, but by that inexorable law of consequences, whose evidence is confirmed instead of weakened as the ages advance; and human duty is comprised in the earnest study of this law and patient obedience to its teaching (Essays, pp. 30-31).

Thus, Gwendolen, who is really intelligent and whose strong will could be an asset in achieving her goals, first is uprooted from her complacent vision of a self-centered universe, then forced to acknowledge her cruelty to Lydia Glasher, her callous treatment of her own family, and her murderous hatred of Grandcourt--forced to acknowledge her wasted existence. Daniel becomes her confidant and adviser in helping her to face the evils she has committed--and cannot erase--and then to move beyond them. By the end of the book she does not

seem to have moved far, for she can only murmur, "'I shall live. I shall be better'" (p. 879). But she had a very thick shell of egoism to break, a dreadfully long distance to come. She discovers she can love--her mother, sisters, and cousins, and she can care for their welfare before her own. Klesmer, Mirah, and Daniel have revealed to her the devotion-to-others which brings the happiness she had been impulsively seeking at the gambling table, on mind-blocking horseback rides, in butterflying society parties. Her regret is that unlike Klesmer, Mirah, and Daniel she has no great object on which to expend her powers.

Klesmer's engrossing object is Art, which demands great sacrifices of its devotees. Patterned on Eliot's contemporaries, Franz Liszt and Anton Rubenstein,[10] Klesmer exhibits the strong intellect, powerful emotions, and indefatigible will to practice which ultimately make him a European success. For him Art is a sacred vocation, and he satirically castigates the expectant peer Bult for his shallow conception of the artist: to Catherine's comment that Herr Klesmer held the cosmopolitan idea propounding the fusion of the races, Bult condescendingly replies, "'I was sure he had too much talent to be a mere musician'" (p. 284). Klesmer, refusing to have his gods blasphemed, fires back with a Shelleyan defense that musicians are not mere amusing puppets: "'We help to rule the nations and make the age as much as any other public men. We count ourselves on level benches with legislators.'" Both Feuerbach (EC, pp. 9, 63) and Eliot conceive

[10]See Daniel Deronda, Barbara Hardy's note 7, p. 888, and Gordon S. Haight, "George Eliot's Klesmer," in Imagined Worlds: Essays on Some English Novels and Novelists in Honour of John Butt, eds. Maynard Mack and Ian Gregory(London: Metheun and Co.,Ltd., 1968), pp. 205-214.

of music as the voice of feeling in the human psyche, the mode by which one man's feeling speaks to the heart of another. And it is through their shared love of music that Catherine Arrowpoint and Klesmer grow to love one another. Grandcourt, by contrast, thinks of singing for one's private enjoyment as mere "squalling"; his lack of this mode of expression of feeling betrays his inner emotional void.

Mirah and Daniel are also genuine lovers of music--and ultimately of one another--but their great object takes a political aim. Daniel undergoes the long education of his soul in searching for a vocation to which he can devote all his human capacities and chooses to follow Mordecai's ideal of leading the Jews back to Palestine to establish a national cultural center. Mirah, facing the reality--again presented by Klesmer--that while she has a well-trained voice, she has not the drive or stamina for the concert stage, chooses first to give private lessons and drawing room recitals, then to be helpmeet to Daniel.

Minor characters serve to underscore the theme of realistically assessing one's capabilities and then putting them to productive use. Mab Meyrick, a magazine illustrator, and her sewing sisters work hard that brother Hans may continue to study art at Cambridge. And Hans, while not destined to be great, can laugh at his ambitions and still accept rather routine work like painting the Mallinger girls' portraits. In contrast, when the Davilow fortune is lost, none of the six women knows what to do. Gwendolen, as noted, fancies she can become an overnight theatrical success; Mrs. Davilow and the four girls think to do needlework. Instead, they move from the old dependency to a new: they are taken care of by Uncle Gascoigne. Even more parasitic is

Grandcourt, who contributes nothing to the welfare of his country (running for member of Parliament, as Mallinger suggests, is beneath him) and lives on the fruits of others' labors while enjoying oppressing those who have less. In comparison to him, Lush, the more obvious and self-admitted parasite, is strictly small time.

The parallels and contrasts bubble through all layers of the novel. But the trend is clear: the characters who can identify and implement their human qualities find inner peace; those who rely on illusion are shattered.

(3) Klesmer, Mordecai, and Daniel are further alike in their ability to single out and to follow a human goal, one aimed at improving the quality of life for their fellowmen. Stressing man's need for a dominant passion as one pathway to fuller self-consciousness, Feuerbach had claimed: "Man is nothing without an object" (EC, p.4), and that object becomes his God: "Every man, therefore, must place before himself a God, i.e., an aim, a purpose. The aim is the conscious, voluntary, essential impulse of life, the glance of genius, the focus of self-knowledge,--the unity of the material and spiritual in the individual man. He who has an aim has a law over him; he does not merely guide himself; he is guided" (EC, p.64). In the case of the three men here, each has used his knowledge to investigate what his goal demanded of him, then exerted his will and devoted his passion to its pursuit. The process has already occurred, by the time the novel opens, for Klesmer and Mordecai; but we see Daniel struggling and sifting his way to a sense of purpose and the growth of consciousness. In their high ideals Eliot illustrates two Feuerbachian claims:

(a) In the object which he contemplates, therefore, man becomes acquainted with himself; consciousness of the objective is the self-consciousness of man (EC,p.5),[and]

(b) In brief, the occupations of man determine their judgment, their mode of thought, their sentiments. And the higher the occupation, the more completely does a man identify himself with it. In general, whatever a man makes the essential aim of his life, he proclaims to be his soul; for it is the principle of motion in him (EC, p. 171).

Mordecai in particular reveals the degree to which an absorbing goal controls his entire life style. When he was a young man, he studied Hebrew culture at several European universities, drank "knowledge at all sources," to prepare himself to be "a temple of remembrance where the treasures of knowledge enter and the inner sanctuary is hope" (p. 555). "'I knew what . . .I chose,'" he notes to Daniel. "'I measure the world as it is . . . .'" Head, heart, hand, and breath he dedicated to his vocation (p.554). No matter that many Jews wagged their heads, or that many Jews had forsaken their traditional beliefs and practices. He drew strength from the prophets of old--his forebears Moses and Ezra, who also led their reluctant, ignorant bands back toward the promised land. Like them, Mordecai is not destined to cross the mountain: consumption, he knows quite well, runs a deadly race with his feeble strength. Thus his obsessive search for a mind receptive to his aims, a heart responsive to the fire in his breast, a will strong in shouldering the burdens of leadership.

The cool-thinking, reserved Daniel does not overnight become disciple to the strangely persistent visionary. He must grow out of a pleasant aimless life of the young English gentleman and find for himself a focus for his own vague yearnings. But he does sense that "In activity, man feels himself free, unlimited, happy; in passivity,

limited, oppressed, unhappy" (EC, p. 217). Hence his dissatisfaction with his first life-plan for attending Cambridge, then becoming--something. Hence his search to discover his origins. Finally, when his mother reveals that he really is a Jew, and when Kalonymos (his grandfather's bosom friend) talks with him about the elder Charisi, he arrives at his aim--and picks up Mordecai's falling standard.

Gwendolen and Grandcourt, of course, illustrate the antithesis of Feuerbach's claim. In their lack of purpose they contemplate nothing beyond the self and consequently contribute nothing to society. "Nothing, non-existence, is aimless, nonsensical, irrational," Feuerbach had warned (EC, p. 43). "He who has no aim, has no home, no sanctuary; aimlessness is the greatest unhappiness" (EC, p. 64). Ironically, Gwendolen literally has neither sense of home at Offendene (even while the family fortune still existed) nor an actual home after the loss of fortune. For in marriage to Grandcourt she is taken from country residence to townhouse to yacht in an atmosphere of hatred, dread, and sickness of soul. Moreover, neither Gwendolen nor Grandcourt, so concerned with the appearances of rationality and respectibility (Grandcourt frequently warns Gwendolen not to behave like a madwoman, i.e., show strong emotion), behaves toward the other with understanding or sympathy, which require the operation of reason and love. Their final aimless sailing from England through the Mediterranean, cut off from all human contact, epitomizes the utter selfishness, the nullity of their entire existence. Grandcourt, devoid of the capacity to love, is swallowed up by the sea--ancient symbol of the unconscious; Gwendolen survives in bitter remorse.

(4) Daniel's own life, because of his "gentleman's upbringing"

and uncertainty about parentage, has not had focus. At the age of 25 he feels "like a yearning disembodied spirit": "He was ceasing to care for knowledge--he had not ambition for practice--unless they could both be gathered up into one current with his emotions . . ." (p. 413, italics added). He yearns to become an organic part of society, to "make a little difference for the better," but for over half the novel he is sunk in a kind of moral neutrality, a "meditative numbness" (p. 414) which threatens to make him as useless as Grandcourt. The tracing of his struggle out of the slough of uncommitted sympathy to a sense of purposeful partisanship is a dramatization of the search for Feuerbach's humanistic trinity: "The divine trinity in man, above the individual man, is the unity of reason, love, will. Reason, Will, Love. . .are the constituent elements of his nature, . . .the animating, determining, governing powers--divine, absolute powers--to which he can oppose no resistance" (EC, p 3). "Reason, love, force of will, are perfection," Feuerbach emphasizes, "--the perfections of the human being. . . .To will, to love, to think, are the highest powers, are the absolute nature of man as man, and the basis of existence." Authentic independent existence "is thinking, loving, willing existence"; for "To think is to be God,"(EC, p. 40). "Only he who thinks is free and independent" (EC, p. 39).

Daniel's metamorphosis does not occur all at once, but he starts at a farther point on the continuum than does Gwendolen. His studies have been independently directed, for he left the "narrow tracks" of Cambridge to seek "wide knowledge" in Europe (p. 217). And as the novel progresses, he methodically studies Hebrew history and language

first to learn more about the people to whom Mirah clings, later to prepare himself to go to Palestine. His capacity for affection is mentioned numerous times, often in connection with Sir Hugo or Hans. Indeed he feels so often with the underdog in a situation that he fails to take sides on a rational basis. At two points of the trinity Daniel offers a distinct contrast. Only his will lacks adequate integration with the intellect to give it proper direction and focus. It is this subtle development we watch in his relations with Gwendolen, Hans, Mirah, his mother, and Mordecai.

If, at the outset, Daniel is at least aware that all three faculties must work harmoniously to lead a satisfying existence, and if Mordecai and Klesmer have achieved that unification, then Grandcourt, Gwendolen, Alcharisi, Hans, and Catherine Arrowpoint represent various stages along the way. Catherine is portrayed as an intelligent, talented, but not outwardly beautiful young heiress: "she was one of those satisfactory creatures whose intercourse has the charm of discovery; whose integrity of faculty and expression begets a wish to know what they will say on all subjects, or how they will perform whatever they undertake; so that they end by raising not only a continual expectation but a continual sense of fulfillment" (p. 282) Her sole duty, in her parents' estimation, is to pass on their vast fortune to the proper hands. She has quietly acquiesced in meeting one eligible suitor after another, has quietly rejected their suits. When her heart sings to the same sweeping chords as that of Julius Klesmer--"a gipsy, a Jew, a mere bubble of the earth" (p. 289), she musters her latent power of will to defy her irate parents: "'I am sorry to hurt

you, mamma. But I will not give up the happiness of my life to ideas that I don't believe in and customs I have no respect for.'" Despite their threats of disinheriting her, she stands firm and does indeed marry the man who won her love and her respect. The streams of reason, love, and will meet in harmonious confluence.

Hans Meyrick fails to integrate completely his powers. Ignorant of Jewish customs (he assumes Mirah will soon be enlightened and convert), he never fully comprehends Mirah's past sufferings for and her commitment to her race. "Love," Feuerbach warned, "does not exist without sympathy, sympathy does not exist without suffering in common. . . .Sympathy presupposes a like nature" (EC, p. 54). Nor is Hans truly a friend to Daniel. Because Daniel has always seemed so superior to himself, so emotionally stable, he has felt free to pour forth his anxieties but has not served as reciprocal confidant. His friendship is "the self-interested love among men" but not "the true human love, which is alone worthy of this name . . . .that which impels the sacrifice of self to others" (EC, p. 53). It is Daniel who must sacrifice his needs to Hans. Artistically talented and articulate with images, Hans possesses an intellect insufficiently informed by love to save him from a crippling degree of egoism. But his naturally buoyant spirit helps him survive disappointment in love and retain the reader's sympathy.

Her longer life and greater suffering make Alcharisi's case more tragic. Her complaints against her father's dehumanizing attitudes toward his talented daughter are valid. Yet she has exerted her great force of will in denying to her son a knowledge of his true ancestry.

She has deceived her father; she tried to deceive her son. But something within her--not maternal love, she warns Daniel, maybe a sense of justice, or even fear--has driven her to tell the truth before she dies. Her love of self, her singing career, had for years outweighed her love for anyone else. Now, though she cannot erase the wrong, she realizes that "Only with the sense of truth coexists the sense of right and good. Depravity of understanding is always depravity of heart" (EC, p. 246). And so she is trying to make restitution.

Gwendolen's course parallels and magnifies the choices and errors in Alcharisi's life. She undergoes in much shorter time period the change from a world in which she is the center, through the illusion-shattering stage when the reality of Grandcourt's control breaks upon her and forces her to acknowledge her powerlessness, to a period of disorientation in which she feels the world a wide alien expanse on whose horizon she is a mere speck. She is only beginning to recognize other people as beings in their own right, not merely satellites to her sun.[12]

Gwendolen's situation is partly affected by the circumstances of her time. Blessed by nature with superior intelligence and a beautiful appearance, she has received the usual girls' education, which promoted only superficial accomplishments and social graces and which encouraged no sense of vocation beyond a good marriage. In a number of places Eliot had commented on the status of women and the challenges

[12]See Bernard Paris's discussion of the three stages of moral development exhibited in most of Eliot's novels in Experiments in Life: George Eliot's Quest for Values (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 128 ff.

a woman like Gwendolen faced:

> As to airs of superiority no woman ever had them in consequence of culture, but only because her culture was shallow or unreal. . .not knowledge thoroughly assimilated so as to enter into the growth of the character (Essays, p. 203).
>
> Women have not to prove that they can be emotional, and rhapsodic, and spiritualistic; every one believes that already. They have to prove that they are capable of accurate thought, severe study, and continuous self-command (Essays, p. 334).
>
> Women become superior in France by being admitted to a common fund of ideas, to common objects of interest with men; and this must ever be the essential condition at once of true womanly culture and of true social well-being (Essays, p. 80).
>
> Let the whole field of reality be laid open to woman as well as to man, and then that which is peculiar in her mental modification, instead of being, as it is now, a source of discord and repulsion between the sexes, will be found to be a necessary complement to the truth and beauty of life. Then we shall have that marriage of minds which alone can blend all the hues of thought and feeling in one lovely rainbow of promise for the harvest of human happiness (Essays, p. 81).
>
> I would certainly not oppose any plan which held out any reasonable promise of tending to establish as far as possible an equivalence of advantages for two sexes, as to education and the possibilities of free development . . .The one conviction on the matter which I hold with some tenacity is,that through all transitions the goal towards which we are proceeding is a more clearly discerned distinction of function (allowing always for exceptional cases of individual organization) with as near an approach to equivalence of good for woman and for man as can be secured by the effort of growing moral force to lighten the pressure of hard non-moral outward conditions (L, IV, 364-365).

She has read haphazardly, and her mind has never been honed to a sharp edge by demanding study. As Klesmer points out, she has never had to do anything well. Her typical use of her reason is to abandon it in a trying situation and to rely on impulse or luck. Hence her reliance on gambling as the means to escape the problem of poverty-or-Grandcourt.

The opening scene at Leubronn, with Gwendolen at the gaming table

determined to win or lose strikingly, is emblematic of the way she is to handle anxiety. She evades Rex's and Grandcourt's courting--which would force her to a decision--by dashing off on horseback; indeed she admits she loves the exhilarating escape of a hard ride. She hopes, by some stroke of luck owing to her, to extricate herself from the betrayal of Lydia Glasher and later from the dreadful marriage to Grandcourt--the most disastrous gamble of all. Her intelligence, subordinated to subjective wishing, is used only for witty satiric comments to Mrs. Arrowpoint or coquettish toying with Grandcourt. She embodies Feuerbach's contentions that

> . . .the subjective man makes his feelings the measure, the standard of what ought to be. That which does not please him, which offends his transcendental, supranatural, or anti-natural feelings, ought not to be (EC, p. 137);[and that]
>
> Even if that which pleases him cannot exist without being associated with that which displeases him, the subjective man is not guided by the wearisome laws of logic and physics, but by the self-will of the imagination; hence he drops what is disagreeable in a fact, and holds fast alone what is agreeable EC, p. 137).

If her faculty of reason never finds proper scope, her capacity for love is more deficient. When Rex's horse falls during a hunt, she nearly forgets even to inquire about him. Following her refusal of Rex's declaration of love, she sobs to her mother, "'I shall never love anybody. I can't love people. I hate them'" (p. 115). She can bear only her much-abused mother near her. The question of love never enters her decision to accept Grandcourt; he is merely less ridiculous than other men. If she cannot love, it is hard as well for others--at least for women--to love her. Her sisters and cousins fear her sharp tongue. No women in the neighborhood befriend her; she resents Catherine's gestures of kindness as patronizing. Only her mother seems to love her,

and even Mrs. Davilow trembles lest she distress her imperious first-born. Rex, however, is smitten by her vivacity, and Grandcourt declares, in his distant fashion, that she is the woman he loves. Uncle Gascoigne, Hugo Mallinger, and Lord Brackenshaw all admire her race-horse mettle. Hans calls her the Vandyke duchess. Even Daniel thinks at one point that he might have loved her if. But the fact is she cannot love because she does not acknowledge the subjective existence of other people. And until she learns to feel with them, to suffer their sorrows and share their joys, the second of Feuerbach's trinity of human capacities lies ungerminated in her make-up.

The force she feels strong within her is the power of will: she thinks she can command her life because she has always been able to manage her mother and the men at dinner parties. But the empire is only apparent. The family's fortune is lost, she loses at roulette, she cannot pretend excellence with Klesmer or non-chalance with Daniel, and her feigned ignorance of Glasher's existence has been seen through from the start by Grandcourt and Lush. Her greatest confidence--that she will rule Grandcourt--is her greatest defeat. Only when she reaches the nadir of her fortunes and confesses how wrong she has been, how stupid, how unloving, how powerless, can she begin to edge slowly toward that harmony of mind, heart, and will that she envies in Daniel.

The most negative point on the continuum is Grandcourt. As noted earlier, he sees no valid object on which to exert his powers of reason. The perversion of his intellect is conveyed in his slow, drawling speech--"an adagio of utter indifference" (p. 350)--full of dangerous pauses during which he calculates the effects he wants to create in his victims (Lydia, Gwendolen, Lush). The reader does not

see him engaged in any useful activity. It seems that this expressionless, undemonstrative man with his indifferent narrow gray eyes, flaccid bearing, and mealy complexion lives only to force his will--the will of "a boa-constrictor who goes on pinching or crushing without alarm at thunder" (p. 477)--on others. But his wielding of power is, like Gwendolen's, illusive. Eliot suggests this by images, scenes, or gestures denoting the absence of energy in Grandcourt's approach to life. His initial interest in Gwendolen, for example, is compared to "the sunward creeping of planets" (p. 131); and at their first dance Gwendolen is misled, by "the absence of all eagerness in his attention to her," to think she will have it in her power to reject him (p.156). He further impresses her in later conversations with the fact that having been everywhere, seen everything, he finds nothing much to enjoy any more and most people a bore. This absence of emotional attachment to any memories or people has a benumbing, constraining effect on Gwendolen (p. 173). He engages in a strange kind of self-titillation by desisting, at the moment of proposing to Gwendolen, from asking her: this "languor of intention" like "a fit of diseased numbness" is "another gratification of mere will" without motive (p. 187). The narrator, having just noted his slow meandering course in following Gwendolen to Leubronn "after the manner of a creeping billiard ball" which might stick along the way (p. 196), analyzes Grandcourt's personality type: the sort of individual who may seem to show an "air of daemonic strength" but whose strength may be merely the result of a "want of regulated channels for the soul to move in--good and sufficient ducts of habit without which our nature easily turns to a mere ooze and mud, and at any pressure yields nothing but

a spurt or a puddle" (p. 194). The last four images almost comically contrast with the stream and current images--images of movement and direction--associated with Daniel and Mordecai.

Grandcourt's passions, moreover, "were of the intermittent, flickering kind, never flaming out strongly"; his speech never expressing any strong opinions on politics, the typical sentences of an English gentleman, issued "at a small expense of vital energy" (p. 194); his thoughts "like the circlets one sees in a dark pool continually dying out" (p. 364). This subtle interweaving of images implying reason, will, and emotion exposes how the insufficiency of one becomes a detriment to the others.

Grandcourt seeks to exert his "intense obstinacy and tenacity of rule" (p. 364) on Lydia, Sir Hugo, and Gwendolen. But in each case he is foiled. While he holds Lydia in utter economic subjection, he finds her refusal to give him the diamond necklace annoying: he doesn't want to exert his will with any trouble to himself, especially if it means a "scene" with a "woman whose life he had allowed to send such deep suckers into his" (p. 397). He is able to exact a promise--as proof of subjection--that she will give the necklace to his new wife, but he leaves the interview with a "sense of imperfect mastery" (p. 399). To torment Sir Hugo, who would like to buy the Diplow estate as security for his wife and daughters,[13] Grandcourt moves into the manor house

[13]Because Sir Hugo has no male heirs, Grandcourt is to inherit the entailed Mallinger holdings, including Diplow and Ryelands, where Sir Hugo lives. Sir Hugo would like to leave Ryelands to Grandcourt and to obtain Diplow for his own family.

just to flaunt his sense of power in refusing Hugo's desire. He keeps his uncle--that "superfluous bore" (p. 198)--sufficiently tantalized for a year before greed for Hugo's 50,000-pound offer drives him to accept.

His greatest satisfaction is found in contemplating his relationship with Gwendolen. Before their marriage, he amuses himself that Gwendolen is not in love with him despite his assiduous attentions. He thinks of her as a horse brought to kneel down in the arena, though inwardly objecting. Such submission brings greater delight than if she loved him personally--"the pleasure in mastering reluctance." He wants "to be master of a woman who would have liked to master him" (pp. 364-365). And, once married, he does so for nearly a year until the consequences of his domination redound upon him. The rebel, forced to suppress her rebellion, refuses to throw a lifeline when Grandcourt, having abandoned the tiller to her, is knocked into the sea. Monstrous will power is of small help to a man who cannot swim, who is, for once, dependent on the actions of one upon whom he has wreaked the perversions of intellect and emotion.

(5) Feuerbach's critique of religion suggests not only a new trinity but a new view of the sacraments. U.C. Knoepflmacher, in Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel (pp. 52-59), has ably demonstrated how Eliot in Adam Bede exploited "Feuerbach's own humanistic adaptation of the sacraments of the church" (which are "the semiconscious expression of man's worship of natural forces "). Through three symbolic suppers Adam acknowledges first "man's subservience to the cycle of extinction and preservation which governs

all life," then man's superiority to the natural world through his ability to rise above the forces of Nature by means of his capacity for suffering, to a new state of communion with his fellows in which man is acknowledged as the true object of his religious aspirations (God), the true means for his salvation (Saviour).

The meal scenes in Daniel Deronda are handled in a different way to accommodate a different emphasis. They are informed by several of Feuerbach's statements:

> (a) . . .water is the element of natural equality and freedom . . . (EC, p. 276);
>
> (b) The symbols of this difference [from nature] are bread and wine. Bread and wine are, as to their materials, products of Nature; as to their form, products of man. If in water we declare: Man can do nothing without Nature; by bread and wine we declare: Nature needs man, as man needs Nature (EC, p. 276);
>
> (c) If in water we adore the pure forces of Nature, in bread and wine we adore the supernatural power of mind, of consciousness, of man(EC, p. 277);
>
> (d) Eating and drinking is the mystery of the Lord's Supper;--eating and drinking is, in fact, in itself a religious act; at least, ought to be so (EC, p. 277);
>
> (e) The sacrament of Baptism inspires us with thankfulness towards Nature, the sacrament of bread and wine with thankfulness towards man. Bread and wine typify to us the truth that Man is the true God and Saviour of man (EC, p. 277).

Feuerbach's purpose was to peel away the theological significance of the various religious sacraments and expose the underlying natural significance and the accompanying human motivations. Beneath the sacrament of communion lies the essential act of sharing nourishment for survival and the binding together of mankind. For, Feuerbach maintains, ". . .the sacrament of Love is the Lord's Supper"(EC,p.236).

Nature provides the raw materials, man shapes and modifies. "But in thy gratitude towards man forget not gratitude towards holy Nature!" (EC, p. 277). Meal-sharing implies the interdependence and love among the participants: "Think, therefore, with every morsel of bread which relieves thee from the pain of hunger, with every draught of wine which cheers thy heart, of the God who confers these beneficent gifts upon thee,--think of man!" (EC, p. 277). It was the absence of sympathetic bonds which Eliot wanted to fill.

Just prior to the first meal scene (I,3) at Offendene, attention is called to two pictures in the dining room: "a copy of snarling, worrying dogs from Snyders over the sideboard, and a Christ breaking bread over the mantelpiece" (p. 55). The pictures rather blatently foreshadow the two philosophies at opposite poles in the novel, the ways of life embraced on the one hand by Gwendolen and Grandcourt, the Arrowsmiths and Alcharisi; on the other by Klesmer and Catherine, Mirah, Mordecai, the Meyricks, and Daniel. Gwendolen's selfish, demanding behavior is given strong illustration in the chapter. The Gascoigne family spend the pre-dinner period discussing with Gwendolen and Mrs. Davilow the financial problems of rearing six boys and two girls (the widowed Mrs. Davilow, mother of five girls, sits quietly by) and the kind of impressive society into which Gwendolen is about to make her debut. The Rector's worldliness is apparent but not offensive: to survive, he has had to reflect the opinions of the leading families and to exploit a poor curate; and to add to the weight of his authority, the former Captain Gaskin has taken orders and a diphthong. The reader reaches the end of the scene with the sudden realization

that eating, the simple act of family communion, the most basic acknowledgement of reliance upon Nature and upon the labors of others, has not been mentioned. They have apparently dined, for the conversation picks up in the drawing room where Gwendolen flatters her financially straitened uncle into buying her a horse that she may be seen to best advantage. The speakers, secluded in the depths of the house, have been absorbed in their own little sphere of existence unaware of any life beyond.

Isolation is imaged in the second scene, the dinner following the archery match at Brackenshaw Park and just before the evening dance (II,11). Here, the narrator tells us, "It was the rule on these occasions for the ladies and gentlemen to dine apart, so that the dinner might make a time of comparative ease and rest for both" p. 150). Unspoken is the suggestion that dinners among these people are unnatural affairs, tests of their skill in posing. In the ladies' dining room Gwendolen is not a favorite, for the women render her no homage. Only Catherine makes a point of sitting frequently with her; and Gwendolen's response is to envy Catherine her content--little guessing the pressures the Arrowpoints are putting upon the young heiress. Again, there is no mention of sharing in the simplest form of communion. The scene proceeds to focus on Gwendolen's proclamation that she will not waltz or polka because she doesn't want to be touched by ugly people. The isolation of the group and of one person from another within the group is again underscored.

The narrator provides a key to her intent in the third meal scene, a picnic at Diplow at mid-harvest time (II, 14). In the natural

world horses are straining under heavy loads of harvested wheat, the cattle rest in rolling pastures: "peace and permanence seemed to find a home away from the busy change that sent the railway train flying in the distance" (p. 167). Yet it is an anxious time in the social world of Gwendolen and Grandcourt: will Grandcourt finally propose? will Gwendolen accept or reject him? The picnic for the roving archers is to be "where a bit of hanging wood made a sheltering amphitheatre" (p. 183). But the narrator says:

> I am not concerned to tell of the food that was eaten in that green refectory, or even to dwell on the glories of the forest scenery that spread themselves out beyond the level front of the hollow; being just now bound to tell a story of life at a stage when the blissful beauty of earth and sky entered only by narrow and oblique inlets into the consciousness, which was busy with a small social drama almost as little penetrated by a feeling of wider relations as if it had been a puppet-show (pp. 185-186).

Nature can hardly infiltrate the shallow preoccupations of this third enclosed world, ignorant of "wider relations" in the world.

A contrast to the three previous scenes is presented in a very different social group in the fourth meal scene (IV, 34). Daniel has returned, on a Friday evening, to the home of Cohen, the Jewish pawnbroker who is to hold Daniel's ring. When he sees Cohen open the Sabbath evening ritual with a blessing of the children, he thinks this crass Hebrew "not utterly prosaic" (p. 447).[14] Cohen briefly talks

[14] In "The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!" (Impressions of Theophrastus Such, The Works of George Eliot (Philadelphia: University Library Assn.,n.d.), IV, 415, Eliot observes of the Jews: "they have a predominant kindliness which must have been deeply ingrained in the constitution of their race to have outlasted the ages of persecution and oppression. The concentration of their joys in domestic life has kept up in them the capacity of tenderness. . . ." Subsequent references to this essay will appear in text as "Hep!"

about money and business, then proceeds to begin the meal, to which the whole family join in inviting Daniel. Cohen follows the Hebrew ritual (washing the hands, offering the prayer, breaking the two long flat loaves and sharing pieces around the family circle); little Jacob imitates the blessing. Daniel himself is not conscious of what foods they ate except to notice that Mordecai is given the thin tails of fried fish (he is a charity case, Cohen later confides, but brings a blessing down on them). Jacob offers the corner of his sweet-cake to Mordecai. The grandmother and children converse freely with the family and are obviously loved. The adults make an effort, crude though it be, to interest Daniel by recalling details about the Royal Family, the visit of the Emperor of France ten years earlier, celebrities' birthdays. They are at least modestly aware of life beyond themselves, and they are bent on sharing their hospitality with a total stranger. The meal ends with a communal chant of thanksgiving. Eliot ironically suggests that a Jewish family of no great social rank knows more about human communion than do the upper class Christians. Feuerbach, seeking the essence of the Eucharist, had concluded: "Christ is nothing but an image, under which the unity of the species has impressed itself on the popular consciousness. . . . Christ is the love of mankind to itself embodied in an image. . ." (EC, p. 268).

In the very next chapter (V, 35) the fifth meal scene forms a vivid juxtaposition of opposites. The Grandcourts are giving their first official dinner party in the old Benedictine refectory of The Abbey at Monk's Topping, Ryelands--a property which Sir Hugo has re-

modeled and which Grandcourt will inherit. Sir Hugo shows a minute degree of consciousness of the past life of the abbey; the others take no interest in its history. Ironically it was characteristic of the Benedictine order that the individual monk should defer to the community as a whole and that individual and community were bound to one another for life. Here are collected representatives of the individualistic, "snarling dog" philosophy. Like the first three scenes, there is no reference to the diners' sharing in the communal act of eating--except to Daniel's helping himself to the entrée. While in the refectory Gwendolen tells Sir Hugo about Daniel's disapproval of her playing roulette, and we know Daniel is beginning to have a significant effect on her conscience because she begins to think of someone besides herself: she is painfully aware that Daniel himself might have inherited the Abbey (where he grew up); and later, as they talk over an ivory carving of a monk's cowled head, she makes enigmatic references to having gained by another's loss. She is struggling to communicate her tormenting thoughts to Daniel, but always Grandcourt is watching.

There is a kind of coda to this series of meal scenes, one in keeping with the guarded estimation of man's ability to commune with his fellows. It is, therefore, not a meal scene but rather an incipient one (V, 36). At the New Year's Eve dance a day or so after the scene in the Abbey Gwendolen, desperate to try to learn from Daniel some new footing, winds around her wrist the necklace Daniel had redeemed in Leubronn. She asks Daniel to fetch her a glass of

water, and by receiving the glass with that hand she calls his attention to the necklace as a sign of submitting her mind to his rebuke (p.500). To rescue her from Grandcourt's cutting remarks on "that hideous thing" (p. 499), Daniel takes her to a window looking out on a moonlit court with its ancient steadfast forms. There, temporarily freed from constraining egoism, she confesses she has gained from another's loss and asks Daniel's guidance.[15] Daniel's advice is to urge her to seek communion with others: "'Look on other lives besides your own. See what their troubles are, and how they are borne. Try to care about something in this vast world besides the gratification of small selfish desires. Try to care for what is best in thought and action--something that is good apart from the accidents of your own lot'" (pp. 501-502).

(6) Daniel's simple advice expresses the essence of Feuerbach's and Eliot's central belief that man should direct his efforts for the good of the species, for humanity. Eliot had excoriated Dr. Cumming in 1855 for preaching that what good men do, they should do "for the glory of God"; according to Dr. Cumming, they should not concern themselves with exercising love, truthfulness, or justice for the well-being of His creatures. "A man is not to be just from a feeling of justice; he is not to be a tender husband and father out of affection: all these natural muscles and fibres are to be torn away and replaced by a patent steel-spring--anxiety for the 'glory of God'" (Essays,

[15]See Barbara Hardy's excellent discussion of recurrent images of narrow rooms and open windows in "The Moment of Disenchantment in George Eliot's Novels," RES, n.s. 5, no. 19 (July 1954), rpt. in Creeger, pp. 55-65, and in The Novels of George Eliot: A Study in Form (London: Univ. of London, the Athlone Press, 1959), Ch. IX. Subsequent references to the latter work will appear in text as NGE.

p. 187). Feuerbach had explained how this clannishness came about in Christianity: the early Christians "substituted for the natural love and unity immanent in man a purely religious love and unity; they rejected the real life of the family, the intimate bond of love which is naturally moral, as an undivine, unheavenly, i.e., in truth, a worthless thing. But in compensation they had a Father and Son in God, who embraced each other with heartfelt love, with that intense love which natural relationship alone inspires" (EC, p. 70).

This diversion of natural human loyalty and affection to a non-human being destroyed the possibility of a united humanity and in fact set one group of men against another. Feuerbach thus condemned religious faith as a divisive force, "a spirit of partisanship" which "knows only friends or enemies, it understands no neutrality" (EC, p. 255). Faith "deprives him [man] of the freedom and ability to estimate duly [i.e., without prejudice] what is different from himself" (EC, p. 249; cf. p. 257). Worst of all, "Faith abolishes the natural ties of humanity" (EC, p. 254), and having separated man from man, it separates man from God as well (EC, p. 247). Feuerbach could find no useful purpose whatever for religious faith within human social organization.

What man needed, instead, was to develop his capacity for love, to recognize that I and thou "are required to constitute humanity, that only men taken together are what man should and can be" (EC, p. 155). In countless passages (e.g., pp. 67, 92, 152, 155, 156, 159, 271), Feuerbach hammers home his conviction that there can be no fully

conscious I when there is no consciousness of thou:

> The ego, then, attains to consciousness of the world through consciousness of the thou. Thus man is the God of man. That he is, he has to thank Nature; that he is man, he has to thank man; spiritually as well as physically he can achieve nothing without his fellow-man. Four hands can do more than two, but also four eyes can see more than two. And this combined power is distinguished not only in quantity but also in quality from that which is solitary. In isolation human power is limited, in combination it is infinite. The knowledge of a single man is limited, but reason, science, is unlimited, for it is a common act of mankind; and it is so, not only because innumerable men co-operate in the construction of science, but also in the more profound sense, that the scientific genius of a particular age comprehends in itself the thinking powers of the preceding age, though it modifies them in accordance with its own special character. Wit, acumen, imagination, feeling as distinguished from sensation, reason as a subjective faculty,--all these so-called powers of the soul are powers of humanity, not of man as an individual; they are products of culture, products of human society. Only where man has contact and friction with his fellow-man are wit and sagacity kindled; . . .Only where man suns and warms himself in the proximity of man arise feeling and imagination. Love, which requires mutuality, is the spring of poetry; and only where man communicates with man, only in speech, a social act, awakes reason. To ask a question and to answer are the first acts of thought (EC, p. 83).

Feuerbach's message is the essence of Christianity, without the partisan trappings that have only led men to torture and destroy one another. Eliot couldn't have agreed more with Feuerbach's summary of the kind of man society needs: "He therefore who lives in the consciousness of the species as a reality, regards his existence for others, his relation to society, his utility to the public, as that existence which is one with the existence of his own essence--as his immortal existence. He lives with his whole soul, with his whole heart, for humanity" (EC, p. 171). Into Felix Holt's address to working men (written in late November and early December, 1867, at the suggestion of John Blackwood, who had just heard Disraeli's own impressive address to working men) Eliot injected her philosophy of men's

dependency on one another: ". . .a society, a nation is held together. . .by the dependence of men on each other and the sense they have of a common interest in preventing injury. . . .it is our interest to stand by each other"; ". . .a society, to be well off, must be made up chiefly of men who consider the general good as well as their own" (Essays, pp. 419,420). She believed that this philosophy must begin with the individual--"Amid all the considerable trials of existence, men and women can nevertheless greatly help each other; and while we can help each other it is worth while to live" (L, V, 358)--and percolate to the governing levels where the leaders exert their influence.

Thus, when she created the character of Daniel Deronda she gave him an unusual capacity for sensitivity to others; his development entails a channeling of his amorphous gift for perceiving the needs of a thou and the degree to which his ego can realistically respond without destruction to himself. He grows into a sense of the kind of service to humanity--originally envisioned by Mordecai--which he can legitimately render. (A further discussion of Daniel's and other characters' sense of community will be taken up in Chapter V.)

Eliot diverges at one point from Feuerbach with regard to the example set by the Jewish nation. Feuerbach condemned the Jews' "national egoism" (EC, p. 120), its "malignant religious separatism" which has been mollified only by their contact, after the Dispersion, with "the principle of humanity contained in Greek culture" (EC,p.267). Thinking minds "early overstepped the civil and political separation of man from man" which Jewish customs and rituals had fostered. Early in her career Eliot had mocked both Disraeli's idea of "the fellowship of

race" (presented through Sidonia in Coningsby, Book IV, ch. 15) as "an inferior impulse" and things "specifically Jewish" as "low grade" (L, I, 246-247). But by the time she wrote Daniel Deronda she had greatly modified her hopes for universality. She could not agree that the world was yet ready for a fusion of all races. The Feuerbachian goal of the unity of the species lay in the distant future. The intermediate step was studied in Mordecai's and later Daniel's concept of a unified race--sharing a long past of customs, ritual, history, and suffering; subduing the selfishness of the individual ego; joining in common cultural pursuits for the development of consciousness in the individual members; and sharing the fruits of their knowledge and work with the rest of the world.

Chapter II: The Diastole and Systole of Life--The Treatment of Time

> Time. . .is the medium of uniting opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject (EC, p. 23).

Early in The Essence of Christianity (Ch. 1, Sec. 2) Feuerbach stresses an underlying assumption in his critique of religion: that man, conceived as a finite being existing in time and as a species, can unite a number of qualities and activities which he has been taking from himself and attributing to a Being out there--a Being who gratifies the wishes of man's imagination. Yet this all-powerful God, with an infinity of predicates, is merely the summation of an infinite number of men with their individual powers. "Only in the realm of the senses, only in space and time, does there exist a being of really infinite qualities or predicates" (EC, p. 23), Feuerbach warns. To detach from man and attribute to God an "infinite fulness of various predicates is a conception without reality, . . .a conception derived from the sensible world, but without the essential conditions, without the truth of sensible existence." Thus, the qualities men most admire and desire must be found in human flesh and blood, in many human beings who exist in time: who grow out of the past, influence each other in the present, and who have some effect on future generations. In accepting this conception of the source of man's condition, a man undertakes grave responsibility for his own life and for the lives of others.

It is to this mature assessment of the individual's role in life

that Eliot also arrived.[1] Misfortunes cannot be blamed on God, nor can strokes of good fortune be credited to him. In a little poem written in 1867 Eliot had stated her personal commitment to this ethic, her interpretation of "life after death" as a benignant influence on others' lives, not as a state of personal self-gratification:

> Oh may I join the choir invisible
> Of those immortal dead who live again
> In minds made better by their presence: live
> In pulses stirred to generosity,
> In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
> For miserable aims that end with self,
> In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
> And with their mild persistence urge man's search
> to vaster issues.
> . . . . . .
> This is life to come,
> Which martyred men have made more glorious
> For us who strive to follow. May I reach
> That purest heaven, be to other souls
> The cup of strength in some great agony,
> Enkindle generous ardour, feed pure love,
> Beget the smiles that have no cruelty--
> Be the sweet presence of a good diffused,
> And in diffusion ever more intense.
> So shall I join the choir invisible
> Whose music is the gladness of the world.[2]

The characters in Daniel Deronda (and in all her novels) who find greatest satisfaction in life embrace a similar position.

In order to "be to other souls/ The cup of strength," man must understand himself; to do that, he must have others with whom to compare himself and through whom to recognize those qualities which

[1]Ruby Redinger in her biography, George Eliot: The Emergent Self (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), studies throughout the book Eliot's achievement of self-discipline and responsibility.

[2]The Complete Works of George Eliot (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, n.d.), II, 217-218.

lie within his own personality (Kamenka, p. 122). "Participated life [i.e., that which involves love between I and Thou]," Feuerbach reminds his readers, "is alone true, self-satisfying, divine life. . ." (EC, p. 67). While religion images forth this conception as the Holy Spirit, the love of the Father and the Son for each other, Feuerbach and Eliot would reveal "this simple thought, this truth, natural, immanent in man" in its simplicity: the love between human beings who sympathize with one another, who offer support in the trials of earthly existence, who grow beyond self by participation in the lives of others. Indeed, the notion is readily seen in the growth of industry, science, and art whose practitioners build on the discoveries and accomplishments of their predecessors and grow by sharing their own achievements with their contemporaries.

In her study of one individual's development Eliot shows how Daniel Deronda arrives at a mature estimation of participation in others' lives. As D.R.Carroll has demonstrated, Deronda's participation in the life and vision of Gwendolen (a vision of fear) prepares him for his role in Mordecai's life (a vision of hope) and vice versa.[3] And the participation in both lives prepares him for his choice of vocation in helping the Jewish nation return to its homeland.

Eliot's notion of participation involves a sense of movement through time, a knowledge of tradition and its value to the continued growth of a nation, an awareness of the subtle interweaving of past, present, and future. European man's roots are in the past, she had

[3]"The Unity of Daniel Deronda," Essays in Criticism, 9 (October, 1959), 369-380. Subsequent references to this essay will be indicated as "Unity."

noted in her 1856 review of von Riehl's "The Natural History of German Life; any change in moral tendencies and social conditions must be a slow growth and ripening process (Essays, p. 288). She was to use this same metaphor in the latter part of Daniel Deronda to convey Mordecai's vision of a Jewish homeland. On the one hand she valued "that treasure of knowledge, science, poetry, refinement of thought, feeling, and manners, great memories and the interprétation of great records, which is carried on from the minds of one generation to the minds of another" (Essays, p. 425). On the other hand, she warned against bondage to petrified ideas foisted on man by civilization and by religion (Essays, pp. 28-29). She saw a constant struggle between those who defend the petrifactions of the past and those who try to disseminate enlightened ideas. Certain beliefs and symbols perhaps suited a certain stage of man's development, but the past must not enchain the inquiring spirit which will bring new expressions for an age with different needs. The large mind, like that of Robert McKay who wrote The Progress of the Intellect, is capable of seeing that which is valuable in the past for the present. Erudition should issue in practical application. But she was not blind to the difficulty. The narrator of Daniel Deronda asks, "Yet how distinguish what our will may wisely save in its completeness, from the heaping of cat-mummies and the expensive cult of enshrined putrefactions?" (p. 414).

The essays here referred to, written between 1851 and 1868, show the tenor of her thought. She did not deviate from it. Daniel Deronda represents her most comprehensive statement concerning the "partici-

pated life," for in this novel the central character takes upon himself the awesome challenge of involving himself in a Jewish return. Some group of people had to be selected for the object of Daniel's participation. The Jews offered a paradigm of human beings struggling against terrible obstacles to preserve "a sense of corporate existence," a feeling of "special belonging" ("Hep!",pp. 408-414)--to preserve their past in an unpropitious present for a better future for the nation.[4] Their history and traditions lent a public authority which, Thomas Pinney believes, strengthens "the morality of the heart's simple affections."[5] Pinney goes on to suggest that "In Comtean terms, Deronda is submitting himself to the principle of 'continuity' or 'filiation'--the idea that his life is an organic part of the Jewish past and can only be realized through the effort to serve the historic purposes of that past" (Pinney, p. 50). The success of Daniel's ultimate mission will depend on his learning about Jewish past and traditions, on his gradually developing sympathy with others' sorrows and struggles (Gwendolen's, Mordecai's, Mirah's, Sir Hugo's, his mother's, his grandfather's), and on his capacity to assess what the future will require of him.

[4]William Baker has examined Eliot's holograph notebooks and her markings in personal copies of Jewish history, most by Jewish historians; her notes reveal her careful investigation of Jewish culture prior to writing Daniel Deronda. Baker's conclusions may be found in "George Eliot's Readings in Nineteenth Century Jewish Historians: A Note on the Background of 'Daniel Deronda,'" VS, 15 (1972), 463-473.

[5]"The Authority of the Past in George Eliot's Novels," NCF, 21, No. 2 (September 1966), rpt. in Creeger, p. 54.

The evolution of Daniel's commitment to a goal which can command his affections, intellect, and desire for practical social involvement is made dramatically intense by contrast with Gwendolen's terrifying struggle to break out of the suffocating shell of self-preoccupation, her lack of awareness of a past, and her failure to prepare for a worthy future--the paradigm of the unparticipated life--and to achieve even a modest goal which will command her heart, head, and hands.

To convey this dual evolution and the interpenetration of past, present, and future, Eliot employs a method of narration which may be described as systolic-diastolic, a metaphor Feuerbach had used to describe the thrust outward and the receiving back into itself again of both "life in general" and religion (EC, p. 31). In her epigraph to chapter 1, Eliot announces that the narrator intends to begin in medias res and that while no retrospect can reveal "the true beginning," still the reader should be forewarned that he will be given some of the roots from which grew the actions at the gaming tables. In the first four books of Daniel Deronda Eliot presents a crucial scene, then sweeps back into the past to reveal, in a slow unfolding process of expectation and fulfillment, the memories and events which led up to that scene. Chapters 1 and 2 present Gwendolen in Leubronn in September, 1866, feverishly gambling, as Daniel watches from the side of the room; chapters 3 through 15 trace her past, from early childhood (part of one chapter) to a concentration on the previous year (12 1/2 chapters). At chapter 15 the action focuses on Daniel at Leubronn with Sir Hugo, Grandcourt, and Lush, then sweeps back into his past in chapters 16 through 20, again with heavy concentration on the year immediately

preceding the crossing of paths at Leubronn. Gwendolen's fortunes (or misfortunes) then surge forward as she and Grandcourt parry toward a proposal (chs. 23-29). At chapter 30 Eliot quickly sweeps back into the past to review Grandcourt's 10-year relationship with Lydia Glasher, then onward to the wedding day (in chapter 31) which is blighted by that relationship. While Gwendolen is being married, Daniel visits the Meyricks with whom Mirah is staying; at this time Daniel's growing awareness of his ignorance of modern Judaism and of Jewish history precipitates a sweep back into the previous year to his visit to a Frankfort synagogue. By the end of Book IV (chapter 34) Eliot has synchronized the two careers.

The systolic spurt forward, followed by the diastolic filling in of the past works to keep the reader aware of the living pulsations of the past into the present and to foreshadow what may occur in the character's futures. Eliot makes quiet references to the months or seasons--though rarely to the Christian holidays--as timechecks to remind the reader of the simultaneity of events (widely separated in the chapters) in this very complex scheme. The effects are often ironic. While Gwendolen during harvest season (July) is feeding her fantasies at the Archery Meet, where she is finally introduced to Grandcourt, and thus taking the first steps toward her "fall," Daniel rescues Mirah from suicide by drowning and initiates her restoration to family and love. The following July brings Grandcourt's accidental drowning, the death for which Gwendolen had wished only weeks after her December marriage (her winter of discontent). She descends into the hell of guilt and remorse she has helped form as Daniel is reborn to a sense of vocation after learn-

ing from his mother that he is a Jew. The period June-July brings three major trials: for Daniel, the interview with the mother who didn't want him; for Gwendolen, condemnation to the yachting trip alone with Grandcourt on the Mediterranean; and for Mirah, the return of Lapidoth and the beginnings of her jealousy of Gwendolen's influence on Daniel. At New Year's, Gwendolen experiences the first tender growths of conscience and of consciousness of others (of Glasher and her children, of Daniel's exclusion from hereditary claim to the Abbey because of her husband).

The slow sweeping pace of the first half alters to a more rapid movement, the only flashbacks being ones to bring one character group up to date with another. The months are carefully noted to make the reader recall what was occurring just a year before. Mirah and Daniel, for example, are wed in October, their psychological burdens lifted; Gwendolen, under severe psychological duress, had accepted Grandcourt's "command" the previous autumn. The marriages are poles apart in love, compatibility, motive, and dedication to others besides themselves. The leisurely movement of the first four books speeds up in the last four to give form to the theme that Gwendolen, long oblivious of the march of time and events outside herself, must be inevitably caught up in time's quickening step--caught up and forced to confront her littleness on that ever-widening horizon of human history. It is a confrontation of which she has long felt an instinctive terror (pp. 94-95, and 321). Daniel too finds himself called from the sidelines from which he has merely observed human history to commit himself to ideals he has been content to read about.

The method of narration, then, suggests both the pulsation of life and the interpenetration of past into present and future. It permits Eliot to study in great detail the myriad qualities found in a number of single finite beings--their potentialities, their achievements, and their failures.

The differences among these individuals in their attitudes toward time and the degree of awareness of life beyond themselves distinguish the "whole-souled" characters from the incomplete ones (see L, III, 366). The characters possessed of imaginative energy and vitality can envisage life in other times, in the past or in the future, and in other places--a perception of existence independent of self. They have a sense of history. The Victorian novelists, Jerome H. Buckley observes, fondly contemplated the past in hopes that it would "give the brief peremptory moment some semblance of perspective, extension and solidity. The meaning of the past remembered lay in its power to enhance the quality of life in the all-demanding present."[6] To find a meaning in the personal past was "to find the true self in time" (Buckley, pp. 99-100). Eliot's characters who most successfully unite intellect and feeling in wholeness of soul are also most energetic in seeking out and facing up to their personal pasts and in contemplating historic movements. The characters imprisoned by devotion to their own egos use the standard of their own contracted existence to measure outer events

[6]The Triumph of Time: A Study of the Victorian Concepts of Time, History, Progress, and Decadence (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 115.

and changes. They evince little sense of any existence not involving themselves and speak of no personal memories which would tie them with family or nation. Of the second type, Gwendolen and Grandcourt are most representative.

The long section at the beginning of the book which focuses on Gwendolen reveals many details about her past, but none that indicates she has any sense of place in her own family history. Of her grandparents she knows only that her mother's father was a West Indian plantation owner and that her father's family considered itself too high-born to take notice of "poor mamma." On this bit of information she concludes that her ancestry is high enough to justify a life of luxury appropriate to her rank. Her conclusion is based on wish rather than solid evidence. Of her father she knows only that he died while she was still in longclothes. By her cruel remark--"'Why did you marry again, mamma? It would have been nicer if you had not'" (p. 52)--she prevented her mother from making any further revelations about Mr. Harleth. (We never learn his first name or anything further.) At Leubronn, she pawns the only remembrance she has of him, the necklace he gave her mother. Since she wishes her mother hadn't remarried, she also knows very little about her step-father, Capt. Davilow. She remembers only the nine years of being dragged to assorted watering holes and Parisian apartments where she felt insignificant. Worse, he engendered four superfluous girls, silly, stupid, awkward creatures hardly differentiated from one another in the book because Gwendolen lumps them all together, constantly pushes them into the background, never sharing affection or confidences. Her one act of generosity

toward them--giving them a sum of money--occurs after her marriage to Grandcourt when her spiritual suffering has begun.

Her mother is almost always "poor mamma," much-enduring and easily dominated. Of her Gwendolen knows little, and not until the crash of Grapnell and Company does she learn the source of their income. Since infancy she has been able to domineer over her mamma, always being excused because of her superior sensibilities. When she strangled her sister's canary because its singing interrupted her own, she absolved herself of guilt by replacing the dead bird with a white mouse, "inwardly excusing herself on the ground of a peculiar sensitiveness which was a mark of her general superiority" (p. 53). Though she still winces to remember the incident, her behavior betrays a vital misconception at the root of many of her actions: that one may safely ignore the natural connections between cause and effect, between past, present, and future; that one can erase past harm by penance of some sort. The danger lies that penance may result in a form of self-congratulation in wiping the slate clean. But Eliot's letters and novels insist that the writing is indelible. In 1856 she wrote to John Chapman, "I have long wanted to fire away at the doctrine of Compensation, which I detest, considered as a theory of life" (L, II, 258). In Daniel Deronda the guns are blazing. In Eliot's works, Felicia Bonaparte notes, there can be no doctrines of absolution, confession, purification, or compensation.[7] Time is irreversible: one cannot undo or alter what one has done. Lydia Glasher, experienc-

[7] Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George Eliot's Novels (N.Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 28-29.

ing a bad first marriage, had thought to erase that past by running away with Grandcourt and making a new beginning; and Grandcourt thinks to erase her and the children from his past, but finds he can't dismiss them merely because he is tired of Lydia. For both, the consequences of their actions spread out to blight the future of the children, to threaten that of Sir Hugo's children, and to plague Gwendolen's marriage. Time moves in an organic, not a mechanistic, manner; it combines with causality to create endless mutations which the actors little expect (Bonaparte, pp. 24-25). When Gwendolen chooses to marry Grandcourt in the full knowledge of Glasher's and the children's existence, she learns what it is to bear the consequences of a selfish choice.

If Gwendolen is ignorant of her past and makes little effort to learn more, if she concentrates on the present with small regard for the consequences of those present actions, she shows little evidence of preparing for a fulfilling future. Indeed, she dreads becoming a mother--a simple statement which brings home the complete degradation of her marriage in which sexual intercourse is implied but the absence of love has been all too shockingly demonstrated. Grandcourt's sexual domination is further underscored when he arranges to have Lush show her his will in which Glasher's son is named chief heir if she fails to produce a legitimate heir. When he actually does die, she wants nothing to do with his miniscule settlement on her, though Daniel persuades her to accept it for her mother's sake. The growth of her hatred for her husband has been fast as the rankest weed, and not until she has been thoroughly immersed in remorse can she

begin to move forward in time to some kind of less selfish future.

Gwendolen might well have admitted to a lack of sense of place in family continuity; but she would have objected that she had no sense of rank or place in society: she "felt" herself to be superior to the dowdy furnishings of Offendene and her mother to be too good for Sawyer's Cottage, where it seemed they must go after the financial crash. Her purported rank determines her refusal of "a situation" as governess with Bishop Mompert's family (where she would have to defer to others), and it determines her acceptance of Grandcourt's proposal, though she does not love him and though Lydia has warned her against it. Before the marriage, moreover, we find Gwendolen has no real friends in their circle of acquaintances. And after marriage she must play the role of a Grandcourt wife, avoiding vulgarity or looking like a "gawky." While she seethes with resentment at Grandcourt's domination, she all along has shared his value system: one which needs others only to have something to despise and ridicule. "But she might as well have tried to defy the texture of her nerves and the palpitation of her heart," so alike are their attitudes (p.502). She plays the role of grand lady at the parties in London, often arousing comments that she seems born to the part even though she had been penniless.

Yet her sense of place in society is not attached to an historical sense of what the responsibilities of her rank are. The women of Gwendolen's rank make no contribution to society either by maintaining themselves or by fulfilling any of society's needs. Their lives, taken up by party-going and "calling," permit no time for ordered

study of challenging books nor for self-improvement such as taking singing lessons.[8] The women do nothing for themselves, not even let down their own hair or lay out their clothing. The ladies of Gwendolen's circle contrast markedly with the Meyrick women, Mirah, and Alcharisi, all of whom have had to work to support themselves.

The narrator comments on the way Gwendolen measures life by her own contracted existence, just after she has parted from Grandcourt at the end of their first dancing party. Gwendolen has been concerned with "how far his character and ways might answer to her wishes" (p. 159). The narrator muses:

> Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread in human history than this consciousness of a girl, busy with her small inferences of the way in which she could make her life pleasant?--in a time, too, when ideas were with fresh vigour making armies of themselves, and the universal kinship was declaring itself fiercely: when women on the other side of the world would not mourn for the husbands and sons who died bravely in a common cause [i.e., the women of the Confederacy], and men stinted of bread on our side of the world heard of that willing loss and were patient [the anti-slavery Lancashire cotton-workers]: a time when the soul of man was waking to pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unheard, until their full sum made a new life of terror or of joy.
>
> What in the midst of that mighty drama are girls and their blind visions? They are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and fighting. In these delicate vessels is borne onward through the ages the treasure of human affections (pp. 159-160).

[8] In 1876, just after she had heard the Bach Choir organized by Jenny Lind, Eliot wrote: "It is pretty to see people who might be nothing but empty fashionables taking pains to sing fine music in tune and time with more or less success. . . .These people of 'high' birth are certainly reforming themselves a little" (L, VI, 321).

Gwendolen's ignorance of that strange creature Grandcourt, forewarned by the epigraph to ch. 11, is dwarfed by her ignorance of the world beyond her. Her assumption that she is the measure of all things has been fostered by the way her family waits for her evaluation of the new home, her readiness to discuss a problem. When the family suffers ruin, she is oblivious of her mother's suffering; she is absorbed solely with what the ruin will do to make her life even duller than it is now.

The events of the novel conspire to jolt her into painful awareness of her self-absorption, but even in the later chapters (44 and 48) she betrays the tenacity with which egoistic self-preoccupation clings to her mental processes and judgments: for she imagines that she holds a much larger place in Daniel's thoughts than she actually does. It doesn't occur to her that he might fall in love or that he might choose a vocation which would take him from her beck and call. Gwendolen can no more conceive that Daniel's life "could be determined by the historical destiny of the Jews" than a lap-dog could frame to itself "the motives and adventures of doghood at large" (p. 607). The fruit of her planting has been bitter; but the seed of a more altruistic life is manifested in the comment to her mother, after a night of half-sleeping, half-shrieking: "she looked up fixedly at her mother and said tenderly, 'Ah, poor mamma! You have been sitting up with me. Don't be unhappy. I shall live. I shall be better'" (p. 87, italics added). There is a sense that she must come to terms with time, that she must exert herself to assure that the consequences of her choices

shall no longer blight other lives. The will, as Feuerbach noted, is "'tied to time and place'" (Samtliche Werke, X, 100-101, in Kamenka, p. 129); it is not a miracle-working capacity. The time has come; Gwendolen must find the place, the worthy object of her powers.

Grandcourt, like Gwendolen, is noticeably ignorant about his family. Not once does he make any comment on his mother or father. The narrator lets us know that his father was willing to give up his own name (Mallinger) to marry a Grandcourt heiress. The concern for wealth and rank may have become a gene, for Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt is keenly alive to the "correct behavior" of a person of his rank. Once married, he icily castigates Gwendolen if she exhibits behavior unseemly to a Grandcourt wife. The only other thing we know about Grandcourt's family is that the father died when Grandcourt (now 35) was young and that Lush became his traveling companion and general factotum 15 years ago. A man of "some ability," Thomas Cranmer Lush had insinuated himself into Grandcourt's life as "prime minister in all his more personal affairs" (p. 164).[9] Their symbiotic relationship nourished each man's weaknesses: Grandcourt maintained Lush in the luxury he desired at little physical expense; and Grandcourt's life habits have come to rely more and more on Lush's "handiness," his diplomatic skills--i.e., his willingness to do Grandcourt's more unpleasant tasks, one of which was to keep Lydia Glasher and children from becoming overly importunate. The cost to Lush of this sinecure is

[9]The name is appropriate: Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556) was "handyman" to Henry VIII. He was made Archbishop of Canterbury to help along the divorce from Queen Catherine and the legitimation of Boleyn's imminent offspring. "Lush," of course, suggests the luxuriousness to which the character is addicted.

a willingness to put up with Grandcourt's unpredictable moods. One might expect that since Lush constitutes his only "family" --if the faceless cousin, "a used-up fellow" whom Grandcourt doesn't "care two straws for" (p. 826), is discounted--there might be some kind of affection between the two constant companions. Not so. At one point, Grandcourt tells Gwendolen that Lush is a cross between a hog and a dilettante and easily promises her to dismiss Lush, all the while keeping his lackey in the background for later "use." To retain his easy life, Lush is content "if his puddings were rolled towards him in the dust" for he can find the bits inside relishing (p. 165). The narrator augments this portrayal of a sycophant by calling him a "toad-eater."

For the children he has engendered Grandcourt has the merest tolerance. His affection for his illegitimate son is measured by the way the child is used in Grandcourt's will: if Gwendolen fails to produce a legitimate heir, the Glasher boy will inherit the major portion of the Mallinger holdings; if she does have a son, the bastard boy will receive a mere pittance. In each of his relationships--with wife, with valet, with former mistress and children--Grandcourt exhibits himself as a <u>user</u> of people, one who exploits their dependence on his monetary and social superiority. He has neither sense of past ties of affection, present loves, nor future provision for his dependents. The man exists in a time-void just as much as in an emotion-void.

He is very much aware, of course, of the rank he has inherited: he is presumptive heir to a baronetcy through his father's line (the

Mallingers), though the heirship, Lush reminds him, is "'not absolutely certain'" (p. 163); and if certain intervening cousins should conveniently die, he would become a baron and peer of the realm through his mother's line. The dignity, power, and luxury inherent in this position, however, are unearned; Grandcourt has not had to perform a single act for anyone to gain his wealth and title. Yet, the power is there: when news travels through the neighborhood at Diplow that the heir is about to occupy the manor-house, excitement boils up in business, agricultural, and aristocratic quarters. Mothers hope their boys will become liverymen; farmers hope for a better price for hay and straw; gentlemen with marriageable daughters begin to have visions of "good matches" (pp. 122-123). Even Rector Gascoigne, Gwendolen's uncle and protector, allows himself well-bred hopes in Gwendolen's behalf. He is aware of certain rumors about Grandcourt's past, but "He held it futile, even if it had been becoming, to show any curiosity as to the past of a young man whose birth, wealth, and consequent leisure made many habits venial which under other circumstances would have been inexcusable. Whatever Grandcourt had done, he had not ruined himself. . ." (p. 125), though he may have indulged in some gambling. And "a man who has the strength of mind to leave off when he has only ruined others, is a reformed character." These observations by the narrator tell us as much, of course, about the Rector as about the kind of figure Grandcourt strikes in society.

A little later, when it seems that Gwendolen might really refuse Grandcourt's proposal, the narrator lets us in on more of the Rector's

inner musings:

> This match with Grandcourt presented itself to him as a sort of public affair; perhaps there were ways in which it might even strengthen the Establishment. To the Rector, whose father . . .had risen to be a provincial corn-dealer, aristocratic heirship resembled regal heirship in excepting its possessor from the ordinary standard of moral judgments, Grandcourt, the almost certain baronet, the probable peer, was to be ranged with public personages, and was a match to be accepted on broad general grounds national and ecclesiastical. . .But if Grandcourt had really made any deeper or more unfortunate experiments in folly than were common in young men of high prospects, he was of an age to have finished them. All accounts can be suitably wound up when a man has not ruined himself, and the expense may be taken as an insurance against future error (pp. 176-177).

When, after Grandcourt's drowning, the "hints of former entangling dissipations, and an undue addiction to pleasure" become known to everyone concerned, the Rector is uncomfortably aware that "he had not foreseen that the pleasure which had probably . . .been swept into private rubbish-heaps, would ever present itself as an array of live caterpillars, disastrous to the green meat of respectable people" (p. 826). His major concern is that "'Female morality is likely to suffer from this marked advantage and prominence being given to illegitimate offspring.'" The intimate view of the Rector's thinking offers the reader some feeling for the power held by a person of Grandcourt's rank. And yet, as noted earlier, Grandcourt has no thought for using his power in Parliament or even in improving his own holdings: he is "one who is indifferent to all social interests, all public life, as distinguished from selfish and private interests; he has no sympathy with political and social events except as they affect his own comfort and prosperity. . ."(Essays, p. 296). He is devoid of a sense of responsibility; his is the completely un-participated life.

Since we are given no details about the kind of education he received, we can only assume that he received the traditional gentleman's education at private school and university. He shows no desire for knowledge; in one scene where magazines lie at hand, he sits in bored self-absorption. His extensive travels have failed to enlarge his perspectives; they have merely left him bored with it all. In vivid contrast to Klesmer and Catherine Arrowpoint, he can be no Abelard to Gwendolen's Eloise. There can be no "continued expectation" nor "continual sense of fulfillment" in the "systole and diastole of blissful companionship" (p. 282) that characterize Klesmer's and Catherine's love.

Grandcourt's only amusement in his encapsulated existence is to imagine others envious of him in some way. He condescends to tolerate Daniel at Leubronn, to be civil to him, only because he fancies Daniel jealous of his heirship to the Mallinger holdings. The sense of power feeds his egoism. When that reputation for power is threatened by Gwendolen's running away from him, he takes care that no one shall consider him a disappointed lover or treat him like a prisoner on parole (pp. 195-196); he feigns a yachting trip in a different direction, though Lush knows he will slowly meander after her to Leubronn.

Grandcourt's existence--in a time vacuum, devoid of affection for family, past or present, oblivious of his rank's responsibility to society, enchained by the empty petrified forms of the aristocratic code of behavior, and completely lacking in awareness of larger historical movements--embodies the ground zero point to which human nature, engrossed in its own egoistic projections, can sink.

Mordecai (or Ezra) Cohen (or Lapidoth), in startling contrast, reveals the heights to which the individual soul may soar in seeking to preserve the treasures from his nation's past for the bringing together of his people in the present that they may be culturally fruitful in the future. Mordecai fulfills both Feuerbach's demand for a man who doesn't waste time wishing but who "bounds his wishes by the idea of necessity" and "transforms his attainable wishes into objects of real activity" (EC, p. 123) and Eliot's demand for "a nature which combines the faculty for amassing minute erudition with the largeness of view necessary to give it a practical bearing" and "a wonderful intuition of the mental conditions of past ages with an ardent participation in the most advanced ideas and most hopeful efforts of the present" (Essays, p. 29).

His family background is humble enough, indeed hardly one to be proud of. His father (who dropped the name Cohen and adopted the name of a Polish ancestor named Lapidoth) had deserted his wife and son and had taken with him the sole remaining daughter in the family while young Mordecai was abroad. His mother, in whom he saw "'the majesty of the Eternal'" (p. 601), had sent an anguished letter bewailing the loss. Mordecai had been on the verge of following his ideal to Palestine, but he turned obediently from his great object to soothe her sorrow. (Unfortunately, he caught tuberculosis on his return to England.) He would in no way deny sympathy to the one near and dependent on him. He remained by his mother's side four years, until she died. Daniel, upon hearing Mordecai's account of these events, is deeply moved by Mordecai's unapplauded heroism in turning aside from the great road to

the nearer duty. Years later, when Lapidoth returns to London to harass his children, Mordecai is stern with his father because of the misery brought to Mrs. Lapidoth but does not flinch from promising to care for him. Though Mordecai is not willing to trust his disreputable father, he acknowledges their very real bond: "'. . .though human justice were to flog you for crimes, and your body fell helpless before the public scorn--we would still say, "This is our father. . ."'"(p. 847).

During the two years prior to meeting Daniel and being reunited with Mirah and with his father, Mordecai has lived with the family of a pawnbroker also named Cohen, whom he has served as repairer of jewelry, tutor to young Jacob, and "inspired idiot." Though this Ezra Cohen is embarrassingly concerned with making money, Mordecai is grateful for the family's care and dwells "'in their tent as in a sanctuary'" in his declining health (p. 563). During hours spared from work and from his own continuing studies in Hebrew Mordecai tries to engrave on little Jacob's mind Hebrew language and poetry, including his own poetry "of a blended past and future," though the little imp frequently frustrates his mentor by taking more interest in picking a coin off the floor with his teeth while standing on his hands "mountebank fashion"(pp. 533-534). Mordecai is under no illusions that the Cohens are a deeply religious family; he knows that they are typical of many, many Jewish families who have had to survive in alien cultures over the centuries, and that the new Israel must be forged from this impure ore with its potential for degradation as well as for improvement. Though intellectually the Cohens of the world may be "'as the horse and the mule, without understanding beyond the narrow path they tread,'" still there is a strong

bond of affection--"'the heart of Israel'"--among them (p. 579). Mirah feels, after meeting Mordecai's surrogate family, as if "'we all belonged to each other.'" Old Mrs. Cohen, who Mordecai feared wouldn't want to meet Mirah because of having lost her own daughter, surprises him by "'rejoicing that another's plant blooms though her own be withered'" (p. 680).

Mordecai's academic studies had fed his ideals as his life's experiences had nourished his realistic appraisal of the people with whom he wanted to work. In Holland, Hamburg, and Göttingen he had gained his beloved ideas and a passionate attachment to erudition, especially poetry (as reflected in his speech). He considered them a trust to which he dedicated his head, heart, hands, and breath that his soul might be "'be as a temple of remembrance'" of what Israel once was (p. 555). Thus does Mordecai live his species-consciousness. He is no head-in-the-clouds visionary--though he <u>is</u> a visionary: "'I see, I measure the world as it is. . . .You are not listening to one who raves aloof from the lives of his fellows'" (p. 555). Yet "exiled in the rarity of [his] own mind," he is often ignored by assimilationist Jews (p. 605). Daniel admires how the youthful Mordecai, in setting off for Palestine with the heart of a Moses ben Maimon, could choose as his life's task one involved with far-off issues. Unlike Grandcourt, who was bored by his travels, Mordecai believed that his journeys in the East would permit him to "'speak with a fuller vision'" (p. 600).

Once he knew that he would never fulfill his great desire, Mordecai accepted the necessity of seeking a stronger man to carry on his mission. Daniel's appearance on Mordecai's horizon brings an end to

his "'winters of suffering'" (p. 603), for he sees Daniel as his second soul. It is appropriate that Mordecai, whose mind has yearned for the far-reaching scene, the wide spaces and the sky, the long vistas of bridges and buildings, the broad rivers (pp. 531-537), should see "the face of his visions" beckoning to him from the river as he stands on Blackfriars Bridge (pp. 549-50): "The prefigured friend had come from the golden background [at sunset], and had signalled to him." Though the two men had twice met before, it is not till this meeting that Mordecai feels confident that time has brought his "new self" (p.551). Puzzled by Mordecai's intense conviction, Daniel is not willing to blast the dying man's hopes; but neither is he about to commit himself to beliefs which may be founded on one assumption, all too possibly mistaken: the assumption that he is a Jew. Mordecai's words, however, stifle outward resistance, and Daniel gives himself over to listening and sympathizing. During the discussion at the Philosophers' Club, Daniel is moved by Mordecai's fervent protestations that the heart of Israel is not dead but lives, and needs a physical embodiment in Palestine.

> Before him stood, as a living, suffering reality, what hitherto he had only seen as an effort of imagination, which, in its comparative faintness, yet carried a suspicion of being exaggerated: a man steeped in poverty and obscurity, weakened by disease, consciously within the shadow of advancing death, but living an intense life in an invisible past and future, careless of his personal lot, except for its possibly making some obstruction to a conceived good which he would never share except as a brief inward vision--a day afar off, whose sun would never warm him, but into which he threw his soul's desire, with a passion often wanting to the personal motives of healthy youth. It was something more than a grandiose transfiguration of the parental love that toils, renounces, endures, resists the suicidal promptings of despair--all because of the little ones, whose future becomes present to the yearning gaze of anxiety (pp. 592-593).

This persuasive power of speech and the biblical metaphors in which he thinks tie Mordecai closely with the forebears after whom he is named or with whom he is compared. Like Ezra of old, he is a scholar and teacher, restricted though he be by physical circumstances, and he is obsessed by a similar desire to lead his exiled people back to Jerusalem, to restore and preserve the Jewish national character (cf. "Hep!", p. 407). Unlike the fifth century B.C. Ezra, Mordecai is not so committed to making a sharp separation between Jews and Gentiles: Mordecai sees the separation as a temporary necessity, but ultimately all peoples must become one (p. 802). Israel "has given a binding theory to the human race," preparing the way for a more spiritual human being united with his brothers. The Mordecai of old was another yearner for his homeland and returned from Babylon a century before Ezra. As guardian of Mirah during his last days, Mordecai Cohen bears some resemblance to the Benjamite guardian of Esther who helped defeat Haman's plan to exterminate the Jews. Mordecai Cohen's prevention of the extermination of Jews takes a much more peaceful path in building cultural bridges of understanding and sharing.

Mordecai is compared to Ezekial and Elijah, both great prophets in Jewish history. The biblical Ezekial had been carried into captivity by Nebuchadnezzar in 598 B.C., whereupon he had prophesied famine and captivity as the just deserts for Israel's wickedness. But after the fall of Jerusalem (587 B.C.) his message became one of hope and consolation. It is this second phase of Ezekial's ministry that Mordecai's message parallels, and like Ezekial he bases that hope not on mere wishful thinking but on a realistic doctrine of individual responsibility.

If the three men share an unflinching, down-to-earth capacity to assess their nation's problems, they also share a unique sensitivity to the reality of the invisible world and a predisposition to mystical experiences. Mordecai recalls for Daniel how one day, standing on the quay in Trieste, he was swept out of body, out of self, into "'the flood of a glorious life, wherein my own small year-counted existence seemed to melt, so that I knew it not. . .'"; his soul had mingled "'with the ocean of human existence, free from the pressure of individual bondage'" (pp. 600-601). Mordecai's mystical release from self forms the antithesis to Gwendolen's and Grandcourt's imprisonment within the ego. Coupled with this capacity for extra-sensory experience is an unexpected patience with earthly time and processes. Mordecai is content to await the revelation of new directions: "'events are as a glass where-through our eyes see some of the pathways,'" he explains (p.818). Evil men may incite the righteous man from inaction to resist evil, to promote actively "'the laws of justice and love'" to which a multitude and its counsellors must be obedient. He points out to Daniel how his loving will saved Mirah from suicide(precipitated by Lapidoth's callous exploitation) and restored her to her brother (pp. 818-819).

Elijah, long associated with fire and lightning, led a solitary life close to God; Mordecai too, though involved in the mundane affairs of his people, long dwelt in mental solitude for he had found no one with whom he could share his visions and hopes--until he met Daniel. As Elijah is the Old Testament prototype of the desert-solitary, John the Baptist, the forerunner of the Messiah, so Mordecai sees himself as the forerunner of a stronger, more capable man who will restore human rights to his people--a Christ in very Feuerbachian human form.

Thus, in her depiction of the tubercular Jew Eliot implies that the heroic figures of the Old Testament and the supernatural figures of the New Testament were, like Mordecai, just human beings, who illustrate "that the idea of God, so far as it has been a spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e., an exaltation of the human)"(L, VI, 98).

Between the Gwendolen-Grandcourt pole of egoism and the pole of selflessness of Mordecai move Mirah and Daniel. Though Mirah's importance in the book is modest, Eliot gives a considerable amount of information about her. Her most outstanding trait is her devotion to her lost family and to her Jewish heritage. In the few years she was with her mother she formed a deep attachment to the Jewish religion, for her mother had taught her prayers and had sung Hebrew hymns and lullabies, had imprinted on her brain (as Mordecai had hoped to imprint on Jacob's) the Hebrew syllables, unintelligible but conveying love and security. As if illustrating the importance Feuerbach attached to the senses, Mirah operates largely on the basis of feeling. Her memories of mother and older brother are of the sounds of their voices, the feeling of being carried on Ezra's shoulder.[11] Her later recollections of life with Lapidoth on the continent and in America, being dragged from one sleazy playhouse to another, are imbued with the garish stage-lights, the false beauty removed from an actress's face after a performance, the feeling of being caught in a perennial rush like Shelley's "Triumph of Life."

[11]David Kaufman in George Eliot and Judaism: An Attempt to Appreciate 'Daniel Deronda', trans. from Deutsche Rundschau (February 7, 1877) by John Ferrier),(N.Y.: Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., 1970), p. 71, commends Eliot's dramatization in Mirah of the moral power of memory--a subtle manifestation of Eliot's treatment of time.

Mirah's sense of family life has been blighted, since age nine, by her father's unstable occupation as actor, translator of plays, stage-manager, and gambler. Having taken her away from Mrs. Lapidoth, he at once put Mirah on stage and had her tutored in acting and singing. But Mirah's nature was not suited to the world of the theater. She did not feel at home in the personality of a character; she could only be herself. Unable to commit herself where her heart didn't lie, she sought refuge from the false life in her mother's prayer books and in occasional furtive visits to the synagogue.

Lapidoth kept her "fiery furnace" (p. 258) flaming hotly by forcing her to train to sing opera and eventually arranging to use her as a payoff to a non-Jewish Count who had bailed him out of gambler's prison. Lapidoth threatened Mirah with visions of the poor actress's life if she would not accept the Count's proposal. Mirah's devotion to her culture, tested many times in the past by anti-Semitic comments on shipboard and thoughtless appraisals of her suitability for the "marriage market," had strengthened her in her species-consciousness, in resigning herself to suffering with her people. Unlike her father, she did not try to "pass" by making fun of Jews to keep Christians chuckling. The final negotiations between her father and the Count drove her from their hotel in Pesth back to London. When she finds her old neighborhood torn down, she falls into utter despair. Catapaulted into a kind of world-nausea by conditions far harsher than Gwendolen's she wades into the Thames to rejoin her mother in death. Then "'Faith came to me again,'" she says (p. 264). That is, a human being--Daniel--intervenes in the form of loving care and finds a family to shelter her.

Having been plucked from the hell of existence with her father,

she wants to continue the search for her mother and brother, for a home. (Gwendolen, we recall, scorned her "dull" home at Offendene, dreaded her home with Grandcourt.) At first the Meyricks and the Mallingers somewhat fatuously hope Mirah will convert to Christianity. They fail to understand that her deep feelings about her religion are interwoven with what was best and most loving in her miserable life. Memory of mother and brother has been the fragile thread tying past with present, inspiring her continued search. Her perseverance awakens Daniel to the fact that Judaism is not fossilized, to be studied in books (p. 411), but still throbs in people's lives. As a result, he begins reading Jewish history and visits a synagogue service (where he has his first brush with Joseph Kalonymos). And it is her persistent desire to find her family that keeps Daniel searching for them despite certain priggish prejudices against mercenary Jews. The narrator pokes sly fun at Daniel's interior arguments about what he should do if Mirah's brother should be the fulfillment of his stereotype. The pawnbroker Cohen and his mother turn out to be not so coarse as Daniel had feared! Mirah wins them over instantly when she is finally allowed to meet them. Like Mordecai, though she is ashamed of her father, she forgives him because her mother had once loved him and stoically promises to provide for the arrogant, presumptive, parasitic reprobate.

Mirah's affections are thus family oriented, despite the meager opportunity for fulfillment in her youth; her sense of place in society has had little chance for development because of the peripatetic life she has led. Her contact with society at large takes the form of very personal relations with a limited number of individuals. She accepts the

kindnesses of the Meyricks with humble gratitude. Completely unpretentious, she is unafraid to audition before Klesmer, for she has been well-trained though her voice is not made for great tasks. She merely hopes to be good enough to give drawing-room recitals and private lessons in order to support herself. Unlike Gwendolen, she is not overwhelmed by Klesmer's "larger sweep of vision" (p. 539) or by his gruff scolding manner. She readily performs in Christian drawing rooms in hopes of finding pupils; and at one point she tries to cheer Gwendolen, who cannot be satisfied with her "middlingness," by offering to give her singing lessons. Gwendolen, however, is too proud to accept the offer.

Mirah's sense of responsibility to the larger world falls within the context of wife and mother. Hers is a nature "'not given to make great claims'" (p. 728). In marrying Daniel, she is conscious of "the acceptance of a great gift which required great uses" (p. 880). The comment Eliot made to young Emily Cross might well have been made to her: "The future must always be in one sense dark, but with a deep love which enables us to be the light and bliss of another, we can never be without reason for saying, 'I am glad that I have lived.' That is really the highest good of a wife--to be quite sure in the midst of the dimness and doubt which this difficult world surrounds us with, that there is one close to her whose life is every day the better for her" (L, VI, 116-117). Like Emily, Mirah was marrying a man of complete comprehension and depth of feeling. Caught up in the blissful prospect of a happy new life, free of past torments, she is not aware of Gwendolen's or Hans's tumults of discontent; but she is very conscious that Daniel has been

Gwendolen's rescuing angel, and she does not begrudge that deliverance. The grace both women have received is not a theological grace but its true equivalent in human feeling.

The agent of that grace--Daniel Deronda--has been called a "Christ figure." But such a term reverses the meaning Feuerbach and Eliot found in the conception of Christ: not that a man is Christ-like but that a Christ is an expression of humanness in the fullest, most positive sense. Moreover, Daniel has to grow into his role. Many critics deny that Daniel undergoes any struggle; everything is given to him, he doesn't have to "win through" to a new viewpoint. They are ignoring, however, the peculiar problem with which Daniel is afflicted: the strange disease of sympathy with others' predicaments, a "many-sided sympathy" which prevents even positive partisanship, which impedes any persistent course of action, and which paralyzes indignation against wrong (p. 413). Few of us suffer this kind of burden! At 25 he yearns for a satisfying "duty" (p. 685), one on which he can focus his intellectual, physical, and emotional energies. While to the working man he may seem to have led the life of a dilettante (a number of critics have called him a "dandy," a patently unfair assessment), yet his youthful studies, travels, meditations, and later studies with Mordecai as well as his interviews with his mother have all directed him toward immersing himself in the flow of life, and consequently of time.

Though fatherless like Gwendolen, Grandcourt, the Meyricks (and for all positive effects, like Mordecai and Mirah), Daniel has had a happy secure childhood with "Uncle" Hugo Mallinger, a man "always indulgent and cheerful" (p. 203), on the large estate called The Abbey,

"at once historical, romantic, and home-like" (p. 204). Daniel's own "disposition was one in which everyday scenes and habits beget not ennui or rebellion, but delight, affection, aptitudes" (p. 208). When at age 13 he learned about illegitimacy (in connection with the popes), he concluded that "Uncle" Hugo was his father. He began building fantasies about his lost but loving mother as a kind of vicarious emotional substitute for the real memories which sustain a person. But the doubts about his parentage also drove him into a sensitivity on the subject, an aloofness and reserve when with his schoolmates. The insecurity about his origins was partially offset by a firm sense of security in "home"; the old Benedictine Abbey with its roots stretching far back into history bespeaks the order and co-operation of harmonious communal existence. The Benedictine monk was self-denying but not austere and bound himself to the community for life. Similarly, Daniel grew up with a strong attachment to the place and to Sir Hugo which no new suspicions could completely undermine.

Daniel's sense of rank was also strong. When Sir Hugo suggested he might like to become a great tenor (for he had a good voice), he flushed with anger, for the suggestion implied he was not a gentleman: a gentleman didn't have a singing career. He resented, as did Mirah, being made a toy to be manipulated by the wealthy. Upon being sent to Eton he breathed in relief, for Eton provided a gentleman's education. Sir Hugo also told him he would have a bachelor's income and wouldn't have to support himself. Behind these genial assurances lingered the desire--at times the dread--of finding out his true parentage.

This strong sense of rank grew with his sense of that rank's

responsibility as his studies led him to admire the man of action, the scholar-leader, and to seek after wide knowledge as nourisher of motive and opinion. His going abroad, unlike Grandcourt's but like Mordecai's, was motivated by a desire to escape the Philister's, the Englishman's, point of view and to enlarge his limited outlook. Upon returning to England, he took up the study of law with its own implications of order, of the consequences of past actions in the present and for the future. Yet this career leaves him yearning for a more definite role in society. He rejects Sir Hugo's suggestion that he get involved in Parliamentary politics on the grounds that he doesn't want to conform his opinions and actions to those of others: "'I don't want to make a living out of opinions,' said Deronda; 'especially out of borrowed opinions'" (p.434). The practical Sir Hugo suggests that one must indulge in a little "humbug," though of a "good style"; for "'If you are to rule men, you must rule them through their own ideas. . . .There is no action possible without a little acting.'" Unwilling to compromise his understanding of moral action, Daniel retorts, "'I can't see any real public expediency that does not keep an ideal before it which makes a limit of deviation from the direct path. But if I were to set up for a public man I might mistake my own success for public expediency'" (p. 435). The narrator soon lets Daniel come down from his pedestal to a more pragmatic viewpoint: in order to learn more about the pawnbroker's family, Daniel indulges in "a plan [to pawn a ring on pretense of needing money] which was certainly more like acting than anything he had been aware of in his own conduct before" (p. 442). Later, in his dealings with Mordecai, who becomes increasingly convinced without

tangible evidence that Daniel, though not proven a Jew, is the one he has long looked for, Daniel adopts a manner which, if not acting, is at least a less-than-full exposure of his doubts on the subject.

Like these experiences, a number of other personal relationships serve over a period of time as educating influences not only to reveal Daniel's responsibilities with respect to his rank but also to help him channel his amorphous sympathies. Sir Hugo's cloddish insinuations of some kind of attraction between Mrs. Grandcourt and Daniel at first incline him to keep away from her. Daniel is content to consider her a coquette setting up opportunities to talk with him alone in some kind of "vulgar flirtation" (p. 489). But once he is informed of the Glasher situation and of Gwendolen's "knowing of that woman with her children, marrying Grandcourt, and showing herself content," he is moved to pity. He resolves, rather than to avoid her, to talk with her. During their several interviews he does not gloss over the deep wrong she has committed, nor tell her she hasn't really hurt anyone. Instead he helps her to acknowledge her wrongdoing in all its blackness, to increase her remorse and to define her dread (p. 509), then tries to indicate the way out of her slough of despond: he urges upon her "the religious life"--not a taking of the veil (as Grandcourt at one point had suspected her of insanely considering) nor a dedication to orthodox Christianity, as a Victorian reader might have expected. But a Feuerbachian solution which translates Christ's words--that to save your life, you must lost it--into human terms: Daniel defines the religious life as one "'which holds an enthusiasm for something more than our appetites and vanities. . . .the higher life must be a region

in which the affections are clad with knowledge," in which elevated feeling is conjoined with wisdom (pp. 507-508). Over the long months that it takes Gwendolen to accomplish this, Daniel stands by her side, treading a delicate line between sympathizing with her in her struggle with guilt and remorse and preventing her from falling in love with him.

Daniel's sense of delicacy is tested again in his relationships with Hans Meyrick, his college friend, and Mirah; for Hans declares (in his usual manner of using Daniel as father-confessor without listening to Daniel's problems) his infatuation with Mirah, even though she is a Jewess and would marry only one of her own race. He uses her as a model in a series of pictures about Berenice, the "first century Jewess, beautiful, popular and ambitious, suspected of living in incest with her brother Agrippa [for whose portrait Hans wants Daniel as model!]" (Hardy's note, p. 895). Berenice lived with Titus, but because of anti-Semitism in Rome they were compelled to separate. Daniel says he objects to the series because it uses Mirah as model for an abhorrent woman, but he really feels jealousy of Hans gnawing at his heart and doesn't quite know how to deal with it since he thinks he is no more a Jew than is Hans. It is a number of months until he admits his attachment to her. Meanwhile he treats her with overscrupulous delicacy, even reserve, for he doesn't want to seem to take advantage either of her gratitude for saving her life or of Mordecai's friendship for him. Only when Hans reluctantly admits that Mirah seems attached to Daniel is Daniel released from constraint and plans to make his avowal. He has learned that stifling his own emotions and declarations has only made him miserable and has left Mirah in jealous uncertainty about his feelings for her.

A third channeling occurs during his interview with his mother, about whom he has woven fantasies of a loving parent forced, like Mrs. Lapidoth, to part with him as an infant. Instead Alcharisi elaborates on her father's suffocating domination and the misery of female bondage, and she explodes his fantasy by recalling the ease with which she parted with her unwanted child. Yet in her revelation that he is a Jew, she guesses his attachment to Mirah, and in forcing him to admit it she opens up a clearer pathway to loving Mirah (ch. 53). She also reveals the intellectual and spiritual heritage left him by his grandfather, Daniel Charisi, an embodiment of the scholar-leader Daniel has admired since childhood. His meeting with his grandfather's old comrade, Joseph Kalonymos[12], whose persistent nagging of Alcharisi drove her to make this revelation to Daniel,

> . . .wrought strongly on Deronda's imaginative susceptibility: in the presence of one linked still in zealous friendship with the grandfather whose hope had yearned towards him when he was unborn, . . .he seemed to himself to be touching the electric chain of his own ancestry; and he bore the scrutinising look of Kalonymos. . .something like what one feels in the solemn commemoration of acts done long ago but still telling markedly on the life of to-day. Impossible for men of duller fibre--men whose affection is not ready to diffuse itself through the wide travel of imagination, to comprehend, perhaps even to credit this sensibility of Deronda's . . .(pp. 787-788).

Kalonymos evokes a second commitment: Daniel discovers "that the need for speech [in answer to Kalonymos's, "You will call yourself a Jew and profess the faith of your fathers?"] made an epoch in resolve.

[12]Baker, p. 464, says the name probably came from "a family of scholars and poets named Kalonymos," one a poet (Jehuda B.) who flourished 1090 in Mainz, who founded a distinguished dynasty of poets and writers, and who edited selichot, poems of anguish and suffering. Baker's source is Leopold Zunz, whom Eliot quotes in her epigraph to Ch. 42.

His respect for the questioner would not let him decline to answer, and by the necessity to answer he found out the truth for himself" (p. 792). Daniel vows to call himself a Jew, though his beliefs will not exactly duplicate those of the past, and to "'maintain my grandfather's notion of separateness with communication.'" Kalonymos praises his reverence for the past and his looking forward to the future. The sense Daniel had earlier, in his visit to the Juden-gasse and its synagogue in Frankfort, of "union with what is remote" (p. 414), of communication across the generations (p. 416), a sense which had set in motion his musings about the beginnings of a faith and its institutions and its visible remnants in the present, either awakening a perception of a more "sublimely penetrating life" or revealing the "pathetic inheritance in which all grandeur and the glory have become a sorrowing memory" (pp.414-415)--this sense reaches its fruition in the climactic encounters with Alcharisi and Kalonymos, who emerge from the past, make their revelations, evoke Daniel's commitment, and then disappear from his life forever.

Nurtured in childhood by a secure home and the firm affection of Sir Hugo, endowed with a unique sensitivity to the sufferings of others, and armed now with a strong sense of purpose and of racial and social responsibility, Daniel has grown from the young man at loose ends to a determined leader of his people, willing at least to involve himself with a larger historical movement, to begin the attempt to erect a national center in Palestine. What is important for the purposes of the novel is not that he may or may not succeed, but that he has confronted in Gwendolen, Grandcourt, and Lapidoth the illusions and egoism which

debilitate and debase a human being and has learned through Mordecai to nurture those human qualities of intellect, love, and will which, in a people united, can bring greater happiness to mankind.

Mordecai's words to the men in the Philosophers' Club probably convey Eliot's own perception of the movement of mankind through time toward an improved condition, for they closely parallel her comments in "The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!" in Impressions of Theophrastus Such (1878). While Mordecai's--and Eliot's--ultimate vision is universalist in that all races may one day be united in common sustained application of human effort and intelligence for the improvement of the human race[13], still, Eliot was to write in 1878, "The time is not come for cosmopolitanism to be highly virtuous, any more than of communism to suffice for social energy" ("Hep!"p.405).[14] At present, "Affection, intelligence, duty, radiate from a centre, and nature has decided that for us English folk that centre can be neither China nor Peru." For Mordecai and the Jewish folk the center is to be in Palestine. Mordecai's argument responds to several claims by the other men (some of whom are also Jews): (1) that nationality as a sentiment is dying, therefore the idea of nationality is dying; (2) that a rational form of Judaism would call for assimilation into the races of the countries in which Jews live; (3) that Jews obstinately adhere to the superannuated and

[13]See Murphy's discussion of Meliorist ideas afloat in the nineteenth century, pp. 800-817.

[14]Cf. "Hep!", p. 419: "Because we too have our share--perhaps a principal share--in that spirit of separateness which has not yet done its work in the education of mankind, which has created the varying genius of nations, and, like the Muses, is the offspring of memory."

and consequently there is no development in the Jews as a race.

To (1), Mordecai notes that it is true, there is danger to a nation, exiled from its homeland, if memories of its past are allowed to be stifled, to become mere withered relics.[15] Yet the life of a people may grow and expand by absorbing the thought of other nations, and the soul of a people may still have life stirring in the breasts of certain of its individuals willing to resist change in the wrong direction and to "'make a new pathway for events'" (p. 586). In moving from (1) to (2), Mordecai argues that it is not rational to deny one's past when it has enriched the world as the brains of countless Jews have done.[16] Israel has given the world a "'law which carried within its frame the breath of social justice, of charity, and of household sanctities'" (p. 588). The "rational expectations" one may expect of Jews involve seeing "more and more of the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change as a dependent growth--yea, consecrate it with kinship'"(p. 587), for the Jewish race won't grow and develop unless it becomes again a nationality (p. 594). As every nation enriches the world's stores, so Israel has given "'the core of affection which binds a race and its families in dutiful love, and the reverence for the human body which lifts the needs of our animal life into religion, and the tenderness

[15]Cf. Essays, p. 29: "Our civilization, and, yet more, our religion, are an anomalous blending of lifeless barbarisms, which have descended to us like so many petrifactions from distant ages, with living ideas, the offspring of a true process of development."

[16]Cf. "Hep!", p. 407: ". . .we find here [in the canonical Hebrew books] the strongly characterized portraiture of a people educated from an earlier or later period to a sense of separateness unique in its intensity--a people taught by many concurrent influences to identify faithfulness to its national traditions with the highest social and religious blessings. Our too scanty sources of Jewish history, from the return under Ezra to the beginning of the desperate resistance against Rome, show us the heroic and triumphant struggle of the Maccabees...."

which is merciful to the poor and weak and to the dumb creature that wears the yoke for us'" (p. 590). Moreover, Mordecai exclaims in answer to (3), Israel's religion, law, and moral life have made one growth, and the people have struggled amid terrible persecutions to preserve that growth (pp. 590-591) and have spread it to the very nations that have subjugated them. Their teachers have kept making fresh interpretations, though many among those in exile have lost their consciousness of race. The Gentiles too, Mordecai points out, have their ignorant multitudes without even superstitions as remnants of memory (p. 592); at least ignorant Jews still confess the Divine Unity. Mordecai takes even this shred as a sign that the soul of Judaism is not dead. That is why the people need to make an organic center as an outward embodiment of their spiritual unity, to fertilize the seeds of past memories to flower into illumination and understanding and thus rid themselves of superstition. This is what may "rationally" be expected of the Jews.

But if the Jews are to become "'living fountains of enlarging belief'" (p. 594), the learned, the skillful, the wealthy Jews must join the effort. Israel still has a store of wisdom which would promote justice and protection to all; Israel could offer "'a tribunal of national opinion'" (p. 596), "'a halting-place of enmities'" (p. 595), to be an example to despotic nations of the world. And the world will gain in freedom as this one segment of its population gains its free-com. But men must <u>choose</u> to cherish that "'good which promises good to all nations'" (p. 597), to promote a new order "'founded on the old, purified, enriched by the experience our greatest sons have gathered

from the life of the ages,'" to form "'a new Judea, poised between East and West--a covenant of reconciliation'" (p. 597). Dropping to an impassioned whisper, Mordecai closes with a thought that reverberates throughout the novel: "'I say that the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice'"(p. 598). Human beings are endowed with the power of discrimination; it is blasphemous to be a mere onlooker in the drama of human events. The vision is before the Jewish people; they must choose to fulfill it.

Mordecai's message speaks loudly to Daniel, who has been preaching a more personal version of the same ethic to Gwendolen: that one must choose what is best from one's past, put aside the degrading, and will an improved future by active involvement in movements for the betterment of mankind. Mordecai's arguments have been neither irrational nor unrealistic; he knows what immense indifference and ignorance the leader of a Return will face. But he knows too that that leader must be inspired by realistic ideals and by a reasonable insight into the way Israel may win the comity of nations.

In her selection of a systolic-diastolic narrative structure and her choice of a subject in which the interconnecting influences of past and present on the future reverberate through major and minor actions, Eliot has successfully transmuted into form and structure ideas which she shared with Feuerbach about the importance of human beings and their choices as they evolve in time.

Chapter III: Structure in Daniel Deronda

Despite Eliot's careful manipulation of time sequences to open new perspectives on, or to reveal new insights into, previous events, critics have from the first felt that the structure of the book fails to unify "the Gwendolen story" and "the Jewish part." Having heard by October, 1876, of the critical reaction to Daniel Deronda, Eliot objected to "readers who cut the book into scraps and talk of nothing in it but Gwendolen. I meant everything in the book to be related to everything else there" (L, VI, 290). Did she fail? Some impressive readers claim she did, though they often soften their condemnation by calling the book a "magnificent failure." Some of these readers have offered a variety of explanations of the cause of the split. Others have concentrated on the devices which work toward unifying the Gwendolen and Deronda stories. Still others point to Eliot's use of fictional techniques which they find innovative for that time period. No doubt there is truth in all the readings. At the close of this chapter and in the following two chapters I offer some suggestions for reconciling the two parts of the novel, suggestions prompted by a reading of Feuerbach and by Northrup Frye's comprehensive view of criticism.

The early reviewers, like Henry James and Richard Holt Hutton, objected largely to the weakness of the Jewish part, a weakness traced to the allegedly vague philosophy which Mordecai, then Daniel, espouses, and the failure to vivify Daniel and the Jewish characters. The disparity between the contrived Jewish world and

the thoroughly felt world of Gwendolen and her group creates a breach in the plot structure too wide for Daniel to bridge. "George Eliot takes them [the Jews] as a person outside of Judaism--picturesquely. I don't believe that is the way they take themselves" (James, p. 167). Thus they fail to hold up their part in the structure: ". . . Deronda, Mordecai, and Mirah are hardly more than shadows. They and their fortunes are all improvisations" (James, p. 166). James attributes this failure to Eliot's inventing the Jewish characters rather than drawing them from observation. Hutton objects to the goal to which Mordecai and Daniel dedicate themselves: "But the ideas and creed of the man [Mordecai] on which . . . so very much turns, are too indefinitely and vaguely sketched to support the character."[1] One is left, he complains, with the uncomfortable feeling that Daniel is off on a wild goose chase "to preach ideas which have only been hinted and which must rest on a creed that has hardly been hinted at all" (Hutton, p. 97).

The weakness they see in the Jewish part, at least in the philosophical ideas which Mordecai embraces, may be allayed by looking closely at the scene at the Philosophers Club where, as noted in the preceding section, Mordecai explains rather clearly his

[1]"Daniel Deronda," Spectator, 49 (9 September 1876), 1131-1133, rpt. in A Century of George Eliot Criticism, ed. Gordon S. Haight (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 96; cf. Edgar Rosenberg, From Shylock to Svengali: Jewish Stereotypes in English Fiction, (Stanford Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 164-165: Of Eliot's several Jewish polemicizing puppets, the portrayal of Mordecai "comes closest to what it is customary to designate 'an ambitious failure.'" The failure Rosenberg attributed to "Eliot's tendency to confuse rather wooly ideals with explicit doctrine."

"creed"--possibly an unfamiliar one to the average Christian Briton of the time, nevertheless one to which David Kaufman, a professor at the newly established Jewish Theological Seminary at Buda-Pesth, had a very different reaction from that of James and Hutton -- perhaps because he and others at the University shared Mordecai's idealism. Kaufman found Eliot's treatment of her Jewish characters quite believable: "She does not introduce us to ideas, but to men and women of flesh and blood in whom these ideas work and act consciously and unconsciously; we are shown not a creed, but its professor -- not a faith, but those who have been nurtured in it" (Kaufman, p. 26). Thus he finds Mordecai well handled: ". . . for the authoress has succeeded in bringing before us, in all its inward, compelling power, and in all its fiery, action-craving impetuosity, no common passion of mankind, well known and easy to understand, but a special sentiment shared by few, strange, and therefore incomprehensible to the many" (Kaufman, p. 40). Kaufman's credentials for assessing the credibility of "the Jewish part" cannot be lightly ignored. Eliot wrote to Kaufman (31 May 1877) to express her gratitude for both his "sympathy with the best aspirations of his race" and his "remarkable insight into the nature of art and the processes of the artistic mind" (L, VI, 379). She wished that other readers showed his "clear perception of the relation between the presentation of the Jewish element and those of English Social life." That relation was established for Kaufman not only by equally strong character groups, not only by Eliot's revelation to the English

public "that Judaism is no obsolete petrifaction, but a force beating pulsating in the hearts and minds of men -- no indifferent shadow unworthy of our attention, but a fact of incalculable significance -- no object to be neglected and despised, but a profound mystery, and a vital challenge to reflection" (Kaufman, p. 56). It was established also by a careful series of contrasts, among them the contrasting morality of Gwendolen's and Daniel's worlds, the contrast between Mirah and Gwendolen, the contrast between the marriages of Gwendolen and Grandcourt and of Daniel and Mirah, and the contrast between the Cohen family and the Mallinger family (Kaufman, p. 46). The Jewish characters are different from the English characters, but they are valid in their own right. "Mordecai is carved of the wood from which prophets are made. . . . He is one of the most difficult as well as one of the most successful essays in psychological analysis ever attempted by an author . . . so human and so true to nature" (Kaufman, p. 67).

Despite Kaufman's enthusiastic response to the novel, twentieth century critics in general have not been able to share his feelings. The most influential is F. R. Leavis, whose essay in Scrutiny in 1945-46 (later included in The Great Tradition) struck a rather devastating blow to the novel's reputation. Like James and Hutton, Leavis objected to the Zionist part as an unfortunate weakness which caused a structural split.[2] In fact, he would excise most of the

[2]The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad (N.Y.: New York Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 79, 81. Subsequent references to this work will be indicated by the abbreviation GT.

Daniel Deronda part and call the novel Gwendolen Harleth (GT, p. 122). The split is caused by an unfortunate authorial intrusion, a symptom of Eliot's usual weakness (which he explicated at length in relation to The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch): her succumbing to a deep personal need, an emotional flow uncontrolled by her intelligence and manifesting itself in the obtrusion of the author's presence (GT, p. 32). Her mature capacity for understanding was worsted by this deep emotional need to create a daydream ideal self (GT, p. 75). W. J. Harvey elaborates on this position: Eliot's novels "are generally weakest when she fails in objectivity and allows a wrong kind of personal emotion to invade her work. The novels then become a form of therapy . . . ."[3] An important kind of flaw occurs, says Harvey, when Eliot is "too close to her creations and the failure to realize them reveals itself in her style," in an "impulse to idealize" or an "obtrusive and unpurged . . . animus or hostility toward a character" (Harvey, p. 205). Daniel and Mordecai are idealized out of reality; Gwendolen is treated too harshly for relatively minor failures. U. S. Knoepflmacher agrees: ". . . Gwendolen's debasement is carried out by a novelist indignant at the 'queenly' ways of a character who dares to aggrandize herself into a 'princess in exile' or 'fallen royalty'" (Knoepflmacher, RHVN, p. 124). Here Leavis and his followers differ from James, who felt the novel flawed by a predominance of the intellect over the emotions. Where James

[3]The Art of George Eliot (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 116.

found Deronda a cold prig, Leavis thinks him emotional, equivocally inspired[4]; Deronda is "a mere emotionalized postulate" whose idealism is not impelled by any external circumstance in his own life. Instead he fulfills his creator's personal need for an intellectual, sympathetic hero. His situation is too unique to be a generalizable solution for Gwendolen, whose troubles differ from his (Leavis, GT, p. 87). Though they concentrate heavily on the structural weakness, James and Leavis praise the sense of life in country house and county society, the clarity of vision in the "Gwendolen part" (James, p. 176; Leavis, GT, p. 87). James exclaims: " . . . how the girl is known, inside out, how thoroughly she is felt and understood! It is the most intelligent thing in all George Eliot's writing. . ." (James, p. 173). He and Leavis do not feel that the Jewish world is nearly so fully rendered.

From these two astute critics have flowed numerous explanations of the novel praising what Eliot seems to have attempted in creating a unified work but noting how she has failed to achieve. Always the examiners see an irremedial structural flaw, a weakness of symmetry, in the handling of the dual plot-lines. But they do try to assess what Eliot must have been trying to do. Maurice Beebe, for example, advises the reader to ignore what links he finds between the two plots, for they are gratuitous, externally imposed; rather, the reader should take the view that "The one story is commentary on the other, and the two stories are counterpointed variations on a single theme": "the interdependence of self and society" in

[4]"George Eliot's Zionist Novel," Commentary, 30 (October, 1960), 321.

the manner of Middlemarch, "the need to lose one's life in order to find it."[5] In order to discover a purpose, both Daniel and Gwendolen must learn the meaning of self-renunciation by submitting themselves to a higher calling than the fulfillment of petty personal desires. In carrying out this theme Eliot has used "two co-plots . . . running parallel to each other and intersecting only at intervals." Beebe's implication is that the intervals are too widely spaced; yet in his skillful demonstration of Eliot's use of three major devices -- "Dramatic opposites, prevision [via dreams], and the repetition of the seeing-oneself motif" -- he shows how closely interwoven are the two strands. The counterpoint technique provides a pleasing, often surprising cohesive force.

Although the lots of Gwendolen and Daniel seem almost independent of one another, notes Darrel Mansell, Jr., still there is a parallel in that both characters "are searching for a duty to submit to."[6] The relations between the two are analogical, like those between Bloom and Daedalus in Ulysses. Unfortunately, Mansell fears, the unity of Daniel Deronda may exist largely in Eliot's mind, for it has not been obvious to many readers. Mansell has examined Eliot's "Notes on Form in Art" (1868) and has concluded that the principle of analogy was basic to Eliot's conception of form (Mansell, p. 67). Form, for Eliot, should show "how something related

[5]"'Visions Are Creators': The Unity of Daniel Deronda," Boston Univ. Studies in English, 1 (1955-1956), 166-176; I follow here his argument.

[6]"George Eliot's Conception of 'Form,'" Studies in English Literature, 5 (Autumn, 1965), 651-662, in Creeger, p. 74; cf. Beebe, p. 176.

to its environment in the manner of Carlyle's organic filaments" (Mansell, pp. 67-68). Mansell feels that in this novel there are not enough filaments to make a closely-textured web.

Barbara Hardy notes Eliot's use of analogies, contrasts, and ironic parallels to suggest possibilities in the characters' lives that might have been but weren't. She points, for example, to the parallel between Gwendolen and Mirah with regard to a woman's selling herself to a wealthy suitor to gain the luxurious life.[7] After citing a number of such instances (Hardy, pp. 125-134) she contends that Eliot marred the unity which she had gained by means of the parallels by heavy use (an occasionally flimsy use) of coincidence which "shows her occupied with personal destiny as something fixed and determined . . ." (Hardy, p. 135). Like some of the other critics, Hardy finds Daniel too static, too much a symbolic construct, too relevant to the moral theme to provide a sense of variety and life to balance the Gwendolen part (Hardy, p. 110).

Succeeding criticism echoes most of the above points. Jerome Thale finds the unity of Daniel Deronda marred by a terrible disparity between the moral perceptions and the quality of characterizations in each story. The Deronda plot is "indifferent," full of "vaporous idealism," "flabby, optimistic idealism" -- actually "wretched."[8] The Gwendolen story, however, "with its clarity and

[7]Hardy, NGE, p. 139.

[8]The Novels of George Eliot (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959, 1967), pp. 122, 126-127.

disenchantment," has the makings of a great novel (Thale, p. 122). In contrast to Kaufman, the Jewish seminarian who praised Eliot's understanding of Judaism and its spokesman, Thale claims "nothing could make us take Mordecai or the novel's version of Zionism" seriously; Eliot's is an external, uncritical knowledge of Zionism (Thale, p. 123). Thale objects not only to the philosophy but to the characterization: he finds Deronda flat, suffering from a debility of will which Eliot fails to see as a defect (Thale, p. 123). Similarly, Carole Robinson calls Deronda a straw-man who should have been a woman.[9] Moreover, Eliot fatally simplifies the psychological issues involving the characters by making egoism and altruism the alternatives (Robinson, p. 293). Thale agrees: Deronda is not, as others have claimed, a lay confessor; rather "he is a lay analyst and a poor one" (Thale, p. 135) because he urges self-reproach upon Gwendolen. Thale and Robinson trace the source of structural disunity to the kind of philosophy, the accuracy of psychological perceptions, and the kinds of characters intermingled in the novel.

For Harvey, Mordecai weakens the novel because he is "the purest example in George Eliot's work of an almost entirely theoretical character, whose individuality is completely subordinated to his functional purpose" (Harvey, p. 184) -- another instance of Eliot's failure in distancing when she idealizes her subject (Harvey, p. 205). He is not in any real relationship with the society of the novel

[9]"The Severe Angel: A Study of Daniel Deronda," ELH, 31 (September 1964), 278, 288.

(Harvey, p. 170). Mordecai, however, is supposed to be a kind of isolato, a Jew living among Jews but more deeply possessed of the historical aspirations of Judaism than the complacent, assimiliative Cohens, Gideons, and Pashes or the defiant Alcharisis, who blend more easily into a social context essentially antagonistic to Jewish culture. Most of the Old Testament prophets, whom Mordecai resembles, might be condemned on the same grounds. Daniel himself suspects Mordecai of monomania -- before he fully understands Mordecai's ideals and the brief time left to fulfill them.

Here lies the crux for U. C. Knoepflmacher: the real world of Gwendolen, Grandcourt, the Mallingers and others should not have been mingled with the fantastic heroic world of Mordecai and Daniel. The interlocking of the two worlds through the character of Daniel was a ruinous decision (RHVN, p. 126). Eliot should have kept the two in suspension. Her unwise decision is reflected in the style, for the idealistic, fantastic world of Daniel is treated poetically; the actual, the Philistine world of Gwendolen satirically. The religious purpose, moreover, which was intended as a unifying principle, is superimposed, overwhelmed by her own obtrusive skepticism, and is therefore unsuccessful (RHVN, p. 119). Knoepflmacher suggests that the real and the ideal worlds could have merged in the prosaic Ezra Cohen household, whose "world envelops and supports the lonely prophet" (RHVN, p. 140), in the person of a Leopold Bloom-type pawnbroker -- "a Christlike vulgarian and city-dweller oppressed by time and flesh" (RHVN, pp. 147-148). Knoepflmacher is disappointed that Eliot rejected this option.

Daniel, according to Knoepflmacher, is therefore an inadequate mechanism for uniting the two disparate worlds. He is "infallible and arrogant in his presumed fallibility and lack of pride" (RHVN, p. 148), neither good Christian nor good Jew. His heart is not schooled by experience but "by a providence that prepares him as the new Daniel by furnishing him with a ready-made tradition already tested by the experiences of history and heredity" (RHVN, pp. 144-145). That tradition, which, for Eliot as for Matthew Arnold, could be "a convincing and authoritative vehicle for . . . morality" (RHVN, p. 62), "a predominantly spiritual force rooted in history" (RHVN, p. 64), Daniel merely accepts. He does not have to earn his belief as Dorothea in Middlemarch must earn hers. Knoepflmacher attributes the shift -- from belief in the power of human will to order events to guarded belief in a Providence -- to Eliot's "increasing disbelief in her scientific humanism and in her ultimate realization that her era's acceptance of the new progressive theories had brought with it a paradoxical weakening of values and convictions" (RHVN, p. 136). She tried to show, Knoepflmacher claims, that some kind -- "a bare possibility" -- of Providence may order events in the world. "For it is the possibility of the 'divine influx' felt by Daniel at the service in Frankfort which constitutes the prime purpose of the Jewish half of the novel and not its Zionist message" (RHVN, p. 146). This "bare possibility" of divine intervention accounts both for the synagogue scene and for the appearance of Alcharisi, who, against her own will, feels compelled to fulfill her father's will for her son. The phrase, "divine influx," epitomizes the externality of the

religious motif.

It is true that by chapter 32 (in which Daniel visits the Frankfort synagogue) Daniel has met Mirah, that her tenacious belief in Judaism has jolted him out of his complacent assumption that the Jews (whose thinking "ought to have been entirely otherwise") were chosen for the sake of someone else (p. 411), and that he has begun reading books to dispel the ignorance underlying his facile opinions. So that when he goes to Frankfort, his sensitivities have been alerted to detect the poetry of the Jewish ghetto and the prayers in the synagogue which express man's "yearning to escape from the limitations of our own weakness and an invocation to all Good to enter and abide with us" (p. 416) -- prayers voiced in a form which has expressed a sense of communion "for long generations of struggling fellow-men." For once the litany, lyrics, proclamations, and chants made Daniel aware that Judaism, as a national faith, heard here like "a remote obscure echo," had "penetrated the thinking of half the world, and had moulded the splendid forms" of Christianity itself. This strong feeling, which seemed to him "beyond the occasion," is, the narrator says, "what one might imagine to be a divine influx in the darkness, before there was any vision to interpret" (p. 417, italics added). The phrase should not be lifted out of context to suggest an unmotivated mystical experience. It is part of a comparison likening Daniel's emotional response to the ritual, with its evocation of the unity of men's yearnings and hopes for centuries and centuries, to a religious experience claimed by Christianity for itself and attributed to an external agent. Daniel's sensitivities

have all along been demonstrated and described to be unusually keen but without focus. Mirah's unusual plight, then his reading, and now his actual attendance of a service have cumulatively combined to open Daniel's eyes to the power of a national tradition in the lives of common people. And of course this experience adds its influence in preparing Daniel to receive Mordecai's hopes into his own heart. Daniel also has tucked in the back of his mind an opposite image, the image of individualistic self-concentration, of "dull, gas-poisoned absorption" and futility (p. 37) -- Gwendolen at the gaming tables -- which elicited his own impulsive action of redeeming the necklace, returned with a note expressing "the hope that she will not again risk the loss of it" (p. 49).

Daniel's gradual acceptance of Mordecai's hopes for a reunited Jewery and a re-vivified Judaism is based on a sequence of concrete, dramatized experiences. Those portions of the novel which present the change from non-commitment to the embrace of Mordecai's ideals should not be labeled "assertion" and considered distinct in mode from the Gwendolen part. Eliot has carefully shown the psychological stages through which Daniel grew into his acceptance.

If the foregoing critics are largely negative in their assessment of the structure of the novel, a second group, smaller in number, has purported to find unifying devices which, if they are all valid, combine to suggest a creative mind working to relate "everything in the book . . . to everything else there." David Kaufman, as noted, found the main unifying device to be the series of contrasts; G. W. Cooke, another contemporary, saw the central contrast to be that

between Jewish life and English life "with the objective of comparing those whose life is anchored in the spiritual traditions of a great people, with those who find the centre of their life in egotism and an individualistic spirit."[10] Maurice Beebe, we remember, called this a counterpointing technique but not a device for organically uniting the two "co-plots."

By comparing what Eliot did in Felix Holt with a similar approach in Daniel Deronda, Carroll traces "The organic unity of the novel" to "Deronda's psychological condition: his disease of sympathy is the reason why he finds himself in relationship with Gwendolen and Mordecai, and the reciprocal movement consists in their demands curing him of his disease" (Carroll, "Unity," p. 378). Daniel Deronda, Carroll demonstrates -- as if in answer to Knoepflmacher, both fulfills and redeems the visions of Gwendolen and Mordecai. Daniel's participation in Gwendolen's vision of fear and in Mordecai's vision of hope prepares him for his role in each person's life: through his participation in Mordecai's hopes he acquaints Gwendolen with his and Mordecai's aspirations in behalf of the Jews and thus makes her aware of her insignificance in the face of "'the larger destinies of man'"; and his participation in Gwendolen's world makes him the accomplished man of the world Mordecai knew was needed (Carroll, "Unity," pp. 370, 372). Thus both Gwendolen and Mordecai are essential to Deronda's education. In Genoa "both visions are fulfilled" when Daniel learns that being a Jew, he is equipped to

[10] George Eliot: Life, Writings, Philosophy (n.p., preface from Dedham, 1883), p. 347.

fulfill Mordecai's hopes for a "national messiah" and when, upon Grandcourt's drowning, he becomes the personal saviour to a Gwendolen hurled into the hell of dread and guilt (Carroll, "Unity," pp. 373, 376). The demands of each character's vision ultimately force him to accept a role in the other's world. The two plot strands are carefully interwoven to urge a philosophical unity -- the need for a balance between self-projection and full communication and the quality of separateness.

A second unifying device, Shirley F. Levenson points out, is the recurring theme of music as "a technique for revealing Gwendolen's essential character faults" and the Jewish characters' healthier attitudes toward music and toward life.[11] Feuerback had noted that music is associated with deep feeling:

> Music is a monologue of emotion (EC, p. 9).
>
> What would man be without feeling? It is the musical power in man. But what would man be without music? . . . man has a musical faculty and feels an inward necessity to breathe out his feelings in song . . . (EC, p. 63).

When one is affected by melody, he is affected by the voice of his own heart. We have already seen the enlargement of insight Daniel experienced in hearing the chants in the Frankfort synagogue. Levenson goes on to demonstrate the way music serves as emblem of communication -- between Daniel and Mirah just before Mirah's attempted suicide, for example, and between Klesmer and Catherine Arrowpoint. The lack of music in the Gwendolen-Grandcourt marriage (Grandcourt considers singing for one's own pleasure mere "squalling")

[11]"The Use of Music in Daniel Deronda," NCF, 24 (1969), 319.

betokens its emotional aridity. Gwendolen must have sensed his antipathy to music even in their courting days, for in accepting Grandcourt's proposal she foresees herself as a wood-nymph without "an impassioned lyrical Daphnis" (p. 182). The first shock to Gwendolen's self-image comes in her discussion with Klesmer of her musical aspirations. Klesmer, not slave to her charms and whims, faces her with the limitations of her power over men. He also exposes her true motives in becoming a singer: she is not dedicated to Art and the amplification it can bring to her own life and to the lives of others; rather she sees music as an agent of freedom from her financial stress and an occasion for self-display. She lacks the inward vocation of the true artist. Gwendolen is so concentrated on self that she cannot sing even for her own pleasure, for in order to value anything she must excel in it. Thus the kind of emotional constriction Gwendolen suffers is revealed by means of her attitude toward music.

Mirah, in contrast, sings as naturally as she breathes. Her songs, in combination with the Frankfort synagogue experience, help prepare Daniel to meet Mordecai (Levenson, pp. 324-333 passim). Daniel too loves to sing (his youthful voice had prompted Sir Hugo to suggest that he become an operatic singer) and is able to be satisfied with his own "middlingness."

Still other critics find the novel tightly unified by Eliot's choice of metaphor or image. William R. Steinhoff studies several pairs of metaphors -- for example, stasis and movement or develop-

ment, selfishness and altruism, and separation or confinement and union -- which join to convey Eliot's familiar theme of "the conflict between the confined life of the individual and the enlarged existence to be found in society."[12] The metaphorical texture of Daniel Deronda reveals a process of "earned revelation," a reconciliation of opposites in character and action -- "the movement from province to universe, self to altruism, narrow to wide, inner to outer, darkness to light, and death to life" (Steinhoff, p. 224). Brian Swann focuses on images related to eyesight and symbols of reflecting glass to explicate Gwendolen's movement from the hell of egoism, in which the outer self is a cult-object, into a kind of purgatory where Daniel is substituted as "the reflection of true values and the interpreter of reality."[12a] Swann points to the various shifts in mirror imagery which signal Gwendolen's painful emergence from her egoistic cocoon.

These critics are representative of readers who perceive more than just the Gwendolen story. There is a third group who find Eliot striking out in new and surprising directions for her time, employing techniques which sometimes succeed, sometimes fail, in unifying the novel. Robert Preyer, for example, suggests Eliot's "failure" in Daniel Deronda may be the result of her pioneering new ideas, for she seems to be attempting to deal with an alleged deterministic universe and to be positive in the face of engulfing realities.

[12]"The Metaphorical Texture of 'Daniel Deronda,'" Books Abroad, 35 (Summer, 1961), 223, 224.

[12a]"Eyes in the Mirror: Imagery and Symbolism in Daniel Deronda," NCF, 23 (1969), 434.

"Daniel Deronda represents a final attempt to reconstitute the positive, creative side of the liberal humanist vision, to make it something more than a vantage point from which to offer a (negative) criticism of life. A chief object here was to describe the processes by which a breakthrough into some larger, more comprehensive way of living could be managed," one that would preserve one's private world yet permit meaningful participation in the larger public world.[13] In dealing with "the disaffections, the irrationality, the idealism, the sense of disconnection and loss, the yearning for a saving vocation -- all these morbid symptoms. . . as responses appropriate to a grave distortion in the relations that obtained between the self and society," Eliot dramatized a new order of experience; for she "was attempting to extend and refine her account of the actual workings of sympathy and repulsion within the psyche" (Preyer, pp. 35, 34). Eliot's philosophy here Preyer finds to be quite modern (and quite ancient, if we recall Ezekial): she insists on the meaningfulness of individual actions, even in a world which threatens to swallow up the individual. To deal with this tension, Raymond Williams might add, Eliot developed the method of "the defining consciousness" which mediates between the individual desire and the general observation of society outside the self. Writers like Eliot and Hardy, finding "no unified form, no unity of tone and language, no controlling conventions, that really answered their

[13]"Beyond the Liberal Imagination: Vision and Unreality in Daniel Deronda," VS, 4 (September, 1960), 45.

purposes," struggled toward new modes of expression, new narrative structures in which to contain their dual vision.[14] And that is why, David R. Carroll (writing of Felix Holt) might add, Eliot uses in her later novels a central character involved in both the public and the private worlds simultaneously. Daniel, like Felix, must play a "double role of private individual and public reformer."[15]

Barbara Hardy (NGE, p. 153) has casually noticed the open endings of Eliot's novels as a new structural departure for the time, and Thale (pp. 125-132) has detected a new confrontation with evil as an explanation for the presence of Grandcourt (less true for Lapidoth) in the plot -- a confrontation which he considers an experiment in realism.

One of the most thought-provoking analysts of Daniel Deronda sees the novel as an experiment of still another kind -- an attempt to combine the novel and the romance forms, an attempt which accounts for the alleged lack of coherence. Leon Gottfried may have taken his cue from G. W. Cooke's comment in 1883: "Daniel Deronda is a romance, and hence differs in kind, conception, scope, circumstance and form from her other works" (Cooke, p. 336). Gottfried believes Eliot intended a gulf to lie between Deronda's world of romance and Gwendolen's world where "the laws of consequence . . . hold merciless power" (Gottfried, p. 168); the two character groups hardly inhabit

[14]The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 94, 85.

[15]"Felix Holt: Society as Protagonist," in Creeger, p. 125.

the same universe. But the problem is that the gulf is more than moral, social, or psychological; it is ontological as well. Eliot may have set a too difficult task for herself in uniting a painfully realistic plot, almost devoid of mythic dimension, with the almost purely romantic and mythic in form and texture" (Gottfried, pp. 170-171). Structurally, Daniel was necessary for the Gwendolen Harleth plot, for Eliot needed "a double perspective so that her modern hero could be seen simultaneously against a background of ordinary reality and heroic myth" (Gottfried, p. 174). Gottfried praises Eliot's courageous search for a new artistic mode within which Flaubertian realism and the spiritualized romance of The Faerie Queene could alike reside. He demonstrates at length Eliot's deliberate use of mythic elements, especially in the parallel between Daniel and Moses, to whom Eliot refers. But ultimately the novel is a noble failure (Gottfried, pp. 174, 175).

The failure, Gottfried feels, lies largely in the lack of psychological richness and the thin romantic ambience in which Daniel and the Jewish characters move -- weaknesses typical of the romance. The Cohens form a mere colorful background for the heroes in much the same way that the Mehricks are included in a sentimental attempt to give the Deronda plot some social density (Gottfried, p. 171).[16] The Jewish characters inhabit "a world of myth and magic rather than of cause and effect"; "in place of a developing

[16]James, p. 176, had said, in contrast, that Hans Meyrick, like Klesmer, had sprung "from a much-peopled mind."

moral counsciousness there is predestination and recognition" (Gottfried, pp. 171-172). Daniel merely is; he never becomes: "His selfhood is more a matter of discovery than of achievement." Carroll's article explicating the roles which Gwendolen's and Mordecai's visions play in Daniel's development (his "becoming") and the comments in Part II herein offer strong arguments illustrating Daniel's subtle psychological development -- which is, of necessity, different from Gwendolen's.

Gottfried traced the novel's weakness to a second cause -- the absence "of a sense of the demonic or the inexplicably destructive, of darkness as a necessary setting for light" (Gottfried, p. 172). No Grandcourt-like evil penetrates the "poetic world" of David, Mirah, and Mordecai; Lapidoth is a petty criminal who has no power to undermine the order of virtue as Grandcourt entangles Gwendolen in his insidious kind of reasoning. Gottfried, apparently demanding perfect symmetry, would have preferred that Daniel's soul be tested in much the same way Gwendolen's was, and certainly more severely than it is tested; too often, he complains, Daniel has the right answer in a crisis, never wavers in his own rectitude. If a reader keeps in mind, however, that Mirah is a minor character and that she need be no more tempted to evil than is Catherine Arrowpoint or Rector Gascoigne (in the "Gwendolen world"), then the question of temptation should focus on Daniel as counterpart to Gwendolen. Daniel does suffer temptations, albeit of a different sort. How may a basically good, sympathetic person be logically tempted? Probably in the

way Eliot suggests: by sloth and indolence, by failing to concentrate his capacities on any one useful object, frittering away his life on the sidelines, taking up first one underdog's cause (as he loses his own scholarship for further study in helping the scatterbrained Hans win his), then another's (rescuing a would-be suicide but procrastinating in finding her Jewish family because they might offend his Christian sensibilities). Daniel's various struggles to channel his energies may seem trivial; he battles no giants nor does he contend with any John Claggert. And yet it is each insignificant-looking choice which slowly forms the kind of determined character he is capable of and must possess if he is to make the idea of a national center take root in the imaginations of dispirited Jews.

As one reviews such articles as the foregoing -- whether attacking, defending, or pointing to innovations -- one has the feeling that the book is too large for one reader, or at least for one or two readings. Where one critic sees a structural flaw, another sees a series of interconnecting links by means of images, analogies, or plot-actions. There is still another possibility, as there will be many more in the ensuing years, which may have grown out of Eliot's sympathy with Feuerbach's philosophical ideas and his mode of presenting them to his readers. Feuerbach had wanted to show the paradoxical effects of the Christian religion: religion had grown out of basic, real human needs, desires, and emotions. In its essence religion "believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature" (EC, p. xxxvi). These he traces in Part I of The

Essence of Christianity. In Part II he reveals the contradictions of theological Christianity, how it really subverted what it purported to teach and how it replaced the reality of authentic human relationships with illusory divine relationships.

> Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; but, be it observed, only in relation to the unhuman, not to the human elements of religion. It is therefore divided into two parts, of which the first is, as to its main idea, positive, the second...not wholly, but in the main, negative; in both, however, the same positions are proved, only in a different or rather opposite manner. The first exhibits religion in its essence, its truth, the second exhibits it in its contradictions; the first is development, the second polemic; thus the one is, according to the nature of the case, calmer, the other more vehement. Development advances gently, contest impetuously, for development is self-contented at every stage, contest only at the last blow. Development is deliberate, but contest resolute. Development is light, contest fire. Hence results a difference as to the two parts even as to their form (EC, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii).

Eliot was not writing assertively and thus could not make such an abrupt division into halves. She chose to present the paradox that Christian culture had bred into society's complex structure and mores by employing a paradoxical mode of presentation, itself complex and quite innovative. Her vision of society had grown increasingly multi-faceted. Perhaps, like Shakespeare and Conrad among others, she found the artistic form or mythos which she had been using inadequate to contain all she wanted to convey. Gottfried has already suggested this, but he may not have gone far enough in his application of Northrop Frye's theory of myths:

> The four mythoi that we are dealing with, comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony, may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth. Agon or conflict is the basis or archetypal theme of romance, the radical of romance being a sequence of marvelous adventures. Pathos or catastrophe, whether in triumph or in defeat, is the archetypal theme of tragedy. Sparagmos,

> or the sense that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized or foredoomed to defeat, and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world, is the archetypal theme of irony and satire. Anagnorisis, or recognition of a newborn society rising in triumph around a still somewhat mysterious hero and his bride, is the archetypal theme of comedy.[17]

While a complete application of Frye's criteria for the various modes lies beyond the scope of this paper, his definitions and qualifications of each individual mythos suggest that a writer may desire to blend at least two of the mythoi. "'Pure' examples of either form [prose romance and the novel]" he writes, "are never found . . ." (Frye, p. 305). A reader of Daniel Deronda suspects that several modes are employed -- and employed ironically -- to convey the inversion of human values which block progress toward full human development.

In the Gwendolen-Grandcourt world, which nearly every critic agrees is well-conceived, the social satire is aimed at Gwendolen personally and at the values of "proper manners" and "genteel decorum" which her group maintain merely as a façade. If indeed these values expressed true concern for the welfare and sensibilities of others, they would not be the target of attack. Rather they hide the individualistic "snarling dog" ethos in which wealth must be retained within a given family and thus the heiress must marry not a man she loves but one socially acceptable to her parents; in which a woman is taken as wife not because she is loved and her individual freedom is important to her husband but because like a race-horse she

[17] Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), p. 192.

possesses beauty and the opportunity for the exercise of complete mastery; in which a husband is selected not in order to build a fuller relationship and a new family but to be the instrument for providing a life of ease, luxury, and social splendor. Just as religion, in Feuerbach's estimate, "takes the apparent, the superficial in Nature and humanity for the essential" (EC, p. xxxviii), so does living for self misplace the values which lead to a fuller life. The lives of the characters enacting the so-called realistic or satiric plot-line are beclouded almost to the point of spiritual darkness by selfish illusions which constrict human freedom and block effective action, which smother the growth of love, and which deny the needs of the human beings who compose their own social set. Eliot, like Feuerbach, reveals the contradictions in the code by which Christian Britons profess to live. The impact of the opening scene in the gambling den suggests the degree to which chance and anarchy rule their lives. Ironically, pastoral images usually associated with the romance -- the horse and the hunt, royalty and power -- are debased in the Gwendolen-Grandcourt world to suggest the danger of the totally socially oriented life with its poses and façades. The "realistic" characters live in a dream world nurtured by caprice, illusion, and imagination.

Again, paradoxically, Eliot reveals through the romance world of "the Jewish set" the essence of the real, the fulfilled life. In Daniel's life is revealed the growth, development, and channeling of the human personality. Even in the relation of Mordecai's and Mirah's backgrounds Eliot lets the characters tell how they grew

into the faith we see them firmly holding. Daniel, the two young Lapidoths, and the five Cohens openly express the depth of feeling, love, and devotion which bring Mordecai and Mirah together after years of separation, which bind together the Cohens in family solidarity, and which impel Daniel to forgive his own mother and to seek out the ideals of his grandfather.

In addition to satire and romance, the book also contains elements of the mythos of comedy as the hero grows from mere accepted opinions of his social class into knowledge nurtured by study, Mordecai's tutelage, and his experiences with Gwendolen, Mirah, and Alcharisi. In characterizing the movement in comedy, Frye writes: "Thus the movement from pistis [belief; Frye translates as "opinion"] to gnosis [knowledge], from a society controlled by habit, ritual bondage, arbitrary law and the older characters to a society controlled by youth and pragmatic freedom is fundamentally, as the Greek words suggest, a movement from illusion to reality . . . . Hence the importance of the theme of creating and dispelling illusion in comedy: the illusions caused by disguise, obsession, hypocrisy, or unknown parentage" (Frye, pp. 169-170). Another kind of movement found in comedy is illustrated by Gwendolen's sinking to the depths of a world governed by chance, then slowly rising to a sense of her place in the universe (insignificant as it is) and the kind of action she can expect of herself (limited as it may be): "The action [of late romantic comedies, like those of Shakespeare] seems to be not only a movement from a 'winter's tale' to spring, but from a

lower world of confusion to an upper world of order. The closing scene of The Winter's Tale makes us think, not simply of a cyclical movement from tragedy and absence to happiness and return, but of bodily metamorphosis and a transformation from one kind of life to another" (Frye, p. 184). Indeed, Eliot deliberately alludes to The Winter's Tale early in the novel when she has Rex and Gwendolen choose the episode of the reconciliation of Hermione and Leontes for the charade. But Eliot has Gwendolen shift the meaning of the scene: for in Shakespeare's play, Hermione advances from her statue-pose to embrace the wrongdoer, Leontes, in forgiveness for his insane treatment of her sixteen years before, and the play closes with the traditional happy ending of marriage and reconciliation. Gwendolen wishes merely to be seen in a striking pose, and will allow Leontes-Rex merely to kiss the hem of her robe, no sign of affection forthcoming from her. The irony of the scene seizes the reader only at the end. The woman, petrified first by selfish whims, then by the serpentine wiles of a husband motiveless in his malignity, is forced to take more than a few minutes to achieve her metamorphosis from statue to feeling human being. And when she does step out of her encapsulated stance, she may neither embrace nor be embraced. It is she rather than the Leontes counterpart who must suffer abasement and who must repent.

Peripherally, one may note (1) the inclusion of an Autolycus in Lapidoth, whose stealing from his own children is less than amusing but whose inability to resist taking Daniel's ring provides the

one really comic scene in the novel; (2) the inclusion in Mirah and Daniel of a pair of young lovers whose union is impeded by a series of obstacles; and (3) the employment of a certain number of somewhat improbable or coincidental events, such as the presence of both Daniel and Gwendolen in Genoa at the critical point in each life, coincidences to which critics have objected. Yet, Frye reminds us, "Unlikely conversions, miraculous transformations, and providential assistance are inseparable from comedy" (Frye, p. 170). The traditional happy ending in the marriage of Daniel and Mirah is in keeping with both romance and comedy, for a new order is suggested in their going to the East to build a new nation assuring freedom and cultural development for the Jews. Gwendolen's "ending" is much more muted, if not triumphantly happy, for she is rid of a hateful and hated spouse and she is learning to come to terms with her guilt of complicity in Grandcourt's drowning. She is beginning to triumph over her disease of egoism.

By exploiting conventions to be found in these three mythoi, Eliot dramatizes the Feuerbachian theme -- "the immediate nature of man," "the treasure hid in man" (EC, p. xlii). Like Feuerbach, she presents both the positive and the negative, the essence and the contradiction, the development and the contest, in its distinctive way, within a strikingly new unity amid diversity.

Chapter IV: A Feuerbachian Unholy Trinity -- Distortions of Reason, Will, and Love

To flesh out her innovative structure, Eliot chose a wide variety of recurrent images and motifs which both unify structure and underscore her thematic intentions in a subtle substitute for the authorial voice. As Feuerbach warned, the negative, the unhuman, must be exposed. In the novel, three major groups of images and motifs expose the way deficiencies of will, love, and reason may arrest or inhibit human development and thus human freedom.

One large cluster of motifs reveals the form that misdirection of will may take. The individual is driven to dominate and control others, even to imprison them, in an attempt to satisfy an overmastering will. Ironically, as the individual tries to fulfill this craving, he or she succeeds only in alienating himself or herself from others, thus reducing self-consciousness as well as preventing the growth of species-consciousness. A large subgroup within this cluster has to do with power, empire, ruling, deity, and royalty. The references have positive or negative moral value, indicating the legitimate and the selfish uses to which will-power may be put. As if to suggest that man more habitually uses power to destroy humanness rather than to foster it, the positive references are sporadic, thinly sprinkled; whereas the negative uses cluster thickly around Gwendolen and Grandcourt.

The key to Eliot's own thinking with regard to regalness of

human nature, one of the positive manifestations of will power, and the direction power should take is not made very explicit until rather late (Book VI, Ch. 42) in the novel. Mordecai closes his impassioned speech at the Philosophers' Club with a special plea, actually directed at Daniel: "'Shall man, whose soul is set in the royalty of discernment and resolve, deny his rank and say, I am an onlooker, ask no choice or purpose of me? That is the blasphemy of this time. The divine principle of our race is action, choice, resolved memory'" (p. 598). His plea echoes Feuerbach's own admonition that man must not rely on some supernatural force to intervene on his behalf, solve his problems, right his wrongs; he must use the capacities within his own being -- divine in their own right -- to launch the attack on evils and to begin the movement for human melioration.

The second clue appears in the epigraph to Chapter 49, Book VI:

> Ever in his soul
> That larger justice which makes gratitude
> Triumphed above resentment. 'Tis the mark
> Of regal natures, with the wider life,
> And fuller capability of joy: -- (p. 674)

This regal nature is contrasted with the nit-picker who turns goodness into pulp and seeks out causes for resentment, ignoring the worthy intentions toward him. In each case, the truly regal nature is characterized by the wisdom to see the full picture, compassion to understand human weakness in others, and determination to choose and to follow the compassionate course in life. In the scene at the Philosophers' Club and in the epigraph we hear the echo of Feuerbach's human trinity -- reason, love, and will -- as essentials to the being

who would rightly rule.

The negative use of the human power drive appears quite early and continues regularly throughout the courses of Gwendolen's and Grandcourt's lives. Gwendolen is early presented to us as the power-force in her immediate family. Her manner is to command her sisters, her tutor, the housekeeper (who calls her "Royal Highness" behind her back), and even her mother, all of whom feel compelled to defer to her greater sensitivity to the family's financial ruin and removal to Offendene. "Having always been the pet and pride of the household, waited on. . . as if she had been a princess in exile, she naturally found it difficult to think her own pleasure less important than others made it . . ." (p. 53). Her sarcastic conclusion about Offendene is that "'it would do for fallen royalty or any sort of grand poverty'" (p. 54). "Always she was the princess in exile, who in time of famine was to have her breakfast-roll made of the finest bolted flour from the seven thin ears of wheat" (p. 71). The narrator accounts for this deference not merely on the grounds of her beauty but on a certain "decision of will," an "inborn energy of egoistic desire" which expressed itself in confident movements and her "power of inspiring fear as to what she might say or do." (She loved to do or say the very opposite of what others expected.) Though this power becomes severely tarnished over the next year or so, her sisters still look on her as a "goddess" (p. 611) as she trots off to London to live with her new husband.

Gwendolen is early alluded to in supernatural terms. At

Leubronn, she is presented as a "problematic sylph" playing her stakes with firm choice, as Daniel observes from the sidelines (p. 38). Sylph carries the pleasant connotation of a slender graceful female; but Paracelsus warned they were soulless inhabitants of the air. Very shortly thereafter, she appears as a "Nereid in sea-green robes and silver ornaments," a feather fastened in silver from her green hat (p. 40) -- the allusion again suggesting beauty and grace, this time of a sea nymph. Gwendolen as sea-nymph gains her soul through marriage to a mortal man, not from the birth of a child but from a long period of fear and confrontation with her true self. In the promenade to retrieve arrows at the Archery Meet (a sport, notes the narrator, which prompts "attitudes full of grace and power"), she "seemed a Calypso among her nymphs" (p. 134). This image combines the characteristics of the sea nymph and the ruler, and adds a certain sinister quality, for Calypso's talent lay in beguiling. The fourth classical allusion culminates in the most powerful of the comparisons: Sir Hugo calls her a "'gambling beauty,'" "'An uncommonly fine girl, a perfect Diana,'" (p. 199), "'the fair gambler, the Leubronn Diana'" (p. 367). Sir Hugo means the comparison to be flattering, for he admires the way she took both winning and losing with pluck. But the figure of the huntress-queen Diana calls up associations with the hunt (she is an archeress, which recalls Gwendolen's fondness for displaying herself with bow and arrow); with youthful, graceful, even militant virginity; and with coldness of heart. The ambiguity of Diana's relationship with women -- she

is goddess of birth, yet may bring sudden death from sickness to women -- is reflected in Gwendolen's effect on the women in the novel: those related to her fear her power and worship her; those in her social set find no cause for friendship and avoid her, resenting her sarcastic wit. Her posing as St. Cecelia at the organ on the day of her arrival at Offendene (pp. 55, 294) suggests the irony of her real mediocrity as a musician. Moreover, St. Cecelia is also patron saint of the blind, and who more egoistically blind than Gwendolen? The allusions thus may suggest beauty and power on the one hand; but they are double-edged, pointing to the soullessness, the militant chastity and coldness, and the moral blindness inherent in Gwendolen's personality.

This early use of the power-goddess-royalty motif seems merely to convey the disapproving tone of a crochety narrator who wants to take a lovely, conceited girl down a peg or two. But the reference is seen to be a part of Gwendolen's perception of herself. When Rex asks her what she'd like to be, if not a married woman, she fancifully offers among several possibilities "queen in the East" (p. 101). And when they plan the charade, she rejects playing the slave-girl Briseis to play the queen, Hermione of The Winter's Tale. Riding in the forbidden hunt, she completely forgets about Rex on his inadequate horse and rides to the front, "as secure as an immortal goddess, having . . . a core of confidence that no ill luck would happen to her" (p. 103). The line makes the reader recall the opening scene at Leubronn (which takes place chronologically

a year after the events at Offendene) where she envisioned herself as a "goddess of luck" followed by a worshiping cortege; shortly thereafter the reader sees her lose at the gaming table, then learn of the family's loss of fortune. The irony for the reader who later recalls the two references is that she does not learn from her experiences. She continues to hope that somehow things will work out to make her dream of a life of ease and luxury materialize without any price to pay.

But the price to be paid comes disguised as salvation in the form of Grandcourt. The option of becoming submissive to Mrs. Mompert seemed worse than to be "a queen disthroned" (p. 334); she felt like one who discovers his divinity disbelieved in and his homage withdrawn, and himself unable to perform a miracle that would restore the confidence and the divinity. Gwendolen's beauty and "majestic figure" would count for naught as a governess. Just at this terrible moment, Grandcourt's note, which Gwendolen knows will mean a marriage proposal, arrives. "Impossible for Gwendolen not to feel some triumph in a tribute to her power at a time when she was first tasting the bitterness of insignificance: again she seemed to be getting a sort of empire over her own life" (p. 337). She had known he was attracted to her at the Archery Meet where she was conscious of pre-eminence among the other archers. But the narrator undercuts the exhilaration in her pre-eminence by noting that a slave is proud to be bought first, and a barn-door fowl may feel important because of being sold first, not having heard he was the best of a poor lot

(p. 133). As grandcourt persists in his languid manner, Gwendolen thinks of him "as a man over whom she was going to have indefinite power"(her loving him "having never been a question with her") (p. 359). The reader knows, however, that Grandcourt has his own ideas about the nature of this marriage: "his strongest wish was to be completely master of this creature" (p. 346). Yet he pays persistent attention and lets her delude herself that "in this man's homage to her lay the rescue from helpless subjection to an oppressive lot." It is at this point that Grandcourt expresses his proposal arguments in the series of imperatives ("'You will tell me,'" "'You will trust me,'" "'You will give me,'" "'You accept,'" "'You consent'") into whose current Gwendolen drifts because, though she does not come forth with an immediate acceptance, "the sails have been set beforehand" (p. 348). Grandcourt lets her play "at reigning" (p. 361), at one point even letting her wave him past her "with playful imperiousness" (p. 382) that she may speak to Daniel alone. What attracts her to him, though she knows his dark secret, is his "sovereign power of depreciation" (p. 371). He is not disagreeable, not ridiculous, and he always knows what to say.

But just as she had experienced a seizure of irrational terror when the panel revealing the dead face and the fleeing figure had sprung open during the charade with Rex -- a terror she had experienced a few times before when in an open field, a terror at the vastness of the world, at the "immeasurable existence aloof from her" (p. 95), a terror from which she could recover her "usual world

in which her will was of some avail" only by immersing herself with others with whom "she felt the possibility of winning empire" -- so now she felt a terror of committing herself to a relationship which she knew was wrong and which would wrong five other human beings. Now there could be no one to comfort her, as her mamma had comforted the spoiled child who "had been her ruler" (p. 114) when Gwendolen rejected Rex. For the secret could be shared with no one, not even Grandcourt. This time she would face alone the consequences of her choice.

The language suggesting power, which the narrator applies to Gwendolen, is undercut by suggestions of pathetic futility and impotence following Gwendolen's marriage. Daniel speculates what effect marriage to a "'remnant of a human being'" like Grandcourt will have on Gwendolen, so "young, headlong, eager for pleasure, fed with the flattery which makes a lovely girl believe in her divine right to rule" (p. 456). Gwendolen had been "enthroned" (p. 457) at Grandcourt's two manor houses, yet "how quickly might life turn from expectancy to a bitter sense of the irremediable!" Grandcourt has impressed no one with warmth of personality. But, Daniel knows, Gwendolen will not betray any feelings which might indicate she had made a wrong choice. And sure enough, she plays her role in fine style. She gives herself away, however, when Sir Hugo asks whether she thinks there is a disparity in the impecunious Klesmer's marrying the wealthy Catherine Arrowpoint. Daniel has noted that if there is any <u>mésalliance</u>, it is on Klesmer's side, for he is the genius. "'I

have no doubt that Herr Klesmer thinks himself immortal. But I daresay his wife will burn as much incense before him as he requires,' said Gwendolen" (p. 460). The sarcasm is not lost on Daniel. He cannot make up his mind at this point whether to pity her wretchedness of soul or to find in her a demon to match one in Grandcourt.

Gwendolen's reserved manner reveals "her native love of homage, and belief in her own power," but inwardly she feels her illusion of control crumbling: "the poor thing's belief in her power, with her other dreams before marriage, had often to be thrust aside now like the toys of a sick child, which it looks at with dull eyes, and has no heart to play with, however it may try" (p. 467). Eliot's image implies the long period of growth into wisdom Gwendolen faces. The motif is repeated within a few pages: "all her easy arrangement[s] of her future power over her husband to make him do better than he might be inclined to do, were now as futile as the burnt-out lights which set off a child's pageant" (pp. 478-479). Reading Glasher's venomous letter on her wedding night reminding her of her promise not to marry Grandcourt had precipitated "her husband's empire of fear" (p. 479). In the ensuing chapters the newlyweds maintain a reserve unusual even for the English; "their exchange of looks [seemed to Daniel] as cold and official as if it had been a ceremony to keep up a charter" (p. 467). And Gwendolen is resolved that no matter how bitter her marriage may be to her, "she meant to wear the yoke so as not to be pitied" (pp. 479-480). Yet Daniel, and eventually the reader, is moved to pity her. Much later, as she and Grandcourt sail the Mediterranean on his luxurious yacht, she, "enthroned

on her cushions," finds her heart torn by"the terrible fury of moral repulsion and cowed resistance which . . . concentrates the mind in . . . poisonous misery" (p. 733). Grandcourt continues to let her think he doesn't know she knows about Glasher in order to keep her defiance capped.

Grandcourt's drowning smashes any rationale for proud pretense and unleashes her feelings of remorse and guilt. As Daniel advises her to accept the provisions Grandcourt made for her maintenance, he urges her to keep her knowledge to herself and to let her expiation work itself out in kindness to others. With Daniel, "her proud secrecy was disenthroned" (pp. 838-839), and childlike she consents to obey him. In her submission to his greater moral wisdom she shows herself on the path to species-consciousness. At this point, the images and motifs of royalty, power, and domination cease.

Eliot uses the same pattern of motifs at least nine times in connection with Grandcourt. Usually the references underscore his power over others. (The exception is his unwillingness to exert his power to excite rage in Lydia Glasher, whose solicitations once had some power over him and had provided a zest now missing from his life [p. 389].) Yachting was a pastime especially well suited to exerting his control over Gwendolen and to making her feel "she was his to do as he liked with" (p. 732): "its dreamy do-nothing absolutism, unmolested by social demands, suited his disposition." He liked the way the manners of their social class demanded that they not argue openly but maintain a calm facade. Confident in his legal

power to make Gwendolen return (p. 665), "Grandcourt had an intense satisfaction in leading his wife captive after this fashion: it gave their life on a small scale a royal representation and publicity in which everything familiar was got rid of, and everybody must do what was expected of them whatever might be their private protest -- the protest (kept strictly private) adding to the piquancy of despotism" (p. 736). The degree to which this "correct decorum" degrades the human being is suggested by the ensuing paragraph that briefly states Gwendolen dreaded "lest she should become a mother." The final act of despotism Grandcourt indulges in is to badger Gwendolen into agreeing to go sailing off the coast of Genoa. He exults in the admiration cruder sailing men have for his courage; "Moreover, he was ruling that Gwendolen should go with him" (p. 745). She guides the tiller just as he commands. But it is his last occasion to command. When the boat turns about, he is swept into the sea. Absolute power corrupts the ruled as well as the ruler, prohibits the exertion of reason, love, or will that might have saved Grandcourt's life.

Alcharisi has enacted in her life the corrupted power theme in a minor key. In many ways, she is like Gwendolen. She had wanted to be -- and unlike Gwendolen, became -- a "queen" among operatic singers (pp. 697, 702), but a queen unable to pass on her royalty. When she began to sing out of tune, she married the Prince Halm-Eberstein as second best to being the greatest lyric actress of Europe. And she had acted the new part. The affliction to her voice turned out to be a temporary indisposition, but the marriage vows

were permanent. She too has found herself disenthroned as a result of her choices. In her first marriage she knew that she could rule Ephraim (pp. 695-696) and thus defeat her father's will that she be a mere instrument for generation of an heir to his dreams for a free Jewery in Palestine. But her choice is selfish, based on her domination of Ephraim; and when he dies, she easily gives away her tiny son to Sir Hugo that she may continue her career. wonder, then, that when they meet after more than twenty years the kiss of greeting is "something like a greeting between royaltics" (p. 687).

The contrast between their types of royalty is clear by this time: Alcharisi's is the false kind, like Gwendolen's and Grandcourt's based on using others to suit one's pleasure. Daniel's is the kind indicated by Mordecai and the epigraph, that of the larger spirit who sees beyond the fault to discern the good that is left in the human spirit. It is not without purpose that on four occasions (pp. 224, 421, 540, 640) the Meyricks call Daniel Prince Camaralzaman of The Thousand and One Nights. Four other allusions suggest, through Daniel, the kind of power a human being should exert, as opposed to that seen in Gwendolen and Grandcourt. Hans Meyrick thinks of his generous friend as a Gabriel, a being removed from any rivalry or jealousy over Mirah (p. 520). He also compares Daniel to Bouddha who gave himself to feed a famished tigress to save her and her offspring from starving (p. 522). In each case, the effect is somewhat humorous, for Daniel, while flattered, is exasperated Hans cannot see that he too has desires. He labels Hans's compari

"an extreme image of . . . the transmutation of self" (p. 523) in a kindly attempt not to hurt Hans's feelings but to hint to Hans that he is a human being. In a third fanciful comparison, Hans calls Daniel a Hyperion to whom he is a Hesperus. Again, the effect is comic, for while Daniel is on the continent, Hans is busily trying to make progress with Mirah by befriending Mordecai. In each instance there is both the serious implication of the kind of beneficent power Daniel exerts upon those around him and the comic suggestion of Daniel's inability to exert his will on his own behalf with Mirah. It is for Mordecai to make a comparison which assesses Daniel's role in life: "'And if it seems that the erring and unloving wills of men have helped to prepare you, as Moses was prepared, to serve your people the better, that depends on another order than the law which must guide our footsteps. For the evil will of man makes not a people's good except by stirring the righteous will of man; and . . . this is clear -- that a people can be blessed only by having counsellors and a multitude whose will moves in obedience to the laws of justice and love'" (p. 818). Justice -- the product of reason and the will to maintain rightfulness -- and love characterize the kind of power fruitful for human community.

A second large subgroup of images conveying the human drive to control others is found in references to horses and lions. Eliot exploits the common conception of the horse as a large, powerful, magnificent-looking creature which can provide an exhilarating sense of abandon to its rider. Indeed, Rector Gascoigne, Lord Brackenshaw,

and other older men see Gwendolen as "a young race-horse in the paddock among untrimmed ponies and patient hacks" (p. 54), "a high-mettled racer" (p. 134), one with "a high spirit" and "a little too much fire," whose reins must not be held too tightly (p. 111). Poor Rector Gascoigne, as father of two large families, finds himself a little "overcharged with the management of young creatures who were hardly to be held in with bit or bridle" (p. 124). There lies the rub: this large, powerful animal may be brought to obedience by a little six-inch piece of metal and a few leather straps. Eliot uses the less common knowledge of horse-handling to evoke additional ironies in her exposition of the power-drive. Gwendolen internalizes the first group of associations with the horse in her thinking about her relationship with any future husband. He must be one who would let her "mount the chariot and drive the plunging horses herself," a spouse who would just stand by with folded arms and lend his countenance to her control (p. 173). As the proposal from Grandcourt seems imminent, the thought of exercising her power by refusing him "was inspiriting: she had the white reins in her hands again . . . she was going to exercise her power" (pp. 343-344). When, however, he induces her to accept his offer, they walk to the window to look out on the two fine hunters Grandcourt has brought along, "symbols of command and luxury, in delightful contrast with the ugliness of poverty and humiliation" (p. 349). The horses comfort Gwendolen in her rejection of the Momperts and her acceptance of Grandcourt; she doesn't notice they are being led.

Grandcourt has been thinking in the same terms. When Gwendolen fled from him (after her interview with Glasher) to Leubronn, Grandcourt, rather than forgetting her, found his interest piqued: "to be worth his mastering it was proper that she should have some spirit" (p. 195). His greatest pleasure after marriage is mastering her reluctance, for he is the type of man who prefers command to love and enjoys having her "in a temper which would dispose her to fly out if she dared" (p. 645). "She had been brought to accept him in spite of everything -- brought to kneel down like a horse under training for the arena, though she might have an objection to it all the while." "He meant to be master of a woman who would have liked to master him, and who perhaps would have been capable of mastering another man" (p. 365). Acute in detecting what made a "proud and rebellious spirit dumb and helpless before him" (p. 478), he experienced the same delight in psychologically torturing Gwendolen that he had formerly obtained "'in making the dogs and horses quail . . . . It will come to be so with me; and I shall quail' [Gwendolen bitterly tells herself]" (p. 482). Grandcourt, for his part, is satisfied that in public "she answered to the rein." It is a very subtle dramatic irony that Eliot achieves in having each character independently think in the same terms, then in bringing the characters together in the same scene as they continue to employ the horse image.

For Gwendolen the image shifts to reflect her changed perspective of marriage to Grandcourt. After she has accepted his pro-

posal, Gwendolen becomes uncomfortably aware of how much Grandcourt is doing for her in providing a home for Mrs. Davilow: "it was as if she had consented to mount a chariot where another held the reins" (p. 373). She finds she cannot turn back from the commitment, for she hasn't consented in ignorance of Glasher. As she continues to argue with herself over this issue, she convinces herself that what she has done is right, for how can she help what others may do or have done in the past? "The horses in the chariot she had mounted were going at full speed" (p. 381). On her wedding day itself she is aware "that the cord which united her with this lover and which she had hitherto held by the hand, was now being flung over her neck" (pp. 401-402). And as noted earlier, she resolves "to wear the yoke so as not to be pitied" (p. 479). Grandcourt counts on this attitude. In Genoa he feels "perfectly satisfied that he held his wife with bit and bridle" (p. 744). But as any good rider knows, one cannot place "perfect" confidence in the mode of control. The cowed animal may at any time irrationally rebel and throw his master.

Supporting this major use of the horse motif is a secondary association of the horse with escape. While Gwendolen thinks primarily of a horse as an adornment for her social image and a symbol of luxury, she also turns to the creature when decisions press upon her. As Grandcourt slowly edges toward a marriage proposal, Gwendolen's impulse is to canter away from him (p. 172) to postpone the necessity of making a decision. When his note urges her to wear his ring, she determined "to do as she would do if she had started on horseback, and go on with spirit" (p. 357). She uses the hard

gallop to avoid thinking about Glasher: it is a means to regain "the intoxication of youth and to recover the daring with which she had been used to think of her course in life" (pp. 359-360). After marriage, her solution to bearing this miserable existence is to seek "excitements that would carry her through life" in the same way that "a hard gallop carried her through some of the morning hours" (p. 483). The image represents a mental attitude which is the very antithesis of Feuerbach's and Eliot's own approaches to life, for it grasps at un-reason as a solution to problems.

The lion image neatly incorporates the implications of regality, power, and magnificence without any of the negative connotations contained in the horse image. Its major use is to define Julius Klesmer's relation with the British aristocrats around him. To the charade-tableau entertainment which Gwendolen and Rex have planned he has been deliberately invited, although he is only the music tutor to the Arrowpoint heiress and therefore not really one of their set. But he had just told Gwendolen, when she asked his opinion of her drawing-room singing, that she had "'not been well taught,'" produced her notes badly, and chose music "'which expresses a puerile state of culture,'" without any "'sense of the universal'" (p. 79). She had expected, of course, that he would offer the usual compliments. But Klesmer was not impressed by his menial position within society and so made a truthful assessment. Thus, Gwendolen is out to win back his admiration. He comes to the amateur performance, trying to remain non-committal and not to move "his lion

paws lest he should crush a rampant and vociferous mouse" (p. 91). But it is his resounding music which flings open the panel disclosing the terrifying dead face and fleeing figure. Again, at the archery meet he stands out from the ordinary looking English folk, "his mane of hair floating backward in massive inconsistency with the chimney-pot hat. . . . his tall thin figure clad in a way which, not being strictly English, was all the worse for its apparent emphasis of intention" (p. 136). He clearly wants to avoid being confused with this upper class group. The contrast is emphasized during Klesmer's introduction to Grandcourt who stands unmoving "with an impassive face and narrow eyes" (p. 149): Klesmer speaks "with animation -- now stretching out his long fingers horizontally, now pointing downwards with his fore-finger, now folding his arms and tossing his mane" (p. 149). The narrator mentions lastly Grandcourt's "thin whisker," as if to underscore the difference in physical vigor and energy of mind. If the leonine Klesmer puts the aristocracy on the defensive, little Mirah Lapidoth, awaiting her audition, refuses to be caught up in the Meyricks' anxiety. "'I shall not be frightened,' said Mirah. 'If he were like a roaring lion, he only wants me to sing. I shall do what I can '" (p. 524). Experienced on the stages of Europe, she has no fancied reputation to lose.

Whether or not it is intentional, the lion image in two other incidental uses is associated with Jews. The dark-eyed, dark-haired little Cohen children appear to Daniel "looking more Semitic than their parents, as the puppy lions show the spots of far-off pro-

genitors" (p. 440). Alcharisi, speaking of the way Joseph Kalonymos trailed her to Russia to berate her for withholding from Daniel his parentage, found "'This man's words were like lion's teeth upon me'" (p. 702). In the latter case, the leonine associations of strength, tenacity, and courage accurately characterize Joseph Kalonymos's persistence in carrying out his old friend's (Daniel's grandfather's) hopes for Alcharisi's son. Alcharisi herself sees him as a figure of vengeance, punishing her for disobedience to the cultural expectations of a Jewish mother. In the former example, there may be a slight intention of evoking the courage which will be expected of young Jews who will join in the Return.

The dangers inherent in man's drive to dominate others are vividly conveyed by a third large subgroup of images related to imprisonment and slavery, to torture, and to venom or poison. In each case, the victim's will is subjugated to that of the dominator, not by any physical means. But the image suggests that the means actually used are every bit as effective.

The motif of imprisonment permeates the novel rather more widely than others discussed thus far; the majority of uses, however, cluster around Gwendolen. Again, ironic use is made of them. Observing her dreary mother and her imitative, obedient aunt, Mrs. Gascoigne, who took her opinions from her husband (p. 59), Gwendolen has arrived at the conclusion that "to become a wife and wear all the domestic fetters of that condition" (p. 68) was "a vexatious necessity" to be avoided at this time. Still, her vague yearnings for some other

kind of life (she couldn't say what) were "held captive by the ordinary wirework of social forms" (p. 83); "the narrow theatre which life offers to a girl of twenty, who cannot conceive herself as anything else than a lady" did not permit her even to be aware of the "fetters" of decorum which she was condoning (p. 94). The tiny anteroom in which she enacts the tableau, the better to show off her beauty and accomplishments, becomes a clever objective correlative for her status. As the specter of becoming a governess looms large, she changes her mind about marriage, which, she has always admitted, means social promotion for a woman; "there was the reassuring thought that marriage would be the gate into a larger freedom" (p. 183). The reader is aware that nothing in the outer world has occurred to cause this shift; Gwendolen merely hopes it will be so. Once she questions "whether she need take a husband at all -- whether she could not achieve substantiality for herself and know gratified ambition without bondage" (p. 295). She vacillates back and forth. But the Momperts thrice represent a "penitentiary" (pp. 315, 316, 320) of supervision, inspection, and restraint. She accepts relief in marriage to a man whom she thinks to manipulate and to lead.

The image ceases to occur in connection with Gwendolen for a time. When it next appears, Gwendolen, now married, is walking around her drawing-room at Ryelands, "like an imprisoned dumb creature, not recognising herself in the glass panels, not noting any object around her in the painted gilded prison" (p. 651). She has dared to sneak out to visit Mirah and now fears that Grandcourt will learn

about her visit and punish her. On the way to Mirah, she is as heedless of what occurred before she arrived "as one is of lobbies and passages on the way to a court of justice." Grandcourt does find out about her visit, and he does punish her -- without laying a finger on her. He has ordered Lush to disclose to her the ignominious terms of his will. She cannot run out of the room because Grandcourt bars the door; she is forced to feel "The humiliation of standing an obvious prisoner" in her own boudoir (p. 659). The provisions of Grandcourt's will regarding the property and inheritance were obviously "meant as a finish to her humiliation and her thraldom" (p. 663). As Grandcourt's tyranny continues, forcing her into the yachting trip and evoking her unexpressed hatred, she thinks again of running away in Genoa, this time to escape "her worst self" as well (p. 740). She wishes for relief as would "a prisoner that the night wind may blow down the wall of his prison and save him from desperate devices." In her usual manner, she hopes for some chance occurrence to save her from Grandcourt; her reason -- and now her will -- take no active part. When Grandcourt changes his mind about sailing alone because he senses she would be thrilled by a day of freedom to talk with Deronda, she resigns herself to going sailing, the walls of her hotel room becoming "an imprisonment" (p. 744). Cut off from speaking to Daniel and forced to go out in the boat, she felt all the evil wishes for Grandcourt's death come back, she later confesses to Daniel, "'as if I had been locked in a prison . . . and no escape'" (p. 758). She had sat in the boat

"'full of rage -- and I could do nothing but sit there like a galley-slave . . . and the very light about me seemed to hold me a prisoner'" (p. 760). The prison images prepare the reader for her refusal to throw a lifeline when Grandcourt falls overboard. Indeed, one almost rejoices that the monstrosity is dead. The final use of the image with Gwendolen is to emphasize the awakening of her will to improve. Though aware of innuendoes in sending for Daniel, once they are back in England, she will no more forego Daniel's help "than if she had been in prison in danger of being condemned to death" (p. 833). True, it is the wilfulness of desperation, but this time it is exerted in a healing direction. The prison image serves to remind the reader of the very real strictures on a young woman's life, the limitations placed on her ambitions, as well as to reveal the way Gwendolen slowly seals her own bars.

Alcharisi, in her recounting to Daniel her rebellion against her father, complains that Charisi never understood her needs; "'he only thought of fettering me into obedience'" (p. 692) to his aspirations. She hated his discoursing on "Our People," his preoccupation with Israel's past, when what she cared for was the wide world and the acclamation she could win there. His teachings about what she must or must not be "'pressed on me like a frame that got tighter and tighter as I grew. I wanted to live a large life, with freedom to do what every one else did'" (p. 693). Daniel cannot imagine, Alcharisi declares, "'what it is to have a man's force of genius in you, and yet to suffer the slavery of being a girl. To

have a pattern cut out . . . '" into which a Jewish girl must fit. She admired her father, for he was a clever physician and a good man. But he had an iron will, and "'such men turn their wives and daughters into slaves'" (p. 694). Alcharisi determined that she too would have an iron will; her determination lasted until fatal illness turned her thoughts inward and backward to assess the wisdom of her choices. In reviewing her life for Daniel she finds that she, like Gwendolen, has created her own prison in substitute for that she had feared.

Lydia Glasher provides a third example of a person who has helped forge the manacles that bind her. Grandcourt has relegated her to the coal district on his Gadsmere property. In describing the place, the narrator notes the grounds are "guarded by stone lodges which looked like little prisons" (pp. 384-385) and surrounded by rural country, once lovely but now "black with coal-mines" and "peopled by men and brethren . . . with a diabolic complexion," suggesting the hell Lydia finds herself in. Having known Grandcourt far longer than has Gwendolen, she is not too surprised, though no less frustrated and cowed, by Grandcourt's peculiar resistance to her pleas that he not marry Gwendolen: "she felt as absolute a resistance as if her thin fingers had been pushing at a fast-shut iron door" (p. 392). Her rebellion remains suppressed, for he can at any moment cut off support to her and the four illegitimate children. She had chosen to continue the liaison which produced these children, had built the prison brick by brick.

Three characters, in contrast, manage to escape the prisons which would have been imposed on them. Catherine Arrowpoint defies proprieties by obviously hinting to Klesmer that she does not want him to leave their home without her: "'Why should I not marry the man who loves me, if I love him?' said Catherine. To her the effort was something like the leap of a woman from the deck into the lifeboat" (p. 287). When he fears the sacrifice would be too great, she declares, "'I am afraid of nothing but that we should miss the passing of our lives together.'" Each had "willed" the outcome of their decisive words. She finds courage to defy her parents, even when they urge duty upon her (pp. 288-90). Mirah's escape from a miserable life, cut off from friends, from sympathy and pity, and immersed in one garish stage play after another, seemed foiled when, upon reaching England, she found her old neighborhood razed. "'This life seemed to be closing in upon me with a wall of fire -- everywhere there was scorching that made me shrink,'" she tells the Meyricks. But Daniel had delivered her from her own hand. And now her joy in talking with Daniel and the Meyricks was like "having passed from a stifling imprisonment into an exhilarating air which made speech and action a delight" (p. 522). Later, when the pangs of jealousy begin to throb in her breast, she thinks in terms of this image: she reassures herself that Daniel "had no such fetters [placed by Gwendolen] upon him as she had been allowing herself to believe in" (p. 823). The image serves to stress the man-made (or woman-made) bonds a person places upon himself. In Mirah's case, however, the image

ceases to appear, for Daniel's love liberates her from her suspicions.

Of all the characters who suffer imprisonment, Mordecai faces the most impregnable. In the last two years especially he has felt "as one shut up behind bars by the wayside" because he is dying and because no one has understood his idealistic message (pp. 553-554). He has had to work in solitude toward his goal; and before he could change course, consumption prevented, and he felt himself "bound . . . with the iron that eats itself into the soul" (p. 554). He had come to await a replacement "in a state of expectation as sickening as that of a prisoner listening for the delayed deliverance" (p. 578). When Daniel becomes acquainted with him, he frets that someday Daniel may not return when he goes away. "'I am as a man bound and imprisoned through long years,'" he explains (p. 579), and the joy of finding Daniel may be too strong for his weak body. Despite his imprisonment by a fatally diseased body and a society which barely comprehends him, he finds his soul liberated by Daniel's arrival. The narrow room which becomes his lodging may be "'a narrow prison'" to Daniel, but it is no ionger for Mordecai, who is "'straitened for nothing except breath'" (p. 859). Mordecai's manacles have not been mind-forged, and so he can face death in peace and confidence. He believes that his soul will dwell with Daniel's and go forward on its divine mission.

A related group of images exploits the strikingly immediate appeal to sense impressions. References to threat and to physical

torture convey the inward pain one character can inflict on another, sometimes because the inflicter explodes a wish-fulfilling illusion, sometimes because the inflicter wishes to secure his domination. The knife and thong images appear briefly to convey the ultimately positive effects Klesmer and Daniel have on Gwendolen. Klesmer's blunt exposure of the difficulties of becoming an actress and of Gwendolen's inadequacy for the task felt like "a terrible knife-edge" to her pride (p. 299), a "lacerating thong" (p. 307) to her expectations of latent admiration, rather than a morsel of needful truth. Similarly upsetting to her self-confidence is Daniel's way of looking at her, during their discussion of gambling at Leubronn, "with a look so gravely penetrating that it had a keener edge for her than his ironical smile at her losses -- a keener edge than Klesmer's judgment" (p. 376). It is as though a thick shell must be broken through to penetrate the kernel of good Eliot maintained was in every human being.

Not unexpectedly, the majority of such references assist in describing the kind of deadly control Grandcourt wields over Gwendolen. Even at the very beginning of their acquaintance, Gwendolen feels "a wand over her that made her afraid of offending Grandcourt" (p. 158). From then on the images become increasingly more torturous in their implications. Throttling fingers (pp. 481, 626, 651, 669, 733) and assorted instruments of torture -- the iron-boot (p. 392), red heat near a burn (p. 615), handcuff

(p. 645), pincers (p. 649),[1] knife-edge (p. 662), the iron collar which drags a captive (p. 733), and the thumbscrew and the rack (pp. 392, 744) -- bring the reader into a more sympathetic relationship with the "spoiled child" who was so easy to despise in the early part of the book. Grandcourt's tortures, of course, would not have nearly so strong an effect had Gwendolen not shown such an affinity for his depreciatory outlook on life. She too wanted "to lead," to dominate the servants and people whom she perceived to be of lower social order. The soul's metamorphosis from this kind of egoism (which Grandcourt never escapes) is a slow, extremely excruciating growth through suffering. The images create between reader and characters that "community of suffering" which is "the root of pity" (Essays, p. 449).

Still another method by which one creature may control another is that employed by the most loathsome, repellent of creatures, the serpent. The images of reptiles and of their poison or venom are attached to the three characters who most strongly desire to control others. As if to set the stage, the narrator has Gwendolen first appear in the smoky, suffocating gambling room where the gamblers seem to have eaten of a root which restricts the mind to "narrow monotony of action" in "dull"

[1]Mirah, making herself jealous of the time Daniel spends with Gwendolen, is tortured by "the image of Mrs. Grandcourt by Deronda's side . . . as definite as pincers on her flesh" (p. 801).

gas-poisoned absorption" (p. 37). Into this poisoned atmosphere floats Gwendolen, dressed in her sea-green robes, "got . . . up as a sort of serpent, winding her neck about a little more than usual" (p. 40). Her beauty "is a sort of Lamia beauty" (p. 41). She walks "with her usual floating movement . . . attractive to all eyes except those which discerned in them too close a resemblance to the serpent, and objected to the revival of serpent-worship" (p. 47). Her later appearance at the party at Quetcham Hall as "a slim figure floating along in white drapery" (p. 73) calls up the ambiguous beauty others see in her. A number of references to her winding her neck about (pp. 41, 376, 462, 491) maintain the serpentine image; in each case she is winding her neck about either in search of Daniel or turning away from him, like a nervous serpent trying to assess the danger. In Gwendolen's case, the associations with the serpent utilize its characteristics of beauty and sinuous movement. Its dangerousness is latent, de-emphasized.

With Grandcourt the danger is more pronounced, though not yet open. As noted earlier, his physical characteristics are reptilean: he "looked as neutral as an alligator" (p. 195); he has "a will like that of a crab or a boa-constrictor which goes on pinching or crushing without alarm at thunder" (p. 477); he stares at Gwendolen "with his narrow, immovable gaze, as if she were part of the complete yacht" so that she feels no more able to make angry comments to him than to "a dangerous serpent ornamentally coiled in her cabin without invitation" (p. 735). In describing

how Grandcourt will not admit to himself that Gwendolen might refuse his proposal yet will not take the chance of finding that out by proposing, the narrator uses an analogy of our being certain a blind-worm (a European lizard with small eyes) won't bite yet our refusing to handle it because the possibility exists (p. 166). The use of serpent references in connection with Grandcourt perfectly conveys his cold personality, his complete lack of insight into the emotional needs of other human beings, as though he belongs to a completely different genus.

The long-standing victim of Grandcourt's domination manifests the most overt characteristics of the serpent. Repressed by her absolute economic dependence on Grandcourt yet ever hoping that someday he will relent and marry her, Lydia Glasher knows she may not beseech him in any open way, for he would quickly but quietly cut her off. Consequently, "the withheld sting was gathering venom" (p. 387) as she planned part of her attack through Gwendolen. "[S]ome of the stored-up venom" is directed toward turning Gwendolen against the marriage (p. 388); her coordinate plan is to flaunt the children's loveliness "as if it would taunt Grandcourt with his indifference to her and them -- a secret darting of venom" (p. 394). Grandcourt, of course, is impervious to the appeal made through them. Once having failed to divert Gwendolen from her marriage plans, Glasher blights their wedding night with the letter which lays a curse on Gwendolen's happiness. Gwendolen's recognition of the handwriting on the envelope "was as if an adder had lain on them [the diamonds]" (p. 406). "Truly," the narrator

says, "here were poisoned gems, and the poison had entered into this poor young creature" (p. 407). The narrator's comment indicates the way evil spreads from one person to another, the insensitivity and drive to dominate infecting the victim with similar poisonous motives. The heirloom diamonds, once desired symbols of the grand life, become henceforth "poisoned diamonds" (p. 617), with Glasher's "venomous" words (p. 478) "clinging and crawling about them" (p. 480). Possessing "the poisoning skill of a sorceress" (p. 616), Glasher has chosen to sink her "fangs" (p. 504) not into her tormentor but into a weaker victim. Cowed into surreptitious reprisal, Glasher finds one last occasion to torture Gwendolen for marrying Grandcourt: she makes "a Medusa-apparition" in front of the recently-wed couple as they ride in the park, her "vindictiveness and jealousy finding relief in an outlet of venom, though it were as futile as that of a viper already flung to the other side of the hedge" (p. 668). The poison spreads, for Gwendolen is made to realize what happens to a cast-off woman whom society no more pities than it does the serpent beneath its heel. If at one time Gwendolen had viewed the "advantages" of being governess in Bishop Mompert's home "as if he [Gascoigne] had introduced a few snakes "which the ladies regarded as "furnished with poison-bags" (p. 313), she now finds herself in a far worse pit of vipers.

As Eliot frequently does, she uses the image briefly outside the main configuration to show that the characteristic is not reserved to a single kind of character. To reveal how jealousy

is growing in Mirah, the narrator says the thought of any close confidence between Daniel and Gwendolen "stirred the little biting snake that had long lain curled and harmless in Mirah's gentle bosom" (p. 823).

Eliot exploits the association in the human imagination of serpents with demons, hell, and evil in a small group of related images which may utilize both the diabolical denotation as well as the connotation of energy of will. Both meanings are pertinent to Gwendolen, whose occasionally inexplicably cruel behavior and force of personality convey "the undefinable stinging quality -- as it were a trace of demon ancestry" (p. 99). Thrice Daniel perceives something demonic in her as he watches her play roulette (p. 408), exert her charm at a Diplow reception (p. 459), and betray "sick distaste of all things"; he wonders whether "'There may be a demon in her to match the worst husband'" (p. 466). Eliot proceeds to let Gwendolen reveal just what kind of demon does possess her.

Her marriage to Grandcourt, himself associated with Mephistopheles (pp. 511, 658) and an arch-criminal in a "devil's game" (p. 455), evokes in her wishes for his death as the only means of escape from his domination, his diabolical sneers (p. 654), his telling her to "'go to the devil'" if she cannot fill her place properly (p. 503). The unverbalized wishes swarm round her "like a cloud of demon-faces" as they set sail out of Genoa (p. 746). Her plans of evil "would come again and seize her in the night,

like furies preparing the deed that they would straightway avenge" (p. 746). And when the gust of wind strikes Grandcourt, she sees her wish outside herself (p. 761). Her wish has come to be aligned in her imagination with the dead face and fleeing figure in the painted panel at Diplow (pp. 737, 737-738, 753, 755-756, 761); her wish becomes incarnate in the drowned face of Grandcourt. Having returned to Offendene, which she had once viewed as a place of dullness, she looks back on the previous year as "a lure through a long Satanic masquerade, which she had entered on with an intoxicated belief in its disguises" (p. 831). During that time she had come to fear that she might become "one of the evil spirits who were dropping their human mummery and hissing around her with serpent tongues." This culminating image neatly combines the serpent and demon streams of references.

A second large cluster of motifs suggests how a deficiency of love impedes full human development. The cluster includes motifs of madness, lack of sensibility , the statue, constriction (especially the mirror), and thingness. The references deftly reveal Grandcourt's complete inability to empathize with anyone, especially his wife (or "wives"). He fails to comprehend, for example, the frightened and frustrated feelings Lydia Glasher experiences upon learning that he is to marry Gwendolen. Lydia's last feeble hold on him is that she possesses the Grandcourt diamonds, and Grandcourt does not wish to expend any energy in forcing her to return them to him. She insists on giving them to

the new bride herself. But Grandcourt refuses to tell Lydia where they will go after the wedding. "'Of course, if you like, you can play the mad woman,'" he tells her, by coming to the wedding itself (p. 397). Obviously, this she dare not do. So she promises to deliver the diamonds without scandal. "'What is the use of talking to mad people?'" Grandcourt asks himself (p. 398). In this one instance, Grandcourt finds he can "only govern by giving way" for he "had a baffling sense that he had to deal with something like madness" (p. 399). Hysterical women he simply cannot understand.

When Gwendolen loses control after reading Lydia's poisonous letter accompanying the diamonds, Grandcourt wonders if the screaming is "a fit of madness"(p. 407). Later, when Gwendolen wears her turquoise necklace on her arm as a sign to Daniel that she seeks his advice, Grandcourt understands only that it constitutes a kind of indecorous form of communication between them. "'Oblige me in future by not showing whims like a mad woman in a play,'" he commands her (p. 502). Grandcourt has noticed that after her interviews with Daniel Gwendolen becomes more refractory. He fears that this "inward action . . . might become disagreeably outward. Husbands in the old time are known to have suffered from a threatening devoutness in their wives, presenting itself first indistinctly as oddity, and ending in that mild form of lunatic asylum, a nunnery" (p. 656). Such moods must be checked; he will have to make his will known. So amoral is Grandcourt's view of his relationships with Lydia and Gwendolen that he sees no connection between

his repressive domination and the natural human emotional response. Genuine madness might be the only possible escape from his throttling hands. Daniel, in contrast, possesses a nature "too large, too ready to conceive regions beyond his own experience, to rest at once in the easy explanation, 'madness,' whenever a consciousness showed some fulness and conviction where his own was blank" (p. 551). Of all people whom one might reasonably suspect of a touch of madness, Mordecai with his "monomania" for a Return is the logical choice, as Sir Hugo suggests. But Daniel is willing to be patient, to hear him out in full.

Another manifestation of the failure of love in human relationships takes the form of boredom and suppression of emotion. Again, the opening scene strikes a keynote: the gamblers standing around the gaming tables, representing the aristocracy, the merchant class, the middle class, wear "a certain uniform negativeness of expression which had the effect of a mask -- as if they had all eaten of some root that for the time compelled the brains of each to the same narrow monotony of action" (p. 37). Gwendolen first appears among such people. But though professing to be "always bored" (p. 42), she really has to feign boredom, as if in conformity with the expected behavior of her class; her nature is to be inquisitive about life. She finds a supreme model in Grandcourt whose "refined negations" first attract her. He too finds everything "a bore" (pp. 170, 171, 608,609). Their affinity lies in their "critical view of mankind" (p. 734), in their need for an audience to be contemptuous of (p. 646), for admirers of their

distaste (p. 647). Eliot gives a clue to the source of Grandcourt's negation of emotion in the epigraph to Chapter 25: "How trace the why and wherefore in a mind reduced to the barrenness of a fastidious egoism, in which all direct desires are dulled, and have dwindled from motives into a vacillating expectation of motives: a mind made up of moods, where a fitful impulse springs here and there conspicuously rank amid the general weediness? 'Tis a condition apt to befall a life too much at large, unmoulded by the pressure of obligation" (p. 322). Excessive concern with self obviates not only concern for others but ultimately concern for one's own pleasures as well. In the chapter which follows, Grandcourt dawdles on his way home from Leubronn, thus postponing his pursuit of Gwendolen, and refuses to talk about his plans with Lush. Daniel, in a choice of words unusual for him in their violence, views Grandcourt as a "remnant of a human being" whom "one would be tempted to horsewhip . . . for the sake of getting some show of passion into his face and speech" (p. 456). The man evinces no outward emotional behavior because there is no emotion to evince. The narrator, describing Gwendolen's first meeting with him at the archery picnic, notes "it was perhaps not possible for a breathing man wide awake to look less animated" (p. 145). The adjective is especially apt, for its Latin root means not only breath (of life) but soul as well. And who proves himself more soulless, more lacking in human sympathy and love than Grandcourt. Gwendolen learns a bitter lesson in the true psychological condition which manifests itself in boredom: Daniel calls such a frame of mind

"'a disease in ourselves'" (p. 464). In Grandcourt it seems to be a congenital void.

Lapidoth serves as an example of a person who once was capable of feeling love but who has chosen a course in life which slowly but surely eradicated it from his emotional constitution. In his daughter's purse, which he has persuaded her to give him "'to buy a cigar with,'" he finds a worn piece of paper bearing the mother's name, birth, marriage and death dates, and a prayer for Mirah's deliverance from evil. "The father read it, and had a quick vision of his marriage-day, and the bright, unblamed young fellow he was in that time; . . . and very fond of his beautiful bride Sara . . . . Lapidoth had travelled a long way from that young self, and thought of all that this inscription signified with an unemotional memory, which was like the ocular perception of a touch to one who has lost the sense of touch, or like morsels on an untasting palate, having shape and grain, but no flavor" (pp. 810-811). The simile powerfully conveys a kind of sense impression of a mental state afflicting these characters.

References to people as statues imply the emotional petrification which prevents their achieving full human-ness. Gwendolen's choosing to be Hermione as the statue in the last scene of The Winter's Tale is emblematic of her desire to be a kind of art object or ikon to be worshipped. Ironically as the charade nears its climax in which, at the sound of music, Hermione is to step down and embrace Leontes (though, as we recall, Gwendolen changes the ending to having her hem kissed rather than being embraced), Klesmer

strikes the thunderous chord which causes the panel with its dead face and fleeing figure to pop open. Gwendolen utters a piercing cry and looks "like a statue into which a soul of Fear had entered" (p. 91). Though it is only after a period of time that she associates Grandcourt with the dead face and herself with the fleeing figure, she has an uncomfortable fear of this languid man early in their acquaintance. As they climb a little knoll on the Brackenshaw estate, Grandcourt hopes to maneuver Gwendolen into admitting that she wants to be married someday. But Gwendolen is uneasy, unable to make coquettish responses to his comments. She holds up "the folds of her robe like a statue, and giving a harder grasp to the handle of her whip," she continues to parry his pressing questions. The scene recalls the Hermione pose for again emotion is deliberately withheld. There is no hem-kissing here, for she cannot manipulate Grandcourt as she could Rex, and the "dead face," still very much alive, possesses the potential for striking fear in her soul. Indeed her emotions have changed from mere neutrality (she didn't dislike Rex; she simply didn't want to be made love to) to hatred.

A tinge of diffidence tainting her usual intuitive self-confidence prompts her to seek Klesmer's advice about becoming a stage singer-actress. Awaiting his arrival, she contemplates her image in the mirror, "the warm whiteness of her skin set off between her light-brown coronet of hair and her square-cut bodice" (p. 294). The narrator notes: "she might have tempted an artist to try again the Roman trick of a statue in black, white, and tawny marble."

The abrasive interview darkens the tinge of diffidence a few shades deeper. The ironic climax of the use of this image occurs as Gwendolen finishes reading Glasher's poison-letter accompanying the diamonds. Quivering so much she cannot see the multiple reflections of herself in the room's mirrors, she is on the verge of hysteria. Yet the observer might not see the quivering, only the reflections "like so many women petrified white" (p. 407). The artful posing she had associated with a statue is gone; fear has petrified her to the core. This petrification was foreshadowed by the two huge, leaning Whispering Stones near which Glasher made her first revelation to Gwendolen about Grandcourt's dark past. The presence of two stones suggests that both women are or will be petrified by disdain for the happiness of others. Thereafter, the image of the statue continues to convey the utter degradation which Gwnedolen has brought upon herself in marrying a man she doesn't love. His sneering reprimands for her unladylike behavior (in attempting to communicate with Daniel) keep her still "like a white image of helplessness" (pp. 503-504), and his forcing her to go sailing in Genoa makes her assume the appearance of impassiveness "like a statue" so that no onlooker may suspect his domination (p. 745). In their farewell interviews with Daniel, Gwendolen looks "like a melancholy statue of the Gwendolen whose laughter had once been so ready when others were grave" (p. 841) or sits "like a statue" when Daniel reveals his plans to leave England for Palestine (p. 876). By these last interviews, the fear-inspiring cause of her petrification is dead; but the effect

lingers on, as if to suggest the deadly consequences of a loveless existence, even for so short a period as a year or two.

The analogy is used briefly to convey the nadir of despair to which Mirah has sunk upon returning to England to find no trace of her mother or her old neighborhood. As Daniel rows along the Thames, singing a sorrowful tune, he looks up to see "an impersonation of the misery he was unconsciously giving voice to": the dark-haired girl by the river's edge wears "a look of immovable, statue-like despair" (p. 227). He does nothing at the moment, but "that pale image of unhappy girlhood" (p. 228) drives him to return to the spot, just in time to save her from drowning. The dreadful withdrawal of emotional ties has temporarily petrified her life drive.

If in Gwendolen and Mirah we see statues carved by inward as well as outward circumstance, in Mordecai we see the carving or shaping influence for good one person may have on another. The simile is used inauspiciously at first: Daniel's initial impression of the consumptive Mordecai, with his "dead yellowish flatness of the flesh," is of "something like an old ivory carving" with the physiognomy of "a prophet of the Exile" (p. 436). He wears the intense expression honed by bodily suffering. Shortly thereafter, the "fine cowled head carved in ivory" (p. 463) hanging over a small table at the Abbey which Gwendolen contemplates subtly contrasts the two important influences on Daniel's life. Already Gwendolen wears "an appealing look of sadness," and the conflict between her appeals and Mordecai's constitutes one of the main themes of the

book, as Carroll has shown ("Unity," pp. 369-380). Daniel himself makes the association between Mordecai and the carved head when in choosing a dressing gown for his friend he selects one "like a Franciscan's brown frock" (p 639). Both he and Mordecai look upon Mordecai as a kind of carver, a mind which will give "the complete ideal shape of that personal duty and citizenship which lay in his [Daniel's] own thoughts like sculptured fragments" (pp. 570-571). Mordecai humbly calls his imperfect explanations of his thought "'the ill-shapen work of the youthful carver who has seen a heavenly pattern, and trembles in imitating the vision'" (p. 821). To this vision Mordecai has dedicated his love and devotion, his will and reason. His body may seem a yellowed carving, but the fire of love for his people burns ardently within.

A large number of references emphasizing the constriction of Gwendolen's vision of life -- the mirror symbol and images pertaining to eyesight -- have already been thoroughly explicated by Brian Swann (pp. 434-445) and will not be repeated here. They convey an exclusion of reality beyond the self.[2] But there are a few others, some of them drawn from Eliot's knowledge of the science of the times, which reveal the inability to move beyond the self into broader relationships. The constriction is both emotional and intellectual. The neighbors in the district of Diplow, for example, delicately avoid discussion of how they feel about the arrival of the

[2]See Bonaparte, pp. 104-105.

Grandcourt heir at his country home out of an habitual reluctance to be open on any subject, "not even on the generation of acids or the destination of fixed stars" (p. 124) for fear of differing from or thinking ill of one another. In preparing the reader for the difference in temperament between Grandcourt and Daniel, the narrator notes that "poetry and romance" may "exist very easily in the same room with the microscope and even in railway carriages: what banishes them is the vacuum in gentlemen and lady passengers. How should all the apparatus of heaven and earth, from the farthest firmament to the tender bosom of the mother who nourished us, make poetry for a mind that has no movements of awe and tenderness, no sense of fellowship which thrills from the near to the distant, and back again from the distant to the near?" (p. 245). Grandcourt has found everything a bore; for Daniel, his saving of Mirah is quite "as heart-stirring as anything that befell Orestes or Rinaldo." Gwendolen, wrestling with her new knowledge of Glasher's existence, rationalizes marrying Grandcourt (whose wealth and position are his primary attractions) on the grounds that she may be able to help Glasher and the children from her position as a wife. "For what could not a woman do when she was married, if she knew how to assert herself? [Gwendolen, of course, assumes she knows how.] Here all was constructive imagination. Gwendolen had about as accurate a conception of marriage -- that is to say, of the mutual influences, demands, duties of man and woman in the state of matrimony -- as she had of magnetic currents and the law of storms" (p. 342). The reader is well aware of the superficial education

Gwendolen has been exposed to. Similarly the analogy of Gwendolen with the lapdog which is "at a loss in framing to itself the motives and adventures of doghood at large" (p. 607) emphasizes her coddled, constricted existence. A simile drawn from optics helps the reader feel how Grandcourt's indifference to Gwendolen's feeble assertion of will acts as an immovable obstruction which stifles her, "like the nightmare of beholding a single form that serves to arrest all passage though the wide country lies open" (p. 744). That Gwendolen's constricted vision continues up to the end of the novel is seen in her single-minded desire to have Daniel by her to help her overcome the terrible experience she has just been through. She does not provide an opportunity for him to tell her about his plans to marry and to carry Mordecai's ideas into fruition: "she no more thinks of the Lapidoths -- the little Jewess and her brother -- as likely to make a difference in her destiny, than of the fermenting political and social leaven which was making a difference in the history of the world. In fact, poor Gwendolen's memory had been stunned, and all outside the lava-lit track of her troubled conscience, and her effort to get deliverance from it, lay for her in dim forgetfulness" (pp. 842-843).

Still another manifestation of failure to love and to sympathize with others' needs is the propensity to turn people into things -- tools or toys -- to be manipulated at one's pleasure. In Klesmer's vehement response to the Philister Bult, who condescendingly notes he knew Klesmer "'had too much talent to be a mere musician'" (p. 284), he explodes: "'A creative artist is no more a

mere musician than a great statesman is a mere politician. We are no ingenious puppets, sir, who live in a box and look out on the world only when it is gaping for amusement.'" It is because of this common conception of the musician that young Daniel is insulted by Sir Hugo's suggestion that he become an operatic singer. He has no wish to be viewed by others "as a wonderful toy" (p. 209). As a public performer Mirah hated being set out "for show at any minute, as if I had been a musical box'" (p. 253). She found no pleasure in the audience's clapping; "'it seemed all very hard and unloving.'" Mirah's coach saw that she could never be that kind of performer, for she has "'no notion of being anybody but herself'"; she will have "'no more face and action than a singing-bird.'" This general attitude of the public pervades the drawing-room audience as well. Daniel finds himself resenting Lady Pentreath's comment on Mirah's lack of "'Jewish impudence'"; Daniel feels on her behalf "an indignant dislike to her being remarked on in a free and easy way, as if she were an imported commodity disdainfully paid for by the fashionable public" (p. 619).

Grandcourt is the master user of others. At their first dinner party, he enters "with nothing less than the best in outward equipment, wife included" (p. 458). And Lush has long accustomed himself to being used; it is a price he is willing to pay. His most ignominious use is his employment as a "medium of communication" about the terms of Grandcourt's will. Lush to Grandcourt's mind "was as much of an implement as a pen and paper" (p. 657).

Children are easy victims of the adult who exploits human beings in disregard of their emotional needs. Alcharisi, we recall, vehemently objected to her father's never thinking of his daughter "'except as an instrument'" (p. 726); and at the close of her own life she says resignedly, "'I have after all been the instrument my father wanted,'" for she has given him a grandson with "'a true Jewish heart.'" Glasher tries to use her son as an instrument to win Grandcourt back to her; Grandcourt uses the same son as a threat against Gwendolen. The narrator achieves a certain wry humor at the end when Sir Hugo, in firm possession of the Mallinger property at Diplow, is happy to leave his estate "to his daughters, or at least -- according to a view of inheritance which had just been strongly impressed on Deronda's imagination -- to take makeshift feminine offspring as intermediate to a satisfactory heir in a grandson" (p. 780). In all the instances save this last one, the habit of using others for one's selfish satisfactions bespeaks an inability to acknowledge their co-humanity, a deficiency of love.

The misdirection of reason is embodied in the gambling motif which appears both literally and metaphorically in the novel. Again, the opening scene in the Leubronn gambling room strikes a major chord. Its suffocating "condenser"atmosphere, inhabited by unfeeling, negative-faced players -- intent solely on the turn of a mechanical wheel, surrendering themselves to impulse, oblivious of the existence of others around them -- foreshadows the deficiencies of will, love, and intellect whose effects will be analyzed in the following eight books. Grandcourt calls the

gambling room a "beastly den," and in truth it is, though the adjective is an insult to the beasts. But it accurately conveys the "snarling dog" mentality which governs the gambler.

The three non-metaphorical uses of the reference fall within plot-action: Gwendolen's "imagining herself an empress of luck " (p. (p. 193), abandoning herself, in a kind of emotional release from the tension of knowing that her suitor has a mistress and illegitimate children, to Lady Luck and then almost gambling away the only memento of her real father, the turquoise necklace which Daniel redeems; the loss of the family fortune by Grapnell and Company whose owners, "having also thought of reigning in the realm of luck" (p. 194), recklessly stake other's lives without care or responsibility for the consequences; and Lapidoth's addiction to gambling which drives his daughter from him and which drives him to seek out his children in hopes of obtaining money to continue his habit. The plot-actions, of course, carry important thematic implications.

Eliot explores the psychological motivations behind gambling and the ramifications that the indulgence in it has on the gambler himself and on society about him. When one gambles, he surrenders himself to impulse; his aim is to gain something for himself at the expense of another's loss, amusing himself all the while. He hopes to win this gain without any intellectual investment, without the exertion of his will or expenditure of his energy. "Roulette," the narrator tells us, "encourages a romantic superstition as to the chances of the game" (p. 48). The gambler projects the responsibility of choice to some force outside himself, to "chance"

or "luck," which constitutes a kind of Providence which, he assumes, will take a personal interest in him as an individual and which will interfere with the usual cosmic processes so that his wishes may be fulfilled.[3] It is obvious that his expectations are unreasoned. It is equally obvious that the wisher or gambler seeks to avoid any responsibility for his choices; he prefers to ignore the possible effects on others because he suffers from an egoistic myopia, an insufficiency of sympathy to envision any effects. "It is well known that in gambling, for example," the narrator says, conveying the tenor of Rector Gascoigne's thinking, "whether of the business or holiday sort, a man who has the strength of mind to leave off when he has only ruined others, is a reformed character" (p. 125). Gascoigne had not heard that Grandcourt gambled, but he did not feel disposed to inquire whether "a landed proprietor with a mixture of noble blood in his veins" gambled, as one might indeed do for a butler or footman. Wealth and title confer the right to ignore the consequences of one's actions: thus the insidious power of money and position.

Gambling serves as a most appropriate symbol of Gwendolen's

[3]Cf. EC, p. 188: "Religion denies, repudiates chance, making everything dependent on God, explaining everything by means of him, but this denial is only apparent; it merely gives chance the name of the divine sovereignty. For the divine will, which, on imcomprehensible grounds, for incomprehensible reasons, that is, speaking plainly, out of groundless, absolute arbitrariness, out of divine caprice, as it were, determines or predestines some to evil and misery, others to good and happiness, has not a single positive characteristic to distinguish it from the power of chance. The mystery of the election of grace is thus the mystery of chance."

kind of mentality. The reference forewarns of her unreasoned expectations, her emotional myopia, her abandonment of will by its appearance in the description of her wedding day: "she had wrought herself up to much the same condition as that in which she stood at the gambling-table when Deronda was looking at her, and she began to lose. There was enjoyment in it: whatever uneasiness a growing conscience had created, was disregarded as an ailment might have been, amidst the gratification of that ambitious vanity and desire for luxury within her which it would take a great deal of slow poisoning to kill" (p. 401). Her agitation initiated by the Glasher affair "was surmounted and thrust down with a sort of exulting defiance as she felt herself standing at the game of life with many eyes upon her, daring everything to win much -- or if to lose, still with éclat and a sense of importance" (p. 402). This gambler's mentality fosters the illusion that "she was entering on a fuller power of managing circumstance," a kind of "intoxication of youthful egoism" of which she is only slightly conscious. That this gambler's mentality is a form of disease is hinted in Eliot's choice of "febrile" to describe the kind of excitement Gwendolen is experiencing (p. 404). Daniel had explained to Gwendolen that he saw gambling as "'a besotting kind of taste, likely to turn into a disease. And, besides, there is something revolting to me in raking a heap of money together, and internally chuckling over it, when others are feeling the loss of it'" (pp. 382-383). Gwendolen chooses to set aside Daniel's compunctions in her decision to marry Grandcourt. And she all too soon is forced to bear "this

last great gambling loss with an air of perfect self-possession" (p. 496), as if she had been "a duke's daughter, or one of the royal princesses," just as she had lightly imagined on her wedding day. Daniel, sensing her unhappiness, pities her, so "'ignorantly rash, hanging all her blind expectations on that remnant of a human being'" (p. 456). She is moved to acknowledge to him that she has gambled again, this time not with a necklace, and has made her "'gain out of another's loss'" (p. 500). Awaiting Lush's revelation of the terms of Grandcourt's will, and knowing now that Grandcourt was aware, at the time of their marriage, that she knew about Glasher and yet married him in spite of that knowledge, she sits in searing humiliation. "It was all a part of that new gambling in which the losing was not simply a minus, but a terrible plus that had never entered into her reckoning" (p. 659). Her unreasoned choice has brought a battalion of troubles she had never envisioned, and the illusion of power and regality has turned to dust.

Gwendolen squandered her innate intellectual capacities by failing to learn more about Grandcourt the man, by refusing to act on what little knowledge she did have (Lydia's example was a potent warning), and by ignoring the causal order. She had failed to recognize

> the presence of undeviating law in the material and moral world -- of that invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of physical science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social organization, our ethics and our religion. It is this invariability of sequence which can alone give value to experience and render education in the true sense possible. The divine yea and nay,

> the seal of prohibition and of sanction, are effectually impressed on human deeds and aspirations, not by means of Greek and Hebrew, but by that inexorable law of consequences, whose evidence is confirmed instead of weakened as the ages advance; and human duty is comprised in the earnest study of this law and patient obedience to its teaching (Essays, p. 31).

She has committed the irresponsibility of involving others in her own misdoings, has failed sympathetically to project herself into their situation.

The benumbing, usurping effect of the gambler's mentality is delineated in Lapidoth, who is so addicted to committing his existence to chance that he will stoop to any depth to continue. "Among the things we may gamble away in a lazy selfish life is the capacity for truth, compunction, or any unselfish regret -- which we may come to long for as one in slow death longs to feel laceration, rather than be conscious of a widening margin where consciousness once was," the narrator explains in conveying the dying faculty of sympathy in Lapidoth (p. 811). "The gambling appetite is more absolutely dominant than bodily hunger" for "the passion for watching chances -- the habitual suspensive pose of the mind in actual or imaginary play -- nullifies the susceptibility to other excitation. In its final, imperious stage, it seems the unjoyous dissipation of demons, seeking diversion on the burning marl of perdition" (p. 843). These images succinctly combine the thematic threads and image groups which give form to Eliot's philosophy. "The imperious gambling desire within him," the narrator continues, ". . . carried on its activity through every other occupation, and made a continuous web of imagination

that held all else in its meshes" (p. 858).

George Levine has noticed how Eliot in her novels makes artistic use of the deterministic position, how she dramatizes it as an aspect of the world rather than a rigid depressing system.[4] Her stress falls not on Calvinistic determinism but on the study of a universe which is "a marvelously complex unit in which all parts are intricately related to each other, where nothing is really isolable and where past and future are both implicit in the present" (Levine, p. 270). It is not surprising that Eliot condemns reliance on chance and emphasizes the need to make careful choices to avoid hurting others. The individual is not a helpless bit of flotsam, dashed about by circumstance; he is capable of exerting will, albeit not always in the direction he may wish, and thus influencing his own development (Levine, pp. 273, 274, 277). The consequences, Bonaparte adds, "are never confined to the agent that caused them . . ." (Bonaparte, pp. 31-32); one doesn't choose for the self alone.

The groups of images, motifs, and metaphorical references convey a quality of "felt thought"[5]; they transmute idea into form to elicit a deeper insight into the causes and manifestations of failures in will, love, and reason. As Feuerbach had stated,

[4]"Determinism and Responsibility in the Works of George Eliot," PMLA, 77 (1962), 279.

[5]The phrase is used by N. N. Feltes in "George Eliot and the Unified Sensibility," PMLA, 79 (March 1964), 136.

one must experience life through the senses as well as through the intellect, if one is to achieve wholeness of soul. The images and motifs discussed above will not let the reader see as he saw in the day of his ignorance.

Chapter V: The Vision of Human Freedom

Eliot, like Feuerbach, knew it was not sufficient to expose the negative, the failures or deficiencies of human beings' exertion of reason, will, and love. The positive as well had to be clearly identified. Again, Eliot was able to create powerful images and metaphorical references to help her readers experience more directly the kind of human development and growth into freedom and responsibility she believed both necessary and possible. Not unexpectedly, she proposes a man of enlarged vision, exerting his reason, will, and love alike in probing the frontiers of knowledge, turning his energies to objectives beneficial to his fellow men, and ever growing in sympathy and understanding for the motives and feelings of those about him. Images and motifs of expansion and development, of increased sensibilities, of widening vistas, of fire, and of vegetative growth and development all assist in delineating this individual.

Through the title character we observe the growth of human capacities into a sense of vocation in behalf of humanity. In his early youth, Daniel finds that his studies must be to him, not ends in themselves, not "instruments of success," but feeders of motive and opinion (p. 293). His reading about men born out of wedlock had precipitated an active interest in his own parentage (p. 205), a hunger not assuaged until years later when he learned the truth from his estranged mother. His was a "meditative yearning after wide knowledge" rather than a desire for prizes in "narrow tracks"

(p. 217). At Cambridge he had made the daring decision to risk hurting Sir Hugo by leaving the university before he graduated so that he could follow out his "inward bent towards comprehension and thoroughness," gain insight into principles rather than learn the mere application of them (p. 220). His plan of preparation is demonstrated during an argument with Sir Hugo, Gwendolen, and Grandcourt over the degree to which the old Abbey should be restored. Sir Hugo and Grandcourt prefer to let the new part look new, the old remain. Otherwise, one would have to import monks howling their litanies to carry out logically a romantic concept of restoration. Daniel demurs: "'It is not the logic of human action, but of a roasting-rack, that must go on to the last turn when it has been wound up.'" One must use a little judgment. "'To delight in doing things because our fathers did them is good if it shuts out nothing better; it enlarges the range of affection -- and affection is the broadest basis of good in life'" (p. 470). He uses the same explanation later with Joseph Kalonymos, who urges that he follow his grandfather's way of thinking. Daniel will honor his grandfather's thinking, but he will not be bound by it; new times demand new solutions.

The breadth of Daniel's intellectual perceptions is matched by depth of emotional sensitivity. His "subdued fervour of sympathy, an activity of imagination on behalf of others" is very nearly a fault prior to his experiences with Gwendolen and with Mordecai, for he "would rather be the calf than the butcher" (p.

218), so undiscriminating is his capacity for sympathy. As noted earlier, he foregoes an opportunity to win a scholarship for himself in order to tutor Hans. He is equally sensitive on his own behalf, because of his questionable background. He is not able to confide his apprehensions about bastardy to anyone in his own social class, where purity of birth and rank are everything, moral and intellectual stature nothing. To him, Mother and Father are sacred words, symbols of one's continuity with the past, of intimate love and sharing. The average man, the narrator speculates, may find such sensibility absurd. But "it must be admitted that many well-proved facts are dark to the average man, even concerning the action of his own heart and the structure of his own retina. A century ago he and all his forefathers had not had the slightest notion of that electric discharge by means of which they had all wagged their tongues mistakenly" (p. 526). As man's knowledge has expanded beyond that time, so a man's sensitivity to emotional claims may advance.

To possess sympathy for others' problems is sometimes considered a weakness, "womanish" in character. Feuerbach and Eliot, however, make clear that both "masculine" and "feminine" characteristics are important to wholeness of soul. Early Christians, feeling the coldness, the distance of their Supreme God, embodied the yearning after the mother, after woman, which is prompted by the heart's need for tender, selfless love, in the figure of Christ the Son. The yearning after the womanly tender heart

could find corresponding expression only in a feminine body" (EC, p. 72). "Love is in and by itself essentially feminine in its nature," Feuerbach continues. "The belief in the love of God is the belief in the feminine principle as divine."

It seems no accident that Eliot is careful to emphasize the kind of balance between masculinity and femininity which Sir Hugo finds a bit mystifying but which Feuerbach would understand quite readily. Deronda, the narrator muses tongue in cheek, "was moved by an affectionateness such as we are apt to call feminine, disposing him to yield in ordinary details, while he had a certain inflexibility of judgement, an independence of opinion, held to be rightfully masculine" (p. 367). In this instance, the characteristic is mentioned to explain how Sir Hugo and Daniel, essentially at variance on many topics, could remain deeply affectionate with one another. The second occasion on which this femininity of character surfaces is in the second interview with Alcharisi. Having exhausted her enfeebled constitution in revealing Daniel's parentage, Alcharisi feels she has finished, has confessed all, and will spare herself further agitation. Yet she has not fulfilled Daniel's deep yearning for a sign of maternal affection, a gesture of remorseful love in parting with her firstborn. Her abrupt ending "made the filial yearning of his life a disappointed pilgrimage to a shrine where there were no longer the symbols of sacredness. It seemed that all the woman lacking in her was present in him . . ." as he asks if he is never to mean anything

to her (p. 723). She gives him the brutal truth, though in a softened tone: no, he is like his grandfather and will carry in his heart a condemnation of what she did in giving him away. When she leaves Genoa, "He allowed himself in his solitude to sob, with perhaps more than a woman's acuteness of compassion, over that woman's life so near to his, and yet so remote" (p. 747). As he has been brought to pity Gwendolen, rather than to despise her coquettishness, can care deeply about her future while loving Mirah, so he can enter into his mother's sufferings and forgive her for what she did. Such a love is "an enfolding of immeasurable cares which yet are better than any joys outside our love" (p. 868); it is a capacity which makes Mirah love Daniel the more, not dread Gwendolen's reliance upon him.

Daniel's "early habit of thinking himself imaginatively into the experiences of others" (p. 570) permits him to keep an open mind about Mordecai, who from all outward appearances is a fanatic rather than a visionary. Mordecai has had a long-standing vision of his successor, his thought rendering itself in vivid images: this man he saw "as one distantly approaching or turning his back towards him, darkly painted against a golden sky . . . a far-stretching scene . . . in wide spaces . . . [beneath] a large sky .... "As he would lean on the parapet of Blackfriar's bridge, gazing meditatively, the breadth and calm of the river, with its long vista half hazy, half luminous, the grand dim masses or tall forms of buildings which were the signs of world-commerce, the oncoming

of boats and barges from the still distance into sound and colour, entered into his mood and blent themselves indistinguishably with his thinking . . . " (p. 530-531). The expansion into time and space which the individual images suggest conveys his perception of the kind of person needed to carry on his ideals. Once having met Daniel in the bookshop, he cannot shake the idea that Daniel is the awaited one, even though Daniel seems not to be a Jew. "It was Daniel now . . . whose figure, never with its back turned, was seen in moments of soothed reverie or soothed dozing, painted on that golden sky which was the doubly blessed symbol of advancing day and of approaching rest" (p. 537). He yearns to drag his dying body to the river, the wide sky, and "the far-reaching vista of bridges" where he can feel comforted and rejoice (p. 537). Later, as Daniel, rowing on the river, debates with himself whether or not to probe the strange Cohen lodger for information about Mirah's family, he looks up to the bridge to see Mordecai. For Mordecai, the moment is one of supreme exultation, for the face lifted up to his was "the face of his visions." Rejoicing "that his inward prophecy was fulfilled," Mordecai feels all "Obstacles, incongrueties" melt away and his soul "flooded by this outward satisfaction of his longing . . . . The prefigured friend had come from the golden background, and had signalled to him . . ." (p. 550). It is as though a sun-god had come to restore health and life to an ailing kingdom; his prophet stands in joyful welcome.

Mordecai's mind, it is true, exemplifies a most unusual kind

of enlargement. But, the narrator cautions, such persons do exist. Their "yearning, conceptions -- nay, traveled conclusions -- continually take the form of images which have a foreshadowing power: the deed they would do starts up before them in complete shape . . .; the event they hunger for or dread rises into vision with a seed-like growth, feeding itself fast on unnumbered impressions. They are not always the less capable of the argumentative process, nor less sane than the commonplace calculators of the market: sometimes it may be that their natures have manifold openings, like the hundred-gated Thebes, where there may naturally be a greater and more miscellaneous inrush than through a narrow beadle-watched portal" (p. 527). Hans Meyrick, ever ready to laugh at his own inferiority, finds Mordecai's "mind . . . so broad that I find my own correct opinions lying in it quite commodiously" (p. 705). Daniel wonders if his own grandfather were not someone like Mordecai. "But were not men of ardent zeal and far-reaching hope everywhere exceptional? -- the men who had visions which, as Mordecai said, were the creators and feeders of the world -- moulding and feeding the more passive life which without them would dwindle and shrivel into the narrow tenacity of insects, unshaken by thoughts beyond the reaches of their antennae" (p. 749). (The allusion to insects reminds us that both Gwendolen and Grandcourt were compared with insects early in the novel [pp. 38, 40, 97, 128, 326].) The passage makes a careful distinction between Mordecai's kind of hoping, based on long study, knowledge of the past, and faith in

human nature, and Gwendolen's kind, founded on nothing but wishful thinking.

If Mordecai possesses a "commodious" mind, he embraces ideas which enlarge the scope of human freedom. At the Philosophers' Club he praises the tenets of Judaism as "'the living fountains of enlarging belief'" (p. 594), in opposition to Pash's estimate of Jewish beliefs as superstitious rubbish. Taking a long view of the development of the Jewish people, he believes "the effect of our separateness will not be completed and have its highest transformation unless our race takes on again the character of a nationality.'" Scattered as they are, the Jews cannot learn from their past, cannot build a more rewarding future. They must unite in hard labor, as under Moses and Ezra, to create that "'organic centre, a heart and brain to watch and guide and execute'" (p. 595). Theirs will be a community "'which carries the culture and the sympathies of every great nation on its bosom.'" This objective is one stage in Mordecai's ultimate vision of unity among all peoples, a vision he had experienced years earlier in Trieste when he felt himself mingled with "'the ocean of human existence, free from all pressure of human bondage'" (p. 601).

The sweep of Mordecai's perceptions is made more emphatic by the use of similar imagery to stress the limitations of Gwendolen's mind. She is terrified by vastnesses of existence beyond herself -- as when Klesmer, asking her to sing something larger, more universal, conjures up a "sudden width of horizon [which] opened

round her small musical performance" (p. 79); or when "solitude in any wide scene impressed her with an undefined feeling of immeasurable existence aloof from her" (pp. 94-95); or when she sometimes found herself frightened to be in a field alone (p. 321). Her superficial education has done nothing to prepare her to see more deeply. As a young girl she has read stories of love affairs whose artificial language made horrors picturesque, even romantic; in the flesh, a real-life liaison -- between Grandcourt and Glasher -- betrays the toying with lives without consideration for consequences (p. 193).

Daniel sees and comes to pity the stunting of Gwendolen's growth toward humanness; he does not view her as lost to society. He advises her to expand her interests beyond the self, to "'the world beyond the small drama of personal desires'" by gaining the knowledge that makes the world worth more (p. 507). Realizing the vague nature of her remorse, he tells her to "'keep your dread fixed on the idea of increasing that remorse'" to meditate on defining the longing or dread, to let fear teach the consequences of things, so that the sensibility becomes a faculty like vision. She earnestly tries to follow his advice. But her recovery will not occur as quickly as her degradation. To be disenthroned from an egoistic world is bound to carry its shocks. When Daniel finally divulges his plans to restore a political existence to the Jews or at least awaken a movement in their minds, she feels the world getting larger around her, and she is bewildered by a "vision

of these wide-stretching purposes in which she felt herself reduced to a mere speck. There comes a terrible moment to many souls when the great movements of the world, the larger destinies of mankind, which have lain aloof in newspapers and other neglected reading, enter like an earthquake into their own lives . . . (p. 875). Gwendolen "was for the first time feeling the pressure of a vast mysterious movement, for the first time being dislodged from her supremacy in her own world, and getting a sense that her horizon was but a dipping onward of an existence with which her own was revolving" (p. 8760). Mordecai has lived joyously with the conception of his own existence melting into that of larger humanity; Gwendolen must learn at least not to fear it.

This theme and images suggesting it are played out in minor instances with Klesmer and Catherine Arrowpoint, both of whom exhibit the ability to reason beyond the immediate circumstance, to love beyond society's expectation. "Klesmer's personality . . . immediately suggested vast areas and a multitudinous audience, and probably they made the usual scenery of his consciousness. . ." (p. 539); he is one of those "who take in a larger sweep than their neighbors are apt to ...." His physical presence makes rooms shrink into closets, others' existence as petty as mice (p. 539). To this man of enlarged perceptions, Catherine offered "not only a continual expectation but a continual sense of fulfillment" of companionship (p. 282). The couple are well matched in intellectual vigor, courage of sympathy, and firmness of will.

Windows, open vistas, and penetrating light offer permutations on the enlargement theme. Gwendolen's looking out through a window, rather than into a mirror, indicates her movement from her egoistic condenser-life to a growing awareness of the consequences of her choices on others' lives. When she first indicates to Daniel that she submits her mind to his rebuke, she is looking out a window in the gallery, pressing her brow to the pane as if to convey the intensity of her guilt feelings (p. 500). Similarly, in Genoa following Grandcourt's drowning, she again confesses how she wronged another as she sits by an open window (p. 763). Back in London she looks toward the window "as if at some imagined prospect," wondering if the best she can do for her family is merely to be with them at Offendene (p. 839). The images indicate her reaching out beyond herself, her concern for others beyond her own personal concerns. The light images support the same theme. Daniel encourages her to "take the present suffering as a painful letting in of light" (p. 508), an exposure of her misdeeds, true, but a revelation of new directions in which to turn her abilities. When she momentarily loses faith in Daniel because of Grandcourt's innuendo that some kind of sordid relationship exists between Daniel and his protegee Mirah, "Suddenly from the grey sombre morning there came a stream of sunshine, wrapping her in warmth and light where she sat in stony stillness" (p. 650). Her reason tells her that Grandcourt has no evidence whatsoever to substantiate his conclusions. She resolves to talk with Mirah to determine for herself the nature

of Daniel's relationship with the little singer. She refuses to let Grandcourt -- whom the narrator likens to "a piece of yellow and wavy glass that distorts form and makes color an affliction" (p. 736) -- be her sole window on the world. That her affections for her once-scorned family have been kindled by her suffering and by Daniel's advice is indicated by the joy she feels in her short-lived hope of staying with her mother while Grandcourt goes yachting on the Mediterranean, "the new sudden possibility of peace and affection filling her mind like a burst of morning light" (p. 674). Eliot's use of this very familiar image cluster in connection with Gwendolen relieves the pessimism with which the book, to some readers, concludes.

Similar images are used to convey Daniel's growth from his aloof, unparticipated life into greater communication and a sense of vocation. The author uses it for a subtly humorous effect in commenting on Daniel's rather priggish conflict about whether he should tell Mirah he has found her brother if that brother should prove to be a mercenary pawnbroker like Ezra Cohen: shall he "determine the best consequences by concealment, or . . . brave other consequences for the sake of that openness which is the sweet fresh air of our moral life" (p. 445)? Knowing his propensity for truth as opposed to illusion, the reader understands from the image what his decision will be.

In a quiet repetition of the sun-god analogy, the narrator conveys Gwendolen's gratification, upon hearing from Mirah the

nature of Daniel's kindness, that Daniel is no more like Grandcourt's description of him "than the morning in the horizon was like the morning mixed with the street gas" (p. 653). This new perception comes to her as fresh water to one parched with thirst.

The open window by which Gwendolen arrives at new insights conveys the same change in Daniel as he struggles with his compunctions about Mordecai's faith in his being Jewish and his importance to the Jewish people. Waiting the arrival of his mother, he gazes from his hotel window, night after night, into the darkness of sea and heavens, standing still as time rolls past him as if in breathless expectation of some determining force in his life. His will conquers his sense of disappointment, and he finds himself attracted to a future of devoted service in whatever form it may come, the "blending of a complete personal love in one current with a larger duty" (p. 685). The same image is used in connection with his sense of "a new opening towards the future" occasioned by the revelation of his Jewish birth, which "inevitably shed new lights" on past and present (p. 709). He can now begin to hold realistic hopes of winning Mirah's heart, and he will both gratify Mordecai's expectations and fulfill his own dreams of a meaningful vocation. A negative outcome of his interview with his mother is also conveyed by means of the same image. When Alcharisi refuses to lie and say she loves, or ever loved, her firstborn, Daniel is "conscious of a disappointed yearning -- a shutting out for ever from long early vistas of affectionate imagination" (pp. 703-704).

But this illusion of maternal love was just that; it had been built on no objective evidence but merely on the typical wish of a small child.

Images drawn from the vegetative world of growth and development convey Eliot's thoughts concerning the development of ideals, the continuity of influences through time, the interconnections within the human community, the forces for human growth. Ironically, the man who is physically dying is the one who most frequently employs these images of seed and sowing, growth and nurturing, interconnection, and harvest. Mordecai holds the boldest hopes for the future and the most passionate reverence for the past. With the power of the visionary, he perceives -- and rejoices in -- the simultaneity of sowing and reaping constantly in operation in human experience, even within the individual human life (p. 879). He thinks of himself in these terms, he conceives of his successor in these terms. Struggling to explain to Daniel how his being Jewish accounts for his idealistic fervour, he wants to make clear that he is not "'an ignorant dreamer...thinking ancient thoughts anew and not knowing them ancient'" (p. 554). He is also an Englishman; but England "is but as a breaking pot of earth around the fruit-bearing tree, whose seed might make the desert rejoice" (pp. 554-555); in England he hopes to find "a rooting-place where the planters despair" (p. 556). He had planned, by his studies in Europe, to prepare himself to be a leader. But his father's desertion of his family and the ensuing consumption

forever blocked his dream for himself. Instead, he became caught up in substitute yearnings which rose before him into vision "with a seed-like growth" (p. 527) until he came to envision his successor as a man even more ample than the Cabbalists' second soul, an "expanded, prolonged self," a man "who would be a blooming human life, ready to incorporate all that was worthiest in an existence whose visible, palpable part was burning itself fast away" (p. 530). These expectations of his heart "seemed to him too precious, too closely inwoven with the growth of things not to have a further destiny." In Daniel Mordecai foresees his life will "'be planted afresh; it will grow. You will take the inheritance; it has been gathering for ages'" (p. 557). Though Daniel holds back because of his ignorance of his parentage, Mordecai confidently affirms Daniel's relationship with him: "'Have we not from the first touched each other with invisible fibres -- have we not quivered together like the leaves from a common stem with stirrings from a common root?'" (p. 633). And Daniel has to admit that he has found himself strangely wrought upon by this intense Jew.

The men in the Philosophers' Club, Mordecai tells them, are faintly like the Great Transmitters who "'saved the soul of Israel alive as a seed among the tombs'" (p. 580); but that seed lies ungerminated for lack of commitment. Out of the "'weed of the wilderness,'" Mordecai declares, came a great nation which mingled their religion and law and moral life to make "'one growth'" -- "'a people who kept and enlarged their spiritual store

at the very time when they were hunted with a hatred as fierce as the forest-fires that chase the wild beast from his covert'" (p. 590). So now, someone burning with the same passion of dedication, he feels, must light the "'torch of visible community'" (p. 596) for men like Pash and Gideon, must be a "'seed of fire'" to leaven the latent power beating in Jewish pulses. The past has taught him that "'The native spirit of our tradition was not to stand still, but to use records as a seed, and draw out the compressed virtues of law and prophecy'" (p. 591). Today's Jews, Mordecai's language emphasizes, must be made to recall their proud heritage; it will require a man of superior intellect, sympathy, and will-power to do it.

Mordecai believes that in a new Israel men will see "'a new unfolding of life whereof the seed is more perfect'" by virtue of Jews' learning from and mixing with other cultures in their dispersion. "'The life of a people grows, it is knit together and yet expanded, in joy and sorrow, in thought and action; it absorbs the thought of other nations into its own forms, and gives back the thought as new wealth to the world'" (p. 585). The man who shares with Mordecai this hopeful interpretation of Israel's past suffering and its future, of an Israel benefited, as it were, by a kind of hydbridization with the cultures of other nations, will be "'as a seed of fire that may enkindle the souls of multitudes, and make a new pathway for events'" (p. 586). Such a man will share Mordecai's dream of universal unity; one man's enlarged vision will

leaven the visions of others, and so on. "'The world grows, and its frame is knit together by the growing soul . . . . As thoughts move within us darkly, and shake us before they are fully discerned -- so events -- so beings: they are knit with us in the growth of the world'" (p. 559). As men grow more rational under such enlarged leadership, they too will "'see more and more of the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change as a dependent growth -- yea, consecrate it with kinship: the past becomes my parent, and the future stretches towards me the appealing arms of children'" (p. 587). For such a leader, for such followers, "'the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice'" (p. 598). "'The Messianic time is the time when Israel shall will the planting of the national ensign,'" he prophesies. Thus Daniel and the other "philosophers" are to realize that God will not intervene to make it happen; they must exert their sacred reason, will, and love to make it happen.

As if to signal that Daniel is unconsciously accepting Mordecai's charge, the same images begin to appear in connection with Daniel's thinking and actions. During the interview with Alcharisi Daniel waxes indignant that she betrayed his grandfather by marrying Ephraim, then going her own way without dedicating her son to the grandfather's ideals. But the grandfather has triumphed in spite of her. Daniel Charisi's trust "'is the expression of something stronger, with deeper, farther-spreading roots, knit into the foundations of sacredness for all men'" (p. 727). That Something, whatever it be, has turned his feet into Charisi's pathway

after all. Alcharisi sees that if she had kept Daniel with her, they would never have been at peace, for the boy would have been the grandfather incarnated, "'young growth from the old root'" (p. 730). Joseph Kalonymos thinks of Charisi in terms of a growing plant: he tries to explain that Charisi was not narrowly learned but drank up learning "'as easily as the plant sucks up water'" (p. 791). The image achieves a subtle parallel between Charisi and Mordecai, who also studied widely and absorbed past wisdom as naturally as a plant draws up water. When Daniel mentally visits the synagogue in Genoa, he imagines faces "probably little different from those of his grandfather's time, and [imaginatively] heard the Spanish-Hebrew liturgy which had lasted through the seasons of wandering generations like a plant with wandering seed that gives the far-off lands a kinship to the exile's home" (p. 748). Mordecai's thinking has lent its cast to Daniel's. When he advises Gwendolen to act as if she owed life a debt and to find newly opened needs, he says: "'You will find your life growing like a plant'" (p. 839). The simile carries a heavy freight of meaning by this time. Life, like the plant, must root deeply in the past for nourishment, must spread its stalk and leaves widely in the rain and sun to be fruitful.

The compatibility of Daniel's and Mordecai's minds is foreshadowed by the image early in the novel when Daniel sees Mirah's naturalness and simplicity: "she had grown up in her simplicity and truthfulness like a little flower-seed that absorbs the chance

confusion of its surroundings into its own definite mould of beauty" (p. 266). The narrator is trying to convey the novelty of Mirah's kind of womanhood in Daniel's sophisticated world. Much later when, having learned of his Jewishness, he feels ready to acknowledge his love for Mirah, the narrator again uses the image: Daniel had "kept all the language of passion fresh and rooted as the lovely leafage about the hillside spring" (p. 823). Passion, we had been told, "is of the nature of seed, and finds nourishment within," tending to predominate and make the whole life its tributary.

As she occasionally does, Eliot uses the image in a humorous way, in this case to prepare for the true visionary Mordecai and the major use of the image. Hans, the minor artist-visionary, speaks hyperbolically of his expectations of becoming a great painter: "'The seed of immortality has sprouted within me'" (p. 512). Daniel drolly responds, "'Only a fungoid growth, I daresay -- a crowing disease in the lungs.'" It is for Mordecai to explicate the real meaning of immortality in one's influence on his contemporaries and posterity.

In a permutation of the plant image, women are compared to flowers in order to permit an unobtrusive contrast between Gwendolen and Mirah. In both cases, the beauty of the woman is stressed. Gwendolen and her aristocratic friends are called "Flower-groups of ladies" bowing and turning their necks "like leisurely lilies" (p. 132); Gwendolen arises on the morning of the day of revelation

from Glasher, "lovely and vigorous as a tall, newly-opened lily" (p. 181). In like manner Mirah is a rose whose sweet odor several bees (Hans and Daniel) take as a sign of personal attachment (p. 547), "a freshly opened flower from among the dewy tresses of the woodland" (p. 799), "a dark-tipped yet delicate ivory-tinted flower in the warm sunlight of content" (p. 880), a woman on whom cheap clothing "seemed an adornment as choice as the sheaths of buds" (p. 249). The portrait of Mirah built up by these lovely images is never marred by more sinister references as is Gwendolen's. The "rejuvenating" effect which the thought of refusing Grandcourt's offer has on Gwendolen's depressed state is shown in a "firm poise of head and elasticity of form which had lately been missing as in a parched plant" (p. 341). Indeed, her need for the water of communion becomes more urgent after marriage. Unlike Mirah, who takes circumstances as they come and makes the best of them, she rationalizes her do-nothing existence by an analogy with flowers: "'We women can't go in search of adventures . . . . We must stay where we grow, or where the gardeners like to transplant us. We are brought up like the flowers, to look as pretty as we can, and be dull without complaining. That is my notion about the plants: they are often bored, and that is the reason why some of them have got poisonous'" (p. 171). There is an element of truth to her defense; her statement characterizes the usual upbringing of an upper class young woman.

Again, Hans offers an example of the humorous use of the

vegetative image. When Mirah shows little response to his attentions, and his artistic career shows little evidence of reaching immortal heights, he takes briefly to opium because "the world began to look seedy -- a sort of cabbage-garden with all the cabbages cut" (p. 853). Though such an image shows that Hans's nature "was not one in which love could strike the deep roots that turn disappointment into sorrow," still it makes him lovable as a character and injects a touch of humor into a predominantly serious novel.

Terminology and images drawn from Christian myth, Christian creed, doctrine, and practice share importarce with the image of the enlarged vision to show how "The fundamental faith for man is faith in the result of a brave, honest, and steady use of all his faculties. . ." (Essays, p. 189); how man can be the loving agent for his own and his brother's salvation from life-destroying forces within and without his psyche; how man can fruitfully act upon his responsibility to his forbears, his contemporaries, his posterity. What Feuerbach and Eliot attempted to do, essentially, was to revive the Christian message of brotherly love pruned of its Christian exdusivity and partisanship occasioned by the rigid demand that a person must believe in a certain way and accept certain myths to be worthy of love. "I believe," Eliot wrote to Harriet Beecher Stowe in 1869, "that religion too has to be modified . . . and that a religion more perfect than any yet prevalent, must express less care for personal consolation, and a more deeply-awing

sense of responsibility to man, springing from sympathy with that which of all things is most certainly known to us, the difficulty of the human lot" (L, V, 31).[1] If, as Feuerbach claimed, "Religion is human nature reflected, mirrored in itself" (EC, p. 63), then indeed the time has come to turn from the mirror and the reflections to the reality alive and throbbing in the human breast.

The references drawn from the Christian religion cluster heavily around Daniel and Mordecai to convey the very sympathy with and sense of responsibility for the sufferers about them which Eliot and Feuerbach deemed essential. As noted in earlier passages, Daniel is associated with the figure of Christ in his predisposition to sacrifice his own requirements to those of others (pp. 218, 222-223). Feuerbach had explained that Christ is an image by which the popular consciousness figures to itself the concept of unity of species; "Christ is the love of mankind to itself embodied in an image . . ." (EC, p. 268). "He therefore who loves man for the sake of man, who rises to the love of the species, to universal love, adequate to the nature of the species, he is a Christian, is Christ himself. He does what Christ did . . ." (p. 269). To love the species, one must first love its individual erring members, regardless of their failures; one must see the

[1]George Henry Lewes shared her view: "I profoundly agree with him [Matthew Arnold] that righteousness is salvation--and is not to be sought in metaphysical refinements about a 'personal God' but is to be found in our idealization of human relations and human needs" (L, VI, 87).

virtue beneath the stain (EC, p. 257). And one must be able to feel with them the struggles and conflicts that drive them to hurt others. Feuerbach tries to identify the motives behind the person with such a power of sympathy:

> And out of the heart, out of the inward impulse to do good, to live and die for man, out of the divine instinct of benevolence which desires to make all happy, and excludes none, not even the most abandoned and abject, out of the moral duty of benevolence in the highest sense, as having become an inward necessity, i.e., a movement of the heart,--out of the human nature, therefore, as it reveals itself through the heart, has sprung what is best, what is true in Christianity--its essence purified from theological dogmas and contradictions (EC, p. 60).

Such a man "who suffers for others, who lays down his life for them, acts divinely, is a God to men."

In contrast to Gwendolen, who does not want to be near someone she feels is less virtuous than herself (Lush, Glasher), Daniel comes to see that the despised one's need for pity (here, Gwendolen's need) must take precedence over his own inclination to stay at a distance in order to avoid what he initially feels is the embarrassment of flirtation with a married woman. Daniel first emerges as redeemer when he redeems Gwendolen's necklace from the pawnshop in Leubronn, thus shaming her from further gambling (p. 370). Hans has been made aware of Daniel's predilection for rescuing people, "telling upon their lives with some sort of redeeming influence" (p. 369), in the case of his studying for the scholarship. Hans had felt the "strong sheltering wings" of Daniel's friendship (p. 222), the holy spirit of human comfort. Daniel's literal rescue of Mirah from the Thames restores her faith, for his caring about her, though a stranger, convinces her

she is not forsaken (p. 264). He becomes to her "a divinely-sent messenger" (p. 522). Mrs. Meyrick shares with her the joy she feels in "her salvation" (p. 265). Mirah's faith, restored by Daniel, is based on objective evidence; Mrs. Davilow's faith in Gwendolen, however, is based on subjective wishing. When they lose their fortune, Mrs. Davilow merely hopes that somehow, despite Gwendolen's ignorance of practical matters, Gwendolen's will and daring will result in a plan to extricate them from poverty. It cannot reasonably be expected.

Daniel's relationship with Gwendolen initially takes the form of curiosity, for he is attracted by the plight of a woman who marries the very person from whom she has fled. As he senses her terrible unhappiness behind the bravado and puts aside his prudish reservations, he detects "the struggle of mind attending a conscious error [which] had wakened something like a new soul" with greater potentialities for good or ill (p. 378). She in turn is aware of something more solid in him which does not respond to her usual charming behavior. Gradually, she ceases to resent his failure to admire her and makes of him "an object of reverential belief" because of his stern but gentle condemnation of her careless gambling and marriage: "in some mysterious way he was becoming a part of her conscience" (p. 468). "My fellow-man," Feuerbach had written, "is my objective conscience; he makes my failings a reproach to me . . . he is my personified feeling of shame" (EC, p. 158). Thus Daniel, through loving his erring fellow, helps Gwendolen clarify tangling issues of right and wrong and expands

her self-consciousness (cf. EC, p. 82). His physical presence is more effectual than some theological caveat. The narrator muses:

> Would her remorse have maintained its power within her, or would she have felt absolved by secrecy if it had not been for that outer conscience which was made for her by Deronda? It is hard to say how much we could forgive ourselves if we were secure from judgment by an other . . . who brings to us with close pressure and immediate sequence that judgment of the Invisible and Universal which self-flattery and the world's tolerance would easily melt and disperse. In this way our brother may be in the stead of God to us, and his opinion which has pierced even to the joints and marrow, may be our virtue in the making (pp. 832-833).

Gwendolen looks to Daniel to give her "a new footing," a safeguard against retribution (p. 484). As she begins to realize the extent of damage she has incurred in marrying Grandcourt, she undergoes a "change in mental poise which has been fitly named conversion" occasioned by "revelation," not from heaven or earth, but in the form of a human being who evokes a peculiar response in the offender (p. 484). Daniel's influence merges with "the current of that self-suspicion and self-blame which awakens a new consciousness" (p. 485). Her need for confession and repentance have turned Daniel "into a priest" without the aid of sacred ceremony or costume (p. 485), "a terrible-browed angel" from whom there could be no concealment (p. 737). Sir Hugo was unwittingly prophetic when he teased Daniel about the tender way Daniel looked at women and talked to them "in a Jesuitical way" (p. 409). In Gwendolen's "ideal consecration," in her reliance upon Daniel, a mutually educating effect is being prepared. For the recipient of "Young reverence" feels the coercion more than the bestower of that reverence (p. 485).

While Daniel wants to help Gwendolen, he "dreaded hearing her confession," for "he was not a priest. He dreaded the weight of this woman's soul flung upon his own with imploring dependence" (p. 754). He feels powerless to make any real change in her life, and her claims on him conflict with Mordecai's. "It was as if he had a vision of himself besought with outstretched arms and cries, while he was caught by the waves and compelled to mount the vessel bound for a far-off coast" (p. 625). Robinson, in her destructive criticism of the novel,[2] points to this and similar images (pp. 839, 841) to support her claim that Deronda is the completely ineffectual Feuerbachian hero. She ignores, however, the culminating image of the little sequence that occurs very nearly at the end, during the interview in which Daniel tells Gwendolen he is going to marry Mirah. Gwendolen stretches her arms out straight and wails that she has been a cruel woman and is therefore being forsaken. Without hesitation Daniel "seized her outstretched hands and held them together and kneeled at her feet" (p. 877). Mordecai had used the image of pleading arms to convey man's insensitivity to others; "'We are all of us denying or fulfilling prayers -- and men in their careless deeds walk amidst invisible outstretched arms and pleadings made in vain'" (p. 638). Daniel is determined that, whatever emotional cost to himself, he will respond to this woman's deep need. His heart has heard the cry of another heart's affliction.

[2]See Chapter III, n. 9.

Gwendolen's cry issues forth from within the "purgatory" of her own soul (p. 733). Used to "easy penances" in her youth (p. 53), she learns that she cannot make restitution for what she has done to Glasher and the children. Position, freedom within marriage, deliverance from dull insignificance "had come to her hunger like food with the taint of sacrilege upon it" (p. 356). The glory is entirely illusory; the reality is poison to her being. Thus she clutches tenaciously "her recovered faith" in Daniel, in the face of Grandcourt's sneering insinuations (p. 655), as a person who will not despise her but who will open new pathways. Daniel reveals "the higher, the religious life" as "a region in which the affections are clad with knowledge," as a region in which one moves beyond the constricted world of personal vanity to the larger world where so much remains to be done (pp. 507-508).

It is Daniel's faith in her redeemability that sustains her during her weeks of remorseful despair. That very remorse at wishing Grandcourt dead is to Daniel a sign of "a recoverable nature; it was the culmination of that self-disapproval which had been the awakening of a new life within her" (p. 762). It may seem cruel that Daniel does not try to assuage her misery by saying her wishing didn't really matter. He chooses not "to diminish that sacred aversion to her worse self -- that thorn pressure which must come with the crowning of the sorrowful Better, suffering because of the Worse." The purging must be complete, not merely palliative.

As Gwendolen had identified Daniel with her conscience, so she identifies him "with that struggling regenerative process in her which had begun with his action [of redeeming the necklace and urging her not to repeat her gambling]" (p. 841). With his emotional support, she feels as if she has been touched by "a miraculous hand" (p. 840), as if new life and new powers have streamed into her frame, portending a "new existence" (p. 480). The new existence is not an instantaneous metamorphosis of the nature of a miracle, which both Feuerbach and Eliot deplored as a selfish, unrealistic subjective hope. Rather, it is a slow, regenerative process, like the healing of a severe wound. Gwendolen's renunciation of demands for self, her being satisfied with daily routine upon her return to Offendene, bring a "peaceful melancholy which comes from the renunciation of demands for self, and from taking the ordinary good of existence . . . as a gift above expectation" (p. 866). Each small indication of "pure fellow-feeling," of "generous impulse" furthers her "salvation," promotes a kind of "habitual feeling of rescue."

The concepts of redemption and salvation apply in very different senses to Mordecai. The occasion of their meeting at the pawnshop where Daniel has left his ring acquires symbolic import. On the surface, Mordecai is waiting for Daniel to redeem the ring. But in reality he is waiting for the young man to redeem his soul, his sacred cause. The ring presages the intimate bond between the two men's souls, a marriage of wills preceded by a long period

of wooing. It suggests too the permanence of their commitment, extending down from the times of their forefathers and name-bearers into the future of Daniel's and Mirah's children. As Ezekial had called Elisha to his cause, as Ezra had been aided by Daniel,[3] so this modern Ezekial-Ezra -- "'a prophet of God'" to his sister (p. 809), the "frail incorporation of the national consciousness" (p. 575) -- becomes convinced that in Daniel Deronda he has found "a new executive self" (p. 568). The soul of a medieval Jew who had "'yearned toward a centre for our race,'" Mordecai explains, "'was born again within me'" (p. 555). Now, imprisoned within his dying body, it yearns again to be reborn in the body of some intelligent, loving, strongly-willing successor. In Mordecai's intense, selfless dedication to his vision of the Jewish nation, Daniel sees "something more than a grandiose transfiguration of the parental love that toils, renounces, endures, resists the suicidal promptings of despair" (p. 593). He finds in this contemporary Elias what he had sought since age 13: "some revelation that might influence his view of the particular duties belonging to him" (p. 570). Once having resolved the mystery of his parentage, he returns to tell Mordecai his plan "'to try what can be done with that union [of all Jews] . . . to work in your spirit'" (p. 820). In view of his previous reserve and careful avoidance of commitment to Mordecai's ideals, his pledge takes on

[3]Elisha means "God is saviour"; Ezekial had called Daniel the pattern of righteousness and wisdom.

"a sacramental solemnity, both for his own mind and Mordecai's." Mordecai pronounces the benediction to the religious experience that their growing relationship has been:

> "It has begun already -- the marriage of our souls. It waits but the passing away of this body, and then they who are betrothed shall unite in a stricter bond, and what is mine shall be thine. Call nothing mine that I have written, Daniel; for though our Masters delivered rightly that everything should be quoted in the name of him that said it -- and their rule is good -- yet it does not exclude the willing marriage which melts soul into soul, and makes thought fuller as the clear waters are made fuller, where the fulness is inseparable. For I have judged what I have written, and I desire the body that I gave my thought to pass away as this fleshly body will pass; but let the thought be born again from our fuller soul which shall be called yours" (p. 820).

Daniel's Spanish surname means "guard"; Mordecai knows he has found the proper guardian of his vision.

Within the periphery of this sphere of religious references are images of the temple, tabernacle, and chapel, which lightly underscore the philosophical differences between members of Gwendolen's set and Mordecai. In the opening chapters the Archery Hall at Brackenshaw Park "showed like a white temple against the greenery on the northern side" (p. 132). Besides implying an imitative kind of architecture, a form not in harmony with the purpose of the building, the simile suggests a basic perversion of values. Outside this temple (they never enter it) the adherents worship emblems of bloodshed, though now prettified into a sport for the exhibition of "attitudes full of grace and power" (p. 134). Of the archeresses present, the male judges pronounce Gwendolen the finest "tabernacle" (p. 133). The remainder of the novel reveals

just what kind of soul is housed within that lovely exterior. In marked contrast, Mordecai prepared his soul, by long hard study, to be "as a temple of remembrance where the treasures of knowledge enter and the inner sanctuary is hope" (p. 555). The metaphor stresses not exterior loveliness but the quality and purpose of the inner sanctum. The "tabernacle of flesh" which is Mordecai's body (p. 579) lacks the beauty of Gwendolen's but possesses fullness of soul Gwendolen will be long in reaching.

The ruined chapel of The Abbey, each archway housing a horse-stall with stained glass, the hay in racks where saints once looked down from the altar, still has for Daniel "the aspect of antique solemnity" (pp. 472-472), a reminder of past ages when men in monkish robes dedicated themselves in communal effort to ideals. The physical state of the chapel suggests the spiritual state of Englishmen's ideals. Within English society, however, are humble people who cling to humble values. The Meyrick parlor, cluttered as it is with engravings and needlework and drawings, suffused with sunshine and fresh air, is "a temple" where the family members work together, share their economic burdens, love together (p. 249). In the library at Ryelands, where Gwendolen somewhat desperately seeks out Daniel to relieve her burdened conscience by confession, she finds a retreat "as warmly odorous as a private chapel in which the censers had been swinging" (p. 505). It is the human being in the room who lends it sanctity, whose kindness and sympathy impel Gwendolen slowly toward redemption. Daniel's influence on

Gwendolen has demonstrated that "the fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is not man: and that the idea of God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human . . ." (L, VI, 98).

The necessity for man to reach out to his fellow beings, to build I-Thou relationships, as a pre-condition to becoming fully human is stressed by both Feuerbach and by the novel. One can hardly imagine a being reared in isolation from other human beings. Scientists rush to Africa or southern France at the first report of a child reared by animals, for we can not identify as human a being without the characteristics of the species. "Man shapes and understands himself in his relation to other men" (Kamenka, p. 122). Through family, marriage, friendship, and community man expands his consciousness and develops his capacity to reason, to love, and to will.

The early Christians, Feuerbach complained, "rejected the real life of the family, the intimate bond of love which is naturally moral, as an undivine, unheavenly, i.e., in truth, a worthless thing" (EC, p. 70). But having done that they felt a terrible emotional void, which they then proceeded to fill with a heavenly Father, and a Son "who embraced each other with heartfelt love, with that intense love which natural relationship alone inspires." They needed "a God in whom there is society, a union of beings fervently loving each other" (EC, p. 73). Feuerbach urged a

re-sanctification of the natural relationship found in most cultures. Within the Meyrick and Cohen families, between Daniel and Sir Hugo the reader seees the warm human bonds which keep the members afloat despite economic, political, or racial problems. The Meyrick women work hard for miniscule return to keep Hans at the university. Mordecai, well aware of his difference from the Cohens, is devoutly grateful for their care: "'I dwell in their tent as in a sanctuary'" (p. 563). Daniel has long held the names of mother and father sacred. When Sir Hugo discloses that Daniel's mother is still alive and wants to see him, Daniel feels his soul possessed by "a sacramental moment" (p. 676). When his mother does not go on, in her interview with him, to say that she had loved her child, the moment "made the filial yearning of his life a disappointed pilgrimage to a shrine where there were no longer the symbols of sacredness" (p. 723). Such terminology is not used to describe the familial relationships in the Davilow, the Gascoigne, the Charisi, and the Grandcourt families.

The marriage bond, lying at the foundation of the family, provides an intimate view of one human being's dependence on another. "Man and woman are the complement of each other," Feuerbach notes, "and thus united they first present the species, the perfect man" (EC, p. 156). By loving, "man declares himself unsatisfied with his individuality taken by itself, he postulates the existence of another as a need of the heart; he reckons another as part of his own being; he declares the life which he has through

love to be the truly human life . . . ." Love makes the concept of species, which is only an object of the reason, a "truth of feeling." The distinction between man and woman makes the distinction between I and thou "real, living, ardent" (EC, p. 92). Early critics were sensitive to the contrasts among the marriages depicted in the novel. The obvious example of a marriage not founded on love is that of Grandcourt and Gwendolen. Neither partner is capable of detecting the thou to whom the I may give emotional sustenance. Each married the other to fulfill some craving of will, some desire for power. Since marriage is not the best vehicle to satisfy this craving, it comes as no surprise that the marriage fails. Ironically, there must have been a time in the liaison between Grandcourt and Glasher when a kind of love did exist, for Grandcourt is not able to quash this shadow from his past with so ready a hand as he does Gwendolen. (He does not feel he can exert force to make Lydia return the diamonds.) But since no marriage, no real commitment took place, there is no bond to honor, once love has died.

Marriage must be a "free bond of love: for a marriage the bond of which is merely an external restriction, not the voluntary, contented self-restriction of love, in short, a marriage which is not spontaneously concluded, spontaneously willed, self-sufficing, is not a true marriage, and therefore not a truly moral marriage" (EC, p. 271 n.). Gwendolen's is a textbook illustration of the immoral marriage. The marriage between Catherine Arrowpoint and

Klesmer and between Daniel and Mirah shows the living, systolic-diastolic nature of a compatible bond.

Friendship is a second kind of freely willed bond through which man may "become clear to himself and self-conscious" (EC, p. 82). Friendship evokes participation (EC, p. 156) and thus expansion of the consciousness. Mordecai's hopefulness of finding a kindred soul into which to pour "the spiritual product" of his life, his "yearning for transmission" (p. 528), is gratified by the appearance of Daniel at the bookshop. Upon first meeting, "the two men, with as intense a consciousness as if they had been two undeclared lovers," examine each other (p. 552); there, Daniel perceives "a cry from the depths of another soul" (p. 553) and begins to assuage it. Blackfriars bridge becomes symbolic of the connection slowly built between the two men (pp. 549, 551). Mordecai's temporary withdrawal of interest in Daniel, when he says he is not a Jew, is "like the removal of a drawbridge" to the future. Mordecai's faith, however, persists in spite of the lack of evidence that Daniel is a Jew. Alcharisi's revelations fulfill that faith. The friendship between Mordecai and Daniel is paralled by the close bond between Daniel Charisi and Joseph Kalonymos, who vowed to bind themselves to one another as sons of the same mother. Charisi fortified his soul with such bonds, Kalonymos recalled (p. 788).

The image of bonds and imprisonment, so destructive in the world of Gwendolen and Grandcourt, becomes here liberating and

growth-inducing. At first, Daniel finds "Mordecai's words of reliance like so many cords binding him painfully" (p. 579), for he thinks he is not a Jew. And all this talk about how Mordecai's soul will join Daniel's and how his work will be perfected through Daniel smacks of a lunatic's dependence (pp. 599-600). Mordecai is aware of Daniel's reservations, but his dwindling time will not permit him to give up hope. When Daniel tells his friend, upon returning from Genoa, that they have the same people, that "'Our souls have the same vocation,'" Mordecai utters the Hebrew words expressing the religious bond (p. 817). His wasted face brightens with a gladness shared by Mirah who perceives Daniel's revelation and its effect on her brother "as if she had been beholding a religious rite."

In the family, in marriage, in friendship men may form the natural bonds which, extended to the community, constitute the only arena in which human potential may reach its fulfillment. In the love for another person, Feuerbach claims, it becomes clear "that we two cannot be without each other, that only community constitutes humanity" (EC, p. 158). The early Christians had evolved the concept of the third member of the trinity because "Participated life is alone true, self-satisfying, divine life" (EC, p. 67). The Holy Spirit expresses the unity in love of the Son and the Father: it expresses "the idea of community." In selecting the Jews as a paradigm -- and they are only that, a paradigm -- of the need of man's soul for a visible community from which he may learn, through which he may grow in intellect, love, and willful service,

Eliot was responding not so much to Jewish religious tenets (Mordecai never speaks in terms of specific religious beliefs) as to its model as a moral way of life. Traditionally Judaism has made personal "salvation" dependent on one's personal conduct, one's personal responsibility for his actions and thoughts. It has rejected the notion of atonement by another being, a God incarnated, as well as the doctrine of original sin. The world is not inherently bad. Man was given freedom of will and therefore freedom to sin, if he chooses. But the responsibility lies in man's hands, not in the operation of some Other or in Chance. Feuerbach had said, "To place anything in God, or to derive anything from God, is nothing more than to withdraw it from the test of reason, to institute it as indubitable, unassailable, sacred, without rendering an account why" (EC, p. 274).

Judaism had insisted on individual responsibility in still another way. The servant of Judaism was expected to earn his right to serve. Birth alone did not determine one's readiness, as the stories of Abraham and Lot, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, and Gideon and Elijah demonstrate. The sons of the kings rarely became Israel's moving prophets. Thus, when Eliot selected her characters for the novel, she chose the abandoned son of a mountebank and a betrayer of family as the prophet; the abandoned son of a betrayer of father and race as the hoped-for leader. The characters with wealth and "birth" are unable to break out of the prison of self to enter, at least on their own, the participated

life, the world of communal politics which can reconcile feeling and reason, theory and practice in a society providing for the growth and development of the individual consciousness.

Both Mordecai and Daniel must earn their right to serve by achieving consciousness of species. "He therefore who lives in the consciousness of the species as a reality, regards his existence for others, his relation to society, his unity to the public, as that existence which is one with the existence of his own essence -- as his immortal existence. He lives with his whole soul, with his whole heart, for humanity" (EC, p. 171). Basic to such a personality is the capacity for love. "Love is the universal law of intelligence and Nature: it is nothing else than the realisation of the unity of the species through the medium of moral sentiment" (EC, p. 266). Love, like reason, is "free, universal," not restricted and "narrow-hearted" like religious faith which would include only a few within its sphere (EC, p. 257). Because man has not yet reached the stage of evolution which would permit the achievement of the ideal of complete universality,[4] Eliot suggests that men aim for an interim solution of expanding one's sphere of love to a cultural or national community preliminary to a completely united humanity. The Jewish people are simply an example of what may be done by other groups who share certain inherited characteristics or geographical, cultural, and economic

[4]See "Hep!" pp. 405, 414, 421.

interests. Israel has developed a special "'core of affection which binds a race and its families in dutiful love, and reverence for the human body which lifts the needs of our animal life into religion . . .'" (p. 590). Other cultural groups may have different "cores." Mordecai responds to the core of "dutiful love" by forgiving his vagrant and selfish father for abandoning his mother and exploiting his sister, but he does not grant complete absolution; for Lapidoth must be made to understand that his actions carry consequences. Daniel forgives his mother for giving him away and concealing his parentage, forgives Sir Hugo for sharing in that concealment. Both men evince familial love and love in friendship; Daniel lives to experience love in marriage. Both men grow into love of a people, a determination to draw "shoulder to shoulder with men of like inheritance" (p. 816).

The warmth of love, the physical reality of the bonds among the loving characters is conveyed by the many references to hands and to touching. In Gwendolen's world, the people either never touch one another or express repulsion at being touched by others. But in Mordecai's and Daniel's circle, people reach out to each other -- to save (literally) another life (pp. 230, 242), to restore confidence (p. 842), to promise (pp. 715, 878), to express conciliation with one of opposing temperament (pp. 644, 848, 857), to extend sympathy for an unfortunate past (pp. 702, 728, 731), to forgive (p. 676), to heal (pp. 728, 840), to comfort (pp. 558, 603, 755, 815, 840), and to commit themselves (pp. 564, 638, 724,

863, 882). If some of the characters are imprisoned by illness, or economic stringency, or lack of superb talent, they free their spirits by loving and seeking to help others. In their modest, human ways they make the daily confession of the Shemah a reality, a transmutation of the spiritual into the material.

It is such a transmutation that Eliot has achieved in Daniel Deronda. She has made the theoretical concepts of a philosophy like that of Feuerbach take on life and feeling. The power of her writing lies in Feuerbach's observation that "the imagination is omnipotent when it has a bond of union with the heart" (EC, p. 149). Through her handling of the time sequences and organization of plot structure, through her courageous selection of characters and fictional modes, through her imaginative selection of images to convey both the enemies and the nourishers of human reason, will and love, Eliot has communicated her vision of the essence of humanity.

Nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.

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