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INDIANS, FURS, AND EMPIRES:
THE CHANGING POLICIES OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA, 1674-1768

by
Stephen H. Cutcliffe

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of Lehigh University
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(date)

Lawrence H. Allen
Professor in Charge

Special committee directing the
doctoral work of Mr. Stephen
H. Cutcliffe

Lawrence H. Allen
Chairman
James J. Sizer
Robert J. Smith
John A. Ellis
Edward J. Folley

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To my parents

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INDIANS, FURS, AND EMPIRES:

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Stephen H. Cutcliffe

ABSTRACT

Fur of all varieties, but especially deerskin and beaver, had long been an important concern of English economic interests, primarily for the production of clothing, especially hats. England discovered in New York and Pennsylvania ready sources of beaver and deerskin. France, from its Canadian base, also sought to monopolize the fur trade. In a see-saw struggle for control of the trade and North America, New York, Pennsylvania and the Ohio valley became the fulcrum. The geographic location of the Shawnee, Delaware, and in particular, the Iroquois Indian tribes gave them a position as the balance of power in North America.

New York and Pennsylvania continued a policy of preserving Indian good will throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, the reasons behind this Indian policy changed with the passage of time. Because of their location, the Indians came to play an increasingly important role as a buffer between Canada and the English colonies, especially after 1750. The Indians recognized their position and tried to utilize it to their advantage after 1701 by maintaining their neutrality. Declining

strength and numbers inclined the Indians, especially the Iroquois, increasingly to favor the British as the eighteenth century progressed and as it became obvious England would ultimately triumph over France.

Indian policy was often hesitant and contradictory until mid-century, when imperial policy became fairly consistent. English awareness of market potentials in the colonies forced it to consolidate control of Indian affairs to protect those markets. After the coming of peace in 1763, the fur trade shifted to Canada and the southern colonies, ironically leaving New York and Pennsylvania with reduced profit from the trade which their Indian policies were originally designed to protect. Export figures for New York and Pennsylvania outlined the importance of fur and skins to the colonial economy. These figures also demonstrated that fur was not the reason for changes in Indian policy, but rather that the fur trade fluctuated with periods of war and peace.

INTRODUCTION

Fur trade and Indian policies presented more than frontier problems for French and English North American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Fur, especially beaver, had great political and economic importance for many nations and often instigated wars. New York and Pennsylvania, lying adjacent to the fur-producing country and close to the French in Canada, became pivotal in the Anglo-French struggle for control of the fur trade and for North America. This was especially true during the years from New York's permanent settlement by the English in 1674 and the subsequent founding of Pennsylvania in 1682 through the end of the French and Indian War. Geographic advantages favored the English, since the Hudson-Mohawk transportation route, as well as the Delaware, Susquehanna, and Allegheny Rivers, controlled the flow of goods to and from the interior as far as the Ohio and Mississippi country. These advantages aroused the jealousy of France.¹

The British generally evaluated their colonies in terms of their commercial importance. They sought complementary interaction of mother country and colony, with economic self-sufficiency for the empire as the ultimate goal. Colonies in the early years

¹Paul C. Phillips, The Fur Trade (2 vols., Norman, Okla., 1961), I, xx, 249, 392. Maps of New York and Pennsylvania are included on pages 130 and 230.

were expected to provide a supply of raw goods not otherwise available at home. England did not fail to notice its colonies' market possibilities, but not until the 1740s did they become significant as markets for manufactured goods. New York and Pennsylvania commerce during the colonial period consisted largely of the exchange of raw materials, mostly foodstuffs, for manufactures and semi-tropical products. While the export value of agricultural goods such as wheat often exceeded that of fur, peltry maintained its importance as an export throughout the period. The colonies, perpetually short of hard specie necessary for the purchase of manufactured goods from the mother country, searched for any product, such as fur, which they could trade directly to Britain. The mean of the total value of fur and skins as a percentage of all goods exported to London during the period of this study was 29.9 for New York and 37.2 for Pennsylvania.² England, dependent on northern Europe for its fur supply until the seventeenth century, entered the "modern age" of the fur trade with the discovery of America. Initially, this trade centered on New England, but by the

²George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (New York, 1922), 134-138. Michael Kammen's Empire and Interest (Philadelphia, 1970) contains a good discussion of mercantile theory. The Import and Export Ledgers of the Customs Office in the British Public Record Office give a good overall view of the products exported from New York and Pennsylvania to London and their value. Hereafter they will be referred to as Customs 3. The mean percentage was derived from figures available in the Customs 3 records and contained in the several tables of this study (see Appendix).

mid-seventeenth century it shifted to the middle colonies. The Iroquois Indians and their tributary allies, the Shawnee and Delaware tribes, were located on the major trade routes to the Ohio-Mississippi valleys, the prime fur country, so that both the French and the English had to deal with these nations.³

France and England viewed each other as natural enemies, and each sought to protect itself and its colonies as it expanded its frontiers toward those of the other. Seizure of territory and trade routes was a primary goal, requiring both France and England to extend their influence over trade and to ally with the Indians. Each nation's policy called for its rival's expulsion from the Indian country in order to monopolize as large a proportion of the fur trade as possible.⁴

Through the first half of the eighteenth century, both Britain and its colonies sought Indian friendship primarily to control the fur trade. However, a subtle change in this Indian

³Murray G. Lawson, Fur, A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775 (Toronto, 1943), 32; Philips, The Fur Trade, I, 248-249; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (4 vols., New York, 1924), IV, 283, 294. The Iroquois, also known as the Six Nations consisted of six tribes: the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, Cayuga, and after 1722 the Tuscarora.

⁴Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, IV, 284-285, 300-301; William Johnson to Gov. Clinton, Sept. 25, 1750, Marquis de la Jonquiere to Gov. Clinton, Aug. 10, 1751, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (15 vols., Albany, 1853-1887), VI, 599-600, 731-734 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs.).

policy developed as the century progressed. A representative of the Six Nations told the New York governor in 1735 that "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing." Although this reiterated the importance of trade, it also gave rise to questions concerning the effects of war upon trade, especially as the English came to recognize that the Indians' military value overshadowed their trade role. By 1750 this changed English outlook was well-defined in its Indian policy. England by then recognized that the major value of the Indians no longer lay in their commercial role as fur gatherers, but rather as a potential military ally in an imperial struggle.⁵

In the transition period until 1750, each English colony conducted Indian affairs on a separate and often contradictory basis. However, by mid-century imperial policy became fairly consistent. Several considerations will hopefully clarify the approaches of both New York and Pennsylvania. Differences between the proprietary government of Pennsylvania and the royal government of New York had an impact on the determination of Indian policy. The Quakers' pacifism also affected Pennsylvania's policy. In

⁵Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs... Transacted in the Colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751, ed., Charles H. McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), xl, 195; Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1748-1763 (Stanford, 1950), 42-43; Stanley C. Smoyer, "Indians as Allies in the Inter-colonial Wars," Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, XXXIV (1936), 411-422.

addition, specific events in each colony contributed to the development of a more uniform Indian policy, as did the colony's responses to imperial pressures. Finally, the evolution of such an Indian policy can be seen in the fluctuating statistics of the fur trade, specifically in the amounts of fur and deerskin exported, and in fur as a percentage of all exports from New York and Pennsylvania to Great Britain. Information about the kinds and amounts of fur traded by each colony is essential for understanding the competition between the two colonies and, in part, explains the shift in emphasis from the New York area to the Ohio valley by mid-century. An analysis of import and export statistics available in the British Public Record Office, will help clarify what happened in the fur trade, and when and how this trade affected Indian policy (see Chapter III, fn. 2 and the Appendix). The interplay of Indian policy and the fur trade provides the theme of this study.

Most historians' treatments of the fur trade and British Indian policy ignore interactions between the two and the development of both. Historians have produced a varied body of work on North American Indians, but most of the literature takes an ethnological point of view. Frederick W. Hodge's edited Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, George S. Snyderman's Behind the Tree of Peace, and Paul A.W. Wallace's Indians in Pennsylvania provide a good ethnological background for the study of Indians in the United States and Canada. Of the material that does deal with the two aspects of trade and policy, only a portion is directly

concerned with New York and Pennsylvania.⁶

Several works reflected developments in the fur trade and Indian policy during the seventeenth century. Francis P. Jennings' recent study of Indian-White relations, The Invasion of America, Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest, should be the starting point for all historians interested in Indian affairs. With sharp insight, Jennings puts to rest many long-held myths concerning the American Indian in a masterful summary of present knowledge about Northeastern tribes and follows this up with an in-depth analysis of Puritan New England in the seventeenth century. William I. Robert's unpublished dissertation, "The Fur Trade of New England in the Seventeenth Century," describes the importance of the early fur trade during the first century of British settlement and prior to the trade's shift to the middle colonies. Allen W. Trelease' Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century is an extremely important work on this aspect of New York's history. His analysis of earlier misconceptions concerning the development of the Iroquois Confederation and its supposed savage nature provides the basis for

⁶Frederick W. Hodge, Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico (2 vols., Washington, 1907-1910); George S. Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace: A Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare (Philadelphia, 1948); Paul A.W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1961). Two bibliographical compilations extremely helpful to the study of American Indians are: Frederick J. Dockstader, Graduate Studies on the American Indian: A Bibliography of Theses and Dissertations (New York, 1957) and William N. Fenton, American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs and Opportunities for Study (Chapel Hill, 1957).

further study in the eighteenth century. Trelease's utilization of sources and organizational framework were an important guide for the approach taken in this study.⁷

There are few comprehensive studies of Indian policy in the eighteenth century. However, two major works are Francis P. Jennings' unpublished dissertation, "Miquon's Passing, Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674-1755," and Thomas E. Norton's recent investigation, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776. In conjunction with several recent articles, Jennings' study and the works of Anthony F.C. Wallace permit the historian to understand a major portion of Pennsylvania's Indian policy. However, Jennings does not carry his study beyond the French and Indian War, a critical event in defining the nature and direction of Indian policy in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁸ While Norton chronologically carries his narrative to the

⁷Francis P. Jennings, The Invasion of America, Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill, 1975); William I. Roberts, "The Fur Trade of New England in the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa., 1958); Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, 1960).

⁸Francis P. Jennings, "Miquon's Passing, Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674-1755" (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa., 1965); Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 (Madison, 1974). For additional studies by Jennings and A.F.C. Wallace, see bibliography. Albright G. Zimmerman's unpublished dissertation, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania" (Univ. of Del., 1966) offers important insights into the fur trade itself but does not delve deeply into the questions of policy and, like Jennings, does not go beyond 1755.

outbreak of the American Revolution, he fails to consider the possible effect that competition for fur with Pennsylvania or a shifting emphasis in the trade to that colony had upon Indian policy at mid-century. In part, this is due to an overreliance upon Murray G. Lawson's statistical research in his Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism. Lawson is practically the sole historian to make use of the statistical material regarding the fur trade available in the British customs records. However, he deals primarily with the development of the British hat industry, which was the principal user of beaver pelts, rather than with development of Indian policy. Furthermore, his statistics vary widely from those found by this investigation. Lawson's use of five- and ten-year time periods conceals marked variations in the fur trade which reflect important developments in both the trade and an Indian policy. His general conclusion that fur played an insignificant role in the total colonial economy does not hold for New York and Pennsylvania. As the subsequent data clearly shows, this misconception requires correction.

Other recent historians of colonial New York have not totally neglected the importance of the fur trade to that colony, but have struggled first to sort out the confusion in the colony's politically factional and therefore complex history. Lawrence H. Leder's Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York and Stanley N. Katz's Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 provide an excellent political framework from

which to delve further into English Indian policy. Several studies on Pennsylvania provide a similar framework for that colony. Joseph E. Illick's William Penn the Politician: His Relations with the English Government and Gary B. Nash's Quakers and Politics, 1681-1726 cover the early period, while William Hanna's Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics and Theodore Thayer's Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 reflect developments during the later colonial period.⁹

While all these authors note the important role Indians played in the colonial economy and as a military buffer against the French, two further steps are necessary to fully understand the interaction of the fur trade and Indian policy. A comparison of the approaches of New York and Pennsylvania will clarify each and show how both converged into a more unified imperial policy after 1750. In addition, an analysis of import and export statistics, which was beyond the scope and intent of the authors mentioned above, will clarify the traditional literary evidence. The relative lack of secondary literature on eighteenth-century Indian policy

⁹Lawrence H. Leder, Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York (Chapel Hill, 1961); Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); Joseph E. Illick, William Penn the Politician: His Relations with the English Government (Ithaca, 1965); Gary B. Nash, Quakers and Politics, 1681-1726 (Princeton, 1968); William Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics (Stanford, 1964); Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Harrisburg, 1953).

determined the scope of this study. In many respects Pennsylvania and especially New York have only recently received the attention they deserve, and many aspects of their development remain untouched. In short, because of their economic and political importance, the relationship between the fur trade and Indian policy merits closer study than it has hitherto received. Hopefully this study will fulfill that need.

CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF FUR AND CHAINS

Two themes, which are basic to an understanding of the fur trade and Indian policy in New York and Pennsylvania during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, also provide the basis for understanding the evolution of trade and policy in the following century. First, the nature of the fur trade, including its geographical, economic, and social aspects, explains how and why Indian policy developed as it did. Second, the Covenant Chain defines the relationship between the English and the Indians, and among the Indians themselves.

European expansion and the trade goods it brought originally attracted the Indians rather than repelled them. The attractiveness of trade goods travelled by word of mouth and example faster and further inland than the rate of European settlement. A desire for previously unobtainable items, such as firearms and ammunition, manufactured textiles, and metal goods, often existed well before any actual face-to-face contact between the two civilizations. Friendly Indians provided the European with already cleared farm land, trade routes to the interior, and peltry (especially beaver and deerskins) in return for goods which were at

first luxury items, but quickly became necessities for the natives. Such changes did not mean that only the native culture experienced a transformation. Indeed, European civilization in the New World also underwent its own process of acculturation.

England initially obtained its furs from the New England colonies. However, when England conquered Dutch New Netherlands in the second half of the seventeenth century, the trade shifted to the re-named colony of New York. It and its neighboring colony on the Delaware River, New Sweden, had existed primarily for the Indian trade, and the final advent of English control in 1674 did little to change the nature of the trade, which centered on Albany and the settlements at the mouth of the Schuylkill River.¹

The strategic locations of Albany and what would later become Philadelphia made them centers of control in the fur trade. The Mohawk River reached west from Albany and brought furs from as far away as the Ohio- Mississippi valleys. In turn, the Hudson River flowing southward provided an outlet to English markets. Likewise, the Delaware, Susquehanna, and Allegheny Rivers controlled the flow of goods to and from the interior of Pennsylvania. The

¹Philips, The Fur Trade, 15, 246; Lawson, Fur, 32-33; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 215; Francis P. Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indian in the Seventeenth Century," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXII (1968), 23; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," 7. For background on the early Dutch and Swedish Indian trade see Trelease, Indian Affairs, Chap. II, Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," Chap. I, and Norton, The Fur Trade in New York, 3-8.

English formed alliances with the Iroquois nations and their allies lying to the west of Albany and Philadelphia. The resulting control of these trade routes aroused the jealousy of France very early in the colonial period. During the century of English dominance of these areas, the Indians acted both as procurers of the desired fur and as a military buffer against the French in Canada.²

The fur trade became an inseparable part of westward expansion to satisfy the European mercantile economy which demanded exportable raw goods. Fur was the one valuable product which would bring profit to both natives and Europeans. Contrary to many long-held notions, Indians were not originally nomadic but sedentary, practicing agriculture and relying on fishing and hunting as a secondary source of food and clothing and other needs. Only the European demand for furs, especially beaver, brought about depletion of the plentiful supplies of the early seventeenth century, forced the Indians into more nomadic ways, and intensified Indian

2

Leder, Robert Livingston, 12; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xxxv-xxxviii; Francis P. Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CX (1966), 407; "Zimmerman, Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," 16; Douglas E. Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763 (New York, 1966), 92-93; Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, 36-37. Arthur Buffington described Albany's position in the following manner: "Governors came and went, reflecting the policy or lack of policy of the British government, or developing one of their own; but the one constant factor in British Indian policy was the policy of Albany." "The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VIII (1922), 335.

warfare.³

Both the French and English colonies initially followed the same basic patterns in securing peltry and in disposing of it. At the outset they obtained fur from the Indians at central locations rather than send their own people out to secure it from the Indians or trap for it. In order to dispose of the fur, the French had originally established a marketing monopoly. However, in 1674 Jean-Baptiste Colbert, in charge of reorganizing the French colonial empire, abolished the monopolistic Compagnie de l'Occident in an attempt to diversify the Canadian economy. Ironically, this attempt backfired, for the Canadian beaver trade ultimately devolved by means of a lease upon a single entrepreneur, Aubert de la Chesnayne, who guaranteed to buy the pelts from any individual who cared to enter the trade. Consequently, vast numbers of coureurs de bois, or wandering traders, took to the woods in search of pelts and profit. Despite various regulations, Colbert was able to do little to curb the fur trade and to diversify the Canadian economy. Thus, the Canadian frontier developed, not even on the

³Leach, Northern Colonial Frontier, 91, 97, 161-162; Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, 35; William J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 (New York, 1969), 32; William J. Eccles, France in America (New York, 1972), 84; William N. Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," Eleanor B. Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie, eds., North American Indians in Perspective (New York, 1971), 142; Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Women, Land, and Society: Three Aspects of Aboriginal Delaware Life," Pennsylvania Archaeologist, XVII (1947), 9-10.

basis of an irregular line, but as pockets of settlement surrounded by hinterland into which ranged the French trader.⁴

The English also did not initially send traders into the wilderness, but instead relied upon the Indians to travel to the trade centers of Albany and Philadelphia. However, they, too, quickly changed their pattern, and English traders followed the French example by ranging far and wide. Three distinct groups soon became identifiable in the merchandizing pattern: the traders themselves, moderate sized merchants, and the largest import-export merchants in the major cities. Little profit was derived from the sale of fur in London, for prices there only slightly exceeded those in the colonies. Rather, merchants made their profit on imported trade goods, which passed through several hands before reaching the Indians. Thus, for the English, as well as for the Indian, who was perhaps the most vital link in the economic chain, the fur trade was a major factor in Anglo-colonial development.⁵

In the struggle which evolved for control of the Indians, the French suffered a serious economic disadvantage. English woolen textiles, known as duffels and strouds, were more desirable and

⁴Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 2-3, 43; Eccles, France in America, 60, 75, 83-86.

⁵Norton, The Fur Trade in New York, 83, 102, 105-107; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 145-147; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," 45-48, 58-59, 63-65, 68-70; Concessions of William Penn, #11, July 11, 1681, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania (16 vols., Philadelphia, 1838-1853), I, 28 (hereafter cited as Pa. Council Minutes).

useful than French luxury cloths. While the French traded with brandy,¹ the Albany handiaers and Pennsylvania traders provided the Indians with much larger quantities of rum for the same amount of fur. Added to this, the French incurred much higher shipping costs, which correspondingly increased their trading prices, giving the English a two-fold advantage.⁶

The fur trade was encompassed within the context of the Covenant Chain which defined the development of Indian affairs. Transactions of Indian affairs usually occurred in Albany and Philadelphia, although more and more envoys ventured into Indian country as the years passed. Pennsylvania differed somewhat from New York in this respect, for by mid-eighteenth century it was holding many of its conferences in such frontier towns as Easton and Lancaster. Early contacts consisted largely of meetings with a single Indian or small groups at odd times during the year, but by the turn of the century large full-dress councils had become almost yearly occurrences for both colonies. As Indian affairs

⁶Leder, Robert Livingston, 47. The following is a comparative price list from 1689 of commodities for which the Indian traded at both Montreal and Albany.

	<u>Albany</u>	<u>Montreal</u>
8 pounds of powder	1 beaver	4 beaver
A gun	2	5
40 pounds of lead	1	3
A blanket of red cloth	1	2
A white blanket	1	2
4 shirts	1	2
6 pairs of stockings	1	2

See O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 408-409.

became increasingly important, so did the individuals who served as envoys and interpreters. Gerrit Luycasse was the first real envoy for New York, spending the fall of 1690 at Onondaga. He was quickly followed by Arnout Cornelisse Viele, also an interpreter, who spent the following winter among the Indians. In Pennsylvania, while still under the Duke of York, one Israel Helm served as an interpreter in the 1670s. Many others followed during the course of the next hundred years, including such influential men as George Croghan, Conrad Weiser, and William Johnson, all of whom served under the orders of the Indian Commissioners and governors in New York and the proprietor or his duly appointed representative for Indian affairs in Pennsylvania. It was these men who, in large part, determined the direction of English Indian policy.⁷

That policy had to be accommodated to the framework of the Covenant Chain, an institutional concept which defined relationships between the English and the Indians. Although the Covenant Chain remained fairly stable as a concept, the members' understanding of the roles within it changed considerably during the late seventeenth century. The earliest antecedents of the Covenant Chain can be traced to alliances between the Indians and

⁷Trelease, Indian Affairs, 210-213; Norton, The Fur Trade of New York, 73-74; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," 36, 177-178; Information of the Reverend Mr. Miller respecting New York, Sept. 4, 1696, Proceedings of the Board of Trade, May 13, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 183, 186, 876.

the Dutch of New Netherland. Evidence suggests the Covenant Chain was a metaphor for a series of independent alliances made with the Indians at various times by both the Dutch and the English. River Indians first noted the chain in 1618, although the Mohawks claimed the first alliance occurred in 1643 with the Dutch. A 1703 speech by the Schaahkooks Indians sheds some interesting but inconclusive light on the Chain's origins:

Father

It is now Eighty five years since the first Christian came here in this Countrey then wee tyed them with a Roap but now they are fastened with an Iron Chain to the tree of welfair so that wee hither have stood firm to the Covenant Chain with our father.

Despite conflicting evidence, the first real reference to the Covenant Chain occurred in 1677 after two treaties with the Iroquois, negotiated at Albany.⁸

Sir Edmund Andros negotiated those treaties three years after his arrival in New York as the first permanent English governor. In 1675 he had established a board of Indian Commissioners and selected Robert Livingston, an Albany merchant, as its secretary. Under Livingston's watchful eye the Albany Indian records were much better kept than previously had been the case. The Board's purpose was to invoke some order into the conduct of Indian negotiations

⁸Francis P. Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXV (1971), 89-90; Speech of the Schaahkooks Indians, Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records, 1666-1723, Pennsylvania History, XXIII (1956), 191.

and to give the governor a greater voice in them. During this period Andros really formulated the concept of the Covenant Chain.⁹

Soon after his arrival, Andros faced a series of problems with various Indian tribes as well as other colonies. Andros effected a peace with the Lenape Indians of Delaware Bay in 1675, after which time they aided him in further negotiations. In addition, the governor finalized negotiations with the Mohawk Indians who desired a pact of mutual friendship against the French. However, most dangerous to the colony's Indian relations was the eruption of King Philip's War in New England in the summer of 1675. Andros feared a widespread uprising of all Indians against the English. He was especially watchful lest the Mohawk join King Philip, who was wintering near Albany, as many of the Mahican had already done. Governor Andros ultimately convinced the Mohawk to push King Philip out of the Hudson area to within reach of the New England militia. Further, he offered sanctuary and redress of grievances for the Mahican despite their deprivations against the New England villages. He intended to control as many of the Indians as possible within the colony and its surrounding environs for reasons of peace as well

⁹Trelease, Indian Affairs, 207; Leder, Robert Livingston, 15; Jennings, "Glory, Death and Transfiguration," 35 and "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 89.

as trade.¹⁰

Of equal importance to the emergence of the Covenant Chain was a series of events taking place in what would soon become Pennsylvania. The Susquehannock Indians, a tribe of Iroquois lingual stock, resided on the lower Susquehanna River, where they controlled a large share of the early fur trade. Both the Susquehannock and the Five Nations in New York sought control of the western beaver lands as overhunting began to deplete eastern supplies. During the third quarter of the century both competitors fought incessantly for what had become a mainstay of life. In 1675 the Susquehannock sought refuge in Maryland, but a series of murders and misunderstandings, culminating in Nathaniel Bacon's attack on innocent Virginia Indians, resulted in their going into hiding. Fearing the Susquehannock might join King Philip in a general uprising, Andros sought out those Indians and "invited" them to live under New York's protection. Ultimately, despite some Iroquois objections at not being able to garner a victory, many of the Susquehannock joined with the Five Nations and dis-

¹⁰Indian Conference between Gov. Andros and Lenape Indians at Newcastle, May 15, 1685, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., XII, 523; A Short Account of the General Concerns of New-York, Oct. 1674- Nov. 167 , Ibid., III, 254-255; Andros to Esopus Magistrates, Jan. 6, 1676, Meeting of Gov. Andros and two Wickerscreek Sachems, Apr. 14, 1676, New York Council Minutes, Mar. 12, 1677, Ibid., XIII, 493-496, 503; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 36. For a detailed description of the formation of the Covenant Chain see Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," Chap. I and Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 88-96.

appeared as a separate entity. Those who refused this adoption returned to the upper Susquehanna River near Conestogo Creek, assuming the name of their new home.¹¹

The legal, although not the absolute, demise of the Susquehannock Indians was finalized by a treaty held at Albany in August 1677. New York and Maryland both sought control of the fur trade, in which the Susquehannock were a major factor, and also hoped to prevent Indian retaliation in revenge for past misdeeds. On both counts Andros was successful; he brought the Susquehannock under nominal control of the Iroquois and effected a peace between Maryland and the Iroquois. An address made by several Mohawk sachems to Henry Coursey, Maryland's representative to the conference, showed the effective establishment of the Covenant Chain:

Wee are glad that... the Governor General hath bein pleased to destinat and appoynt this place [Albany] to Speak with all Nations in peace.... Especially that his honor hath bein pleased to Grant you the Priviledge for to Speak with us heir... for the Covenant that is betwixt the Governor Generall and us is Inviolable yea so strong that if the very Thunder should break upon the Covenant Chayn, it wold not break it in Sunder.¹²

¹¹Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 36, 41-42, 44-47; Gov. Andros to Gov. of Md., O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., XII, 543; Conference between Gov. Andros and Susquehannock Indians, June 2, 1676, Ibid., XIII, 497-498; Order of New York Council, Apr. 6, 1677, Ibid., XII, 572; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 36, 39-44.

¹²Address of the Mohawks to Henry Coursey, Aug. 6, 1677, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 42-48, quote 45-46; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 43.

The Covenant Chain differed from both the nuclear League and the extended tributary system of the Iroquois by combining both Indian and European politics.¹³

The Five Nations benefitted from the Covenant, since it made buffers for them of the Lenape of Delaware and Mahican Indians. England benefitted because in its eyes the Covenant Chain provided a legal claim to exercise sovereignty over the member Indians. The Indians, however, saw the Chain as a group of unequal peers, of which New York was one, each with a power and status and the right to govern itself.

Flexibility in practical affairs was the Covenant Chain's greatest merit. It also provided stability for both the Indians and Anglo-Indian relations and a means for England to penetrate areas claimed by France. Nevertheless, the Covenant Chain had its limits, for the Iroquois recognized the impossibility of diverting the desires of merchants, who were firmly committed to the prosperity of the fur trade which an enlarged covenant enhanced.¹⁴

¹³The Iroquois constantly pressured their tributaries to furnish warriors for their battles, but the tributaries discriminated in their degree of response. Thus, the Iroquois clearly did not have total mastery of their tributaries. For example, the Susquehannock lost their identity and became one with the Iroquois, but it occurred only with their consent. Jennings, "Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," 92.

¹⁴Ibid., 88-96; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 44. In 1728 Governor Patrick Gordon of Pennsylvania described the relationships of the Covenant Chain as follows:

The Chief Heads or Strongest Links of this Chain I find are these nine, vizt:

Although the basic outlines of the Covenant Chain were well established by the late 1670s, it remained for the Iroquois to define their specific role within the Chain vis-a-vis the French and the English. French activities, aimed mostly at monopolizing

1st. That all William Penns People or Christians, and all the Indians should be brethren, as the Children of one Father, joyned together as with one Heart, one Head and one Body.

2nd. That all Paths should be open and free to both Christians and Indians.

3rd. That the Doors of the Christians Houses should be open to the Indians and the Houses of the Indians open to the Christians, and they should make each other welcome as their Friends.

4th. That the Christians should not believe any false Rumours or Reports of the Indians, nor the Indian believe any such Rumours or Reports of the Christians, but should first come as Brethren to enquire of each other; and that both Christians and Indians, when they hear any such false Reports of their Brethren, they should bury them as in a bottomless Pitt.

5th. That if the Christians hear any ill news that may be to the Hurt of the Indians, or the Indians hear any such ill news that may be to the Injury of the Christians, they should acquaint each other with it speedily as true Friends and Brethren.

6th. That the Indians should do no manner of Harm to the Christians nor their Creatures nor the Christians do any Hurt to any Indians, but each treat the other as their Brethren.

7th. But as there are wicked People in all Nations, if either Indians or Christians should do any harm to each other, Complaint should be made of it by the Persons Suffering that Right may be done, and when Satisfaction is made, the Injury or Wrong should be forgott and be buried as in a bottomless Pitt.

8th. That the Indians should in all things assist the Christians, and the Christians assist the Indians against all wicked People that would disturb them.

9th. And lastly, that both Christians and Indians should acquaint their Children with this League and firm Chain of Friendship made between them, and that it should always

the fur trade and gaining control over the Indians, forced the Five Nations to move cautiously into the British camp. Furthermore, the need to obtain furs to exchange for trade goods brought the Indians into conflict with the western tribes, who had easier access to the richest beaver lands and who were largely under French influence. French depredations in areas of primary concern to the Iroquois during the two decades prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1689 convinced the Indians that their survival depended on a policy of neutrality, slightly pro-British in nature. Thus, the Iroquois never totally submitted to the English, recognizing that behind their friendship lurked almost as great a danger as that of France, since both shared a similar desire for fur.

be made stronger and stronger and be kept bright and clean, without Rust or Spott between our Children and Childrens Children, while the Creeks and Rivers run, and while the Sun, Moon, and Stars endure.

Indian Conference at Conestoga, May 26, 1728, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 311-312.

CHAPTER II

THE STABILIZATION OF ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS

1674-1701

Three major powers participated in a series of events culminating with the Iroquois decision for neutrality in 1701. French, English, and Indians each had their own cultural assumptions, goals to reach, and axes to grind along the way. In addition, none of these groups was a monolithic whole; rather, each consisted of a number of parts often vying with one another for power, glory, and financial gain.

Canada became a royal province in 1663 and as such was perhaps the most unified of the three powers. French minister Colbert intended to expand the population and to diversify the Canadian economy on an imperial basis. To this end, the colony was to provide France and the West Indies with raw materials, of which fur was to be only one, and provide a market for French manufactures and West Indian sugar, molasses, and rum. By the 1680s Colbert's plans for economic diversification had failed to reach maturity.

The English conquest of New York in 1664 had created consternation among the French who feared that "the King of England did grasp at all America." This fear in part led to the

establishment of peace with the Iroquois the following year, a peace which lasted nearly twenty years and enabled Colbert to implement much of his colonial policy. Despite this, the fur trade continued to overshadow all other concerns, and traders flagrantly violated regulations intended to restrain their activities. In this trade, as well as for protection against English expansion, the French recognized the vital role of the Indian, and in particular the Iroquois nations. On the one hand, they needed the profitable furs from the western tribes, but unless the Iroquois were mollified they posed a disruptive threat to the trade. On the other hand, an Iroquois-Huron-Ottawa alliance would send most of the fur south to Albany. Therefore, the French had to maintain the Iroquois in a position of neutrality between the western nations and the English. To this end, the French sought out the Indians' friendship and alliance through treaty.¹

However, the Iroquois position was predicated on the need for hunting grounds for their economic existence. These were usually located to the north and west of the shifting English settlement. In addition, all tribes to some degree sought participation in the fur trade, either as direct suppliers or as provisioners for those tribes who provided furs. Whether the Indians

¹Relation of the March of the Governor of Canada into New York, Peace Treaty between the Iroquois and Gov. de Tracy, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 118-119, 121-127; Eccles, France in America, 60-68, 83-89; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 31-32, 103-104; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 244-248.

maintained a position of neutrality or allied themselves to one of the European powers depended in large part on geographical location and relative strength of the expanding colonies at any given time. During the period under study, the Mohawk who resided closest to Albany, remained largely within the English camp, but the Seneca at the opposite end of the Iroquois league were more recalcitrant and often stood aloof or sided with the French. In Pennsylvania the shifting geographic position of the Shawnee and the Delaware often dictated their primary allegiance. When the French invaded the Ohio country in the mid-eighteenth century, reliance on European trade goods and firearms, in part, forced the Indians to side with the invading forces. Even beyond tribal differences, factions often existed within a given nation of Indians, such as the Iroquois and the Delaware of the Ohio region and their counterparts at Onondaga in New York and on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania. The Indians were neither monolithic in their actions, nor were they mere pawns in European hands, despite their cultural dependence on trade goods.²

English settlements were actual settlements rather than trading posts. Furthermore, each colony proceeded apace, especially in Indian affairs, with little imperial guidance until the mid-eighteenth century. Although both New York and Pennsylvania sought profit from commercial agriculture, trade, and land speculation, it

²Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York, 1969), 39-40; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, vii.

was here that the similarities often ended and diversity began.

English occupation of the Delaware and Susquehanna valleys differed from that of the Hudson and Mohawk, particularly in the premises involved. William Penn, founder of Pennsylvania, had become a Quaker at age twenty-three, and he intended to found a large scale "Holy Experiment" which would provide religious freedom for those persecuted in England, as well as financial returns for himself. As sole proprietor, Penn held complete control over Indian affairs within the colony and in such matters acted upon certain moral principles. In contrast to most Europeans, Penn believed Indians to be children of God and that, consequently, they should be treated as true Christians. His famous letter to the Indians in 1681 expressed this basic understanding.

My friends -- There is one great God and power that hath made the world and all things therein, to whom you and I, and all people owe their being and well-being, and to whom you and I must one day give an account for all that we do in the world; ... I have great love and regard towards you, and I desire to win and gain your love and friendship, by a kind, just, and peaceable life.

Several months later in his Conditions and Concessions of July 11, 1681, Penn had established the rules upon which all Pennsylvanians would conduct Indian affairs. All transactions with the Indians would be "performed in public market," and "whatever is sold to the Indians in consideration of their furs... there suffer the test. whether good or bad; if good to pass; if not good, not to be sold for good, that the natives may not be abused nor provoked."

Additionally, Penn set up legal equalities for both whites and Indians symbolized by the provision "that all differences between the Planters and the natives shall also be ended by Twelve men, that is, by Six planters and Six natives, that so we may live friendly together as much as in us lieth." While Penn had largely modelled his laws on those of the Duke of York, the difference was in the manner in which he administered them.³

Penn's maxims included the idea that all land titles should be free and clear of Indian claims, which he took for granted as morally and legally binding in contrast to other colonies that viewed purchase largely as an expedient.⁴ Additionally, once he cleared the Indian title to lands, he would profit through the perpetual quit-rents stipulated in his sale agreements. For

³Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 54, 66; Thomas E. Drake, "William Penn's Experiment on Race Relations," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXVIII (1944), 375, 377, 382; Frederick B. Tolles, "Nonviolent Contact: The Quakers and the Indians," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society CVII (1963), 93-94; William Penn to Indians, Oct. 18, 1631, Samuel Hazard, ed., Annals of Pennsylvania, from the Discovery of the Delaware, 1609-1682, (Philadelphia, 1850), 532-533; Certain Conditions of Concessions, July 11, 1681, in Pa. Council Minutes, I, 28; William Penn to the Free Society of Traders, August 16, 1683, Albert C. Meyers, ed., Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey, and Delaware, 1630-1707 (New York, 1912), 236-237; See Duke of York's Laws, 1665-75 in The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (5 vols., Albany, 1894), I, 40-42 (hereafter cited as Colonial Laws of New York).

⁴For a description of the more common European attitude concerning Indian land rights, see New York Council's Opinion concerning Indian purchases, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., XIII, 487 and Jennings, The Invasion of America, chap. V, 105-110, 131-137.

these reasons Penn paid freely for his lands; in fact, often several times over. The Indian notion of land ownership was one of a mutual right to use and residence, rather than one of exclusivity in the European sense. However, by 1700 through some means of acculturation, the duplication of payment for land sales had come to an end. It was this concern for settling Indian claims that led Penn into his first conflict with the neighboring province of New York.⁵

Penn, desirous of establishing a fur trade on the Susquehanna, sent commissioners to Albany "to treete with the Sackem of the Mahawkes and Senecers and there [sic] Allies about some susquehanash land on the back of us." The Iroquois were apparently delighted at the prospect of the greater convenience of trading posts on the Susquehanna. Several investigating Albany magistrates recognized the threat to Albany's dominance of the western trade and reported to Governor Thomas Dongan their views of the consequences of such a move:

It will tend to the utter Ruine off the Bever Trade.... Wee presume that there hath not any thing Ever been moved or agitated from the first settling of these Parts, more Prejudiciall to his Royal highnesse Interest, and the Inhabitants of this his government then this business of the Susquehanne River. The french its true have endeavoured to take away our trade, by Peace mealls but this will cutt it off at once.

⁵Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Women, Land, and Society: Three Aspects of Aboriginal Delaware Life," Pennsylvania Archaeologist, XVII (1947), 2-6; George Snyderman, "Concept of Land Ownership Among the Iroquois and their Neighbors," Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin, 149 (1951), 15-27; Jennings, "Glory, Death and Transfiguration," 46; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 59-64.

To exclude Penn from this area, Dongan accepted the cession of the entire Susquehanna valley by the Iroquois. Such a grant required proof of ownership, which the Iroquois could derive only by right of conquest. Dongan and the Iroquois concocted a fictional story concerning an Iroquois conquest of the Susquehannock, who occupied the area, to provide a foundation for this transaction. Dongan wrote to Penn informing him of the Indians' gift, "about which you and I shall not fall out: I desire we may Joyne heartily together to advance the Interest of my Master and your good Friend [The Duke of York]." The Duke of York's instructions "to preserve the Indian trade as entire as I can for the Benefitt of the Inhabitants and traders of New York preferably to all others" emphasized Dongan's position, for in 1684 he had rebuffed a second attempt by Penn to buy the Susquehanna lands. In that same year, Dongan, as the Duke of York's representative, surreptitiously obtained personal title to the vast Susquehanna region. The Iroquois sought protection against French threats from Canada and believed they had put themselves "under the Great Sachim Charles that lives over the Great Lake." Dongan's coup was in ignoring Iroquois intentions and, unbeknownst to the Duke, converting the grant to private title. The situation remained as such until 1697 when Dongan, who had since returned to England and was financially distraught at that point, transferred supposed title to the area for £ 100 in a deed to Penn. Penn may well have thought the price cheap enough to erase all claims,

however false.⁶

Governor Dongan, although not the first to realize the value of the West for the fur trade, was the first to try to gain control of it for England. He intended to replace Canada's influence over the western tribes with that of New York, and to achieve that goal he willingly made use of the Albany fur trade and the Iroquois confederacy. Although he continually complained about Pennsylvania's encroachments into the Susquehanna, his more immediate problem was to prevent a French invasion of the Iroquois country. Since 1665 the French, under the governorship first of Sieur de Courcelle and then his successor the Comte de Frontenac, had sought to acquire the Iroquois fur trade. Courcelle, with plans to overawe the Iroquois with French power, proposed the construction of a fort at the juncture of Lake Ontario and the Saint Lawrence

⁶William Penn to Capt. Brocles and Jo. West, July 3, 1683, Pennsylvania Archives (104 vols., Harrisburg, 1838-1935), Ser. II, Vol. VII, 3 (hereafter cited as Pa. Archives); Minutes of Albany Justices of the Peace, Sept. 7, 1683, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York (4 vols., Albany, 1850) I, 259 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History); Albany Magistrates to Gov. Dongan, Sept. 24, 1683, Ibid., 260; Indian Proposals, Sept. 26, 1683, Ibid., 261; Gov. Dongan to William Penn Oct. 10, 22, 1683, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 76-77, 80-81; Duke of York to Gov. Dongan, Aug. 26, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 349; N.Y. Council Minutes, Apr. 29, 1684, Oration of the Onondagoes and Cayouges Sachims, Aug. 2, 1684, Sir John Werden to Gov. Dongan, Aug. 27, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, I, 263-265; Deed, Thomas Dongan to William Penn, Jan. 12, 1697, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 121-123. Gary B. Nash, "The Quest for the Susquehanna Valley: New York, Pennsylvania, and the Seventeenth-Century Fur Trade," New York History, XLVIII (1967), 3-27 contains a good discussion of the struggle for control of the Susquehanna valley between New York and Pennsylvania.

River. It had a three-fold purpose: to keep a military force within reach of the Iroquois, to provide a trading place for both the Ottawa and the Iroquois, and to hinder commerce between these tribes on the lake.

The Comte de Frontenac succeeded Courcelle in 1672 and, convinced of the necessity for such a fort, he finished the work in the summer of 1672. Frontenac, a farsighted governor, had as his ultimate goal French domination of the North American interior. He supervised the construction of another fort at Niagara in 1679. French activity in the West increasingly aroused Iroquois discontent and probably brought on their invasions of the Illinois country after 1677. It certainly contributed to French-Iroquois discord in 1682 and did little to endear the French to Iroquois hearts.⁷

Continued attacks by the Seneca and Cayuga in 1684 against the western Indians, and even against the French themselves, caused Lefebvre de la Barre, Frontenac's successor, to plan his own retaliatory raid. Fearful of the possible consequences, the Iroquois expressed great friendship for the English in return for a promise of military support. Onondaga and Cayuga sachems went so far as to place themselves under English sovereignty. "Wee have putt ourselves under the great Sachim Charles that lives over the great

⁷Gov. Dongan's Report on the State of the Province, 1687, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 393-394, 416; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 247-248; Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701," Pennsylvania History, XXIV (1957), 225.

lake, and we do give you Two White Drest Dear Skins to be sent to the great Sachim Charles that he may write upon them, and putt a great Redd seale to them."⁸

On the surface it appeared that the Indians had placed themselves in a subsidiary position to the English within the context of the Covenant Chain. In reality, only two tribes had subscribed to this position, and their very real fear of English aims induced them to treat with the French as well. La Barre agreed to meet with the Iroquois upon learning of their desire for peace. A conference opened at La Famine in the Oswego country with representatives of the Oneida, Cayuga, and Onondaga tribes. Knowing that sickness and a paucity of supplies weakened any military threat that La Barre could make, the Iroquois quickly gained the diplomatic upper hand. In return for a promise to cease hostilities against all except the Illinois, the Iroquois forced La Barre to make immediate peace with them and to withdraw his forces. Because of this diplomatic loss of face, the French king soon replaced La Barre as governor of Canada.⁹

Dongan exaggerated the friendship of the Iroquois at this time, claiming their submission to England gave substance to

⁸Trelease, Indian Affairs, 260-264; Proposition of the Onondaga and Cayuga Indians, Aug. 2, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 417-418.

⁹Trelease, Indian Affairs, 265-267; Papers relating to La Famine Conference, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 236-248, 269.

its claim of sovereignty over the Five Nations. In reality, the Iroquois continued to take an independent stand, giving up the smallest part of their autonomy only when absolutely necessary. They clarified their position to Dongan by concluding the 1684 meeting with the claim that they were "a Free people uniting our selves to what sachem we please," and reaffirmed it to La Barre at La Famine. "We are born free, We neither depend on Yonnondio nor Corlaer. We may go where we please, and carry with us whom we please, and buy and sell what we please."¹⁰ Although hopeful of maintaining this semi-neutral position, the Iroquois soon returned to the English fold. Events in Canada clearly indicated that the French were not yet ready to allow the Iroquois to occupy peacefully a neutral role between themselves and the English.

With the temporary cessation of hostilities in 1684 between the French and Iroquois, Dongan moved quickly in an attempt to augment New York's role in the fur trade. The end of Iroquois raids against the western tribes increased the trade at Albany because now both natives and traders alike could freely gather furs. Subsequently, one of Dongan's plans involved sending fur traders directly to the Ottawa, which contradicted his past policy of cen-

¹⁰ Proposition of the Onondaga and Cayuga Indians, Aug. 2, 1684, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 418; Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America (Ithaca, 1969), 55. Yonnondio or Onontio were names given to the Canadian governor similar to that of New York's governor, Corlaer.

tralizing trade at Albany. By the fall of 1684 Dongan had begun to issue passes to go into the far reaches of the province. A 1685 trading party led by Johannes Roseboom of Albany was the most important of these. Reaching the Ottawa country, they found themselves received with great enthusiasm because of the low English prices, and the Indians invited them to return every year. In 1686 Dongan organized a much larger expedition consisting of two parties. He hoped to establish a trade, to send Iroquois envoys with the mission to arrange a prisoner exchange, and to set up a peace conference with the Ottawa. The first group, under the command of Roseboom, was to leave Albany in September, winter in the Seneca country, and go to Michilimackinac in the spring. Early the following spring a second group led by Major Patrick Magregory would leave Albany, overtake the Roseboom party, and accompany it to the Ottawa country. Iroquois refusal to negotiate ruined the peace mission, while a lost message insured the failure of the trade aspect.

Dongan, after learning of a new French garrison at Detroit, ordered Roseboom to remain in his winter quarters until Magregory joined him. Never having received the message, however, Roseboom's small group set out, and a much larger force of French and Indians apprehended them on Lake Huron. Shortly thereafter Magregory's party succumbed to a similar fate. The French returned to Niagara and sent their prisoners on to Quebec; the prisoners

obtained their release several months later. Dongan's attempt to gain control of the western tribes failed because he overestimated English power in the region. The French had too much at stake to allow the English to continue such experiments as Roseboom's, and the English could not commit a large enough force to overcome French hostility.¹¹

In August 1685 The Marquis de Denonville replaced La Barre as governor in Canada. He soon concluded that a war against at least the Seneca was necessary to insure the safety of his colony and the maintenance of its fur trade. In the meantime, while strengthening his defensive position, Denonville attempted to quiet Iroquois fears with peace talks. Dongan, fearful of French intrigues, especially the building of a fort at Niagara, called the Iroquois together in May 1686. Niagara controlled the fur trade, and both the English and the French desired it. Dongan warned the Indians of the dangers of French forts in their country and charged them "neither to make warr nor Peace with any Christians without my approbacon; and that you will Suffer no frenchmen nor other Christians to live or Build fort or house at onayaggere [Niagara] or any other Place that might hinder the Brethrens Progress in the Bever hunting." The Five Nations recognized the menace of the French as more immediate than that of the English and agreed to prevent

¹¹Release, Indian Affairs, 268-271.

the former's construction of forts and to refrain from trading with them.¹²

Dongan continued to try to thwart French advances, while furthering those of the English. He attempted to get the Iroquois to interfere with all traders not specifically licensed from Albany. When Denonville invited the Iroquois to a conference set for the spring of 1687, Dongan again reminded them of their promises not to treat with the French. Denonville's true plans emerged when the French captured several Iroquois and sent them to France as slaves. England and France signed a treaty of neutrality in late 1686, and official news of it reached New York and Canada in June 1687. However, it left the question of Indian jurisdiction for a later date. Although Dongan fully intended to respect the treaty, Denonville continued to carry out his plan for an attack on the Seneca.¹³

Denonville descended upon the Seneca country in late June 1687 with a force of 3,000 men. Shortly thereafter 450 Seneca warriors ambushed the advance guard of the French. Under pressure

¹²Ibid., 271-274; Proposition of Gov. Dongan to Five Nations, May 29, 1686, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 99-102.

¹³Gov. Dongan to Monsieur de Denonville, Dec. 1, 1686, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 463; Proposals of Mohawks to Albany Magistrates, Feb. 18, 1687, Proposals of Gov. Dongan to Five Nations, Apr. 25, 1687, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 109-113; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 277-278; Jennings, "Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," 408.

from the main body of Denonville's force, the Seneca finally retreated, and the French could make no further contact with them. They burned the empty Seneca villages and then, exhausted and sick, withdrew to Niagara. Denonville built a fort there and by early August had returned to Montreal, leaving behind a garrison of 100 men.

The French campaign did little save to reestablish the fort at Niagara, for they could not defeat the Seneca. Dongan received full support from the British government after news of the French attack reached England. However, New York's real problem was now financial, as disruption of the fur trade had seriously reduced the colony's revenue. One of the chronic failures of imperial policy was England's unwillingness to support expenditures for frontier defense. Instead, the burden rested on the colonies themselves. France would have been hard pressed to maintain its position if faced with a united effort by England and its colonies.¹⁴

Renewed peace agreements in Europe forced Dongan to recall the Iroquois from their raids on Canada. Desirous of peace and recognizing that they bargained from a position of strength, the Five Nations again asserted their independence and neutrality. The Iroquois rejected English claims of sovereignty and any inferior status in relation to the Covenant Chain. Although the Indians had

¹⁴Frederick A. Osgood, Indian Affairs, 279-280, 286-289; Warrant authorizing Gov. Dongan to protect the Five Nations, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 504.

more reason to dislike the French, they desired to remain aloof from too close a connection with either European nation unless it benefited them to do so in a specific instance. While the value of neutrality had become clear to the Iroquois, they found it difficult to maintain such a position.¹⁵

Dongan's purposes in furthering the fur trade had been both economic and political, for he desired not only to increase the province's wealth, but also to strengthen New York through extended Indian alliances, by enlarging the volume of the Albany Indian trade. England's natural advantages over the French might have increased New York's trade without political involvement, but the fur trade depended upon the Indians, a factor beyond the colony's complete control. This led to Dongan's political approach, which brought about warfare between New York and France. However, England refused to pay the cost, leaving the expense largely to the colony. Dongan's efforts were too ambitious for most of his successors to continue, but a claim of sovereignty over the Iroquois and the attempt to use them against the French would eventually become the basis of British Indian policy. Sir Edmund Andros returned to the colony in August 1688 as governor-general of the new Dominion of New England, which now included New York. King James approved

¹⁵ Trelease, Indian Affairs, 289-290; Declaration of Neutrality by three Iroquois Nations, June 15, 1683, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 384-386.

of Dongan's Indian policy and made no attempt to change it. Rather, the king viewed the Dominion as an attempt to confront Canada from a stronger and more united position.¹⁶

Much of the narrative of events for the decade of the 1680s focused primarily on New York for two major reasons. First, and perhaps foremost, was Pennsylvania's lack of development. Despite its Swedish and Dutch background, Penn's proprietary colony had achieved neither the growth nor a position of economic importance within the fur trade commensurate with that of New York. A second reason, closely tied to the first, was the direction and thrust of French activity in Indian affairs. It was their belief that the Iroquois and English of New York presented the major threat to French control of the Great Lakes and Mississippi valley. Consequently, it was in that direction rather than toward Pennsylvania that they turned their attention, which in turn solicited the English response noted above.¹⁷ However, it was not long before Pennsylvania found itself drawn into the orbit of international politics.

Peace lasted only until 1689 when the Iroquois became involved in a larger war between France and England resulting from the English Glorious Revolution. The Iroquois found themselves caught

¹⁶Release, Indian Affairs, 290-294; Instructions for Sir Edmund Andros, Apr. 16, 1688, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 548-549. For a succinct account of the French role in these events see Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, Chap. 6.

¹⁷Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 117; Eccles, France in America, 93.

once again between the two stronger European powers. Until they could enforce their position as both a sovereign and neutral entity, the Five Nations remained in a state of flux. Although the Indians tended to side with the English, in their eyes it was as an ally of equal status, rather than as a subordinate to Britain. As the war dragged on, and it became increasingly obvious to the Iroquois that they bore the brunt of the fighting, they intensified their search for peace and neutrality, conditions they viewed as vital to their very existence.

William of Orange assumed the English throne in February 1689, and England soon joined in the war against France which was already raging on the Continent. In the American phase of the Glorious Revolution, Bostonians overthrew Governor Andros in April, and Jacob Leisler assumed control in New York after Lieutenant-Governor Francis Nicholson fled the colony in June. The War of the League of Augsburg, known in the colonies as King William's War, lasted until the Peace of Ryswick in 1697. However, the Iroquois did not consider it over until they signed their own separate peace treaties four years later.¹⁸

Distinctly American peculiarities marked this conflict. In New York it was largely a continuation of previous discord be-

¹⁸ Trelease, Indian Affairs, 295-296; Leder, Robert Livingston, 61; also see Lawrence H. Leder, "The Glorious Revolution and the Patterns of Imperial Relationships," New York History, XLVI, (1965), 203-216.

tween the French, English, and Iroquois. The Iroquois feared a combined plot of both France and England to eliminate them. Shortly after receiving reassurance that this was a false rumor, the Indians resumed hostilities against the French for previously unappeased grievances. Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson did not object to this, although he refused members of the 1687 Roseboom-Magregory expedition permission to raid Canada in revenge for their previous losses, largely because he had not yet received definite word concerning the commencement of war. While Nicholson was too reserved for the Albanians, Leisler was too great a firebrand for them. Fearing any upset of their friendly relations with the Iroquois and a possible loss of their fur monopoly, Albany's leaders determined to maintain control of the city until new orders arrived from William and Mary. In Pennsylvania official news of King William's War and orders that the colony "take effectual care for the opposing and resisting any attempt of the French upon his Majesties Province of Pennsylvania" did nothing to arouse Quaker sympathy for the war or the plight of the empire. For the next three years pacifist Quakers refused to compromise and join forces with New York in its struggle with the French.¹⁹

¹⁹Leder, Robert Livingston, 61; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 296-297; Stephen Van Cortlandt to Gov. Andros, July 9, 1689, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 592-593; N.Y. Council to Albany Magistrates, May 12, 24, 1689, N.-Y. Hist. Soc., Collections, I (1868), 256-258, 266-267, 285-286; Earl of Shrewsbury to Gov. Blackwell, Apr. 13, 1689, Pa. Council Minutes, I, 302; also see Nov. 1, 4, 1689 Pa. Council Minutes, I, 302-311; Edwin B. Bronner, "The Quakers and Non-Violence in Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania History, XXXV (1968), 6-7.

On July 26, 1689, 1500 Iroquois warriors attacked and massacred the village of Lachine located about six miles from Montreal. Such attacks by the Five Nations forced Frontenac, who had since returned to Canada, to restrict hostilities to border raids against New England or New York. In retaliation for the Lachine massacre, Frontenac launched a three-pronged expedition. Two groups attacked Salmon Falls, New Hampshire and Casco Bay, Maine, while a third descended upon Schenectady on February 9, 1690. Frontenac's forces effectively destroyed Schenectady but also brought a certain unity to the English colonies, excepting Pennsylvania. Albany, fearful of further French attacks, finally submitted to Leisler in return for continued control of local affairs. They also desired to promote an attack on Canada to insure the elimination of future threats. The New England colonies and Maryland agreed to join New York in raising an expedition of 855 men for the reduction of Canada. Delighted at such prospects and believing that with English support they could defeat the French, the Iroquois agreed to assist in the joint effort. The expedition failed due to inadequate troops and supplies and to a smallpox epidemic which affected both the Indians and the English.²⁰ After 1690 the war settled down

²⁰Leder, Robert Livingston, 64-67; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 297-304; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 120, 122; Proposals of the Commissioners at Albany to the Indians, May 3, 1690, Lt.-Gov. Leisler to Earl of Shrewsbury, June 23, 1690, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 712 -714, 731-733.

to one of revenge and requital in which the Iroquois had the initial advantage of guerilla techniques. The French very quickly adopted Indian tactics, however, and forced the Iroquois to have second thoughts about their position.

The 1690 expedition's setback did not immediately weaken the Anglo-Iroquois alliance. Governor Henry Sloughter arrived in New York in March 1691 and, after settling certain governmental affairs, he travelled to Albany to meet with the Iroquois and dispense gifts among the tribes. The Crown's instructions to Sloughter revealed the English conception of relative positions within the Covenant Chain.

You are to encourage the Indians upon all occasions, so as that they may apply themselves to the English Trade and Nation rather than to any others of Europe,... and upon their renewing their submission to our Government, you are to give them our Royall Presents which we have caused to be provided for them, assuring them in our name that we will protect them as our subjects against the French king and his subjects.

Outwardly professing their allegiance to the British Crown, the Iroquois renewed the Covenant Chain and agreed to join a forthcoming raiding party. The raid had negligible results, and both the English and the Iroquois became increasingly frustrated at the course of the war. New York's problems were again largely financial due to the decline of the fur trade during the war. The colony could not provide for an offensive capability and relied instead on Albany's defenses and whatever support the Iroquois would lend

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the cause.

Supplies such as guns and ammunition became scarce and more expensive as the war dragged on, increasing the Five Nation's desire for peace. In August 1692 Benjamin Fletcher replaced the recently deceased Sloughter. Fletcher's orders to deal with the Iroquois were similar to those of his predecessor. Complaints about Pennsylvania's refusal to join in the war for defensive measures against the French resulted in the Crown abrogating Penn's political rights and placing the colony under Fletcher's control as a joint royal governorship. Despite continued complaints and a request from Queen Mary to the other colonial governors to assist New York in its struggle, little effort was made to prosecute the war vigorously.²²

Fletcher found himself continually forced to badger the Quaker Assembly for the money requested by the Queen for "aiding

²¹Minutes of the Lords of Trade concerning New York, Aug. 31, 1689, Instructions for Gov. Henry Sloughter, Jan. 31, 1690, Minutes of Indian Conference held at Albany, May 26-June 4, 1691, Robert Livingston to Gov. Sloughter, July 2, 1691, Propositions of the Senecas and Mohawks at Albany and the Answer thereunto, Sept. 4, 1691, O'Callaghan ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 618, 690, 773-780, 783, 806-808.

²²N.Y. Council to Mr. Blathwayt, May 30, 1692, Five Nations to Richard Ingoldsby, June 6, 1692, Instructions to Gov. Fletcher, Mar. 7, 1692, Ibid., 837, 842-844, 823, 861; Order of King in Council, Mar. 1, 1692, Sainsbury, et al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies (40 vols., London, 1860-1939), Vol. 1689-1692, Doc. 2094 (hereafter cited as Cal. St. Pprs.); Various Complaints and Fletcher's Orders, Cal. St. Pprs., 1689-1692, Doc's. 1583, 1820, 2179, 2227, 2584; Order in Council amending Col. Fletcher's Commission as Gov. of Pa. May 12, 1692, and Commission, June 27, 1692, N.Y. Col. Docs., III, 835, 856-860.

and assisting from Time to Time... the Governor, or Commander in Chief of our said Province of New York, in the Maintenance and Defense of it during the present War." He received a small grant from the Pennsylvania Assembly and conditionally upon the proprietor's approval a gift of £ 300 after Penn had regained control of the colony in 1696. Pennsylvania's Quakers had backed off from their earlier strict pacifism, but it had taken the concentrated effort of Governor Fletcher and his successor Lieutenant-Governor William Markham.²³ Events in New York flowed no more smoothly for Fletcher than they did in Pennsylvania. He barely averted a crisis with the Indians just shortly after his arrival, when Richard Ingoldsby, the commander at Albany, refused to attack the French after they had raided several Mohawk villages. By calling out the militia and by the help of a retaliatory raid led by Peter Schuyler, Fletcher quieted the anger of the Iroquois. Nevertheless, many of the Indians continued to desire peace. Fletcher arranged a large conference with the Five Nations in June 1693 in an attempt to

²³See various letters and minutes of the Pennsylvania Assembly in Pa. Archives, Ser. VIII, Vol. I, 129, 150-151, 179, 186, 188, 192, 195-197 (hereafter cited as Pa. Ass. Minutes) and Pa. Council Minutes, I, 391-394, 453, 469-470, 486. For evidence of Fletcher's imperial concern for the conduct of Indian affairs see Gov. Fletcher to Wm. Markham June 12, Sept. 3, 1695, William Penn Papers, II, 294-295, 302, The American Philosophical Society, Phila., Pa. (microfilm copy); Gov. Fletcher to Pa. Council, Mar. 26, 1694, Ibid., I, 254; Gov. Fletcher to Lt.-Gov. Markham, Apr. 15, 1695, William Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, I, 13, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., Pa. (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as PPOC); Pa. Ass. Minutes, I, 159-160; Gov. Fletcher to Pa. Ass. May 23, 29, 1694, Pa. Council Minutes, I, 459-460, 463-464.

change their minds. Although happy to receive gifts and renew the Covenant Chain, the Indians' fundamental position remained the same.²⁴

Aquadacando, an Onondaga sachem, described well the Iroquois dilemma which would plague them for the rest of the century:

The mohagues are as if conquered, the Oneijas wavering, the Senekes have great force but [are] more inclined to bever hunting than warr so that the Onondages ly in the greatest danger. You hear in your ears the cry of the women and children for the losse of their husbands and relations, great promises were made now neer five years agoe that Quebeque should be taken by Sea but I dont hear that it is done. I sneak not in reference to Our Brother Caijenquiragoe [Fletcher]; he behaves himselfe like a soldier and hath not been long here. New England, Virginia and Maryland hath renewed the Covenant for them but that doth not knock the enemy in the head, so my senses are as drunk not knowing what to do.²⁵

Iroquois policy wavered for several years between a desire for peace and neutrality and a willingness by warlike elements of the tribes to continue battle. The Five Nations repeatedly asked for English support for a large-scale attack on Canada and for help when raided by French war parties. However,

²⁴Major Ingoldsby to Gov. Fletcher, Feb. 11, 1693, Peter Schuyler's Report to Gov. Fletcher, Journal of Gov. Fletcher's Expedition, Mar. 7, 1693, Gov. Fletcher's Speech to the Indian Sachems and Answer, Feb. 25, 1693, Minutes of Conference with the Five Nations at Albany, June-July, 1693, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 6-7, 14-24, 38-47.

²⁵Journal of Major Dirck Wessel's Embassy to Onondaga, Aug., 1693, Ibid., IV, 62.

a continued lack of substantial British aid convinced the Iroquois of the necessity for permanent neutrality and complete balance between England and France. They feared their own annihilation if either nation emerged as the total victor. News of the Peace of Ryswick, signed in October, reached the colonies late in 1697. Eight years of war had done little to solve the basic problems confronting England and France, and the stalemate persisted. Curiously enough, the Iroquois found it very difficult to arrive at a viable peace agreement with both the French and the English for another four years.²⁶

While Indian affairs in New York centered around King William's War and engulfed Pennsylvania on a financial and military basis, important internal changes were also taking place within the Quaker colony. A central problem for the development of Pennsylvania's Indian trade was a lack of indigenous Indians. Disease, warfare, and adoption had greatly decreased original numbers, and the Iroquois, who held nominal control over the area, were anxious to see the Susquehanna repopulated to prevent European settlement and as a military buffer against their enemies. Unsuccessful war with the western Indians had driven a tribe known as the Shawnee from their original home on the Ohio. The Shawnee Indians were closely allied with the Delaware and Mahican, which facilitated

²⁶Trelease, Indian Affairs, 314-323; Leder, Robert Livingston, 134-135.

an eastward migration. With Iroquois approval the newcomers settled on the upper Delaware River and the lower Susquehanna, and Governor Fletcher adopted them into the Covenant Chain in 1694. However, the Shawnee occupied a tributary position which indicated the increasing importance within the Covenant Chain of the Iroquois.²⁷

Despite the arrival of various bands of Shawnee in the Susquehanna valley and their trading connections with the western tribes, Pennsylvania's Indian trade developed only slowly. Penn's initial problem upon regaining control of his colony in 1696 was to acquire valid title to the area. As noted, he acquired Dongan's quit claim to the Susquehanna lands the following year, and after his return to the colony in 1700 he made another purchase from the Conestoga Indians.²⁸ Final negotiations took place in April 1701 at a great and long-remembered treaty with the chiefs of all the Susquehanna tribes and a representative of the Onondaga. The treaty provided for the creation of an everlasting peace in which the Indians would have full privileges in the law. It also required the Indians to trade only with properly approved and licensed traders, not to sell their furs or skins outside the province, and

²⁷Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 84-88, 96; Maj. Schuyler to Five Nations, Feb. 6, 1694, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 90; Indian Treaty, Albany, Aug. 15-20, 1694 and Kingston, Aug. 28, 1694, William Penn Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 14, 27, 32, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., Pa. (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Penn Papers, Ind. Affairs).

²⁸Susquehanna Deed, Sept. 13, 1700, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 133-134.

not to permit settlement west of the Susquehanna River by any strange Indians without Penn's approval. This transfer of the Susquehanna title paved the way for the development of Pennsylvania's Indian trade in the eighteenth century. Penn recognized many of the problems that his colony would have to face upon entering the Indian trade and that central to entry and for protection against French encroachments, both military and economic, would be the preservation of Indian good will. While many problems remained unsolved, such as the use of liquor in the fur trade, Pennsylvania, unlike many other colonies, maintained peaceful relations with its Indians until 1755.²⁹

While events in Pennsylvania were developing along lines of proprietary interest, New York and the British Crown successfully came to grips with several Iroquois problems left unsettled at the end of King William's War. Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, arrived in the colony in April 1698 to take up the governorship of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. The Crown hoped thereby to organize and unite the colonies more effectively against Canada. Shortly thereafter, at Bellomont's orders, Peter Schuyler and Domine Godfrey Dellius travelled to Canada with news of the Ryswick treaty and instructions to arrange

²⁹Susquehanna Indian Treaty, Apr. 23, 1701, James Logan Papers, Vol. XI, Indian Affairs, 2-3, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., Pa. (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs); May 17, 1701, Pa. Council Minutes, II, 18-19.

for a prisoner exchange. Frontenac agreeably released his English prisoners, but not his Iroquois ones. He insisted that the Five Nations must conclude a separate treaty with the French, thus challenging English jurisdiction over the tribes. Bellomont met with the Iroquois at Albany in July in order "to continue them faithful and prevent their being debauched by the French kindness or menaces." He returned from the conference convinced that he had regained the friendship of the Five Nations. However, although the Indians agreed to refrain from dealing with the French, they neglected to inform the new governor of negotiations already under-way with Canada for a separate peace.³⁰

A variety of abuses against the Iroquois further persuaded them of the need for an independent position within the context of the Covenant Chain. Governor Bellomont quickly became convinced that the Indian Commissioners at Albany were misusing their position. Most serious of the complaints came from the Mohawk, who claimed that the commissioners under Fletcher had defrauded them of a part of their lands. This threatened the fur trade and security of the colony, since it weakened Anglo-Iroquois relations. Bellomont removed Fletcher's Indian Commissioners and returned their duties to

³⁰Bellomont's Instructions to Schuyler and Dellius, Apr. 22, 1698, Frontenac to Bellomont, June 8, 1698, Report of Schuyler's and Dellius' Negotiations in Canada, July 2, 1698, Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, July 1, Sept. 14, 1698, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 341-344, 347-351, 334, 362-364.

the Albany magistrates. Both the Council and Assembly after some debate agreed to a bill vacating the land grants. Although the law met with mixed reaction, the Crown ultimately upheld its constitutionality.

However, continued abuses kept the Five Nations in a state of confusion as to how to balance French and English power. A fear of offending the New York government restrained the Indians in many of their dealings with the French. In reality a separate peace with Canada, although undesirable from the English point of view, would not have brought down England's wrath upon the Iroquois, since the English feared alienating the Indians.³¹

Immediate need for negotiation evaporated when Chevalier de Callières, Frontenac's successor, released all the French-held Iroquois captives by June 1699. The five Nations found that peace did not automatically follow the prisoner release, for the western tribes continued their raids into the Iroquois country. Commissions appointed under the Treaty of Ryswick continued to discuss the political status of the Indian, but until they reached a specific resolution, the English could do little to support their allies in this matter. While in Boston in early 1700, Bellomont received word of a conspiracy which he feared involved the Iroquois. He noted in a letter to the Board of Trade: "If a speedy and effectual course

³¹Frelease, Indian Affairs, 337-341; Leder, Robert Livingston, 134.

be not taken, we shall lose the five nations irrevocably, I foresee it plainly; the French never applied themselves so industriously, as they do now, to debauch them from us; and we on our parts have nothing, nor do nothing to keep 'em in good humor steady to us."³²

Bellomont quickly sent Robert Livingston, Peter Schuyler, and Hendrick Hansen of Albany to Onondaga to talk with the Indians and to arrange a conference for the following August. They found no evidence of a plot against the English, but reported that the Iroquois were demoralized and wavered between the French and the English. Livingston declared

that two things are the principle cause of our Indians desertion.

1.) Fear; Seeing the French so formidable as to destroy their cattle and we are not able to protect them.

2.) Our neglect of sending ministers among them to instruct them in the Christian faith.

I do humbly offer that it is morally impossible to secure the 5 nations to the English interest any longer, without building Forts and securing the passes that lead to their Castles.

Bellomont forwarded Livingston's report to England and eventually incorporated many of its suggestions into his own policy. Since Dongan, no one had had as good a grasp of the frontier situation and its realities as Bellomont.

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³²Trelease, Indian Affairs, 342-344; Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, Feb. 28, 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 606-610.

³³Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, April 1700, Gov. Bellomont to Lords of Trade, May 25, 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 644-646, 648-652; Leder, Robert Livingston, 151-153.

English and French alike during the summer of 1700 held conferences with the Five Nations in order to win Iroquois allegiance or at least neutrality. Callières and the Iroquois exchanged peace pledges in Montreal. After agreeing upon the restoration of Indian prisoners, Callières declared a truce and arranged for a great conference during August of the following year. Bellomont similarly held a meeting with the Five Nations in August. Continued warfare hindered any successful prospects for the fur trade, and Bellomont urged the Indians to strive for peace with the western tribes to prevent the trade's further decline and any dissolution of the confederacy itself. Solemnly accepting the gifts and renewing the Covenant Chain, the Iroquois agreed to make peace but again neglected to tell the English of their French negotiations.³⁴

A similar pattern of events emerged the following summer. In July 1701 a meeting between the Iroquois and the western tribes got underway. After much wrangling over the exchange of prisoners, they concluded a peace on August fourth. Three days later the French concluded their agreement with the Iroquois. In exchange for trading rights and recognition of their traditional claims east of Detroit, the Five Nations agreed to remain neutral in any future wars between France and England.

³⁴Release, Indian Affairs, 347; Conference of Governor Bellomont with the Indians, Aug., 1700, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 727-746.

While they solidified arrangements in Canada, the Iroquois also met with Lieutenant-Governor John Nanfan at Albany. Showing primary allegiance to the English, the Indians deeded their western beaver lands to the King in exchange for his protection in their use of them. The Iroquois had established their neutrality and independence as best they could, while still satisfying both the French and the English.³⁵

The Albany and Montreal treaties of 1701 laid the basic groundwork for the events of the eighteenth century in both Pennsylvania and New York. The French had recognized their inability to crush the Iroquois, just as the latter had recognized the English would not commit themselves to the full extent necessary to eliminate the French. These facts, when combined with English abuses and attempts at domination, caused the Iroquois to fear for their very existence. Thus, their early position as a semi-subordinate, pro-British ally changed. Recognizing the fruitlessness of the beaver wars and fearing further involvement between France and England, the Iroquois ultimately determined upon neutrality as best suited to their needs. The English colonies feared the loss of the Indians as

³⁵Conference of Lt.-Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, Deed from the Five Nations to the King of the Beaver Hunting Ground, July 19, 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 896-910; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 362-363; Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality," 229-233.

an offensive barrier to French advances, but they were quick to realize in the eighteenth century that Iroquois neutrality could be just as effective. Indeed, Pennsylvania sought to take advantage of this neutrality and the enhanced position of the Iroquois within the Covenant Chain over the tributary tribes within its own boundaries. The Covenant Chain as an institution continued to evolve during the eighteenth century, both as new tribes entered, and as members' positions changed within it. Coincidentally, the Indian tribes of both New York and Pennsylvania stabilized and became well-disposed toward the English at the same time.

A balance of power had emerged, albeit an uneasy one, in which the participants could pursue the profits of the fur trade. Ultimately the English would use this framework to pursue expansionist goals of imperialism. However, at least for the moment, the Iroquois as the most important assemblage of Indians had forced the European powers to recognize their territorial claims and in turn relinquished rights only to lands west of Detroit, lands which they could not hold anyhow and which had been at the root of most Indian wars since the 1650s. Strict neutrality placed the Iroquois in a position as the balance of power between the French and the English colonies. These two nations embarked upon a policy during the next half-century which sought to maintain this neutrality, for each continually feared the consequences of a potential alliance of the Iroquois with the other side.

CHAPTER III

QUEEN ANNE'S WAR

Maintaining good relations with the Indians and, in particular, maintaining Iroquois neutrality remained the basic aims of both the French and the English during the first decade of the eighteenth century. Their desire to avoid actual fighting and, more important, to protect the fur trade which had languished for many years lay behind their effort to preserve the Indians' neutrality. During Queen Anne's War, France refrained from all attacks on New York largely because the Montreal traders, as well as those of Albany, hoped to keep open the New York-Canada fur exchange. Pennsylvania likewise hoped to enlarge its as yet infant trade. Furthermore, the treaties of 1701 provided for Iroquois neutrality, and neither European nation desired to upset the balance between themselves. New York and Pennsylvania agreed to support expeditions against Canada in 1709 and 1711 only under pressure from England and with the mother country's direct assistance. The Five Nations continued to balance one European nation off against the other by upholding a neutral position, thereby hoping to maintain their very existence. When the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought an end to major hostilities between the French and English, fur again became the major preoccupation of the colonies.

The inter-war years from 1697-1702 provided the colonies with little but a breathing spell. It was a time in which the colonies could restructure and confirm Indian relations and prepare for future emergencies. Both New York and Pennsylvania sought to develop their respective fur trades. New York had exported only 5,000 to 15,000 skins during the last two decades of the seventeenth century, which marked a sharp decrease in contrast to exports for the years prior to conflict with the French. Pennsylvania had never exported large numbers of skins, although individual traders had frequently made reasonable profits from the trade. When the Indians returned to harvesting peltry after 1700, they discovered that the demand for beaver had dropped drastically. Hoping to restore the beaver hat to stylistic favor again, the Iroquois gave Lieutenant-Governor John Nanfan "ten Beavers to send to the King praying his majesty to make a Beaver hat of them and then wee hope all his good subjects will follow his example and were [sic] Beaver hatts again as the fashion was formerly." Meanwhile William Penn solicited his agent in the colony, James Logan, to further develop the fledgling fur trade. "O that we had a fur-trade instead of a tobacco one, and that thou wouldst do all that is possible to master furs and skins for me, but bears more especially." Interestingly, Penn believed at this time that bearskins would provide more profit than the beaver in which New York dealt, or the deerskin trade which would subsequently develop in Pennsylvania. While many complained of the poor state of trade, fur continued to

constitute a large percentage of New York and Pennsylvania exports and to shape further the evolution of colonial Indian policy.¹

Statistics for the quantity and value of fur exported by New York and Pennsylvania from 1699 to 1713 help explain evolving Indian policy.² England declared war upon France in May 1702, and

¹Leach, Northern Frontier, 115; Trelease, Indian Affairs, 216-217, 323-324; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," Chap. III; Conference of Lt.-Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 905; Wm. Penn to James Logan Feb. 24, 1703, Correspondence between William Penn and James Logan, 1700-1750 (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1870-1872), I, 170. Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," and Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania" both contain detailed accounts of James Logan's somewhat nefarious career as proprietary agent in Pennsylvania.

²A short description of the British Customs Records and the information derived from them pertaining to this study is contained in the Appendix. Customs officials compiled their ledgers beginning in 1607, but the first complete records available for New York and Pennsylvania started in 1699. The tables at the end of this chapter include the years 1699-1713, and references to any figures derive directly from the information contained therein.

Compilers of the data for Customs 3 based their figures on fixed official values at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Consequently, they erected a constant value series as opposed to a current value series, which would have shown the fluctuating values of each individual year. A current value series reflects the variations due to price changes. For purposes of this study, a constant value series allows better measurement of the changing volume of trade. However, John McCusker recently erected a commodity price index (C.P.I.) for the years 1697-1800, which allows the conversion of the constant value series to a current value series. The CPI prepared by F.B. Schumpeter and E.W. Gilboy in the 1930s, provided the basis for McCusker's index. They based the original index largely on products internal to England rather than imported items. As a result, McCusker's index most accurately reflects exports from England rather than imports. Nevertheless, included in the text is a table for each period which reflects the current value of the fur exported from New York and Pennsylvania to England. Hopefully this may shed some further light on the topic, despite

the conflict soon spread to the colonies, where it was known as Queen Anne's War. Fur had regained its accustomed position of economic importance for New York and Canada, and Pennsylvania had finally developed the factors necessary to the trade. Thus, none of the principals wanted to lose the trade again to the ravages of war. The extremely high figure of over £ 5,000 worth of beaver exported by New York in 1699 most likely reflected the end of King William's War and a short return to peace (see Table III-1). The following year saw a more representative export of £ 2,864, which dropped drastically, however, to less than £ 500 by the first year of Queen Anne's war. The value of both beaver and all furs remained at a low level after 1702. In contrast to New York, Pennsylvania exported little beaver, but a much higher percentage of deerskin. During the first part of the eighteenth century, bearskins were also an important item in Pennsylvania's total fur exports, evidence that Penn clearly understood the nature of his colony's trade. Like its northern neighbor, Pennsylvania experienced a boom in fur exports between the wars, a boom which

inherent inaccuracies.

A more detailed examination and the conversion table for data included in the Customs 3 records is contained in an article by John J. McCusker entitled "The Current Value of English Exports, 1697 to 1800," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXVIII (1971), 607-628. Also valuable are Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697-1808 (Oxford, 1960), 1-14 and G.N. Clarke, Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696-1722 (London, 1938), 1-42.

declined sharply after 1703 and again in 1709. Although the quantity and value of furs exported from the two colonies fluctuated during the war, the figures did not return to their earlier levels until the cessation of hostilities.³

Tensions which had built up in America burst forth in a series of raids on New England frontiers. New York and Pennsylvania initially remained free of any conflict, largely because of the participants' desire to maintain neutrality for the preservation of the fur trade and the latter's inclination toward pacifism. Only during the two expeditions to reduce Canada did the colonies diverge from their major intentions. The Indians provided a defensive buffer against the French during the war, and Iroquois neutrality in particular played an important role in keeping the New York-Pennsylvania frontier quiet.⁴

Learning their lesson well from the first inter-colonial war, the Five Nations determined to balance one European nation off against the other. Additionally, they courted both Pennsylvania

³Table III-4 contains figures computed on the basis of the current value of the exports from New York and Pennsylvania to London. The values of beaver, deerskin, and total furs lend further support to these conclusions and those that follow. Percentage columns in the current value series remain the same as in the constant value series, because the Commodity Price Index figure used for each year is constant for all categories.

⁴David M. Ellis, A Short History of New York State (Ithaca, 1957), 53; William Smith, The History of the Late Province of New York, from its Discovery to the Appointment of Governor Colden in 1762, N.-Y. Hist. Soc., Collections, (2 vols., 1829-1830), I, 153-154; Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, 142.

and New York in seeking out the best trade advantages. Lord Cornbury, New York's governor, met with the Indians at Albany during July and August 1702, at which time they informed him of their intent to maintain the peace. They further indicated their displeasure at trade conditions and the lack of concern with which the English treated them. By the spring of 1704 several Iroquois chieftains had come to Philadelphia to request the establishment of a trade and "friendly Correspondence." Finalization of this event in late August marked an important point in the development of Pennsylvania's Indian trade, for with Iroquois cooperation the colony could now move out from under New York's economic shadow. This change and the quest for neutrality did little to enlarge or, in New York's case prior to 1708, maintain the trade, as indicated by the low figures for 1702-1713 (see Table III-1). Nevertheless a policy of neutrality was welcome to all except the New Englanders, who consequently bore the brunt of French attacks.⁵

Despite its policy of neutrality and its desire to pursue the fur trade, New York did not totally neglect its defenses. Lord Cornbury, in his 1702 address to the Assembly, noted the need for fortifying the port of New York and providing for frontier defense.

⁵Alexander C. Flick, ed., History of the State of New York (10 vols., New York, 1933-1937), II, 216-217; Conference of Lord Cornbury with the Indians, July-August 1702, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IV, 978-999; Several Indian Conferences, May 9, 10, Aug. 28, Sept. 1, 1704, Pa. Council Minutes, II, 140-141, 158-159.

In November the House accordingly passed a law to raise £ 1800 for the maintenance of 150 "fusileers" on the frontier plus thirty "outscouts." During this same session, it also passed a bill for the "better settling of the militia" to make it more useful for the defense of the colony. The legislature approved a similar law the following year, raising £ 1300 for the protection of the frontiers. All remained calm during the winter of 1703-1704, but in April 1704 Cornbury again asked the Assembly to provide and provision 150 men for the frontier, some of whom would protect outlying farms to prevent their abandonment. Fearing that Cornbury had misused previous funds, the House refused to allocate new money pending an investigation. Discovery of a balance of £ 1,000 in the governor's coffers and the Council's repeated attempts to amend money bills encouraged the House in its refusal to approve any funds for defense of the frontier.⁶

William Penn and his governors were likewise aware of the importance of defense for the security of Pennsylvania. In August 1701 Penn called a joint conference of Council and Assembly concerning the King's request for £ 350 to aid New York in defending its frontier by the erection of a series of forts. The Assembly refused to contribute, pleading the exigencies of high taxes and

⁶Smith, History of New York, I, 151-154; Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York (2 vols., New York, 1764-1766), I, 149-150, 153, 158, 174-175, 182, 187, 189, 192-194 (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as N.Y. Assembly Journals); Colonial Laws of New York, I, 493-494, 500-507, 562; Flick, History of New York, II, 164.

debts and the colony's yet infant state. James Logan wrote to Penn the following year expressing fear that the Canadian neutrality treaty with the Iroquois would remove them as a protective barrier. "Albany, by it, seems ruined; and we shall be greatly exposed when that barrier of the Five Nations is removed." He recognized the defensive value of the Iroquois to Pennsylvania, but failed to see that Indian neutrality could be just as effective as an offensive ally. By November 1702 Governor Andrew Hamilton was urging the Assembly to care for "the naked and defenseless State of the Province." Hamilton noted

The Greatest Danger we seem to be in by land is from the French and their Indians of Canada, and the likeliest method to prevent harm from that Quarter is to Joyn with our neighbours of New York in fortifying the Frontiers at Albany, and some passes near it. It will neither be safe nor Reputable for this Government to lett the whole Burthen lye upon New York, seeing we are Embarqued with them in the same Bottom, and must Fall under the like if the Enemy should Possess them Selves of the Frontiers, For want of timely assistance.

He also requested a voluntary militia which, while the Quakers would not have to join, would allow others to do so. The Quaker dominated Assembly refused to acquiesce to Hamilton's requests, and 1704 witnessed his successor, John Evans, pleading for similar help. Cornbury requested Evan's aid in convincing the Pennsylvania Assembly to comply with the Queen's renewed requisition for the £ 350. Evans expressed disappointment over the Assembly's subsequent refusal to aid New York whose defense contributed to

Pennsylvania's security. He warned, "we shall have too little reason to blame them, if when they have opportunities as they fail to extend their Regards to our welfare."⁷

Clearly the two governors recognized that cooperation on matters of defense were vital for the security of both colonies. However, New York and Pennsylvania continued to go their own separate ways due primarily to Quaker intransigence. Additionally, Logan noted in a letter to William Penn that New York was "jealous" of the Iroquois establishing a treaty and competitive trade with Pennsylvania.⁸ It was yet too early for complete inter-colonial cooperation, for while the stakes were high, the immediate danger of French encroachment was not great enough to overcome political and economic jealousies or Quaker pacifism.

Continued fears of French encroachment and Pennsylvania's failure to contribute anything to the cause again led Cornbury in June 1705 to stress the necessity of raising money for the colony's defense. He noted French and Indian designs to attack the Five Nations

who if they see we are not willing, or not able to support and defend them, against their Enemies, will the more easily be persuaded to go over to the French, the ill Consequences wherof are so well known, that I need not mention them to you.

⁷Various letters and speeches relative to colonial defense, Aug. 1701-May 1704, Pa. Council Minutes, II, 28, 30-31, 41, 78-79, 133-136, 142-143; James Logan to Wm. Penn, May 2, 1702, Penn-Logan Correspondence, I, 88-89.

⁸James Logan to Wm. Penn, Sept. 28, 1704, Ibid., 320-321.

The Assembly recognized the need for defense and agreed to provide the necessary money, with the stipulation that it be paid out by "their treasurer." A joint conference held in October could not resolve the differences between Council and Assembly. Although the frontiers were open to attack, the House provided no money until 1706, when the Queen approved the establishment of an Assembly Treasurer. At that time, the legislature again provided for the militia for a one year period.⁹

While New York struggled to maintain its defenses, Pennsylvania continued to stabilize its Indian relations. In May 1705 several tribes expressed uneasiness over suspected hostilities with Maryland and Virginia as well as the Five Nations. James Logan travelled to Conestoga in October to quiet those fears and told them of the Assembly's intention to pass new legislation "more effectually to put in practice what has been so much wished for in Vain." Logan also warned the Indians of the importance of peace and that the English armed themselves only for protection against the French. After several weeks of debate between the House and the Council, Governor Evans on January 12, 1706, signed into law a bill for improving relations with the Indians. The new act noted the importance of Indian friendship to the peace and welfare of the colony and provided £ 50 per annum for the expense

⁹N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 196-207, 214, 216-217, 212; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 598, 591; Flick, History of New York, II, 164; Smith, History of New York, I, 153-160.

of treaties. It also required the licensing of all fur traders and prohibited them from disposing of furs and skins outside the province. Evans presented and explained this new legislation at a meeting with the Indians in Philadelphia the following June and, after an exchange of gifts, the conference broke up amicably.¹⁰

Both New York and Pennsylvania continued to express concern for good Indian relations over the next several years primarily for reasons of defense and the British interest. In December 1706 the Pennsylvania Assembly pleaded with Governor Evans to "admit of no Treaties with the Indians, but such as may directly tend to the Honour of God, the Interest of the Queen, and the publick Weal of her People in these Parts." During the summer of 1707 Evans made several trips to visit with the Indians and assure them of Pennsylvania's friendship and to warn them against ill rumors about the English.¹¹ When the next session of the New York Assembly convened in 1708, Cornbury addressed them concerning "the propriety of making presents to the Indians," to which the legislature readily agreed. They hoped to maintain the Iroquois in their neutral position, both for reasons of trade and defense. In September

¹⁰Indian meeting, May 12, 1705, Logan's Report and Indian Conference, June 6, 7, 1706, Pa. Council Minutes, II, 191, 244-247; The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682-1801, (17 vols., Harrisburg, 1896-1915), II, 229-231 (hereafter cited as Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania).

¹¹Assembly to Gov. Evans, Dec. 28, 1706, Pa. Assembly Minutes, I, 667-668; Gov. Evans to Council, Aug. 31, 1706, Gov. Evans' Account of Indian Conferences, June 27-July 1, 1707, Pa. Council Minutes, 251, 386-390.

the legislators appropriated £ 450 for Indian gifts "to Encourage them to continue their Obedience and Loyalty to her Majesty." Cornbury and the Council also approved bills for the defense of the colony and the continued organization of the militia. Concern for the colony's safety did not preclude a preoccupation with the fur trade. On October 28 the New York Assembly received a message from the Council informing them of a bill just passed by the upper house that prevented all trade and commerce with the French at Canada and that regulated the Indian trade at Albany. The House refused to concur in that bill or in a second which regulated the transportation of furs, peltry, and other skins. Fur still remained important in New York, regardless of whether it came directly from the Iroquois or from the French in Canada.¹²

New York's Governor Cornbury had succeeded by 1708 in mismanaging the affairs of government in most areas of concern. One contemporary wrote, "we never had a governor so universally detested, nor any who so richly deserved the public abhorance. In spite of his noble descent, his behaviour was trifling, mean, and extravagant." His department alienated most of the colony, but in the end he served one good purpose: he paved the way for a reconciliation of the factions which had begun in the Leislerian

¹²N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 220-221, 225-226, 237-238; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 607-608, 611; Smith, History of New York, I, 164-165. Also see Norton, Fur Trade of New York, which emphasizes New York's concern for neutrality during Queen Anne's War.

upheaval. Thus, when news of Governor Lovelace's imminent arrival reached New York, the populace awaited him with open arms.¹³

Lovelace arrived in the colony in December 1708 with a two-fold purpose. The Crown proposed settlement under his direction of several thousand Palatines on New York's frontier. England hoped that the settlers would supply Britain with naval stores, thereby reducing its dependence on the Baltic, provide a substantial revenue for the colony, and act as a security buffer against the French. More closely linked to the problem of Indian affairs, however, was an expedition for the reduction of Canada. England, after several victories over France in the European theater, turned its attention to the colonies. Plans for the expedition called for a land assault against Montreal with troops from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, and a sea attack on Quebec by British forces in conjunction with those of New England. Lovelace convened a new Assembly on April 5, and he informed the members "that he had brought with him large supplies of soldiers and stores of war, as well as presents for the Indians." However, Lovelace died shortly thereafter, and command of the project devolved upon Colonel Francis Nicholson, who had earlier been Lieutenant-Governor. On May 17, 1709, the House received news of the proposed expedition and resolved to do all it could to support

¹³Smith, History of New York, I, 167.

the Queen's instructions.¹⁴

Pennsylvania's Governor, Charles Gookin, returned to the colony in late May, having conferred about the proposed expedition in New York. He laid before Council the Queen's instructions that Pennsylvania raise and supply 150 men to be ready at Albany, ironically, by mid-May. In support of the expedition the Council ordered an embargo "be laid upon all ships and Vessels in the ports of this government." On June 2 Gookin informed the Assembly of the Queen's order, noting that "the Charge, I believe, will amount to about £ 4,000." Within a week the House resolved to raise a present of £ 500 for the Queen's use, since they could not "for Conscience sake comply with the furnishing a supply for such a defence as thou proposest"; the governor roundly chided them for the smallness of the appropriation. Gookin also sent a message to the Indians near Conestoga telling them of the proposed expedition and offering a good reward if they would join.¹⁵

While Gookin's preparations suffered due to Quaker pacifism, proponents of the expedition in New York faced opposition

¹⁴Queen to Lord Lovelace, Mar. 1, 1709, Board of Trade to Lovelace, Mar. 28, 1709, Lord Sunderland to Lovelace, Apr. 28, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 70-74; Smith, History of New York, I, 168; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 247; Leder, Robert Livingston, 204-205.

¹⁵Pa. Council Minutes, II, 449-452, 460-462; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 857-858, 860, 864-866.

from the Albany fur interest. New York had previously been unwilling to take an offensive role in the war for fear of upsetting the fur trade and instigating French attacks. Only under pressure from England and with the increased hope of a smashing victory over Canada were New Yorkers willing to sacrifice the benefits of neutrality. Even so, a group of Albany traders doubted the wisdom of this new policy. By 1708 the value of fur had registered a distinct increase over the early war years (see Table III-1). This marked growth explained in large part the traders' opposition to the Canadian expedition which might reduce that commerce. One especially disgruntled citizen noted, "Interest that governs all the world, Tyrannizes at New York. At Albany where they trade with the French at Canada, the Handlaers,... are against it."¹⁶

Despite these hesitations, the war fever caught on, and preparations proceeded at a hectic rate throughout the summer. Everyone expected the defeat of Canada before the season ended, "an event which would put a period to all the ravages of an encroaching, merciless enemy, extend the British empire, and augment trade." On May 23 New York's governor and Council agreed to a bill raising £ 6,000 for the expedition. The following month the Assembly voted to detach 487 men for the expedition and to

¹⁶Thomas Cockerill to Popple, July 2, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 80-81.

raise an additional £ 4,000 for their support. Finally, during September the legislature passed a law for the better settling of the militia. Lieutenant-Governor Ingoldsby held a conference with four of the Five Nations at Albany in July. Although the Seneca refused to participate, Ingoldsby gained the support of the other nations for the expedition. Credit for raising 600 Iroquois warriors was largely due to Colonel Schuyler, a perennial favorite among the Indians. Despite their great show of interest in the project, however, the Iroquois hesitated to abandon their neutrality and its advantages by too extensive an effort.¹⁷

In spite of the elaborate preparations for the expedition, it failed, causing great consternation among the people. Military reverses in Portugal had forced England to divert to the European theater the naval forces intended for the Quebec assault. Without British support, the whole affair quickly deteriorated and became a fiasco. By summer's end the Pennsylvania Assembly had not finalized its resolution to provide the Queen with £ 500 or an additional £ 300 voted in July for expenses and presents to keep the Indians content. The delay was due to bickering over the passage of other legislation, while using the supply bill as leverage, and a belief that the immediacy of the French danger was

¹⁷ Smith, History of New York, I, 170-173; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 249, 252, 258; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 659, 675; Propositions of Lt.-Gov. Ingoldsby to Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, and Cayugas at Albany, July 14, 1709, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 206-210; Flick, History of New York, II, 220.

not great. New York, believing itself more directly in danger of French reprisal, reacted differently. Leaders of the expedition met with the Indian Commissioners and Albany's magistrates on August 12 to prepare an account of the colony's present condition. They noted the "Deplorable and dangerous Condition these frontiers will be in this winter if Canada should not now be Reduced" and suggested several alternatives to protect the colony. The Assembly followed soon thereafter with a memorial to the Queen. "We Conceive it our indispensable duty to lay at royal foot how dangerous the French are seated at Canada and the maxims they follow for making themselves formidable there." Ingoldsby requested the Assembly to provide a fund for strengthening the forts. The House, emphasizing the great cost of the abortive expedition, refused and instead asked the lieutenant-governor to put the Crown's regular troops on duty to protect the frontier. Thus, both assemblies, although for different reasons, retreated into the neutrality of the earlier war years.¹⁸

In contrast to 1709, the following year was largely peaceful, although the colonists were still wary of French dangers. On April 14 Governor Gookin laid before the Council a communication

¹⁸Minutes of Indian Conference, Phila., July 25-29, 1709, Pa. Council Minutes, II, 469-475; Ass., to Gov. Gookin, June 8, 1709, Gov. Gookin to Ass., Sept. 28, 1709, Ibid., 460, 492; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 874-877; Smith, History of New York, A, 172-175; Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 213-214; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 260-270.

from his counterpart in New York warning of a potential attack by a number of French and Indians, an indication that cooperation between the colonies operated at least on the gubernatorial level. This warning was somewhat surprising considering that New York had ignored New England and had largely abandoned it to French ravages during the early war years. It would not have been entirely inconceivable for it to have also ignored Pennsylvania for refusing to actively support the Quebec assault. Gookin's Council responded to the information by suggesting that the governor meet with the several tribes of Indians, discern their feelings, and quiet their fears. By late August matters were such that James Logan could inform Penn that there was little fear of Indian disturbance from either Pennsylvania's own tribes or the Iroquois with whom "we settled a firm peace and friendship." However, the governor, never totally secure about these fears, signed a bill in February 1711 to replace the one since expired for "Improving a Good Correspondence with the Indians." Similar to the 1706 act in most ways, the new law further restricted traders to their respective towns or places of abode because many disreputable ones frequently went far afield to cheat the Indians with rum, often before they even returned from their hunting. Thus, Pennsylvania continued to maintain a stability in its Indian affairs based on a clear understanding of needs, including the fur trade, rather than

an aggressive warlike policy.

While Pennsylvania worked at consolidating its Indian relations, New York underwent another change of governors. Robert Hunter arrived in New York on June 14, 1710, with the long-expected Palatine refugees, 2,000 in number. Mohawk sachems, upon whose land the Palatines were to have settled, reacted vigorously against the plan. They finally agreed "that her majesty shall have the land at Skohere for poor people, and not one foot more, provided it be duly purchased." However, Hunter finally settled the Palatines on Robert Livingston's manor rather than Schoharie.²⁰

Although New York had escaped French ravages in the past because of Iroquois neutrality and protection, many feared that recent participation in the Canada expedition would bring on direct conflict with the enemy. Failure to settle the Palatines on the frontier potentially exposed the colony to French attack, unless the Iroquois continued in their neutrality. To this end, Governor Hunter travelled to Albany in August 1710 to meet the Five Nations and renew the Covenant Chain. As a result of this conference, Hunter in-

¹⁹Pa. Council Minutes, II, 509-513; extract, Isaac Norris to Benj. Cole Aug. 29, 1710; Penn-Logan Correspondence, II, 428; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 965-967, 980; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, II, 365-368.

²⁰Mohawk Sachems to Indian Commissioners, July 3, 1710, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 215-216. For a more complete study of the Palatine experiment see Leder, Robert Livingston, 211-226 and Walter A. Knittle, The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration: A British Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores (Philadelphia, 1936).

sured the continued friendship of the Iroquois. New England requested Iroquois aid against French Indians who had raided those colonies, but New York refused to use its influence with the Five Nations for fear of upsetting this delicate balance of power and exposing its own frontiers to attack. All remained quiet in the colony until the following summer, when news arrived from England of a second expedition against Canada.²¹

Governor Hunter, as the expedition's leader, began preparing for the impending invasion upon receiving his instructions on June 14, 1711. He sent Colonel Schuyler to the Iroquois to convince them to join the campaign and then travelled to Connecticut to arrange details with the other governors. Governor Gookin did not go to New London, but at the Queen's orders met with Hunter and Colonel Nicholson in New York upon their return from Connecticut to discuss Pennsylvania's role. Upon Gookin's return to Philadelphia in July, he informed the Assembly of the expedition and the Queen's instructions. The Assembly readily agreed to provide £ 2,000 for the Queen's use, and on August 10 Gookin signed the bill into law. New York's Assembly convened on July 2 and heard the news of the attack on Canada. By the end of the month New York had passed laws raising 600 men and £ 10,000 for the expedition. Both

²¹Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug. 1710, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 217-229; Smith, History of New York, I, 178-179.

colonies had again taken part in the expedition, but only at England's instigation. Early in August Hunter went to Albany with General Nicholson, and the Iroquois arrived on the twenty-fourth with 700 warriors. After conferring with the Indians, the united forces proceeded to Lake Champlain, only to learn that fog and strong gales had engulfed the fleet and destroyed a large part of the troop transport. The few remaining ships salvaged what they could and sailed back down the Saint Lawrence, effectively ending another Canada expedition.²²

On October 2, 1711, Governor Hunter informed the New York Assembly of the Canada expedition's miscarriage and of the poor condition of frontier defenses. Consequently, the House resolved that Hunter should discharge the forces upon his arrival at Albany except for 150 men to protect the borders during the winter. On November 7 the legislature passed a law to raise 2,855 ounces of plate for improvement of the fortifications and for the colony's defense. Pennsylvania was so slow in actually collecting the £ 2,000 granted in August that Hunter was dunning them for its payment a year later. Except for a minor Indian attack against a New York village, no further incidents disrupted the calm

²² Gov. Hunter to Sec. St. John, Sept., 12, 1711, Proceedings of New London Congress, June 21, 1711, Conference between Governor Hunter and the Indians, Aug., 1711; Gen. Hill to Gov. Hunter, Aug. 25, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 252-261, 265-278; Pa. Council Minutes, II, 532, 534-538; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 985-987, 989-994, 998-1001; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, II, 388-399; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 289-296; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 723, 727.

of neutrality for either colony. A nominal force to guard the approaches to Albany, to which Pennsylvania more than freely acquiesced, remained the only vestige of wartime concern. No one suggested a further offensive move.²³

Events during 1712 followed much the same pattern as they had earlier when there were no expeditions against Canada. Preservation of Indian neutrality and the fur trade remained central to both colonies' policy. The Pennsylvania Council and Assembly met frequently with the Indians and provided various gifts to preserve good relations. Tacitly, the Quaker colony continued to accept New York's self-protection as its own by ignoring the potential danger of French attack. Somewhat in contrast, Governor Hunter addressed the New York Assembly in early May, warning them of the frontier dangers and emphasizing the need to provide for defense. During this session the legislature passed several money bills for support of frontier fortifications and garrisons. By December Governor Hunter had assented to those laws and to two others for repairing the colony's fortifications and organizing its militia.²⁴

²³N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 299-300, 302-304; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 745, 750; Pa. Council Minutes, II, 557; Indian Commissioners to Gov. Hunter, Oct. 20, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 281-282.

²⁴Pa. Council Minutes, 546-549, 553-560; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1038-1039; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 310, 315, 320, 331, 316-317, 319; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 757, 773, 778-779.

Peace was obviously near at hand in 1713, and all looked forward with great hope to a period of tranquility. The New York Assembly refused to do more than provide for the continued organization of the militia, while Pennsylvania did nothing. As usual, both colonies continued to meet with the respective tribes resident within their boundaries. Pennsylvania quieted Conestoga apprehensions that the Five Nations might cause trouble under a pretense of trading with the colony. This may have had direct connection to the news that the Iroquois were considering joining the Tuscarora and going to war against the Flathead Indians of North Carolina as they had the previous year. Certainly neither colony wished to see the balance of neutrality upset. Governor Hunter sent Hendrick Hansen and several others to Onondaga in September to confer with the Iroquois, hoping to deter them from their warlike intentions. Hansen took with him news of the Treaty of Utrecht which had since arrived in the colony and gifts to renew the Covenant Chain. He succeeded in dissuading the Iroquois from their plans for war, but they nevertheless refused to abandon completely the Tuscarora. After encouraging the Indians in their hunting and trade, Hansen promised them a conference with Governor Hunter in the near future "to take the hatchet out of [their] hands."²⁵

²⁵Pa. Council Minutes, II, 565-566; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 337-338, 441; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 781; Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, June 23, Dec. 16, 1712, Gov. Hunter to Sec. Popple, Sept. 10, 1713, Conference with the Five Nations at Onondaga, Sept., 1713, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 343, 351, 371-376.

The Treaty of Utrecht brought the cessation of hostilities and an increased concern for the fur trade, which had languished for many years. Article 15 of the treaty pertained specifically to the Indian situation.

The Subjects of France inhabiting Canada, and others, shall hereafter give no Hindrance or Molestation to the five Nations or Cantons of Indians subject to the Dominion of Great Britain, nor to the other Natives of America, who are Friends to the same. In like manner, the Subjects of Great Britain shall behave themselves towards the Americans, who are Subjects or Friends to France; and on both sides they shall enjoy full Liberty of going and coming on account of Trade. Also the Natives of those Countrys shall, with the same Liberty, resort, as they please, to the British and French Colonys, for promoting Trade on one side and on the other, without any Molestation or Hindrance, either on the part of the British subjects, or of the French.

What had been the de facto situation was now de jure, and herein lay the treaty's value. It justified many earlier actions by the English. Indians and white men could now freely ply their trade. This would remain the situation during the ensuing thirty years of peace.²⁶

Queen Anne's War had directly affected the trade and Indian policies of both New York and Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's total trade declined markedly after 1706, and the fur trade in particular never developed during the war years (see Table III-1).

²⁶ Fred L. Israel, Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967 (4 vols., New York, 1967), I, 210.

James Logan wrote of the trade in 1713, "We have never had much of it, and now less."²⁷ New York suffered a similar decline in its overall trade, and by 1706 the annual value of exported beaver had declined to less than £ 38. Furthermore, the value of beaver and all furs as percentages of New York's exports declined during the war, as had deerskin for Pennsylvania (see Table III-2). Although within two years the value of New York's beaver and fur exports had increased, it did not return to previous levels until 1714, at which time Pennsylvania experienced a similar increase in exports.

Despite the variations and disruptions in the fur trade during the war, it was clear that beaver was the most important item in New York's trade, while deerskin of various sorts occupied that position for Pennsylvania. In both colonies bearskin in particular, but also fisher, fox, and mink, played an important secondary role in rounding out total fur exports. Interestingly, during the pre-war years 1700-1703, Pennsylvania's fur trade contributed a higher percentage of the colony's total exports to London than did New York's trade (see Table III-2). This continued through 1706, but was due in large part to the rapid decline in New York's fur exports once hostilities commenced. A further comparison of interest can be made in the composition of the total beaver and deerskin trade of all major exporting colonies (see Tables III-4 and III-5). Pennsylvania's share of these markets in the early

²⁷Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," 69, 71-72, Logan quote, 83.

years of the eighteenth century was small; it had considerably less than one percent of the beaver trade and only a slightly higher percentage in most years of deerskin, despite its importance to the colony's individual trade. While New York also contributed only a small percentage of the total deerskin exported to London, often less than Pennsylvania, its beaver trade occupied a position of much greater importance. Except for the early years of Queen Anne's War, 1702-1706, New York's share was frequently more than forty percent and never less than twenty-five percent of total beaver exports. All this indicated that not only was the fur trade vital to each of the individual colonies, but that on a broader scale, New York's beaver trade was a major contributing factor as an important colonial export. England was most naturally concerned about the preservation of that trade in any conflict with France and would seek to insure its continuation. This would prove to be a major theme in future colonial affairs.

English aims throughout the war were to prevent French attacks and to protect the fur trade as completely as possible. Iroquois neutrality was essential to both ends, for it provided a defensive buffer against the French, especially for New York, and allowed the Indians to gather the fur necessary to the trade. The Five Nations as well as the French concurred in the desire for neutrality. The Iroquois hoped to maintain an independent position, subservient to neither European nation. In turn, the French hoped

to corner the fur trade, and Iroquois neutrality was necessary to this. Ironically, the Albany-Montreal trade and the non-aggressive policy of the English enabled the French to hold the fur rich western lands. To facilitate this and to keep the western Indians in tow, France needed to separate its native allies from the Iroquois and to provide them the trade goods which would make trading with Albany for English strouds and duffels unnecessary. Thus, the Albany-Montreal trade provided exactly what the French needed, while a sufficient supply of fur at Albany and a yet dormant trade in Pennsylvania coupled with Quaker pacifism worked against westward expansion prior to 1713. Only under the direct pressure of England did New York abandon its policy or was Pennsylvania willing to join its neighbor in a show of inter-colonial cooperation. Despite the two Canadian expeditions, the desire for neutrality had remained strong enough on all sides, so that the delicate balance remained intact. Unbeknownst to all, the stage was now set for thirty years of peace in which both New York and Pennsylvania would practice and develop their respective Indian trades.²⁸

²⁸Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 135-139.

TABLE III-1

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Constant Value in £

Year	Total Value of Beaver exported to London in £		Total value of Deerskin exported to London in £		Total value of all fur and skins exported to London in £		Total value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	5,071	27	732	111	7,491	699	13,754	1,478
1700	2,864	80	269	72	4,187	702	15,531	3,076
1701	1,983	96	409	874	3,033	2,109	13,585	5,219
1702	460	33	165	163	1,166	1,043	4,698	4,143
87 1703	433	63	68	593	870	1,753	6,063	4,714
1704	624	5	165	310	947	929	10,340	2,262
1705	missing							
1706	37	5	79	516	478	867	2,689	4,210
1707	515	0	113	0	1,170	0	4,557	21
1708	1,700	6	51	86	2,587	412	6,926	1,941
1709	2,849	0	273	14	4,130	14	9,155	618
1710	951	2	38	15	2,191	132	7,880	1,277
1711	1,213	0	78	0	2,151	39	7,571	39
1712	missing							
1713	2,925	0	162	99	4,099	168	9,601	179

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE III-2

Fur by Type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of Beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported to London		Value of Beaver as a % of total exports to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of all fur and skins ex- ported to London		Value of deerskin as a % of total exports to London		Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports to London	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	67.7	3.9	36.9	1.8	9.8	15.9	5.3	7.5	54.5	47.3
1700	68.4	11.4	18.4	2.6	6.4	10.3	1.7	2.3	27.0	22.8
1701	65.4	4.6	14.6	1.8	13.5	41.4	3.0	16.7	22.3	40.4
1702	39.5	3.2	9.8	.8	14.2	15.6	3.5	3.9	24.8	25.2
1703	49.8	3.6	7.1	1.3	7.8	33.8	1.1	12.6	14.3	37.2
1704	65.9	.5	6.0	.2	17.4	33.4	1.6	13.7	9.2	41.1
1705	missing									
1706	7.7	.6	1.4	.1	16.5	58.2	2.9	12.3	17.8	21.1
1707	44.0	0	11.3	0	9.7	0	2.5	0	25.7	0
1708	65.7	1.5	24.5	.3	2.0	20.9	.7	4.4	37.4	21.2
1709	69.0	0	31.1	0	6.6	100.0	3.0	2.3	45.1	2.3
1710	43.4	1.5	12.1	.2	1.7	34.1	.5	3.5	27.8	10.3
1711	56.5	0	16.0	0	3.6	0	1.0	0	28.4	100.0
1712	missing									
1713	71.4	0	30.5	0	4.0	58.9	1.7	55.3	42.7	93.9

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE III-3

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Current Value in £

Year	Current Value of beaver in £		Current value of deerskin in £		Current value of total fur and skins exported to London in £		Total current value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	5771	31	833	126	8525	795	15,652	1,682
1700	2979	83	280	75	4354	730	16,152	3,199
1701	1927	93	398	850	2948	2050	13,205	5,073
1702	454	33	163	161	1151	1029	4,638	4,089
1703	417	61	65	571	838	1688	5,839	4,540
1704	607	5	160	301	919	903	10,050	2,199
1705	missing							
1706	36	5	76	499	463	859	2,643	4,075
1707	458	0	101	0	1041	0	4,056	19
1708	1562	6	47	79	2377	379	6,365	1,784
1709	2866	0	275	14	4154	14	9,210	622
1710	1055	2	42	50	2430	146	8,739	1,416
1711	1441	0	93	0	2551	46	8,979	46
1712	missing							
1713	2772	0	154	94	3886	159	9,102	170

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Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE III-4

Percentage of total Deerskin Exported by Colonies

Year	Total deerskin Exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1699	2525	4.4	28.8	22.5	19.4	25.0
1700	7570	1.0	3.6	50.8	3.5	41.2
1701	7470	11.7	5.5	51.0	7.1	24.8
1702	8581	1.9	1.9	58.2	8.2	29.8
1703	5928	10.0	1.1	79.7	7.9	1.3
1704	12,644	2.5	1.3	57.9	3.4	34.9
1705	missing					
1706	9078	5.7	.9	36.1	14.0	43.4
1707	13,959	---	.8	82.2	5.5	11.5
1708	3571	2.4	1.4	47.1	42.4	6.7
1709	7816	.2	3.5	49.2	1.5	45.6
1710	6178	.7	.6	80.5	4.8	13.3
1711	4570	---	1.7	38.1	3.3	56.8
1712	missing					
1713	5830	1.7	2.8	84.2	5.8	5.5

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE III-5

Percentage of Total Beaver Exported by Colonies

Year	Total Beaver exported- colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	Hudson's Bay	N.Eng.	Va. & Md.
1699	11,496	.2	44.1	2.4	33.4	15.5	4.4
1700	6,999	1.1	40.9	3.6	31.7	17.6	5.0
1701	3,944	2.4	50.3	1.4	.1	39.3	6.5
1702	3,728	.9	12.3	12.8	43.4	21.9	8.6
1703	53,438	.1	.8	.1	98.3	.7	.0
1704	2,248	.2	27.8	4.2	---	48.5	19.3
1705	missing						
1706	7,000	.1	.5	.5	87.3	9.4	2.2
1707	1,133	---	45.5	6.7	---	40.0	7.9
1708	6,749	.1	25.2	---	38.1	35.8	.9
1709	6,204	---	45.9	.1	22.7	26.8	4.4
1710	1,495	.1	63.6	.7	---	29.8	5.8
1711	4,102	---	29.6	---	8.5	27.6	34.3
1712	missing						
1713	11,236	---	26.0	.3	58.2	14.9	.5

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CHAPTER IV

FORMULATION AND FAILURE OF A UNIFORM INDIAN POLICY: NEW YORK, 1714-1730

Prior to the treaty of Utrecht the Indian policies of New York and Pennsylvania were often closely intertwined. However, in the succeeding decade and a half each colony pursued an independent course. In particular, New York moved toward a policy of nascent imperialism during the latter years of the Hunter administration and under his successor, William Burnet.

During the first three decades of the eighteenth century, Albany and the fur trade remained vitally important to New York's economy. The colony's Indian policy largely revolved around the question of fur and especially beaver. Additionally, Anglo-French rivalry centered on considerations of trade. Continued Iroquois friendship and neutrality were basic to both the French and English desires to corner the fur trade after Queen Anne's War. While Indian policy recognized the defensive military value of the Five Nations, especially in time of war, the constant which continued throughout the period was the economic importance of fur. However, except for this profit motive held by certain individuals, New York's policy was extremely inconsistent until the arrival of Governor William Burnet in 1720. He hoped to overcome this diversity and unify Indian policy on an imperial level based on the

Indians' importance to the colony's defenses, but fierce opposition from the fur trading interest finally defeated his efforts by 1730. It would take another decade and a half before New York's policy was brought full circle by the advent of King George's War.

Several trends became increasingly evident within Indian policy during the years 1714-1720. New York found itself forced to provide the Iroquois with ever larger gifts at yearly conferences to insure their friendship. The Indians frequently demanded the services of smiths to repair their guns and metal goods, to which the government readily acceded. Smiths and interpreters helped maintain an influence with the Indians and surveyed French movements. French intrigues and rumors of English plots against the Iroquois required New York's constant attention if it was to retain its influence in the fur trade. Market fluctuations and changing tastes affected the demand for fur, often decreasing its value. Indians found the corresponding increase of prices for trade goods extremely difficult to understand, which necessitated constant reassurance by the English. Finally, imperial interests concerning control of the fur trade began to take precedence in a number of peoples' minds.

Evidence of the colony's concern with the Iroquois was clear when Governor Hunter informed the Assembly on July 7, 1714, that the Iroquois believed themselves neglected and that they grew uneasy. The Five Nations had received rumors of an English plan to eliminate them, and this made them wary. Reports of "a general

Meeting at Onondago of the 5 Nations and all the Indians... designed to be so Secret that if any Person divulged it they were to suffer Death," reached New York. Fearing the consequences of such a meeting, the Assembly voted £ 400 for gifts and the governor's expenses for a trip to Albany to confer with the Iroquois. Hunter met with the Five Nations in September and reassured them that rumors of an English plot were "altogether groundless and not to be credited, neither can you beleive [sic] it except you should think me so foolish as to cut off my right hand with my left since we are one flesh and blood." He also encouraged the Indians to develop the fur trade, especially to open it up to the Far Nations. The Iroquois sachems thanked Corlaer for his assurances and gifts, and they in turn renewed their part of the Covenant Chain. At this same conference Hunter learned that the Iroquois had taken in the Tuscarora Indians and given them shelter as new members of the Covenant. Iroquois friendship was necessary for the expansion of the fur trade, and it increasinely depended upon larger gifts and guarantees of support from the English.¹

Friction along the frontier between the French and the colonies did not abate, and the Iroquois continually demanded favors

¹N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 361, 363-365; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 814; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 96-97; Indian Commissioners to Gov. Hunter, May 13, 1714, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 221-222; Conference between Governor Hunter and the Indians, Sept., 1714, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 382-389.

to insure their allegiance, or at least their neutrality. French intrigues reportedly lay at the base of a war between the Flathead Indians and Carolina in 1715. Many, such as Charles Lodwick, feared the possible expansion of a war and its consequences for the colony's trade. He informed the Board of Trade of the general complaint of "a great decay in... trade with the Indians" due to French plotting, which would, "if not prevented, in a little time seduce all our Indians wholly to themselves, but also be a means to engage them to become our enemies." Governor Hunter journeyed to Albany in August to persuade the Iroquois to intervene in the Carolina war, which would hopefully bring the conflict to a quick end, therefore protecting the fur trade.²

Sachems of the Five Nations met with Hunter on August 27 and renewed the Covenant Chain. At that time they also returned the war hatchet from the last French war, and the governor thanked them for their role in it. He went on to note "another hatchet which you mention and I repeat with great joy, that is the hatchet of mutual defence and security, that it is bright, I hope and pray it may be lasting as the sun."

²McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 102-105; Gov. Hunter to Sec. Popple, July 2, 1715, Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, July 25, Aug. 13, 1715, Lodwick to Lords of Trade, Aug. 23, 1715, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 415, 417-418, 420, 422. Although much of Lodwick's memorial to the Board of Trade later proved to be false and malicious, the above can be taken as typical of the general concern for the state of Indian relations and the fur trade.

Despite their complaints about the price of trade goods, Hunter persuaded the Iroquois to join in an attempt to defeat the Flatheads by promising them enough guns and ammunition for the expedition. Hunter also promised to fulfill requests for smiths and a trading house at Albany for the Indians, and the conference broke up amicably shortly thereafter.³

During the following year, Iroquois parties set out against the Flatheads as agreed upon, and New York in turn fulfilled its promises to the Indians. Governor Hunter wrote to the Board of Trade in April 1716 that the Carolina war was drawing to a close according to the latest reports. In June the Assembly provided for the construction of two wooden houses for the accommodation of the Indians at Albany, because their trade was "of great advantage to the Country." By December several smiths and other persons had departed from Albany to reside among the Iroquois in answer to their needs and "to keep them firm in their Allegiance and to watch the Motions and defeat the intrigues of the French."⁴

Continued rumors of English conspiracies to wipe out the

³Conference of Gov. Hunter with the Indians, Aug., 1715, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 437-447.

⁴Five Nations to the Indian Commissioners, Oct. 3, 1715, Gov. Hunter to Lords of Trade, Apr. 30, 1716, Ibid., V, 463-464, 475-476; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 383-386; Colonial Laws of New York, I, 890-891; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 117.

Five Nations and repeated complaints about the price of trade goods brought the Iroquois and Governor Hunter together at Albany in June 1717. Hunter indicated great concern with the Albany-Montreal exchange, "that pernicious trade which I am sure is hurtfull to both of us, and only serves to put money in the pockets of a few traders." The sachems frankly admitted,

our people are furnished with other goods also at the said French trading house as clothing and other necessaries, which stops a great deal of peltry coming hither; but the French are supply'd with all those goods from the people here at Albany.... If you will stop that trade of goods being carried from hence to Canada the other trade will fall of course.

The Albany-Montreal trade would continue as a thorn in the side of all concerned, for it admitted of no easy solution.

The perennial complaint by the Indians about the price of trade goods was based upon their inability to comprehend the fluctuations of a world market. Hunter countered their grumbling with a brief explanation. "The price of goods does not depend on any persons will, the marcat must govern that which is sometimes higher sometimes lower, but the best way that you can take to get full value for the skins is... to sell them by retail, and then you will have the full value for the skins." Never completely grasping this concept, possibly intentionally, the Indians accepted it temporarily until they next felt the pressure of high prices for trade goods and again reiterated their grievance.⁵

⁵Conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, June, 1717, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 484-493.

When the Assembly reconvened in September, Hunter addressed them about a memorial written by ex-representative Samuel Mulford, who had attacked each governor in the past and now took on Hunter. Mulford opposed all measures for securing the fidelity of the Five Nations and even proposed a scheme to cut them off. Appalled by such a proposal and its possible consequences for the fur trade and the colony's defense should another war break out, the House lent Hunter its full support and suggested he convince the Indians that the English held no such ill intentions. Iroquois friendship was extremely important to the legislature, because it believed that, "for the Steadiness of those Indians, to the interest of Great Britain, all the last War with France, it is that we owe in a great measure, our present Security." Furthermore, the Indians remained central to the pursuit of the fur trade. Governor Hunter agreed to the Assembly's suggestion that he do all he could to reassure the Five Nations and convince them of the falsity of Mulford's memorial. Hunter presented a letter from the Indian Commissioners and noted the complaints of the Iroquois pertaining to the high cost of goods, especially those transported from Albany to Canada. The House resolved to consent to any law which would remedy such abuses.⁶

⁶N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 400-401, 403, 409; Smith, History of New York, I, 199; Leder, Robert Livingston, 244.

Perhaps Hunter's greatest achievement in Indian affairs was in laying the groundwork for improved relations between the Iroquois and western tribes. Before the English could extend imperial control over the Indians and the fur trade, a substitute had to be found for the Albany-Montreal trade which benefitted the French and a handful of Albany merchants. Since the Iroquois themselves could not provide enough fur to satisfy demands, Hunter hoped to persuade them to allow the passage to Albany of western tribes presently trading with the French. By this means the Albany-Montreal trade would be circumvented, theoretically to everyone's advantage, except of course the French. The Iroquois were initially hesitant, but gradually allowed more and more tribes passage through their lands to the east. They profitted by supplying the western Indian traders and by the increased gifts from the English to oil the opening of doors to this new trade. However, any coordinated effort to end the Canada trade would have to wait until William Burnet's term of office.⁷

Governor Hunter had grown weary of office in the New World. Undoubtedly the death of his wife and a desire to settle his personal affairs confirmed his intention to return to England.

⁷ Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 37-38, 40-42, 134-135, 155, 159-160; Conferences between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, August 1710, June 1717, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 221, 224-225, 485-486; Minutes of N.Y. Commissioners of Indian Affairs, July 17, 1716, N.Y. Colonial Mss., Vol. CX, 122 (microfilm copy, Cedar Crest College, Allentown, Pa.); McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 77, 113.

On June 25, 1719, he informed the Assembly of his decision. A memorial which the Assembly presented to Hunter upon learning of his departure testified to his adroitness as governor. When Robert Hunter took leave of New York in the fall of 1719, he left a united colony, rather than the factious and divided one he had found nine years before.⁸

Peter Schuyler as Council president managed the affairs of government in the interim between Hunter's departure and Burnet's arrival. Earlier in 1718 Schuyler had informed Hunter that "the Commissioners of Indian Affairs have exactly complied with your last order" for sending smiths "to the Indians who are very quiett and well satisfied as far as we yet hear but deep snow hinders our Intellegence." Events soon proved that all was not quiet with the Iroquois, for Hunter had to travel to Albany to reprimand them for further attacks on the southern Indians and to reassure them of English friendship.⁹ In July 1719 Schuyler received news that the French were building a fort at Niagara and hindering the Indians trading with the English. The Indian Commissioners met with the Iroquois in November to renew the

⁸Ibid., 116; Leder, Robert Livingston, 248-249; Smith, History of New York, I, 200-202; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 437-439.

⁹McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 122; Col. Schuyler to Gov. Hunter, Feb. 5, 1718, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 506; Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 226-228.

Covenant Chain. They asked the Five Nations to prevent the erection of a French fort at Niagara, to which the Indians replied, "they cannot do it for if they do the French will treat them as Enemies." When the Commissioners further suggested that Jean Coeur, the French interpreter, not be allowed to reside with the Seneca the following winter, the Iroquois answered very plainly and independently:

You say Jean Coeur is to stay among us this Winter and that hele make it his Interest to hinder the far Indians from coming to Trade here. You can better prevent his hindering those Indians from coming to Trade here than we, for if you do not supply the French with Goods from hence they cant furnish the Far Indians with what they want.

The Indians refused to threaten their own position of neutrality and safety by too overt an action against either European nation.¹⁰

Persuasion by the Commissioners had little effect, and by April 1720 Schuyler ordered Robert Livingston, Jr., and Myndert Schuyler to travel to the Seneca country to remind the sachems of their allegiance to the British Crown. Having convinced the Indians of the danger of the French presence for their hunting and trade, Lawrence Clawsen, an interpreter, set out for Niagara with several sachems. Upon arriving, they ordered the Frenchman there to demolish the trading house, but he refused pending orders from

¹⁰Intelligence of a French Fort at Niagara, July 6, 1719, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 528-529; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 124-127.

Canada. Clawsen returned to the Seneca and related the situation. The Indians replied in the presence of Jean Coeur that the French had built at Niagara without their permission, and they requested that the governor do his utmost to effect the demolition of the trading house. Schuyler ordered an Indian conference in August to insure the continued allegiance of the Iroquois and to counteract the French influence.¹¹

Late in August the conference got underway with representatives of all the nations except the Seneca, who feared that the English planned to destroy them. Understanding full well the danger of too great a French influence, the sachems agreed to accompany any forces New York might send to destroy the fort at Niagara. However, they recognized that more basic to the problem was the Albany-Montreal trade. "The selling of Indian goods to the French and their Indians of Canada as Great Inducement for the french to make that settlement and therefore we Desire you to stop that trade." The Indians showed a clear understanding of the French ability to corner the fur trade if individual Albany traders sacrificed the colony's good to their own private interests. However, Schuyler made no effort to solve this problem; rather, he left it for consideration by the incoming governor.

¹¹ Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Apr. 27, June 9, 1720, Journal of Schuyler's and Livingston's Visit to the Senecas, May 1720, Journal of Lawrence Clawsen's Visit to Niagara, May 1720, Col. Schuyler to Lords of Trade, Aug. 11, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 538, 542-545, 550-551, 558.

After brightening the Covenant Chain he returned to New York City to await the arrival of Governor Burnet.¹²

William Burnet was a close friend of Governor Hunter and planned to continue most of his predecessor's policies. His Indian policy had a two-fold approach. He hoped to end the Albany-Montreal trade, behind which goal lay an understanding of the Indians' military value to the English. In order to satisfy trading interests, however, Burnet had to substitute something for the lost Montreal trade, and he hoped to draw enough fur from the western Indians to counter-balance the lost trade. In these matters he relied heavily on the advice of Robert Livingston and Lewis Morris. Opposed to Livingston's view concerning the danger of the Albany-Montreal trade were Stephen DeLancey, Adolph Philipse, and Peter Schuyler. These three, deeply involved with commerce in furs, provided continual opposition to all plans for ending the Canada trade and became the center of new factional disputes in the colony.¹³

Even before Burnet's arrival, plans were afoot for a new trade policy. Livingston, then Speaker of the Assembly, prepared a memorial concerning Indian affairs, which he delivered to

¹²Conference between Col. Schuyler and the Indians, Aug.-Sept., 1720, Ibid., V, 562-569.

¹³McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxx-lxvi; Leder, Robert Livingston, 251. Thomas Eliot Norton's recent Fur Trade of Colonial New York contains a similar overall view of Burnet's Indian policy.

President Schuyler on August 23, 1720. Deploring present conditions, Livingston believed that,

our danger at present consists chiefly in three things--

1st The five nations infesting our neighbours the King's subjects to the Southward which I perceive (by their letters now exhibited) will nor can not longer be endured.

2nd The French settling Onjagaro [Niagara].

3rd The furnishing the French and their Indians of Canada with goods from hence whereby they not only supply the farr Indians and Engroce that trade to themselves, who otherwise must come here to buy them, and by that means secure them to their interest to assist them upon occasion and engage them to be our Enemies--

In order to combat these ills, the elder statesman set forth several proposals. He hoped Schuyler would use his influence to end the Iroquois depradation against Virginia and the Carolinas. Second, Livingston desired "that a private conference be held with a sachim of each nation to engage a party of their people to go to Onjagore and demolish the French settlement." This, he believed, would end the diversion of western furs from Niagara to Canada, and direct them instead to Albany. Livingston feared most the Albany-Montreal trade, because it brought the western fur trade to Canada and increased French influence with the far nations. Thus, he proposed cutting off the Montreal trade and suggested giving "encouragement... to those that will go to the Sinnekas Country and Onyagoro to sell what Indian goods they please to the Five Nations, of the farr Indians." Hopefully, such action would "keep the Indians steady to

the British interest, and defeat the subtle artifices of the French."¹⁴

Governor Burnet quickly saw the value and wisdom of Livingston's thought, and he gave the Speaker's ideas his full support. By mid-October he had replaced several of the old Indian Commissioners who "had misrepresented the true Cause of the French success with the Indians... so as to Shelter the Profit some of them had... from their Pernicious Trade with the French." At the same time he dispatched a smith and several others to reside with the Seneca for purposes of observing French movements and maintaining friendship.¹⁵

Burnet first addressed the Assembly on October 13, stressing self-preservation against the French, who infringed upon the fur trade and spread "false and scandalous Reports among the five Nations in order to draw them off from their Allegiance, to the Crown of Great-Britain." By the following month Burnet had clearly formulated his plans. Colonel Lewis Morris presented a bill on November 3 "for the encouragement of the Indian trade," which the Assembly, Council, and Governor enacted into law on the nineteenth of the same month. It pro-

¹⁴ Robert Livingston to Col. Schuyler, Aug. 23, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 559-561.

¹⁵ Leder, Robert Livingston, 252-254; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 132.

hibited trade in Indian goods with the French in Canada and imposed a fine of £ 100 and the confiscation of all goods for any violation. In 1720 New York exported over twenty-six thousand beaver skins to London, and Burnet hoped to increase or at least maintain a similar level of trade. He predicted to the Board of Trade on November 26, 1720, that "Montreal will sink to nothing which now flourishes by its Trade with Albany.... I expect no less than restoring our influence over the Five Nations and drawing new Nations of Indians through their means to trade with and depend on us." The governor further intended to travel to Albany at the first opportunity to confer with the Indians, where he hoped to get permission to build forts at Niagara and Onondaga.¹⁶

Governor Burnet reached Albany in September 1721 for his first conference with the Five Nations. After renewing the Covenant Chain, he warned the Indians of French intrigues and requested them "to hinder all these evill practices and designs of the French for the time to come without using any violence." Burnet then further emphasized the importance of trade. "I do not doubt but you will Sweep the Path clean for our people to come among you and for the farr Indians to come through your country to trade with us." The new governor somewhat naively expected

¹⁶ N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 439, 446-448; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 8-11; Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Nov. 26, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 576-580; Import and export data, Customs 3.

immediate results from this meeting, and shortly thereafter he sent a party led by Peter Schuyler, Jr., to the Seneca country to conduct a trading mission and to establish a settlement. Burnet hoped this would axtract the far nations to the English and further hinder the Canada trade. He sent a subsequent expedition the following year with similar orders "to draw the farr trade hither." In all this Burnet desired to further imperial ends without hurting trade profits. Those individual traders who suffered could hopefully recoup their losses through an increased western trade.¹⁷

However, the ineffectiveness of Burnet's fur policy had become obvious by 1722. Even the continued expansion of beaver exports could not hide certain problems (see Table IV-1). The commissioners for Indian affairs informed him that certain persons in Albany, facilitated by his liberal issuance of passes for travel to Canada, violated the 1720 act. Many traders also sent their goods first to the Mohawks and then on to Canada, whereby they avoided detection. Thus, in July New York passed a second, more stringent act, extending the first and providing for an incriminating oath to be given to anyone suspected of dealing in Indian goods with the French. Several people were empowered to

¹⁷Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept., 1721, Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Oct. 16, 1721, Gov. Burnet's Instructions to Peter Schuyler, Jr., Sept. 11, 1721, *Ibid.*, 630-642; Gov. Burnet's Instructions to Abraham Schuyler, Sept. 8, 1722, Leder, ed., Livingston Indian Records, 233-235.

give the oath, including the mayor and aldermen of Albany and the commanders of the several surrounding garrisons. The 1720 law had placed the full burden of enforcement on the Albany sheriff alone, making it easy to avoid compliance.¹⁸

The new law made it more difficult to carry on the illegal trade with Canada, but smugglers continued to operate nonetheless. In October 1724 the Indian Commissioners wrote to Burnet that they were at a loss for a way "to prevent this Pernicious trade,... since a few Men break thro the severest Laws that can be invented for the Good and Prosperity of this Province in general,... for it is plain that Strouds is transported to Canada." Despite a willingness to contravene the oath, the law hindered traders enough that they induced twenty London merchants to petition the King that the 1720 trade act "in its Effects... has proved very Pernicious to the British Trade in general, and to the Interest of New York in particular." This marked the beginning of a debate in royal as well as colonial circles concerning the legislation's value and effectiveness, which ended in 1729 with the disallowance of all acts dealing with the Indian trade. Burnet and the New York Council rejected the petitioner's claim "that there had

¹⁸McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 139-140; Letter of Henry Holland, June 16, 1721, Leder, ed., Livinston Indian Records, 229; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 475, 481-482; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 98-101; Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Dec. 12, 1722, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 682.

not been by far, so great a Quantity of Beaver and other Furs imported into Great Britain since the passing of the said Act," along with allegations about the geographical locations of the Indians. The governor expressed little fear over the French getting trade goods from elsewhere, for only Great Britain and its colonies produced most of the items -- guns, rum, strouds, and other woolen goods.¹⁹

While the arguments roared inconclusively with conflicting claims and evidence on both sides, Governor Burnet did not neglect frontier defense. He indicated his dual concern in a message to the Assembly on July 3, 1722:

The Security of this frontier depends in a great Measure, on the Fidelity of the Five Nations to this Government.... The most frugal and effectual Method, to keep them in their Allegiance, as well as to preserve and increase our Trade with the far Indians, is to have a fixed Trading House, established among... Seneka's.

Further recognition of the widespread significance of the Iroquois was expressed during a large Indian conference at Albany in August and September. Governors William Keith of Pennsylvania and

¹⁹ Indian Commissioners to Gov. Burnet, Oct. 12, 1724, McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 156; Minutes of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs at Albany, Oct. 24, 1724, June 11, 1725, I, 136 contained in Indian Records, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Minutes of N.Y. Ind. Comms.); Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 142-144; Petition of London Merchants to King, Cadwallader Colden, Papers Relating to an Act of the Assembly of the Province of New York for Encouragement of the Indian Trade (New York, 1724), 2, 10-13; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxii.

Alexander Spotswood of Virginia attended, as well as Burnet. All three governors renewed the Covenant Chain for the united British colonies and succeeded in settling many past differences.²⁰

Governor Burnet made continuing efforts throughout his administration to further trade and Indian alliances. He next conferred with the Indians in September 1724. During the previous year the Iroquois had officially accepted the Tuscarora as a sixth nation, and henceforth referred to themselves as the Six Nations. At this conference Burnet attempted to get permission to build a fort at Oswego. When the Iroquois suggested Lake Oneida as the site, he replied, "I always like to hear your answers that come from yourselves but I do not like the answer which the Handlers here put into your mouths for they neither love you nor me but mind only their own Profit.... As to the Blockhouse it must be at the Onondages Mouth and not at the Oneides Lake." Increases in beaver exports in 1725 and 1726 tentatively indicated that the several prohibitory trade laws had increased New York's trade with the Western Indians, now ostensibly compelled to turn to the English rather than the French for their necessities (see Table IV-1). Nevertheless, opposition to the trade laws remained very evident, and by 1726 Burnet himself recognized the impossibility

²⁰N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 479; Conference between Gov's. Burnet, Spotswood, and Keith and the Indians, August-Sept., 1722, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 657-681.

of totally ending the Canada trade. Continued avoidance of the legal prohibition by Albany traders made it necessary for the colony to shift its approach by imposing a discriminatory tax on goods going to Canada, while taxing "that which goes to the West [only] half as much."²¹ Considering the many evasions of the early acts, and considering that the French controlled most of the fur, the increase before 1726 probably resulted from furs brought illegally from Montreal to Albany and then exported, as well as furs gathered by the early traders at Oswego, of which there were approximately 300 by 1726. After 1726, the imposition of the discriminatory tax on goods going to Canada apparently sharply restricted the Montreal trade, although the western trade did not take up as much of the slack as Burnet had hoped.²²

Of all Burnet's efforts, the building of Fort Oswego would be most successful. By 1725 the Indian Commissioners believed that "if no Settlement be made among the 5 Nations we will in process of time loose most of our best and trusty Indians and

²¹McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 144, 153, lxxv-lxxvi; Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept. 19, 1724, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 718-179; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 538-539; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 281-282, 350-351, 366-367, 370-371.

²²Ibid., II, 281-282; McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxv-lxxvii; Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1730-1760," Canadian Hist. Assoc. Report, 1939 (Toronto, 1939), 66, 70; Frederick W. Barnes, "The Fur Traders of Early Oswego," Proceedings of the New York State Hist. Assoc. XIII (1914), 130; Frederick K. Zercher, "The Port of Oswego," Ibid., XXXIII (1935), 309; Philips, The Fur Trade, 380; Lawson, Fur, 34, 39.

then in Course all the Trade." New York also feared the French fort at Niagara would defeat any plans for capturing the western trade. In the middle of this struggle lay the Iroquois, who continued to strive for a balance between the French and the English. In September 1726 Burnet met the Indians at Albany, where they complained bitterly about the French in an oft-quoted speech.

We speak now in the name of all the Six Nations and come to you howling: This is the reason for what we howl, that the Governor of Canada incroaches on our land and builds thereon, therefore do we come to your Excellency our Brother Corlaer, and desire you will be pleased to write to the great king Your Master and if Our King will then be pleased to write to the King of France, that the Six Nations desire that the Fort at Niagara may be demolished.

Returning from Albany, the governor informed the Assembly of the French danger and proposed to build a fort at Oswego with £ 300 designated for that purpose.

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Work on the fort at Oswego commenced in the spring of 1727 and progressed rapidly. Burnet wrote the Board of Trade in June that he "depend[ed] upon its being of the best use of anything that has ever been undertaken on that side either to preserve our own Indians in our Interest, or to promote and fix a constant Trade with the remote Indians." French alarm and protest increased with the completion of the fort in August, but New York remained

²³McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 157; Conference between Gov. Burnet and the Indians, Sept., 1726, Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, Dec. 4, 1726, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 785-795.

firm in its commitment to support the project. Although the cost exceeded the projected sum of £ 300, the Assembly voted to pay for the complete outlay. "All reasonable Charge thereof ought to be paid and provided for, because the said Building is esteemed formidable and defencible, and to tend very much to secure the Six Nations in the British Interest and to promote the Trade with the more remote Indians." Oswego now became a mainstay for New York's Indian policy and, while debates arose over its maintenance, few advocated its abandonment.²⁴

With Fort Oswego hardly completed, Burnet was enroute to Massachusetts to take on the duties of the governorship as a consequence of royal whim and transfer. Shortly thereafter the Board of Trade recommended the disallowance of Burnet's acts restricting trade with the French in Canada, and the Privy Council acted accordingly, not because of the intention of the laws, but rather because of their means of enforcement. Albany's fur traders were overjoyed at this repeal, recognizing their freedom to pursue private profits unrestricted by imperial-minded

²⁴Minutes of the N.Y. Ind. Comms., Apr. 3, 4, 1727, I, 178a-179; Gov. Burnet to Lords of Trade, May 9, June 29, 1727, Gov. Burnet to Duke of Newcastle, May 10, Aug. 24, 1727, Gov. Burnet to Marquis de Beauharnois, Aug. 8, 1727; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 813-822, 824, 827-832; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 558, 567, 571; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 372-373; Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 168-169. See Johnson G. Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English Struggle in North America, 1720-1760" (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse Univ., 1961) for a detailed discussion of Oswego's history as a military and trading outpost.

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legislation.

The avowed intention of Burnet's policy had been to restrict the Canada trade, while replacing it with an increased western trade. Hence, it is upon this basis as reflected in the fur statistics that it must be judged. Decreased exports of beaver and other furs during 1721 and 1722 revealed the 1720 act's ineffectiveness, or at least to Burnet's inability to increase the western trade (see Table IV-1). In 1722 the Crown placed furs on the list of enumerated goods; however, this did not greatly increase the quantity or value of furs during the next two trading seasons.²⁶ It is probable that the significant increases of 1725 and 1726 were in part a result of enumeration, as well as increased trading activity in the west. Apparently Burnet's discriminatory tax of 1726 successfully restricted the Montreal trade as noted by a sharp retraction of beaver and fur

²⁵McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxviii-lxxxii; Board of Trade to Privy Council, Nov. 19, 1729, Gov. Montgomery to Lords of Trade, Dec. 21, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 897-899, 906; W.L. Grant and James Munro, eds., Acts of the Privy Council (6 vols., London, 1908-1912), III, 209-214; Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 147-148.

²⁶Thomas E. Norton takes a somewhat different view, based upon Murray Lawson's statistics. In contrast to Norton's conclusion that after enumeration there was "an automatic increase in the quantity of peltry arriving in London from New York," this author can find no evidence of a substantial increase in fur exports, but in fact a small decrease in 1723 and only a "moderate" rise in 1724. Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 102, 163.

exports from 1727-1730. This also indicated the governor's inability to replace the lost trade with profits from the west and accounted for much of the sharp reaction to his policy after 1726.

Export figures for 1730-1731 further signified the effectiveness of the double-duty tax and the pressure it applied to private trading interests. A better than three-fold increase of beaver exports in 1731 over the previous year signalled the repeal of the fur acts of 1720-1729 prohibiting or taxing the Canada trade. Although the last law was disallowed in December of 1729, that word did not reach the colony until well after the summer trading season had begun in 1730. Thus, the increase which would naturally follow the relaxation of such regulations came in 1731, and fur which presumably accumulated for a period of years flooded the market. Current values for both beaver and all furs also reflected these same trends during the period that the fur interests again freely plied their trade (see Table IV-3).

New York's exports to London during the period after Queen Anne's War were dominated by fur, especially beaver, and, to a lesser extent, deerskin after 1718 (see Table IV-2). Beaver alone made up twenty to thirty percent of the value of all New York's exports, while deerskin contributed another ten percent. While fluctuations occurred in furs as a percentage of the value of New York's total exports to London in this period, their percentage of value was often as high or higher than forty percent.

A sharp increase in the value of beaver in 1714 marked the end of Queen Anne's War and the exportation of stockpiled furs. Although followed by a sharp decline the next year, beaver exports registered a steady increase until the 1720s, when they again dropped in value, particularly after the double-duty tax. Both the total value of beaver and of furs as percentages increased in 1730 and 1731. Deerskin exports also registered an increase in value after 1714, reaching a peak in 1718, and then declining until the mid-1720s when they underwent a sharp upward trend, only to be followed by another decline at the end of the decade.

New York's fur policy affected beaver most markedly, for its percentage of the total value of all furs and skins decreased over the period, especially after 1726, only to increase again with the disallowance of the acts. Inversely, deerskin's rise as a percentage of total fur exports was in part due to the proportionate decrease of beaver. New York's share of the overall colonial market in beaver was generally between twenty-five and thirty-five percent after the war (see Table IV-5). Although it fluctuated from year to year, there was no widespread decrease until 1727, showing the effect of Burnet's double-duty tax. At this point exports from Hudson's Bay showed steady increases year after year, while those from New England correspondingly declined. New York experienced a sharp increase in this market in 1731, but then another falling off for several years (see Table VI-5). In the overall deerskin market, New York's percentage

increased steadily until 1721, when it underwent a slump until 1726 (see Table IV-4). After three years, the percentage again dropped off to remain at about one tenth of total colonial deerskin exports to London.

The evident importance of beaver and other furs to New York's trade with London, the major market for peltry, indicated a basic difficulty with the Hunter-Burnet Indian policy. A diversity of approaches and concepts had characterized Anglo-Indian relations prior to Burnet's coming, and his governorship marked the first real attempt to organize Indian policy on a permanent basis. He formulated his theory largely on the importance of the Indian for New York's security against the French and on economic imperialism. He did not ignore the importance of the fur trade, but rather hoped to augment it at French expense through increased amounts of fur from the west. However, Burnet's approach was too advanced for the period, and New Yorkers -- in particular, the Albany merchants -- continued to emphasize a privately-oriented trade policy, ultimately bringing about the rejection of Burnet's plan. Defeat of half of Burnet's program in 1729 did nothing to detract from the success of the other half. The fortified trading house at Oswego increased New York's fur trade and furthered the colony's influence with the Six Nations. Succeeding governors would meet with factional opposition at the slightest hint of an aggressive Indian policy, but no one doubted the value of Oswego. New York continued to provide support for

the post throughout the period under study. However, only with the approach of King George's War would this economic-based policy change to reflect increasing concern for the Indians' value as an ally and a buffer against the French.

TABLE IV-1

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. to London by
Constant Value in £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of Deerskin ex- ported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of all fur & skins exported from N.Y. to London in £	Total value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1714	5,651	267	6,533	20,078
1715	1,962	174	2,688	10,070
1716	3,229	600	4,780	14,069
1717	3,523	972	5,851	17,646
1718	5,294	3,974	10,209	23,792
1719	3,197	2,188	6,683	15,576
1720	4,667	1,869	7,281	15,179
1721	4,142	1,021	5,321	11,156
1722	4,509	1,114	6,468	16,478
1723	3,974	1,507	6,222	19,657
1724	4,082	2,127	7,112	17,192
1725	5,886	2,415	9,138	20,101
1726	6,246	3,950	11,926	34,510
1727	2,200	2,642	5,975	28,955
1728	2,380	2,139	6,827	15,465
1729	1,909	1,221	4,553	11,453
1730	1,349	725	3,106	6,435
1731	4,525	1,628	8,375	19,204

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE IV-2

Fur by type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported from N.Y. to London	Value of beaver as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London	Value of deerskin as a % of all furs and skins exported from N.Y. to London	Value of deerskin as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London	Value of total furs and skins as a % of total exports from N.Y. to London
1714	86.5	28.1	4.1	1.3	32.5
1715	73.0	19.5	6.5	1.7	26.7
1716	67.6	23.0	12.6	4.3	34.0
1717	60.2	20.0	16.6	5.5	33.2
1718	51.9	22.3	38.9	16.7	42.9
1719	47.8	20.5	32.7	14.0	42.9
1720	64.1	30.0	25.7	12.3	48.0
1721	77.8	37.1	19.2	9.2	47.7
1722	69.7	27.4	17.2	6.8	39.3
1723	63.9	20.2	24.2	7.7	31.7
1724	57.4	23.7	29.2	12.4	41.4
1725	64.1	29.3	26.3	12.0	45.7
1726	52.4	18.1	33.1	11.4	34.6
1727	36.8	7.6	44.2	9.1	20.6
1728	34.9	15.4	31.3	13.8	44.1
1729	41.9	16.7	26.8	10.7	39.8
1730	43.4	21.0	23.3	11.3	48.3
1731	54.0	23.6	19.4	8.5	43.6

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE IV-3

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. to London by
Current Value in £

Year	Current value of beaver exported from N.Y. to London in £	Current value of deerskin exported from N.Y. to London in £	Current value of total furs & skins ex- ported from N.Y. to London in £	Total current value of all exports from N.Y. to London in £
1714	5,329	252	6,161	18,934
1715	1,813	161	2,884	9,305
1716	2,951	548	4,369	12,859
1717	3,171	875	5,266	15,881
1718	4,738	3,557	9,137	21,294
1719	2,938	2,011	6,142	14,314
1720	4,378	1,753	6,830	14,238
1721	3,806	938	4,890	10,252
1722	4,013	991	5,757	14,665
1723	3,382	1,282	3,382	16,727
1724	3,592	1,873	6,279	15,129
1725	5,268	2,161	8,223	17,990
1726	5,890	3,725	11,246	32,543
1727	2,064	2,478	5,605	27,160
1728	2,244	2,017	6,438	14,583
1729	1,848	1,182	4,407	11,087
1730	1,265	680	2,913	6,036
1731	4,027	1,449	7,454	17,091

Source: Customs 3/1-80

TABLE IV-4

Percentage of total Deerskin exported
by colonies

Year	Total deerskin ex- ported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1714	4,420	12.6	6.0	64.6	5.5	11.3
1715	2,180	41.6	8.0	2.2	8.0	40.2
1716	4,008	26.8	15.0	13.9	6.4	37.9
1717	5,771	17.2	16.8	25.5	8.0	32.4
1718	10,732	8.9	37.0	8.6	14.3	31.1
1719	8,551	6.8	25.6	9.9	14.8	42.9
1720	7,732	16.2	24.2	23.8	3.4	32.4
1721	7,863	7.7	13.0	25.2	8.9	45.2
1722	10,200	9.5	10.9	48.7	3.0	27.9
1723	9,049	24.5	16.7	42.3	.8	15.7
1724	13,656	5.1	15.6	66.6	1.6	11.2
1725	12,722	23.8	19.0	42.3	2.4	12.5
1726	12,242	12.6	32.3	35.7	.3	19.2
1727	11,829	29.3	22.3	32.3	.4	15.7
1728	9,225	27.1	23.2	29.9	1.3	18.5
1729	10,935	10.2	11.2	60.1	.7	17.9
1730	39,793	10.5	1.8	81.2	.1	6.4
1731	9,071	6.7	17.9	53.7	.7	21.0

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE IV-5

Percentage of total Beaver exported
by colonies

Year	Total beaver ex- ported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	Hudson's Bay	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1714	15,321	---	36.9	.6	40.6	21.5	.4
1715	5,242	.2	37.4	2.0	---	59.1	1.2
1716	16,422	---	19.7	.5	70.8	8.6	.5
1717	14,202	.0	24.8	---	51.2	23.4	.5
1718	14,329	.0	36.9	---	50.3	11.8	.9
1719	7,747	.1	41.3	---	42.6	15.2	.9
1720	14,689	---	31.8	---	62.9	4.9	.5
1721	14,051	---	29.5	---	60.8	3.5	.2
1722	15,180	---	29.7	---	67.4	2.7	.2
1723	13,985	.1	28.4	---	70.9	.2	.4
1724	9,823	.0	41.6	---	58.0	.1	.3
1725	16,563	---	35.5	.0	61.5	2.3	.6
1726	15,195	.3	41.1	.0	56.4	.8	1.5
1727	10,707	.1	20.5	.7	74.7	2.7	1.3
1728	16,234	.1	14.7	---	76.5	7.3	1.5
1729	12,780	.2	14.9	---	75.4	8.0	1.5
1730	13,273	---	10.2	---	83.7	4.8	1.4
1731	19,174	.3	23.6	---	67.1	6.8	2.2

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CHAPTER V

THE PREDOMINANCE OF PRIVATE INTEREST: PENNSYLVANIA, 1714-1730

During the years 1714-1730 Pennsylvania maintained an Indian policy much different than that of New York. Under Governors Hunter and Burnet New York moved toward an imperial policy in its control of Indian affairs, only to be frustrated at the end of the third decade of the century. In contrast, Pennsylvania's policy developed directly along the lines of private interest, particularly that of James Logan and William Keith. Although there would admittedly be exceptions, the general thrust of the period was clear: private white interest at Indian expense. For the Indians the consequence would be to force them sporadically but generally westward to the Allegheny-Ohio country.

James Logan was perhaps the single most important individual in Pennsylvania's Indian affairs during this period. He controlled numerous public offices, including Commissioner of Property, Provincial Secretary, and Receiver of proprietary rents, in addition to playing an official role in Indian affairs. In 1712 he returned to Pennsylvania from a two-year visit to England with the enhanced power of collecting revenue for the company of receivers who had recently taken control of the province

because of Penn's debts. Furthermore, he had obtained the rights to 8,000 acres of unpatented and unlocated land, which placed him in an excellent position to profit from land speculation. Logan had established a far-flung network of fur traders, which additionally contributed to the direction and location of expanding settlement. In all this Logan sought personal gain; from 1712 to 1720 Logan's wealth multiplied five-fold by his own reckoning. Nevertheless, he frequently couched his plans and activities in grandiose rhetoric for public and proprietary consumption.¹

In the public sector, Pennsylvania sought to maintain good relations with the Indians. The 1711 law for preserving "Good Correspondence with the Indians" expired late in February 1714, and early the following year the Assembly introduced "an Act for continuing a friendly correspondence with the Indians," similar in intent and nature to the just recently expired law.

¹Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 104-105, 136-137, 143-144. For a clear understanding of Logan's personal role in Indian affairs see Ibid., especially Chapters 4, 6, and 7. In 1731 Logan wrote an unpublished memorial on the state of the North American colonies, lamenting their lack of unity and defenceless position vis-a-vis the French. Although written in an imperial minded tone, Logan was primarily interested in protecting his own trade and speculative enterprises, James Logan, Of the State of the British Plantations in America: A Memorial (unpublished), Joseph E. Johnson, ed., Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LX (1936), 113-130. In contrast to Jennings, who sees Logan's personal enrichment as the basis of his motivation, Albright Zimmerman views Logan in more altruistic light. Nevertheless, his account contains a well balanced discussion of Logan's personal fur trade, as well as that of the small trader, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," Chapters 4-6.

After some debate and several amendments, Governor Charles Gookin passed the bill, based upon the premise that,

the maintaining and cultivating of a friendly correspondence and preserving a good understanding with the native Indians, the first possessors of these lands, hath been found by continued experience to be a great means of securing this province in peace and tranquility (when many of the adjacent provinces have fallen under the clamities of war and cruelty from their neighboring Indians).

His intention in approving the bill was "to maintain a good correspondence with the natives, to prevent their being abused or imposed on, and to secure the Trade with them to the Inhabitants of the Province." In the long run, Pennsylvania's inability to abide by these principles and to maintain Indian relationships on a firm basis of mutual respect and concern would have important consequences for the fur trade, modes of settlement, and ultimately security of the province itself.²

In June 1715 Governor Gookin and his Council met with Sassoonan, chief of the Delaware, and a number of representatives of other tribes east of the Susquehanna River, excepting the Conestoga Indians. Sassoonan freely renewed former friendships but requested clarification of trading procedures and prices and complained of abuses occasioned by traders bringing large quantities of rum to the Indians. Gookin, in typical English

²Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, III, 60, 63; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1119, 1126, 1132, 1135; Pa. Council Minutes, II, 577-578, 581.

fashion, explained away the curiosities of trade with platitudes about fluctuating market prices and admonitions to deal with the "bestest men." The governor in part blamed the Indians for their own desire for liquor and told them of the strict laws against its use. He further authorized their staving in of any casks brought among them. Closing the conference with an exchange of gifts, Governor Gookin expressed concern that the Conestoga had not come to the conference and that he had heard that they intended to leave their village. He requested Sassoonan convey a message to them that he would be happy to treat with them at "the first good Conveniency."³

Although representatives of the Conestoga and Conoy met with Gookin and the Council in September to renew friendships, their basic problems remained unanswered. They, too, requested a clarification of trade prices, but, more important, they emphasized their suffering from the white man's greed for land. Pennsylvania underwent a rapid population increase in the first half of the eighteenth century. Those immigrants attracted to the Middle Atlantic region found Pennsylvania's land policy, which allowed private purchase, more congenial than the tenancies which characterized New York.

³ Conference between Gov. Gookin and the Delaware and Schuylkill Indians, June 14-15, 22, 1715, Ibid., II, 599-604.

James Logan, as fur trader and Commissioner of Property, was instrumental in guiding the location of this settlement. He placed his traders and stores in close proximity to Indian villages, as he did at Conestoga with Peter Bizailon in 1708 and John Cartlidge in 1716. Logan often personally acquired these lands in payment for outstanding debts upon a trader's death. In surveying land in the Conestoga area for a proprietary manor, Logan also preempted a personal estate of several hundred acres. Gaining first the profits of the fur trade, Logan next took advantage of cleared Indian land by inducing settlement in those areas, thus increasing significantly the value of his personal holdings. As more and more immigrants poured into Pennsylvania, the Indians increasingly felt their pressure under the direction and pattern of settlement induced by Logan.⁴


One of the first groups to enter Pennsylvania in a body were Swiss Mennonites who in 1710 settled on Pequea Creek south of Conestoga in present day Lancaster County. They were followed

⁴Conference between Gov. Gookin and the Conestogo Indians, Sept. 13-15, 1715, Ibid., II, 606-608; Leach, Northern Frontier, 126-127; Michael Kammen, Colonial New York, A History (New York, 1975), 179-180; Fvarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790 (New York, 1932), 89-91, 95-100, 114-155; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 131, 155-156, 162-163; Oct. 11, 1708, Minute Book "G" and Dec. 11, 1716 Minute Book "H" of Minutes of the Board of Property of the Province of Pennsylvania in Pa. Archives, Ser. II, Vol. XIX, 496, 644. Following the minutes of the Board of Property indicates the thrust of settlement during Pennsylvania's expansion.

by a group of Palatine refugees in 1717 who settled in the same general location. Soon afterward Scotch-Irish immigrants moved into the area just north of the German Palatines, putting further pressure on the Conestoga Indians. Pressure upon the Indians was so great and rumors of English designs were so rife that by mid-1717 even the Iroquois in New York demanded an answer as to what was going on. By January 1718 the Commissioners of Property had decided to erect a fence around the Conestoga village to protect the Indians' corn from the white settlers' cattle. It was clear that all was still not well when in June the Conestoga, led by Chief Civility, on a trip to Philadelphia ostensibly to renew friendships requested that the governor also fence off the Shawnee and Conoy villages. The Indians apparently had considered moving from their village, but William Keith was able to delay their action.⁵

To complicate matters further, Pennsylvania's Indians suffered as a consequence of Iroquois raiding parties aimed against the Catawba and Cherokee further southward. The Iroquois,

⁵Nov. 22, 1717, Jan. 2, 1718, Minute Book "H", Ibid., 622-623, 625-626; Private Conference between Gov. Hunter and the Five Nations, June 13, 1717, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 488-487; Conference between Gov. Keith and the Conestoga Indians, June 16, 1718, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 45-49. William Keith had replaced Charles Gookin as governor in May 1717, For a more detailed description of this period and, in particular, Logan's role, see Jennings', "Miquon's Passing," 164-172.



Localities of Indians of Eastern Pennsylvania, 1720

The numbered streams are as follows:

1. Delaware West Branch (Lehigh River)
2. Conestoga Creek
3. Pequea Creek
4. Brandywine North Branch
5. Brandywine West Branch
6. Brandywine Creek

This map was obtained from the original as contained in Francis P. Jennings, "Miquon's Passing, Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674 to 1755," (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pa., 1965), xxiii.

facilitated by their neutrality treaties and the tacit cooperation between Albany and Montreal, ranged far and wide in revenge against their old enemies. Frequently the Shawnee supplied and even participated in Iroquois raids, which Pennsylvania found disrupted the fur trade and frontier tranquility. Governor Keith warned the Indians of their folly as early as 1717, noting that if "you shall Hurt or molest the Indians who are at this time in friendship with any English Government, You thereby Break the League of friendship made With this Government."⁶ Reports that such activity had not ceased induced Keith in June 1719 to send Colonel John French to Conestoga to renew treaties and dissuade the Indians from hostile activity. French informed the chiefs that Pennsylvania gladly approved any Iroquois trading or hunting ventures, but if they had warlike designs they should "have nothing to do with them nor entertain them." He related the governor's hope "that you are all fully convinced that Peace is better than War, which destroys you and will bring you to nothing." Chief Civility, interpreting for the several tribes assembled at Conestoga, thanked French for the governor's message and agreed to abide by his suggestions and advice.⁷

⁶Conestogo Indian Conference, July 19, 1717, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 25.

⁷Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1307, 1309, 1311; Report of Colonel French's Indian Conference at Conestoga, June 28-29, 1719, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 78-81.

Even after French's journey to Conestoga, it was evident that the problem still remained; however, at this point it is perhaps pertinent to look more closely at Governor William Keith. He had arrived in the colony an impoverished man, and he intended to take advantage of the Quaker Assembly's need for a governor with whom it could easily work. Despite Keith's interest in the colony's affairs, he also maintained a certain interest in imperial concerns.⁸ As early as 1717 he had volunteered, although without denying Pennsylvania's control over its own Indians, to establish a treaty which would answer the complaints of his friend, Governor Alexander Spotswood of Virginia, about Iroquois raiding parties. Even though nothing immediately came of this offer, it did show a certain willingness to cooperate with other governors, a willingness that he again indicated by journeying to New York in 1719. Governor Hunter had determined to return to England, and Keith desired to confer with him on various affairs including those of the Indians, prior to his departure. Upon Keith's return in August, he announced to the Assembly that "there is now such a perfect good Understanding established between this and all the neighboring Governments, that I hope nothing can suddenly arise to disturb the present tranquillity."⁹

⁸Jenning's, "Miquon's Passing," 190-192. For Keith's attempts at personal enrichment through Indian affairs and his power struggle with James Logan see Ibid., Chap. 6-7.

⁹Pa. Council Minutes, III, 23, 68; Gov. Keith to Ass., Aug. 18, 1719, Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1311.

In 1719 Keith made a report to the Board of Trade which was perhaps his most important contribution. Ironically, he cribbed major portions of it from suggestions which James Logan had submitted to him upon learning of the Board's imperial interest in Indian affairs and French encroachments. Ultimately Keith, not Logan, received credit for the report which greatly impressed the Board of Trade. Keith opened the report by noting French successes in dealing with the Indians which hindered "further progress to the westward." He noted that Indian "friendship and correspondence is by experience no other way to be acquired than by trade." Great Britain had certain advantages in this trade, but intercolonial competition was "highly destructive of the publick interest, both with respect to trade and the advancement as well as security of the British Dominion on this Continent." In order to benefit from Britain's natural trade advantages, he had five suggestions. Keith believed the Indian trade should be "put. . . under such wholesome and just regulations as that the traders may not have in their power to cheat or impose upon the Indians in any sort." He next suggested the westward extension of the trade and its protection through a series of forts and garrisons. Thirdly, he believed the governor should "endeavour to make treaties and alliances of strict friendship with as many Indian Nations as possibly he can." Maintaining peaceful relations among the tribes within this system of alliances was important, as was his final suggestion for a regular inter-colonial correspondence concerning all such Indian affairs. Inherent in all these

suggestions was Crown control, without which "the success is very much to be doubtful, from the interruptions which we may continually expect to meet with amongst ourselves as well as from the French."¹⁰

Keith and Logan would subsequently argue over the number and distribution of forts for protecting the fur trade, primarily because of Logan's ambitions for personal enrichment. However, their unsettled argument came to naught, for imperial agitation subsided, and the Privy Council rejected the Board of Trade's 1721 Report which incorporated Keith's proposals. Frustrated in these wider designs, the Board of Trade implemented certain of its ideas through the appointment of William Burnet as New York's governor and his enactment of the program outlined in the previous chapter.¹¹

The death toll having sounded for Keith's imperial designs, events in Pennsylvania returned to a more particularistic level. Even while Keith was drawing up his plan and awaiting the outcome, Indian troubles continued in the south. Early in 1720 Governor Spotswood wrote to New York Council President, Peter

¹⁰ Journal of Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1714-1718 (14 vols. London, 1924), III, 311, 335; State of the British Plantations in America, in 1721, B. of T. report to King, Sept. 8, 1721, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 620. For Keith's complete report see Cal. St. Paps., 1719-1720, Doc. 61-I and also Papers respecting Sir William Keith's Report to the Board of Trade, 1718-1719, Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs.

¹¹ Jennings, "Hiqon's Passing," 257-260 contains a good discussion of Logan's objections to Keith's suggestions of four protective forts.

Schuyler, complaining of various attacks and abuses. Apparently Iroquois raiding parties received sanctuary along the Susquehanna, which particularly annoyed Spotswood. Events were such that in June Logan travelled to Conestoga to warn the Susquehanna tribes of the danger of becoming involved with the Iroquois raids:

This whole Business of making War in the manner You do is now owing to those who desire nothing more than to see all the Indians cut off, as well to the Northward as the Southward, that is the French of Canada, for they would have the Five Nations destroy the Southern Indians, and the Southern Indians destroy you and the Five Nations, the Destruction of all being their Desire.

To complicate matters even further, it soon became apparent that the Indians, particularly the Iroquois, were anxious over the westward push of English settlers into the Susquehanna valley.¹²

Keith, recognizing that Pennsylvania's "present Security seemed wholly to depend upon the Strength and Authority of New York, and not upon the Peaceable Disposition or Faith of these Barbarians," wrote to Schuyler in July 1720 to request his help in preserving peace among the Indians.¹³ In light of the need for some solution, further intercolonial cooperation developed when

¹² Gov. Spotswood to Pres. Schuyler, Jan. 25, 1720, Report on Conestoga Indian Conference, June 1720; Pa. Council Minutes, III, 82-89, 92-98.

¹³ Interestingly, when Governor Burnet forwarded a Crown request for £ 350 aid for New York's security, the Pennsylvania Council passed it off as an outdated instruction and took no action, Ibid., 119-120, 134-136.

Keith travelled to Virginia to confer with Governor Spotswood the following year. Spotswood suggested that the English erect an artificial east-west boundary line from the Potomac River to the Appalachians which would separate the northern and southern tribes. In June, when Keith next met with the Indians, including the Iroquois, at Conestoga, he related Spotswood's plan so the Indians would have time to consider its impact. The Iroquois had problems of their own; they complained of high costs and trade abuses, as well as the lack of trade goods. James Logan attributed this to the Albany-Montreal trade, but indicated the new governor would shortly restore "a clear Sunshine as they desired." The conference closed with Iroquois assurances that they had peaceful intentions, and in August the governor requested that the Assembly renew the law for regulating the Indian trade "to give the Indians that Content and Satisfaction which you see they expect from us."¹⁴

Hopes that the various governors had reached a rapprochement with the Indians received a severe shock in early 1722 when John and Edmond Cartlidge, resident traders at Conestoga, brutally and openly murdered a Seneca Indian. Significantly, John Cartlidge functioned in numerous official capacities with the Indians. Additionally, he was a major cog in Logan's fur trading empire, which

¹⁴ Ibid., 96-105, 114-118; Indian Conference at Conestoga, July 1721, Ibid., 121-134; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1368.

presented a dual problem. Pennsylvania had to punish the offenders in some fashion in order to maintain peaceful accord with the Indians; however, the Cartlidges were privy to enough of Logan's illegal transactions so that he could not afford to allow their punishment for fear they might expose him. The details of the solution involved a power struggle between Keith and Logan, but in the outcome the Cartlidges never came to trial. While the colony offered the Seneca £ 100 as "blood money," similar to the old English custom of wergild, the Indians understood where the true power lay.

Keith was able to take further advantages of Indian unrest for his personal enrichment by proposing a survey of Indian lands along the Susquehanna. Purportedly this would protect the Indians from further white encroachments, but the governor, having recently usurped control of land patents, intended to profit in precisely the same manner as had Logan over the years. The Conestoga Indians were willing to allow Keith his survey but requested he obtain final permission from the Iroquois. This could be best accomplished at Albany, and Keith hoped to participate in a forthcoming treaty there, both to smooth over the Cartlidge affair and to feather his own nest. In addition, he wanted to establish Spotswood's plan for a boundary line on a sound footing in order to prevent further intertribal warfare.¹⁵

The Assembly had immediately expressed a concern for the

¹⁵ Pa. Council Minutes, III, 146, 151-152, 178-183, 196;

peace and safety of the colony after the Cartlidge murder. "By a Delay of Justice, the Indians, by the Subtilty of ill minded People, may be prevailed on to withdraw their Allegiance to the Crown of Great-Britain." Governor Keith persuaded the Assembly to support the cost of the proposed journey to Albany as vital to peaceful Indian relations. The Assembly took further action by bringing in a bill for regulating the Indian trade and preventing the sale of liquor to the Indians. Although Keith initially refused to approve it until the Assembly voted on a bill of his own creation, apparently giving him sole control of Indian affairs, he ultimately passed the legislation on May 22. The act, similar to its expired predecessor of 1715, had no time limit, so that it remained the basic law until the late 1750s.¹⁶

From the beginning, the Albany treaty was all that could be desired by the various participants. The Covenant Chain received the standard metaphorical brightening on all sides, and the Seneca accepted their gifts gladly, requesting that Keith release

Issac Norris to Henry Gouldney, Apr. 9, 1722, Issac Norris Letter Books (12 vols. Historical Society of Pa., Philadelphia, microfilm copy), VIII, 294-296; William Keith, A Just and Plain Vindication of Sir Wm. Keith, Bart., Late Governor of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1726), James Logan, Remarks on Sir William Keith's Vindication (Philadelphia, 1726). Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 197-206 contains a detailed account of the importance of the Cartlidge affair and its aftermath.

¹⁶Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1418, 1432-1444, 1450, 1455-1456; Pa. Council Minutes, III, 195-196; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, III, 310-313.

the Cartlidges from jail. Spotswood achieved his purpose when the Iroquois agreed to observe the proposed boundary line on their own part as well as for the Tuscarora, Conestoga, and Shawnee tribes. One additional transaction took place when Keith apparently accepted the "surrender" of Iroquois claims to all lands near Conestoga upon the Indians' understanding "that if any of our people come to Trade at Philadelphia you will order that they be received like Brethren, and have the Goods as cheap as possible." Ultimately it would be to this area that restless Palatines from New York would migrate, but to what turned out to be a small personal grant to Keith alone.¹⁷

Despite the Albany treaty and proprietary ideals, the various tribes in Pennsylvania experienced the ill fruits of European expansion. Hannah Penn wrote to Governor Keith in May 1724 to express her pleasure with the recent treaty:

We hope and Desire the same care of those poor People the Indians may still be Continued that the same Measures my Husband first established with them may be constantly pursued, and that on all occasions [sic] of moment the Council, more especially those Members of it who are In-trusted with the affairs of Property, may be consulted and that all Treaties with them may be managed with concurrence and approbation.

¹⁷ Pa. Council Minutes, III, 197-202; Albany Indian Conference, Aug.-Sept., 1722, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 669-681; James Logan to John Penn, July 10, 1727, Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, I, 283 (12 vols., Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, microfilm copy, hereafter cited as PPOC).

Although the Indians thanked Keith and indicated trade conditions were better in 1723 under his direction, they also requested in the same speech "that the English may not be suffered to straiten or pinch the Gawanese or Shawannoës to make them remove further off, but to consider them as Brethren." Whether under Logan's or Keith's control, the fur trade continued to open up lands for the relentless push of English settlers. Both men tried to advance such settlement for their own benefit in land speculation, with results that could only be called detrimental to Amerindian society. Apparently, such pressure induced the Shawnee on the Susquehanna to confer with the Canadian governor, presumably concerning a move away from their present home, for Keith pleaded with them to remain. In May 1723 a number of Palatine families descended upon the upper Susquehanna, much to the resident Indians' dismay. By the following year, many of the Delaware Indians had left the area, moving westward to the Ohio. The Brandywine Indians, living near a creek bearing the same name and flowing into the Delaware, frequently complained of whites settling on unpurchased land. In 1725 the Assembly attended the Brandywine claims to the area for "as long as the Water run down that Creek" with promises to do justice by them. In 1726, the Brandywine returned still unsatisfied. Although they finally received total payment for a part of their lands purchased in 1706, they failed to get a written guarantee of their right to the upper Brandywine. The inexorable demands for land were

not lessened with the arrival in June of the new governor, Patrick Gordon. Even though Keith was no longer involved in land schemes, Logan regained many of his previously curtailed powers and resumed his speculative activities.

18

Recognition of the effect of expanding English settlements, especially the building of Oswego in New York, induced the Iroquois to request all tribes to "fall upon and fightt with the English." Rebuffed by the Shawnee and Delaware, the Iroquois reacted by re-trenching their position in New York and the upper Susquehanna. They demanded that the Shawnee remove to the Ohio, a move already underway. Traditional Indian agricultural life broke down as a result of the overwhelming demand to hunt for fur. This, when combined with the Shawnee's refusal to aid the Iroquois, resulted in the latter's decision to put "pettycoatts on you [the Shawnee] and look upon you as women for the future, and nott as men." They further decided to "Take pittty on the English and Lett them have all this land." Thus, they arrived in Philadelphia in July 1727

¹⁸ Hannah Penn to Gov. Keith, May 20, 1724, PPOC, I, 147; Pa. Council Minutes, III, 218-220; James Mitchell to James Logan, May 13, 1723, Pa. Archives, Ser. II, Vol. VII, 77-78; James Logan to John Penn, Aug. 2, 1732, PPOC, II, 181; Pa. Assembly Minutes, II, 1701-1702, 1757-1764, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 250-252. For a detailed discussion of land transaction in the Susquehanna country, including the Keith-Logan struggle, and the resultant pressure upon the Indians see Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," Chap. 7 and "Incident at Tulpehocken," Pennsylvania History, XXXV (1968), 335-355.

with an offer to sell land in the lower Susquehanna valley. Pennsylvania, believing Keith had purchased the lands in 1722, rebuffed the Indians with promises that one of the proprietors would soon arrive in the colony and settle all such affairs.¹⁹

By 1728 affairs had deteriorated to the point that a major Indian conference became necessary. The Assembly had suggested one after an incident in which several Indians had murdered a white man, the first such instance in the colony's history.²⁰ In April James LeTort arrived in Philadelphia with a report of a war belt circulating among the Indians. Further concern developed in May when several settlers mistakenly fired upon a band of friendly Shawnee and a group of white men irresponsibly murdered an Indian family. On May 16 Gordon issued a proclamation ordering Pennsylvania inhabitants not to abuse any Indians under treaty to the colony, and later in the month at Conestoga he held the first of several treaties with the Indians. The Governor and several tribes,

¹⁹Shawnee Chiefs to Gov. Gordon, June 7, 1732, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 329; Examination of Edmund Cartlidge, Dec. 7, 1731, Ibid., 305; Wallace, "Women, Land, and Society," 31; Indian Conference, July 3-5, 1727, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 271-276; Gov. Gordon to John Penn, July 7, 1727, James Logan to John Penn, July 10, 1727, PPOC, I, 281, 283.

²⁰Pa. Council Minutes, III, 285-287; Pa. Assembly Minutes, III, 1868. The Assembly began to display increased initiative in Indian affairs outside of Logan's influence during this period. Another example had occurred in 1726 when they postponed payment of Ezekiel Harlan's expense claims as an interpreter in the Brandywine Indian affair, so as not to set a precedent for unauthorized dealings with the Indians, Ibid., 1833, 2035.

including the Shawnee, Conoy, Delaware, and Conestoga, exchanged condolences and brightened the Covenant Chain. After Gordon explained his recent proclamation, the Indians departed, assuring the officials they had "no Cause of Complaint" or "Uneasiness." However, events did not transpire as smoothly the following month when Sassoonan led the Schuylkill Delaware to Philadelphia for their treaty. He complained of white settlement in the disputed Tulpehocken area without payment for it. Logan, as Commissioner of Property, denied any prior knowledge of this white settlement, blaming it all on ex-governor Keith, but then went on to promise satisfaction if the Indians would only be patient. Logan actually hoped to make another speculative profit by inducing one of the proprietors to travel to the colony in order to make a land purchase on the upper Delaware.²¹

Logan cajoled the proprietors for the next three years, telling them only they could buy land cheaply, "for the Indians well know that lands amongst the English are now much advanced." He noted many of the tribes had moved to the Ohio where the French "are tampering with them," and expressed the fear that this might turn them into enemies "for the Injury we have done them in robbing

²¹Various minutes and examinations relating to incidents, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 302-307 and Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 215-221; Gov. Gordon's Proclamation, May 16, 1728, Indian Conference at Conestoga, May 26-27, 1728, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 307-308, 310-314; Minutes of Indian Conferences, May-June, 1728, Ibid., 309-314, 316-326; Jennings, "Incident at Tulpehocken," 343.

them of their Lands." The proprietors, although increasingly aware of Logan's personal interest in such matters, expressed genuine concern that Indian affairs not get out of hand. By 1732 Thomas Penn was able to come to Pennsylvania to take part in a treaty with the colony's Indians, at which time Sassoonan received payment for the Tulpehocken lands. Although this treaty would do much to reorient Pennsylvania's Indian affairs, they remained in a state of flux as the century's third decade drew to a close and the fourth began.²²

The history of Pennsylvania's Indian relations since the end of Queen Anne's War had been fraught with the pressures of fur traders and expanding settlements. Various tribes continually moved further west as the 1720s progressed, culminating with Schickellamy's demand that the Shawnee remove from their homes to the Ohio. Schickellamy was an Oneida chief, who in 1728 became resident Iroquois supervisor over the Shawnee and eastern Delaware. He lived at Shomokin on the Susquehanna River and directed affairs

²²James Logan to John Penn, June 28, Sept. 11, 1728, Aug. 13, 1729, Aug. 2, 1731, James Logan to Proprietors, Aug. 26, 1731, Gov. Gordon to Proprietors, Dec. 15, 1731, PPOC, II, 17, 21, 83, 181, 191, 221; Issac Norris, James Logan, and Samuel Preston to Proprietors, Nov. 13, 1731, Penn Papers, Indian Mss., I, 36 (4 vols., Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., microfilm copy); Proprietors to James Logan, Summer 1730, Jan. 20, 1732, Thomas Penn Letter Books, I, 13, 46-47 (microfilm copy, Lehigh University), Indian Conference at Philadelphia, Aug. 23- Sept. 2, 1732, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 435-452. See Jennings, "Incident at Tulpehocken," for the details of Logan's personal involvement.

there until the 1740s.²³

The Shawnee migration, in part a direct result of the fur trade, had its own effect upon the trade. Logan in many ways had monopolistic control over the fur industry in its early years. However, as the tribes with which he dealt moved westward and out of his immediate control, interlopers from outside his private network began to offer competition. In part because of this competition, and in part due to a crippling fall in 1728, Logan began a slow withdrawal from active participation in the fur trade over the next few years. Additionally, the restrictions which Thomas Penn placed upon Logan made activities among the Indians, especially in land speculation, less remunerative.²⁴

However, this is not to say that the fur trade itself declined during this period. In fact, competition had reached such a point in 1729 that Governor Gordon issued a set of "Rules and Injunctions" to preserve "the Peace and Tranquility of this Government." He ordered the Allegheny traders to refrain from using rum in the trade and to "enter into a mutual Agreement to

²³Pa. Council Minutes, III, 334-337; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 287-291. In 1729 the Brandywine Delaware went west, adding their name to the growing list of refugee tribes in the Ohio.

²⁴Various letters and examinations on the Ohio trade, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 243-245, 254-255, 261, 265, 299-306; William A. Hunter, "Traders on the Ohio: 1730," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, XXXV (1952), 85-89; Jennings, "Incident at Tulpehocken," 353. For an account of Logan's fall and withdrawal from the trade see Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Pennsylvania," Chap. 8.

Sell and buy or receive at some one certain reasonable price, according to the value of the Goods." Trade was both a major reason and a means for maintaining good Indian relations.

25

Pennsylvania's fur exports increased dramatically following the end of Queen Anne's War, easily surpassing their pre-war level for most years several times over (see Table V-1). In contrast to New York, beaver made up a very small percentage of Pennsylvania's fur exports, usually less than one percent (see Table V-2). However, deerskin constituted fifty to seventy-five percent of fur exports and frequently twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the colony's total exports to London. As with New York, the value of all furs as a percent of Pennsylvania's total exports to London fluctuated during this period, varying from thirty to forty percent. Probably because of the enumeration of furs in 1722 the value of deerskin exports increased dramatically the following year and, except for 1724, continued to be high throughout the remainder of the decade. Understandably, a similar trend occurred in total fur exports. A decrease in both these statistics in 1729 may have reflected the Indians' residential shift to the Ohio valley, resulting in some dislocation within the fur trade, but by 1730 these figures had returned to their previous

²⁵Gov. Gordon to the Traders of Pennsylvania, Oct. 4, 1729, James Logan to Allegheny Traders, Oct. 6, 1729, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 243-245.

level. Although Pennsylvania did not export as much fur as New York, the difference between the two colonies was not as great as frequently believed, especially for deerskin, the mainstay of the former's fur trade.²⁶ Pennsylvania's percentage of the total deerskin market (see Table IV-5) varied between ten and forty percent immediately after the war until 1723, when it stabilized at about twenty-five percent. It remained at this level until 1729, at which time it dropped to about ten percent, reflecting in part the Indians' shift westward, as well as Carolina's increased role in the deerskin trade. Current values for the fur trade reflected similar trends during this same period (see Table V-3).

Indian policy in Pennsylvania by 1730, with one major exception, had developed along two lines. The importance of the fur trade on one hand and of land acquisition on the other had shaped the colony's policy during this formative and expansionistic period. The value of deerskin in particular, but of other furs as well, induced Pennsylvania's officials to maintain good relations with the Indians. England prior to 1730 was only a minor market for the colony, the majority of its trade taking place with

²⁶Elliot Norton reached the conclusion based upon Lawson's statistics that Pennsylvania seldom produced "more than 5 percent of England's supply of furs while New York on several occasions exported between 35 and 50 percent of all English fur imports," Fur Trade of New York, 92. While the figures included in this study are not all-conclusive, they would generally suggest a less extreme comparison for the years 1714-1730.

the West Indies.²⁷ Therefore, the maintenance of an important staple export such as fur, the major market for which was London, was vital to Pennsylvania's economic stability. This economic need, when combined with the rapid increase of settlement which demanded new lands, led the colony to put great pressure on the native population, resulting in its ultimate move westward to the Ohio valley by the late 1720s. James Logan, in particular, directed the flow of white settlement through his various offices, which, in turn, facilitated his own personal enrichment. Thus, it was largely private interest in terms of fur and land profits which led to the colony's policy of general friendship toward the Indians.

The major exceptions to the private orientation of Pennsylvania's Indian policy during the period were Keith's plan of 1719 and the Albany Indian conference of 1722. However, even the latter was marred by the private interest of Governor Keith. Despite Keith's own personal greed, he did display a certain imperial concern when he submitted his plan for unified control of Indian affairs to the Board of Trade. However, the failure of the Crown to adopt the plan marked not only the end of imperial concerns in the colony, but also even minimal expenditures on Indian affairs. Prior to 1732 Indian expenses had averaged about fifty pounds per

²⁷ James G. Lydon, "Philadelphia's Commercial Expansion, 1720-1739," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XCI (1967), 402-404.

annum, not a large sum in and of itself but, with the exception of the Albany treaty, the colony paid out no money from 1723-1727.²⁸ Only after the potential danger became evident in 1728 of ignoring Indian problems did the colony begin to expend sizable amounts on maintaining good relations. In 1722 the colony had sent Governor Keith to Albany to confer with the Iroquois. Although Governor Spotswood's barrier line received approval, little other inter-colonial cooperation took place. Keith had to deny any economic interest in New York's fur trade before he was allowed to talk to the Indians, and then he used the conference for his own personal enrichment. Nevertheless, one of the major results of this treaty was to indicate Iroquois suzerainty over certain Pennsylvania tribes and to open the door for future trade and closer diplomatic relations. Over all, the post-war period had been one of economic, geographic, and numerical expansion, frequently at Indian expense. The fur trade had not protected the Indian from white encroachments; rather it facilitated the advance of settlement and the breakdown of Amerindian culture.²⁹ At the same time, aggressive, imperial Indian policy had no place in Pennsylvania, and the decade of the 1730s would witness the continuation of private interest.

²⁸George A. Cribbs, "The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, II (1919), 7-8.

²⁹Jennings, "Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," 420.

TABLE V-1

Fur and Skin Exports from Pa. to London by
Constant Value in £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported from Pa. to London in £	Total value of Deerskin ex- ported from Pa. to London in £	Total value of all fur & skins exported from Pa. to London in £	Total value of all exports from Pa. to London in £
1714	0	557	1,083	2,663
1715	10	907	1,485	5,413
1716	0	1,076	2,641	4,138
1717	4	993	1,675	2,344
1718	6	960	1,783	3,103
1719	5	582	1,170	5,047
1720	0	1,251	2,012	5,423
1721	0	607	1,117	4,063
1722	0	971	1,592	3,120
1723	7	2,218	2,988	8,015
1724	1	701	871	2,695
1725	1	3,032	4,063	8,649
1726	43	1,544	2,247	3,169
1727	8	3,465	4,502	10,556
1728	9	2,502	3,988	8,230
1729	23	1,111	1,952	3,683
1730	0	4,190	6,056	7,363
1731	64	605	2,715	6,572

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE V-2

Fur by type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported from Pa. to London	Value of beaver as a % of total exports from Pa. to London	Value of deerskin as a % of all furs and skins exported from Pa. to London	Value of deerskin as a % of total exports from Pa. to London	Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports from Pa. to London
1714	0	0	51.4	20.9	40.7
1715	.7	.2	61.1	16.8	27.4
1716	0	0	40.7	26.0	63.8
1717	.2	.2	59.3	42.4	71.5
1718	.3	.2	51.6	29.6	57.5
1719	.4	.1	49.7	11.5	23.2
1720	0	0	62.2	23.1	37.1
1721	0	0	54.3	14.9	27.5
1722	0	0	61.0	31.1	51.0
1723	.2	.1	74.2	27.7	37.3
1724	.1	.1	80.5	26.0	32.3
1725	.1	.1	74.6	35.1	47.0
1726	1.9	1.4	68.7	48.7	70.9
1727	.2	.1	77.0	32.8	42.6
1728	.2	.1	62.7	30.4	48.5
1729	1.2	.6	56.9	30.2	53.0
1730	0	0	69.2	56.9	82.2
1731	2.4	1.0	22.3	9.2	41.3

Source: Customs 3/1-80

TABLE V-3

Fur and Skin Exports from Pa. to London by
Current Value in £

Year	Current value of beaver exported from Pa. to London in £	Current value of deerskin exported from Pa. to London in £	Current value of total furs and skins exported from Pa. to London in £	Total current value of all exports from Pa. to London in £
1714	0	525	1,021	2,511
1715	9	838	1,372	5,002
1716	0	983	2,414	3,782
1717	4	894	1,508	2,110
1718	5	859	1,596	2,777
1719	5	535	1,075	4,638
1720	0	1,173	1,887	5,087
1721	0	558	1,027	3,734
1722	0	864	1,417	7,133
1723	6	1,888	2,543	6,821
1724	1	617	766	2,372
1725	1	2,713	3,636	7,741
1726	41	1,456	2,119	2,988
1727	8	3,250	4,223	9,902
1728	8	2,359	3,761	7,761
1729	22	1,075	1,890	3,565
1730	0	3,930	5,681	6,906
1731	57	538	2,416	5,849

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARD AN IMPERIAL POLICY, 1731-1744

The decade of the 1730s, culminating with the years just prior to King George's War, brought a change in colonial Indian policy, particularly for New York, but for Pennsylvania as well. New York's fur trade and Indian policy revolved around the fortified trading house at Oswego. Although concern for the Indians during the decade of the 1730s largely centered around what they could provide in the way of trade profits, policy had subtly changed by the early 1740s. Impending war with France brought New York back to a recognition of the value of the Iroquois for the colony's security. As in the past, Pennsylvania continued to structure its policy around the Indians' value to the Europeans in the fur trade and in land acquisitions. Its approach as the fur trade shifted further westward was to deal with the Iroquois as overlords, rather than directly with the individual tribes resident within the colony, as it had previously done. Inter-colonial cooperation was still atypical rather than typical, and developed only over warlike issues of imperial concern. However, there was evidence of a general shift in colonial attitude toward imperial concerns, especially for New York.

A period of relative peace characterized North America during the 1730s. Neither the French nor the English desired outright war; rather they competed on an economic basis for the Indian trade. In New York, despite Governor Burnet's aggressive Indian policy, subsequent administrations did little to further his programs, except to continue support for Oswego. Factional disputes were common at the time, and any Indian trade regulations met with stern opposition. Secretary of Indian Affairs Peter Wraxall noted in November 1730 that Governor Montgomery, who had succeeded Burnet, had not met with the Indians in two years, which Wraxall considered too long an absence. He attributed this to factionalism, for "Governor Montgomerie was a wise Man and an honest Governor. I suppose he was distressed by those Factions which have always blasted the Welfare of this province." Fur interests remained central to New York's policy during most of the 1730s, as reflected in the export statistics and in an increased concern for Oswego.¹

Figures for beaver exported from New York after 1731 revealed several interesting trends (see Table VI-1). After the banner year of 1731 (see Table IV-1), the quantity of beaver dropped off again for four years. No outstanding reason within the fur trade seemed to explain this; it appeared as part of an

¹McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxi, 182; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, III, 376; Cosby to Lords of Trade, June 19, 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 7.

overall trend, since all exports from New York underwent a general contraction. Beaver and total fur as percentages of New York's total value of exports also confirmed this, for they remained constant or even increased over the pre-1731 level (see Table VI-2). At the end of the fourth decade a great increase occurred in the volume of furs exported, made up largely by an increase in beaver. Decreases occurred in 1740-1741, but the total volume remained higher than in the first half of the 1730s. Cadwallader Colden in 1740 attributed these increases to the policy of strengthening Oswego.²

Whether Colden's observation explained in full the increase in furs was not clear. Nevertheless, Oswego's trading house and fort did become the center of most Indian affairs during the 1730s and early 1740s. Contemporary comments and provisions for support testified to Oswego's importance. Montgomery first met with the Six Nations in September 1728. At that time he renewed the Covenant Chain and expressed to them the purpose of Oswego: "I now expect you are Convinced that the Garison and House erected at Oswego is not only for the Conveniency of the Far Indians to carry their Trade with the Inhabitants of this province but also for your Security and Conveniency to Trade there." On August 26, 1730, Montgomery informed the Assembly of the repeal of the fur trade acts and also noted the continued importance of

²McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, lxxxii.

Oswego. "Every man who knows the Interest and Circumstance of this Province, must be very sensible of the Importance of that Place, on which chiefly depends the Prosperity and Success of your Indian trade; the Fidelity and Obedience of the Six Nations to the Crown of Great Britain; and the Protection and Defence of your frontier Settlements." Both the Council and Assembly subsequently petitioned the Board of Trade for permission to lay a small duty on the Indian trade, which would pay for the support of the fort. They emphasized that the alliance of the Six Nations, "firm and steadfast Friends to the British interest," depended upon the support of Oswego. Despite fears to the contrary, the Assembly passed an act to support the troops at Oswego and to regulate the trade there in September 1731 and renewed it again the following year.³

Late in 1730 Governor Montgomery received news that the French planned to erect a fort at Crown Point on Lake Champlain. He met the Six Nations in May 1731, at which time he renewed the Covenant Chain in the usual manner and warned them against allowing the French to build at Crown Point. Death prevented Montgomery from fully reporting on this affair, and control of the government

³Conference between Gov. Montgomery and the Indians, Sept. 1728, Gov. Montgomery to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 21, 1730, Gov. Montgomery to Sec. Popple, Dec. 21, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 861, 913-914; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 606-607, 610, 620-622; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 705-707, 788; Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English Struggle," 84.

devolved upon Council President Rip van Dam. French occupation of Crown Point in 1733 had met with little resistance, and that but verbal, although the French obviously had reasons other than trade in mind. Governor William Cosby met the Six Nations at Albany in September of 1733, where he addressed them concerning the French fort. "I do in particular manner require you in my Masters name, that you will not suffer the French to build any Forts or trading houses on the side of the Lake or any other part of your Lands." More important, his address dealt largely with trade and particularly with Oswego. Taking his cue from Montgomery's address three years earlier, Cosby stressed the value of Oswego for both trade and security. Trade and defense slowly became intertwined as the basis for Indian policy.⁴

Although private land and trade interests loomed larger than defensive concerns in Pennsylvania during most of the 1730s, events transpired on another level that would have great effect upon Indian relations for the future. Thomas Penn had arrived in the colony in 1732, at which time he took part in the treaty settling acquisition of the Tulpehocken lands. In addition to the land purchase, the colony had called the conference because of

⁴McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 182-188; Conference between Gov. Cosby and the Indians, Sept. 1733, Gov. Cosby to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 15, 1733, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., V, 964-967, 972; History of New York, I, 247; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, III, 375-376.

continued unrest about abuses in the trade, and because French encroachments upon Indians normally in alliance with the English colonies had created a need for some permanent resolution. Apparently English activity, particularly at Oswego and in the Ohio valley, had aroused French fears. New York Council President Rip van Dam had forwarded the warnings of his Indian Commissioners concerning the new French construction at Crown Point and the French attempt to win over to their interest a number of Pennsylvania Indians. Governor Gookin responded by inviting the Six Nations, "whose Friendship is well known to be of the highest Importance to the Peace and Security of these Countries," to Philadelphia to take part in the upcoming conference.⁵

The 1732 treaty marked an important change in Pennsylvania's relationship with the Iroquois nations. Previously the colony treated them as only one of numerous tribes with whom it dealt directly, but from this point on Pennsylvania placed the Iroquois in a position of supremacy within the context of the Covenant Chain. Although in many ways their elevation by the English was artificial, the Six Nations readily accepted their

⁵ Indian Deed, Sept. 7, 1732, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 344-347; Edmond Cartlidge to Gov. Gordon, May 14, 1732, Invitation to Five Nations, Aug. 18, 1731, Ibid., 327-328, 288; James Logan to Proprietors, Dec. 15, 1731, PPOC, II, 191, 221; Minutes of the N.Y. Indian Commissioners, Sept. 25, 1731, I, 348a-349; Pa. Council Minutes, III, 402-403; Pa. Assembly Minutes, III, 2104-2105.

new position for reasons of power, economy, and security. Pennsylvania hoped by means of Iroquois influence to force the Shawnee, who grew increasingly friendly toward the French, to return to the eastern portion of the colony. Governor Gordon had earlier offered the Shawnee a secure land grant on the west side of the Susquehanna, but, even with Iroquois pressure and despite threats that the colony might cut off trade relations, they refused to return. Although the 1732 treaty did not result in the return of the Shawnee, it did establish Pennsylvania-Iroquois relations on a firm footing. A smooth diplomatic road was now open between the two parties, upon which Shickellamy, the Iroquois viceregent, and Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's interpreter, could travel. After the establishment of more permanent relations with the Iroquois, the intensity of concern with the fur trade and French encroachment subsided momentarily. French activity did not decline, but a proprietary concern for profiting from land sales preoccupied Indian affairs for several years. This concern manifested itself particularly in the so-called Walking Purchase.⁶

Although Pennsylvania would occupy itself during the mid-

⁶ Indian Conference at Philadelphia, Aug. 23-Sept. 2, 1732, Shawnee Conference at Philadelphia, Oct. 5, 1732, Pa. Council Minutes, III, 435-452, 462; Shawnee Chiefs to Gov. Gordon, June 7, 1732, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 329-330; Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio; A Narrative of Indian Affairs on the Upper Ohio Valley Until 1795 (Pittsburgh, 1940), 26-29; Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 148-150, 177-178.

1730s with matters of land, New York continued its hesitant return to the emphasis on defense prematurely expressed by Burnet. In October of 1733 the Assembly, in response to a petition of a large group of Oswego fur traders, suggested sending a competent person such as David Schuyler to regulate the abuses complained of by the traders. They felt it would increase trade and "tend to the Benefit of his Majesty's Subjects of the Colony, and enable them to vend much larger Quantities of the British Woollen Manufactures, in Return for the Beaver Furs, and other Skins, they have the Prospect to procure by that Trade." The Albany commissioners wrote to Governor Cosby the following spring, referring to the dangers both for trade and for peace on the frontier of allowing the Seneca to fall under French influence. Cosby addressed the Assembly on April 25, suggesting it send gunsmiths to reside among the Iroquois, for "it is to our Interest to defeat Attempts of the French by the like Acts, and to preserve the Friendship of the six Nations though at greater Expense." Frontier security and trade together determined New York's Indian policy as the decade advanced.⁷

Representatives of the Six Nations at an Albany conference in September 1735 addressed Governor Cosby: "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing," recognizing that each depended on the other.

⁷ N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 651-652, 654; Minutes of the N.Y. Indian Commissioners, Mar. 4, 1734, II, 50-51, also in McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 189-190.

New Yorkers, however, increasingly valued the Iroquois as buffers between themselves and the French. Several Albany inhabitants noted that year that "the five Nations of Indians are [the] Chief Security against the French and their Indians, in time of War." Fear of a dreaded third inter-colonial war grew larger with each succeeding year.⁸

Events transpired in 1734 which would have great consequence for Pennsylvania Indian affairs in the future.⁹ These developed out of a long background. Thomas Penn had arrived in the colony with one major concern - to raise enough money to pay off proprietary debts, nearly £ 8,000 by his brother's estimate. With debts mounting rapidly, the Penns needed to cash in on their one asset, land. However, to buy land from the Indians for resale, they needed working capital, an item in short supply. Thomas and John Penn met with the Delaware Indians at Durham in 1734, offering a pittance for land which the Indians recognized as very valuable. White settlers increasingly drifted into the Forks area of the

⁸ Ibid., 195; Minutes of the N.Y. Indian Commissioners, Sept. 18, 1735, II, 71-74; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 683.

⁹ Numerous historians have chronicled the events leading up to and surrounding the Walking Purchase, and I have based the following brief description upon three excellent accounts: Francis P. Jennings, "The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn's Sons: Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase," Pennsylvania History, XXXVII (1970), 19-39; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," Chap. 10; and Anthony F.C. Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763 (New York, 1970), Chap. 2.

Delaware country, located between the Lehigh and Delaware Rivers south of the Blue Mountain. James Logan himself had an interest in an iron works at Durham. The Penns claimed that the boundaries of the land sold in 1686 to the original proprietor were vague, and they induced the Delaware to a meeting at Pennsbury Manor the following spring to settle such matters.

Passage of a year brought the Penns to the conclusion that they would have to disregard legitimate Indian claims to the Forks area if they were to stay afloat financially. At Pennsbury they produced a copy of the 1686 deed by which William Penn purchased the land south of Tohickon Creek which flowed east into the Delaware at a point considerably south of the Forks. However, it was the present Penns' contention that the original measuring walk of "a day and a half" had never taken place and that the Forks area was in fact within such a distance. They proceeded upon this bold line of reasoning based upon the knowledge gained from a privately conducted "walk" that a runner could readily travel along a pre-determined course which would encompass not only the Forks region, but also the Minisink area north of the Blue Mountain. Disillusioned, Chief Nutimus and his Delaware tribesmen returned to consult with their elders on the matter. Although Thomas Penn delayed any immediate action, by 1737 he was in need of funds, which could only come from the official removal of the Indian land title. Thus, in August when the Indians came to Philadelphia, Penn

induced them to confirm the 1686 deed by showing them a map printed in English that they could not read, on which the acknowledged Tohickon boundary was labeled "West Branch River Delaware." The famous Walk, or perhaps more accurately, run, took place on September 19 and 20. Almost immediately the Indians complained that the walk was contrary to their traditions and expectations; however, nothing serious developed immediately. Penn released patents for previously sold land in the Forks area, and new settlers increasingly poured in, often giving the Indians additional payments to maintain good relations. It was clear that the Indians had been hoodwinked; both they and the Penns knew it. Resentment smoldered, and although some sort of compensation might have alleviated pressures, none was forthcoming, and by the early 1740s the Pennsylvanians had decided, with Iroquois complicity, to drive the Delaware out of the area.

Before turning to a series of events which propelled the Iroquois to the head of the Covenant Chain, it is necessary to look at events in New York during the late 1730s, events which in many ways induced the Six Nations to turn to Pennsylvania for support in their battle to maintain power and position in a world increasingly dominated by Europeans. When the Iroquois met with Governor Cosby in September 1735 they expressed confusion over New York's policy. On the one hand New York wanted the Iroquois to

prevent French building on Indian land and to protect Oswego in case of attack, while on the other hand the Indian Commissioners were drawing up a "treaty of friendship" with the Caughnawaga, middle-men in the Albany-Montreal trade. In addition, Albany, concerned for its security, attempted to arrange a neutrality agreement in case of a French-English war, rather than to adopt a more aggressive imperial policy. The Iroquois noted that "its as if you on one side and the french on the other will press us out of our Lands, we are like dumb people not knowing what ails us."¹⁰

The Iroquois continued to experience confusion and ambivalence under George Clarke, who as Council President, took over the governorship and subsequently received appointment as Lieutenant Governor. Clarke summoned a large Indian conference in June 1737, which he hoped to use to prevent the French from building a trading post at Irondequat that would "enable them to intercept all the Western Fur Trade in its way to Oswego."¹¹ The

¹⁰Minutes of the N.Y. Indian Commissioners, Aug. 1-2, Sept. 18-20, 1735, II, 65-67, 71-74; 1735 Indian Treaties, McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 193-196; Marquis de Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, Oct. 10, 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., IX, 1039-1040; Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English Struggle," 86-87.

¹¹President Clarke to Lords of Trade, Mar. 16, 1736, Pres. Clarke to Mr. Van Dam, Mar. 11, 1736, Commission of George Clarke, Esq., as Lieutenant Governor of New York, July 13, 1736, Lt.-Gov. Clarce to Lords of Trade, May 9, 1737, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 42-43, 45, 71, 95; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 702-703. Irondequat was located forty miles west of Oswego on the south side of Lake Ontario.

new governor severely reprimanded the Iroquois for giving permission to Jean Coeur, the French interpreter, to settle at Irondequat. The Six Nations agreed to retract that permission, but caustically concluded: "How comes it that the French have settled so near in the neighborhood even at the Crown Point have they Wone it by the sword We think it is our land." Clarke himself desired permission from the Seneca to build at Irondequat, but he could not persuade them. He settled instead for the usual method of sending an interpreter, smith, and several other people into Indian country to watch over French activities and maintain the British interest.¹²

Support for the Oswego garrison and prevention of further French forts occupied a large part of New York's Indian policy. In 1737 the Assembly capitalized on Clarke's fear of a defenseless frontier. Although it forced him to accept a one year revenue act for his support by threatening not to provide for the colony's defenses, it voted to support the Oswego garrison and continued to do so, recognizing its defensive value to the colony. New Yorkers made continued efforts to keep the French from their proposed building, and the Assembly rewarded the Seneca in 1739 by sending them £ 100 for their important role in preventing further French construction in their area of control. Clarke conferred with the Six Nations

¹²Conference between Lt.-Gov. Clarke and the Indians, June-July, 1737, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 98-109; N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 705.

in August 1740, at which time they admitted all "the Indians to the Southward and Westward as far as Mississippi" into the Covenant Chain. The Board of Trade expressed hope that this action would establish a lasting peace among the Indians. Clarke again requested permission to settle at Irondequat, but the Iroquois desired to maintain their neutrality in the affair. "We perceive that both you and the french intend to settle that place, but we are fully resolved that neither you nor they shall settle there [. T]here is a jealousy between you and the Governor of Canada about that place, if either the one or the other should settle there we think it would breed mischief." However, Clarke did obtain a deed to the Irondequat area the following winter, largely because the decreasing strength of the Iroquois forced them to lean more to the British cause than that of the French.¹³

In leaning toward the British, the Iroquois increasingly came to rely upon Pennsylvania. Logan's private home was the meeting place for a number of Iroquois chieftains who came in October 1736 to confirm the treaty signed four years earlier. At this time the Six Nations claimed by previous conquest the right

¹³N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 740-742, 756, 761, 766, 768, 771-772, 775-776; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 974, 1013, III, 104-105, 241; Stanley N. Katz, Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 151-152, 156-157; Conference between Lt.-Gov. Clarke and the Six Nations, August 1740, Lords of Trade to Lt.-Gov. Clarke, Aug. 20, 1741, Deed to His Majesty of the Land around Irondequat, Jan. 10, 1741, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 172-179, 199, 204.

to sell the Conestoga land along both sides of the Susquehanna River. They did so with the additional promise not to sell land within Pennsylvania's boundaries to anyone but the proprietors or their heirs.¹⁴

Pennsylvania had now firmly established the precedent of dealing directly with the Iroquois as overlords to the lesser tribes within the colony's bounds. Logan carried this one step further by inducing the Iroquois to release any claims to Delaware lands in the Forks area. Logan and the proprietors feared that Chief Nutimus would apply to the Iroquois for confirmation of Delaware claims to the disputed area. Logan sent Conrad Weiser, the colony's interpreter, to Onondaga to negotiate a release. With difficulty Weiser got a number of the Six Nations to sign a deed for all lands west of the Delaware and north to the Blue Mountain. In return, the Indians requested that the governor intercede on their behalf concerning payment for land settled by Virginia and Maryland. They further asked for a reduction in the price of trade goods. The Iroquois star was clearly in the ascendancy, while that of the Delaware was on the decline.

¹⁴Indian Treaty, Sept. 28 - Oct. 14, 1736, Julian P. Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties printed by Benjamin Franklin, 1736-1762 (Philadelphia, 1938), 3-14, also in Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 79-95; Copies of Susquehanna Deed and Release, Oct. 11, 25, 1736, Penn Papers, Indian Mss. and Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 494-499, Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs.

The impact of these negotiations remained hidden for several years, but the pattern was clear. Pennsylvania had treated directly with the Iroquois in order to facilitate Indian affairs and to gain title to land, both on the Susquehanna and on the Delaware. The Six Nations had forsaken their traditional position within the Covenant Chain for a new one, one which they hoped would enhance their position vis-a-vis the European powers. Their new role enabled them to survive on an equal footing for a number of years, but in the end a rejection of traditional "props" like the Delaware would prove fatal.¹⁵

Benjamin Franklin's Gazette unknowingly praised the Penn policy of maintaining good Indian relations to which "nothing has contributed more than the Practice he [William Penn] set on Foot and has since been continued, of purchasing their Claims to lands, before he would suffer them to be taken up by his Authority." However, it was soon evident that something was amiss, for the Indians continually complained about the subsequent Walking Purchase, abuses by traders, and too much rum.

In August 1737 Governor Clarke of New York, increasingly concerned about frontier security, wrote to Logan to inform him of a decision by the Shawnee living on the Susquehanna to move closer

¹⁵Iroquois Proposition and Deed, Oct. 1725, Penn Papers, Indian Mss., I, 39-40, Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 363-368.

to the French. The Shawnee had reached the point of having to choose sides between the European powers. Like the Iroquois, they too hoped to maintain a certain degree of integrity and independence. The Pennsylvania Council refused a Shawnee request for powder and lead to maintain such a position, believing it better if the Indians came east to renew treaties and settle such matters. An imperial concern became increasingly evident, for the Council felt that "as the Practices of the French on those Indians, if successful, may prove extremely prejudicial in case of a Rupture with France, all possible Means ought to be used to prevent their Defection and to keep them attached to the British Interest." Although the Shawnee refused to meet in 1738, they did travel to Philadelphia in July of the following year to renew old friendships. The new treaty continued the articles originally established in 1701 by William Penn, and the Shawnee assured the province of their allegiance against the French.¹⁶

Although the Shawnee temporarily remained on good footing with Pennsylvania, new trouble arose in 1741 when Nutimus' band of Delaware again complained of land fraud in the Walking Purchase. In this matter Governor George Thomas forced Nutimus to agree to

¹⁶ Pennsylvania Gazette, Oct. 7-14, 1736; Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 234-235, 336-347; Indian Resolution Respecting Rum, Mar. 15, 1738, Indians at Allegheny to Gov. Thomas, Mar. 20, 1738, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 549-552; Downes, Council Fires, 33-36.

accept the judgment of his "uncles," the Six Nations, at the next treaty in Philadelphia. The long-awaited treaty took place in July 1742. As agreed upon in 1736, the Iroquois had come to collect payment for the lands they had sold along the Susquehanna. They further renewed the Covenant Chain and promised their assistance if war should break out with the French. However, affairs did not reach such a pleasant accord for Nutimus and the Fork's Delaware. The realization of where the Iroquois stood became clearly evident as the Delaware listened to Canasatego, an Oneida chief, pronounce their doom. He denied his "cousins" any right to the disputed land.

Let this Belt of Wampum serve to Chastize You; You ought to be taken by the Hair of the Head and shaken severely till you recover your Senses and become Sober; You don't know what Ground you stand on, nor what you are doing. We conquered You, we made Women of you, you know you are Women, and can no more sell land than Women. You act a dishonest part not only in this but in other Matters. And for all these reasons we charge you to remove instantly. We... Assign you two places to go -- either to Wyomin or Shamokin. You may go to either of these Places, and then we shall have you more under our Eye, and shall see how You behave.

Canasatego concluded his speech by denying the Delaware any right to engage in future land transaction. The Iroquois had reached a pinnacle of power, while the Delaware suffered the depths of
17
ignominy.

¹⁷Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 380-383, Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 481; Indian Treaty at Philadelphia, July 2-12, 1742, Ibid., 559-586 and Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 15-39.

Although the Delaware problem on the surface appeared settled, Pennsylvania increasingly displayed a concern for defense and good Indian relations in light of a French war, which most people considered almost inevitable. As early as 1739, Deputy Governor George Thomas complained about the French danger and about the Quaker refusal to do anything for defense. To defend itself against charges of pacifism at the expense of frontier security, the Quaker-dominated Assembly voted a £ 3,000 grant to the Crown as well as compensation for any master's servant who enlisted in the King's service for duty against the Spanish in the West Indies. This, in addition to future action, indicated the Quakers were not complete pacifists. Certain courses of action were justifiable, as long as they themselves did not have to engage directly in military matters.¹⁸

In addition to settling land disputes, a major reason for the 1742 treaty had been to decide upon measures for dealing with the French in the Ohio valley. Governor Thomas noted the importance of the recent treaty with the Iroquois, not only for settling land affairs, "but for its [the province's] future Security..., in case of a Rupture with the French, who will leave

¹⁸George Thomas to John Penn, Nov. 5, 1739, PPOC, III, 89; Issac Norris to Robert Charles, Oct. 26, 1741, Norris Letter Book, IX, 1719-1756, 11; Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Harrisburg, 1953), 12, 16-17 and "The Quaker Party of Pennsylvania, 1755-1765," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXI (1947), 19-20.

no Methods unessayed to corrupt this Fidelity, and to persuade them to turn their Arms against us." Thomas Penn approved of the treaty and the Six Nations' willingness to assist Pennsylvania in case of trouble; however, continued disputes among the Indians themselves threatened to disrupt frontier tranquility. New York and Virginia, as well as Pennsylvania, feared the French would take advantage by fomenting such divisions, driving a wedge between the English colonies and their native allies.¹⁹

The point at which defensive concerns overshadowed trade advantages remains uncertain and varied from one colony to the next. However, as the war years approached, New York placed greater emphasis on Oswego and the fidelity and unity of the Indians as security against the French. Governor Clarke's April 15, 1741, address to the New York Assembly referred to Oswego as "of the highest importance to the Fur Trade," and went on to say, "if you suffer Oswego to fall into the Hands of the French I much fear you will lose the Six Nations, an Event which will expose the whole Country to the merciless Spoil and barbarous cruelty of a Savage Enemy." On April twenty-seventh Clarke told the House that the friendship of the Six Nations was more important than anything else, and "if we lose them, no Part of the Country will be safe." The

¹⁹Wallace, Teedyuscung, 35; Gov. Thomas to Assembly, Aug. 20, 1742, Pa. Assembly Minutes, IV, 2784-2785; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, Sept. 16, 1742, Feb. 25, 1743, T. Penn Letter Books, II, 2-3, 21; Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 27, Feb. 2, Mar. 31, 1743.

legislature responded, although somewhat begrudgingly, by providing £ 60 for a stone wall to fortify Oswego. By the following year he made no mention of fur at all in his address to the Assembly. A great unrest and fear of a French war lay heavily on the minds of New Yorkers. Even such a stalwart as Philip Livingston wrote to his son expressing his darkest thought: "I do very much dread a French war in this Country[. T]here is no manner of notice taken of our frontiers."²⁰

Although New York in particular stressed the value of Oswego, both it and Pennsylvania recognized the ultimate importance of Iroquois friendship to colonial defense. During Clarke's final conference with the Indians in the summer of 1742, he accentuated the importance of Oswego and the alliance of the Covenant Chain but made little mention of trade. He emphasized the necessity for the Indians to maintain unity, especially with the southern tribes, as agreed upon two years earlier, against "those people who may attempt to divide you... [with your] Destruction in view." Pennsylvania expressed a clear interest in this affair, and minutes of the 1740 and 1742 Albany treaties appear in the Logan Indian records

²⁰ N.Y. Assembly Journals, I, 793, 799-800, 827, 831; Gov. Clarke to Board of Trade, Aug. 24, Nov. 29, 1742, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 214-215, 220-221; Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, Oct. 19, 1742, Livingston-Redmond Mss., Franklin D. Roosevelt Lib., Hyde Park, N.Y. (microfilm copy, hereafter cited as Livingston-Redmond Papers); Barnes, "Fur Traders of Oswego," 132.

for the period.²¹

The Iroquois frequently expressed the desire to meet with representatives of the southern tribes to settle a permanent peace, but continually met with frustrations in their attempts. As early as 1737, Virginia and the southern tribes were willing to meet the Iroquois, but matters of protocol, pride, and security precluded a meeting in either Williamsburg or Albany. Finally, in 1743 a backcountry encounter between Virginia settlers and Iroquois raiding parties, which resulted in deaths on both sides, provided the catalyst for the long-desired peace treaty. Pennsylvania, fearing the consequences of being caught between the two factions and the advantages which the French might gain from such a disruption, offered service as mediator in the affair. George Thomas' perception of his role as governor is worthy of note. "It is my Duty not only to preserve peace in my own government, but to be the Instrument, as far as lyes in my power, of restoring it to any other of his Majesties' Subjects." The exact extent to which Pennsylvania's specific needs motivated Thomas was not evident, but it was clear that he offered to cooperate on an inter-colonial basis to provide the necessary tranquility for frontier security.²²

²¹Conference between Lt.-Gov. Clarke and the Six Nations, June 15-16, 1742, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 216-219; Albany Indian Treaties, Aug., 1740, June 1742, Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs.

²²Conrad Weiser, Narrative of Onondaga journey, April 1737, Penn Papers, Indian Mss., I, 42; Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 630-637, 640-669; Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, xxxv-xxxvi.

Lancaster, Pennsylvania, something of a neutral location, became the site for probably the most important Indian treaty since 1722. News of war with France increased the importance of maintaining Iroquois support for the English. Speaker of the House John Kinsey promised that the Assembly would "let no expense be wanting proper to put the country into a posture of defense in such a manner as their Known principles would admit of." Thomas Penn asked for a copy of the forthcoming treaty as soon as possible, so the ministry could see "the Credit our Government has with the Indians." In brief, the treaty provided compensation for Iroquois land claims in Virginia and Maryland. Most important, all parties brightened the Covenant Chain, and the Iroquois agreed to remain neutral in the recently declared war and not allow French military forces access to English settlements through their lands.²³

The main import of the treaty was clearly evident in Governor Thomas' opening remarks to the commissioners from Virginia and Maryland.

These Indians by their Situation are a Frontier to some of them [English] colonies, and from thence, If Friends, are Capable of Defending their Settlements; If Enemies, of making Cruel Ravages upon them; If Neuter, they may deny the French a passage through

²³ Lancaster Indian Treaty, June 22- July 4, 1744, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 41-79 and Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 698-737; Gov. Thomas to Assembly, May 18, 1744, Assembly to Gov. Thomas, May 25, 1744, Proclamation of War, June 11, 1744, Ibid., 685-689, 696-697; Pa. Assembly Minutes, IV, 2932-2933; Kinsey quote in Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics, 19; Thomas Penn to Gov. Thomas, May 5, 1744, T. Penn Letter Books, II, 89.

their Country, and give us timely Notice of their Designs. Some allowances for their Prejudices and Passions, and a Present now and then for the Relief of their Necessities, which have in some measure been brought upon them by their Intercourse with Us, and by our yearly extending our Settlements, will probably tye them more closely to the British Interest. This has been the Method of New York and Pennsylvania, and will not put you to so much Expence in Twenty Years as the carrying on a War against them will do in One. The French very well know the Importance of these Nations to Us, and will not fail by Presents and their other usual Acts to take advantage of any misunderstandings we may have with them.²⁴

Thus, as the Lancaster Treaty drew to a close, so did an era. No longer would New York solely dominate Indian affairs or base its policy upon its interests in the fur trade. Pennsylvania had risen to a position of importance as the center of Indian affairs moved westward toward the Ohio country. The Iroquois left Lancaster at the peak of their power, but the relinquishment of their right to land west of the Alleghenies and their earlier decisions to cast aside tributary allies would ultimately undermine their position as sole spokesmen for all Indians.

Although colonial Indian policy increasingly reflected the importance of defensive interests, fur did not lose all its importance until just prior to King George's War. Peltry as a percentage of New York's exports increased, reaching seventy-one percent in 1736, then slowly decreased until 1744 (see Table VI-2).

²⁴Lancaster Indian Treaty, June 25, 1744, Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 700-701.

The increased total figures for 1736-1738 indicated the reason for this percentage rise (see Table VI-1). Although Pennsylvania did not export a similarly large percentage in the mid-1730s, it maintained, with several exceptions, an almost identical rate with New York throughout the rest of the period. This indicated an approximately equal interest on the part of both colonies for the role of the fur trade within their respective economies. From 1739-1741 the small overall decreases in volume only marked a return to a more normal level of trade. The years immediately preceding King George's War showed a further decrease in the value of total fur, which proceeded naturally from the tensions along the frontier. Since the value of total exports from New York remained basically constant from the early 1730s through 1744, fur declined in the later years as a percentage of the total exports. Pennsylvania's total exports to London fluctuated somewhat inconsistently from one year to the next, in large part accounting for the percentage differences of total fur exports compared to the steadier trend in New York. Current values again exhibited the major changes discussed above, but they further indicated a general price decline in fur (see Table VI-3).²⁵

²⁵ Samuel Storke, a London merchant trading to both New York and Pennsylvania, complained that by the late 1730s his fur trade had fallen off. As an individual Storke's trade may have declined, but overall figures did not support his complaint until the 1740s. William I. Roberts, III, "Samuel Storke: An Eighteenth Century London Merchant Trading to the American Colonies," The Business History Review, XXXIX (1965), 164, 167.

Deerskin exports, although fluctuating from year to year, remained as a fairly consistent percentage of each colony's total fur exports through 1743 (see Table VI-2). Except for the peak years of beaver export, they provided twenty to thirty percent of New York's total and generally more than sixty percent of Pennsylvania's. Although Pennsylvania beaver exports increased as the colony expanded operations into the Ohio valley during the 1730s and early 1740s, the total amount seldom reached more than three percent of total fur exports. Beaver continued as New York's single most important fur export, often more than forty-five percent of the total and during the peak years from 1736-1739 accounted for the colony's overall increase in fur exports. In the London beaver market, New York continued to contribute twenty-five to thirty-five percent, with the lion's share coming, as before, from Hudson's Bay (see Table VI-5). In sharp contrast to its almost non-existent beaver exports, Pennsylvania played a much larger role in the overall deerskin economy, providing in the neighborhood of twenty percent of London's imports (see Table VI-4). New York occupied a lesser role, but still added ten to fifteen percent. The largest exports came from the southern colonies of Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas. Thus, New York played a relatively larger role in the beaver market than did Pennsylvania in the deerskin market. Coupled with New York's exports of deerskin, it was probable that London still considered New York more important than Pennsylvania in the fur economy. This of course does not deny the importance of fur

and skins to Pennsylvania's own economy. Obviously political considerations had frequently controverted a strictly economic rationale, and this would increasingly become the case in the third quarter of the century as imperial concerns took precedence.

Indian affairs had undergone several major changes during the decade and a half previous to King George's War. During the 1730s neither England nor France wanted war with each other and competition was largely in the realm of trade. Only when the French posed an active threat did the English and Iroquois show concern about the westward shift of Indian tribes, both Iroquoian and non-Iroquoian. Hence, while few people in either New York or Pennsylvania initially displayed an active interest in imperial designs, by the 1740s both colonies were less interested in the Indian as a provider of fur than as a protection against French attack. Although New York's fur trade remained substantial, the center of its trade shifted to the Ohio, as had Pennsylvania's, which resulted in an increased political role for the latter. In an attempt to deal with this shift, Pennsylvania added to Iroquois prestige within the Covenant Chain by treating directly with them as political overlords to other tribes within its boundaries. Thus, the Iroquois became the single most important set of tribes with whom both New York and Pennsylvania dealt. There was an increasing display of intercolonial cooperation among the colonies as the war years approached. Paradoxically, New York was very obviously absent from the 1744 Lan-

caster treaty. It was now Pennsylvania that increasingly acted as a mediator and director of Indian affairs. Impending war had brought the colonies to a recognition of the value of the Indians for colonial security. For Pennsylvania this was a new role; for New York it was a return to the policy of William Burnet. Ironically, he was unable to taste its fruits.

TABLE VI-1

Fur and Skin exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Constant Value in £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported to London in £		Total value of Deerskin exported to London in £		Total value of all fur and skins exported to London in £		Total value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	PA.	N.Y.	PA.	N.Y.	PA.	N.Y.	PA.
1732	1,138	27	1,280	934	3,852	2,067	7,520	5,635
1733	1,772	41	1,349	2,553	4,934	4,564	9,022	8,476
1734	2,045	88	1,101	1,892	4,490	3,185	12,407	10,381
1735	1,476	99	1,057	1,907	3,813	4,414	11,448	17,573
1736	6,652	74	2,280	3,739	10,714	6,045	15,084	18,754
1737	6,448	37	1,397	1,985	9,220	3,211	15,697	11,455
1738	5,179	188	642	2,599	6,727	4,375	13,547	9,843
1739	3,923	89	1,108	1,195	6,150	1,526	16,424	6,881
1740	2,846	22	1,626	2,254	5,932	3,304	17,040	9,847
1741	4,172	16	2,298	4,115	8,187	5,571	16,322	10,607
1742	1,576	51	1,214	1,135	4,050	2,133	11,953	5,566
1743	2,394	145	1,492	2,876	5,048	4,131	14,243	8,911
1744	2,161	18	1,884	1,408	4,843	2,184	14,398	6,824

Source: Customs 3/1-80

TABLE VI-2

Fur by type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of Beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported to London		Value of Beaver as a % of total exports to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of all fur and skins ex- ported to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of total exports to London		Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports to London	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1732	29.5	1.3	15.1	.5	33.2	45.2	17.0	16.6	51.2	36.7
1733	35.9	.9	19.6	.5	27.3	55.9	15.0	30.1	54.7	53.8
1734	45.5	2.8	16.5	.8	24.5	59.4	8.9	18.2	36.2	30.7
1735	38.7	2.2	12.9	.6	27.7	43.2	9.2	10.9	33.3	25.1
1736	62.1	1.2	44.1	.4	21.3	61.9	15.1	19.9	71.0	32.2
1737	69.9	1.2	41.1	.3	15.2	61.8	8.9	17.3	58.7	28.0
1738	77.0	4.3	38.2	1.9	9.5	59.4	4.7	26.4	49.7	44.4
1739	63.8	5.8	23.9	1.3	18.0	78.3	6.7	17.4	37.4	22.2
1740	48.0	.7	16.7	.2	27.4	68.2	9.5	22.9	34.8	33.6
1741	51.0	.3	25.6	.2	28.1	73.9	14.1	38.8	50.2	52.5
1742	38.9	2.4	13.2	.9	30.0	53.2	10.2	20.4	33.9	38.3
1743	47.4	3.5	16.8	1.6	29.6	69.6	10.5	32.3	35.4	46.4
1744	44.6	.8	15.0	.3	24.4	64.5	8.2	20.6	33.6	32.0

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VI-3

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Current Value in £

Year	Current value of beaver in £		Current value of deerskin in £		Current value of total fur and skins exported to London in £		Total current value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1732	990	23	1,114	813	3,351	1,798	6,542	4,902
1733	1,473	34	1,121	2,122	4,100	3,793	7,497	7,044
1734	1,730	74	931	1,601	3,799	2,695	10,396	8,732
1735	1,234	83	884	1,594	3,187	3,690	9,571	14,691
1736	5,468	61	1,874	3,073	8,806	4,969	12,399	15,416
1737	5,443	31	1,182	1,679	7,800	2,717	13,280	9,691
1738	4,330	157	537	2,173	5,624	3,658	11,324	8,229
1739	3,185	72	890	970	4,994	1,239	13,336	5,587
1740	2,615	20	1,494	2,071	5,452	3,036	15,660	9,049
1741	4,159	16	2,291	4,103	8,162	5,554	16,273	10,576
1742	1,502	49	1,157	1,082	3,860	2,033	11,391	5,304
1743	2,155	131	1,343	2,588	4,543	3,718	12,819	8,020
1744	1,912	16	1,048	1,246	4,286	1,933	12,742	6,039

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VI-4

Percentage of total deerskin exported by colonies

Year	Total deerskin exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1732	15,619	6.0	8.2	74.1	.2	11.6
1733	21,758	11.7	6.2	68.8	.9	12.4
1734	10,828	17.5	10.2	56.1	.8	15.4
1735	8,796*	21.7	12.0	31.5	.3	34.5
1736	10,435	35.8	21.8	41.4	.9	unavailable
1737	12,465	19.0	13.3	57.4	.0	29.4
1738	10,842	24.0	5.9	44.2	1.0	24.9
1739	10,095	11.8	11.0	52.7	1.0	23.5
1740	9,843	22.9	16.5	47.2	.0	13.3
1741	13,231	31.4	17.4	27.9	.0	23.6
1742	9,462	12.0	12.8	43.2	.0	32.0
1743	13,920	20.7	10.7	44.2	.0	24.5
1744	7,268	19.4	16.3	33.7	.0	30.7

* In addition, Ga. exported £ 1,486 of deerskin.

Source: Customs 3/1-80

TABLE VI-5

Percentage of total beaver exported by colonies

Year	Total beaver exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Hudson's Bay	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1732	13,299	.2	8.6	86.0	3.6	1.6
1733	12,893	.3	13.7	75.8	8.0	2.1
1734	13,212	.7	15.5	71.3	11.7	.9
1735	10,682	.9	13.8	78.2	6.5	.6
1736	16,554	.4	40.2	54.2	5.2	unavailable
1737	16,941	.2	38.0	57.4	2.6	1.7
1738	15,542	1.2	33.3	61.0	3.1	1.4
1739	16,836	.5	23.3	72.6	1.1	2.5
1740	13,478	.2	21.1	75.9	1.9	.9
1741	12,529	.1	33.3	65.2	.5	.9
1742	13,089	.4	12.0	86.3	1.1	.1
1743	13,457	1.1	17.8	79.8	1.1	.2
1744	11,633	.2	18.6	80.4	.6	.2

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CHAPTER VII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IMPERIAL POLICY, 1744-1754

Indian policy, as King George's War approached, had reflected the growing recognition of the Indians' military value. The years 1745-1755 finalized such an approach. Military immediacies waned with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and peace brought with it time for reflection. The importance of Indian allies, and the impact of Britain's shift from mercantilism to imperialism continued to dominate Indian policy. A series of events of a cause-and-effect nature involving the French and centering on the Ohio valley further contributed to this solidification of policy. Political writers and government officials on both sides of the Atlantic emphasized the Indians' value to colonial defense, and imperial authorities accepted this continued concern with the Indians' military value. This movement culminated with the government's call for an inter-colonial conference on Indian affairs in 1754 and the creation of an Indian superintendency in 1755 to further unify imperial policy.

King George's War, 1744-1748, occasioned a revival of imperial interests in Indian affairs. In contrast to earlier years, both New York and Pennsylvania favored a more vigorous

policy toward the French, although there were elements in both colonies which wanted to avoid open conflict. Albany traders and officials in particular desired to protect their fur trade and to secure the frontier. Although the value of all furs exported from New York to London took a sharp plunge in 1745, which continued throughout the war, Pennsylvania's fur exports remained fairly high and reached peaks in 1746 and 1748, peaks which exceeded any of the colony's pre-war exports (see Table VII-1). This developed from trade expansion in the Ohio valley, which was, in part, a result of the Indians turning to the British for necessary trade goods which the French were unable to supply due to the exigencies of war. Fur continued to make up at least a fifth of New York's total exports, largely because of a general contraction of trade, and in Pennsylvania contributed thirty to sixty percent of the colony's total exports to London during the war years. To preserve these trades, one waning and one growing, and to protect their frontiers, both colonies adopted more active roles in Indian affairs.¹

Governor George Clinton of New York pursued a policy of keeping the Six Nations favorable to the British interest. He first

¹Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 184; Ellis, Short History, 54; Osgood, American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, IV, 175, 183. Tables containing all statistical information are located at the end of the chapter.

met with the Iroquois at Albany in June 1744. Stressing the need "to renew, strengthen and brighten the Covenant Chain," Clinton proclaimed British friendship for the Iroquois, warned of French treachery, and urged the Indians to keep careful guard now that the French had declared war on the English king. Clinton went on to promise British protection and asked the Indians for their assistance "in the vigorous prosecution of this just war against the French King," and especially in the protection of Oswego.

Despite assurances to the contrary, Lieutenant-Governor Clarke found the Iroquois "rather inclinable not to intermeddle with the War." Jean Coeur, the French trader, noted their "secret understanding" with other tribes to remain neutral in this "white man's" war. Upon his return to New York, Clarke addressed the Assembly concerning the recent Albany conference and stressed the great importance of preserving Oswego upon which "the Fidelity of the Six Nations to the British interest does in a great Measure depend." Warning of a possible loss of the native alliance, he further noted, "we may easily foresee how fatal and Destructive such an event would prove."²

Upon receiving news of the outbreak of war, many fur traders retreated from Oswego. Clinton believed this weakened

²Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June 1744, Journal of Occurances in Canada, 1746, 1747, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 262-266, X, 94; N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 24.

Iroquois confidence in the British. Although refusing to act upon a more extensive series of proposals for frontier protection submitted by the Indian Commissioners, the Assembly by September 1744 had passed an Act to support the garrison and trading house at Oswego. With a militia reinforcement to double the garrison of royal troops, Clinton confidently wrote to the Duke of Newcastle of the fresh spirit instilled among the Indians.³

This enthusiasm was not long-lived, and by mid-1745 Clinton faced new problems in providing for the colony's defense. His addresses to the Assembly centered on the importance of giving presents to maintain the Indian alliance. However, the legislature's refusal to take positive action resulted in a scathing lecture and a dissolution in May. "Through your Carelessness and Improvidence, we must hazard the seduction of the Six Nations, and our Northern Frontiers, for the present, remain naked and open to the Incursions and Insults of our declared Enemies, and their Indians."

The culmination of the year's effort was the Albany conference held in October 1745, planned in order to allay Iroquois

³Memorial on Frontier Defense, July 6, 1744, McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, 236-237; Minutes of the N.Y. Ind. Comm's., Oct. 8, 1744, II, 307; Colonial Laws of New York, III, 352-353; Clinton to Newcastle, Dec. 13, 1744, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 268; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, I, 304.

fears of the French and to deny English plans to eliminate the Indians. Ironically, the previous year's conference had done little to calm this disquietude, for Philip Livingston wrote to his son Robert on January thirteenth, "I received Surprising News. That the Mohawk Indians give out that the White people will massacre them." Although the Indian Commissioners partially allayed these fears, and the October conference further dissipated the Indians' concern, Clinton could only extract from them a tenuous promise of aid, even if the French continued their attacks. Upon returning from Albany, Clinton warned the newly convened Assembly that, although he hoped for a strict neutrality on the part of the Indians, the legislators could not afford to remain idle, and he asked them for aid toward assisting his majesty's services.⁴

Pennsylvania had freely joined commissioners from Massachusetts and Connecticut in meeting with the Iroquois at Albany. However, they operated upon a different set of assumptions about the nature of Indian affairs than did the New England and New York representatives. Pennsylvania's fur trade was expanding in the Ohio Valley despite minor French disruptions, and the

⁴ N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 61, 72, 74, 79; Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, Jan. 30, 1745, Livingston-Redmond Papers; Gov. Clinton to the Duke of Newcastle, Mar. 27, 1745, Conference between Commissioners of the colonies and the Indians, Oct. 1745, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 289-305; Albany Treaty, Oct., 1745, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 81-100.

colony felt secure from Indian attack as a result of many years of peaceful relations. Thomas Penn ironically captured this sentiment in a letter to Richard Peters: "It has been primarily owing to the just and kind Methods that my Father observed in his transactions with them, and our acting on that Plan ever Since." Governor George Thomas, in a letter to the proprietor, noted his personal desire to drive the French out of Canada, but only if the colonies were united in offering the Indians support and not using them as a sacrifice to English ends. He included Conrad Weiser's report of the conference which revealed the "Weakness, Selfishness, and Dishonesty of the G ___ of Y." Thomas further reported a French attack against the village of Saratoga in New York with the comment that, "under a Sober, and honest and a prudent Administration," the inhabitants would have nothing to fear and even might not have been attacked. "If the Enemy judge right, they will not do any thing that m[a]y occasion a closer union between Us and N. York. F[riend]s are still fast asleep and will not awake untill something of the like kind happens nearer home." Hence, Quaker pacifism and the desire to maintain an honest and unified imperial front prevented the Pennsylvania contingent from joining the other colonies in requesting active military aid of the Iroquois. Rather, the colony sought to preserve the Indians' neutrality and strength, a position that they themselves much

preferred.⁵

Despite Pennsylvania's unwillingness to go along with New York and New England in trying to induce Iroquois participation in the war, the Quaker Assembly had not been totally inactive. In July 1745 it agreed to provide £ 4,000 for provisioning the recently captured Louisbourg garrison with food and "other grains," interpreted to mean gunpowder. Although again refusing to request active participation by the Iroquois the following year, the Assembly did hesitatingly provide a grant of £ 5,000 for the King's use, which went toward raising several military companies for an expedition against Canada. Governor Thomas expressed his disgust that the Assembly did so little by comparing Pennsylvania to the more active New England colonies. "These people have a noble Spirit. I wish a little of it was communicable to Pennsylvania; but our Assembly Men think of nothing but holding their Seats in the House." Thomas did not elect to travel to Albany for an August conference with the Iroquois, because he knew the Assembly would not support New York in requesting the Iroquois to go to war. In reporting the conference to Thomas Penn he noted that, "if anything could shake the Fidelity of these Poor People [the Indians] the Governor

⁵ Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, June 7, 1745, T. Penn Letter Book, II, 129; Conrad Weiser's Report of the 1745 Albany Treaty, Dec. 7, 1745, Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, I, 49, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 309-311; Gov. Thomas to Thomas Penn, Dec. 11, 1745, PPOC, IV, 55; Gov. Thomas to Assembly, Sept. 17, 1745, Jan. 8, 1746, Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 772-773, V, 5.

of New York has done enough to disgust them." Although he wanted to cooperate with New York in driving out the French, he could express no feeling other than disgust for Clinton and the factionalism that surrounded him. The only bright spot was the emergence of William Johnson, an Indian trader who operated in the Mohawk valley, as the key figure in New York Indian affairs. Johnson, in collaboration with other New York imperialists, would guide the colony's Indian policy during the remainder of the war and, with a brief interlude, through the conclusion of the Fort Stanwix Treaty in 1768.⁶

By 1746 Governor Clinton had broken with his earlier political ally, James DeLancey, who himself sought increased political power. In part, the break resulted from DeLancey's involvement in the Canada trade which Clinton saw as a hindrance to his aggressive Indian policy. As a result, the governor came to rely most heavily on imperialists such as Cadwallader Colden and William Johnson. In November the Indian Commissioners resigned their positions, leaving Johnson who had great influence among the

⁶Ibid., IV, 763-764, 767-769; Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 1, Sept. 12, 19, 1745; Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, Russel B. Nye, ed., Autobiography and other Writings by Benjamin Franklin (Boston, 1958), 106; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 30-32, 36-49; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, V, 45-49; Gov. Thomas to Thomas Penn, June 26, Nov. 3, 1746, PROC, IV, 67, 75; Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, Sept. 27, 1746, Conrad Weiser Papers, 1741-1766 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., microfilm copy).

Iroquois as chief Indian council and negotiator. Johnson received a colonel's commission from the governor for his past services and for his ability to recruit Iroquois aid. A meeting with the Indians in late summer sought their help in a projected expedition against Canada. Only Johnson could influence the Indians to join in this attempt, but even with his urging, only the Mohawk, most heavily under English influence due to their eastern position, contributed actively to the war effort.⁷

Factionalism and the desire for neutrality continued to hinder Clinton in his war efforts. In 1747 he reprimanded Albany for the "shameful Neutrality, which it is generally believed, some in this Province, have endeavoured to establish between this Province and Canada, at this Time, such as was established in the War in Queen Anne's Reign, by which the French in Canada, gained great Advantages over the neighbouring Colonies, to the Prejudice of the common Interest of the Nation." Despite the factionalism which seemed to dominate the war years, Clinton and Johnson provided

⁷Milton M. Klein, "William Livingston's A Review of the Military Operations in North-America, in Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Colonial Legacy, (4 vols., New York, 1971-1973), II, 110-112; Katz, Newcastle's New York, 171-173, 176-177; Minutes of the N.Y. Ind. Comm's., Nov. 27, 1746, II, 405-406; Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, August, 1746, Gov. Clinton to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 9, 1746, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 313-314, 317-326; Gov. Clinton to William Johnson, August 27, 28 1746, James Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols., Albany, 1921-1965), I, 59-61 (hereafter cited as Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers).

for the proper defenses of the colony, although they might have wished for a more aggressive policy. When the Crown set aside the Canadian expedition, it especially disappointed Clinton who believed that only aggressive action by the English would secure the favor of the Indians. Realization of the closeness of peace, however, eased tensions within the colony by late 1748. Governor Clinton warned against a premature relaxation of security, and the House continued the usual support of Oswego. However, it denied financing for the forces on the northern frontier after November first in anticipation of peace.⁸

Pennsylvania took an uncharacteristically aggressive stance during the latter part of King George's War, but primarily in the economic sphere. Traders, facilitated by the English capture of Louisbourg and blockade of the Saint Lawrence River in 1745, pushed further and further west. At the head of this group was an Irishman, George Croghan, destined to be a major influence among the Indians on the Ohio. Much of his influence was due to his ability to provide tribes with the desired trade goods normally supplied by the French but cut off by the exigencies of war. An increase of historically pro-British Indians in the

⁸ Gov. Clinton to William Johnson, Apr. 25, 1747, Ibid., I, 86-88; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 310-312, 379, 396, 419, 432; Colonial Laws of New York, III, 605-606, 729-730, 736-737; N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 115, 124-125, 142, 145-156, 169-170, 186, 223, 235, 239-243, 245, 249; Smith, History of New York, II, 119.

Ohio country also extended English influence at the expense of France. Croghan, taking advantage of this for reasons of personal revenge for trade losses suffered at the hands of the French, induced a number of Wyandot and Seneca to attack Sandusky, a French outpost on Lake Erie. The French were angered by the English, in particular Pennsylvania, for stirring up the western tribes. They were able to regain the allegiance of most of the western tribes, but the Wyandot and Twightwee, fearing French reprisals, sought English help. Croghan had forced Pennsylvania's hand by arousing the Indians and, when he suggested the colony should reward them for their effort, the legislature agreed to appropriate £ 400 for such purpose.⁹

While the colony debated exactly how to deliver this present, ten Ohio chiefs arrived in Philadelphia to press their case personally. The chiefs noted their discouragement that the English did not take a more active role in the war. "How comes it to pass that the English who brought us into the War, will not fight themselves? This has not a good appearance, and therefore

⁹The best biography of Croghan is Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959). Pa. Council Minutes, IV, 767; Downes, Council Fires, 42-47; Wainwright, Croghan, 7-8, 14-16; Nicholas B. Wainwright, "George Croghan and the Indian Uprising of 1747," Pennsylvania History, XXI (1954), 21, 27-31; Indian letter to Gov. Thomas, May 16, 1747, George Croghan to Richard Peters, May 26, 1747, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. I, 741-742; Report of M. Boisherbert on Indian Affairs, Nov., 1747, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., X, 84; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 72, 121-122, 139; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 4, 1747.

we give you this string of Wampum to hearten and encourage you to desire you would put more Fire under your Kettle." Pennsylvania assured them of its aid and friendship and gave them the allotted gift, promising more the following spring. The Indians gratefully accepted the present, noting that without such help, "the Indians would have gone over to the French to a man." In relating the treaty to the Assembly, Council President Anthony Palmer noted these Indians "are capable of doing or preventing the greatest Mischiefs; and... there is reason to apprehend that without Encouragement from this Province they may be seduced by the French to go over to their side, whereby Lives of the back Inhabitants will be in the utmost Danger."¹⁰

The following winter President Palmer was able to induce Virginia to contribute to the proposed gift for the western tribes. Pennsylvania's request was an interesting development in light of its frequent refusals to aid New York upon request. The proprietors had expressed their approval that some of the western tribes had turned toward the English for support and suggested maintaining a good correspondence with them. Despite innumerable delays, by July a group of Council members had readied themselves

¹⁰ Indian Conference at Phila. Nov., 1747, Conrad Weiser to Richard Peters, Nov. 28, 1747, Pa. Ass. to Anthony Palmer, Nov. 25, 1747, Pa. Council Minutes, V, 145-152, 167, 156-157; Pennsylvania Gazette, Nov. 12, 19, Dec. 3, 15, 1747, Jan. 12, 1748.

for a journey to Lancaster to meet the Twightwee. At the subsequent Lancaster treaty they accepted the Twightwee into the Covenant Chain after determining their true intentions and, shortly thereafter, Weiser set out for the Ohio. Croghan shipped Pennsylvania's gift of £ 900, along with an additional £ 200 present from Virginia, so that everything was in readiness when Weiser arrived at Logstown on the Ohio. Weiser informed the Indians of the Aix-la-Chapelle treaty and accepted the Wyandot into the Covenant Chain. He warned the Indians of the French danger despite the recently signed peace treaty.

The French King's People have been almost starved in Old France for want of Provision, which made them wish and seek for Peace; but our wise People are of the opinion that after their Bellies are full they will Quarrel again and raise War. All nations in Europe know that their Friendship is mixed with Poison, and many that trusted too much on their Friendship have been ruined.

Weiser concluded the meeting by presenting the colony's gift.¹¹

The Lancaster and Logstown treaties marked important developments for Pennsylvania. Vast new opportunities for trade were now open. Richard Peters noted the recently adopted tribes "are of great consequence and may be made extremely useful to the Trade

¹¹Pa. Council Minutes, V, 189-190, 223, 289-293, 298-300, 307-318; Lancaster Treaty, July 1748, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 109-122; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 28, 1748, Proprietors to Pres. Palmer, Oct. 16, 1747, T. Penn Letter Book, II, 214; Weiser's Ohio Journal, dated Sept. 29, 1748, Pa. Council Minutes, V, 348-358 and Reuben Gold Twaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland, 1904), I, 40; Wainwright, Croghan, 17-21.

and security of this Province." However, equally important was the inherent change in policy. Pennsylvania now began to deal directly with the western tribes, a reversal of the policy only so recently established of operating through the Onondaga Council. Although the Iroquois established a viceregent, the "Half-King," over the Ohio tribes, it was clear that Iroquois supremacy over the increasingly independent western tribes was diminishing. The decline of Iroquois authority was by no means instantaneous, but its effects would soon be evident to all concerned parties.¹²

Pennsylvania was now committed to a more aggressive Indian policy. The Wyandot and Twightwee tribes had both moved eastward to put themselves under English protection. These disruptions severed the French line of communication from the Great Lakes to Louisiana. In addition, the French fur trade suffered at the hands of English traders. With only one major exception, Pennsylvania exported over £ 7,000 of fur and skins every year from 1746 to 1754, a figure much larger than in any pre-war year (see Table VII-1). Coupled with the Indians' obvious willingness to attack, the French found themselves for the first time forced to secure their weakly held toehold on the Ohio. Although French policy was initially

¹² Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, July 28, Oct. 24, 1748, PPOC, IV, 143, 163; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 322, 330; William A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758, (Harrisburg, 1960), 12; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 402, 404-408.

hesitant, a series of increasingly inflammatory events and counter-events would mark the Ohio as the scene of the first major battle of the French and Indian war.

In New York peace brought with it time for reflection upon Indian affairs and the expected dangers from the French. Policy during the war had concerned itself almost wholly with the Indians' military value, and despite a rejuvenation in the colony's trade from 1749 to 1754, this new approach would continue through the 1750s. The British evidently needed a more sophisticated understanding of their relations with the Indians in order to restrain the French from controlling both fur supplies and territory. As soon after the war as 1749, William Johnson reported French attempts to draw the Iroquois away from the British. Fearing their "Scheme which is to build trading Houses and garrisons at all Passes between said [Ohio] River and Oswego," he stressed the need for checking the French advances. New York's Council assured him that the Iroquois would receive ammunition and supplies if they sided with the English against the French. Governor and Assembly alike during the inter-war years realized the importance of the Indian to the British cause. The Assembly reaffirmed that "the preserving of the Indians, is undoubtedly of Great Consequence to the Security and Prosperity of this colony." Governor Clinton and DeLancey still battled for control of the colony, which had repercussions on exactly how much support the Assembly would

lend Indian policy, but neither side ever completely abandoned an imperial approach. The acceptance of this new policy was evident when in 1753 Lieutenant-Governor DeLancey finally took control of the government and mended political fences with Johnson, leading member of the imperialists.¹³

The necessity for a unified approach to Indian policy became progressively more important as the French grew bolder each year. In addition to Pennsylvania's aggression on the Ohio and New York's activity centered at Oswego, Virginia also threatened French dominance in the west. In 1747 a group of frontier speculators, recognizing the value of the Ohio country, petitioned the Crown for a large grant of land. Believing such a grant would be "a proper Step towards disappointing the views and checking the encroachments of the French by interrupting part of the communication from their Lodgements upon the great Lakes to the River Mississippi," the King granted the Ohio Company 200,000 acres of land upon condition of settlement. This decision marked an early imperial attempt to direct westward expansion at French expense by splitting the encirclement of forts and posts surrounding the English colonies. The struggle which ensued was

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Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, II, 276-279, 281, 301, 314; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 589-593; N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 263, 270, 276, 291, 297, 308, 311, 326, 330, 336-337, quote 312; Colonial Laws of New York, II, 781-784, 885-886; Norton, Fur Trade of New York, 191-195.

one of European powers over European goals, not one between whites
and Indians.¹⁴

French policy at this point was hesitant, but in the summer of 1749 they elected to send an exploratory expedition down the Ohio to determine the extent of Indian defection to the English. Richard Peters informed the proprietor of the land grant to the Ohio Company and of the French expedition, warning him that increased English activity would force the French to attempt to recoup their losses, "if not for the sake of the Trade..., for the conveniency of the River Mississippi." At the same time Celeron de Blainville was descending the Ohio, French officials adopted a policy of price cutting at Niagara and Fort Frontenac to regain the fur trade lost to Oswego and Pennsylvania. French concern was further evidenced by the offer of \$1,000 for George Croghan's scalp.¹⁵

English reaction to this French activity was mixed.

¹⁴ Grant and Munro, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, IV, 55-56, quoted in Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 410; Alfred P. James, The Ohio Company: Its Inner History (Pittsburgh, 1959), 4-8, 20, 26-27, and Lois Mulkearn, ed., George Mercer Papers, Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh, 1954), viii, xi, xiii. James' study and Mulkearn's collection of the Mercer Papers are the basic sources for the history of the Ohio Company. Clarence W. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution (Cleveland, 1917), 105, 115.

¹⁵ Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753 (Harrisburg, 1954), 6-12; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 387, 425, 480-481, 483; Richard Peters to Proprietors, July 5, Oct. 26, 1749, Oct. 15, 1750, PPOC, IV, 219, 243-249, V, 73; Abstract of Dispatches from Canada, 1749, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., X, 199-202.

Governor Clinton of New York offered his help to Governor Hamilton, suggesting a unified effort, but expressed "doubt whether this can be effected without an immediate Application to his Majesty for that purpose." Thomas Penn had advised the English ministry of the affair, and upon its failure to take any direct action, he offered to contribute £ 400 and an additional £ 100 toward yearly maintenance, if the Assembly would assist in the building of a fort on the Ohio. Despite continued addresses by Governor Hamilton concerning the French danger, the Assembly refused to accept Penn's offer. Pleading pacifist principles, it complained of increased Indian expenses in recent years. However, the Assembly continued, if the proprietor had contributed funds, there might be no need for military expenditure. Nonetheless, after learning of increased French influence at the Onondaga Council, the Assembly did offer to provide a gift to the Ohio Indians because they were especially needy at that juncture. George Croghan delivered the present in the spring of 1751. In making his report concerning a recent journey to the Iroquois, Conrad Weiser noted that "the bad Circumstances of our Indian Affairs, requires a very able Counsel and Unity among the English Colonies in North America." Hamilton hoped the New York Assembly, in conjunction with the other colonies, might reach some joint solution, but New York expressed an unwillingness, considering Pennsylvania's refusal to contribute

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during the last war.

Colonial and British thought increasingly recognized the need for unified imperial policy in Indian affairs. Although the governors of New York and Pennsylvania agreed on the need to present a unified front, as evidenced by their increased correspondence, neither was willing to sacrifice his colony to the private interests of the other. In addition, the two assemblies expressed a jealousy of each other. Thomas Penn approved of Hamilton's hesitancy over too ready an acceptance to unite with New York in such matters. Penn noted with approval the Duke of Bedford's imperial resolve upon the arrival in London of one of numerous lead plates claiming the Ohio for France, which the Celeron expedition had buried along the way. Bedford determined to send a dependable governor to New York who, with Crown support, would be able to maintain the Indians in the British interest. Although nothing developed from this after Bedford's resignation from office, the growing imperial concern was evident. In British eyes, the Iroquois were still the most important tribe. Penn concurred in this, and disapproved of the Assembly's resolve to send separate presents to the Ohio tribes. Although recognizing the

¹⁶ Gov. Clinton to Gov. Hamilton, Oct. 8, 1750, Pa. Council Minutes, V, 480; Thomas Penn to Gov. Hamilton, Feb. 12, 1750, T. Penn Letter Book, II, 294-295; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 454-455, 462, 466, 470-480, 485-487, 515; Pa. Assembly Minutes, IV, 3443-3447; Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, I, 54, 59, 66-69, 71, 72; Conrad Weiser to Col. Lee, Oct. 4, 1750, copy to Richard Peters, Weiser Papers, and Weiser to R. Peters, Sept. 30, 1750, PPOC, V, 63; Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 30, Nov. 1, 1750.

problems of distance and Ohio independence, he and Peters agreed on the importance of maintaining Iroquois supremacy and not undercutting their support by dealing with the western tribes. He expressed concern that this could not be done without English support, "as the place where they are seated is that where we should wish to strengthen them, and if they remain numerous there, and well inclined, they may be a good Barrier both to the People of New York, and Pennsylvania."¹⁷

One of New York's leading imperialists, Archibald Kennedy, expressed well the thinking of the period in a series of pamphlets in the early 1750s. He asked rhetorically if it were not time to secure the frontiers while peace lasted, "which from all Appearances cannot be very long." "What ever Pretences may be made, it is absolutely true, that the Preservation of the whole Continent, depends upon a proper Regulation of the Six Nations." Cadwallader Colden, inspired by Kennedy's proposals, drew up a memorial on the state of Indian affairs, which eventually went to the Board of Trade in August 1751. It described the Iroquois' importance and the desirability of a single superintendent to supervise them. Increasing evidence and pressure such as this would shortly force the Board of

¹⁷ Pa. Council Minutes, V, 495-496; Thomas Penn to Gov. Hamilton, Feb. 25, Mar. 30, July 29, 1757, T. Penn to Richard Peters, May 30, 1750, Feb. 24, Sept. 28, 1751, T. Penn Letter Book, II, 311, III, 40-43, quote 44, 59, 67, 77, 105; R. Peters to T. Penn, Dec. 8, 1749, Oct. 25, 1750, Gov. Hamilton to T. Penn, Oct. 13, Novv 18, 1750, Feb. 3, 1751, PPOC, IV, 265, V, 69, 77, 79, 89, 129.

Trade and Crown to take positive action.

In the meantime, events on the Ohio offered further evidence that an imperial policy imposed from above, rather than separate positions taken by individual colonies, was of great necessity. In late 1750 the Ohio Company, in accordance with its grant, sent Christopher Gist on an exploratory journey to the Ohio to feel out the Indian sentiment regarding settlement and the erection of a fort. Gist met with native resistance, such that he had to conceal his true intentions. Luckily he fell in with George Croghan and the interpreter Andrew Montour who had travelled to the Ohio in early 1751 to deliver Pennsylvania's gift. At this time Gist revealed his other purpose as Virginia's agent and informed the Indians of a gift from the King. Virginia desired the Indians to travel to Fredericksburg to receive the goods, but they refused, saying they would meet the Virginians only at Logstown where their council fire burned.¹⁹

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Archibald Kennedy, Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies Under Proper Regulations (New York, 1750), 6; Kennedy, The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest Considered (New York, 1751), 7; Cadwallader Colden to Gov. Clinton, Aug. 8, 1751, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 738-747. Milton M. Klein's "Archibald Kennedy: Imperial Pamphleteer," in Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Colonial Legacy, II, 75-105, provides an excellent summary of Kennedy's political career and his concern with Indian affairs.

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Christopher Gist's Journal, Sept. 11, 1750- May 19, 1751, Mulkearn, ed., Mercer Papers, 7-31; George Croghan's Journal, May 18-30, 1751, Pa. Council Minutes, V, 530-540 and Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, I, 72.

At this point Croghan's and Pennsylvania's influence was still strong on the Ohio. In addition, the Six Nations spoke harshly to the French agent, Philippe Thomas de Joncaire, accusing him of breaking the peace and demanding he leave the Ohio and return to Canada. However, this English strength was not to last long. Although the Indians desired the presence of the white man because of his trade goods, and even requested the erection of forts to protect this supply, they just as adamantly refused to allow settlement in the surrounding areas.

When Croghan returned to Philadelphia he related the Indians' request for a fort on the Ohio. The pacifistic Assembly, ever suspicious of too aggressive an Indian policy, investigated the request and found contradictory evidence in the person of Croghan's assistant and supposed witness, Andrew Montour. Although the evidence is scanty, Montour's refusal to substantiate an Indian request for a fort was probably based on his knowledge that they did not want settlement. The effect of the matter was to give the Assembly the excuse it needed to reject the proprietor's offer to build a fort on the Ohio. Penn's disappointment was clear. In letters to Hamilton and Peters he noted his lack of faith in any dependence upon fur traders in Indian negotiations, and he hoped that Virginia might build a fort on the Ohio, if it did not prejudice his own boundaries, for it was clear the Indians

would receive no support from Pennsylvania if a war should break out. He said he would not be surprised to see them go over to France unless someone was charged with enforcing resolutions established in England. Whoever was the governor of New York should be the head of any such plan. Pennsylvania had left Virginia standing alone. If Virginia or New York did not fill the space left by Pennsylvania's withdrawal, the French certainly would.²⁰

In late 1751 Christopher Gist again set out for the Ohio, this time with a message that the Virginians would meet the Indians at Logstown the following summer. The treaty at Logstown, which was primarily a Virginian affair designed to confirm the Lancaster treaty of 1744, commenced in June. The Ohio Company desired permission to settle the land south and east of the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers. Taken aback by this interpretation of the lands granted in 1744, the Indians instead requested "our Brethren of Virginia may build a strong House, at the Fork of the Mohongalio, to keep such Goods, Powder, Lead and necessaries as shall be wanting,

²⁰Various letters and minutes related to fort building on the Ohio, Pa. Council Minutes, V, 497, 515, 522, 529, 547, 568; Gist's Journal, Dec. 25, 1750, Mulkearn, ed., Mercer Papers, 12; Gov. Hamilton to Thomas Penn, Apr. 30, June 27, Sept. 14, Nov. 29, 1751, Richard Peters to T. Penn, June 20, 1752, PPOC, V, 135, 157, 173, 193, 251; T. Penn to Gov. Hamilton, Mar. 9, 1752, T. Penn to R. Peters, Mar. 13, 1752, T. Penn Letter Book, III, 113-114, 119-120; Nicholas B. Wainwright, "An Indian Trade Failure, The Story of the Hockley, Trent and Croghan Co., 1748-1752," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXII (1948), 367-369.

and as soon as you please." This was in part a delaying action, for the Iroquois vice regent, Tanacharisson or Half-King, noted that he would have to refer to the Ondondaga Council for final confirmation. However, the Virginians later duped the Iroquois chieftain, perhaps with his private collusion, into signing an agreement for English settlement. The request for a fort was soon followed by the arrival of news of a French attack against the Twightwee tribe. French policy had been somewhat hesitant from 1748-1751, but in 1752 the Marquis de Duquesne became the new governor-general of Canada. Under his direction French policy took on an aggressive tone. Although not at the governor's orders, Charles Langlade, on June twenty-first, destroyed the Indian village of Fort Pickawillany, captured several English traders, and ate the Twightwee chief, Old Britain, who had been pro-British. The Twightwee requested help, and much now depended upon English willingness to provide it.²¹

Unfortunately for the English colonies, their response was too little and too late to preserve the Ohio Indians as a defensive buffer. In May 1753 the Pennsylvania Assembly appropriated £ 800 for Indian presents, £ 200 of which was to

²¹Christopher Gist's Journal, Nov. 4, 1751-Mar. 1, 1752, Mulkearn, ed., Mercer Papers, 32-40; The Treaty of Logstown, 1752, Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XIII (1905), 143-174; Gov. Hamilton to Thomas Penn, Nov. 1752, Richard Peters to T. Penn, Dec. 14, 1752, PPOC, V, 295, 311; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 599-600.

go directly to the Twightwee as condolence for their recent losses and the remainder to the other allied tribes. However, delivery of the gifts was not immediate. Virginia planned to meet the Ohio tribes at Winchester in September, but in the meantime the French under orders from Governor Duquesne were advancing down the Ohio. By early fall they had completed a second fort at the head of the Rivière aux Boeufs. Despite severe decimations due to food shortages and disease, the French had struck fear into the hearts of the Indians. English traders had withdrawn from the Ohio, and the natives now had to rely upon the French for much of their trade goods. Although the Iroquois representatives warned the French to leave the Ohio in May and June, and for a third time in September, it was to little avail. The Indians were fragmented. The Onondaga Council was annoyed that the Virginians had earlier given the King's present to the Ohio tribes, because they considered them mere hunters. In turn, the Ohio Delaware reasserted their independence and demanded to know if and when the Iroquois planned to sell more land, so that they might receive their share of the payment. To cap matters off, the Virginians, fearing the Indians might use the gift of arms and ammunition against their own settlements, refused to turn it over. The Ohio Indians led by the Oneida Half-King, Scarouady, then travelled to Carlisle to see if they would fare better at the Pennsylvanians' hands. Despite Weiser's advice that support was necessary to preserve

Indian friendship, the commissioners also delayed immediate presentation of the Assembly's £ 800 grant. Apparently, the Indians gave Virginia permission to build a fort for the protection of trade goods but again adamantly refused to allow settlement, believing this had drawn the French down the Ohio. Despite permission to build a fort, Virginia failed to raise the men and supplies until early 1754. Instead, their only action was to commission George Washington to travel to Fort Le Baouf to demand the immediate withdrawal of French forces who trespassed on English soil. Washington was received with kindness by the French commander Saint-Pierre, but his demands met such a stern rebuff that he returned to Virginia having accomplished nothing.²²

Reaction to the events of 1753 on both sides of the Atlantic reflected increased concern and dismay over the deteriorating state of Indian affairs. With classic understatement, Governor Hamilton noted in a letter to Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia that,

The Governors of New York have heretofore attempted to bring all the Colonies to act in a conjunct Body in Indian Affairs, but without Success; owing, I

²² Ibid., V, 608-609, 616-617, 635-637, 639-647, 658-659, 665-686; Pennsylvania Gazette, May 10, June 7, 1753; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 433-442; Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, lxvi-lxvii, 123-134; Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 18, 25-26, 61-62; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 160-163. Kent's, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753 contains a good account of French activity on the Ohio for that year.

presume to their mutual and injudicious Jealousies of Each Other. Nor is this in my opinion likely ever to be effected unless the Ministry at home can fall on some expedient to compel it.

Richard Peters kept Penn informed of the deteriorating state of events during the hectic summer months in a series of lengthy letters relating to Indian affairs. Penn's response was critical of New York and, in particular, of William Johnson whom he believed was trying to aggrandize power for himself and his colony. Despite New York's hesitancy to cooperate openly with Pennsylvania, Penn was probably overly critical, for Governor Clinton had met with the Indians hoping to improve relations. However, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Mohawk spokesman, Chief Hendrick, complaining of land frauds and other abuses, angrily declared that the Covenant Chain was severed. Although William Johnson was able to smooth over affairs, he did not totally mollify the Indians.

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The British ministry clearly recognized the severity of the situation. Its concern for a uniform policy grew out of a larger movement toward imperialism that would eventually engulf

²³ Pa. Council Minutes, V, 632; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, May 3, June 1, 3, July 5, Aug. 21, Sept. 12, Nov. 6, 26, 1753, PPOC, VI, 47, 53, 61, 71, 73, 95, 105-107, 113, 133; T. Penn to R. Peters, Aug. 16, Nov. 16, 1753, T. Penn Letter Book, III, 276; R. Peters to Conrad Weiser, Feb. 6, 1753, memorandum relating to Weiser's journey to Onondago, July 28, 1753, Weiser Papers; Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, I, 85-112; Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June, 1753, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 781-788; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," 357-358.

all the colonies. As early as August, Secretary of State Holderness had sent a circular letter to all governors asking them to investigate French activity and to prepare "to repel Force by Force." The Board of Trade desired the newly appointed New York governor, Sir Danvers Osborne, to recommend laws to the Assembly for repairing and erecting fortifications for the security of the colony and for subsidizing annual presents to the Indians. By September news of Clinton's recent treaty with the Indians induced the Board of Trade to write again: "Friendship and Alliance is only to be gained and preserved by making presents to them at proper Times, and upon proper occasions." Indian policy changed radically as the Board, having ordered a conference of all concerned colonies, advised Osborne to "take Care, that all the Provinces, be (if practicable) comprised in one General Treaty to be made in his Majesty's Name, it appearing to us, that the Practice of each Province making [a] separate Treaty for itself, in its own Name is very improper, and may be attended with great Inconveniency to His Majesty's Subjects." Shortly after his arrival in New York, Osborne committed suicide, and Lieutenant-Governor DeLancey requested the Assembly to provide for the conference desired by the Board of Trade; the House readily complied, and it set mid-June as the date.²⁴

²⁴Pa. Council Minutes, V, 689-690, 711-712, 717-718; N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 353, 367-368; Lords of Trade to Earl of Holderness, Sept. 18, 1753, Lords of Trade to Gov. Osborne, Sept. 18, 1753, Lords of Trade to the Governors in America, Sept. 18, 1753, Lt.-Gov. DeLancey to Lords of Trade, Oct. 15, 1753, Lords of Trade to Lt.-Gov. DeLancey, Feb. 26, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 799-804, 829.

The wisdom of the Board of Trade's decision became even more evident the following year as the French renewed their assault on the Ohio. Pennsylvania's failure to take direct action and Virginia's hesitant steps to erect a fort at the forks of the Ohio were simply not enough to hold the vast area beyond the Alleghenies, and the French readily stepped into the power vacuum. In early 1754 a command of 800 men departed Montreal for the Ohio. They arrived at the Forks in mid-April and forced the surrender of a small band of Virginians who were building a fort under the command of Ensign Ward. Isaac Norris believed "these are the beginnings of introducing the War into America where in all probability the [longest?] Sword must decide the boundaries." The following month a party of Virginia militia under the command of Washington advanced into the Ohio, too late to save the fort at Monongahela, but well in time to do military battle with the French. Washington, suspecting treachery, attacked a small force of French troops, killing their commanding officer, Ensign Villiers de Jumonville, and several others. Seeking revenge for Jumonville's death, the French commander at Fort Duquésne, Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, sent out 500 soldiers and numerous Indian allies to drive the English from the Ohio. Washington, hopelessly outnumbered and outclassed, surrendered on July fourth at Fort Necessity. The French, who had driven the English from the Ohio, now demanded the support of the

western tribes, declaring they would destroy them otherwise. Thus, in need of trade goods and not wishing to die, the Ohio Indians inclined toward the French. The Onondaga Council was unable to hold them in the English interest.

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News of Washington's capitulation reached New York while the Albany conference was in session. Despite the increased urgency occasioned by this news, and despite the good intentions of many colonial leaders, the conference could not overcome deep-seated jealousies. Although Pennsylvania had voted £ 500 in trade goods to be delivered to the Six Nations at Albany, the colony's instructions made no mention of intercolonial union. With a certain amount of insight Archibald Kennedy in his writing had pleaded with the Albany Congress not to break up for reasons of petty jealousy, believing that only unified action would defeat France, Britain's "implacable and most inveterate Enemy." The importance of frontier issues, as expressed in the Congress's final representation and Plan, indicated the chief concerns of the commissioners. They pleaded for appointment of a single Indian superintendent, and most specifically Colonel Johnson. Brother

²⁵Pa. Council Minutes, V, 748, VI, 28-29, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 24-25; Leonard W. Labaree, "Benjamin Franklin and the Defense of Pennsylvania, 1754-1757," Pennsylvania History, XXIX (1962), 9-10; Downes, Council Fires, 66-68; Marcel Trudel, "The Jumonville Affair," Pennsylvania History, XXI (1954), 351-381; Issac Norris to Robert Charles, May 8, 1754, Norris Letter Book, IX, 54; Capitulation of Fort Necessity, July 3, 1754, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 146-147; George Croghan to Gov. Hamilton, Mar. 23, 1754, Col. Innis to Gov. Hamilton, July 5, 1754, PPOC, VI, 29, 203.

Abraham, a Mohawk sachem, expressed the need most succinctly: "if he fails us, we die." Nonetheless, despite Kennedy's appeal and the Plan of the Union, the conference was largely a failure. Both the colonies and the Crown rejected the Plan. As early as August the Board of Trade had recommended that such a union "cannot be made to answer the purpose of a present exigency."²⁶

In addition to the problems created by inter-colonial rivalries, there was a lack of Indian response to the Albany Congress. Peter Wraxall later attributed the paucity of Indians present at the meeting to their "discontented cold disposition... towards us" and the "Proceedings of the French upon the Ohio." The erection of Fort Duquesne and Washington's capitulation at Fort Necessity made the Indians hesitant to offend the French, now clearly in control of the Ohio. Nonetheless, they disliked the French intensely, and, if the English could forcefully drive them from the Ohio, affairs would probably have returned to normal. A smuggled letter came to the governor's hands by late summer from one of Washington's hostages

²⁶The New-York Mercury, May 6, 1754; Pa. Assembly Minutes, V, 3637-3640, 3694; Pa. Council Minutes, V, 747-749, VI, 25-26; Roger R. Trask, "Pennsylvania and the Albany Congress, 1754," Pennsylvania History, XXVII (1960), 276-277; Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (15 vols., New York, 1936-1971), V, Chap's. 4 and 5; Archibald Kennedy, Serious Considerations on the Present State of Affairs of the Northern Colonies (New York, 1754), 3, 14-15; Proceedings of the Colonial Congress held at Albany, June-July 1754, Representation to the King with plan of General Concert, Aug. 9, 1754; Representation to the King on the Proceedings of the Congress at Albany, Oct. 29, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 853-892, 901-906, 916-920.

held at Fort Duquesne; it noted the restlessness of the Indians over English ineptitude and the Indians' desire that the English attack the poorly garrisoned fort. Combined, these events gave rise to the Crown's decision to send a royal military command to North America and to establish an Indian Superintendent for the northern colonies. Imperial control of Indian affairs would not only prevent abuses in the fur trade, but it would also maintain those alliances which would prevent French encroachment.

Recognition of such a vital concept had evolved slowly, but it would prove its ultimate worth during the Great War for the Empire, the last of the inter-colonial wars.²⁷ Although conflicting interpretations exist as to the reasons for and the power behind the creation of the Indian Superintendency, the Crown appointed William Johnson to the office in 1755. Secretary Pownall wrote to Johnson in 1756 concerning the office's importance and its "great end... of fixing them [the Indians] steadily in our interest and engaging them in the service" against the French. Johnson directed Indian policy toward maintaining friendship of the Indians for strategic ends throughout the war years.²⁸

²⁷Sec. Robinson to the Governors in North America, Oct. 26, 1754, Jan. 23, 1755, Some Thoughts Upon the British Interest in North America, Jan. 6, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 915-916, 934, VII, 20; George Croghan to Gov. Hamilton, Aug. 16, Sept. 27, 1754, PPOC, VI, 217, 221; Croghan to Richard Peters, Oct. 16, 1754, Daniel Claus to Gov. Morris, Oct. 29, 1754, Croghan Papers, Cadwallader Collection (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Phila., microfilm copy).

²⁸William Johnson to Gov. Shirley, Jan. 3, 1756, Gov.



Before investigating in the following chapter the responses of New York and Pennsylvania to the new imperial policy, it is necessary to note one additional sidelight resulting from the Albany Conference. Although Pennsylvania had attended the conference without much real interest in colonial union, it hoped to make a further land purchase from the Iroquois. The Pennsylvania commissioners requested an open meeting, indicating their basic good faith in this transaction, but Governor DeLancey and the Congress refused permission, believing land sales were not within the avowed purpose of the conference. Therefore, in series of private meetings, the Iroquois agreed to sell approximately the remainder of present-day Pennsylvania for £ 400. When settlers actually occupied the area west of the Susquehanna, the Indians were to receive additional compensation. Further, the Iroquois reserved the area around Shamokin and the Wyoming Valley as a protection against English encroachment on their southern flank. Although they promised not to sell this land to anyone but the proprietor of Pennsylvania, John Henry Lydius of New York

Shirley to Wm. Johnson, Jan. 4, 1756, Sec. Pownall to Wm. Johnson, Mar. 5, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., 11-13, 40-41; Commission from Edward Braddock, Apr. 15, 1755, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, I, 465-466. For an interesting discussion concerning the basis for Johnson's appointment see John R. Alden, "The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev. XXVII (1940), 193-210; cf. McIlwain, ed., Wraxall's Abridgment, xcvi-xcviii; also see Gipson, British Empire, VI, 137-139, 186-190.

was able to secure a deed to the area for a group of Connecticut speculators from a small group of unauthorized Iroquois. This underhandedness would later cause great consternation and dispute between the two colonies, but Pennsylvania's basic honesty in the Albany transaction was indicated in 1758 by its willingness to deed back a part of the purchase to smooth over misunderstandings. This transaction also reflected the loss of Iroquois control over the Ohio Indians. Selling land west of the Susquehanna was in part an attempt to preserve what small hold over the West they had and still profit by it. Having successfully concluded another land purchase and with no visible threat of Indian attack on its frontier, Pennsylvania thought itself in a very tenable position as 1754 drew to a close.²⁹

Although the inter-war years had involved a heightened awareness of the importance of Indian affairs to imperial security, the fur trade had not suffered. In fact for Pennsylvania it reached new heights, while New York returned to a level of exportation commensurate with that of the 1730s (see Table VII-1). However, with the French incursions of 1753, exports declined in 1754 and would continue to do so during the ensuing war. Beaver continued as the major item in New York's total fur exports, while

²⁹ Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, II, 4-7, 10-18; Pa. Council Minutes, VI, 47-48, 110-129; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 147-158; Trask, "Pennsylvania and the Albany Congress," 279-283; Wallace, Teedvuscung, 48, 51, 58-62.



These maps were obtained from the originals as contained in Paul A.W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1963), 136-137.

deerskin remained as Pennsylvania's primary fur commodity (see Table VII-2). During this expansionary period, fur consistently provided thirty percent or better of Pennsylvania's total exports to London, and in several years accounted for more than fifty percent. In contrast, New York fur, as a percentage of that colony's total exports to London, remained at a very stable level of approximately twenty percent. Therefore, it was not surprising that Pennsylvania's share of the total deerskin market was at least a third of the total, while New York's declined from about fifteen percent during the pre-war years to less than five percent of the total (see Table VII-4). New York was able to hold its own in the total beaver trade, even increasing its share in some years at the expense of the Hudson's Bay area (see Table VII-5). The extent to which the fur trade played a continued or even expanded role in the economies of New York and Pennsylvania indicated that Britain's increased imperial interests operated, at least in part, independently of purely economic concerns, for upsurges in the fur trade had followed each of the previous inter-colonial wars without similar reaction. This imperial interest would encounter mixed reaction over the next fifteen years, but, no matter what the form, it had clearly become a part of colonial Indian affairs.

TABLE VII-1

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Constant Value in £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported to London in £		Total value of Deerskin exported to London in £		Total value of all fur and skins exported to London in £		Total value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1745	1,001	136	575	1,312	3,855	2,084	13,229	10,056
1746	304	68	343	6,120	1,828	8,411	8,211	15,127
1747	677	4	268	616	2,587	1,089	13,647	2,439
1748	27	27	584	5,042	927	6,574	8,297	10,885
1749	2,068	68	1,166	6,650	4,690	8,393	20,386	14,944
1750	3,819	53	1,160	6,140	6,986	8,108	33,236	26,228
1751	2,242	95	639	8,361	5,209	11,294	36,997	22,313
1752	4,805	37	146	9,729	7,085	14,428	38,485	29,931
1753	5,700	71	203	8,547	8,652	12,205	45,866	33,919
1754	2,117	70	441	4,196	4,352	7,120	21,289	24,036

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Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VII-2

Fur by Type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of Beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported to London		Value of Beaver as a % of total exports to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of all fur and skins ex- ported to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of total exports to London		Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports to London	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1745	26.0	6.5	7.6	1.4	14.9	63.0	4.3	13.0	29.1	20.7
1746	16.6	.8	3.7	.4	18.8	72.8	4.2	40.5	22.3	55.6
1747	26.2	.4	5.0	.2	14.2	56.6	2.7	25.3	19.0	44.6
1748	2.9	.4	.3	.2	63.0	76.6	7.0	46.3	11.2	60.4
1749	44.1	.8	10.1	.5	22.7	79.2	5.2	44.5	23.0	56.2
1750	54.7	.7	11.5	.2	16.6	75.7	3.5	23.4	21.0	30.9
1751	43.0	.8	6.1	.4	12.3	74.0	1.7	37.5	14.1	50.6
1752	67.8	.3	12.5	.1	2.1	67.4	.4	32.5	18.4	48.2
1753	65.9	.6	12.4	.2	2.3	70.0	.4	25.2	18.9	36.0
1754	48.6	1.0	9.9	.3	10.1	58.9	2.1	17.5	20.4	29.6

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Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VII-3

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Current Value in £

Year	Current Value of beaver in £		Current value of deerskin in £		Current value of total fur and skins exported to London in £		Total current value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1745	808	110	464	1,059	3,111	1,682	10,676	8,115
1746	272	61	307	5,477	1,636	7,528	7,349	13,539
1747	580	3	315	527	2,214	932	11,682	2,088
1748	24	24	520	4,484	825	5,851	7,384	9,688
1749	1,880	62	969	6,045	4,263	7,629	18,531	13,584
1750	2,399	47	1,032	5,465	1,064	7,216	27,289	23,343
1751	1,908	81	544	7,114	4,433	9,611	31,484	18,988
1752	4,065	31	124	8,231	5,994	12,206	32,558	25,322
1753	4,794	60	171	7,188	7,277	10,264	38,573	28,526
1754	1,842	61	384	3,651	3,786	6,194	18,521	20,911

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Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VII-4

Percentage of total Deerskin Exported by Colonies

Year	Total deerskin exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	Ga.	Va. & Md.
1745	5,360	24.5	10.7	47.0	.0	17.8
1746	13,627	44.9	2.5	29.4	.0	23.1
1747	10,025	6.1	3.7	57.9	.0	32.3
1748	16,588	30.4	3.5	55.0	.0	11.1
1749	20,288	32.8	5.3	43.0	.0	18.9
1750	17,788	34.5	6.5	19.2	2.9	36.8
1751	16,816	49.7	3.8	29.1	.6	16.8
1752	13,830	70.3	1.1	9.3	1.3	18.0
1753	18,205	46.9	1.1	17.4	7.6	26.9
1754	12,600	33.3	3.5	32.8	5.9	24.5

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VII-5

Percentage of total Beaver Exported by Colonies

Year	Total Beaver exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Hudson's Bay	N. Eng.	Va. & Md.
1745	10,984	.2	9.1	88.0	1.4	.3
1746	7,366	.9	4.1	93.8	1.2	.0
1747	6,967	.1	9.7	82.6	7.5	.0
1748	10,540	.3	.3	98.4	.9	.1
1749	12,120	.6	17.1	80.9	1.5	.0
1750	10,933	.5	34.9	63.0	1.5	.0
1751	9,433	1.0	23.8	74.0	1.2	.0
1752	10,934	.3	43.9	54.4	1.3	.0
1753	12,595	.6	45.3	53.0	1.2	.0
1754	7,504	.9	28.2	69.7	1.2	.0

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CHAPTER VIII

REACTION, RESPONSE, AND CULMINATION: IMPERIAL INDIAN POLICY, 1755-1768

Britain during the 1750s and 1760s increasingly moved toward a unified imperial policy. The government called for an inter-colonial conference on Indian affairs in 1754 and created an Indian superintendency in 1755 to further unify policy. Although Pennsylvania and New York provided for much of their own defense in the early years of the French and Indian War, by 1758 England committed itself to the ultimate defeat of France in North America and took over the direction of the war for its duration. Indian policy stressed the importance of the native as an ally against the French. Settlement of the Great War for the Empire further reflected England's new imperial concerns. Rather than take the French sugar islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique, England chose to retain Canada, which supplied the majority of furs, but more important, provided a potential market for Britain's manufactured goods.


After the conquest of Canada, English interest and concern for the Indian and his land rights decreased, resulting in Pontiac's Rebellion (1763-1765). The need for some sort of

solution to lessen the impact of cultural conflict was evident. However, confusion, economics, and political rivalry delayed reaching such a solution until 1768, when the British ministry compromised by returning control of the Indian trade to individual colonies, while retaining the Indian superintendencies to handle matters of an inter-colonial nature and those related directly to the Crown. Ironically, after the victory of imperialism in the conquest of Canada, the beaver and deerskin trades shifted north and south respectively, and both the Indians and the middle colonies of New York and Pennsylvania lost their central roles.


The emergence of a new imperial policy and undeclared war with France in the mid-1750s met with mixed reactions in the colonies. New York's Assembly met in February 1755 in response to Secretary Robinson's request for military aid and voted £ 45,000 for fortifications and the support of royal troops under Edward Braddock. In Pennsylvania events did not flow so smoothly. As early as 1754 the Assembly was willing to raise a fund for the King's use, but only if it had control over its disbursement. However, proprietary instructions would not permit this unless the governor had a voice in the expenditure. In addition, controversy emerged the following year over whether proprietary estates should be taxed along with other lands in raising such a fund. The result left Braddock and the frontier

unsupported. Only Benjamin Franklin's personal appeal brought forth enough transportation to enable the British troops to set out for Fort Duquesne in late April. In all probability, decisive victory by Braddock's troops would have been sufficient to maintain the Ohio Indians in the British interest. However, in the well known debacle at Monongahela, his men suffered defeat at the hands of an inferior force of French and Indians. Braddock himself died of wounds received in the battle, and the Indians were now convinced of English ineptitude. Furthermore, Braddock's haughty attitude had offended the Indian delegates who "Enquired what he intended to do with the Land if he could drive the French and their Indians away. To which General Braddock replied that the English Should Inherit the Land." Unable to trade with the English for the necessary goods of life and threatened by the French, Delaware and Shawnee Indians turned against the English and their Iroquois allies. By October the frontier was ablaze.¹

¹N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 376-377, 380, 388-389, 435-438; Lt.-Gov. DeLancey to Lords of Trade, Mar. 18, 1755, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VI, 940-941; Pa. Assembly Minutes, V, 3702, 3704, 3728, 3771, 3872, 3874, 3915-3916, 3926-3928, 3936; Pa. Council Minutes, VI, 191-192, 200, 457-458, 465, 478, 481, 517-518, 643, 645-651, 659-660, 665, 673-675; Thayer, Growth of Democracy, 32, 37-39; James H. Hutson, "Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XCIII (1969), 336-337, 345, 348-349; Gipson, British Empire, VI, 75-98; Thomas Dunbar to Gov. Morris, July 16, 1755, PPOC, VII, 83; "The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-1757," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev., XIII (1926), 63-64; Hunter, "The Indians' Land," 347, 349; Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 172, 178.



This map was obtained from the original as contained in James Ed., "The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols. Albany, 19



...ed from the original as contained in James Sullivan,
 Sir William Johnson (14 vols. Albany, 1921-1965), III, 32.

Early stalemates and defeats suffered at French hands, including the loss of Oswego and Fort Henry, forced back the English frontier. The colonies needed a show of military strength to keep the Indians favorable to the British and to drive back the French. However, as Governor DeLancey noted, they must first put themselves "in a proper Posture of Defense." Governor Morris suggested the Pennsylvania Assembly provide a gift to the Indians in conjunction with that of the King who is "sensible of the great Importance it is to the British Interest and to the Success of our Schemes against the French, to preserve and improve our Friendship with the Indians." William Johnson believed "the Six Nations will never be thoroughly fixed to the British interest and arms until we strike some grand stroke, and thereby convince them that we have ability to protect them and humble the French." Johnson enlisted a minimum number of Indian allies on most occasions, but only success would bring them to the British side in larger numbers.²

In order to secure victory, two things were necessary: financial support, and a political fence-mending with the Indians. In New York neither was terribly difficult. Except for a brief

² Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 171-174, N.Y. Assembly Journals, II, 433-434, 453, 500; O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 426-429; William Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 28, 1756, Sept. 28, 1757, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 90, 276; Pa. Council Minutes, VII, 29-31, 44, 733; Pa. Assembly Minutes, V, 4115-4117, 4291-4292; Jacobs, Diplomacy, 158-159, 178-180; July 23, 30, Aug. 6, 20, 1759, The New-York Gazette.

flirtation with the establishment of a neutrality with Canada in late 1754, New Yorkers largely abandoned their trade with Montreal and supported the war effort after Braddock's defeat.³ In Pennsylvania this was not so easily accomplished. However, it would be a mistake to think that the Pennsylvania Assembly or its statesmen refused to defend themselves once the war began. While Quaker pacifists were hesitant to enact measures which would involve them directly with the war effort, they were not averse to more circuitous methods. The legislative struggles which ensued were largely over the control of expenditures and the question of taxation of proprietary lands. For example, by November 1755 the Assembly had enacted a bill establishing a voluntary militia and had provided £ 60,000 for the erection of a series of forts along the frontier, but only after the proprietors agreed to a supplementary gift of £ 5,000. The years from 1755 to 1760 saw active warfare in Pennsylvania, and by the latter date, the Assembly had voted a total of £ 490,000, a fairly extensive sum for a supposedly pacifistic colony. Hence, the more important issue at stake was clearly a constitutional one, pitting colonial against

³Gov. Shirley to Gov. Morris, Oct. 21, 1754, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 181; Thomas Penn to Gov. Morris, Feb. 26, 1755, T. Penn Letter Book, IV, 61; Gov. Morris to Gen. Braddock, Mar. 12, 1755, Pa. Council Minutes, VI, 338; Norton, Fur Trade in New York, 196-197; Jacobs, Diplomacy, 179.

proprietary economic and political interests.⁴

The second requirement, that of resolving differences with the Indians, reached a satisfactory conclusion through a series of three treaties held at Easton between 1756 and 1758. At these treaties it became evident that rum, trade abuses, English disrespect, and land pressure had all contributed to the outbreak of hostilities, although most important had been the display of French strength on the Ohio coupled with English ineptitude.

Thomas King, an Iroquois, stated the cause as follows:

When we first heard of the French coming to the Ohio we immediately sent Word to the Governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania; we desired them to come, and likewise to supply us with such things as were proper for War, intending to defend our Lands, and hinder the French from taking Possession of them; but these Governors did not attend to our Message; perhaps they thought there was no Foundation for our Intelligence. The

⁴Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, V, 197-212, 243-261, 294-302, 337-352, 379-396, VI, 7-22, also see various references in Pa. Council Minutes and Pa. Assembly Minutes. Numerous historians have chronicled the intricate and detailed events of this period, and interested readers should consult the following: James H. Hutson, Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770, The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences (Princeton, 1972) and "Benjamin Franklin in Pennsylvania Politics, A Reappraisal;" Ralph L. Ketcham, "Conscience, War, and Politics in Pennsylvania, 1755-1757," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XX (1963), 416-439; John J. Zimmerman, "Benjamin Franklin and the Quaker Party, 1755-1756," Ibid., XVII (1960), 291-313; Nicholas B. Wainwright, "Governor William Denny in Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXXI (1957), 170-198; Jack D. Marieta, "Conscience, The Quaker Community, and the French and Indian War," Ibid., XCV (1971), 3-27; Edwin B. Bronner, "The Quakers and Non-Violence in Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania History, XXXV (1968), 1-22; Labaree, "Benjamin Franklin and the Defense of Pennsylvania;" and Thayer, Growth of Democracy, Chapters IV and V.

French however came and became our Neighbours,
and you neither coming yourselves, nor assisting
us with Warlike Stores, our People, of necessity,
were obliged to Trade with them for what we
Wanted, as your Traders had left the Country.

Teedyuscung, a Delaware chieftain important to the negotiation of peace with the Delaware and Shawnee tribes, complained of land fraud and abuses, especially concerning the 1737 and 1754 purchases. He stated that while the Walking Purchase was "not the Principal Cause that made us strike our Brethren the English, yet it has caused the Stroke to come harder than it otherwise would have come." Whatever the exact combination of reasons, Pennsylvania's angry reaction to the Indian attacks was to declare war against the Shawnee and Delaware in April 1756.⁵

William Johnson had already undertaken to negotiate with the Iroquois, hoping their influence would curb the Delaware and Shawnee menace. Hence, news of Pennsylvania's declaration of war, which undercut his position as Indian Superintendent, was highly irritating. He noted on several separate occasions his concern. "What will the Delawares and Shawnees think of such Opposition and Contradiction in our Conduct?" "These Hostile Measures... [are] throwing all our Schemes into Confusion,

⁵Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 135-166, 189-243 and Pa. Council Minutes, VII, 313-338, 649-714, VIII, 174-223 contain minutes of the Easton treaties. King and Teedyuscung quotes, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 229, 196; War Proclamation, Apr. 14, 1756, Pa. Council Minutes, VII, 88-90; Philadelphia Indian Conference, Jan., 1755, Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs; Downes, Council Fires, 76-79. For a detailed account of the Easton treaties and related events, see Anthony F.C. Wallace's exceptional study, Teedyuscung, King of the Delawares, especially pages 67-207.

and must naturally give the Six Nations such Impressions and the French such advantages to work on against us, that I tremble for the Consequences." Despite his fears, Johnson got the Indians to agree in principle to a peace, and Governor Morris withdrew his declaration of war against all but the westernmost tribes still ravaging the frontier.⁶

Pennsylvania authorities, including the proprietor, were slow to accept Johnson's singular authority as Indian Superintendent. Perhaps understandably, they wanted to retain a certain amount of control over their own affairs. Nevertheless, they begrudgingly surrendered much of this control over the next several years, in part due to the appointment of George Croghan as Johnson's deputy in June 1756. While many detested Croghan and suspected his private interest, at least he was from Pennsylvania and not New York. As a result, Johnson's presence in Pennsylvania was not as evident as it might otherwise have been.⁷

⁶ Indian Conferences held by William Johnson, Dec. 7, 1755- Feb. 28, 1756, Johnson to Board of Trade, May 28, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 44-74, 88-89; Johnson to William Shirley, Apr. 24, 1756, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, II, 447; Pa. Council Minutes, VII, 117, 142, 147-148, 269-271, 305-307, 351-352, 390, 434-435, 523-524, 527, VIII, 153-155, 165.

⁷ Croghan's Appointment as Deputy Indian Agent, June 1, 1756, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, IX, 470-471; Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, lxxviii-lxxx. Various letters showing degree of cooperation with imperial policy in PPOC, VIII, 71, 73, 139, 163, 197, 207, IX, 43, 49; T. Penn Letter Book, IV, 317, V, 49, 101-102, 338; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 339, 405, III, 107-120, 485-487; and Council Minutes noted above, fn. 6.

While the governor and proprietor somewhat reluctantly cooperated with the imperial agents, Johnson and Croghan expressed increased anger at the Pennsylvania Quakers who acted as a private but extremely interested party at the Easton conferences. In their squabble over political power, both the proprietor and the Quakers sought to blame the other for the outbreak and severity of Indian hostilities. The Easton conferences were one of several arenas for this struggle.⁸ While the proprietary party blamed the Quakers for their pacifism, the latter sought to implicate the proprietors in land frauds perpetrated against the Indians. Thus, while it was true that the Indians were concerned about land pressures, it was also likely that the Quakers took advantage of this real concern and magnified it out of proportion. Whatever the balance of the charges, Johnson and the Pennsylvanians reached a settlement by October 1758. Pennsylvania agreed to return most of the 1754 purchase to the Iroquois and to submit the details of the Walking Purchase to adjudication, promising compensation if the proprietors had wronged the Delaware. With this settlement, the way was paved for

⁸The Quakers and proprietary party dueled with paper and pen as well as at the Indian conferences. Several pamphlets depicted the opposing views of which the Reverend William Smith's A Brief State of the Conduct of Pennsylvania for the Year 1755 (London, 1755) blasting the Quakers for their pacifism and Charles Thomson's An Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawwanese Indians from the British Interest... (London, 1759) criticizing proprietary land policy were the most important.

a change in fortune. The winds of war now began to favor the
British.⁹

A major reason for this change was that the English were now able and willing to finish the war in contrast to their past failures. While Pennsylvania and New York struggled to provide for their own defense, writers and administrators on the other side of the Atlantic influenced and directed policy on a military basis. Malachy Postlethwayt, a British economic writer, published a series of dissertations in 1757 concerning England's commercial interests, in several of which he made extended comments about Indian policy in the American colonies. Postlethwayt's comments were strikingly similar to those of Archibald Kennedy, and he may indeed have borrowed some of the latter's ideas. Nevertheless, his exposition shows the widening concern for a unified Indian policy both in England and in America.

Postlethwayt recognized the increased importance of the Indians as a barrier against the French and believed that Parliament, rather than the individual colonies, must manage such

⁹Various letters relative to Quaker interference and the question of land fraud, Pa. Council Minutes, VII, 354-355, 634-635; Penn Mss., Indian Affairs, II, 19; Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, II, 738, 824-834, III, 837-851; Sir William Johnson's Remarks respecting Purchases of Lands from the Indians, Sept. 10, 1757, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., 329-333; PPOC, VIII, 201, 271, IX, 11; T. Penn Letter Book, V, 75-76, 85, 94-95, 97-99, 101-102, 121; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 38-39, 86, 338; Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, lxxxi-lxxxvii.

affairs. He believed that "if we do not attach the Indian states to our alliance and friendship upon ties far more interesting, engaging, and obligatory than those that arise from mean temporary presents:... our settlements in this part of America will not be tenable." To prevent the colonies from falling to the French he suggested that "the Chief principles to be laid down in the management of our Indian affairs are, first, by all means to endeavor to undersell the French; and the next is, to do justice to the Indians in all our trafficable concerns with them." Finally, because all the colonies depended upon the security of New York's frontier, Postlethwayt indicated that each should bear a portion of the necessary cost in maintaining the security. This united action would also bolster the British image in the eyes of the Iroquois. Postlethwayt recognized the need for a unified imperial policy and ostensibly influenced others in similar fashion.¹⁰

Early in 1758 England under the guidance of William Pitt sent a military force to drive the French from the Ohio. Thomas Penn had noted his pleasure over the proposed expedition in a letter to Richard Peters. "I entirely agree with you that an offensive War is the only method of proceeding to make the Indians weary of their incursions, or to make the French incline to peace."

¹⁰ Malachy Postlethwayt, Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved (2 vols., London, 1757), I, 421-460, 479, 513-517, found in Reprints of Economic Classics (New York, 1968).

After the Easton treaty in October, the western Shawnee and Delaware tribes remained neutral, allowing General Forbes to capture Fort Duquesne. The French had no more been able to supply the war-weary Indians with trade goods at a time of stress than had the English. News of the proposed expedition, combined with Pennsylvania's promise to abandon the land west of the Alleghenies, thereby induced the Indians to foresake their brief romance with the French. Johnson's victory over the French at Niagara the next year solidified the somewhat hesitant western tribes in the English interest. The following newspaper account, written after the Crown Point and Ticonderoga battles of 1759, further demonstrated the need for a bold offensive capability:

It is said all the Indians but the brave Mohawks stood neuter the first onset the enemy made, to see, it is thought, which way the scale would turn; for I believe it was imprinted in their mind the French were invincible. As soon as they found the contrary, and that the French gave way, it is said but a yard of ground, they fell on them like so many butchers.

After the British victories on the Ohio and Lakes Ontario and Erie, they were ready for the final push to drive the French out of North America.¹¹

¹¹Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, Jan. 14, 1758, T. Penn Letter Book, V, 262; Richard Peters to Gen. Forbes, July 8, 1758, Col. Boquet to William Allen, Nov, 25, 1758, PPOC, IX, 47, 55; Pa. Council Minutes, VIII, 269, 292, 305, 310-311, 315, 380-381; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. III, 520-544, 571-574; Aug. 20, 1759, The New-York Gazette; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 177-181 and France in America, 194-198; Downes, Council Fires, 82-97.

As the tide of victory began to shift to the British, the colonists emphasized trade as a means of maintaining Indian friendship. They further recognized the importance of preventing land fraud and usurpations as a means of keeping the Indians within the British interest. As noted, Pennsylvania returned much of its Albany purchase to the Iroquois in 1758. Likewise, French settlement at Niagara in 1719 had initially caused the Six Nations to deed their land to the British in 1726, eliciting a Board of Trade comment in 1756 that it "clearly mark[s] out what should be the Conduct and Politicks of the English with regard to them viz. to leave them in Possession of their Country,... and to undertake the Guarantee of it to them, protecting them and their Hunting Lands." To minimize abuses of the Indians in New York, the government legislated against selling them liquor and buying or trading their arms, gunpowder, and clothing given in return for their friendship and alliance.¹²

William Johnson combined the two notions in a letter to Governor Denny of Pennsylvania in July 1758. To protect the frontier, he knew of no better way than

to open an advantageous Trade for the Indians,
and to have it put under such authoritative
regulations as may convince the Indians how
much it is for their interest to maintain Peace

¹² Colonial Laws of New York, III, 1009-1010, 1096, IV, 93, 349-350; Report of the Board of Trade to King, Dec. 11, 1755, O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History, II, 411-412.

and Friendship for the English, and protect your Province from the Irruptions [sic] of the Enemy. Trade is undoubtedly the strongest cement to bind the Indians to our alliance, taking necessary precautions that Justice is done them by the Traders, giving them satisfaction with regard to their Land Complaints, and by a solemn public Treaty, to agree upon clear and fixed Boundaries between our Settlements and their Hunting Grounds, so that each party may know their own, and be a mutual protection to each other of their respective Possessions.

To these ends the Pennsylvania Assembly in October passed a bill for preventing abuses in the trade and "strengthening the Peace and Friendship lately Concluded with the Indians." This act established a board of Indian Commissioners to regulate the trade at specific locations and at fixed rates. It also prohibited private trade and the sale of liquor to the Indians by anybody except the Commissioners or their agents. By the following year Johnson was writing to the Board of Trade on this. "An Equitable and Open and a well regulated Trade with the Indians, is and ever will be, the most efficacious means to improve and extend his Majesty's Indian interest." The ability of the English to maintain a fair and equitable trade with the Indians would have an important influence upon Anglo-Indian relations after the war.

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¹³ Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. III, 485-487; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, V, 320-330, 396-400, also Mulkearn, ed., Mercer Papers, 154-163; Thayer, Growth of Democracy, 60-62; William Johnson to Jeffrey Amherst, Apr. 21, 1759, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 29; Wm. Johnson to Lords of Trade, May 17, 1759, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 376-377.

By 1760, Amherst's victories had marked the end of French rule in Canada, and Johnson wrote to Secretary Pitt congratulating him on the reduction of Canada. "Thus sir, we became Masters of the last place in the Enemy's possession in these parts and made those Indians our friends by a peace, who might otherwise have given us much trouble."¹⁴

Pitt's peace negotiations in 1761 revealed differences of opinion as to the value of certain captured French territories. Sugar interests were divided. Importers wanted the French sugar islands so as to gain a monopoly in the world's sugar trade, while many producers feared competition by the addition of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The Hudson's Bay Company and the British industrial community desired that England keep Canada for its fur supply and as a potential market for manufactured goods. England desired an early peace, and to that end realized it could not keep both Canada and the sugar islands, for France refused to surrender both its fur and sugar trades. Strong sugar interests and a changing commercial policy, which emphasized the increased importance of markets for manufactures, dictated that England keep Canada, while surrendering Guadeloupe and Martinique. British imperial interests had finally come to the forefront in determining

¹⁴William Johnson to Pitt, Oct. 24, 1760, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 269-275.

the war's settlement. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 put almost all of North America's fur country in British possession, even though fur itself played a role of little importance in the peace settlement.¹⁵

A relaxed Indian policy followed on the heels of victory. The records for the years immediately following the French expulsion revealed a limited concern for Indian relations, now that they no longer served a purpose as a buffer against encroachments from the North. With Forbe's capture of Fort Duquesne, traders and settlers flooded back to the Ohio. George Croghan wrote to Johnson early in 1759 that "the People of this province are all running after the Indian Trade." The Indians complained of white encroachments both in the Wyoming valley and on the Ohio, which the English had promised to abandon after defeating the French. By October 1761, Colonel Boquet had issued a proclamation prohibiting settlement west of the Alleghenies. During this same period the Crown issued an official warning not to dispossess the Indians of their land due to "the fatal Effects which would attend a discontent amongst the Indians in the present situation." General Amherst assured the Indians at Fort Pitt in 1760 that the English had no desire for their land; however, his

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Edwin E. Rich, Montreal and the Fur Trade (Montreal, 1966), 37-42; Philips, The Fur Trade, 542-543; Beer, British Colonial Policy, 133-155.

haughty tone, the subsequent refusal to abandon the western forts, and the failure to renew the trade, especially in powder and lead, aroused the Indians' fears of English intentions. Although Johnson and Amherst attempted to regulate trade at specific posts in New York and the Ohio, there occurred a decrease in gifts and presents, for which Amherst was largely responsible, before traders were able to fill the gap. In addition, the English demand and subsequent pressure for the return of prisoners held by the Indians compounded the situation. Indian population had decreased dramatically, and they sought to replenish their numbers through traditional means of adopting prisoners, especially orphaned children, into the tribes. The clash of cultures could not be easily reconciled. Historian and ethnologist, Anthony Wallace, noted that Teedyuscung was one of the few people, white or Indian, who recognized the need for a slow process of acculturation regarding all issues, but on terms and land familiar to the Amerindian. Unfortunately, he was unable to forestall the consequences of cultural blinders.¹⁶

¹⁶For various letters relative to the causes of Pontiac's Rebellion see Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, III, 344-345, 463, 486-487, 496-498, 515, 529-535, 597-598, 604-605, 733, 743, 964, IX, 273-277, Croghan quote, X, 91; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 472-479, 572-581; Pa. Council Minutes, VIII, 484-491, 497-501, 567-572, 594-601, 630-654, 662-664, 721-774, IX, 27-30; PPOC, IX, 65, 77; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. III, 715-717, 744-752, Vol. IV, 48-49. Also important are numerous letters in the Croghan Papers, Cadwallader Collection. For secondary accounts Jacobs, Diplomacy, 5, 58, 66-67, 161, 183; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 210-266; and Downes, Council Fires, 97-120 are especially helpful.

Despite the Crown's request that Johnson investigate the Delaware charge of land fraud and the subsequent settling of the affair, even when combined with an extension of Pennsylvania's 1758 trade law and Johnson's attempts at regulation, the Indians unleashed a savage fury against the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania. The declaration of peace published in the colonies early in 1763, by which the French ceded all lands east of the Mississippi to the English, alarmed the Indian population, and by June rumors of Indian attacks had arrived in the eastern settlements.¹⁷ News of the capture of Presque Isle, LeBoeuf, and Venango in July induced the Pennsylvania Assembly to raise 700 men for frontier defense. They allotted £ 24,000 for this purpose in October, and at the same time passed a second bill prohibiting the sale of guns, ammunition, and other warlike stores to the Indians. The following spring, after some debate, they voted an additional £ 55,000 for the King's use. New York's Assembly more grudgingly voted to raise 800 men "to suppress this dangerous Defection, pregnant with the most fatal evils." Despite their

¹⁷ Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. IV, 78, 85-87; William Johnson to Pa. Commissioners, June 2, 1762, Wm. Johnson to Lords of Trade, Aug. 1, 1762, Sullivan, ed., Johnson Papers, IX, 465-466, III, 837-852; Wallace, Teedyuscung, 239-249; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, VI, 283-293; Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 13-15, 25, 30-31; Thayer, Growth of Democracy, 81. For Thomas Penn's changing opinion of William Johnson, culminating in approval of his handling of Teedyuscung, see T. Penn Letter Book, VI, 65-66, 220, VII, 30-31, 98, 168, 182-183, 192-194, 225, 240-241.

early victories, the Indians could not coordinate a united effort, and by the fall of 1764 peace had been concluded with the majority of tribes, essentially ending the rebellion. Finalization of the peace awaited Croghan's journey to the Ohio the following spring and culminated with treaties at Johnson's home in May and July 1765.¹⁸

Pontiac's Rebellion led to several reactions, both in the colonies and in England. In addition to the legislative response of providing for defense, private citizens in Pennsylvania took the law into their own hands to protect their property and ensure their safety. Late in 1763 a number of frontiersmen attacked and massacred some friendly Indians at Conestoga and Lancaster in retribution for earlier frontier attacks. Subsequently, they marched upon Philadelphia with demands for more extensive governmental protection. Although Benjamin Franklin dissuaded the so-called Paxton Boys from further lawlessness, a vicious pamphlet war ensued in a search to locate and lay the blame on someone for the colony's troubles. Although Pontiac's Rebellion had largely died out by the summer of 1765, another

¹⁸ Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 31-33, 36, 42, 64, 90, 178, 184, 193-197, 246, 250-267, 277-280; Pa. Assembly Minutes, VI, 5425-5431, 5439, 5478-5484, 5493-5494, VII, 5506, 5557, 5569-5570, 5603, 5606, 5617-5618; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, VI, 311-320, 344-367; O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 586-587, 621-623, 650-653, 738-741, 750-758; Thayer, Growth of Democracy, 81-85, 88; Norton, Fur Trade in New York, 211-212.

band of frontiersmen in Cumberland County commandeered supplies and trade goods headed for the Indians on several occasions until William Johnson and George Croghan finalized the peace. When Governor Penn officially proclaimed the reopening of the Indian trade in June, the rioting subsided, and relative calm returned to the frontier. These incidents displayed the concern for safety felt by settlers on the outskirts of the colony. They further reflected a nascent racism and nativism on the part of the participants, reflecting attitudes about the inherent worth of the Amerindian. The Indian's fear of his ultimate fate once the balance of European power disappeared was in many ways not totally unfounded.¹⁹

Pontiac's Rebellion was a logical response to the end of the French and Indian War and the changes suffered by the Indians. By 1763 Britain had clearly recognized that more than military force and an Indian superintendent were needed to main-

¹⁹ Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York, 1970), 114-115; John R. Sahli, "The Growth of British Influence Among the Seneca to 1768," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, XLIX (1966), 132-135. For detailed information concerning the Paxton and Cumberland County riots of 1763-1765 see Brook Hindle, "The March of the Paxton Boys," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., III (1946), 461-486; James E. Crowley, "The Paxton Disturbance and Ideas of Order in Pennsylvania Politics," Pennsylvania History, XXXVII (1970), 317-339; Eleanor M. Webster, "Insurrection at Fort Loudon in 1765: Rebellion or Preservation of Peace?" Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, XLVII (1964), 125-140; and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Sideling Hill Affair: The Cumberland County Riots of 1765," Ibid., LIX (1976), 39-53.

tain peaceful and balanced relations. Hence, new comprehensive plans were drawn for the control of Indian affairs. In October the imperial government issued the Proclamation of 1763. An enlargement of the principles contained in Lord Egremont's 1761 request, the Proclamation prohibited settlement west of the heads of rivers flowing into the Atlantic, provided for resolution of civil disputes concerning the Indians by the courts of the nearest colony, and required the licensing of fur traders. Pontiac's Rebellion precluded surveying a specific line to separate white and Indian, hence the ministry temporarily settled upon the Appalachian Mountains as a convenient geographical barrier. The question was not the necessity for such a line, but rather its location. In addition, the British ministry desired more information concerning the Indian trade before imposing further regulations. Thus, the Proclamation of 1763, designed as a provisional program, anticipated a more complete plan.

Prior to issuance of the Proclamation itself, the Lords of Trade wrote to Johnson and the southern agent asking for

²⁰ Lords of Trade to the King, Dec. 2, 1761, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 477-479; Vernar W. Crane, ed., "Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Colonies in America," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev., VIII (1922), 367-373; Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 79; Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1961), 53-57, 63-64; Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 124-127, 161-163, 203, 217. Sosin's work and Alvord's older, but still valuable study provide a detailed account and good analysis of British imperial Indian policy for the years 1763-1768.

suggestions for a comprehensive Indian policy. Combining Johnson's reply and a memorandum from his assistant, George Croghan, then representing him in England, the Board of Trade finalized a plan which it forwarded to the Indian agents and governors for their comment in July 1764. The plan provided for many of Johnson's proposals such as conducting Indian trade at specific locations, licenses for traders, and repeal of individual colonial laws regulating trade. In the words of the plan's designers, it had

for its object the regulation of Indian affairs both commercial and political throughout all North America, upon one general system, under the direction of Officers appointed by the Crown, so as to sett aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs in general.

Although the plan met with general approval, financial difficulties hampered its implementation. Parliament believed the colonies should support such a program, while they, as indicated by the Stamp Act crisis, believed in no taxation without representation. When combined with an internal struggle for power, the plan never received final authorization, and Johnson continued his own
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program as it had evolved during the war years.

²¹Lords of Trade to William Johnson, Aug. 5, 1763, July 10, 1764, Wm. Johnson to Lords of Trade, Nov. 18, 1763, Oct. 8, 1764, George Croghan to Lords of Trade, undated, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 535-536, 572-584, 602-607, 634-641, 657-669; Croghan to Wm. Johnson, July 12, 1764, Sullivan ed., Johnson Papers, IV, 462-463; Croghan to Board of Trade, undated; Croghan to Wm.

Despite Johnson's attempts to maintain a balanced Indian policy, the situation deteriorated rapidly after 1765. Confrontations increased between whites and Indians, concerning both the fur trade and land encroachments. Johnson complained of cheating and unprincipled traders, "the very dregs of the people." A compounding problem was present in the remaining French traders, who traditionally travelled the wilderness in search of fur, rather than trade from fixed posts as suggested by Johnson. The Proclamation of 1763 had promised a permanent boundary line for the separation of white settlers from the Indians, as had the treaties ending Pontiac's Rebellion. However, the British ministry took no action on this, until subsequent events forced them to recognize the necessity of some separation. A major consideration involved in the delay was the split between those who desired to maintain a fur trade requiring a fairly primitive environment and those who sought new markets for industrial growth through expansion of settlement. By late 1767 events had moved to the point where some decision was necessary. Then, early in 1768, Frederick Stumpp murdered ten Indians in Cumberland County, Pennsyl-

Johnson, Feb. 19, 1764, Croghan Papers, Cadwallader Collection; Board of Trade to Gov. Penn, July 10, 1764, Board of Trade to John Stuart, July 10, 1764, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. IV, 182-189; Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 220-225, 228; Downes, Council Fires, 124-126; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 73-78; Peter Marshall, "Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768," Journal of American Studies, V (1971), 1-17.


vania, which blew the situation wide open.

As Indian Superintendent, Johnson immediately wrote to Governor Penn offering to mediate the obviously serious affair. He also expressed his concern over Britain's failure to finalize a boundary line, which he believed would reduce such frontier tensions. Early in February the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a bill ordering the removal of people settled on unpurchased Indian lands because of the practice's "dangerous and fatal consequences to the peace and safety of this province." Shortly thereafter, it followed up the first act with a second, which provided £ 3,000 for condolence presents. In the meantime, the British ministry under the leadership of Secretary Shelburne, had authorized the permanent establishment of Johnson's proposed boundary line. Thomas Penn expressed his approval of the decision in a letter to Johnson and requested him to do his best to establish the line on a basis advantageous to Pennsylvania. During the spring Johnson and Croghan at separate treaties at Johnson Hall and Fort Pitt were able to assuage the ill feelings

²²William Johnson to Board of Trade, May 24, 1765, June 28, 1766, Wm. Johnson to Earl of Shelburne, Dec. 16, 1766, Sept. 22, 1767, Wm. Johnson, "Review of the Trade and Affairs of the Indians in the Northern District of America," Sept. 22, 1767, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 711-717, 837-838, 882, 953-978; Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 321-325, 327-328, 342-345, 403-420; Depositions relative to Stump murders, Jan. 19, 1768, John Penn to Thomas Penn, Jan. 21, 1768, PPOC, X, 124, 126; Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 107-108, 279, 283, 288, 290-291, 294-295, 298-299, 309, 313; Northon, Fur Trade in New York, 213-215.

of the Indians over the Stump murders. They further informed the Indians of the decision to settle the boundary question, which was well received. By April the ministry had decided to abandon the unified control of all Indian affairs and return the regulation of trade to the individual colonies. However, the Indian superintendencies continued "for such matters [as] are of immediate Negotiation between his Majesty and the Savages, and cannot therefore be regulated by Provincial Authority; and that the Boundary Line between the Indians and the Settlement[s] of his Majesty's Subjects... shall be finally ratified and confirmed." Fort Stanwix in New York was the site of the long-desired treaty which established a permanent boundary. As finalized, the boundary ran from a point near Fort Stanwix in northern New York south to the Delaward River. From this point it moved westward and then south along the Susquehanna River to Shamokin, then north and west to the Ohio whence it descended the river to the mouth of the Tennessee, where it turned directly southward (see map, p. 253).²³

²³ Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 448, 465-467, 481-482, 491-506, 514-543, 552-553; Pa. Assembly Minutes, VII, 6145-6147, 6159, 6163-6164, 6180, 6184-6185; Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. IV, 261-262, 282; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, VII, 152-158; Thomas Penn to William Johnson, Jan. 7, 1768, Feb. 2, 1769, T. Penn Letter Book, IX, 204-205, 329-333; George Croghan to Benjamin Franklin, Feb. 12, 1768, Croghan's instructions, Mar. 5, 1768, Croghan to Gen. Gage, Apr. 14, 1768, PPOC, X, 132, 154, 168, 178, 180; Earl of Shelburne to Lords of Trade, Oct. 5, 1767, Lords of Trade to Shelburne,



Boundary Line Between The Colonies and The Indians Proposed By The Lords of Trade

This map was obtained from the original as contained in James Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 vols. Albany, 1921-1965), V, 286.

The Stanwix Treaty and the decision to return control of much of Indian affairs to the individual colonies marked the final stage of British imperial Indian policy. It was a compromise decision reflecting two sets of competing interests: on the one hand, advocates of the fur trade opposed by market interests, and on the other hand, champions of imperial control countered by the interests of local control. As a compromise solution, it lacked the strengths of either unified imperial control, or the detailed awareness of and complete control by individual colonies. In part, the change in policy resulted from the failure of the fur trade to rebound strongly after the Seven Year's War (see Table VIII-1). Furthermore, the general expansion of colonial trade lessened the relative importance of fur as a commodity (see Table VIII-2). Canadians in competition with traders from New York and Pennsylvania applauded the freedom allowed by the 1768 decision; however, this very freedom created difficulties. The individual colonies did little to control their traders, especially in the far west. The boundary line did not prohibit traders from operating beyond the Appalachians and, as a bar to settlement, it was limited. As a result, trade

Dec. 23, 1767, Shelburne to Wm. Johnson, Jan. 5, 1768, Wm. Johnson to Shelburne, Mar. 14, 1768, Indian Conference at Johnson Hall, March 1768, Lords of Trade to Sec. of State Hillsborough, Mar. 17, 1768, Hillsborough to Governors in America, Apr. 15, 1768, Hillsborough to Wm. Johnson, Apr. 15, 1768, Fort Stanwix Treaty, Oct.-Nov., 1768, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VII, 981-984, 1004-1005, VIII, 2, 19-31, 36-53, 55-58, 111-138; Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 345-356, II, 31-33, 71-72; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 163, 169-180.

abuses and land encroachments beyond an imaginary line, the existence of which only aggravated relations because of its unenforceable nature, further embittered the Indians. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the Indians, especially the Iroquois, sided with Britain in its war against the colonies after 1776.²⁴

During the Seven Year's War and its aftermath, the fur trade itself underwent dramatic changes. The renewed struggle for empire brought a fifty percent decrease in all furs exported from New York in 1754 and 1755 and a corresponding decline in beaver (see Table VIII-1). Relatively, an even larger drop occurred in Pennsylvania's trade, particularly in deerskin. Total exports of all commodities from New York also declined, so that fur as a percentage did not decrease until 1756 when the second major drop took place (see Table VIII-2). In Pennsylvania fur as a percentage of total exports declined right away. Even though the percentage of fur exports to London fluctuated during the war years, this resulted largely from changes in total exports, rather than changes in the fur situation. The southern colonies supplied

²⁴ Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 107-108, II, 34, 61, 66, 68, 72, Pa. Council Minutes, IX, 582, 592; Downes, Council Fires, 131-132, 141-142; Marshall, "Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment," I, 6-7; Sahli, "British Influence Among the Seneca," 138-139; Norton, Fur Trade in New York, 215-220; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 211-217, 238-242, 249-250; Col. Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, Jan. 26, 1776, O'Callaghan, ed., N.Y. Col. Docs., VIII, 654-657. For the Iroquois role during the Revolution, see Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse, 1972).

London with the majority of deerskin, while Hudson's Bay provided the beaver during this period (see Tables VIII-4 and VIII-5). Beaver and deerskin, as well as total fur exports, did not rise again for Pennsylvania and New York until the war began to wind down in America in 1760 and 1761.

The Treaty of Paris had profound effects on the colonial fur trade. As the war drew to a close in America, fur exports again rose, reaching a plateau for New York from 1762-1764 (see Table VIII-1). After an even larger increase in Pennsylvania, broken only in 1764-1765 due to Pontiac's Rebellion, both colonies' exports decreased slowly over the next half-decade, reflecting shifts in the fur trade. Much of the beaver trade, and hence New York's profits, shifted to Canada, while the southern colonies, especially newly formed Georgia, as well as Canada, increased their share of the total deerskin market, during which time Pennsylvania's share correspondingly decreased (see Tables VIII-4 and VIII-5). Compared with the figures of earlier years, when fur exports were at their height, the downward trend in fur exports was reasonably conclusive. Perhaps most striking was the rise in total exports from New York, especially after the British gained effective control over North America. If combined with the overall decreases in all furs exported, this increase in total exports clearly defined the

shrinking role of the fur trade for New York's economy (see Table VIII-2). Since Pennsylvania's exports did not increase commensurately with New York's, fur exports remained a more important segment of its economy, contributing about twenty percent to the total. However, this was far less than during the pre-war years, when fur and skins often contributed over fifty percent to Pennsylvania's total exports to London. Control of Indian policy had come under imperial jurisdiction, and this destroyed Pennsylvania's, and especially New York's, preeminence in the fur trade.

During the period 1755-1768, Indian policy was based upon imperial considerations. Although in many ways a period of confusion, both in terms of the policy itself and of the colonial response, it was clear that imperial control was paramount. Britain's conduct of the war and the settlement at Paris indicated the importance of its imperial interests in defending the colonies and securing a market. This in turn affected and determined Indian policy. The extent of this concern was evident after 1768, in the passage of the 1774 Quebec Act, which placed all western Indian affairs and most of the trade under the control of the Canadian government. This imperial policy had developed out of the need for Indian allies in the Great War for Empire. Peace brought a partial return, especially after 1768, to the earlier concern for trade on an individual colonial basis as a major

consideration in Indian affairs. Ironically, when the French retreated from North America, thereby eliminating the need for war-time alliances, the fur center shifted to Canada, and New York and Pennsylvania found themselves without a major interest in this once vital trade.

TABLE VIII-1

Fur and Skin exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Constant Value in £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported to London in £		Total value of Deerskin exported to London in £		Total value of all fur and skins exported to London in £		Total value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1755	1,739	43	462	2,457	4,243	4,904	17,987	19,678
1756	419	24	256	1,396	1,419	3,353	13,136	14,938
1757	3	7	0	593	365	1,098	9,828	7,158
1758	0	1	427	419	508	876	3,442	10,097
1759	0	24	30	804	167	2,167	10,012	17,311
1760	179	229	424	3,099	1,456	4,992	6,328	13,562
1761	1,960	374	420	3,560	4,621	5,380	16,721	19,758
1762	2,335	1,365	272	5,890	6,418	10,656	17,730	19,217
1763	2,433	126	91	5,718	5,539	9,268	29,978	26,068
1764	3,361	482	48	151	6,264	2,026	28,922	20,188
1765	1,529	35	109	1,313	5,586	3,286	38,233	16,042
1766	969	60	120	3,192	3,756	6,029	45,683	20,152
1767	380	221	5	1,850	3,101	3,999	35,502	21,097
1768	942	10	1,032	3,245	5,884	4,937	50,509	34,888
1769	157	5	829	1,529	5,286	3,081	38,585	14,154
1770	26	9	517	2,191	2,929	3,265	55,192	15,857

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VIII-2

Fur by Type as a Percentage of Exports

Year	Value of Beaver as a % of all fur and skins exported to London		Value of Beaver as a % of total exports to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of all fur and skins ex- ported to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of total exports to London		Value of total fur and skins as a % of to- tal exports to London	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1755	41.0	.9	9.7	.2	10.9	50.1	2.6	12.5	23.6	24.9
1756	29.5	.7	3.2	.2	18.0	41.6	1.9	9.3	10.8	22.4
1757	.8	.6	.0	.1	.0	54.0	.0	8.3	3.7	15.3
1758	.0	.1	.0	.0	84.1	47.8	12.4	4.1	14.8	8.7
1759	.0	1.1	.0	.1	18.0	37.1	.3	4.6	1.7	12.5
1760	12.3	4.6	2.8	1.7	29.1	62.1	6.7	22.9	23.0	36.8
1761	42.4	7.0	11.7	1.9	9.1	66.2	2.5	18.0	27.6	27.2
1762	36.4	12.8	13.2	7.1	4.2	55.3	1.5	30.6	36.2	55.5
1763	43.9	1.4	8.1	.5	1.6	61.7	.3	21.9	18.5	35.6
1764	53.7	23.8	11.6	2.4	.8	7.5	.2	.7	21.7	10.0
1765	27.4	1.1	4.0	.2	2.0	40.0	.3	8.2	14.6	20.5
1766	25.8	1.0	2.1	.3	3.2	52.9	.3	15.8	8.2	29.9
1767	12.3	5.5	1.1	1.0	.2	46.3	.0	8.8	8.7	19.0
1768	16.0	.2	1.9	.0	17.5	65.7	2.0	9.3	11.6	14.2
1769	3.0	.2	.4	.0	15.7	49.6	2.1	10.8	13.7	21.8
1770	.9	.3	.0	.1	17.7	67.1	.9	13.8	5.3	20.6

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VIII-3

Fur and Skin Exports from N.Y. and Pa. to London by Current Value in £

Year	Current value of beaver in £		Current value of deerskin in £		Current value of total fur and skins exported to London in £		Total current value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1755	1,548	38	411	2,187	3,776	4,365	16,008	17,513
1756	377	22	230	1,256	1,277	3,018	11,822	13,444
1757	3	7	0	585	360	1,084	9,700	7,065
1758	0	1	430	422	511	881	3,462	10,158
1759	0	23	29	786	163	2,117	9,782	16,913
261 1760	174	223	412	3,012	1,415	4,852	6,151	13,182
1761	1,858	355	398	3,375	4,381	5,100	15,852	18,731
1762	2,225	1,301	259	5,613	6,116	10,155	16,897	18,314
1763	2,389	124	89	5,615	5,439	9,101	29,438	25,599
1764	3,317	476	47	149	6,183	2,000	28,536	19,926
1765	1,524	35	108	1,309	5,569	3,276	38,118	15,994
1766	971	60	120	3,198	3,762	6,041	46,231	20,192
1767	384	223	5	1,870	3,135	4,043	35,893	21,329
1768	944	10	1,034	3,251	5,896	4,947	50,610	34,958
1769	146	5	770	1,420	4,911	2,862	35,845	13,149
1770	25	8	448	2,066	2,762	3,079	52,046	14,953

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VIII-4

Percentage of total Deerskin Exported by Colonies

Year	Total Deerskin exported-		Colonies to							
	London	in £	H. Bay	Pa.	N.Y.	Caro- linas	Ga.	Va. & Md.	Fla.	Can.
1755	10,867		.0	22.6	4.3	36.6	11.6	25.0	.0	.0
1756	13,522		.0	10.3	1.9	49.8	11.6	26.4	.0	.0
1757	10,865		.0	5.5	.0	65.7	.0	28.9	.0	.0
1758	14,012		.0	3.0	3.0	72.4	.0	21.5	.0	.0
1759	19,633		.0	4.1	.2	85.4	.0	10.4	.0	.0
1760	19,091		1.3	16.2	2.2	60.9	6.9	12.4	.0	.0
1761	20,165		1.0	17.7	2.1	59.5	1.0	12.1	.0	6.7
1762	21,533		1.0	27.4	1.3	40.0	2.2	11.4	.0	16.8
1763	30,873		.8	18.5	.3	50.9	14.5	12.7	.0	2.2
1764	29,709		.5	.5	.2	39.8	31.1	9.1	.0	18.8
1765	24,983		.7	5.3	.4	40.1	38.8	6.1	.0	8.6
1766	32,760		.4	9.7	.4	38.7	32.7	8.2	.0	9.9
1767	24,883		.7	7.4	.0	37.8	39.0	9.2	.0	5.8
1768	33,470		.9	9.7	3.1	30.2	18.6	7.7	19.1	10.7
1769	33,222		.9	4.6	2.5	17.2	54.3	6.1	2.6	11.8
1770	35,351		.7	6.2	1.5	20.8	45.4	9.1	3.0	13.2

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

TABLE VIII-5

Percentage of total Beaver Exported by Colonies

Year	Total Beaver Exported - Colonies to London in £	Pa.	N.Y.	Hudson's Bay	N. Eng.	Quebec Canada
1755	8,066	.5	21.6	77.1	.9	.0
1756	6,265	.4	6.7	92.8	.1	.0
1757	6,393	.1	.0	99.9	.0	.0
1758	5,509	.0	.0	100.0	.0	.0
1759	4,833	.5	.0	99.3	.2	.0
1760	6,765	3.4	2.6	84.2	3.8	6.0
1761	16,757	2.2	11.7	46.2	2.7	37.2
1762	29,153	4.7	8.0	30.4	.8	56.1
1763	21,262	.6	11.4	28.7	2.7	56.6
1764	24,119	1.7	12.0	21.6	3.3	61.4
1765	27,653	.1	5.5	28.1	2.9	63.3
1766	24,402	.2	4.0	28.1	2.0	65.6
1767	20,244	1.1	1.9	30.4	2.0	64.6
1768	18,741	.1	5.0	23.3	1.9	69.7
1769	21,121	.0	.7	21.4	1.2	76.6
1770	23,727	.0	.1	26.1	1.1	72.6

Source: Customs 3/1-80.

CONCLUSION

By 1768 Indian policy in New York and Pennsylvania had undergone numerous and profound changes since its earliest beginnings under Sir Edmund Andros and William Penn. Although often hesitant and frequently contradictory, maintenance of Indian good will through gifts of wampum and merchandise was the avowed aim of all colonies bordering on the frontier and of the British imperial government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. New York and Pennsylvania both followed that policy during the years 1674-1768; however, the concepts and bases of their policies changed as the century progressed.

During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, France and England struggled for control of the fur trade. Caught in the middle of these two European Nations were the Indians, the most important of which were the Iroquois nations. They ultimately decided upon a policy of neutrality, a balance which both the French and English sought to maintain during the eighteenth century. In New York, Governors Sir Edmund Andros and Thomas Dongan played an important role in the evolution of Indian policy during the seventeenth century. They had stressed the economic importance of the fur trade, but by the time of the neutrality treaties of 1701, the earlier large numbers of beaver

skins had declined. Fur continued to occupy an important position in New York's economy during the eighteenth century, but not to the extent it had earlier.

William Penn's initial concern was the establishment of Pennsylvania as a religious sanctuary. Beyond this, the proprietor's primary concern was in making a profit from the sale of his major asset, land. Only after Queen Anne's War did the fur trade emerge under James Logan's tutelage as a major economic interest. Even then, it generally took a back seat to the proprietary interest in land.

Although early governors, such as Lord Bellomont at the turn of the century in New York and later William Keith in Pennsylvania, recognized the two-fold value of the Iroquois Confederation, both for its fur and for its protection against French incursions upon English territory, little resulted in the way of specific policy. Not until the 1720s, and then only in New York with the arrival of Governor William Burnet, was there an attempt to formalize the regulation of Indian affairs. A diversity of approaches and concepts had marked Anglo-Indian relations prior to Burnet's arrival. He attempted to control the fur trade in New York alone, based on the importance of Indian alliances for New York's security, although he recognized the value of fur itself. His policy, too advanced for its time and exclusive of Pennsylvania, held sway only until 1729 when the British Crown

revoked it.

Until the middle of the eighteenth century the British had no consistent Indian policy, since each colony controlled its own affairs. Nevertheless, a general policy, although divided in approach, did gradually evolve during the 1730s and 1740s. It increasingly emphasized the need for Indian allies in the expected confrontation with the French in Canada. With increased English recognition of the colonies as valuable markets for manufactured goods, Britain consolidated control of Indian affairs as a means of protecting that market rather than as a means of monopolizing fur sources. This development received its first impulse with the Ohio Company land grant in 1748, while the Albany Congress and the appointment of Sir William Johnson as Indian Superintendent marked its finalization. Thus, the change to imperialism, often considered only a post-1763 phenomenon, had taken place in the realm of Indian affairs by mid-century. The British had come to look upon the Indian as an ally and a buffer against the French.

The conduct of the French and Indian War emphasized the maturation of Britain's imperial policy. A British commander-in-chief directed the military campaign, while William Johnson supervised relations with the Indians. Elimination of the French in 1763 enabled Britain in part to revert to the original approach

to the Indians. Fur trade and prevention of conflict between white and Indian west of the Appalachians provided the rationale for the Proclamation of 1763 and the ill-fated Plan of 1764 for Indian affairs. Throughout the period of confusion from 1763 to 1768 imperial control remained supreme and, despite the change in policy in the latter year which returned control of the fur trade to the individual colonies, imperial considerations remained paramount. It was a question of expense, rather than an abandonment of the ideal of imperial control, which led to that change. Evidence of an ongoing concern with the imperial nature of things was clear in the well-known legislation of the revolutionary period, particularly the Quebec Act of 1774. Hence, it seems fair to conclude, along with historians such as Michael Kammen and Bernard Knollenberg, that, at least in the realm of Indian affairs, the real change to a uniform imperial policy took place about 1750, rather than only after 1763.¹

The Indians, particularly the Iroquois, continually sought a solution to the problem of their position between Canada and the English colonies, for they feared their elimination by one European power or the other. In actuality, the Indians played too valuable a role in the fur trade to warrant their

¹Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest (New York, 1970) and Bernard Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution: 1759-1766 (revised edition, New York, 1965).

fear; however, they failed to recognize this fact. Ultimately, the Indians, led by the Iroquois, formed themselves into a united league for purposes of strength, both against Europeans and against other tribes. Combining this with an attitude of neutrality after 1701, they occupied a buffer position, whereby they held the balance of power between France and England in North America. Continued French threats and encroachments forced the Iroquois ever closer to the British camp and exposed the Shawnee and Delaware tribes, newly arrived on the Ohio in the 1720s and 1730s, to French influence. At the same time all the tribes increasingly grew weaker because of war, disease, and the disintegration of their native cultures.

In the colonies the War of Austrian Succession had wrought few changes. Under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle everything had returned to a status quo ante-bellum. The French, aware of the value of their North American settlements and concerned about the limited hold they had on the area from Canada to Louisiana, sought to rebuild peacefully. In contrast, England sought an early renewal of the war, believing its own strength lay in the comparative commercial and population advantages it maintained over the French colonies.

Despite the relationships and jealousies among the Indians on the Ohio -- and it was fairly evident that any forthcoming battles would center there -- they all saw the Ohio lands threatened by white encroachment and settlement. For the Indian,

European legal niceties meant little when the cost was an entire way of life. In one Ohio Indian's words, "their Great Men the Beaver and Captain Oppamylucah... desired to know where the Indian's land lay, for that the French claimed all the Land on one Side the River Ohio and the English on the other side."

During the French and Indian War the Iroquois finally expressed their primary allegiance to the British after the winning side became clearer. Relegated after 1763 to a position of secondary importance, the Indians, despite the flareup of Pontiac's Rebellion, continued to decline in strength and numbers. Although clearly there were shortcomings in British and provincial Indian policy, the ultimate fate of the Indian would probably not have been vastly different had the English operated upon more enlightened assumptions concerning Indian values and rights. The white man ultimately sought the Indian's land and therefore almost guaranteed the loss of his friendship.²

T.E. Norton in his study of the fur trade in New York suggested that the Dutch traders of Albany played a positive role in defending the colony's frontier, for "if farmers and expansionists had originally settled on the New York frontier, they would

²Speech of Ohio Indian recorded in Christopher Gist's Journal, Mar. 12, 1752, Mulkearn, ed., Mercer Papers, 34; Hunter, "The Indian's Land," 344-345, 349-350; Eccles, France in America, 178-179; Conrad Weiser to Gov. Hamilton, Apr. 22, 1749, Pa. Archives, Ser. I, Vol. II, 24; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, Nov. 7, 1754, T. Penn Letter Book, IV, 21-22.

have almost assuredly driven the Iroquois into the hands of the French." While to a certain degree this may have been true, the foregoing comparative study would suggest a more complex relationship between Europeans and Amerindians over matters of trade, land, and defense.³

As should be evident, the Indian's increased cultural dependence upon European technology inextricably involved him with the fur trade, the same trade which opened the doors to white settlement. However, settlement of Indian land alone was not the problem; rather, it was the manner in which it took place. Pennsylvania's Long Peace from 1682-1755 indicated that. When violent attacks against the frontier did take place, they resulted from French pressure on the Ohio and the Indians' need for trade goods.

This is not to deny the long range effects and negative attitudes engendered by the highhandedness of James Logan or Thomas Penn, but only to place them in proper perspective. In Teedyuscung's words, land abuses, such as the Walking Purchase, were "not the principal Cause that made us strike our Brethren the English, yet it has caused the stroke to come harder than it otherwise would have come."⁴

³Norton, Fur Trade in New York, 221-223.

⁴Teedyuscung, Easton Treaty, July 28, 1757, Boyd, ed., Indian Treaties, 196.

The historian's tendency to generalize often leads him astray by simplifying events, the complexity of which needs to be understood. In the study of acculturation between Europeans and Amerindians during the colonial period, it is this very complexity which must be kept in focus, for Indian clans and tribes had differences as great as those of Europeans, whether they be of French, English, Scottish, German, or Irish descent. The interactions contributing to the development of a society, therefore, are best understood at the level upon which they occurred. Hopefully this study has illuminated one aspect of this process.

Finally, two further conclusions seem appropriate. The statistics of the fur trade reflected the importance of the trade to both cultures. However, the amount of fur exported from New York and Pennsylvania in each of the post-war eras showed that overall fur production was not a reason for policy changes; rather fur output fluctuated with periods of war and peace. At the same time these figures demonstrated the relative importance of the fur to each colony's economy. A general overall decline in fur as a percentage of total exports to London pointed out the diminishing role of fur, especially after 1763, even though the total value of fur did not greatly decrease until this latter date. Thus, almost ironically, due to expansion

fostered by the fur trade, policies which originated to facilitate that trade developed into one whereby the Indian became an ally for the preservation of British colonies and their markets against the French. Finally, with the war's conclusion, New York and Pennsylvania lost much of the fur trade which these policies were initially designed to develop and safeguard.

While much of the above evidence suggested a growing inter-colonial cooperation in Indian affairs during the eighteenth century, it was of limited scope, even under imperial direction. What cooperation did exist took place largely on a level of correspondence and the exchange of ideas between governors. The respective assemblies displayed a jealousy of their governors and of each other for reasons of power. Financial aid during wartime was slow in forthcoming, if at all. Undercurrents of dislike for New York's neutrality in the early years of the century countered a hatred of Quaker pacifism. Even during the last and greatest of the wars for empire, there was a hesitancy to support British imperial policy. Thomas Penn only begrudgingly acknowledged William Johnson's effectiveness as Indian Superintendent when he ended Teedyuscung's claims about land fraud and settled the 1768 boundary question to Penn's personal satisfaction. Finally, when control of the fur trade reverted to the individual colonies, they took few steps to

cooperate or establish any unified regulation in the absence of Crown authority. Thus, to see too much cooperation in matters of Indian affairs as part of a pre-revolutionary trend would be to suffer the limitations of whiggery and the blinders of historical hindsight. The fur trade and Indian policy, while obviously tied to other events and developments, must ultimately be understood upon its own basis, with its own merits and its own faults.

APPENDIX

Figures and values included in the tables of this study are compiled from the Import and Export Ledgers in the Public Record Office in London. These ledgers, known as Customs 3/1-80, are on microfilm. The years 1697-1770 are contained in Customs 3/1-3/70, from which only figures for the years 1705, 1712, and 1727 are missing. A duplicate of the 1727 ledgers is contained in the Departmental Archives of H.M. Customs, however.

William Culliford first held the office of inspector general of imports and exports, established in 1696. He and his successors compiled the series of eighty-three folio ledgers which contained the values for imports, re-exports, and exports for both London and the Outports (ports other than London itself in England and Wales). Customs 3 contains the figures pertaining to each foreign country and colony trading with England and included all items exchanged during each year.

Table I of the Appendix contains the values of goods exported to the outports in pounds sterling and percentages. The fluctuations in percentage values contained in column 3 of the table add only a further variable to the London figures. London received most of the furs shipped from Pennsylvania and New York;

the outports, foreign countries, and other colonies received only a small fraction of colonial furs. Figures for London alone therefore provide an accurate picture of the Pennsylvania and New York fur trade, and all references to imports and exports in the text refer only to those from the two colonies in London. However, throughout this study it is important to remember that fur and total goods sent to London represented only a portion of the colony's total trade.

Statistics from an early period, such as those contained in the tables and in the Customs 3 records, must be interpreted with extreme care. They can only be used to supplement other materials, for such things as smuggling, errors in original compilation, and changing values of the goods included were not always taken into consideration.

TABLE I

Year	Total exports to Outports in £		Exports to London and Outports in £		Exports to Outports as a percentage of total exports to England	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	3,065	0	16,819	1,478	18.2	0.0
1700	2,037	1,532	17,568	4,608	11.6	33.2
1701	4,962	2	18,547	5,220	26.8	0.0
1702	3,267	3	7,965	4,145	41.0	.1
1703	1,408	447	7,471	5,161	18.8	8.7
1704	200	169	10,541	2,430	1.9	7.0
1705	missing					
1706	161	0	2,850	4,210	5.6	.0
1707	9,727	766	14,283	787	68.1	97.3
1708	3,921	179	10,847	2,120	36.1	8.4
1709	3,104	0	12,259	618	25.3	.0
1710	324	0	8,204	1,277	3.9	.0
1711	4,622	0	12,194	39	37.9	.0
1712	missing					
1713	4,827	0	14,429	179	33.5	.0
1714	9,733	0	29,811	2,663	32.6	.0
1715	11,247	48	21,317	5,461	52.8	.9
1716	7,903	1,055	21,972	5,194	36.0	20.3
1717	6,889	2,156	24,535	4,499	28.1	47.9
1718	3,540	2,485	27,332	5,589	13.0	44.5

TABLE I (Cont.)

Year	Total exports to Outports in £		Exports to London and Outports in £		Exports to Outports as a percentage of total exports to England	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1719	4,020	1,518	19,596	6,565	20.5	23.1
1720	1,658	2,505	16,837	7,929	9.8	31.6
1721	4,525	3,974	15,681	8,038	28.9	49.4
1722	3,641	3,762	20,119	6,882	18.1	54.7
1723	8,336	317	27,992	8,032	29.8	3.9
1724	3,999	1,362	21,191	4,057	18.9	33.6
1725	4,875	3,333	24,976	11,981	19.5	27.8
1726	3,798	2,791	38,308	5,961	9.9	46.8
1727	2,662	2,267	28,955	12,823	9.2	17.7
1728	5,677	6,401	21,142	15,231	26.9	42.0
1729	4,381	3,751	15,834	7,435	27.7	50.5
1730	2,306	3,219	8,741	10,582	26.4	30.4
1731	1,552	6,214	20,756	12,787	7.5	48.6
1732	1,891	2,889	9,411	8,525	20.1	33.9
1733	2,604	6,301	11,627	14,777	22.4	42.6
1734	2,901	9,837	15,308	20,217	19.0	48.7
1735	2,708	4,347	14,154	21,919	19.1	19.8
1736	2,861	2,033	17,945	20,786	15.9	9.8
1737	1,136	3,744	16,834	15,199	6.7	24.6
1738	2,682	2,076	16,228	11,919	16.5	17.4

TABLE I (Cont.)

Year	Total exports to Outports in £		Exports to London and Outports in £		Exports to Outports as a percentage of total exports to England	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1739	2,035	1,253	18,459	8,135	11.0	15.4
1740	4,458	5,202	21,498	15,049	20.7	34.6
1741	4,820	6,551	21,142	17,158	22.8	38.2
1742	1,584	2,962	13,537	8,528	11.7	34.7
1743	825	685	15,067	9,596	5.5	7.1
1744	130	622	14,528	7,446	.9	8.4
1745	855	75	14,083	10,130	6.1	.7
1746	631	652	8,841	15,779	7.1	4.1
1747	1,345	1,393	14,992	3,832	9.0	36.4
1748	4,061	1,479	12,358	12,364	32.9	12.0
1749	3,027	1	23,413	14,944	12.9	.0
1750	2,398	1,963	33,060	28,191	7.3	7.0
1751	5,367	1,558	42,364	23,871	12.7	6.5
1752	2,164	48	40,649	29,978	5.3	.2
1753	4,687	4,608	50,533	38,528	9.3	12.0
1754	5,374	6,614	26,664	30,650	20.2	21.6
1755	10,067	12,658	28,055	32,337	35.9	39.1
1756	10,937	5,157	24,073	20,096	45.4	25.7
1757	9,340	7,032	19,168	14,190	48.7	49.6
1758	10,819	11,287	14,261	21,384	75.9	52.8

TABLE I (Cont.)

Year	Total exports to Outports in £		Exports to London and Outports in £		Exports to Outports as a percentage of total exports to England	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1759	11,673	5,094	23,685	22,405	49.3	22.7
1760	14,797	9,193	21,125	22,755	70.0	40.4
1761	31,927	19,412	48,648	39,170	65.6	49.6
1762	41,152	18,874	58,882	38,091	69.9	49.5
1763	24,011	12,161	53,989	38,229	44.5	31.8
1764	24,776	16,071	53,697	36,259	46.1	44.3
1765	16,727	9,106	54,960	25,149	30.4	36.2
1766	21,338	6,699	67,021	26,851	31.8	24.9
1767	25,921	16,544	61,423	37,642	42.2	44.0
1768	36,606	24,518	87,115	59,406	42.0	41.3
1769	34,881	11,958	73,466	26,112	47.5	45.8
1770	14,691	13,052	69,883	28,909	21.0	45.1

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VITA

Stephen H. Cutcliffe, the son of Woodrow A. and Elizabeth H. Cutcliffe, was born on January 17, 1947. He graduated from Cushing Academy, Ashburnham, Massachusetts in June 1964, and received a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Bates College in April 1968. After serving two years in the United States Army he began graduate study at Lehigh University in September 1970, receiving a Master of Arts degree in June 1973.