1-1-1975

The influence of the B-17 on U.S. strategic planning in 1941.

George C. Kelly

Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd

Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
THE INFLUENCE OF THE B-17
ON U.S. STRATEGIC PLANNING IN 1941

by
George C. Kelly, Jr.

A Thesis
Presented to the Graduate Committee
of Lehigh University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in
History

Lehigh University
1975
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

5-1-75
(Date)

Professor in Charge

Chairman of Department
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................................. 1

Chapter I - Establishing the Strategy ................................. 3

Chapter II - A New Strategy for the Philippines - July 1941 ... 12

Chapter III - The Logistics of the Philippine Build-Up
and Allied Cooperation ......................................................... 21

Chapter IV - Roosevelt and the B-17's ................................. 34

Chapter V - The Illusion of the War Department ................. 46

Chapter VI - U.S. Negotiations with Japan ......................... 58

Chapter VII - The Results of the Build-Up ......................... 69

Footnotes ................................................................................... 80

Selected Bibliography .............................................................. 94

Appendix I ................................................................................ 98

Appendix II .............................................................................. 110

Appendix III ............................................................................ 117

Appendix IV ............................................................................ 124

Vita ......................................................................................... 131

iii
ABSTRACT

The United States military strategy for the Philippine Archipelago from 1924 to 1941 was to fight defensively and retain Manila Bay until the islands could be resupplied and reinforced from the mainland. Although in 1940, an increase of army and navy aviation strength in the Philippines was recommended to provide a more credible U.S. deterrent to further Japanese expansion, the proposal was rejected. Thus, until July 1941, the U.S. policy was a defensive one; however, in the late summer of that year, the U.S. Government acted decisively and determined to send heavy bombers to the Philippine Islands. That decision was made shortly after the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26, and it proved beyond a doubt that the United States earnestly intended to protect her national interests in the Pacific.

On July 31, 1941, the dramatic reversal of policy occurred. General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, recorded in his diary, "At a conference attended by General Bryden, General Haislip, General Twaddle and myself, the Chief of Staff stated that it was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines." General Marshall partially based his Philippine reinforcement decision on General Arnold's recommendations. Arnold proposed placing a total of 340 heavy bombers and 260 pursuit planes in the Far East. Those recommendations were largely based on forthcoming production.

President Roosevelt tried to provide Great Britain with all possible military aid and develop credible armed forces for U.S.
defense. The President swung from wholehearted support for the Far Eastern build-up to partial support. In October 1941, Roosevelt wanted to divert to the British additional Flying Fortresses that had been assigned to General Douglas MacArthur (Commanding General United States Forces Far East). Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold effectively dissuaded F.D.R. from diverting the heavy bombers to Great Britain.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Chief of Staff George Marshall, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Henry Arnold were the major advocates of the B-17 build-up in the Philippine Islands. All three believed that United States diplomacy and security in the Far East had to be supported by military power.

The U.S. never completed its reinforcement of the Philippine Islands but the build-up displayed boldness and imagination. In 1941, Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold took a calculated risk when they placed B-17's in the Far East. Although their gamble failed, the repercussions were minimal on the overall strategic position of the United States.
CHAPTER I
"Establishing the Strategy"

The United States military strategy for the Philippine Archipelago from 1924 to 1941 was to fight defensively and retain Manila Bay until the islands could be resupplied and reinforced from the mainland. Although in 1940, an increase of army and navy aviation strength in the Philippines was recommended to provide a more credible U.S. deterrent to further Japanese expansion, the proposal was rejected. The rejection was not of a military nature; rather the American armament industry was nascent at best. Thus, until July 1941, the U.S. policy was a defensive one; however, in the late summer of that year, the U.S. Government acted decisively and determined to send over heavy bombers to the Philippine Islands. That decision was made shortly after the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26, and it proved beyond a doubt that the United States earnestly intended to protect her national interests in the Pacific.

Since the British situation in the autumn of 1940 had been critical, the United States had to act alone against Japanese expansion in the Pacific. In October 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt revived his plan for a naval quarantine of Japan; however, that program was not adopted. Then, on October 23, 1940, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote the President that he had talked with the Secretary of War Henry Stimson concerning the latter's proposal to send a force to Singapore. What eventually developed was a modest program for reinforcing the Philippines. The program "... involved a revision of the long accepted view that in the event of war
those islands could not be held... ."\(^4\) Two squadrons of pursuit planes and ten additional submarines were sent that October, but these did not constitute any substantive revision of the outlook that in the event of war the Philippines could not be maintained.\(^5\)

In November Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, put forward Plan D or Dog as the recommended strategic posture of the United States. According to this plan, the primary theatre of operations would be the Atlantic because Germany represented the greatest threat to our national survival. Later, Plan Dog was wholly incorporated into Rainbow 5.

In the beginning of 1941 "... it appeared that Britain would survive and the newly revised Rainbow 5 was the most likely contingency for which to plan... ."\(^6\) A Presidential directive of January 17, 1941, stated that if the United States was attacked by a "... sudden and simultaneous action on the part of Germany and Japan . . . we would stand on the defensive in the Pacific... ."\(^7\)

Though there was no specific crisis with Japan, in mid-January 1941, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, at a planning meeting attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, directed "... that the Navy should have under consideration the possibility of bombing attacks against Japanese cities."\(^8\) However, the Joint Planning Committee, which was comprised of representatives from the Army and the Navy, recommended that only $52 million "... authorized but not appropriated by Congress, be made to the Commonwealth Government to reinforce its ordinary budget in furthering the American defense plans in the Philippines." The money could be used for
various defensive needs and such special projects as "... air
fields, gas-proofing, bombing-proofing, protected storage and com-
munications... ."

President Manuel Quezon of the Philippines believed and, both
the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Board concurred, that
this assistance could greatly lift the morale of the Philippine na-
tion and its armed forces. Any material which the Philippine Islands
needed, however, would be sent only after British and United States
forces were "... raised and trained... ." This effectively meant
that the Islands would receive very little. The Philippine Govern-
ment was permitted to place orders for equipment "... the delivery
date being coordinated with deliveries to other purchasers so as to
meet the requirements of the United States most effectively." In
February, General Marshall wrote the commander of the Philippine De-
partment, Major General George Grunert: "I have been working on your
various recommendations and what might be done to help out despite
our great deficiencies in material at the present time." Despite
the Chief of Staff's efforts very little additional material aid was
sent to the islands.

The strategic posture of the United States, as represented by
Plan Dog and Rainbow 5 in March 1941, was essentially incorporated
by the American, British, and Canadian Staff talks into ABC-1. Those January-to-March conversations were extended to the Far East
at the Singapore Conference, attended by representatives from the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Their report
dealt with an overall strategy for the Far East. However, the Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral Stark joined General Marshall in rejecting the ADB report "because it was at variance with ABC-1 and did not constitute a 'practical operating plan for the Far East Area'." Due to the strategic needs of other areas, the United States was still unable to provide the Philippines with additional reinforcements. Matloff and Snell in their *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare* stated that with the situation as it existed in early 1941 it was "... not considered possible to hope to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines."

That was the strategic position of the United States in the Far East in April 1941. While the military situation seemed desperate, the diplomatic situation in the early part of 1941 appeared so hopeless that the American Ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph C. Grew, thought that negotiations with the Japanese Government were virtually impossible. He wrote:

One of my colleagues in Tokyo recently characterized the present situation in Japan as one of unstable equilibrium. ... 'Equilibrium' between the moderates and extremists seems hardly the right word. The latter are firmly in the saddle, and in practice there is ample evidence that they intend to push rapidly ahead ... The outlook for the future of the United States has never been darker.

Diplomatically and strategically Japan had two potentially powerful friends or enemies in the Far East, Russia and the United States. The Japanese could either play one against the other, attempt to strike a middle ground between the two, or ally herself with one or the other. Only the most ardent and most foolish
nationalist believed that Japan could survive the opposition of both the United States and Russia in the Far East. With Great Britain fighting Germany and Italy in Europe, her (Great Britain's) assistance to the U.S., the Commonwealth nations or the Netherlands East Indies could not be of major impact.

Russia regained some prestige (after her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905) in the summer of 1939 during the Nomaham incident. "It took Zhukov's tanks eleven days to roll the twenty miles to the [Manchurian] border and 20,000 of the 60,000 Japanese defenders died in front of them." Right on the heels of that disaster, Tokyo was surprised by the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact (August 19, 1939). Thus, Japan was dealt a military defeat and a very serious diplomatic setback. Russia was no longer preoccupied with her western frontier and the Anti-Comintern Pact among Germany, Japan and Italy was virtually a dead letter. Japanese Home Minister Kido referring to the Russian-German Pact, "... wrote in his diary: 'However we consider the Anti-Comintern Pact and its attached secret protocols, we are startled that there has been this breach of faith'." Indeed, "The German-Soviet Pact destroyed the whole basis of Japanese policy towards Europe and there was little concealment of the dismay and bitterness in Tokyo." Japan had been "... made to look ridiculous in the eyes of the world", but the German and Soviet collaboration could have affected "... a Soviet-Japanese accord, which would ..." have freed Japan to expand southward.

A Strike North concept emanated within the Japanese Government from a faction that wanted to fight Russia and expand northward.
The Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact and the Nomahan incident ended much of the so-called Strike North talk. Another deviating blow to the northern expansionists proponents came in June 1940 when France fell to the German war machine. The Japanese had been pressuring France, with little satisfaction, concerning Indo-China. However, the French "... surrender to Germany profoundly altered the situation and the Japanese were quick to seize their advantage." By the end of June 1940, Germany's European supremacy "... orphaned French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, the richest colonies in southeast Asia."20

As a result, in July 1940, a liaison conference among Japan's ministers of the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff "called for stronger ties with Germany and renewed diplomatic efforts to neutralize Russia."21 August, one year after the Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact, brought Japan full cycle in her diplomatic relations with Germany, and the Imperial Government signed a defensive military alliance with the Third Reich and Italy. In September at a conference in the Imperial Presence, the Army Chief of Staff Prince Kanin stated:

On the basis of our studies to date, the Army section of the Imperial Headquarters agrees with the government's proposal for stronger Axis Pact with Germany and Italy. Furthermore, since the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is extremely important both for the settlement of the China incident and for future defense policies, we would strongly urge that the government redouble its efforts in this area.22
Even so, it was not until January 1941 that Emperor Hirohito of Japan put pressure on Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuki to obtain an agreement with Russia. However, as David Bergamini has written, "Matsuoka did not want Japan to sign a pact of neutrality with the U.S.S.R. because he hoped secretly that Japan would soon join Germany in war with the U.S.S.R." But Matsuoka had to negotiate a mutual non-aggression pact with the Russians, no matter what he desired, because Japan's northern flank had to be secure if she struck south. Emperor Hirohito seemed disposed to an attack on Singapore though he "... was not yet ready for the concomitant war with the United States."  

On April 13, 1941, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuko Matsuoka and Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov concluded the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact. With this agreement, Japan could either resolve her China problem or leave it in abeyance while pursuing her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere southward. The Philippine archipelago, French Indo-China, Singapore, and in fact, everything south of Japan appeared ominously naked.

While Matsuoka was busy in March and April with Russian negotiations and visits to Germany and Italy, President Roosevelt's cabinet discussed the possibility of decreasing or ending Japanese imports of American oil. "State Department estimates in April, 1941, were that the Japanese would receive from the United States and the Dutch East Indies 12 million barrels during that year or three times the normal amount."  

As the United States Government pondered its oil policy
toward Japan, Congress made assistance to Great Britain a national priority. In March, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act but available material, especially airplanes was scant. When the British request for heavy bombers was received on March 3, Harry Hopkins urged that additional B-17's be given to them. On March 5, 1941, General Arnold recommended to the Chief of Staff George Marshall that no further B-17's be given to England. Then Arnold complained "The Air Corps had furnished 20 B-17 airplanes to the British. This number will provide for the combat operations of a squadron ..."27 President Franklin Roosevelt, as Arnold wrote on March 10, 1941, "... objected very strenuously to the attitude taken by me in connection with aid to Britain ..." Roosevelt made his feelings known through the versatile Harry Hopkins and "Hopkins expressed himself in no uncertain terms about ... [my (Arnold's) recommendations]."28

As the Secretary of War later wrote in August, 1941, "All they [the British] want now is a great big 4-engine bomber regardless of the fact that we are behind in those bombers mainly because they knocked them so hard in the beginning ... With their help in building up production, we could have been in a very different situation to what we are now ..."29

In 1941 F.D.R. faced the realities of modern air warfare, and the results of the 1939-1940 bombing were devastating. Because of U.S. weakness in heavy bombers and the belief that the outcome of the war might hinge on air power, the President and Secretary of War initiated the new Big Bomber Program in May, 1941. Roosevelt wrote
Stimson on May 4 "The effective defense of this country and the vital defense of other democratic nations requires that there be a substantial increase in heavy bomber production." Secretary of War Stimson responded on May 6 to the President "I have your two letters of May 4th. As was made clear I believe that our big bomber program can be brought up to the monthly rate [of 500 a month] which you mentioned by the middle of 1943." In May 1941, no one seriously considered substantial reinforcement of the Philippine Islands with Flying Fortresses, yet within only a few weeks that became an integral part of the strategic distribution of B-17's.

In August the United States began planning the deployment of Flying Fortresses in the Far East. These heavy bombers from the Philippine Islands could menace Japan's vital lines of communication to the South. However, the first test of the United States' ability to reinforce the Philippines by air was not completed until Friday, September 12, 1941. A detailed report of the Trans-Pacific Flight was immediately forwarded to Washington to aid in future flights. (See Appendix I).
U.S. relations with Japan had deteriorated steadily throughout the late spring and early summer of 1941. Germany's attack on Soviet Russia in June, 1941 offered Japan another set of options. "The Nipponese government decided to exploit this golden opportunity by gobbling up the weakly held territories of southeast Asia one by one, beginning with southern Indo-China." In July, the Japanese began to implement their new policy.

The United States responded to this policy by intensifying diplomatic and economic pressure on Japan. On July 23, 1941, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles expressed the position of the United States to Japanese Ambassador Nomura, most explicitly:

The movement now undertaken by Japan could only be regarded by the United States as having two probable purposes, neither of which purpose this government could ignore: First, the United States could only assume that the occupation of Indo-China by Japan constituted notice to the United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of conquest, and second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume that the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region.

Two days later, Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, wrote the President: "Due to the situation in the Far East, all practical
steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippine Islands."³

Then, on July 26, two significant events occurred. First, by executive order, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the U.S.; although initially designed not to end all trade with Japan, that was the practical result after August 1941. According to Langer and Gleason, the joint actions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands resulted in an economic blockade of Japan. Second, President Roosevelt acting on the recommendations of his military advisers, nationalized the armed forces of the Philippine Army and appointed former Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur Commanding General of the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFE).⁴ That appointment was a firm indication to Japan of U.S. determination to maintain itself in the Far East. Still, these actions did not alter the basic strategic policy of the U.S. towards the Philippines. This is reflected in a cable sent on July 28 to General MacArthur. Two days after he had assumed command of USAFE, MacArthur learned from the Adjutant General's office, that "No additional forces except approximately four hundred reserve officers . . . will be available for your command in [the] near future."⁵

Then, on July 31, the dramatic reversal of policy occurred. General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, recorded in his diary, "At a conference attended by General Bryden, General Haislip, General Twaddle and myself, the Chief of Staff stated that it was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines."
Gerow noted that, "This defense will not be permitted to jeopardize the major efforts made in the theater of the Atlantic." Nevertheless this new Philippine policy represented a substantial shift in U.S. policy and strategic thinking. MacArthur received notification that "... plans are maturing to send you [the] following reinforcements: one squadron of nine [of the] most modern B-seventeen Flying Fortresses from Hawaii as soon as availability of staging fields [at] Wake Island and New Britain [are] assured ... ."

On August 1 President Roosevelt enlarged the economic blockade of Japan to include "... wood pulp, metals, and manufactures, machinery and vehicles, rubber and manufactures, chemicals and related products ..." as well as high grade aviation petroleum products. Roosevelt and his top military advisers agreed that military and economic pressure were effective weapons, especially in the Far East.

General Marshall had three reasons for altering America's strategy in the summer of 1941; first, he "... knew and loved the Philippines ...", second, Marshall recommended that MacArthur be given command of USAFFE. Third, and by far the most important, as he testified in December 1945 before the Pearl Harbor Committee, "We felt that we could block the Japanese advance and block their entry into the war by their fear of what would happen if they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers on that island." Marshall's decision to reinforce the Philippines was approved by Secretary of War Stimson. On August 4, 1941, the
Secretary recorded in his diary, "We are sending nine of our big flying fortress to the Philippines to help in the defense there. . . ." These had been "... dispatched in the hope that enough of them could be sent in the next three or four months, to serve as a real deterrent to further Japanese action."\(^{10}\)

Chief of Staff George Marshall partially based his Philippine reinforcement decision on General Arnold's July 19th recommendations. The Chief of the Army Air Force had recommended that the AAF deploy in the Philippines "... four heavy bombardment groups, to consist of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve and an additional two pursuit groups of 130 planes [each]..." \(^{12}\) Both Marshall and Arnold believed that a concentration of heavy bombers would force the Japanese Imperial Government to revise or at least reconsider her southward expansion program.

Arnold's proposal, placing a total of 340 heavy bombers and 260 pursuit planes in the Far East, was largely based on forthcoming production. Even by August 1941, the AAF had only 109 B-17's; of those, 30 were located outside the continental United States with 21 in Hawaii, 8 in Panama, and 1 in Alaska. \(^{13}\) Arnold knew that between June 1941 and July 1942, 14 heavy bombardment groups were to be fitted with both personnel and planes. Though none of those were scheduled for the Philippine Islands, nine groups were to remain within the continental United States, two groups were to go to Hawaii and one each to Alaska, Puerto Rico and Trinidad. \(^{14}\) General Arnold was also aware that between September and December of 1941, a total of 282 Flying Fortresses were to be produced. Of
these, the AAF was to receive 181, the U.S. Navy 5, and the British Royal Air Force (RAF) the remaining 96. During January and February of the following year, an additional 184 B-17's would be ready. The AAF was to obtain 157, and the RAF, 27.\textsuperscript{15} Production of Flying Fortress would steadily increase after September 1941. General Arnold recognized that there were other problems such as air routes, air fields, supplies and defending the Flying Fortresses [when they were on the ground].

While the U.S. War Department was working to reinforce the Philippines with modern equipment, President Roosevelt sought to meet with Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In early August, F.D.R. had wanted "... a firsthand view of the changed situation [Germany's attack on Russia], so he sent Hopkins to London in mid-July to arrange a conference with Churchill."\textsuperscript{16} Hopkins not only set up the Roosevelt-Churchill summit but also went to Russia and talked directly to Stalin about the Russian situation, militarily and materially. The secret conference in Argentia, Newfoundland August 9-12, 1941 between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill dealt extensively with U.S.-British cooperation, most notably in regard to Japan. That series of meetings between the two leaders was a full scale summit conference because the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the Air Forces, members of the war plans divisions, Under Secretary of State Welles, and Sir Alexander Cadogen of the British Foreign Office attended.

Although the conference ostensibly "... grew out of the
situation created by Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union", Japan and the Far Eastern situation headed the list of topics for discussion at Argentia. The British were pressing for a stronger and more overt U.S. policy in the Far East because "Mr. Churchill was harassed by the pleas from the Pacific Dominions and the Dutch that he secure some promise of American military aid in the event of a Japanese attack." At the first general meeting, August 9, 1941, Churchill elucidated on the war and "Expressing deep concern over Japanese aggression in the Far East, he proposed that the United States, Britain, and Russia warn Japan of their opposition to movement of troops into the Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies." Roosevelt promised Churchill that the U.S. would serve diplomatic notice on the Japanese.

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogen also discussed U.S.-Japanese relations. Welles indicated that the major objective of the U.S. in the Pacific was to avoid war with Japan because of the strain that it would create on the United States military forces and production activities. Welles wrote:

I trusted that the British Government would take the same view as that which I had indicated to Sir Alexander Cadogen: namely, the dragging out of conversations on this latest Japanese proposal to the utmost without the slightest relaxation of the military or economic measures which had been taken.

The Welles-Cadogen draft settlement on Japan was presented to Hull on August 15, 1941; the draft was a virtual ultimatum. Yet, "...
the statement which the President personally handed to Ambassador Nomura on August 17 carried [only] implications." President Roosevelt warned the Ambassador that any further Japanese advance in the Southwest Pacific would force the U.S. Government to take countermeasures, even at the cost of war between the United States and Japan. But obviously, "... discretion triumphed over valor and the warning to Japan, envisaged at Argentia as a major state paper, a virtual ultimatum, was reduced to a statement for the information of the Japanese Ambassador." 

While the British argued for a tougher U.S. policy vis-a-vis Japan, they simultaneously pressed for more U.S. heavy bombers. General Arnold noted that the most recent British Program required all the Army Air Force's heavy bombers plus 6,000 that we, the United States, had on order. Arnold wrote,

\[
\text{The British as usual asked for everything they wanted regardless of whether we have or ever will have an Air Force. They never blinked an eye when they asked for 100\% of our production . . . Fortunately we were able to get away without promising or giving away everything we had. As a matter of fact we might have lost everything we owned including our pants - but we didn't.}
\]

Arnold further commented, "I think however that the conference was invaluable as it gave the British a much better understanding of our problems and certainly gave us a better understanding of not only their problems, but also their urgent desire to get everything they can regardless of [the] effect on the other fellow." Arnold stated that Sir Marshall Freeman gracefully accepted the United
States refusal to send additional heavy bombers to England.

General Arnold's refusal was partially based on one of the principles that Chief of Staff Marshall stated should guide American military representatives at Argentia. Namely that the Philippine Islands were going to be reinforced with B-17's. While refusing to give Freeman any more Flying Fortresses, Arnold requested that a permanent air route to the Philippines via New Britain or Australia be established.27

The military men of Great Britain and the United States did agree on strategy affecting six items: aid to Russia, the seizure of the Azores, the reinforcement of the Philippines, what to do if Japan moved southward, Iceland's defense, and finally, the occupation of the Canary Islands and the Cape Verde Islands.28 Following the conference major efforts were expended to coordinate the U.S. build-up in the Far East with the available resources of our major Pacific ally, the United Kingdom. Personnel and logistics problems for both Britain and the United States were complex, primarily because the Pacific Area was considered secondary to Europe by both nations.

Secretary of War Stimson, after learning about the Newfoundland conference wrote, "... I found that what the practical British were after was action and that they had no idea at all of how the cupboard was bare so far as the United States was concerned ..." Stimson strongly criticized the British requests for heavy bombers, "... the fact that we are behind in those bombers ..." was largely due to British opposition to them. Now they "...
reversed their position . . ." and were anxious to obtain as many flying fortresses as possible, ". . . the same type that they were knocking a year ago."29

After Argentia the reinforcement of the Philippine Islands began to gather momentum. However, the decision to reinforce the Philippines with B-17's was difficult to accomplish. The radical reversal in U.S. policy became possible for the United States only because of the availability of the Flying Fortresses.30 The dramatic change in the U.S. strategy towards the Philippines archipelago had been first proposed by General Arnold on July 19, 1941. Washington's belief in its new strategic deterrent for the Philippine Islands, wrote Dr. Pogue, was based on ". . . the Far Eastern commander's oversanguine estimates of the strength of his forces and General Marshall's overrating of the current capacity of the heavy bomber. . . ."31 Dr. Pogue's evaluation of the situation in the Philippines with regard to the B-17 might be very accurate; however, it underestimated the potential of an adequate force of B-17's in controlling Japanese southward expansion.

Matloff and Snell, in their official history wrote:

The notion that the Philippines could be defended, in spite of all the considerations that . . . led the planners so often to reject the idea, grew out of a new approach to the problem of operations in the western Pacific, involving the use of long-range Army bombers to neutralize Japanese offensive capabilities.32
CHAPTER III

"The Logistics of the Philippine Build-Up and Allied Cooperation"

The Army Air Force pushed the investigation of the possibilities of alternate air routes for the heavy bombers assigned to the Far East. Chief of the Air Staff Brig. General Carl Spaatz indicated the importance of these alternate routes in the implementation of new Philippine policy: "This matter is very urgent; it must be thought of in terms of weeks and not years; every possible expedient must be visualized and utilized in order to complete this project in the minimum time." General Spaatz also sent the following memorandum to the Air War Plans Division (AWPD):

An immediate investigation will be undertaken and action initiated without delay to expedite and develop at the earliest possible moment, an air route from Honolulu to the Philippines for heavy bombers, in addition to the present proposed route: Hawaii - Midway - Wake - New Britain - Darwin - Philippines. This route is too exposed to attack and Wake Island is too difficult to defend.

On August 14, the War Department acquired detailed information regarding both the Argentia Conference and the Philippine situation. General MacArthur received a memorandum from Colonel H.H. George, Air Corps Executive United States Army Forces Far East with a detailed list of U.S. airplanes in the Far East.
These figures indicated that the planes in the Philippines had no military value for the United States.

The U.S. air arm in the Philippines was totally antiquated and inadequate. The task of changing in six months or less that inadequate air force into a realistic deterrent to Japanese expansion was a difficult problem. Brigadier General L.T. Gerow noted in his assessment:

To offer a reasonable chance of successful defense of the Philippines, studies indicate necessary minimum reinforcements of:

- A composite Air Wing,
- An Infantry Division,
- An Antiaircraft Regiment, and
- Additional Harbor Defense Troops
  (Approximately 2300) . . .

The primary reasons, in the past, for the failure to undertake adequate defensive measures for the defense of the Philippine Islands were:

a. Lack of funds
b. Lack of personnel and equipment
c. Inability of the Navy to provide adequate support
The above reasons were no longer entirely controlling. Approximately $52 million had recently been appropriated for the defense of the Philippines; equipment and troops were to be prepared shortly. Even airplane bombs in adequate supply were becoming available.

The allocation of B-17's to the Philippines overcame the major obstacle to reinforcement - the Navy's inability to furnish adequate support. Naval reinforcement of the Philippine Islands had to come from Hawaii, a distance of 5,000 miles. Naval supply shipping was being pressed to the limit in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific. Air reinforcement would help alleviate the supply problem and would open the way for the U.S. to bypass the Japanese bases in the mandated islands. It was hoped that the B-17's would decrease the logistical and military problems of the United States in the Pacific.

General Gerow appraised the Far Eastern situation for the Chief of Staff on August 14:

The present attitude of Japan indicates she may consider reduction of the Philippine Islands a prior requirement to consummation of other plans for expansion. The ability of the Philippine Islands to withstand a determined attack with present means is doubtful. To enhance the probability of holding Luzon and, in any event, giving reasonable assurance of holding Manila Bay, further prompt reinforcement of the Philippines is essential.

The logistics problems were enormous in the United States as well as in the Philippines. General Spaatz wrote regarding air
facilities in the Philippines:

There is only one airdrome, Clark Field, Ft. Stotsenberg, suitable for use by heavy bombardment aircraft, at the present time. The runways at Nichols Field, Manila, are under construction and will not be completed before October 1, 1941. When construction is completed, this field will be suitable for use by heavy bombardment aircraft. 6

General MacArthur, on August 19, 1941, forwarded to Washington information pertaining to accommodations for additional planes at the existing airfields in the Philippine Islands. Three heavy bombardment squadrons could be handled immediately, in November an additional three, and in February 1942, four more squadrons. It was "... estimated that an additional four fields to accommodate two pursuit and seven bomber squadrons could be completed within the six month period . . ." if the necessary construction equipment was delivered on time to Manila. 7

Major General Hugh J. Casey, General MacArthur's engineer, wrote in his official history Airfield and Base Development that construction of airdromes in the Philippines was managed "... in one of three ways: first, by Army Engineer units, of which two were available . . . second, by private contractors under contract to the U.S. Engineer Department; and third, by private contractors working under contract with the Civil Aeronautics Authority. . . ." Two principal means were employed to obtain land for the construction of an airdrome, "... either through purchase or condemnation . . .", each of these "... was a long administrative process. . . . Even after all legal obstacles were overcome . . .", construction
was slow because of "... the shortage of heavy construction equipment." 8

The construction program begun in the Philippines during the summer had progressed so far that in October MacArthur wrote to Marshall, "A construction program was initiated without delay and is making excellent progress." 9 Nevertheless, the airfield situation in the Philippines in the Fall of 1941 remained bleak, despite the fact that "... there were in the Philippines approximately 40 airfields available for use by military aircraft and about 50 others which could be used in emergencies." 10 However, few runways exceeded the 3,500 feet in length necessary for B-17's. General Brehon, who commanded the United States Far East Air Forces, wrote in his diary October 8-9-10, 1941:

It was well known in the War Department at this time that there were only two landing fields in the Philippines from which heavy bombers could operate in the wet season ... . The landing area at Nichols Field near Manila was being enlarged to accommodate heavy bombers, but would not be completed for some months. 11

In August 1941, "With Marshall's approval the Air Chief transferred units from commands in the U.S. and Hawaii and earmarked 165 of the 220 bombers scheduled for production in the U.S. by the end of February 1942 for delivery to the Islands." 12

The initial effort to strengthen the Philippines was initiated on August 30, 1941, when the War Department sent an ultra secret message to Manila. "A flight from Hawaii to [the] Philippines is contemplated for nine B-17D airplanes about September fifth ...
Clark Field at Fort Stotsenberg will be destination landing field.\textsuperscript{13} Chief of Staff Marshall notified General MacArthur that "Further air reinforcements will be made as soon as your fields are sufficiently advanced to accommodate additional planes."\textsuperscript{14} To alleviate that situation, the Philippines were given "... the highest priority in the War Department ..." and MacArthur was assured of "... the funds needed for airfield construction ..."\textsuperscript{15} Plans matured to build and extend airfields in the Philippine Islands. The fields were: Nichols, Clark, Kindley, O'Donnell, Hala-banz, several sites on the Bataan Peninsula, as well as several smaller fields in Luzon.\textsuperscript{16}

On September 9, General Marshall informed the Commanding General USAFFE Douglas MacArthur that an increase in his heavy bombers "... to a group of four combat squadrons ..." was again proposed, only the availability of airfield accommodations was preventing their dispatch.\textsuperscript{17} Also, on September 9th, the Chief of Staff informed President Roosevelt that General MacArthur sent his "... personal appreciation for the splendid support ..." that he was receiving from the War Department. The President was told that "The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was delayed because of the runway at Wake Island. It is now en route and arrived at New Britain this morning. It should be in Manila tomorrow, or the next day."\textsuperscript{18}

On September 28, MacArthur radioed the Adjutant General: "None of [the] stops along [the] route can adequately accommodate more than nine aircraft at one time. [I] recommend that squadrons
of nine airplanes each take off [with] at least two day intervals . . . Parking facilities [at] Wake [are] limited to nine airplanes."

Other problems faced the deployment of B-17's in the Philippines. One was the question of the combat worthiness of the Flying Fortresses. On September 29, General Arnold was notified that "The initial results of the R.A.F.'s employment of American B-17's on daylight Continental bombing missions thus far are not encouraging." The R.A.F. reported that "... 46% of all assigned missions abandoned (primary or secondary targets), Mechanical difficulties caused 5% [and] 41% bad weather conditions." The memo Arnold received indicated mild reservations about the 41% aborted missions caused by bad weather. "If bad weather was responsible for the abandonment of such a high percentage of operational missions, it is indicative of the imperative necessity of increasing the accuracy of the R.A.F. Continental meteorological reports in order to minimize the risk of American equipment unnecessarily falling into the hands of the Germans." The report noted that "... if other operational factors ... are responsible for this high percentage of abandoned missions, immediate action and research ..." should be started to correct the problems. However, General Arnold was informed that the B-17 was able "... to withstand terrific enemy fire." The reports that Arnold received from England indicated that the fighting ability of the Flying Fortresses had to be improved. The B-17's that the War Department had scheduled to send to the Philippines in January, February, and March of 1942 were
improved models. Their improvement was due principally to the action that the Flying Fortresses experienced over Europe.

Arnold believed the R.A.F. had used the B-17's incorrectly and concluded:

The success or failure of the initial results of the B-17's bombing operations will have an effect, far in excess of its actual operational importance on the attitude of the R.A.F., the British, and American people toward the B-17 as a fighting plane. The excellent qualities of a fighting plane may go unrecognized for months if the plane is not properly introduced.

Therefore the AAF was determined that the Philippine build-up demonstrate to the American people the value of heavy bombers in halting Japan.

Another immense problem proved to be personnel. In 1941 a year after the RAF and the Luftwaffe engaged in air battles at 30,000 feet and higher, "In the entire country we had just two complete crews who had had as much as one hour of combat training in four-engine bombers above 20,000 feet." General Brereton, Commander of the Far East Air Forces wrote,

One very serious shortcoming was the lack of trained personnel . . . . I fully understood the inadequacy of the Air Forces. We were definitely a third-rate air power. In the Third Air Force in September we had only three Bombardment Groups and a mere 17 qualified first pilots and 22 qualified co-pilots for four-motored bombers.

The available trained personnel in the U.S. Air Force Combat Command on October 1, 1941 totaled:
Although personnel and material were scarce, the top echelon of the U.S. Government believed that it was possible to complete the Far Eastern build-up. Thus at 9:15 A.M. on September 30, 1941, Hull met with Stimson, Knox, Stark, and Marshall; the meeting was called at Secretary of State Hull's request. Stimson wrote, "... we wandered all over the face of the whole world on our discussion. Hull seemed to have West Africa in his head and we ended up with a fine disquisition on what we were doing in the Philippines by General Marshall." Four of the highest political and military officials in the United States Government had been fully briefed on the continued reinforcement of the Philippine Islands. That same day, General Arnold informed General Marshall on the development of additional air routes from Hawaii to the Philippine Islands. Arnold had directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to take any necessary action "... which will assure the early completion of the airports that are required for the movement of heavy bombardment aircraft between Hawaii and the Philippines." Arnold then noted that, "This matter is very urgent. It must be thought of in terms of weeks and not years."25

As General Arnold demonstrated the need for speed in the Philippine build-up, the War Department informed several potential
U.S. allies about the American program in the Far East. Secretary Stimson had informed the Chinese and the Dutch of our planned build-up in the Far East and General Gerow, on September 16, 1941, gave the British Joint Staff Mission detailed information on the Philippine reinforcement. Allied cooperation and coordination had picked up momentum after the Atlantic Conference and the U.S. build-up in the Far East would be more effective with the assistance of the BCD nations (Britain, China, and the Netherlands).

War Department studies indicate that air defense of [the] Philippines - Australia - Dutch East Indies - Singapore Area would be materially strengthened if operating fields with necessary supplies and equipment including bombs, ammunition, gasoline and oil, and service detachments at Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby and advanced air depot facilities at Rockhampton were available to the United States.

The above message was sent to General MacArthur on September 30, 1941; it contained orders to contact the appropriate authorities and obtain permission to use their facilities in the above mentioned areas. This memo emphasized the need for an airfield "... between Singapore and Manila suitable for operations of B-17 type bombers ..."); such a field was "... essential to our probable operations." MacArthur was further directed to ask the British to develop an airfield in North Borneo to aid in controlling the Japanese in the South China Sea. The Commanding General USAFFE was also told that he would receive 35 B-24 bombers along with 136 operational heavy bombers (along with 34 additional B-17's in reserve). As
General Gerow stated, "It is planned to augment [the] Philippine air units as rapidly as airplanes and units become available." 27

With the build-up in the Philippines escalating, code designations for that augmentation were established - Plum for troops and Peach for material. 28 On October 1, 1941, General MacArthur notified the Adjutant General that War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow 5, needed some revision. Rainbow 5 had been approved by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941 and

Since that time a new Command, the United States Army Air Forces in the Far East, has been constituted. . . . The Philippine Islands are now being organized into a potential Theater of Operations, with a force of from eleven to thirteen divisions with corresponding Air Corps and Army Troops.

MacArthur advised that the mission of defending only Manila Bay should be expanded "... to include the Defense of the Philippine Islands . . . ." The Commanding General of USAFFE believed that, "... the strength and composition of the defense forces projected here are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mission." 29

In order to facilitate the air power build-up in the Philippines, General MacArthur approved the selection of General Brereton to command the Army Air Forces in the Far East. Brereton later wrote:

Apparently I had been selected because of the fact that build-up of the Far East Air Force in its early stages would be largely one of preparing services and facilities. Airplanes, airfields, pilots, and all the things

-31-
needed to run an air force were practically nonexistent in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{30}

General Brereton discussed the build-up with General Arnold on October 5, 1941; at that time the contemplated force for the Philippines "... was approximately four Bombardment Groups, four Fighter Groups, the necessary air warning installations, and various associated air and ground units ..." General Brereton, however, was very skeptical about the build-up in the Philippines. He told General Arnold that it was "... extremely hazardous to place bomber forces in any sensitive area without first having provided the necessary fighter cover and air warning services...\textsuperscript{31}

Brereton disagreed with a plan which would put unprotected B-17's in the Philippines. He said, "The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before the arrival of units necessary for their protection." After two days of discussions with General Arnold, Brereton voiced his criticism of the Philippine heavy bomber build-up to the Chief of Staff. Marshall told Brereton that "... the hazards involved were recognized. Both [Arnold and Marshall] were aware that it was a calculated risk."\textsuperscript{32}

During September, the War Department had become more cognizant of the logistical problems involved in the heavy bomber build-up in the Far East. Those problems, although never fully resolved, were nonetheless energetically pursued. The War Department's ability to reinforce the Philippines with B-17's was partially impeded by the condition as well as the number of airfields in the Philippines.
The fact that the War Department planned and partially completed the Philippine build-up does not mean that Secretary Stimson conceived the idea. Richard Current, in his biography of Henry L. Stimson, exaggerated the role that the Secretary of War played in the planning of the build-up in the Far East when he wrote, "His idea was to make the Philippines a base for B-17 bombers which could attack any Japanese expedition daring to move southward past the islands. He wanted to put in the Philippines at least a hundred of the Flying Fortresses . . . ." The idea for air reinforcement of the Philippines was undeniably Arnold's and "... the main strategic decision on the more aggressive policy in the Philippines was made by Marshall." Secretary Stimson did play a significant role in the air reinforcement in the Philippines because, along with Marshall and Arnold, he vigorously urged for these reinforcements.
CHAPTER IV

"Roosevelt and the B-17's"

As the United States was implementing its radical new strategic policy in the Philippine Islands, first Russia, then Britain pressured President Roosevelt for more B-17's. In September, Marshall and Stimson successfully fought off Roosevelt's 50-50 idea concerning B-17's. Their action enabled the Far Eastern build-up to continue, and the President's desire to give the British more heavy bombers was also temporarily frustrated. It is apparent that Arnold's support for the B-17 build-up in the Philippines was motivated by his distrust of the British handling of U.S. heavy bombers, and his fervent desire to develop an autonomous Army Air Force.

Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, conferred on September 10 with Marshall, McCloy, Aurand, and Harriman on the Russian aid problem. William S. Knudsen, when told of the proposed aid to Russia "... thought we were a little over generous in the number of four-engine bombers we were prepared to give up, ..." in the months ahead. Stimson informed Roosevelt "... of Marshall's courageous and generous attitude towards the amount of this proposal to the Russians. I told him of the number of heavy bombers that we proposed to give and I told him that was especially generous. He seemed to think so too." Deliveries were to be made in 1942 after the Philippines build-up had been completed.

Then, a few days later, F.D.R. irritated Stimson when he interfered "... into a matter about which he knew very little, ..." Ambassador Oumansky along with General Gromov and Col.
Baidukov consulted with President Roosevelt on September 12, 1941 and Roosevelt became "... intrigued with the romance of the thing, promised them five of our 5-engine [4-engine] bombers AT ONCE* for them to fly back in a picturesque gesture over Germany ... and dropping something on Germany ..." to boost Russian morale. Stimson wrote that President Roosevelt had "butted into" this matter and characterized his offer as "... pure gesture". Stimson fully realized that five B-17's would not actually alter "... the Russian chance of winning the war." His adamant opposition to Roosevelt's gesture was based on the assumption that "... those planes are vital at the present moment at the opposite end of the world ..." where they could significantly alter the U.S. military position vis-a-vis Japan. Secretary Stimson was so "... disturbed over this ..." that he "... brought up the matter at Cabinet. I didn't go into all the military secrets but I told them of the reversal of the strategy of the world ... . The President was impressed and I think was very sorry for what he had done ..."). The Secretary of War then advised Soviet Ambassador Oumansky that it was impossible for the United States to fulfill Russian demands for B-17's. However, Stimson, after conferring with the Air Corps, concluded that the U.S. Government could provide the Russians with B-25's. These were available and were capable of performing the mission Roosevelt had in mind, that is, flying over Germany to Moscow.

In the middle of September the British Joint Staff Mission

*author's italics
had been fully informed of the U.S. build-up in the Philippines.

The British also learned of two developments; first, they would receive no immediate increase in their allocation of B-17's and second, almost all available B-17's were to be diverted to the Philippine Islands.6

At the Joint Board meeting on September 19, 1941

The Far Eastern situation was reviewed by General Marshall. . . . General Marshall stated that he was presenting in detail the Army plans for defending the Philippines, in order that the members of the Joint Board, and particularly the Navy personnel, might give their opinion as to the strategic effectiveness and influence which the augmented Philippine garrison might have.7

Admiral Richard Kelly Turner, U.S.N., Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations discussed the Far Eastern strategic situation from the Navy's perspective. Turner outlined possible Navy measures that could be used against a Japanese thrust toward the South.

The members of the Board concurred in the belief that a defensive force, of the composition and size as outlined by General Marshall, would have a profound strategic effect and that it might be the decisive element in deterring Japan from undertaking a Pacific War.8

When the British pressured Roosevelt for B-17's, their situation was vastly different from the Russian. The U.S. had been giving aid to Great Britain for over a year and Lend-lease was passed to assist the British against Hitler's Germany. Russia was given aid only because of its potential help for England. The
results, however, were the same - no additional heavy bombers were deployed to either of them. Stimson's decision not to give the British additional Flying Fortresses was based upon the advice of Robert A. Lovett and General Arnold. Lovett, in his memo "Need for Heavy Bombers" dated September 22, quoted the British Chiefs of Staff: "'It is in bombing, on a scale undreamt of in the last war, that we find the new weapon on which we must principally depend for the destruction of German economic life and morale.'" Lovett also emphasized the "'... vital importance of heavy bombers in the present strategical situation ... Even though we do not know all of the reasons which lead the British to their conclusion ...'" concerning the vital necessity of heavy bombers. Lovett's memo specifically dealt with reasons for maintaining the high priority status given to the B-17's in the United States rearmament. His argument also provided aid for those in favor of increasing the number of heavy bombers for the British: "Accordingly, in planning for the future it is felt that ... the British need for heavy bombers should be taken seriously and given every possible assistance."⁹

General Arnold also provided Secretary of War Stimson with definite reasons to maintain the British allocation of B-17's and not permit them an increase. "Medium bombers, light bombers and pursuit airplanes are suitable to be exported to England to insure survival of the United Kingdom as a base for air operations."¹⁰ Arnold, like Lovett, realized that "Only heavy bombers are suitable for a decisive air offensive against Germany." Yet the Chief
of Air Corps stated that

It is therefore mandatory that the minimum force required for defense of the United States and its overseas possessions be established. At least 11 groups of heavy bombers are necessary to meet the minimum requirement. Because of the distances involved, medium bombers alone are incapable of meeting these requirements (AWPD-2).

The Secretary of War, thereupon, wrote President Roosevelt regarding his September 18 request for a 50-50 split of B-17's. Harry Hopkins had warned Stimson that F.D.R. seemed "... hell bent on giving them that many...." Then on Tuesday, September 23, 1941, Secretary of War Stimson recorded in his diary "I finished and sent off to the President two letters of considerable importance today, one giving our final views on how many airplanes we could give up to foreign nations between now and the first of July next." Stimson noted "The only point with this issue which was hard was the 4-engine bomber. We have peeled them down to a point where to give up any more on a 50-50 basis in my opinion would mean to dangerously impair the defenses of the United States." Stimson made his position explicit:

After the most careful consideration I have concluded that I cannot approve of the application of that rule to the four-engine bomber class on which we have already taken such heavy deferments.

He included a chart indicating the precarious condition that existed concerning the B-17's.
The Secretary of War also pointed out that no airplanes were ". . . available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve for ABC-1, or for Puerto Rico . . . ." 12

Thus by September 23 the Philippine Islands, virtually written off three months earlier, had become the most significant priority with regard to heavy bombers. Henry L. Stimson radioed Douglas MacArthur that he was closely following the Philippine build-up and was ". . . deeply grateful for the good wishes . . ." that MacArthur sent to him. 13

On the 25th of September, Stimson informed Dr. T.V. Soong of the U.S. build-up in the Philippine Islands.

I told him very briefly that we were planning to increase the air defenses of the Philippines. I told him that I preferred to have this not announced or made particularly public but that he might tell the Generalissimo. 14

Then, on the 30th, the War Secretary told Major General L.H. van Oyen, Commander of the General Royal Netherlands East Indian Air

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm. Requirements</th>
<th>Reduced Allotments Agreed to 9/ /41</th>
<th>Status After Exports Now Contemplated</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Phil. Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ice-Greenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ABC-1 (Engl.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 groups</td>
<td>11 groups</td>
<td>10 groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Forces, the four-engine bombers he was seeking were to be deployed in the Philippines. Stimson also requested their cooperation "... with the whole scheme of defense."  

By the middle of October, while the War Department was concentrating on the build-up of U.S. forces, especially in the Philippine Islands, President Roosevelt focused on increasing U.S. aid to Great Britain. Earlier that month Roosevelt and Hopkins had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Stimson to increase the British allotment of B-17's. The Secretary's position was based upon proper strategic distribution for basic U.S. defense needs. Then on October 13, Harry Hopkins reopened the question for the President,  

There will be a minimum of 675 of these new 4-engine bombers made prior to July 1 and the schedule provides for the British to receive only about 124 of these. You can readily see that we could handle the Philippine and Hawaii business, as well as other important strategic centers, and still give the British 100 to 150 more than is now planned.  

Hopkins stated that he thought Hawaii and the Philippines required 50 and 101 additional planes, respectively. He wrote, "The Army plans to use the balance in Panama, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, et cetera. I have no doubt that these big planes are needed in all of these places but it is simply a question of relative importance." Not surprisingly, that same day F.D.R. replied to Stimson's September 22 letter, regarding the allocation of B-17's.  

My dear Mr. Secretary ... I am in complete agreement about the necessity
for the 4-engine bombers in the Philippine Islands and Hawaii and I realize that all of our production of the two new types of bomber would be pretty well tied up for this purpose through February. I think, however, that the total distribution of these new bombers between February 1942 and July 1942 as concerns our own needs and the British, is not a proper strategic distribution. It seems to me that after February more of these planes than have now been allocated should go to the British.

The President specifically mentioned Newfoundland as less strategically important than having "... the British flying these planes in combat..." Roosevelt requested that Stimson re-examine his decision regarding the strategic distribution of heavy bombers. He inquired about the possibility of a "... distribution which would give 100 to 150 more of these 4-engine bombers to the British after February next but prior to July 1..." Roosevelt directed the Secretary of War to make an early decision "... because of the necessity of equipping them [the heavy bombers] with Sperry equipment."18

Stimson became discouraged when "[this] letter came from the President asking for more 4-engine bombers for the British, renewing the old fight." The original fight had taken place in September, and Stimson thought that he had successfully dissuaded President Roosevelt from giving the British an increased allotment of Flying Fortresses. In mid-October, with the Philippine build-up in progress, the Secretary of War believed that the President was "... entirely in the hands of people who see only their side of the other nations..." Those advisers, the Secretary thought,
were "... wedded to the idea that with our weapons they can win the war." Stimson was sure that they could not, and that we would "... have to fight and that this nibbling away at our store of weapons . . ." was reducing "... our weapons down to what I fear is a dangerous thing." Stimson was well aware that Roosevelt was predisposed toward giving the British any material which could aid them against Germany. Stimson foresaw possible conflicts between increasing the B-17's to Britain and the Philippines build-up. "So I have another very serious issue with the President, which . . . will be very difficult for me to handle. These weapons are going to be needed in the Far East now . . ."  

General Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, helped with a two-page memorandum to the Secretary of War which contained detailed arguments against the "Diversion of Additional Heavy Bombers". Arnold raised the issue of sufficient heavy bombers in the Army Air Force "which can be concentrated where and when they are most needed." Arnold pointed out some of the logistical and personnel requirements necessary for training a heavy bombardment crew. He also took issue over Newfoundland: "... in view of the international situation at this time, Newfoundland is currently a logical place for stationing a group of heavy bombers. Incidents such as that of the Bismarck may occur at any moment." Arnold continued, "The critical points at this writing are the Philippines and Alaska, ..." He wrote that "The present plans for utilization of Army heavy bombers contemplate operations in the Philippines, Alaska, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, Iceland, and possible employment of
heavy bombers in connection with task forces in Natal, the Azores, and Dakar." Those plans, the one year training time required for a heavy bomber crew plus the probability of naval requests for patrol (this occurring when Iceland and Newfoundland have ice in their bays thus preventing patrol by Navy flying boats) eliminated the possibility of re-allocating heavy bombers to Britain. The General summed up his opposition, "These efforts in the diversion of aircraft from the Army Air Forces is [sic] having a disastrous effect on the organization of an effective United States Army Air Force. The lack of airplanes in our tactical units is highly destructive to the morale of our flying personnel." General Arnold expanded his argument:

Other factors enter the picture as soon as considerations are given to the possibility of diverting B-24's from the Army Air Forces. It is far more important as far as the United States is concerned to have these B-24's operating from the Philippines in the Far East where the situation is immediate and most critical, rather than to have them operating with doubtful efficiency on long range missions out of England against targets in the interior of Germany. The range of the B-24 makes it possible to reach interior Japan, while the range of the B-17 brings only the southern tip of Japan within our bombing range.20

Secretary Stimson consulted his military advisers (Marshall, Lovett, and Arnold), then wrote Roosevelt that it would be possible to increase the number of heavy bombers allocated to the British but to a very restricted degree. The Secretary of War considered his arguments "... from two aspects: first, that of the
physical ability to prepare these planes with Sperry equipment, and secondly, the more important element, strategic distribution in the light of military requirements." Of the 675 heavy bombers scheduled to be produced by July 1942, 349 were B-17's (41 B-17D's and 308 B-17E's) and 326 were B-24's (8 B-24C's and 318 B-24D's). Conversion of B-17E's to handle the Sperry equipment was not feasible, because redesigning of plant facilities would disrupt the production of B-17E's. Therefore, it was "... impossible for anyone in authority to agree to it." The disruption caused by fitting B-24D's with Sperry equipment would have been less severe. "As to the matter of physical possibilities, the Army has on order at the present time only 128 consolidated B-24D's with Sperry equipment. The Army Air Forces have already agreed to divert 94 of these planes retaining a balance of 34." Under ideal conditions those 34 and additional 73 planes "... might physically be prepared for the British. If this were done, a total of 107 planes (34 plus 73) would represent the ..." total number possible to divert to Great Britain. In dealing with the second and more important aspect of the problem, Stimson wrote

From the point of view of strategic necessities, as indicated in my letter of September 22, I feel that the ten groups representing the minimum safety requirements for the Army Air Forces should not at this time be reduced in light of military developments in both Far Eastern and European theatres.

Stimson did, however, give the President some of the requested heavy bombers by suggesting
... that no firm commitment be taken to deliver additional 4-engine aircraft to the British beyond the 34 planes for which Sperry equipment is now in sight, and that the final decision be made in light of the military situation later in the winter.²¹

The B-24's concerned Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold because they were involved with the Far Eastern build-up. USAFFE was to receive 30 B-24 bombers.²² During the fall of 1941, the U.S. Government continued to convince itself that it had an opportunity to hold the Philippines and restrain Japan. By September 19, 1941, the top military echelon of both Britain and the United States had been informed of the Philippine build-up. Considering the small number of heavy bombers possessed by the U.S., the air reinforcement of the Philippines was of major proportions.

The Far East happened to be the only area where the U.S. could deploy its air force in 1941, and Roosevelt and Marshall hoped to prevent a Pacific war by a rapid U.S. build-up in the Philippines. When Roosevelt shifted from complete support of the Philippine reinforcement towards sending more bombers to Great Britain and Russia, Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold successfully dissuaded him. Their rearmament program in the Philippine Islands was intended to maintain the status quo in the Far East. The United States' firm resolve to halt Japanese southward expansion was reinforced on the wings of the Army Air Forces' heavy bomber, the B-17.
"The Illusion of the War Department"

Three days after the Secretary of War resolved the problems surrounding F.D.R.'s gestures to Russia and Britain, Stimson directed that General Gerow inform him regularly on "... the entire progress which is being made there in the Philippines rearmament, ..." and to have a special study made of the strategic possibilities of situations.1

On October 4, Stimson sent a map to Hull (See Page 47) that emphasized the significance of the Far East build-up. "I am sending you by Stanley Hornbeck a map ... which will show you the tremendous change which is being introduced by the new establishment of the heavy bombers on the Philippine Islands."2 The map indicated the possibility of shuttle-bombing Japan by using Vladivostok. That idea exhilarated the Secretary of State. Three days later Stimson discussed the situation in the Far East with one of Hull's advisers, Norman Davis, and Stimson noted that he

... was glad to get his [Davis'] side-light on Hull's real reaction to it. I have been working with him every chance I got, making frontal attacks on him, but he is such a cagey old bird I wasn't sure how far it would have affected him. But apparently he has got the idea in his head that it has really given a punch to his own diplomacy in the Far East ... .

In his personal diary Secretary of War Stimson wrote: "I spent this morning in rather lively work, trying to pep up certain things that are of vital importance. First of all was the rearmament of
the Philippines. He had ordered that he be kept fully informed on
the progress of the build-up in the Far East and in early October,
Arnold wrote Stimson that the Philippines were to receive 95 B-17E's
out of a total production of 123 between October 1941 and February
1942. Arnold did recommend that "... due to uncertainties in pro-
duction [of B-24's] it is not believed that we should definitely
make allocation to the Philippines prior to March." The B-24 pro-
duction estimates at that time were: November-2, December-8, Janu-
ary-40, February-45. From the increased March production Arnold
could recommend 35 B-24's be sent to the Philippine Islands. Pro-
gress in rearming the Philippines was well under way.

During October, Washington became optimistic about the Far
East. As Mark Watson has written, "The fact that these considerable
additions were already on the way to the Philippine defense estab-
lishment did much to improve the WPD confidence in the Far East
situation." On October 8, General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff,
received a memorandum from General Gerow which outlined the pre-
sent U.S. position.

Projected movements to the Philippines
have been based on the concept that
maximum results will be obtained from
air reinforcements... Considering
only modern combat equipment, we now
have in the Philippines 9 B-17's and
81 P-40's. By December 31st, 1941, we
will have 65 B-17's, 52 light bombers
(A-24's), and 131 pursuits, P-40's or
similar ships.

Further air reinforcements, con-
templated as fast as equipment and
shipping is available, in 1942 will
bring these totals to 170 heavy bombers,
86 light bombers, and 195 pursuit, a
total of 451 modern combat ships. 8

General Gerow summarized the situation in a memorandum of October 8, 1941 for the Secretary of War, "Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands". He noted the importance of Vladivostok in supplying Russia and the probable closing of that vital harbor if Japan joined the German attack on Russia. This "... factor is of the utmost importance - the Vladivostok routes can handle some 3,000 tons of supplies a day against 270 tons via the Persian Gulf route which will soon be cut." The reality of the Russian supply situation thus became a major factor in the War Department's hope that Soviet Russia would permit the United States to operate against Japan if necessary from airfields on Russian soil.

The present deterrents should be maintained and further strengthened by the provision of strong offensive air forces in the Philippines prepared to operate from bases in British possessions to the south and from eastern Russia. The War Department is taking the lead in providing those forces. (See Map, Page 47)

The ability of the United States to maintain a substantial heavy bomber force in the Philippines would force Japan to pay an enormous price to either conquer or bypass the islands. To attack the Philippines, Japan would have to rely on carrier-based aviation as well as aircraft based on Taiwan. Gerow asserted that "The cost of this operation would be so great that Japan will hesitate to make the effort except as a last resort ... ." General Gerow also stated that "Should Japan consider a movement north against Eastern Siberia, she must weigh the danger of committing major forces to an
operation of uncertain outcome and with British, Dutch, and U.S. forces in her rear." The Acting Associate Chief of Staff added "... the threat of heavy bombardment operating against the Japanese homeland ..." would remain even if the United States did not formally enter such a war. Gerow believed that the threat would be real because of the commitment of the U.S. to supply Russia with war material.

The concluding paragraph in General Gerow's strategic estimate of the Far Eastern situation indicated an overwhelming optimism among the war planners:

Consideration of Japanese forces and her capabilities, leads to the conclusion that the air and ground units now available or scheduled for dispatch to the Philippine Islands in the immediate future have changed the entire picture in the Asiatic Area. The action taken by the War Department may well be the determining factor in Japan's eventual decision and, consequently, have vital bearing on the course of the war as a whole.

The original purpose of deploying B-17's in the Philippines had been purely defensive; that purpose was modified by October, 1941. From the defense of the Philippine Islands, the WPD (War Plans Division) moved into offensive planning. Using the Islands as a base, another new objective was probably established on October 10: "The Mission 1. To bomb Tokyo effectively using B-17 type planes."  

The problem inherent in accomplishing the offensive mission had four facets: Airplanes, Bases and Crews (ABC's) and their
deployment. The most difficult aspect of that problem was placing
the ABC's "... within a circle, whose radius is the Radius of Ac-
tion of a B-17 airplane carrying a load of bombs . . .", along with
"... the establishment of a protective force..." The bombing
value of the Flying Fortress was divided into two functional sets
of operational standards, Full Bomb Load and Half Bomb Load. The
former

[w]as obtained by loading the bomb bays
to full capacity with any one of the fol-
lowing loads:
Twenty 100 lb. bombs or
Fourteen 300 lb. bombs or
Eight 500 lb. bombs or
Eight 600 lb. bombs or
Four 1000 lb. bombs or
Two 2000 lb. bombs.

The maximum radius of action with any of the above bomb loads was
700 nautical miles, absolute 850 miles. The second possibility,
Half Bomb Load, had a radius of action of 900 miles and an absolute
maximum of 1050 miles.

The two Radius of Action Circles available with the B-17
were plotted "... on a map of Asia, with Tokyo as a center..."'(See Map, Page 47) Only from one region was it possible to bomb
Tokyo by employing land based Flying Fortresses. That region was
"... that portion of Russia in the vicinity of Vladivostok which
is bounded on the west by the Manchoukus border, on the north by
the Radius of Action Circle, and on the east by the Japan Sea."
The directive did, however, present one other possibility,

... that of a shuttle attack on Tokyo,
using Clark Field, Guam or an advanced
base in unoccupied China, such as Chuchow
in Cheking Province as the jump-off point and Vladivostok as the terminal.

The distance from Clark Field on Luzon over Tokyo to Vladivostok was 2240 nautical miles, beyond absolute range of 2100 nautical miles for the B-17's. The distance, however, from Chuchow over Tokyo to Vladivostok was 1800 nautical miles (via an all-water route, the distance to Tokyo was 2000 nautical miles) and from Guam was 1980 nautical miles. It was, therefore, obvious

... that to effectively bomb Tokyo using B-17 type airplanes, strongly protected bases must be built in the Vladivostok area. Complete domination of the air over these bases must be established by friendly pursuit and anti-aircraft, and the Japanese ground forces must not be allowed to advance any further east than the present Siberian-Manchukua border.

A group of 32 airplanes (4 combat squadrons) flying a bombing mission to Tokyo would require: 51,000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline, 250 gallons of oil, and under ideal conditions 2800 tons of bombs (mostly 300 lb. and 600 lb. bombs). Using those figures "It would take ten groups of 40 squadrons or 320 airplanes to do the job within a reasonable time, kept up to full strength from a replacement center."11

The study "To Bomb Tokyo" mentioned the vulnerability of Japanese shipping lanes from B-17's based at Clark Field. Marshall, later testified that the U.S. was attempting to control Japanese shipping.12 That possibility, however, noted WPD, was "Beyond the scope of this study . . . ."13

-52-
General Arnold wrote General MacArthur a letter in mid-October to explain the role of the Air Force in the Far East. Unlike the study that dealt with the bombing of Tokyo, Arnold's letter was a more accurate assessment of the situation:

As we see it over here, air operations in connection with the Philippines divide themselves into two parts. First, organization of a route from the United States to the Philippines for ferrying larger types of airplanes, such as B-17's and B-24's. Second, the actual operation of our aircraft in the Philippines - Singapore - Australia - New Britain area.¹⁴

Also in that letter, General Arnold revealed his personal skepticism concerning the possible use of Vladivostok for U.S. air operations against Japan.

During October 1941, the War Department began to perceive the situation through its new strategic concept. The War Department's own combat estimate of Japanese and Philippine Forces indicates how far adrift from reality the WPD was in October 1941:
1. **JAPANESE FORCES**

   **Army:** 68 plus 15 depot divisions; strength: 2,000,000.
   Reserves: 3,500,000.

   **Airplanes:** 114 Army Squadrons and 124 Navy Squadrons.
   Total combat planes: 3,743.

   **Navy:** 10 Battleships, 18 Heavy Cruisers, 20 Light Cruisers,
   129 Destroyers, and 72 Submarines. Total personnel: 180,000.

2. **PHILIPPINE FORCES**

   **Now** | **Proposed** | ** Increases By**
   --- | --- | ---
   29,000 | 500 | Nov.
   Tank Bn (54)
   900 | Nov.
   Tank Destroyers (25)
   500 | Nov.-Dec.
   Light Bomb Group
   3,100 | Nov.-Feb.
   Service Units AC & Miscel
   3,400 | Nov.-Jan.
   Inf. Regt.
   5,500 | Nov.-Jan.
   FA Brig. plus 2 Bns.
   1,100 | Jan.-Feb., 1942
   Heavy Bomb Group
   15,000

   **Philippine Army** 25,000 66,000 Dec.

   TOTAL -- 54,000 81,000

   TOTAL FORCES IN PHILIPPINES, January, 1942: 135,000.

   **Airplanes:**

   | **Now** | **Proposed Totals by:** |
   | --- | --- | --- |
   | Heavy Bombers 9 | 44 Oct.-Dec., '41 | 170 Feb.-Oct., '42 |
   | Light Bombers - | 52 Nov., '41 | 86 Feb.-Oct., '42 |
   | Pursuit 81 | 131 Nov.-Dec., '41 | 195 Feb.-Oct., '42 |
   | 90 | 227 | 451 |

   **Navy:** (Asiatic Fleet) 1 Heavy Cruiser, 1 Light Cruiser,
   13 Destroyers, 17 Submarines, 1 Airplane Tender,
   24 Patrol Planes.

   Reinforcements by additional submarines and patrol planes
   contemplated.

   -54-
The desperate position of the U.S. in the Philippine Islands can be even more clearly seen when we remember that "In the entire country we had just two complete crews who had had as much as one hour of combat training in four-engine bombers above 20,000 feet... In the entire Air Force Combat Command we had only 33 heavy bomber crews trained for combat October 1." 16

On October 20, 1941, Stimson spent his entire morning drafting a "... proposed letter to the President." Secretary Stimson considered the letter an "... important one, stating the strategy of the United States ... giving an entirely new idea of the functions of the Air Corps from what I think the President has." Stimson worked closely with Marshall, Arnold, Lovett, and Gerow on the strategy. Stimson believed that the statement of strategy was necessary "... because the President has evidently made up his mind to try to put this on pretty high ground and pretty broad ground, ..." The Secretary believed that the strategy had been "... worked out and the description of our interests makes a pretty impressive document..." Stimson read the document to Bundy and McCloy who "... had made themselves, as they said, the Devil's advocate to try to beat me, but they thought I was sound." 17

This letter indicated that the United States recognized air war planning in the modern era. (The full text is in Appendix II.) The essence of the strategy was to have available large numbers of heavy bombers. The entire problem of heavy bomber distribution was

... really not a static but dynamic question... These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should
constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied.\textsuperscript{18}

This strategic doctrine puzzled Franklin Roosevelt. The President, on October 25, requested that Harry Hopkins "Please read and speak to me about this. I am a bit bewildered."\textsuperscript{19} The proper strategic distribution and national strategy of defense became moot points after Pearl Harbor. Harry Hopkins' December 9th memorandum on this doctrine, to Miss Tully, the President's personal secretary, attests to that: "In the light of what happened in the last day or two this letter may be filed. It is not important for the President to take any further action on this matter at this time."\textsuperscript{20}

General Gerow believed that deployment of Flying Fortresses in the Philippine Archipelago would prove to be the decisive factor in the Far East. When General Brereton departed for the Philippines, General Marshall gave him "... detailed instructions about the Philippine situation, [and Marshall] stressed the change in the strategic importance of the Islands."\textsuperscript{21} General Brereton observed that the personnel in the War Department believed that hostilities with Japan, at the earliest, would commence in April, 1942. "It was the hope of our Government that the presence of a powerful air force in the Philippines, in addition to a well-trained Army, would serve as a strong argument to enforce the American viewpoint on Japan."\textsuperscript{22}

The War Department's optimistic forecast was based more on hope than reality. The perspective of the war planners had been
altered by their new strategic concept of the Philippine Islands. Unfortunately, that alteration obscured the War Department's vision of the power realities that existed in the Pacific during the fall of 1941.
In the middle of October, Prime Minister Konoye resigned and Minister of War Hideki Tojo replaced him. The Prime Minister had been losing political support when the early deadline for implementing war plans was reached, and so Konoye felt his situation hopeless. He tried to persuade Tojo to accept a temporary evacuation from China with the "... understanding that some arrangement would be made for the occupation of certain key localities later on."\(^1\) However, Tojo remained adamant on the China issue believing that "... the objective of the United States was to control the Far East ..." and "... if Japan were to begin to make concessions, Washington would probably make more and more demands, without limit."\(^2\) This interpretation that the Japanese military leaders had of Washington was crucial in the relations between the two nations. As Langer and Gleason have written "They were convinced that the conversations with Washington held no hope of success and that the United States was simply playing for time, perhaps even preparing to attack."\(^3\) Their assessment of Washington emphasized the importance of the Magruder Mission to China as well as the October 5 conference among General MacArthur, Admiral Hart (Commander in Chief U.S. Asiatic Fleet), General Magruder, and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham (British Singapore Commander).

The critical point for both the United States Government and the Imperial Japanese Government was the evacuation of troops from China. On August 8, the Japanese proposed a meeting between Konoye

-58-
and Roosevelt. The President was on his way to Argentia and Secretary of State Hull was not receptive to the idea. Although President Roosevelt at first seemed amenable to such a meeting, it never matured. Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador Nomura in Washington on October 13, that it was necessary for Roosevelt to meet with Konoye if there was to be any accommodation in Japanese-American relations. 4

According to the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 the Japanese Government was to prepare to wage war if the negotiations with Washington had come to nothing by early October .... The projected Roosevelt-Konoye meeting had not materialized and Japan's economic situation was becoming desperate. 5

The State Department, led by Cordell Hull, opposed President Roosevelt's meeting with Prime Minister Konoye. Hull and his Far Eastern advisers did not place much hope in a diplomatic settlement between the U.S. and Japan. Therefore "... when Hull and his staff read Grew's [September 6] report of the three-hour talk [with Konoye], they could not see that privacy changed Japanese ideas or tactics." 6

Thus, the diplomatic positions of the U.S. and Japan were frozen, with no prospect of a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye was forced to resign on October 16 and the next day, Minister of War Hideki Tojo became Japan's new Prime Minister.

Tojo was given a "tabula rasa" by the Emperor and was not bound to the decision arrived at during the September 6 Imperial
Conference. Herbert Feis, however, described Tojo and his cabinet as ". . . men who had carried the war deep into China and for whom retreat would mean failure. They were the men who made decisions by a military timetable."7

The improving military posture of the United States in the Philippines, specifically, and in the Far East generally, hardened the negotiating position of Roosevelt and Hull. Furthermore, on a global scale,

American defense production was gaining size and speed; the situation in the Atlantic was better; the British still had the Suez Canal; the Russians were holding before Moscow and winter was not far ahead. Japan could no longer determine whether the war in Europe was to be won or lost.8

By, "... October the American Government was revealing more clearly than it did in March that it would not compromise with Japan."9

Even if the U.S. build-up were completed, any U.S. pressure on the Japanese mainland would hinge on Russian assistance. Any successful attempt to shuttle bomb mainland Japan depended upon air bases in the Vladivostok Area. The probability of the Russians allowing that kind of air operation at first appeared dim. However, towards the end of October, W. Averill Harriman (President Roosevelt's special representative) and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson discussed that very question. Harriman had met with Stalin and said that he (Stalin)

. . . professes willingness to let us have all the information we desire as to the northeastern Siberia and Kamchatka but was naturally desirous of

-60-
knowing how far we would go in helping them... I told him it was very important for us to get further information about the air fields of Kamchatka and northeastern Siberia. Harriman then gave Stimson "... the map which Stalin had given to Chaney..." on that subject as well as "... Chaney's report to Harriman." One week later Stimson urged Secretary Hull to aid in the acquisition of one or possibly two airfields near Vladivostok. Stimson was asked "... to draw up a statement of what we wanted..." so that Hull could "... begin negotiations." Langer and Gleason point out that not only was "Secretary Stimson... an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of rushing Flying Fortresses to the Philippines..." but "... he preached this doctrine to the President and to Secretary Hull." Stimson argued for "... avoiding a showdown and... that no effort be spared to secure from the Russians air bases in Siberia which should pose a threat of great bomber sweeps over Japan."

On October 21 Stimson sent a letter to President Roosevelt explicitly stating the reasons for proper strategic distribution of four-engine bombers in a world contest, but most immediately in the Philippines. The Secretary of War also detailed the applied air doctrine of the Army Air Forces, especially in regard to the Far East. (See Appendix II)

The explanation of a U.S. air power doctrine, the build-up in the Philippines and the narrowing of the U.S. negotiating position with Japan converged during October 1941. Secretary Stimson's optimism about the possibilities of the B-17 build-up was reinforced
by MacArthur's sanguine reports: "A construction program . . . is making excellent progress . . . . Good progress is being made in the development of air fields."\(^{16}\) (Text of the letter from MacArthur to Marshall appears in Appendix III.)

The Secretary's optimism and enthusiasm were encouraged during late October by information he received from "magic intercepts". These were messages that the U.S. Government had obtained, because it had broken the most sensitive Japanese codes.\(^{17}\) On October 21, Tokyo received word from Davao, a U.S. air base in the Philippine Islands, that "Already several times a week planes are flying here, and it seems they are expecting large heavy bomber planes too, very soon."\(^{18}\) This was part of a Navy MAGIC intercept, and was probably the information Stimson referred to on October 28 in his conversation with Hull. On October 28 Hull asked Stimson if he favored an "... immediate declaration of war against Japan." Stimson stated that he did not, and that his "... purpose was to take advantage of this opportunity of strengthening our position in the Philippines by air and to use it as a means of strengthening his [Hull's] diplomatic arm in forcing the Japanese to keep away from Singapore and perhaps ... in good luck, to shake the Japanese out of the Axis." Stimson told Hull that he was "... anxious to avoid any boasting about what we are doing or any flamboyant announcement of the movements of the planes and the reinforcements."

The Secretary of War wanted the Japanese to realize the serious nature of the United States build-up. Stimson had "... reason to believe from some of the MAGIC information, ..." which the War
Department received, that the Japanese were becoming concerned.

Hull told Stimson that the Japanese Emperor was "... on his side ..." and that the Emperor would accept the major points of U.S. policy. In October, those points were, "... the evacuation of China, the equality of opportunity for commerce to all nations with China and the cessation by Japan of any movements of aggression." Hull said that "... if the Emperor could get it through, why we will be in a wonderful position." Stimson advised Hull that he "... was trying to ... back him up" by accelerating the Far East build-up. The Secretary of War "... told Hull that all of my policy might be summed up in the homely old words of Theodore Roosevelt, 'Speak softly but carry a big stick.' What I wanted now ... was a very short time to get that big stick into readiness." Naturally, Stimson did not want the magnitude of the proposed build-up in the Philippines to become widely known. The Secretary of War, therefore, cautioned the Secretary of State "... that the policy of the Army under me was to let actions speak for themselves rather than to hail them in advance." On October 31, in a memorandum to Marshall, Stimson proposed that the announcement regarding the rearmament of the Philippines simply state: "As a routine initial strengthening of our Island outposts we are replacing obsolescent aircraft in the Philippines with modern combat planes."20

Near the end of October, Stimson explained to Captain Harold Balfour (The British Under Secretary of State for Air) the overall plan for reinforcing the Philippines as well as Newfoundland and
Iceland. Stimson read Balfour the letter that he had sent to the President. Although Balfour thought that Stimson's "... argument was very powerful ...", he asked the Secretary about his position on the "... bombing of Germany and the necessity of it when it came." Stimson, although engrossed in the B-17 deployment in the Philippine Islands, did not lose sight of the basic American war plan. The Secretary of War told Balfour on October 29 that he "... was all for ..." the bombing of Germany when the proper time developed. 

The situation in the Far East was changing rapidly in the late fall. A G-2 estimate on November 2, 1941 stated that

Two heavy bombardment groups will be in the Philippines by February 1942, equipped with: 130 B-17 Airplanes, 35 B-24 Airplanes. ... A shortage of over 65% of bombs required by the Army Air Forces in the Philippines now exists. ... A shortage of approximately 30,000,000 rounds in 50 Cal. ammunition exists for both ground units and air units set up for the Philippines. This condition will persist for several months.

The intelligence estimate noted that Japan was "... militarily overextended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure ..." was rapidly deteriorating. Although Japan might be "... reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action." 

That evaluation, although superficially favorable to the U.S., failed to emphasize the fact that Japan's power was regionally strong. Although overextended, the logistical problem of reducing
such overextensions were not great. The Japanese air force had an estimated 5353 planes, which included 1069 heavy bombers (with an operating radius of about 700 miles). The Japanese had on Taiwan some 1400 pursuit planes, 20 airfields with four suitable for heavy bomber operations. Japan had suitable heavy bomber airfields at Amoy, Swatow, Canton (10 fields in this area), and French Indo-China. Several combat airfields were also controlled by the Japanese in those areas. "The Mission with which the United States is confronted is to prevent further encroachment of Japanese forces in Asia with particular respect to possible support of China in resisting an attack against Kunming." To accomplish that mission the United States had about 250 airplanes available in the Philippines.

Roosevelt and his advisers were placing their hope in dragging out negotiations with Japan until February or March, 1942. On November 5, the Joint Board "... recapitulated in a memorandum to the President ... a basic statement of the military position, on which alone the nation's foreign policy could be safely grounded." Marshall and Stark agreed that, "The primary objective ... is the defeat of Germany. ... An unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy." General Marshall and Admiral Stark also stated that

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up the defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan
should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand (Siam) to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

Thus, early in November, Roosevelt's military advisers had drawn the line.

President Roosevelt explained on November 9 to Balfour, British Under Secretary of State for Air, that my "... present Japanese policy is one of stalling and holding off." Balfour sought an increase in Britain's share of U.S. heavy bombers, but Roosevelt said that such a decision could not be reached unless the Japanese problem was settled. Balfour wrote,

If during the next few weeks this policy looks likely to succeed for some months ahead, or alternatively, if the President can sign up for peace with Japan so as to ensure no sudden hostilities, then he will feel able at once to direct a further diversion of heavy bombers to U.K. On the other hand, the Japanese situation may blow up in the very near future, in which case U.S.A. and U.K. Joint Staffs will have to get together and decide in the light of combined war strategy where such equipment as becomes available can be used.

Washington closely coordinated its policies with London concerning the Far Eastern build-up. F.D.R. and his chief advisers believed that by February or March of 1942 the increase in the Army Air Forces in the Philippines "... might well be a deciding factor
in deterring Japan in operations in the area south and west of the
Philippines."³⁰

During the first two weeks in November the Japanese Govern-
ment developed two plans (A and B) as the basis of negotiations with
the U.S. "The first, designed to bridge the gap between Tokyo's
original proposal of May 12 and the American counter proposal of
June 12, 1941..." That plan, designated Plan A, dealt with the
three major obstacles between Japan and the United States. Those
were "... nondiscrimination in trade, Japan's association with
Germany and Italy, and the evacuation of Japanese troops from
China." The second plan (B) was "... to be presented only if a
comprehensive agreement on Plan A could not be achieved, was in the
nature of a modus vivendi: the Japanese were to promise to desist
from further expansion in return for relaxation of American econo-
mic pressure." The Japanese military leaders, guided solely by
strategic considerations, had little faith in the American "... desir
to reach an agreement." Neither of the proposals (A or B)
"... appealed to General Sugiyama, Chief of Staff of the Army."
Admiral Shimada, Minister of Marine (Navy Minister), accurately in-
dicated "... that if war came before the beginning of the north-
east monsoon off Formosa and Malaya in December, the prospects for
immediate success would be good." The strong military arguments
notwithstanding, Japanese Foreign Minister Togo was able to obtain
the approval of the military leaders in the continuation of the
negotiations with the U.S. However, "In anticipation of failure,
plans and preparations were to be rushed forward so that military
action, when finally decided upon, could be taken promptly.\textsuperscript{31}

The diplomatic positions of the United States and Japan narrowed decisively during the fall of 1941. Negotiations were being dragged on by both nations, Japan in order to prepare for a surprise attack and the U.S. to continue a substantial build-up in the Philippines. Neither nation wanted to end negotiations in November; Japan did not care after the first week of December. The United States Government had hoped to prolong diplomacy with Japan until February or March, 1942.
CHAPTER VII

"The Results of the Build-Up"

While negotiations continued with Japan, Chief of Staff Marshall met Saturday Morning, November 15, ". . . with representatives of the chief wire services of The New York Times, New York Herald Times, Time and Newsweek . . . ." General Marshall's primary concern " . . . was that nothing be leaked to the Japanese of his plans for the Philippines. With planes being shifted from various parts of the country to west coast ports, it was only a matter of time until an enterprising reporter would break the story." The Chief of Staff believed " . . . that the best way to keep a secret out of the newspapers was to reveal it to responsible newsmen and then explain why it could not be printed."

Thus seven newsmen received a detailed account of the U.S. build-up in the Philippines. That recapitulation even included the map of the Pacific with the various airfields, bases, and ranges of U.S. aircraft. (See Page 47.) Marshall also told them that the United States and Japan " . . . were on the brink of war." After revealing the extensive build-up, General Marshall said

If the United States was allowed time to complete the build-up . . . . the President would then suddenly reveal to the moderate leaders of Japan the extent of the vast air force that menaced them. Perhaps, if they were allowed to save face, they would desist from their aggression.

Marshall stated that the program required some luck and time, but was possible. At one point, "General Marshall felt that the main
involvement in the Far East would be Naval, . . . " yet during No-
vember, 1941 the Chief of Staff felt the B-17's could be the major
U.S. involvement in the Far East.¹

Two days after Marshall's discussion with the seven newsmen,
Roosevelt initiated a trial balloon among his advisers. The Presi-
dent's idea was to offer Japan a truce, but that idea died on No-
vember 26, after several alterations by the Secretary of State.²

In the meantime, four days after his discussion with those
reporters, General Marshall, convinced that the Army Air Forces' heavy bombers would balance the military power scales in the western Pacific, ordered that data be gathered for an air offensive against Japan. He also wanted to know what information General Brereton took with him to the Philippine Islands and was informed that Breren
ton took "... separate Air Staff studies on the steel and petro-
leum industries and on the electric power establishment in Japan."
However, Marshall was reminded that General Brereton's "... dis-
cussions were based upon the employment of the Philippine Air Force on the strategic defensive, . . ." and the reason for that was simple: "With the very small offensive force projected for the Philippine Air Force (never over two heavy bombardment groups), a sustained air offensive against the Japanese Empire was never dis-
cussed."³ The only offensive operations conceived were limited to those against Japan's naval lines of communication.

On November 24, 1941, General Gerow informed the Chief of Staff that even by January 1, 1942, the Philippines would only have 83 heavy bombers. The status of the United States Army Air Force
in the Philippine Islands according to the above memorandum was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODERN COMBAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L       H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Purs. Bombers Bombers Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On hand or en route 131 145 52 35 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By January 1, 1942 - 37 48 83 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 131 182 52 83 448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The maximum projected strength of the U.S. Army Air Force Far East was:

Bomber Command - 2 groups (Hv)
Interceptor Command - 2 groups (I)
- Air Warning Service
Light Bombardment - 1 group (L)
Reconnaissance - 2 squadrons (Hv)
Observation - 1 squadron

Air Service Command

On this limited air force, Commander General MacArthur USAFFE based his defense of the Philippine Islands. Thus MacArthur wrote that "The main operating area will be in central Luzon, with the advanced eschelon [sic] of the Bomber Command and all other headquarters concentrated there, . . ." but he also requested information regarding air objectives in Japan. He in turn was sent ". . . a series of maps showing the location of approximately 600 industrial objectives, in Japan proper." The Commanding General was further informed that he would receive more as soon as possible.

By December 4, the facts accumulated by the U.S. Army indicated that Japan's steel industry had first priority. Incendiary
attack also offered promise because "One Japanese city with a population of 7,000,000 has fire fighting equipment [of] approximately the same quantity as the city of Syracuse (population 200,000)." The report noted that incendiary attacks unless decisive would "... serve more to warn and train the population than toward any military end."

The memorandum went on:

Whereas the augmentation of the Army Air Forces in the Philippines has properly changed our conception of operations from a static defense of the islands to offensive air action in furtherance of the strategic defensive, I believe we are going much too far on the offensive side. ... If we endeavor to use this relatively very small force in a major air offensive, we may be repeating the strategic blunders made when tanks and submarines were originally used in forces much too small to accomplish decisive results ... .

Thus, General Marshall's dream of expanding the defense of the Philippine Islands to an air offensive was challenged.

Nevertheless, the attention of the War Department during the first week of December still focused on the Pacific. Indicative of that concern was an unidentified memo included in the special Philippine file. The unmarked memo was attached to a memorandum for the Secretary, General Staff. Dated December 1, 1941, it read:

In view of the vital interests of the United States and of the British Commonwealth and Netherlands East Indies these three powers will undertake hostilities against Japan in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies,
Portuguese Timor, New Caldonia, the Loyalty Islands, or moves any Japanese expeditionary forces into the China Sea south of latitude ten degrees north.

The United States Government apparently had decided to attempt to stop certain Japanese attacks, even if they avoided all U.S. territory. Raymond Esthus wrote in 1963 that the Roosevelt Administration definitely provided the British Government with such assurances of armed intervention in the Far East. Esthus concluded that Roosevelt would have gone through Congress for a declaration of war, and not committed U.S. forces without Congressional approval. ¹⁰

In a conference on December 6 among Generals Marshall, Gerow, and General Sherman Miles of G-2, Stimson discussed the supplies headed to the Philippine Islands and heavy bombers which the U.S. was desperately trying to fly to the Islands. Secretary Stimson noted in his diary, the "... atmosphere indicated that something was going to happen." ¹¹

Much had been accomplished in the Far Eastern build-up, but much more had been anticipated. The final memorandum prior to the war prepared for Secretary of War Stimson regarding the Philippine build-up, indicated that even by December 6, only 35 heavy bombers were in the Philippines but that an additional 48 were to leave for the islands by December 10. ¹²

By this time, the Japanese had also developed plans against the Philippine Islands. Magic intercepts had indicated in late October that the Japanese were concerned with the U.S. reinforcement of the Philippines. In an article published in 1955 General
Shimada, who served in the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II, wrote concerning the late fall of 1941: "In the Philippines, we estimated that our only serious opposition would come from the United States Armed Forces stationed there, and that they, in all probability would not be augmented after the outbreak of war." The Japanese assigned the major air phase of the Philippine Islands invasion to their navy. "This was mainly because of the much shorter combat range of Army planes, which had been designed primarily for a continental war against Russia . . . ." Thus, every Zero fighter plane that the Japanese Navy had, except those participating in the attack on Pearl Harbor, was allocated to the invasion force assigned to the Philippines. Although the Zero was designed as a carrier fighter, it had extremely long range and by late October 1941 the Zero had been raised from a combat radius of 420 miles to 500 miles and this had been done without modification to the plane's engine or equipment. However, Formosa was 550 miles away from the Manila area, and thus the Zero operational radius was 50 miles short. It was believed this extra 50 miles could be attained through pilot proficiency and discipline; thus, the Zeros could operate from Formosa.

The Japanese Air Staff decided that the opening offensive in the Philippines would be directed at the enemy air force. Shimada observed that there were several reasons for that decision. The first of these was the strength of the United States air arm in the Philippines which "... was a much greater menace to our amphibious convoys than his relatively weak surface strength . . . . It was
further decided that in these attacks, the top-priority target at enemy bases would be heavy bombers . . . ."

The Japanese estimated the strength of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands to be:

Ground: Approximately 20,000 regular U.S. Army troops.
Naval: Heavy cruiser Houston, seaplane tender Langly, two flight cruisers, 15 destroyers, 15 submarines
Air: 110 fighters, 40 bombers, 20 scout planes, 10 light seaplanes, and 35 flying boats, for a total of 215 planes.

The composition of Japanese forces employed against the Philippines was:

Ground: Fourteenth Army, comprising two-and-a-half infantry divisions supporting and service troops.
Naval: (a) For direct participation in amphibious operations: Five heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, 29 destroyers, two seaplane tenders, and a large number of small craft of various types, with light carrier Ryujo to be incorporated as circumstances might require.
(b) To operate in nearby waters as a covering force: Two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers under direct command of the theater naval commander.
Air: (a) Army: 5th Air Group comprising 72 fighters, 27 twin-engined bombers, 54 light bombers, 27 reconnaissance planes, and 12 liaison planes; a total of 192 planes.
(b) Navy: Eleventh Air Fleet main strength, comprising the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas with 108 Zero fighters, 13 old-type fighters, 81 new-type bombers, 36 old-type bombers, 15 reconnaissance planes, 24 flying
boats, and 27 transport
planes; for a total of 304
planes.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, in December 1941, the Japanese held air superiority
in the Far East, principally due to two reasons. First, the radius of the
Japanese Zeros had been increased to some 550 miles. Second, the
United States air build-up in the Philippines was three months away
from completion.

The Japanese estimates of U.S. strength were very accurate. General
Marshall, in \textit{The War Reports}, stated that,

\begin{quote}
The left wing of the southward advance of the Japanese was
concentrated on the reduction of the Philippines. Our strength in
the islands at that time consisted of 19,000 United States Army
troops, 12,000 Philippine scouts, and approximately 100,000 men
of the newly mobilized but partially trained and equipped
Philippine Army. Included in these forces were some 8,000 Army
Air Force personnel equipped with some 250 aircraft, of which
35 were Flying Fortresses and 107 were P-40 fighters.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Some nine hours following the initial bombing of Oahu, the
Japanese initiated a major attack on Clark Field.\textsuperscript{15} When
General Brereton was informed of the Japanese attack upon Pearl
Harbor he, "... requested permission to carry out action immediately
after daylight. General Southerland agreed with my [Brereton's] plans
and said to go ahead with preparations; in the meantime he would
obtain General MacArthur's authority for the daylight attacks." Brereton
left MacArthur's Headquarters to prepare the B-17's for offensive
action and to wait for orders to take action. These orders, for reasons
still unknown, were never issued.
At about 8 A.M. Maj. David Gibbs, operations officer of the 19th Bombardment Group, ordered all B-17's into the air when he received information that Japanese planes were approaching. With only one of these airborne B-17's loaded with bombs, General Brereton finally received permission to execute offensive bombing missions. The Flying Fortresses were radioed back to Clark Field to be refueled and loaded with bombs. As that task was being completed, an estimated 54 Japanese bombers, flying in two waves, attacked Clark Field from high altitude. The attack came without warning.

Initial reports estimated loses at 17 B-17's destroyed or damaged and 16 out of 21 P-40's of the 20th Pursuit Squadron destroyed. The first incomplete casualty report gave 186 killed, 214 missing, and 42 wounded at all fields.

On December 11, telephone communications between the Philippine Islands and the United States were restored, and General Brereton received a long-distance call from General Arnold in Washington. Brereton, in his memoirs, recorded Arnold's opening remarks, "How in the hell could an experienced airman like you get caught with your planes on the ground? That's what we sent you there for, to avoid just what happened. I tried to explain what had happened, but halfway through the conversation the Japs came over strafing the field. What in the hell is going on there?" General Arnold shouted. "We are having visitors," I replied."

General Brereton requested that General Arnold delay making
his judgement until he received a complete report. Brereton reported the incident to General MacArthur who ordered Brereton "... to go back and fight the war and not to worry." Despite their initial setbacks, the Army Air Force Far East fought on. Brereton wrote that the accomplishments of his men were incredible. Arnold must have agreed with General Brereton, in spite of their December 11 conversation. Two days after Brereton and Arnold talked a radiogram from Arnold was received in the Philippines. "For Brereton. The eyes of the entire world friend and enemy are focused in admiration upon the officers and men of the American Air Forces in the Philippines. The fighting spirit being displayed by you has brought America to its feet as one man. Your heroic success against such extreme odds and discouragement has set the pace that will carry this nation forward to victory. We continue to depend upon you. Keep your heads high and your chins up. Your country will not fail you."

However, with the destruction of so many B-17's any plans for offense against Japan ended. The three major advocates of the B-17 build-up in the Philippine Islands, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Chief of Staff George Marshall and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Henry Arnold all had felt the need for military power behind our diplomatic posture in the Far East. In turn President Roosevelt, after some vacillating, backed this reinforcement of the Far East.

The basic question, which must be answered, is could the build-up if completed, have been efficacious in stopping Japanese
expansion without war? Since so few heavy bombers were actually placed in the Philippines, no one will ever know if the War Department's daring gamble would have been successful. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor eliminated the belief that, once these bombers were placed in the Far East, the U.S. would have the upper hand with Japan. If the Japanese willingly attacked one of the world's strongest navies, she would not have been deterred by the strength of the U.S. Army Air Force. Indeed, General Brereton believed that Japan would not have sat idle while the U.S. established a powerful air force in the Philippines. Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 ended any need for speculation. Dr. Pogue, Marshall's biographer, assessed the situation accurately, "In whatever hopes he [General Marshall] held for the Far East Air Forces in November, 1941, he was deceived. The new B-17, much improved as it was, still could not perform the major miracles that he expected of it."
Chapter One

Footnotes


2Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 416-417. See also Memo, AC of S WPD for C of S, 2 Mar 40 sub: Practicality of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines, WPD 4191-3, RG 165.

3Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 48. Roosevelt had seriously contemplated a naval quarantine of Japan as early as the fall of 1937. See also John McVicker Haight Jr., "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan", Pacific Historical Review, (Spring 1971), pp. 203-226.


5Ibid., p. 43.


7Memo for General Gerow, sub: White House Conference of Thursday, January 16, 1941, from C of S George Marshall and memo for C of S sub: Measures to be taken in the Event of sudden and simultaneous action by Germany and Japan Against the United States, January 21, 1941, from Acting Assistant C of S Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, WPD 4175-18, RG 165.


9Memo from Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board, sub: Defensive Measures for the Philippine Islands, January 21, 1941, J.B. No. 305 (serial 672), RG 218.

10Ltr. from C of S Marshall to Grunert, February 8, 1941, WPD 4477, RG 165.


-80-
13Ibid., pp. 66-67.
16Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 707.
17F.C. Jones, Japan's New Order In East Asia, p. 126.
18Ibid., pp. 126-127.
19Ibid., p. 221.
20Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 711.
21Ibid., p. 717.
22Ibid., pp. 726-727.
23Ibid., p. 742.
24Ibid., p. 743.
27Memo for the C of S, Recommendations of the C of AC, as of March 5, 1941, Arnold Papers, Subject File 1918-1949, Box 223 (folder Aircraft Production '39-'41), [Located at the Library of Congress].
28Memo of record, March 10, 1941, Ibid.
29Stimson Diaries, August 14, 1941, vol. 35, p. 31, [Located at Yale University Library].
30Ltr. Roosevelt to Stimson, May 4, 1941, Arnold Papers, Subject File 1918-1949, Box 223 (folder Aircraft Production, 1941-1945).
31Ltr. Stimson to President, subject: the Big Bomber Program, May 6, 1941, Records of the Secretary of War, RG 107.
32Chronological Report of Trans-Pacific Flight, September 19, 1941, Box 1, MacArthur Memorial Archives (hereafter cited M.M.A.), RG 2.
Chapter Two

Footnotes


2 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 644.

3 Ltr. Stimson to the President, July 25, 1941, OCS 18136-34 and WPD 3251-52, RG 165.

4 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 708.

5 Rad: Adams to MacArthur, July 28, 1941, Box 1, RG 2, M.M.A. Memo to TAG, subject: Mission, United States Army Forces Far East from L.T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, July 28, 1941, WPD 4559, RG 165.

6 Gerow's Diary, July 31, 1941, Pre War and Pearl Harbor Period, May 28-Sept. 8, 1941, Operation Plans Division, History Unit Executive 10, RG 2. [This Diary is located at the Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.]

7 Rad: TAG to General MacArthur, July 31, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

8 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 655.


10 Stimson Diaries, August 4, 1941, v. 35, p. 6.

11 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 709.


13 Arnold Papers, Miscellany, Box 242 (folder miscellaneous statistics '41-'45).

14 54 Group 1st Aviation Strength, WPD 1920-1942, file no. 3807-98, RG 165.

15 Arnold Papers, Miscellany, Box 1929-1955 (folder miscellaneous statistics '41-'45). No B-17's were scheduled to be produced in August 1941 for the Army Air Force. In September 5, October 11,
November 29, December 84, January 1942, 71 and February 86 were allocated to the AAF. Production of heavy bombers for U.S. purposes was not to reach 100 per month until March 1942, 200 per month in July 1942 and 300 per month in December 1942.

16 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 141.
17 Ibid., p. 141.
18 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 670-671.
19 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 143.
21 Ibid., p. 348.
23 Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 255-256.
24 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 697.
26 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
27 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
28 Ibid., p. 4.
31 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 186.
32 Matloff and Snell, Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, p. 69.
Chapter Three

Footnotes

1 Memo for AWPD, subject: Additional Air Routes—Hawaii to Philippines, from Brig. General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, Aug. 14, 1941, WPD 4571, RG 165.

2 Ibid.

3 Memo from Col. H.H. George, Air Corps Executive United States Army Forces Far East, to CG USAFFE General MacArthur, Aug. 14, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

4 Memo for the C/S subject: Reinforcement of the Philippines, from AAC/S L.T. Gerow, August 14, 1941, WPD 3251-55, RG 165.

5 Ibid.

6 Chief of Staff, Brig. General Carl Spaatz to Col. Crawford, subject: Air Facilities in the Philippines, August 15, 1941, WPD 3633-17, RG 165.

7 Gen. MacArthur to TAG, August 19, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.


10 Casey, Airfield and Base Development, p. 488.


12 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 186.

13 Ultra-secret radio from WD August 30, 1941 to CG Philippine Department, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

14 Marshall to CG USAFFE, September 9, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

15 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 32.

17 Marshall to CG USAFFE, September 9, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

18 Memorandum for the President from C/S Marshall, Sept. 9, 1941, OCS 18136-48, RG 165.

19 Rad: MacArthur to TAG H.B. Quinn Assistant A.G., Sept. 28, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

20 Sept. 29, 1941, Arnold Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1939-1947, Box 3 (folder Aug.-Dec. '41), Arnold Papers.


22 Ibid., p. 7.

23 Ibid., p. 7.

24 Stimson Diaries, 9/30/41, v. 35, p. 98.


27 Ibid.


30 Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 5.

31 Ibid., p. 6.

32 Ibid., p. 8.


34 Memo from Col. H.H. George Air Corps Executive United States Army Forces Far East to CG USAFFE General MacArthur, Aug. 14, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.
Chapter Four

Footnotes

1 Stimson Diaries, September 10, 1941, v. 35, p. 57.
2 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
3 Ibid., September 12, 1941, p. 61.
4 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
6 Stimson Diaries, September 13, 1941, v. 35, p. 64.
7 Memo for General Gerow, subj: Information for British Joint Staff Mission re Philippine Islands, September 16, 1941, WPD 4340-19, RG 165.
8 Minutes 1901, Meeting September 19, 1941, p. 3, J.B. 301, RG 165.
9 Memo from Lovett subj: Need for heavy bombers, September 22, 1941, p. 4, Arnold Papers, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1939-1947, Box 3 (folder August-December 1941).
11 Memo for SW from Arnold, September 24, 1941, Ibid.
12 Stimson Diaries, September 23, 1941, v. 35, pp. 80-84.
13 Sec. Stimson to Gen. MacArthur, radiogram, September 23, 1941, Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.
15 Ibid., September 30, 1941, p. 98.
16 Ltr. Harry Hopkins to President Roosevelt, October 14, 1941, Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ltr. Pres. Roosevelt to Secretary of War Stimson, October 14, 1941, SW subj. File, Box 11, White House Correspondence June '40-
December '41, RG 107.


20 Memo CAC Arnold to SW, October 16, 1941, SW subj. Files '40-'45, (file Big Bomber Program), RG 218.

21 Ltr. SW to President, October 16, 1941, SW subj. Files '40-'45, (file Big Bomber Program), RG 218.

Chapter Five

Footnotes

1Stimson Diaries, Sept. 16, 1941, v. 35, p. 69.


4Ibid., Oct. 8, 1941, p. 120.

5Memo for SW from Deputy C/S for Air H.H. Arnold, SW subj. Files '40-'45, Oct. 8, 1941, RG 107.

6Ibid.

7Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 445.


9Memo Gen. Gerow, Actg. AC of S, for SW subject: Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands, Oct. 8, 1941, WPD 3251-60, RG 107.

10"The Mission—To bomb Tokyo effectively using B-17 type airplanes", Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.

11Ibid.

12Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 193.

13"The Mission—To bomb Tokyo effectively using B-17 type airplanes", Box 1, M.M.A., RG 2.


15An Army WPD combat estimate, Japan, Oct. 2, 1941, WPD 3251-60, RG 165.

16Brereton, Brereton Diaries, pp. 7-8.


18Congressional Investigation, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 20, p. 4420.
Memo for Harry Hopkins from F.D.R., Oct. 25, 1941, Hopkins Papers Box 131. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library).

PHA, pt. 20, p. 4420.

Brereton, Brereton Diaries, p. 8.

Ibid., pp. 10-11.
Chapter Six

Footnotes

1 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p. 722.


6 Feis, *Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 271.


18 Intercepted Japanese Messages from Manila, October 20- November 1, 1941. Recently released unpublished messages in the records of the Office of the Secretary of War. The Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division was unable to verify if these messages were actually seen by Secretary Stimson.


20 Memo for C/S from SW, subj: Proposed announcement As to the


22Ibid.

23Memo for the Assistant C/S WPD from Brig. General Sherman Miles AAC/S, G-2, Nov. 2, 1941, WPD 4389-29, RG 165.

24Memo for War Plans Division: Subject: Air Corps Units in and for the Philippines, Annex III, Nov. 2, 1941, WPD 4389-29, RG 165.

25Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 849.


27Ibid.


29Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 420.


31Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 852.
Footnotes


2. Burns, Soldier of Freedom, p. 156.

3. Memo for The Secretary, General Staff: (For inclusion in special Philippine file), subject: Air Offensive Against Japan, November 21, 1941, WDSCS/381, RG 218.


5. Ltr. CGUSAFFE to Marshall, Nov. 29, 1941, WPD 3489-21, Box 159, RG 165.

6. Ibid.

7. Memo for The Secretary, General Staff: (For inclusion in special Philippine file), subject: Air Offensive Against Japan, November 24, 1941, WPD 3633-20, RG 165.


9. Memo for The Secretary, General Staff: (For inclusion in special Philippine file), subject: Air Offensive Against Japan, December 4, 1941, WDSCS/381, RG 218.

10. Raymond Estthus, "President Roosevelt's Commitment to Britain to Intervene in a Pacific War", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, (June, 1963), pp. 28-38.


15. Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, p. 203.

17 Ibid., p. 41.

18 Ibid., p. 42.

19 Ibid., p. 50.

20 Ibid., p. 53.

21 Ibid., p. 52.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPTS

Arnold Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)
General Arnold was one of the foremost advocates of strengthening United States air power. He was one of the leaders in the Philippine rearmament and an important supporter of the Flying Fortress.

MacArthur Memorial Archives (MacArthur Memorial, Record Groups 1 and 2)
General MacArthur was Commanding General USAFFE and his command was the focal point of the U.S. build-up in the Far East. Although, most of MacArthur's Philippine material was either lost or destroyed in the Japanese invasion of the Islands, the documents that survived illuminate the air reinforcement problems and hopes. The most interesting papers are located in Record Group 2.

Stimson Diaries (Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library)
Secretary of War Stimson successfully blocked two Presidential efforts to divert B-17's from the Philippine build-up. His extensive diaries provide useful information in regards to the reinforcement of the Far East; volume 35 provided almost all pertinent information about the Secretary's role in the Philippine Islands rearmament.

War Department Files (National Archives, Record Groups 107, 165 and 218)
These files provide documents showing the support that Stimson, Marshall and Arnold gave toward the deployment of B-17's in the Philippines. They also contain information concerning Roosevelt, Stimson, and Lovett and the Big Bomber Program.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS


OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT HISTORIES

United States Army in World War II, War Department Series:

Matloff, Maurice and Edwin M. Snell. Strategic Planning For
Coaltion Warfare, 1941-1942. (Washington, 1953).


Army Air Forces in World War II Series:
Craven, Frank W. and James L. Cate eds. vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1935 to August 1942. (Chicago, 1948).


Airfield and Base Development:

BOOKS

Edmonds, Walter D. They Fought With What They Had. (Boston, 1951).
Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan. (Princeton, 1950).
Grew, Joseph. Ten Years In Japan. (New York, 1944).


**ARTICLES**


Esthus, Raymond. "President Roosevelt's Commitment to Britain to Intervene in a Pacific War." *Mississippi Valley Historical Review.* (June, 1963), pp. 28-38.


UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Appendix I

Chronological Report of Trans-Pacific Flight, September 19, 1941.*

Friday, September 5.

Departed Hickam Field 5:55, Honolulu time. Weather good, except for two hours of instrument flying thru a trough of rain and heavy clouds. Cruised at 8,000 en route.

Landed Midway .......... 13:05
Total Time ............... 7 Hours 10 Minutes
Distance ................... 1,132 Nautical Miles
Estimated T. O. Weight .... 51,400 Pounds

Pan-American radio bearings from Midway very satisfactory.

Contacted Midway control tower voice on landing instructions.

Landed on the 4,500 foot runway, which was adequate even with no wind.

Estimated landing weight 45,500 pounds. Refueled from two pits and drums.

The engine driven gas pumps which we brought along proved to be lifesavers.

On any future hop, be sure to include them as items of equipment.

Had no help in manning the hand pumps as the local marine detachment was out on maneuvers. Could have gased entirely at the pits but wanted to give the men experience in handling gas from drums in order to facilitate operations at Wake where there are no pits.

Midway is a beautiful airdrom, complete even to tie down rings buried in cement.

*Located at MacArthur Memorial Archives, Box 1, RG2.
The officers ate and slept at the Construction Mess and B.O.Q., which are located on another island. The facilities were very good, and shortly will be excellent. Much construction is still in progress.

The men slept on cots under the wings of their own ships and ate at the marine mess which was none too good as most of the marines were out in the field. We furnished five men per meal to help in the kitchen.

It is difficult to figure the gas consumption accurately because we siphoned water out of drums and in addition there was some wastage due to poor connections, etc. All ships were completely serviced and staked down for the night 3 1/2 hours after we landed. The Navy strainers were very helpful, but those made by Colonel Lewis would have been adequate.

Saturday, September 6.

Arose 3:00 A.M. (Wake Time, Breakfast 3:30 A.M. Take-off 4:45 A.M. All nine ships off O.K.. My ship hit two birds in taking off. Fortunately, they hit the fuselage. Being large birds, the result might have been serious had they hit a prop. Weather excellent. Scattered cumulus clouds with bottoms at 2,000 feet and tops at 5,000. Cruised at 8,000.

Crossed International Date Line at 7:45 A.M., and in one second it became 7:45:

Sunday, September 7.

Radio bearings from Wake were quite accurate. Homing was
possible within the last forty miles. In homing on 333 kilocycles, great care must be taken to have the radio compass very finely tuned. If it is not carefully tuned, the needle will give an indication for a right or left turn which pulls you completely through a 360 degree turn without ever going to the other side.

Landed Wake .................. 11:20 A.M.
Total Time ..................... 6 Hours 40 Minutes
Distance ....................... 1,035 Nautical Miles
Time for Refueling ............... 4 Hours

The gasoline drums had been placed in the parking area so that each ship taxied to its own supply. We refueled all ships without motor driven pumps.

Mr. Teaters who is in charge of construction at Wake had everything well in hand. His planning for our service, food and shelter left nothing to be desired. The meals were excellent, beds fine, and he had ample transportation on hand for use of both men and officers. Some of us were guests at his home for a barbeque steak dinner which we finished at 8:00 P.M.. We rested for three hours and then rose at 11:00 P.M.. After some hot coffee and a short operations meeting we went out to the field and took off at midnite for Port Moresby, New Guinea.

Monday, September 8.

Mr. Teaters had lined the runway with gasoline flares which were very helpful as some of the runway edges which looked alright, were actually not. We had a fine moon and the weather looked perfect. The take-off was good. Captain Fisher had to return and land shortly after the take-off because a stud in his cuno
broke and threw oil all over the ship. He was loaded up to maximum gross weight, and did a very fine job of getting back onto the field. They fixed it on the ground, topped off his tanks, and sent him on his way, about one hour and a half behind the rest of the flight. The first two hours we flew at 8,000 feet and then climbed to 20,000 (indicated). As we approached the mandated Japanese Islands, all lights were turned out. We shortly approached some heavy clouds. We climbed to 26,000 feet (indicated) without being able to top them, so we decided to penetrate. They were the type of cloud which is usually associated with equatorial warm fronts; plenty of rain, but not much turbulence. In roughly 2 1/2 hours we emerged, and a celestial fix showed us to be about 100 miles north of Ponape. We skirted the eastern shore of the island at 22,000 feet (indicated), but could see nothing, save a group of lights near the north-east tip of the island. The dawn started breaking 50 minutes after passing Ponape, and we let down to 13,000 feet for breakfast. Complete radio silence was the rule for this leg of the trip and it was not broken until we opened up the position report sequence again when well past the Mandates. We had lost visual contact with the other ships of the formation, but the position reports when resumed, showed everyone to be in nice relative position. Lt. Teats lost both autosyns during the night, and consequently had no engine instruments. In addition, his No. 1 engine stopped after 7 1/2 hours of flight due to lack of fuel. He estimated losing 175 gallons of gas out of that tank in some unknown manner. He was certain of being fully serviced before departing Wake, so we could
think of no explanation except that it might have been caused by siphoning at take-off. At any rate, they were concerned about their gas, and were thinking of going into Rabul. A message from Moresby however, stated that Rabul was soft, and recommended not landing there except in a real emergency. Decided to stretch it into Moresby, and arrived O.K.

Landed Moresby ................ 12:55 P.M.
Total Flying Time .......... 12 Hours 40 minutes
Distance ...................... 2,176 Nautical Miles.

We could not get a check on our gas consumption at Moresby because there wasn't enough 100 Octane fuel to service us. We re-fueled with a mixture of 100 and 90 octane fuel, with a resultant mixture of approximately 97 octane.

Captain Hubbard met us with open arms. Had a detail of R.A.A.F. enlisted men and many bushy headed natives to do the re-fueling. He supervised it while we went to town to wash up and rest. The ships were left under the very capable guard of the Papauan Infantry Battalion. We stayed with the R.A.A.F. and ate at their mess. We were very sincerely welcomed and enjoyed our stay tremendously. The facilities at Moresby were primitive [sic] to say the least. No sanitation, running water [sic] and all canned food except for a little native fruit. Called on the Territory Administrator, Mr. Murray, who told us that they had been greatly anticipating our arrival because it was to be the first time that a United States Army Unit ever set foot on Australian soil, and that our arrival had, consequently, some historical significance.
Tuesday, September 9.

Rested, and took in some of the local scenery, native villages, etc., and met Commodore Lukis who was sent up to greet us from Townsville, Australia, by the Air Board in Melbourne.

Wednesday, September 10.

Took off 8:45 A.M. for Darwin. Weather excellent. Hazy. Cruised at 7,000 feet. En route, looked over Horn Island Airport which seems to be an excellent one.

Landed at Darwin ............... 3:15 P.M.
Total Flying Time ............... 6 Hours 30 Minutes
Distance ...................... 934 Nautical Miles.

Darwin is an excellent field in the dry season. Huge runways in all directions. The dust is very bad however. It is contemplated surfacing the runway in the near future so as to eliminate the dust. (The favorite excuse for another drink here is, "Let's have one to lay the dust.") Was greeted upon landing by the Administrator, Northern [sic] Territory, Mr. Abbott. He presented greetings from the Governor General, and the Prime Minister. Group Captain Charles Eaton had me stay at his home. The rest of the squadron were very comfortably fixed in quarters on the field. A gala party was given in our honor that evening, at which we were all stripped of our collar [sic] and shoulder insignia by the members of the R.A.A.F. for souvenirs. The gasing at Darwin was very well arranged by Major Muehlenburg. They used gas trucks and had plenty of 100 octane fuel available. Received a telegram of welcome from the senior member of the Air Board in Melbourne, Sir Charles
Pickett, which I answered. The Non-Commissioned Officers Mess took excellent care of our enlisted men.

Thursday, September 11.

Maintenance day. We found that in several ships some of the crew failed to turn off oxygen supply at their own stations when finished using it. This, of course, drained the entire supply while on the ground. We used oxygen for 10 hours on the flight from Wake to Moresby, starting with 350 pounds pressure and ending with approximately 150. Had this leak not occurred, we would have had sufficient oxygen for several additional hours flying.

Paid calls on the Civil Administrator and Army and Navy Commanders. Held operations meeting in the early forenoon at which Major Muehlenburg gave us what proved to be some very valuable information as to the location of Clark Field and the terrain surrounding it.

Friday, September 12.

Took off at 4:25 for Manila. Cruised at 9,000 feet. Laid course so as to stay west of the Philippines, in order to be able to let down over the water if necessary, and be clear of all mountains. Visibility taking off at night was poor due to dust stirred up by taxing. Weather excellent. Crossed Dutch East Indies at Ambon. Near the northern portion of Zamboanga, the sky became overcast. Cloudiness increased as we continued northward. Contacted Clark Field by liaison set and requested weather report. Received ceiling 1,200 feet, light rain, visibility one mile, and passing
rain. A still later report gave us ceiling 4,000 feet, visibility 7 miles. It looked as though they were having intermittent squalls. When approaching the southern tip of Panay, we received a message from Clark Field advising landing, if practicable, at Del Monte because of unsettled weather conditions at Manila. I knew nothing of Del Monte and before leaving Hickam Field had been advised by radio from the Philippines that "Clark Field was the only, repeat, only field suitable for landing B-17 in the Philippine Islands." This, plus the fact that the weather did not look too bad at Manila made me decide it was not practicable to go to Del Monte, and to continue on to Clark. The only suitable alternate airdromes for this leg were back in the Dutch East Indies at Amborn and Boeroe, a distance of some 900 miles.

We began to hit squally conditions between Panay and Mindoro. Changed altitude to sea level, where we flew through some heavy squalls off the Mindoro Coast. We were able to maintain contact with the coastline however; most of the time by flying from 100 to 400 feet. The ships were spread out in storm echelon, and the hourly position reports showed them to be in good relative position.

The weather became increasingly worse as we approached Manila, but we had a nice break in finding a dome of good visibility inside Manila Bay near Corregidor. We circled in that area, departing at 3 minute intervals for Clark Field, 60 miles to the north where the sky was very black. Difficulty was experienced in locating the field because of the heavy rain and the low ceiling. The runway
was very hard to pick up because there was no clear line of demarcation between sod and surface. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the actual landing itself. Pilots were completely blind to the front because of the heavy rain on the windshield. The Engineer standing behind the pilot could see out of the dome and was of great assistance in guiding the pilot into the landing. A manual windshield wiper would have been a most valuable asset in this condition. All pilots made three or four passes before getting down, but finally made it allright [sic] with the exception of one mishap. The rudder of one B-17 was damaged in hitting the wing tip of a parked B-18 which the pilot could not see. It is considered feasible [sic] to repair this damage locally however.

Upon landing we found we had been traveling through the periphery of a typhoon which continued to deluge Clark Field for the next three days.

Landed Clark Field ...... 4:00 P.M.
Total Flying Time ...... 11 Hours 40 Minutes.
Distance .................. 2,000 Nautical Miles.
(Straight Distance....1,800 miles.[])
COMMENTS

1. In some ways the secrecy with which this flight was conducted was a definite handicap. This was particularly true in the receiving of weather information. No one knew when to expect us or from what direction. For instance, no information on weather in the Philippine Islands was available to us at Darwin. In the future when a flight is dispatched from Honolulu, I recommend, that effective that moment, complete weather information from the Philippine Islands be sent daily to Darwin until the flight arrives in Manila, then, regardless of time of arrival at Darwin, the flight will have a complete recent picture of the weather to the north. If there is a typhoon in the vicinity of Manila this fact should be known and the flight should remain on the ground at Darwin until it has definitely cleared.

2. Very careful study must be given to the meager weather information available on the route Wake-Moresby. We were very fortunate in getting a good night. The front thru which we passed was just building up. We found that it stirred up into severe storm the very next day. The violence of equatorial storms must not be underestimated. The clouds will build up to 40,000 feet. If there is any doubt as [sic] all about the weather en route, I recommend that the ships be tied down at Wake to await definitely good weather. This leg should be planned for a moonlight night.

3. The folders compiled by Colonel Raley have been mailed for return to Hickam. It made an excellent reference text but
should be thinned out so as to contain only essential information. We kept adding things to it before leaving Hickam until it was too bulky to use handily. I think it should contain only pictures, descriptions and locations of airdromes which might be used. In addition to the detailed information on each suitable field, a master chart of the entire route, in small scale, might be prepared showing the approximate location of each airdrome with reference to its nearest outstanding landmark.

We had no information on the Philippine Islands whatever, except that Clark Field was its only suitable airdrome. I found since arrival, however, that a very complete booklet has been prepared by the Air Force here and sent out by Clipper mail in plenty of time to reach us before our departure from Hickam. It was placed, unfortunately, on the Clipper which cracked up on the reefs of Guam and consequently never reached us. It has undoubtedly, arrived now and will be available to the next flight.

4. A study should be made into the cause for the siphoning of gasoline through the overflow drain. This is a serious situation and should be corrected. Care must be taken in flight not to fill the tanks to overflowing when transferring from one to another. The schedule set up in our operations order proved very satisfactory for the cruising conditions for which it was set up. It must, of course, be revised for any other cruising condition. We topped off our gas tanks at Wake after the engine warm up. This may have been responsible for Lt. Teats' loss of gas thru siphoning on take off.

5. We followed the power settings set up in our operations
order fairly closely [sic] but found that due to our excessive weight
we had to use a little more manifold pressure than was prescribed.
A good general rule is to set the RPM's and manifold pressure so as
to keep an indicated air speed at level flight of 150 MPH for the
first half of the gas load and at 145 MPH for the second half.

6. The following items are necessary for a trip of this kind
and should be carried in the ships.

   1. Motor driven gasoline pumps.
      (One per three ships is adequate). [sic]
   2. Gasoline strainers made of 200 mesh screen.
   3. Lengths of thinwalled rubber tubing for siphoning of water out of bottom of gas drums.

7. I wish to express my appreciation for the fine work of
Majors Huehlenburg and Moore and Captains Blake, Hubbard and Flick-
enger, all of whom I understood are soon to return to Honolulu.
Without their efforts this flight would have had a much less chance
of successful completion. They worked hard and unselfishly and de-
serve the highest commendation.

8. I wish to express my appreciation to all the officers at
Hickam who helped to ease our path. We left in rather a hurry but
we certainly had all the help that was humanly possible.

E. O'DONNELL
Major
Air Corps
Appendix II

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, October 21, 1941.*

Strictly personal and Confidential.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 14th in which you raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four-engine bombers. In order to answer as carefully as possible the questions you raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the head of the Air Forces and the head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I have also been assisted in forming my views by the conferences which I recently had with these gentlemen and their subordinates in which we have gone over these same problems of strategy for the purpose of answering your inquiry of last July as to the means necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All of these labors have had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in your present letter. I hope that you will discuss this question fully with your military advisers before you make up your own mind upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall try to give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to your letter of October 14th. I do not think that they vary in any substantial particular from those of the gentlemen with whom I have consulted.

1. Essentially, this question of the distribution of these planes is really not a static but a dynamic question. It is *Located in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 20, pp. 4442-4444.*

-110-
not to be solved by taking a map and computing how many planes shall be allocated to certain geographical positions. These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied.

These planes themselves are not individually a finished element of such power. They must be manned with crews, trained first in individual operation and then in group operation, before they become the vital elements of this pool of power. The process of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning a battleship, and you know how long that takes. The melancholy list of casualties which have recently occurred to our planes in the hands of British pilots is a reminder of the danger of trying to shorten this time and to use such planes with hastily trained crews.

Again, the panorama of the theatres of action for our defense is constantly and rapidly changing. The relative importance of the different theatres of action varies greatly at different moments. This precludes static allocations or conceptions. The number of our planes at strategic points must be susceptible of rapid reinforcement and change. The ability thus to throw great massed power upon a given place at a given time is one of the essential elements of an effective use of air power. Germany in her use of air power has shown thus far supreme skill in her ability to mass her air force at different places at different times. The fate of the war conceivably may hang upon the length of time within which
we can throw an overpowering force of these planes into a given
theatre.

The center of all of these operations is the United States. There the planes are manufactured. There their combat crews are
trained. There their group formations are organized and tactically
instructed. From that as a center it should be possible in times of
opportunity or necessity to send these trained combat units out as
reserves to such theatres of action as need them. At present you
will remember from my letter of September 22nd that the minimum num-
ber of ten groups of these planes, to which we have been reduced by
the exigencies of the demands of outside nations, does not permit
the retention of any such pool as I have described above within the
continental United States. Nor does it provide the absolute essen-
tial of enough equipment in the shape of four-engine bombers to
train the large number of combat pilots and crews which will be
needed to maintain our air forces in the various theatres of defense
of the United States. This in itself shows the fundamental error of
a static conception and the results which will follow from a merely
geographic allotment of the planes.

What is happening today in the Pacific exemplifies the
importance of the foregoing principles. A strategic opportunity of
the utmost importance has suddenly arisen in the southwestern Paci-
fic. Our whole strategic possibilities of the past twenty years
have been revolutionized by the events in the world in the past six
months. From being impotent to influence events in that area, we
suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great
effective power. Indeed we hardly yet realize our opportunities in that respect. We are rushing planes and other preparations to the Philippines from a base in the United States which has not yet in existence the number of the planes necessary for our immediate minimum requirements in that southwestern Pacific theatre. This is a result of our deferments to the British of last year. From nowhere but the United States can come the needed planes, the crews, the equipment, and the training. Yet even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore, with all the revolutionary consequences of such action. As you well know, however, the final success of the operation lies on the knees of the gods and we cannot tell what explosion may momentarily come from Japan. If we had the reserve necessary in the United States, we should not be in this present period of uncertainty.

Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportunity, another such chance is opening in the northwestern Pacific. Vladivostok is one of three gateways to Russia. The Archangel gate may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf gate is insignificant in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula and the facilities which we believe (although we have not yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, present us with the opportunity for another use of these bombers supplementary to the one I have just described in the south. That locality can possibly form the base of a northern pincer movement of American influence and power, this time not only to protect against
aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of Russia in Europe. Its operation would fit into and supplement the operation from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which would greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, after passing over Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to safety in the north in a way similar to the sweeps which Germany is now employing through the North Atlantic from Norway to France. The power of such a completed north and south operation can hardly be over-estimated. The control over the Western Pacific which it would open could hardly fail to have immense powers of warning to Japan as well as of assurance to Russia. It might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. But it will require the existence of an adequate force of these bombers -- even greater I believe than the minimum requirements stated in my letter to you of September 22nd. At present under the system of allocation we are planning but one group for Alaska. That I believe would be quite inadequate. Any my feeling is strongly reenforced by information which I have just received from General DeWitt who is responsible for the Alaska station. Today there are not more than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska.

2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because that is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we are already in actual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers which we have proposed to place in Newfoundland are not designed to
repose idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emergency. They are to form the reserve competent of a team of such four-engine bombers of which the advance unit is to be in Iceland, only seven hours away by air. This takes on an added importance with the approach of the coming winter during which time the long range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North Atlantic and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the harbors where they ordinarily land. In other words, we contemplate the possibility of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes and have planned to place them in these separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base. Our past deferments to Great Britain of the B-24 bombers have contributed to the delay in the establishment of these two bases. Six of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfoundland. None is yet at Iceland.

The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic is evidenced only too clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. As you know from our talk the other day when General Embick was present, I am much concerned that steps should be taken as promptly as possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in the northeast, namely the British Islands. That safety will not be secured by a comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unmanned, and unorganized for battle formation. The situation requires far more radical treatment than that. It requires treatment which will make safe beyond peradventure a favorable decision of the battle of the Atlantic as well as the defense against invasion of the
British Isles. I have already stated my views to you on that subject and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think the time is coming rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. Otherwise I fear lest some morning we be caught napping by a surprise German attack. All that is germane for me to say in respect to my present letter is that I believe, in the light of this situation and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in the world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a few additional planes.

Quite apart from that, there remains the question of the possible impairment of the defensive power of our own country which it is always our first duty to secure. Giving full tribute to the enormous service which has been rendered and will continue to be rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that the moment has now come when we should give our primary attention to the prompt development of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well-trained American air force. And I have, after using the most careful consideration and study, reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to divert further production from the Army air forces until such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of September 22nd are fully completed.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
My dear Marshall:

This is written in pursuance of the plan, initiated by my letter of August 30th, of writing to you from time to time to give you a general outline of developments in the Philippines.

The response of the Philippines Army has been excellent. Ten regiments of infantry, one from each of ten reserve divisions, together with cadres of officers and non-commissioned officer of the remaining elements, were mobilized on September first and commenced an intensive training program. Morale has been exceptionally high and all ranks show a real eagerness to learn. In consequence training has progressed even beyond expectations. Most of the soldiers, being from rural districts, are in excellent physical condition; they are, of course, completely acclimated, and the sick rate is very low—consistently better than that of American troops. Discipline is almost perfect.

A construction program was initiated without delay and is making excellent progress. Photographs are enclosed, showing the type of construction and the materials employed. Costs are low, fifty dollars per man for Filipinos and one hundred and seventy-five dollars per man for Americans. The buildings can be erected quickly and are entirely adequate for this climate. Sites secured

*This letter is located at the MacArthur Memorial Archives, Box 1, RG2.

-117-
--either public lands or through lease--provide adequate training facilities. Housing is provided where practicable in general areas, perhaps 20 to 30 kilometers in extent, rather than in concentrated divisional camps, with a view to the conservation of training time for subordinate units. The areas selected are shown on the enclosed map. With the completion of the first shelter, divisional Engineer Battalions were mobilized, and all ten of them are now working in their own divisional areas. Nine regiments of infantry are being moved into the camps this month, and on November second nine additional regiments will be mobilized on their cadres, which have been in training since September first. All elements of the ten divisions and in addition three regiments of Constabulary, will be mobilized and housed in their new camps by December 15th. The selection of sites, the acquisition of land, the preparation of building plans and the execution of the construction program within this short space of time represents an outstanding achievement on the part of Colonel Richard J. Marshall. He has shown clear vision, superior organizational and planning ability and outstanding qualities of forceful leadership.

From a planning standpoint, the major part of the organizational work for a theatre of operations had been completed. I enclose a chart which shows the organization as projected. The Philippine Army, in its present stage of development, has produced infantry divisions, some coast artillery and a considerable number of air corps pilots. Corps and Army elements that would provide a balanced force were scheduled for production only in the latter part
of the Commonwealth's Defense Plan and those units must now be formed, utilizing reservists who have had basic infantry training. Organizational equipment for them had not yet been provided and must be supplied in toto from the United States. In certain units, particularly anti-aircraft artillery, Philippine Army officers are not yet available, and the officer personnel will have to be American.

The first squadron of B-17s completed a very satisfactory flight from Hawaii. Detailed information has been sent back for use by future flights. Airplane crews were in fine condition with high morale and expressed pleasure regarding their new station. Upon direction by the War Department, arrangements were rapidly made here to ship gasoline and oil to staging points for use by the later flights.

Good progress is being made in the development of air fields. The location of fields thus far selected for construction or development is shown on the enclosed map. We are prepared to take care of the contemplated additional units as rapidly as these can be sent out.

Let me amplify the meagre information I have supplied on the U.S. Philippine Division, the reorganization of which you have already approved. The strength of the Philippine Scouts is fixed, as you know, at 12,000. They are assigned to the Philippine Division, the 91st and 92nd Coast Artillery, the 26th Cavalry, and various service elements and detachments. It would be impolitic to increase the number even if possible, for all recruits would be taken
from Philippine Army reservists to serve at higher rates of pay than
the Philippine Army can pay. The Philippine Division should be or-
ganized at war strength and be trained intensively for offensive com-
bat as an element of the General Reserve. After study, it was found
that the only way to meet the requirements with the numbers avail-
able was to secure an additional American regiment of infantry, with
two battalions of artillery to complete American combat teams with
the 31st Infantry and the new regiment. Certain small units were
also deemed desirable. The division can now be organized as a tri-
angular division at war strength, retaining all old line Scout units,
although the 45th Infantry will be rendered inactive except for the
garrisons of Petit Barracks and Camp John Hay. There will be suf-
ficient Scouts to bring the 91st and 92nd Coast Artillery up to an
adequate strength, retain several small units now in existence, and
provide station complements for McKinley and Stotsenburg, thus mak-
ing the division completely available for combat training and for
instant use. The division will be regrouped for station by combat
teams. This will add materially to the combat efficiency of this
command. The entire plan will be placed in effect upon the arrival
of the new regiment. I anticipate its dispatch, although I have
not yet been advised to that effect. I enclose a chart of the or-
ganization—although a complete report will be made to the Adjutant
General when the plan is effectuated.

I have recently received War Department Operations Plan,
Rainbow 5, and have written to the Adjutant General with reference
to it. It was prepared in conformity with the action of the Joint
Board, approved by the Secretary of War on June 2, and thus ante-
dated the creation of this command. It was based upon the old con-
cept of the defense of the entrance of Manila Bay. The new situ-
tion since, of course, necessitates its revision. The new plan
should contemplate the defense of the Archipelago and the Philippine
Costal [sic] Frontier should be delimited accordingly. The wide
scope of possible enemy operations, particularly with air elements,
makes imperative the broadening of the concept for there can be no
effective defense of Luzon without denying to the enemy the air
fields in the southern islands. The development of the Philippine
Army provides a force sufficient to accomplish such a mission.

Although there is a political campaign in progress that
will culminate in the Presidential election next month, the local
situation here is excellent. Quezon has made a remarkable recovery
from his illness and his leadership and national control are com-
plete; he will not have any serious opposition for reelection. Mo-
rale in the Commonwealth is high. The local press and innumerable
speeches by leaders throughout the country give evidence of poise;
there is no hysteria. This has been brought about to a large ex-
tent by the organization of this Command. Prior to that, there was
uneasiness and dread, noticeably accentuated by each minor crisis
precipitated in the Western Pacific area.

The naval component of the Philippine Army has reached a
milestone in its development, having recently placed in service the
first locally built torpedo boat, and having laid down ten new ones
that are expected to be in the water by the end of March. My
original plans in 1935 included a project for a fleet of fast motor torpedo boats. The protected waters of this archipelago provide an ideal theatre for effective operations. The U.S. Navy at that time could not be stirred to interest itself in the development, and I was forced to turn to British builders to get what I wanted. Two boats were delivered and found satisfactory; three more were built, but were diverted to Finland; five additional were finished, but the British Admiralty commandeered those. I closed out the contract, securing delivery of ten sets of engines in return for the payments already made on boats, purchased the right to build from the British design and constructed a boat here. It was successful and we are now going into, comparatively speaking, quantity production. Meanwhile the successful use of this type in the war led the Navy into belated experimental development, followed by a production schedule. At my suggestion, Admiral Hart asked the Navy Department to send some of their craft here, resulting in the allocation of twelve, of which six have arrived. They naturally provide a welcome addition to defense potentialities, and should give an impetus to the development of the Philippine Army element. The naval component has not yet been called into U.S. service, but its development is continuing as originally planned. I informed Hart that I would issue the order whenever he wanted the unit, but it will be called only in case of war. I am satisfied.

I wish to reiterate my appreciation of the splendid support you and the War Department are giving me. No field commander could ask more. Your attitude has been a marked factor in the
building of morale here.

Faithfully yours,

Signed (Douglas MacArthur)
Appendix IV

November 5, 1941.*

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches [sic] have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere.

*Located Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division of the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U.S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing 11 naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom
to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U.S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:
(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

   (1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

   (2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
(c) If war with Japan can not [sic] be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
That aid to the American Volunteer Group
be continued and accelerated to the maximum
practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Signed by C/S and CNO.
NOTE FOR RECORD:

The attached W.P.D. study, subject, "Far Eastern Situation", was prepared in War Plans Division with the help of the Defense Aid Division, the staff of the Army Air Forces G-2 and G-4 on November 2, 1941. The Chief of Staff informally approved the recommendations as the views of the War Department and used this paper as a basis of his presentation on the subject to the Secretary of State on November 4. The study should now be filed in W.P.D. with this note attached.

C. W. Bundy,
Colonel, G.S.C.
George Kelly was born on September 6, 1947 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is the son of Mr. and Mrs. George C. Kelly, Levittown, Pennsylvania. He received a B.A. in Politics in May, 1969 from Allentown College of Saint Francis de Sales. While attending Allentown College, George was President of his Junior Class, a Student Government representative and served on the Student Judicial Court. He was President of Eta Theta Gamma (a politics fraternity), a member of Alpha Chi Delta (an honors fraternity) and was selected for Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities.

The author is currently in his sixth year at Bethlehem Catholic High School, where he teaches Social Studies and coaches Football, Basketball and Volleyball. George is married to the former Joanne P. McDevitt and they have two sons, Sean Patrick and Joseph McDevitt Kelly.