Hungarian Foreign Policy: Nato or the CFSP?

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought about startling changes in the world. Formerly oppressed states in Europe received their full sovereignty at a time when scholars of international relations were at a loss to explain why the Cold War ended and what would become of a Europe without a common enemy to unite it. Over a decade has passed, and some trends are now becoming apparent. The Eastern and Central European countries, newly enriched with the full rights of self-governing states, have sought to redefine themselves and seek out a path which will best provide for their citizens. In this process many of these states, including Hungary, have ironically chosen of their own free will to give up some of their newly regained autonomy to larger international institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

Hungary was among the very first of the post-Warsaw-Pact states to seek membership in both of these organizations, becoming a full member of NATO in 1999 and of the EU in 2004. Hungary’s changes in the wake of the end of the Cold War parallel those of the EU and NATO, which both face similar crises of purpose and structure. Both organizations continue to expand in membership and redefine their intentions. This process has caused a convergence of responsibilities for NATO and the EU in regard to the area of security, which leaves many countries like Hungary with dual obligations and a hard choice to make as to which organization will best provide security to its members.

In this article I focus on Hungarian foreign policy as it relates to the choice between the EU and NATO. I use a classifying framework to analyze Hungary’s past foreign policy actions. Then I compare how the past decisions of NATO and EU (with regard to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP]) in the security arena correspond to Hungary’s foreign policy goals and preferences. I then present some possible future avenues for Hungary’s foreign policy with regard to these organizations.
Hungary's Goals Viewed in Context

In order to best elucidate Hungary’s position regarding whether the EU, through its CFSP, or NATO will best suit its security needs, I must first explain Hungary's foreign policy goals. Thankfully, Hungary’s three main foreign policy objectives are consistently confirmed and articulated by each government administration. These three goals are: 1) better ties with the West and better transatlantic relations, 2) cooperation and rapprochement with neighboring countries, 3) oversight of the situation of Hungarians in nearby states. The analysis of how Hungary has pursued and will continue to pursue these ends is made easier through the use of frameworks created by Andrew F. Cooper, Associate Director of the Centre for International Governance Innovation and a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. In this article I use Cooper’s frameworks to analyze Hungary’s past and current foreign policy actions to predict whether the EU or NATO will afford greater opportunities for security within the context of Hungary’s other foreign policy objectives.

In his book Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, Cooper offers two very general frameworks for categorizing the diplomatic behaviors of middle powers: one framework for the older “self-identified” middle powers of Canada, Australia, Norway, and Sweden; and another framework for the newer, recently emerging middle powers most commonly identified with the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Argentina and Malaysia. In attempting to describe Hungary by using one of these frameworks, the problem arises of whether to classify Hungary as an “old” middle power or a “new” middle power; for Hungary possesses traits associated with both types.

In addition, the very idea of what characterizes a middle power is debatable, including Cooper’s own approach. (Chapnick) Cooper himself has admitted that the changing structure of world politics in the wake of the end of the Cold War has meant that his “two sub-categories of countries have often rubbed up against each other.” (Cooper, p. 19) While useful in categorizations of middle powers, Cooper’s frameworks are far from definitive judgments and are better used as guidelines for understanding what types of foreign policy middle powers have historically preferred. In addition, states may easily act in ways which contradict past methods or preferences for foreign policy action. As a result, the methods used in this article will refer to both frameworks in the attempt to describe Hungary’s diplomatic behavior as fully as possible and to thereby best visualize its future dealings within NATO and the EU through the CFSP.

“Old” Middle Power Framework

Heroic Hungary and Hungarians Abroad

The framework used for the “first wave” of middle powers such as Canada or Australia employs two axes upon which to gauge diplomatic behavior. One axis refers to the form of diplomacy, whether “heroic” or “routine.” Heroic diplomacy engenders more “initiative-oriented” diplomacy associated with formulating new agendas and even unilateral action, typified by Cooper as Australia’s efforts to remove veto rights from the United Nations’ great powers in the 1940s or as Sweden’s UN ceasefire proposals during the first Gulf War. (Cooper, p. 12) Routine diplomacy entails a “consensus-oriented style” of tackling certain problems through the use of institutions to reach an accord among the international community, as exemplified by Norway’s role in achieving the Oslo Accord in the Middle East peace process.

On this spectrum of the form of diplomacy, Hungary lies toward the heroic end. One reason for placing Hungary in this category lies in the initiatives and actions undertaken on behalf of the millions of Hungarians living just outside the border (covered much more extensively by Soo Hooi Oh’s article in this same volume). In the wake of the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, Hungary lost around two-thirds of its territory, and as a result three million ethnic Magyars found themselves under the jurisdiction of several other states, including Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. While Hungary has been relatively quiet about its loss of territory in recent years, the more serious issue lies in the treatment and citizenship rights of
Hungarians living abroad. Towards this end, Hungary has repeatedly sought or considered certain remedies including offering dual citizenship, instituting travel visas, and even criticising neighboring governments for their treatment of the Hungarian minority. These efforts culminated in the passing of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries in 2001 with 92 percent of the Hungarian Parliament in favor. (“Act on Hungarians…”) This law gives certain benefits such as access to government aid and educational subsidies to ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of the Hungarian state. While the mere passing of this law, which tends to violate the fundamental international norm of sovereignty, lends credence to the claim that Hungary acts to create new agendas where needs exist, the development of the law also adds further information for analysis.

The passing of this law reflects how Hungary created and fully supported its own initiative to fulfill a clearly articulated and domestically desired foreign policy goal. However, Hungary did not act unilaterally. In fact, the EU was consulted as were the neighboring countries within which ethnic Hungarians reside. The EU ensured that the law complied with existing European law. Despite the inclusion of neighboring countries in the creation of the law, those countries with the most ethnic Hungarians and, therefore, most affected by the law (namely Slovakia and Romania) continued to voice opposition to it. (“Hungary ‘Status Law’…”) In fact, the ethnic interest of the Hungarian state caused conflict with neighboring countries, which in turn threatened to derail Hungary’s objective of joining both the EU and NATO. Yet Hungary remained determined, despite its other concern for good neighborly relations, to serve the needs of ethnic Hungarians. In this respect, Hungary further shows its ability to lead an initiative fully on its own clearly in line with the heroic form of foreign policy.

Middle Power on a Middle Path — Discrete and Diffuse?

The other axis in the “old” middle power framework refers to the scope of diplomatic actions taken by the middle power, ranging from “discrete” to “diffuse.” Discrete diplomacy involves the middle power in only a few issue areas of specific interest or expertise to it. Cooper describes Norway as having a discrete

Source: Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, p. 10.
scope of diplomacy in that Norway is the “classic nonJOINer,” expressing its preference only for the two areas of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. (Cooper, p. 12) Diffuse diplomacy on the other hand occurs when the middle power makes its presence known on a wider array of issues, often through participation in international organizations or regimes. Cooper typifies this scope of action in both Canada’s and Sweden’s practices in areas from security to economy to environment to human rights. (Cooper, p. 11)

Hungary’s past actions do not readily correspond to either extreme of scope. However, certain trends of behavior make Hungary lean more towards the discrete end of the spectrum despite her eagerness to become an active member in certain international organizations. As mentioned earlier, Hungary has only three key objectives in regard to its foreign policy. So few foreign policy goals might lead one to believe that Hungary has a very discrete scope of action. In addition, two of the three goals (namely, better neighbor relations and support of Hungarians abroad) involve fostering better connections with a small number of nearby states, thereby limiting the need for Hungary to concentrate on issues far beyond its borders. However, Hungary’s other goal of foreign policy, better transatlantic relations, has meant that she does not ignore the increasingly interconnected world. Towards this end, Hungary has eagerly joined such organizations as NATO and the EU, but has yet to assert her presence. For these reasons, Hungary characterizes an indeterminate stance between either extreme scope of foreign policy.

A relevant example of Hungary’s indeterminate stance comes from its role in Iraq. Originally the Hungarian Parliament voted in 2003 to send 300 soldiers in a non-combat capacity (transportation and logistics as it turned out) and set as a date for the end of the mission December 31, 2004. In addition, Hungary allowed the United States to use Taszar airbase as a civilian training center for Iraqis with plans to train up to 3,000 Iraqi exiles. (“Hungarian Iraqi...”) However, due to the adverse direction the U.S. occupation has taken and the declining support at home, Hungary has had to relinquish certain promises to the U.S.

In early November 2004, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány announced that Hungary would remove its contingent of personnel from Iraq by March 2005 and actually pulled out all its troops by the original date set by Hungarian Parliament. (“Hungary Announces...”) In addition, the U.S. postponed the training of any more Iraqis at the Taszar base for undisclosed reasons, but one may infer it had to do with Hungarian domestic opinion and political pressure. (“Hungarian Iraqi...”) However, following the removal of its soldiers from Iraq in December 2004, Hungary donated 77 tanks to the Iraqi government and pledged 150 non-combat troops under the auspices of NATO to help with training outside of Baghdad. (Agence France-Presse) Gyurcsány wanted the Parliament to extend its mission in Iraq, but lacked support for such a measure. However, NATO deployments do not require the approval of the Hungarian Parliament, which allowed the current dispatch of tanks and non-combat training personnel. Hungary has shown at once both an interest in actively pursuing its foreign policy abroad and also a domestic preference for staying out of potentially entangling engagements. For this reason, Hungary’s foreign policy remains indeterminately between diffuse and discrete.

As an additional example of Hungary’s indeterminate stance on scope of foreign policy, Hungary’s energetic efforts to gain membership in both the EU and NATO showed a willingness to take on a significant role in these organizations. However, Hungary at times has shown a reluctance to fulfill its obligations to these organizations. For example, Hungary recently missed its government spending deficit target by a significant amount, which earned the country a scolding by other EU member states. (“Hungary Ticked...”) Hungary has had similar problems with meeting NATO budget requirements, and Hungarian officials suggested that a serious reassessment of her promises to NATO should be made. (Barnett) These failures to conform to NATO and EU policies could signify a reduced future role for Hungary in those organizations.
“New” Middle Power Framework
Accommodative, but to Whom?

The framework created by Cooper for the wave of emerging middle powers such as Mexico, Malaysia, and Argentina also uses two axes to gauge foreign policy actions. The first axis applies to the area of the intensity of diplomatic style, ranging from “combative” to “accommodative.” Combative intensity usually relates to an ingrained policy in many emerging middle powers of counterweighing or even opposing whatever stance the United States takes. Cooper identifies this type of diplomatic style in Malaysia’s consistent public antagonism toward the United States in regard to international order. (Cooper, p. 18) However, this combative style might also be applied to countering the stance of other great powers depending on the issue at hand or the region involved. The accommodative style indicates alignment with U.S. policy (or policy of the relevant great power) in most issue areas, as characterized by Cooper in Argentina’s “full alignment with the USA.” (Cooper, p. 18)

Hungarian intensity most definitely falls into the accommodative style in regard to U.S. foreign policy as well as EU foreign policy; however, choosing which power to accommodate at the expense of the other in the future remains a pertinent question for many European states including Hungary. Hungary has been willing to adjust its policies and practices in order to gain membership within the EU and U.S.-led NATO. For example, Hungary concluded bilateral agreements with both Romania and Slovakia at the behest of the United States so as to limit the amount of potential conflict that Hungary could bring into NATO. In addition, Hungary has had to moderate at times its heroic stance with regard to Hungarians abroad so as to assuage concerns from other EU members that she could start a conflict with other potential EU candidates either before or after accession. However, Hungary cannot always fol-

Figure 2
Cooper’s “New” Middle Power Framework
(with his exemplary countries added here for reference)

Source: Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, p. 17.
low the lead of both the U.S. and the EU. Fortunately, few if any situations exist where the U.S. and the EU have come into direct conflict on an issue where Hungary has had to definitively choose between one or the other, as Hungary would most likely seek not to alienate either the U.S. or the EU.

**Regional/Bilateral When Not Following the U.S.**

The second axis for portraying these emerging middle powers refers to the “target” or focus of diplomatic activity, which varies from “multilateral” to “regional/bilateral.” The multilateral focus denotes a middle power attempting to influence international institutions in order to play an active role in world politics. Cooper identifies Argentina, which actively courted the United States and other NAFTA members in an effort to extend NAFTA to South America, as an example (though not an extreme) of this multilateral focus as compared to Brazil, which sought to strengthen the more exclusive MERCOSUR economic group. The regional focus refers to a middle power’s tendency to emphasize its relationships with only a select few (often adjacent) states and to converse with states outside these select few on a bilateral basis as needed. Cooper illustrates this focus of diplomatic activity in Malaysian actions advocating the East Asian Economic Caucus as a way of strengthening regional economic ties and potentially limiting outside influence.

While Hungary participates in numerous international organizations as do most modern states, the target of its diplomacy has been generally geared towards the regional/bilateral end of the spectrum. As mentioned before, two of Hungary’s three main foreign policy objectives involve states geographically adjacent to Hungary. Both goals of better relations with neighboring states and concern for ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states ensure that Hungary’s primary focus will be on its immediate vicinity. While certain neighboring states belong to the EU, other countries on Hungary’s borders (Romania and Croatia) currently do not. Whereas EU political mechanisms might allow Hungary to address her goals in regard to other member states, those neighboring countries still outside the EU will require a regional/bilateral approach outside the bounds of a multilateral forum. Perhaps if and when the EU expands further to encompass all of Hungary’s neighbors, Hungary might then be able to address most of its foreign policy goals within the EU structure. Until that time, Hungary’s focus of diplomatic activity will necessarily be regionally centered.

Hungary’s involvement in the U.S. occupation of Iraq allows further insight into what target of diplomatic activity Hungary prefers. As mentioned previously, Hungary contributed a force of around 300 soldiers to the U.S.-led coalition involved in post-war Iraq, a force which was later recalled by the Hungarian Parliament and then redeployed under the auspices of NATO. These actions by the Hungarian government reflect the public uncertainty and even disapproval about the Iraq situation. While one might conclude that Hungary’s participation in NATO in this regard denotes a multilateral focus of diplomatic activity, one must concede the fact that the primary driver behind the invasion of Iraq was not NATO itself, but the U.S. Hungary values greatly its bilateral relationship with the U.S., especially in the security realm, as evidenced by Hungary’s continuing cooperation with the destruction of certain types of weapon systems. (“Hungary Destroys...”; “U.S., Hungary Agree...”) Hungary’s NATO deployment to Iraq represents a continuing commitment to its U.S. bilateral relationship, despite some domestic opposition to her role in Iraq. Therefore, despite her actions within the NATO structure, Hungary’s target of diplomacy lies closer to the regional/bilateral end.

**NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Partners or Rivals?**

**NATO — Old Faithful**

NATO began as a means to balance the power of the USSR and later the Warsaw Pact in Europe, and few can argue as to its effectiveness in this regard. However, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as well as the end of the Cold War, NATO member states have increasingly questioned the value of this insti-
As a result of the lack of a clear enemy, NATO underwent a redefinition to become a broader security organization that might face more numerous, smaller conflicts instead of one large war. Rather than continuing a struggle against old enemies, NATO instead incorporated former Warsaw Pact members, which is how Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic all came to be NATO members. While the bureaucracy and command structure of NATO remain intact, the new members have widened the scope of NATO's security concerns. In fact, NATO has so broadened its mission that it has involved itself in conflicts far from member states.

As a result NATO has found itself looking beyond its historical realm of interest, and with a relatively free hand (due to the lack of a sizeable opponent) has acted to combat potential security threats to its members, as in the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan. When NATO conducted air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, this military action was the first time NATO actually went to war, and it indicated a clear movement away from defense toward a more proactive role. (Michta, “Is There Life…,” p. 25)

In this situation, Hungary's own actions as a new member in support of NATO were, as Michta states, “adequate, though it was tinged with seemingly excessive timidity and concern for safety of its own territory” while at the same time echoed Hungary's pursuit of its regional goal of concern for Hungarians abroad. (Michta, “Conclusion…,” p. 197) While ultimately deemed successful in stopping ethnic cleansing campaigns and setting up a NATO peacekeeping role in the region, this new shift in NATO objectives has not entirely dissuaded critics who look toward the coming Afghanistan operation with great interest. While NATO has proved itself capable of acting credibly and quickly, there are some who see it as an archaic institution which will fade away as Europe rises to take over its own security obligations.

Common Foreign and Security Policy — New Kid on the Block

The gradual evolvement of the CFSP and of its security/military component, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), occurred under the attentive eyes of the U.S. as well as all other NATO members. Many observers, especially in the U.S., view any growth of the CFSP as diminishing the role of NATO. The emergence of the CFSP as the premier security organization of Europe would leave the U.S. as well as other NATO allies effectively without a voice in European defense. However, EU member states and the U.S. government have consistently reaffirmed that NATO would continue as the defensive base for its members, especially in the area of crisis management. (“Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional…”) Also, through the Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, NATO and the EU codified the process by which the CFSP can make use of NATO assets in operations with the important understanding that the CFSP would work “in close coordination and cooperation with NATO.” (“NATO Topics: NATO-EU…”) While a wide variety of issues, ranging from funding, to EU member states’ dual commitments to both organizations, to new decision-making processes, certainly have limited the CFSP’s progress, the CFSP has shown that its role in regional security is more than just symbolic. The CFSP has increasingly played a more dynamic role in the security issues of Europe, including areas outside member states of the EU itself. Operation Concordia is one strong example of the growing role of the CFSP in regional affairs. Operation Concordia is the name for the EU takeover of NATO peacekeeping operations (called Operation Allied Harmony) in the Republic of Macedonia in 2003. While NATO laid most of the groundwork, the EU agreed to step in for NATO to provide continued policing of the situation and to eventually phase out a military presence entirely. In addition, the EU played a similar role in Bosnia-Herzegovina by taking over peacekeeping operations for NATO’s Stabilization Force and replacing it with the EU Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these actions utilize the Berlin Plus Agreement and make use of NATO assets. (Monaco)

While this trend towards taking over peacekeeping operations after NATO lays the foundation may point to a mutually reinforcing role for both NATO and the CFSP, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo shows that the CFSP does not need NATO to act first. The UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) could not adequately provide security in the province of Bunia in the wake of the departure of Ugandan forces, so the EU stepped in to stabilize the situation and provide humanitarian aid in 2003. (Mace) As the first autonomous EU operation, many placed symbolic weight upon the success of Operation Artemis when the EU handed over peacekeeping and other duties back to a buttressed MONUC force. The success of a mission led by the EU (and specifically France within the EU) which was accomplished without resorting to the use of NATO resources shows that the CFSP can both play a needed role in international security and do so without relying on the predominantly U.S. assets within NATO. (Mace)

The NATO Option — Heroic and Accommodative

NATO policy more closely coincides with Hungary’s heroic form of diplomacy simply because NATO actually has stepped into conflicts to stop atrocities from being committed against minorities, as happened in Yugoslavia. The CFSP was unable or unwilling to mount any significant action to combat this crisis. While obviously not a unilateral action, NATO’s aerial bombardment and subsequent peacekeeping efforts showed the ability of the organization to take the initiative to ensure the security of its members against potential threats and, to a lesser extent, its ability to provide security to ethnic minorities. In addition, while one may argue that the EU’s Operation Artemis shows an inclination to proactively step into a situation, the MONUC force of the UN in the Congo undoubtedly played a role prior to EU involvement in laying some groundwork of which the EU could make use. NATO has shown itself capable of using significant force on behalf of minorities in the face of heavy opposition. This proactive and effective display of influence clearly corresponds to Hungary’s own heroic stance.

In terms of the choice between NATO and the CFSP, Hungary’s accommodative style has luckily not been put to the test in any significant form. Both NATO and the CFSP have been mostly non-confrontational, with NATO providing most of the CFSP military assets in any case. In so far as the Central and Eastern European countries are trying to avoid having to choose between the U.S. and the EU, this preference has proven unattainable in the case of the Iraq crisis of 2003. The EU accession countries all supported the U.S.-U.K. group, which irked some of the opponents of the U.S.-U.K. position within the EU. (Dunay, “Strategy...,” p. 41) However, Pál Dunay, the Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, is also quick to doubt that these same countries would “consistently represent the position they took in the Iraqi case” in the future. For these reasons, Hungary, while not seeking to isolate herself from the EU, will not align herself solely with the CFSP and would therefore most likely side with NATO, at least in the near future.

The CFSP Option — Potentially Discrete and Relatively Regional

Due to Hungary’s seeming ambiguity in regard to its scope of foreign policy, one must be cautious when considering whether NATO or the CFSP better addresses the issues specific to Hungary. Neither NATO nor the CFSP tend to become embroiled in conflicts or other affairs far away from the borders of its members. However, growing exceptions to this rule exist in the form of a role for NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan and Operation Artemis for the CFSP. However, the EU’s CFSP has been relatively more reluctant to get involved in security issues beyond the borders of its members. The question now becomes, Will Hungary ever seek involvement beyond its immediate borders and, if so, what alliance will best allow Hungary to promote its agenda?

Hungary recently provided support for the coalition that invaded Iraq and subsequently called back its support troops, only later to return them under NATO auspices. This evidence supports a diffuse foreign policy potentially evolving into a discrete foreign policy due to domestic public opposition. In taking this stance, which went against many of the EU founding members, Hungary has shown, albeit indirectly, a commitment to the U.S. brand of
diplomacy. Therefore, since the U.S. most directly influences NATO, one can argue that Hungary would be more inclined to support NATO over the CFSP with regard to the scope of its foreign policy. In addition, NATO deployments do not require the approval of Parliament and thereby give the Hungarian Prime Minister a freer hand to act in foreign policy matters as long as it is within the NATO framework. However, due to Hungary's limited and politically unsupported time in Iraq, a swing to a more discrete foreign policy scope may be likely in the future. There remains much uncertainty as to the short- and long-term effects of Hungary's experience in Iraq, and a small shift to either a more discrete or more diffuse scope of foreign policy could easily change Hungary's preference for NATO or the CFSP.

On the other hand, Hungarian foreign policy leans definitively towards the regional/bilateral end of the focus axis, though one might debate whether the EU or NATO is strictly "regional," since both increasingly interact with a significant portion of the planet. While Hungary can address its goal of transatlantic relations through the use of NATO in the security realm and through the EU in the political and economic realms, Hungary has not attempted to play a proactive role in either forum as of yet. Supporting Hungarians in neighboring states and better relations with these states ensure that the main focus of Hungarian foreign policy will be regional, but so far Hungary has acted bilaterally to address these problems. Unless Hungary becomes more active in either NATO or the EU, the question of whether or not these institutions correspond to Hungary's regional preference remains unresolved.

However, the EU's CFSP does tend to better serve Hungary's foreign policy preferences than does NATO. NATO is relatively more widely-based and widely-involved than the CFSP. The trend for NATO to get involved early on in crises and for the CFSP to take over the peacekeeping efforts has occurred mostly in regions close to EU members. (Greco, pp. 70–71) However, the CFSP, while focused more directly on the region valued by Hungary, has yet to prove itself ready and willing to act in a serious situation without NATO to lead the way. Therefore, Hungary will necessarily remain close to NATO as it remains the sole credible security force in the region. The future willingness of the EU to take the lead in security issues close to Europe and to become a real presence in the region will have a significant impact on whether Hungary ultimately chooses to associate with the CFSP at the expense of NATO.

Conclusion

In the present state of affairs, the framework analysis implies that Hungary faces a very difficult choice. While most of Hungary's foreign policy goals can be addressed through the EU, NATO appears to be the best source of security for Hungary as well as a prime means for continuing interaction with the U.S. Fortunately, Hungary does not face an imminent deadline with respect to which security organization it must choose. There currently exists room for membership in both NATO and the CFSP, and as mentioned before these two organizations are learning to cooperate and exist in conjunction as well as independently. But where does this relationship leave Hungary, and how might future changes in both NATO and the CFSP affect Hungary's choice?

One potential course of action for Hungary has been that of mediator or at least impartial third party, playing a niche role in both organizations. As long as memberships in NATO and the CFSP are not mutually exclusive, Hungary can selectively choose when to become involved and thereby maintain some room to maneuver. In addition, as long as NATO remains the sole viable option for crisis intervention and the CFSP continues its role in peacekeeping and lower-level engagements, Hungary has no need to choose between them. However, this choice of action depends upon the assumption that the present relationship between NATO and the CFSP remains the same and that Hungary will continue to participate in security operations, both of which are uncertain.

In the face of such uncertainty, some have even suggested that Hungary take a wait-and-see approach. Elements of such an approach
appear in Hungary’s presence in both security organizations, yet lack of a proactive role in either. As a middle power, Hungary has a limited ability to affect how either NATO or the CFSP will develop. Therefore, it makes sense that, instead of seeking to create or even anticipate the impetus for change, Hungary may simply wait for change to come and make its decision at that time. While her choice of security organization is far from simple, the good news lies in the fact that no great security threat exists for the Hungarian people. Therefore, there may be little need or desire to choose a security organization when both choices have significant strengths and few if any negative aspects.

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