A System of uncertainty: Reforms in Italian Elementary Education

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Italy's education system has been evolving since 1877, when Italian law declared that elementary education was compulsory for all children aged six to nine, and Italy began providing free non-secular schooling. Michele Coppino, the minister of public education from 1876 to 1878, declared that a country that could force its citizens to go to war could also enforce mandatory schooling for its children. From this point onward, the struggle for control over the Italian schools has been intense. In 1922, Benito Mussolini gained control of Italy's schools and vacillated between transforming all of them into Montessori institutions and declaring Montessori education illegal and enforcing a stringently controlled system of education filled with fascist propaganda. The changes to the education system that occurred during Mussolini's reign are commonly called the Gentile reforms, named after his Minister of Public Education Giovanni Gentile, who declared in 1924 that the entire school system should be run by the government. In 1944, with the collapse of fascism in Italy, the government established a more democratic control of the school system, but still retained a large degree of power. (“Italy”) Every attempt at enacting significant educational reform has failed since these changes and the changes listed in the Italian Constitution in 1947.

Today, Italy needs to drastically change its educational system. The current system of elementary education is antiquated and overburdened. In this article, I analyze the problems affecting elementary education in Italy. I detail both the successful and failed reforms of the past and explain why most past proposals have failed. I also address how proposed reforms would affect the school system and the country. Finally, I investigate the probable outcomes of the current reforms, report the public's reaction to proposed changes and provide suggestions for future changes to the system of Italian elementary education.

On the basis of my research I conclude
that the transitory nature of the Italian government makes it impossible for a comprehensive, all-encompassing set of reforms to be successfully instituted in the educational system. Instead, ministers of education should focus on the most critical weaknesses of Italian elementary education and implement smaller piecemeal reforms to accommodate specific needs.

**Italian Education Today**

Demographically, the face of Italian education has been significantly shifting in recent years. Only 10% of the current population is between ages 5 and 14, the ages school attendance is compulsory for Italian children (compared with 15% of the American population). (*Education at a Glance*, 2001) Indeed, Italy has the lowest percentage of children in this age range of all the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Moreover, this number is expected to decrease by a further 11% over the next ten years. These low numbers can be attributed to the drop in Italy’s birthrate that began in the 1980s and still continues. The birthrate in 1980 was 2.2 children per household and declined to 1.19 by 1998; it has continued to dwindle causing a “...conspicuous decrease of the young population, in particular at pre-primary, primary and lower secondary age.” (“UNESCO Country Reports”) This shift in demographics has had serious repercussions in Italy’s schools.

**Figure 1**

Number of Primary, Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Schools, Classes and Teachers

![Graph showing the number of Primary, Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Schools, Classes and Teachers from 1989 to 1998.](chart)

Figure 1 illustrates the diminished student population and the effects that lowered enrollment has had on the Italian school system: teachers laid off and schools closed. Between 1990 and 1997 alone, 16,000 schools closed, representing 38% of all of Italy’s primary, lower secondary and upper secondary schools. During that time, 57,000 teachers lost their jobs. (“UNESCO Country Reports”) Throughout the school closings and faculty firings, Italy has maintained a steady primary school teacher–student ratio of 3:11. During the past decade, Italy also has increased its per-pupil expenditure from $4,430 per student in 1994 to $5,653 in 1998. (Education at a Glance, 1997; Education at a Glance, 2001) Despite spending and a desirable teacher–student ratio, the performance of Italy’s primary school students has continued to decline. According to the Third International Mathematics and Science study (1999), Italian student achievement in these areas was significantly below the norm, ranking last of the 12 OECD countries measured. Italy scored 485 on math (43 points below the OECD country mean) and 498 on science (36 points below the OECD country mean). Even more troubling, these scores were significantly worse than the last time Italy participated in this test in 1995. (Education at a Glance, 2001)

Past Reforms

Faced with closing schools and diminishing test scores in math and science, successive governments have argued for drastic changes to the Italian public education system. Despite repeated efforts, educational reforms have had a difficult time being enacted in Italy because of the transitory nature of the Italian governments: “...there has been no thorough overhaul of the education system since the 1920’s causing an extraordinary accumulation of unresolved issues and problems.” (Reviews of National...) Since 1948, Italy has had 30 different ministers of public education serving under 45 different governments. (Reviews of National...) The instability of the Italian government has depressing implications for the future of education reform and has led to frustrating consequences of attempted reforms of the past. With governments constantly changing and continually canceling the work of their predecessors, it has been nearly impossible to produce any significant or lasting changes or to enact a reform that has been approved.

Former Minister of Public Education Luigi Berlinguer had drafted and sponsored a reform that would change the composition of the elementary and secondary school. His reform combined the eight years of elementary and lower secondary school into a seven-year “basic school.” The new schooling program began at the age of 3, with 3 years of pre-primary education; then, from ages 6 to 13, the student would attend 7 years of basic schooling; and between the ages of 13 and 18, the student would attend 5 years of secondary school. (“UNESCO Country Reports”) This reconstituted school system would have lowered the graduation age to 18, which is in line with EU norms, and increased the length of compulsory secondary schooling to two years. In February 2001, the school reform laws were finally approved after years of political deliberation; they were to be enacted in the 2001–2002 school year. (“Government Halts...”) Figure 2 illustrates the system of Italian education as it currently exists and as conceived in Berlinguer’s reforms.

But, like the reforms of his predecessors, Berlinguer’s were quickly overturned by a new government. Elections held on May 13, 2001, halted the reforms drafted by the previous government. A party shift caused by the election placed the center right in power and the newly appointed Minister of Public Education, Letizia Moratti, began researching her own reorganization scheme, rejecting the reforms that Berlinguer had worked so diligently to get approved during his term in office.

Although overturning Berlinguer’s reforms was significant, it was not a surprise. None of the Italian ministers of education since Gentile (1924) have been able to enact their entire proposed system of reforms. But this does not mean no changes have been made to the school system in the past 80 years. Some ministers of public education, while having their large-scale reforms rejected, have been able to initiate small changes. These partial reforms and slight changes have contributed
to the public’s opinion that the Ministry of Education is capable only of tinkering with the system, but this may not be the case. Although former minister Berlinguer was unable to institute the entirety of his educational reforms, he was able to pass the Bassanini Act (1997), which has had significant influence on the current system of Italian education as a whole. The Bassanini Act focuses on decentralizing the Italian system of education and granting each school a degree of autonomy.

Italy’s schools are as diverse as its population, with rural schools facing problems that do not trouble their urban counterparts. Yet each of these schools for many years was held to the same rigid national standards. The Bassanini Act sought to increase the flexibility of the national school system by decentralizing and granting school autonomy. According to this law, “all the administrative functions and responsibilities concerning their respective districts at present carried out by any institution or administration of the State whether central or peripheral or through other public authorities or bodies will be transferred to the regions and local authorities.” (“The Italian Education Profile”)

The Bassanini Act allows local schools to evaluate their community’s problems and focus curricula and resources to fix them. This enables distributing resources in ways that best meet local needs. Autonomy and decentralization create elasticity in the school system, something that the Italian Ministry of Education views as a great strength: “the best idea in the Italian school system is its flexibility.” (De Gasperis) Other influential international agencies such as the government of Scotland and OECD have strongly praised the benefits of school autonomy: “Our view of autonomy is that it will become the cornerstone of school improvement; that it will shift the focus of teachers, principals and others involved in education away from laws that define inputs, that is class size, school organization, teaching hours, to a focus on benchmarks to decide appropriate learning outcomes for students in schools.” (“QUALS”; Reviews of National...)

Following 50 years of debate, Berlinguer passed another reform in 2000, finally establishing school parity. This new law recognizes private schools as equal to public schools, if they conform to set standards: “Private schools can now enter the national teaching system with full freedom of method and focus.” (“The Italian Education Profile”) The standards include accepting all students, including those with disabilities; conforming to the government’s established educational program; and
agreeing to evaluations by governmental agencies. ("The Italian Education Profile")

**Current Education Reforms**

Establishing autonomy and school parity has changed the structure of Italian schools, but these two small reforms do not fix all the problems the system is facing. It is the larger problems of decreased enrollment, student achievement and ages of school attendance that have been featured in various forms in many different reform plans over the past decade. These are the issues that Berlinguer had hoped to address with his overturned reforms, and these are the focus of Moratti’s current reorganization scheme.

Moratti is proposing a comprehensive, highly political and highly contested set of reforms. Whereas some say these reforms are aimed at bringing Italy’s schools in line with EU standards, others believe they are simply destructive and should not occur: “Letizia Moratti, the education minister, has advanced a reform bill that takes resources away from state schooling; for the average pupil this will mean fewer years in high school, fewer teachers and increased workloads for remaining staff.” ("School")

Moratti has based her reforms on the suggestions of the Bertagna Commission, a group she formed of education professionals who scrutinized the educational system and proposed solutions. The result was the Bertagna Draft, upon which the new legislation was based. (Visco) Similar to Berlinguer’s reforms, the Bertagna Draft aimed to lower the graduation age of Italian students to eighteen. It suggested reducing the number of years that Italian students spend in secondary school from five to four. However, Moratti, in her final proposal, retains the five-year upper-secondary school. (Visco) Moratti’s solution to the age gap between Italian and other European secondary school graduates was to lower the age at which children could enter elementary school.

Unlike Berlinguer, Moratti is not suggesting that a year of school be eliminated, rather that children commence formal schooling at a younger age. Currently a child must be five years and eight months to begin school; Moratti’s reform lowers this by four months. This seemingly insignificant, yet contested, difference would allow Italian students to graduate at the age of eighteen and a half, closer to the European norm.

Although this reform has been debated and disputed, it is by no means the most controversial of Moratti’s proposed reforms. Moratti’s reign seems destined to be contentious, beginning with Berlusconi’s decision to change her official title from the Minister of Public Education to the Minister of Education. ("School") Many perceive this change as favoritism for private schools over public schools. They also believe it is related to Moratti’s most contested reform: her proposal that the government should subsidize private school tuition in order to give parents a choice about whether their children attend public or private schools. ("La Stampa...")

Until Moratti’s proposal, private school was attended by a relatively small percentage of the school-aged population. In 1999, 93.7% of the population of primary and secondary school students were enrolled in public schools; the remaining 6.3% were in private schools. (Education at a Glance, 2001) Although 6%–7% of students enrolled in private schools is low compared with the 10.9% enrolled in private schools in the United States, Italy’s private school enrollment rate “ranks considerably above the OECD average.” (Checchi and Jappelli) Only 2.2% of German primary school-aged children attend private schools and 4.7% in Great Britain. ("Private Enrolment...") In 2000 private school enrollment increased slightly, to 92.9% of students in public primary schools and 7.1% in private institutions. ("The School Reform")

The response to Moratti’s proposed reform was overwhelming: “since mid-November [2001] there have been student strikes, marches, and even ‘occupation’ and ‘self-management’ of schools as part of their protest strategy.” ("School") Teachers’ unions, school staff and students have unified their efforts, protesting that subsidization of private school tuition will critically injure the already weakened public schools. Through 2003, Moratti’s attempts to pacify the public were futile. In December 2002, Moratti explained her
proposed reforms during a highly publicized conference. (“School”) Approximately 100,000 students, teachers and citizens arrived to demonstrate against Moratti’s reforms, marching throughout Rome in protest. (“Privatization Protest”) Moratti responded to the crowd that her reforms will “ensure that all students receive education and training of a comparable quality to other European Union states.” But opposing groups argue that, among other things, the changes will lead to the privatization of education and the loss of thousands of school-related jobs.” (“Privatization Protest”)

Those opposing this reform believe that the public uproar is justified, because “the issue is particularly topical in Italy, where the Constitution stipulates that public and private schools have equal rights but the latter should not be state funded.” (Bertola and Checchi, p. 2) Some of the protests target this issue, claiming that Moratti’s reform violates the Italian constitution. “Then change the constitution,” says Minister Moratti. ‘Even post-communist constitutions like those in Croatia, Estonia, Bulgaria and Hungary give parents choice.’” (“La Stampa...”) No end to this debate is in sight. The major unions, public school teachers and students continue to protest this reform, maintaining that school choice would weaken the public schools and lead to further loss of teaching jobs. Nonetheless, Moratti continues to embrace this proposed policy, saying it is “meant to increase equality of opportunity and allow talented children of poor families to obtain high-quality education in the private sector.” (Bertola and Checchi, p. 3)

Moratti’s argument is supported by various groups in Italy for many different reasons. The private Catholic schools that make up the vast majority of private schools in Italy are rapidly developing problems maintaining their enrollments. (Bertola and Checchi) “The Constitution prohibits state support private schools; however, declining enrollment in Catholic schools has led Catholic Church officials, as operators of the country’s most extensive network of private schools, to seek government aid.” (“International Religious...”) Although the Catholic Church and the Ministry of Education have long had a partnership, which includes an hour of religious instruction taught in public schools paid for by the state, this is the first time that they have directly asked for help with their private schools. (“International Religious...”) Other groups, such as the Committee on Legal Affairs and the International Market, support Moratti’s proposal for other reasons; they argue that the “best” schools in Italy are the private institutions and that by charging admission they are preventing all students from receiving an equal education. These citizens, teachers and parents believe that the education system favors the wealthy, because few others can afford to pay for private schooling and that by providing vouchers Moratti would make the best education accessible to all students. (“Petition...”)

**Predicted Outcomes of the Current Reforms**

The debate over the proposed private school funding reforms is not concluded, but has far-reaching implications. If the state were to provide tax relief, private school vouchers or public funding, then the private schools would benefit, but at the expense of the public schools. If Moratti’s reform were implemented, a much wider population would be able to consider the option of enrolling in a private school. Moratti’s followers zealously support this proposed reform, stating it would provide parents with the freedom to selectively choose the school that is most appropriate for their child, not just the school that they can afford. If Moratti’s private school funding reform were enacted, it would have dramatic implications for the composition of all private schools in Italy, making them available to the whole population, not just the upper class, and also further reducing the student population in the already sparsely populated public schools, adding additional pressures to an overwrought system.

Because Berlinguer did establish school parity in 2000, thereby deeming the private schools that meet the state criteria equal to public schools, a voucher system is not as outlandish as it once may have seemed. Moratti can and should use school parity to justify her proposed system of vouchers, arguing that if
public and private schools are to be given equal consideration by the government, they should be given equal funding. Using school parity to substantiate her reform, Moratti may have increased chances of seeing her proposals ratified, but despite the parity laws, it is unlikely that Moratti will be able to grant private schools governmental funding because it would violate the constitution. Moratti may be able to institute vouchers on a small scale, but they will never become a national program. If Moratti’s proposal were put in place, it would have disastrous consequences for the public schools that would not be able to compete for the limited number of students. However, this never will occur; there is far too much controversy and bureaucracy surrounding the proposed private school funding reform.

Based on past trends in educational reforms, it is unlikely that any of Moratti’s reforms, as they are currently presented, will be enacted in Italy. Her proposed reforms are too cumbersome and political to be accepted en masse, so neither private school vouchers nor the Bertagna Draft will be instituted in the Italian educational system. Like Berlinguer before her, Moratti will work her entire term as Minister of Education to promote her system of changes, only to have her reforms overturned by her successor. Large-scale education reforms do not work in Italy, and nothing is accomplished or corrected when these types of reforms are attempted.

Recommendations

If Moratti and the future ministers of education would like to see their proposed changes in effect and actually correcting the weaknesses within the Italian system of elementary education, they need to re-conceptualize their reforms. It would be far better for Moratti to focus on fixing the problems within the public system of education instead of compounding the problem by outsourcing education to private institutions.

Recognizing the established patterns within their government, Moratti and her successors need to acknowledge that all-encompassing reforms will not be ratified in Italy. The leviathan reforms that Moratti has been promoting are too radical and too controversial to be implemented in their current structure; they will forever be bogged down in bureaucracy. Instead, Moratti and her successors should focus on the crucial elements of their reforms and work on passing these in a piece-meal fashion. The key to successfully enacting educational reform in Italy is the reform’s presentation. Reforms should not be offered as massive packages, or presented as a panacea that will solve all of the education system’s problems. Alternatively, reforms should be presented as “small” changes targeted to fix only one problem at a time within the system.

It was this strategy of focusing on small but vital changes that enabled Berlinguer to accomplish much during his term as Minister of Public Education. Although he was unable to see his wide-scale reform in effect, Berlinguer established school parity and autonomy because he did not present these as part of a universal-remedy reform package. By allowing school parity and autonomy reforms to stand by themselves, Berlinguer was able to accomplish what many before him could not: change within the system of Italian education.

Conclusions

The educational climate in Italy is changing. The public has become saturated with empty promises and impotent reforms; they are demanding that the problems with their education system be taken seriously and are passionately reacting to the Moratti’s proposed reforms. The public wants change, but what form this change should take is controversial. The arguments over private school funding and school entrance age will continue to rage; meanwhile, nothing is accomplished and no change is taking place. The much needed and highly contested education reforms that are currently debated in Italy will not occur unless the government stops its internal bickering and the ministers of education learns how to manage their bureaucracy. If the Italian governments continue to be transitory, if ministers of education continue to push for whole-scale reforms and if new governments continue to undo the work of their precursors, then nothing will ever be accomplished.
The public has grown apathetic and frustrated: “Many teachers and parents alike are simply bewildered by the spate of often contradictory reforms and tinkering over the past 30 years, and are skeptical as to whether any solution will succeed.” (Mignone and Coppa, p. 242)

The population has begun to believe that the best any minister of education can do is tweak the system here and there: “The talk in educational circles was of the ‘impossible reform’... Unable to embark on any fundamental transformation, successive governments merely tinkered with the system.” (Reviews of National...)

All this tinkering as well as the continual overturning of reforms has created a population skeptical of any reform and unenthusiastic about the education system as a whole. They believe that despite the need in their educational system, nothing has changed and nothing ever will.

Although the Italian public is losing faith in their Ministry of Education and doubting their ability to effect change, they should not give up hope entirely. The passage of the Bassanini Act and the establishment of school parity prove that Italy’s government is not entirely deadlocked. The Bassanini Act and the establishment of school parity are not insignificant changes to the Italian school system; they just appear so within the scope of all the failed reforms and often are overlooked for this same reason. The public opinion that no significant or drastic changes can be made to the Italian school system is the product of decades of impotent ministers of public education. It is not that these ministers have not wanted or tried to effect changes; they simply have been unable to do so because of the complexity of the Italian governmental system and their failure to package reforms in a palatable size.

Rather than attempting a total reorganization of the school system, and in doing so, repeating the mistakes of their predecessors, Moratti and future ministers of education should focus their efforts on smaller but vital pieces of their reforms. It is impossible to enforce a comprehensive educational reform, and if a reform does manage to get passed, it will endure a fate similar to Berlinguer’s massive program and never come into effect. The Italian governments are too transitory for large-scale reforms to be implemented. Moratti and future ministers of education must recognize how their government works against all-encompassing reforms and match their proposals to function in this unique system. All-encompassing reforms may be needed, but never will be enacted. Moratti and her successors must tailor their reforms to their environment, presenting them in a piecemeal fashion. Working within the constraints of their system, Italian ministers of education can accomplish much by concentrating on implementing the most crucial parts first, then, once these are established, working bit by bit to further their reforms until a whole-scale change has occurred. Until they respond to the way their government operates, until Moratti and her successors prioritize and focus on the important aspects of their reforms, until they recognize that they will fail if they promote only system-wide reform and until the public is willing to acknowledge the benefits of piecemeal reforms, the future of the Italian elementary education system remains uncertain.
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