Stochastic Optimal Control of Grid-Level Storage

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Stochastic Optimal Control of Grid-Level Storage

by

Yuhai Hu

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Abstract

The primary focus of this dissertation is the design, analysis and implementation of stochastic optimal control of grid-level storage. It provides stochastic, quantitative models to aid decision-makers with rigorous, analytical tools that capture high uncertainty of storage control problems. The first part of the dissertation presents a $p$-periodic Markov Decision Process (MDP) model, which is suitable for mitigating end-of-horizon effects. This is an extension of basic MDP, where the process follows the same pattern every $p$ time periods. We establish improved near-optimality bounds for a class of greedy policies, and derive a corresponding value-iteration algorithm suitable for periodic problems. A parallel implementation of the algorithm is provided on a grid-level storage control problem that involves stochastic electricity prices following a daily cycle. Additional analysis shows that the optimal policy is threshold policy. The second part of the dissertation is concerned with grid-level battery storage operations, taking battery aging phenomenon (battery degradation) into consideration. We still model the storage control problem as a MDP with an extra state variable indicating the aging status of the battery. An algorithm that takes advantage of the problem structure and works directly on the continuous state space is developed to maximize the expected cumulated discounted rewards over the life of the battery. The algorithm determines an optimal policy by solving a sequence of quasiconvex problems indexed by a battery-life state. Computational results are presented to compare the proposed approach to a standard dynamic programming method, and to evaluate the impact of refinements in the battery model. Error bounds for the proposed algorithm are established to demonstrate its accuracy. A generalization of price model to a class of Markovian regime-switching processes is also provided. The last part of this dissertation is
concerned with how the ownership of energy storage make an impact on the price. Instead of one player in most storage control problems, we consider two players (consumer and supplier) in this market. Energy storage operations are modeled as an infinite-horizon Markov Game with random demand to maximize the expected discounted cumulated welfare of different players. A value iteration framework with bimatrix game embedded is provided to find equilibrium policies for players. Computational results show that the gap between optimal policies and obtained policies can be ignored. The assumption that storage levels are common knowledge is made without much loss of generality, because a learning algorithm is proposed that allows a player to ultimately identify the storage level of the other player. The expected value improvement from keeping the storage information private at the beginning of the game is then shown to be insignificant.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Energy Storage Systems

Over the past few years, research and development in the power system has increased in energy storage techniques. One of the reasons behind this phenomenon is that renewable energy plays a more important role for the electrical power grid. According to a report published by the Energy Information Administration [1], the percentage of energy generated from renewables has increased from 9.49% in 2006 to 13.35% in 2015. In addition, estimates of the potential market for energy storage in the United States are quite large [33]. According to a white paper from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [80] published in 2010, there is more than 128 gigawatts (GW) of grid-level energy storage installed worldwide. Among all Energy Storage Systems (ESS), Pumped Hydroelectric Storage (PHS) has the percentage of installed capacity around 99%, while Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES), flywheels and battery storage together constitute the remaining 1% [111, 80].

The energy storage system are very useful to deal with inherent intermittency of renewable energy generation, for example, wind, solar, wave energy [15, 5, 27, 23]. Benefit may be derived from the devices by charging them when the price is low and discharging it when the price is high [5, 30, 10]. Other benefits may also be derived from providing ancillary services such as regulation [23, 37, 26]. As a result, researchers have focused
on energy storage techniques, regarding them as a way to integrate renewable energy resources. With proper energy storage techniques, power system operators may be able to balance the difference between demand and supply, provide backup energy, in addition to the flexibility on the demand side provided by demand response [61, 5].

Researchers have been increasingly taking storage into consideration in Optimal Power Flow (OPF) and Unit Commitment (UC). In [16], an OPF model with storage is provided and shows how storage system optimize of power generation across multiple time periods. In [99], a stochastic electricity market model is established (which is similar to a Unit Commitment problem). The results show the effects of wind power generation on system operation as well as on economic value of investments in energy storage system (CAES in their case).

Although different kinds of energy storage techniques are developing rapidly in the recent years, most newer storage technologies are still in the development phase and could not be deployed yet. There are still lots of challenges to integrate storage [64]. In addition, storage devices like lithium batteries are too expensive to be deployed massively within the power grid. However, with a better control system, storage operators may be able to reduce running cost, increase revenue and provide reliable services. Due to those reasons, many researchers have sought to establish a more profitable and reliable storage system by providing practical and efficient optimal control methods.

During the last decade, the application of control theory to grid-level storage problems has increased sharply. Sioshansi et al. [109] establish a dynamic programming model to maximize the profit of four services by controlling the operation of multiple distributed energy storage resources. The services include: energy and ancillary services sales, backup energy supply and transformer loading relief. In [91], Secomandi studies the optimal trading policy for a capacitated storage asset. In this paper, the author uses gas as the commodity, while the charge and discharge rates are limited. Powell et al. [67] provides a stochastic, dynamic program to model hourly dispatch and energy allocation in a grid with storage. In their paper, variations come from wind, solar and demand, and they use hydroelectric storage to smooth energy production over different time scales. Van De Ven et al. [104]
formulate a dynamic program to study an optimal battery control policy, to let the end-user minimize the total discounted cost. The uncertainty comes from demand and price. In [28], optimal control policies for single and multiple batteries are studied. Single battery case has an optimal policy with threshold structure and can be obtained by dynamic programming. Multiple batteries case is extended by a method to map the optimal solution of single case to multiple batteries case. In Su et al. [97], the expected magnitude of residual power imbalance process is minimized. The authors model the power imbalance problem as an infinite horizon stochastic control problem and the optimal policy turns out to be a greedy policy. In addition, short time scale and long time scale approximations for power imbalance are also provided as well as the corresponding necessary storage capacity. Dicorato et al. [21], Teleke et al. [100] and Brekken et al. [11] provide models to integrate a battery storage system with a large wind farm to improve dispatchability. Cruise et al. [18] provide a nonlinear programming model and a Lagrangian-based algorithm to solve it. P Malysz et al. [62] provide a MIP formulation to solve energy storage operation in grid-connected electricity microgrid.

When we deal with stochastic control of energy storage problems, most often we need to establish a price model. As electricity prices have unique characteristics compared to other commodity prices, many different models have been proposed and studied in the literature. In [46], a mean-reverting price process is incorporated to an energy commitment problem where wind farms and storage devices exist. However, since the demand of energy varies during days, throughout months and across years, the impact from stochastic demand also results in seasonality effects on electricity prices. In [63], a mean-reverting jump diffusion stochastic process is adopted as the electricity price model that incorporates seasonality effects and price spikes. A diversity of models for electricity prices are discussed in detail in [48, 58, 29, 45]. In Appendix B, we describe several price models. We also present a p-periodic Markov Decision Process model in Chapter 2 which captures seasonality effects.
1.2 Battery Energy Storage System

As we mentioned in the previous section, in 2010, 99% of installed energy capacity is Pumped Hydroelectric Storage. However, according to the Department of Energy [17], there are around 1630 energy storage projects all over the world, and about 824 projects of them (around 50%) are using battery technology as the storage method, such as Lead Acid, Lithium Ion and Zinc Bromine flow. The main advantages of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) are their rapid response time, and their high energy densities.

Storage batteries are rechargeable electrochemical systems for storing energy [34]. They deliver chemical energy in the form of electric energy. Different types of batteries and their properties are introduced in detail in [23, 42]. Lead-acid batteries are the oldest and mature type of rechargeable batteries which are used mostly in grid-level storage. However, the technology has a low cycle life and battery operational lifetime. Nickel-based batteries have longer lifetimes than lead-acid, but the cost is 10 times more and the energy efficiency is also lower than lead-acid batteries. Zinc bromine (ZnBr) battery belongs to a class called flow battery [15], which has non-self-discharge capacity. A main drawback of ZnBr system is that it need a third pump system to circulate bromine complexes, which introduce extra installation and operation cost. Lithium-based battery battery storage systems seem to be a very promising technology. They have high energy density, high efficiency, and low self-discharge rates.

The charge/discharge mechanism for batteries can be described as follows: during the discharge process, once a load is connected, chemical energy is generated by electrochemical reactions in a basic cell, between two electrodes plunged into an electrolyte. Electrons from one electrode move to the other through an external electric load, where the electric energy is delivered. The process is reversed during charging [34].

A rechargeable battery can be charged and discharged many times. However, any battery has its lifetime, which means there is a limit on the number of charge/discharge cycles (we call it life cycles in the subsequent chapters). Hence, there is a significant difference when we model a BESS and a PHS. In addition, the impact of aging not only affects the life of the battery storage, but also the capacity of the battery. According to
[12], temperature and state of charge (SOC) will affect the life cycles of the battery. In addition, for lead-acid battery, from Peukert’s Law, the rate of charge will also have an influence on the available capacity of battery [24].

1.3 Outline of Contribution

In Chapter 2, we formulate and solve a $p$-Periodic Markov Decision Process model for a grid-level storage control problem. We present computational results. We establish a tighter bound for the near-optimal solution. And we discuss the structure of the optimal policy.

In Chapter 3, we incorporate the aging phenomenon into a grid-level battery operation problem. Instead of the periodic MDP model used in Chapter 2, we use an infinite horizon MDP model in this chapter. An efficient and accurate algorithm for solving the model is established. We provide structural results for the optimal policy. We report on related computational results.

In Chapter 4, we discuss the impact on electricity prices from storage decisions.

In Chapter 5, we summarize our work so far, and our current ongoing research.

Whereas the material of Chapters 4 is ready for submission, most material of Chapter 2 has been published in


and the work of Chapter 3 has been published in

Chapter 2

*p*-Periodic Markov Decision Process

Most work of this chapter has been published in paper


2.1 Introduction

For stochastic dynamic programs with seasonality effects, such as inventory or storage problems with daily demand patterns, rolling-horizon look-ahead policies [75] often appear as a well-suited class of policies. A drawback of look-ahead policies, however, is that end-of-horizon effects can be detrimental to the optimality of the decisions. For instance, the case opposing JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (JPMVEC) to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exposed bidding strategies that were designed to exploit flaws in the market clearing algorithm of the California Independent System Operator (CAISO); one flaw was directly related to the truncation of the planning horizon [31].
2.1.1 Motivation

Two countermeasures are classically considered to mitigate end-of-horizon effects. The first countermeasure is the introduction of a terminal reward function. This essentially amounts to approximate the value function around the state at the terminal stage — and this is an art that requires domain knowledge. The second countermeasure is the extension of the horizon over which the look-ahead is performed. This amounts to assume that end-of-horizon effects die out by the time the backward optimization reaches the first stages. A challenge of this approach is the increased complexity of the look-ahead optimization problem, and in certain contexts, the unavailability of data relative to the extended horizon — for instance, longer-term forecasts may not be available; for a multistep bidding problem, market participants may not have been required to submit offers further in the future; etc.

This chapter is motivated by the synthesis of these two mitigation strategies. We consider policies that solve a discounted periodic dynamic program, over an infinite horizon, constructed by replicating the look-ahead problem or by appending a steady-state cycle to the look-ahead. The rationale is that the structure of a policy optimal for a finite-horizon Markov decision problem on \( p \) stages is the same as the one for an infinite-horizon, discounted \( p \)-periodic Markov decision problem. However, the cyclo-stationary extension could significantly improve the approximation of the future reward process. Early use of this strategy can be found in the water reservoir operations literature [98, 107].

2.1.2 Contributions and Related Work

Periodic dynamic programs have of course been considered earlier [82, 106, 103], as well as variations thereof [41]. In particular, it is known that an optimal \( p \)-periodic Markov policy can be derived using \( p \) value functions coupled by a Bellman-type recursion. Periodic dynamic programs can be viewed as dynamic programs with stationary reward and state-transition functions over a state space augmented with the position of time in the cycle, and therefore results from abstract dynamic programming are directly available [6].

The contribution of this chapter is twofold.

• We study the near-optimality of nonstationary policies greedy for periodic approxi-
mate value functions, and provide bounds that are tighter than the general bounds used with stationary value functions on an augmented state space or specialized bounds established for periodic Markov Decision Processes.

- We formulate a periodic Markov Decision Process model for a grid-level energy storage control problem where random electricity prices follow daily patterns. The idea is to recalibrate the model every day and then solve it for operations on the next day in a rolling-horizon fashion. A numerical example with a daily cycle of 24 periods is provided.

### 2.1.3 Organization

In this chapter, we provide a $p$-Periodic Markov Decision Process model without aging phenomenon considered. We are concerned with the subproblem to be solved by the proposed class of policies, and we develop effective methods to solve periodic dynamic programs. Most of work in this chapter has been published in [39]. In particular, in addition to the results published in [39], we discuss the threshold-policy structure of the optimal policy.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines the periodic Markov Decision Problem, and recalls the optimality conditions. Section 2.3 establishes bounds useful to control the near-optimality of periodic policies based on periodic approximate value functions. Section 2.4 describes a value-iteration algorithm, based on the results of the previous section. Section 2.5 formulates a simple model for optimizing grid-level storage operations given day-ahead and historical electricity prices, based on the periodic Markov Decision Process framework. It also reports on numerical work carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of a parallel implementation of the value iteration algorithm. Section 2.6 concludes the present chapter.
2.2 Periodic Discounted Problems

In this section, we recall the mathematical formulation and optimality conditions of the $p$-periodic discounted Markov Decision Problem ($p$-MDP).

“Periodic” refers to the way the reward and state transition functions vary cyclically over time — this is distinct from the notion of “periodic state” in the theory of Markov chains.

In our formulation, the state space and the action space are periodic. This proves to be useful to adapt the states to the time-dependent characteristics of the problem.

2.2.1 Problem Formulation

For some integer $p \geq 1$ referred to as the cycle length, let

\[ \{ (S_i, A_i, P_i, R_i) \}_{i=0,\ldots, p-1} \]

define a $p$-periodic Markov Decision Process ($p$-MDP):

- $\{S_i\}_{i=0,\ldots, p-1}$ form a base collection of finite state spaces, such that the state $S_t$ at time $t \geq 0$ is in $S_i$ where $i = \mod (t, p)$, or equivalently, $t = i + kp$ for some integer $k \geq 0$;
- $\{A_i\}_{i=0,\ldots, p-1}$ form a base collection of finite action spaces, such that the action $A_t$ at time $t \geq 0$ is in $A_i$ where $i = \mod (t, p)$.
- $P_i : S_i \times A_i \times S_{i+1} \mapsto [0, 1]$ for $i = 0, \ldots, p-2$ and $P_{p-1} : S_{p-1} \times A_{p-1} \times S_0 \mapsto [0, 1]$, form a base collection of state transition probability functions, such that $\text{Prob}(S_{t+1} = s' \mid S_t = s, A_t = a) = P_i(s, a, s')$ where $i = \mod (t, p)$.
- $R_i : S_i \times A_i \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ for $i = 0, \ldots, p-1$ form a base collection of bounded reward functions, such that the reward at time $t$ given $S_t = s, A_t = a$, is $r_t = R_i(s, a)$ where $i = \mod (t, p)$.

We then define $\iota(t) = \mod (t, p)$ and define $(\mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{A}_t, P_t, R_t)$ for $t \geq p$, where $\mathcal{S}_t = \mathcal{S}_{\iota(t)}$, \mathcal{A}_t = \mathcal{A}_{\iota(t)}$, $P_t = P_{\iota(t)}$, and $R_t = R_{\iota(t)}$. 
When $p = 1$, the problem of course reduces to a stationary MDP $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, P, R)$.

Consider the class $\Pi$ of admissible nonstationary Markov policies

$$\pi = \{A^\pi_t\}_{t \geq 0}, \quad (2.1)$$

where $A^\pi_t : \mathcal{S} \mapsto \mathcal{A}$ is the decision rule at time $t$, that maps the current state $s$ to an action $a = A^\pi_t(s)$ selected from a subset $\mathcal{A}_t(s) \subset \mathcal{A}$ that represents a set of admissible actions given $s$. To streamline the notation, we just write $a \in A_t$ instead of $a \in \mathcal{A}_t(s)$ in the sequel.

Let $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ be a discount factor, and $s \in \mathcal{S}_0$ an initial state. We consider the $p$-periodic Markov Decision Problem consisting in maximizing the expected discounted total return by the choice of an admissible nonstationary policy $\pi$:

$$V^*_0(s) = \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \mathbb{E}^\pi[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R_t(S_t, A^\pi_t(S_t)) | S_0 = s], \quad (2.2)$$

where $\mathbb{E}^\pi$ emphasizes that the probability distribution of $S_t$ depends on $\pi$.

### 2.2.2 Optimality Conditions

For brevity, we use the short-hand $P^t_{s,s'}(a) = P_t(s, a, s')$. For all $t$, and for a fixed nonstationary policy $\pi$, the expected discounted cumulated reward-to-go at time $t$ when being in state $s$ and following policy $\pi$ is given by

$$V^\pi_t(s) = R_t(s, A^\pi_t(s)) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}} P^t_{s,s'}(A^\pi_t(s)) V^\pi_{t+1}(s'). \quad (2.3)$$

$V^\pi_0(s)$ is the value of policy $\pi$ when starting from state $s$.

Due to the periodic structure of the problem, Bellman’s principle of optimality leads
to a system of equations involving $p$ value functions only,

$$V_i(s) = \max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_{i+1}} P_{ss'}^i(a)V_{i+1}(s')]$$

for $i = 0, 1, \ldots, p - 2,$

$$V_{p-1}(s) = \max_{a \in A_{p-1}} [R_{p-1}(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_0} P_{ss'}^{p-1}(a)V_{0}(s')] \quad (2.4)$$

These equations are written more compactly as

$$V_i = T_i V_{i+1} \quad \text{for } i = 0, 1, \ldots, p - 2,$$

$$V_i = T_i V_0 \quad \text{for } i = p - 1,$$

where the operators $T_i$ are defined from (2.4). By induction,

$$V_0 = (T_0 T_1 \ldots T_{p-1}) V_0,$$

$$V_1 = (T_1 \ldots T_{p-1}T_0) V_1,$$

$$\ldots$$

$$V_{p-1} = (T_{p-1}T_0 \ldots T_{p-2})V_{p-1},$$

showing that $V_i$ is a fixed point of the operator

$$\mathcal{T}_i = (T_i T_{i+1} \ldots T_{p-1}T_0 \ldots T_{i-1}) \quad (2.5)$$

The operator $\mathcal{T}_i$ inherits the contractive mapping property of the operators $T_i$ (Section 2.4.2 provides more details), and therefore, the system (2.4) admits a unique solution

$$V^* = (V_0^*, V_1^*, \ldots V_{p-1}^*) \quad (2.6)$$

which we refer to as the optimal periodic value function.

We say that a policy $\pi = \{A_t^\pi\}_{t \geq 0}$ is greedy for a periodic value function $V =
Let \( \pi^* \) be a policy greedy for \( V^* \) as defined by (2.6). Then \( \pi^* \) is nonstationary but periodic with cycle length \( p \), and by definition of \( T_i \), it is optimal for the problem (2.2).

Without loss of optimality, the search over the class \( \Pi \) of nonstationary policies is thus reduced to a search over the class \( \Pi_p \) of \( p \)-periodic admissible policies \( \pi \), such that

\[
A^\pi_t(s) = A^\pi_i \quad \text{with} \quad i = \iota(t),
\]

\( V^*_{0}(s) = \max_{\pi \in \Pi_p} \mathbb{E}^\pi[\sum_{t=0}^\infty \gamma^t R_t(S_t, A^\pi_t(S_t)) | S_0 = s]. \) 

A policy \( \pi \in \Pi_p \) is uniquely defined by \( (A^\pi_0, \ldots, A^\pi_{p-1}) \).

### 2.3 Near-optimality bounds for greedy policies

This section establishes upper error bounds for the difference between the optimal return and the return of a policy greedy with respect to a periodic approximate value function. This situation covers the case of a policy greedy with respect to a periodic approximate value function obtained by value iteration.

The error bounds can be evaluated numerically under the assumption that the periodic optimal value function is known. As this assumption is not met in practice, we establish upper bounds to be used when the optimal value function is unknown.
2.3.1 Error bound for difference between optimal and approximate value functions

Let $V^* = (V_0^*, \ldots, V_{p-1}^*)$ be the optimal periodic value function (2.6), and $\pi^* \in \Pi_p$ the optimal $p$-periodic policy greedy for $V^*$.

In many cases, the value functions $V_i^*$ are difficult or even impossible to evaluate. In order to overcome such situations, it is common to use approximate value functions. Let $\tilde{V} = (\tilde{V}_0, \ldots, \tilde{V}_{p-1})$ denote a periodic approximate value function, and let $\tilde{\pi} \in \Pi_p$ be a $p$-periodic policy greedy for $\tilde{V}$, that is,

$$\tilde{\pi}_i \in \arg\max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_{i+1}} P^i_{ss'}(a) \tilde{V}_{i+1}(s')]$$

for $i = 0, \ldots, p-2$,

$$\tilde{\pi}_{p-1} \in \arg\max_{a \in A_{p-1}} [R_{p-1}(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_0} P^{p-1}_{ss'}(a) \tilde{V}_0(s')] \tag{2.9}$$

Let $V_i^\pi$ denote the “value” of policy $\pi^*$ at time $i$, and let $V_i^{\tilde{\pi}}$ denote the “value” of policy $\tilde{\pi}$ at time $i$, as defined by (2.3), where “value” at time $i$ means the expected cumulated reward-to-go obtained by following the policy from time $i$ onwards. By definition of $\pi^*$ and $V^*$, we have $V_i^\pi = V_i^*$, but in the case of $\tilde{\pi}$, in general we have

$$V_i^{\tilde{\pi}} \neq \tilde{V}_i.$$

**Definition 2.3.1.** Given an optimal policy $\pi^*$ associated to $V^*$ and a policy $\tilde{\pi}$ greedy for $\tilde{V}$, the function $\tilde{L}_i : S_i \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is defined as the difference between the expected reward-to-go at time $i$ of those two policies: For all $s \in S_i$,

$$\tilde{L}_i(s) = V_i^\pi(s) - V_i^{\tilde{\pi}}(s) \tag{2.10}$$

In particular, $\tilde{L}_0(s)$ quantifies the suboptimality of policy $\tilde{\pi}$ for the periodic MDP started from initial state $s$.

**Assumption.** In each time period $i$, the value function $V_i^\pi$ is approximated by $\tilde{V}_i$, and
for all $s \in \mathcal{S}_i$, the difference between those value functions is bounded by $\epsilon_i$:

$$|V^*_i(s) - \tilde{V}_i(s)| \leq \epsilon_i.$$  \hfill (2.11)

To visualize the assumption,

![Figure 2.1: Interpretation of assumption 2.11](image)

Under the assumption above, we provide the following proposition. The mechanism of the proof is based on [93].

**Proposition 1.** Let $V^* = (V^*_0, \ldots, V^*_p-1)$ be the optimal periodic value function (2.6), let $\pi^*$ be the associated optimal policy, and let $\tilde{\pi}$ be a policy greedy for $\tilde{V} = (\tilde{V}_0, \ldots, \tilde{V}_{p-1})$, where $\tilde{V}$ satisfies the assumption (2.11) for $i = 0, \ldots, p-1$. Then for all states $s$, $\tilde{L}_i(s) \leq \mathcal{L}_i$, where

$$\mathcal{L}_i = \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{i} \gamma^{p+k-i} (2\epsilon_k) + \sum_{k=i+1}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} (2\epsilon_k)}{1 - \gamma^p}.$$  \hfill (2.12)

Before establishing Proposition 1, we note that each $\mathcal{L}_i$ in (2.12) depends on all the $\epsilon_k$, but the weighting differs among each $i$. In the stationary case ($p = 1$), the bound reduces to

$$\tilde{L}_0 \leq 2\epsilon_0 \gamma/(1 - \gamma).$$

With $\epsilon = \max_i \epsilon_i$, the bound also reduces to

$$\tilde{L}_i \leq \frac{2\epsilon \sum_{k=1}^{p} \gamma^k}{1 - \gamma^p} = \frac{2\epsilon}{1 - \gamma^p} \frac{\gamma(1 - \gamma^p)}{1 - \gamma} = \frac{2\epsilon \gamma}{1 - \gamma},$$

which is a bound known in the literature (see e.g. [6]). The bound (2.12) is tighter, since it does not replace $\epsilon_i$ by $\epsilon$. In fact, $2\epsilon_i$ is the length of the interval where the difference $V^*_i(s) - \tilde{V}_i(s)$ lies, according to the assumption which is equivalent to $-\epsilon_i \leq V^*_i(s) - \tilde{V}_i(s) \leq \epsilon_i$. 

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Now, if instead we assume that

\[ \epsilon_i \leq V_i^*(s) - \tilde{V}_i(s) \leq \epsilon_i \quad \text{for all } s \in \mathcal{S}_i , \]

then Proposition 1 applies by formally setting

\[ 2 \epsilon_k = \epsilon_k - \epsilon_k . \] (2.13)

**Proof of Proposition 1.** For each period \( i \), there exists a state, say \( z_i \), that achieves the maximal loss \( \tilde{L}_i \) at this period:

\[ \tilde{L}_i(z_i) \geq \tilde{L}_i(s) \text{ for all } s \in \mathcal{S}_i . \]

To this state \( z_i \) corresponds the optimal action

\[ a = A_{\pi}^i(z_i) , \]

and the action of the policy greedy for \( \tilde{V} \),

\[ b = A_{\pi}^i(z_i) . \]

Momentarily let us assume \( i \leq p - 2 \). Since \( \pi \) is greedy for \( \tilde{V} \), we have

\[ R_i(z_i, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P_{z_i, s'}(a) \tilde{V}_{i+1}(s') \]

\[ \leq R_i(z_i, b) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P_{z_i, s'}(b) \tilde{V}_{i+1}(s') . \]
From the assumption $|V_{i+1}^*(s) - \tilde{V}_{i+1}(s)| \leq \epsilon_{i+1}$ we have

$$R_i(z, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P^i_{z,s'}(a)(V_{i+1}^*(s') - \epsilon_{i+1})$$

$$\leq R_i(z, b) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P^i_{z,s'}(b)(V_{i+1}^*(s') + \epsilon_{i+1}) ,$$

which is equivalent to

$$R_i(z, a) - R_i(z, b) \leq 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1}$$

$$+ \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} [P^i_{z,s'}(b)V_{i+1}^*(s') - P^i_{z,s'}(a)V_{i+1}^*(s')] . \quad (2.14)$$

On the other hand, we have, by definition of $\tilde{L}_i$,

$$\tilde{L}_i(z_i) = V_i^*(z_i) - \tilde{V}_i^*(z_i) = R_i(z_i, a) - R_i(z_i, b)$$

$$+ \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} [P^i_{z,s'}(a)V_{i+1}^*(s') - P^i_{z,s'}(b)V_{i+1}^*(s')] . \quad (2.15)$$

Combining (2.14) and (2.15), we obtain (for $i = 0, \ldots, p - 2$)

$$\tilde{L}_i(z_i) \leq 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1} + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P^i_{z,s'}(b)[V_{i+1}^*(s') - V_{i+1}^*(s')]$$

$$= 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1} + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P^i_{z,s'}(b)\tilde{L}_{i+1}(s')$$

$$\leq 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1} + \gamma \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}_{i+1}} P^i_{z,s'}(b)\tilde{L}_{i+1}(z_{i+1})$$

$$= 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1} + \gamma \tilde{L}_{i+1}(z_{i+1}) , \quad (2.16)$$

where the second inequality results from the definition of $z_{i+1}$.

Similarly, for $i = p - 1$, we obtain

$$\tilde{L}_{p-1}(z_{p-1}) \leq 2\gamma \epsilon_0 + \gamma \tilde{L}_0(z_0) . \quad (2.17)$$
By induction,

\[
\tilde{L}_i(z_i) \leq 2\gamma \epsilon_{i+1} + 2\gamma^2 \epsilon_{i+2} + \cdots + 2\gamma^{p-1-i} \epsilon_{p-1}
+ 2\gamma^{p-i} \epsilon_0 + \cdots + 2\gamma^{p-1-i} \epsilon_{i-1} + 2\gamma^p \epsilon_i + \gamma^p \tilde{L}_i(z_i)
= 2 \sum_{k=i+1}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \epsilon_k + 2 \sum_{k=0}^{i} \gamma^{p-i+k} \epsilon_k + \gamma^p \tilde{L}_i(z_i)
\]

and finally,

\[
\tilde{L}_i(s) \leq \tilde{L}_i(z_i) \leq \frac{2 \sum_{k=0}^{i} \gamma^{p-i+k} \epsilon_k + 2 \sum_{k=i+1}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \epsilon_k}{1 - \gamma^p}.
\]

\[\square\]

2.3.2 Bounding $\epsilon_k$

From the analysis above, we may obtain an upper bound for the suboptimality of a periodic policy greedy for the periodic approximate value function $\tilde{V}$. However, in practice, the optimal periodic value function $V^*$ is unknown, and therefore we cannot compute the $\epsilon_k$'s of the assumption. Fortunately, we may bound $\epsilon_k$ using quantities obtained in the course of one iteration of the value iteration algorithm. The mechanism of the proof is based on results from the theory of value iteration presented for instance in [6].

**Definition 2.3.2.** Given $\tilde{V}^\ell = (\tilde{V}_0^\ell, \ldots, \tilde{V}_{p-1}^\ell)$, let $\tilde{V}^{\ell+1}$ be defined by one value-iteration performed as follows:

\[
\tilde{V}_i^{\ell+1}(s) = \max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_{i+1}} P_{ss'}(a) \tilde{V}_{i+1}^\ell(s')] = (T_i \tilde{V}_{i+1}^\ell)(s) \quad \text{for } i = 0, \ldots, p - 2,
\]

\[
\tilde{V}_i^{\ell+1}(s) = \max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_0} P_{ss'}(a) \tilde{V}_0^\ell(s')] = (T_i \tilde{V}_0^\ell)(s) \quad \text{for } i = p - 1.
\]

**Definition 2.3.3.** Define $\delta_i$ as the maximal change of the value function relative to period $i$
using the update described in Definition 2.3.2, over all states \( s \in \mathcal{S}_i \):

\[
\delta_i = \max_{s \in \mathcal{S}_i} \left| \tilde{V}_{i+1}^\ell(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s) \right|
\]

\[
= \begin{cases} 
\max_{s \in \mathcal{S}_i} \left| (T_i \tilde{V}_{i+1}^\ell)(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s) \right| & \text{for } i = 0, \ldots, p - 2 \\
\max_{s \in \mathcal{S}_0} \left| (T_i \tilde{V}_{i}^\ell)(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s) \right| & \text{for } i = p - 1.
\end{cases}
\]

**Proposition 2.** Let \( \tilde{V}^\ell \) be an approximation to the optimal periodic value function \( V^* \), and let \( \delta_i \) be defined as above. In this situation,

\[
\epsilon_i = \max_{s \in \mathcal{S}_i} |V_i^*(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s)|
\]

admits for \( i = 0, \ldots, p - 1 \) the upper bound

\[
\epsilon_i \leq \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^p + k - i \delta_k + \sum_{k=0}^{p-1} \gamma^k \delta_k}{1 - \gamma^p}.
\]

Based on the assumption 2.1, we can also interpret 2 as following:

![Figure 2.2: Interpretation of 2](image)

Before establishing Proposition 2, we note that in the stationary case \( p = 1 \), the expression reduces to

\[
\epsilon_0 \leq \delta_0/(1 - \gamma).
\]

With \( \delta = \max_i \delta_i \), the bound also reduces to

\[
\epsilon_i \leq \frac{\delta}{1 - \gamma} \sum_{k=0}^{p-1} \gamma^k = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma^p} \frac{1 - \gamma^p}{1 - \gamma} = \frac{\delta}{1 - \gamma},
\]

which is a bound known in the literature. The bound in Proposition 2 is tighter, since it
does not replace $\delta_i$ by $\delta$. In fact, if instead of $\delta_i$ from Definition 2.3.3, we define

\[
\overline{\delta}_i = \max_{s \in S_i} (\overline{V}_{i+1}(s) - \overline{V}_i(s)),
\]  
(2.18)

\[
\underline{\delta}_i = \min_{s \in S_i} (\overline{V}_{i+1}(s) - \overline{V}_i(s)),
\]  
(2.19)

and consider $\tau_i$, $\epsilon_i$ as defined in (2.13), then the result of Proposition 2 translates to

\[
\tau_i \leq \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \overline{\delta}_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \overline{\delta}_k,
\]

\[
\epsilon_i \geq \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \underline{\delta}_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \underline{\delta}_k.
\]

**Corollary 2.3.4.** The value for $2\epsilon_k$ in Proposition 1 can be set to

\[
2\epsilon_k = \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} (\overline{\delta}_k - \underline{\delta}_k) + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} (\overline{\delta}_k - \underline{\delta}_k)}{1 - \gamma^p}.
\]  
(2.20)

As a preliminary to the proof of Proposition 2, we recall the following properties of the operators $T_i$.

1. Monotonicity: $V_{i+1} \succeq V'_{i+1}$ implies $T_i V_{i+1} \succeq T_i V'_{i+1}$, in the sense that $V_{i+1}(s) \geq V'_{i+1}(s)$ for all $s \in S_{i+1}$ implies $(T_i V_{i+1})(s) \geq (T_i V'_{i+1})(s)$ for all $s \in S_i$.

2. Uniform-shift: Let $1_i : S_i \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ denote the constant-valued function defined on $S_i$ with value one. Then for any $c \in \mathbb{R}$, it holds that that

\[
T_i(V_{i+1} + c1_{i+1}) = T_i V_{i+1} + c1_i,
\]

since for all $s \in S_i$,

\[
\max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_{i+1}} P_{ss'}^i(s')(V_{i+1}(s) + c)]
\]

\[
= \max_{a \in A_i} [R_i(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S_{i+1}} P_{ss'}^i(s')(V_{i+1}(s)) + \gamma c].
\]
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition of \( \delta_{i-1} \), we have

\[
\tilde{V}_{i-1}^\ell + \delta_{i-1}1_{i-1} \succeq T_{i-1}\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell.
\]  

(2.21)

Applying \( T_{i-2} \) to both sides of the inequality, and using the uniform-shift and monotonicity properties of \( T_{i-2} \), we get

\[
T_{i-2}\tilde{V}_{i-1}^\ell + \gamma\delta_{i-1}1_{i-2} \succeq T_{i-2}T_{i-1}\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell.
\]

By definition of \( \delta_{i-2} \), we deduce

\[
\tilde{V}_{i-2}^\ell + \delta_{i-2}1_{i-2} + \gamma\delta_{i-1}1_{i-2} \succeq T_{i-2}T_{i-1}\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell.
\]  

(2.22)

By repeating this process to cover a single cycle, we obtain the inequalities

\[
\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell + (\gamma^0\delta_i + \gamma^1\delta_{i+1} + \cdots + \gamma^{p-i-1}\delta_{p-1} + \\
\gamma^{p-i}\delta_0 + \cdots + \gamma^{p-1}\delta_{i-1})1_i
\]

\[
\succeq T_iT_{i+1}\cdots T_{p-1}T_0\cdots T_{i-1}\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell.
\]

By repeating this process to cover a single cycle, we obtain the inequalities

\[
\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell + (\gamma^0\delta_i + \gamma^1\delta_{i+1} + \cdots + \gamma^{p-i-1}\delta_{p-1} + \\
\gamma^{p-i}\delta_0 + \cdots + \gamma^{p-1}\delta_{i-1})1_i
\]

\[
\succeq T_iT_{i+1}\cdots T_{p-1}T_0\cdots T_{i-1}\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell.
\]

By induction over an infinite number of cycles, we obtain

\[
\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell + (\gamma^0 + \gamma^p + \gamma^{2p} + \cdots)\delta_i + \\
(\gamma^1 + \gamma^{p+1} + \gamma^{2p+1} + \cdots)\delta_{i+1} + \\
\cdots + \\
(\gamma^{p-1} + \gamma^{2p-1} + \gamma^{3p-1} + \cdots)\delta_{i-1}]1_i
\]

\[
= \tilde{V}_{i}^\ell + \left(\frac{\gamma^0}{1-\gamma^p}\delta_i + \frac{\gamma^1}{1-\gamma^p}\delta_{i+1} + \cdots + \frac{\gamma^{p-i-1}}{1-\gamma^p}\delta_{p-1} + \\
\frac{\gamma^{p-i}}{1-\gamma^p}\delta_0 + \cdots + \frac{\gamma^{p-1}}{1-\gamma^p}\delta_{i-1}\right)1_i
\]

\[
\succeq \lim_{N \to \infty} (T_iT_{i+1}\cdots T_{p-1}T_0\cdots T_{i-1})^N\tilde{V}_{i}^\ell
\]

\[
= V_i^*,
\]
where the last equality comes from the convergence of the value iteration algorithm for finding the fixed point $V_i^*$ of the operator $T_i$ as defined in (2.5).

Rearranging the terms of the inequality above, we obtain

$$\frac{1}{1 - \gamma^p} \left( \sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \delta_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \delta_k \right) \mathbf{1}_i \succeq V_i^* - \tilde{V}_i^\ell .$$

Over all states, this implies

$$\sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \delta_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \delta_k \geq \max_{s \in \mathcal{X}_i} (V_i^*(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s)) . \tag{2.23}$$

A similar reasoning starting from the inequality

$$\tilde{V}_{i-1}^\ell - \delta_{i-1} \mathbf{1}_{i-1} \preceq T_{i-1} \tilde{V}_i^\ell$$

leads to

$$- \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \delta_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \delta_k}{1 - \gamma^p} \leq \min_{s \in \mathcal{X}_i} (V_i^*(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s))$$

which together with (2.23) implies

$$\frac{\sum_{k=0}^{i-1} \gamma^{p+k-i} \delta_k + \sum_{k=i}^{p-1} \gamma^{k-i} \delta_k}{1 - \gamma^p} \geq \max_{s \in \mathcal{X}_i} |V_i^*(s) - \tilde{V}_i^\ell(s)| = \epsilon_i .$$

\[\square\]

### 2.4 Value iteration

In this section, we describe a value iteration algorithm suitable for periodic Markov Decision Processes in finite state-action spaces. The algorithm outputs a periodic value function $\tilde{V}$ such that a periodic policy greedy for $\tilde{V}$ is guaranteed to be (at least) $\eta$-optimal.
### 2.4.1 Iteration mechanism

The optimality condition \( V_0 = (T_0 \ldots T_{p-1})V_0 \) suggests a value iteration algorithm for solving the \( p \)-periodic Markov Decision Problem.

Given \( \eta > 0 \), the algorithm returns a periodic value function \( \tilde{V} = (\tilde{V}_0, \ldots \tilde{V}_{p-1}) \) such that a policy greedy for \( \tilde{V} \) is guaranteed to be (at least) \( \eta \)-optimal.

1. **Initialization**: Guess an initial value function \( \tilde{V}_0^\ell \) for \( \ell = 0 \) (for instance, \( \tilde{V}_0^\ell \equiv 0 \)).

2. **Value iteration**: Compute successively

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{V}_{p-1}^{\ell+1} &= T_{p-1}\tilde{V}_0^\ell, \\
\tilde{V}_{p-2}^{\ell+2} &= T_{p-2}\tilde{V}_{p-1}^{\ell+1}, \\
&\vdots \\
\tilde{V}_0^{\ell+p} &= T_0\tilde{V}_1^{\ell+p-1}.
\end{align*}
\]

For \( i = 0, \ldots, p-1 \), compute \( \delta_i, \delta_i^* \) from (2.18),(2.19), and \( 2\epsilon_i \) from (2.20).

Compute \( L_0 \) from (2.12).

3. Set \( \ell \leftarrow \ell + p \) and repeat Step 2 until the stopping criterion \( L_0 \leq \eta \) is met.

The value-iteration algorithm utilizes the bounds of Section 2.3 which are adapted to each value function in the cycle.

As it can be seen from (2.10), \( \tilde{L}_0(s) \leq \eta \) indicates that a policy greedy with respect to the current value function \( \tilde{V}^\ell \) is \( \eta \)-optimal. This does not imply that \( \tilde{V}_0^\ell \) represent the value of the policy, that is, that \( \tilde{V}_0^\ell \) has converged to \( V_0^* \). To see this, consider the example of a policy greedy with respect to \( V^* + c1 \) where \( c1 \) is a constant-valued function: this policy is optimal and its value is \( V_0^*(s) \) where \( s \) is the initial state.

### 2.4.2 Convergence rate

For a function \( V_i : \mathcal{S}_i \mapsto \mathbb{R} \), we consider the sup-norm

\[
||V_i||_{\infty,i} = \max_{s \in \mathcal{S}_i} |V_i(s)|,
\]
where we write max instead of sup because $\mathcal{S}_i$ is finite.

**Proposition 3.** The rate of convergence of the value iteration algorithm is governed by

$$||T_0^k V_0 - V_0^*||_{\infty,0} \leq \gamma^k ||V_0 - V_0^*||_{\infty,0} ,$$

computed using $\ell = kp$ iterations.

**Proof.** The mapping $T_i = (T_i T_{i+1} \ldots T_{p-1} T_0 \ldots T_{i-1})$ is contractive with modulus $\gamma^p$, in the sense that for all functions $V_i, V_i'$ from $\mathcal{S}_i$ to $\mathbb{R}$,

$$||T_i V_i - T_i V_i'||_{\infty, i} \leq \gamma^p ||V_i - V_i'||_{\infty, i} . \quad (2.24)$$

To see this, note first that the mappings $T_i$ are contractions with modulus $\gamma$, in the sense that, for $i = 0, \ldots, p-2$, the following property holds for all functions $V_{i+1}, V_{i+1}'$ from $\mathcal{S}_{i+1}$ to $\mathbb{R}$:

$$||T_i V_{i+1} - T_i V_{i+1}'||_{\infty, i} \leq \gamma ||V_{i+1} - V_{i+1}'||_{\infty, i+1} ,$$

and for $i = p - 1$, the following property holds for all functions $V_0, V_0'$ from $\mathcal{S}_0$ to $\mathbb{R}$:

$$||T_{p-1} V_0 - T_{p-1} V_0'||_{\infty, p-1} \leq \gamma ||V_0 - V_0'||_{\infty, 0} .$$

Then, by using the contractive property of the operators $T_k$ successively for $k = i, i+1, \ldots, p-1, 0, \ldots, i-1$, one gets

$$||T_i V_i - T_i V_i'||_{\infty, i}$$

$$= ||(T_i T_{i+1} \ldots T_{i-1}) V_i - (T_i T_{i+1} \ldots T_{i-1}) V_i'||_{\infty, i}$$

$$\leq \gamma ||(T_{i+1} \ldots T_{i-1}) V_i - (T_{i+1} \ldots T_{i-1}) V_i'||_{\infty, i+1}$$

$$\leq \cdots \leq \gamma^p ||V_i - V_i'||_{\infty, i} .$$
In particular, for $V'_i = V^*$, we have $T_i V^*_i = V^*_i$ and therefore

$$||T_i V_i - V^*_i||_{\infty,i} \leq \gamma^p ||V_i - V^*_i||_{\infty,i}.$$ 

It remains to set $i = 0$ and iterate $k$ times the mapping $T_0$ to get the result.

## 2.5 Application to grid-level storage operations

We consider a grid-level storage control problem where the goal is to operate a battery to exchange electricity with the power grid at the current hourly spot price. The problem is formulated as $p$-periodic Markov Decision Process where the goal is to maximize the expected net proceeds from the purchase and selling of electricity over an infinite horizon.

A very appealing feature of the periodic Markov Decision Process model proposed in this chapter is that its computational tractability will not be affected by adopting shorter time periods, for instance periods of 5 minutes or less, making it suitable for various storage devices with different physical characteristics (power and energy capacities) or operating at different time scales.

In our numerical implementation, we use C as our programming language, with OpenMP for parallel computations.

### 2.5.1 Model Description

The state $S_t$ is the current price $S_t^{\text{price}}$ and the battery energy charge level $S_t^{\text{battery}}$. The decision $A_t$ is the power at which we charge ($A_t < 0$) or discharge the battery ($A_t > 0$). The instantaneous reward $R_t$ is the revenue over the time period: price $\times$ energy injected to the grid,

$$R_t(S_t, A_t) = S_t^{\text{price}} A_t \Delta_t$$

where $\Delta_t$ is the time period duration (1 hour).

The discount factor $\gamma$ is set to 0.99. Hence the weight of the reward of tomorrow’s
hour-1 is $\gamma^{24} = 0.78$, and the weight of the reward of next week’s hour-1 is $\gamma^{168} = 0.18$.

The stochastic hourly price process is modeled as a cyclo-stationary process with a cycle length of $p = 24$ hours. The means are chosen to match the day-ahead prices posted by the independent system operator on the day preceding the exploitation of the policy. For the price volatility, we use the historical volatility of prices on similar days, although using implied volatility of options on forward contracts should yield better predictive distributions. Inter-hour correlations are neglected, but as the current price is in the state, specifying an order-1 Markov model for the price would simply change the state transition probabilities without increasing the complexity of the periodic MDP.

The hourly prices are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution $LN(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$. Other distributions could easily be accommodated. We formulate the problem on parameters estimated from PJM price data for one day of 2013, with historical volatilities estimated from prices of the corresponding month. The estimated parameters $\mu_i, \sigma_i$ are given in Table 2.1, along with the corresponding mean prices $\exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2)$.

For the battery, we use the parameters of a GM Chevy Volt battery pack repurposed for energy storage by ABB, having $C_{\text{battery}} = 10$ kWh of usable capacity [4]. We assume a power rating of $P_{\text{battery}} = 5$ kW, such that a full charge over the 10 kWh range can be done in 2 hours if desired. Intermediate charge and discharge rates are allowed, including the null injection $A_t = 0$ (pure storage).

The battery state transition function is given by

$$S_{t+1}^{\text{battery}} = S_t^{\text{battery}} - A_t \Delta t,$$

with a state-dependent action space defined by the constraints

$$-P_{\text{battery}} \leq A_t \leq P_{\text{battery}} \quad \text{(power capacity)},$$

$$S_t^{\text{battery}} - C_{\text{battery}} \leq A_t \Delta t \leq S_t^{\text{battery}} \quad \text{(energy capacity)}.$$

A more detailed battery model could easily be accommodated.
Table 2.1: Hourly prices: Lognormal parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour $i$</th>
<th>$\mu_i$</th>
<th>$\sigma_i$</th>
<th>$\exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2)$ [$/\text{MWh}$]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>25.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–18</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>47.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>48.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour $i$</th>
<th>$\mu_i$</th>
<th>$\sigma_i$</th>
<th>$\exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2)$ [$/\text{MWh}$]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>23.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–18</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>57.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>43.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour $i$</th>
<th>$\mu_i$</th>
<th>$\sigma_i$</th>
<th>$\exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2)$ [$/\text{MWh}$]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>15.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>31.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–18</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>48.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>32.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour $i$</th>
<th>$\mu_i$</th>
<th>$\sigma_i$</th>
<th>$\exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2)$ [$/\text{MWh}$]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>14.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>46.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13–18</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>48.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>30.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5.2 Finite State Approximation

For each hour $i$, the support of the price distribution is partitioned into $N = 20$ cells $[c_{i,j-1}, c_{i,j})$ of probability $1/N$, and discrete price levels $s^\text{price}_{i,j}$ are determined by computing the conditional expectation of the price given the cell:

\[ c_{i,j} = F^{-1}_i(j/N) = \exp(\mu_i + \sigma_i \Phi^{-1}(j/N)), \]

\[ j = 0, \ldots, N, \]

\[ s^\text{price}_{i,j} = \mathbb{E}[S^\text{price}_i \mid c_{i,j-1} \leq S^\text{price}_i \leq c_{i,j}] \]

\[ = \frac{\int_{c_{i,j-1}}^{c_{i,j}} xf_i(x)dx}{\int_{c_{i,j-1}}^{c_{i,j}} f_i(x)dx} \]

\[ = e^{\mu_i + \sigma_i^2/2} \left( \Phi(\Phi^{-1}(j/N) - \sigma_i) - \Phi(\Phi^{-1}(j-1/N) - \sigma_i) \right)/1/N, \]

where $F_i^{-1}$ and $f_i$ denote the inverse cumulative distribution function (inverse cdf) and probability density function (pdf) of the price, and $\Phi$ and $\Phi^{-1}$ denote the cdf and inverse cdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively.

By so doing, the rewards associated to the discrete prices will give the correct expected rewards for the original continuous distribution conditionally to being in the cell.

As for the battery state, we partition the operating range into a uniform grid of 50 discrete levels.
Figure 2.3 shows the discretized price levels who approximates the Lognormal distribution. Each time period we have 20 price levels and each price level has probability 0.05.
2.5.3 Results

Figure 2.4: Near-optimal periodic policy, from hour 1 (midnight to 1am) to hour 24. X-axis: charge level state (indexed from 1 to 50), Y-axis: period-dependent price state (indexed from 1 to 20). White: Charge at maximal rate (buy), Black: Discharge at maximal rate (sell), Gray: intermediate actions.

Figure 2.4 shows the near-optimal periodic policy returned by the value iteration algorithm, corresponding to the problem data of Table 2.1. The periodic policy and the price cells $c_{i,j}$ should be loaded into the battery controller and recomputed periodically, typically every day. Actions in real-time would be selected according to the charge level and the price-cell index hit by the spot price.

Figure 2.5: Running time (seconds) for different problem sizes and number of cores.
Figure 2.5 depict the running times for computing a near-optimal periodic policy, as a function of the number of cores used in our parallel implementation. The results of our experiments are consistent with parallel computing theory, which predicts that the more cores we use, the less efficiency gains we should get [83].

Figure 2.6: The threshold policy of 24 time periods

Figure 2.7: The threshold policy of 13th period

Figure 2.6 shows the threshold policy of the whole 24 time periods and particularly,
Figure 2.7 shows the threshold policy of time period 13. The region under blue line is the region where we charge and the target charge level (which may not be reached due to power rate) is on the blue line along the horizontal direction, i.e., $S'_2$ is the target level for state $S_2$. And the region above the green line is the discharging region where the target charge level is on the green line along the horizontal direction, i.e., $S'_1$ is the target level for state $S_1$. Finally, the region between green and blue line is where we do nothing. The proof of the property of threshold policy is provided in the Appendix A in detail.

2.6 Conclusion and future work

In this chapter, we revisit the framework of periodic Markov Decision Processes, motivated by the use of cyclo-stationary models to approximate the expected return of reward processes in non-stationary environments subject to seasonal effects. We apply the approach to a grid-level storage control problem to obtain a near-optimal periodic policy, computed efficiently by combining various techniques proposed in the chapter.

Although the numerical example demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach for a cycle of 24 periods of 1 hour, cycles defined on a much larger number of periods can be accommodated without losing tractability, for instance 1440 periods of 5 minutes for a daily cycle. This favorable property of the approach proposed in this chapter comes from the choice of considering policies based on the greedy optimization of value functions.

The ability to accommodate short duration periods is especially important for battery storage control problems, for two related reasons. First, in contrast to hydro storage, the capacity of batteries is tiny. Profitable operations can thus come from increasing the frequency of profitable charge-discharge cycles during the day, in addition to providing regulation services for the system operator. Second, if wholesale electricity spot prices are updated every five minutes, it makes sense to have a control policy adapted to this time resolution. The spot price fed into the battery storage control problem can then be interpreted as the expected average spot price over the next 5 minutes. The charging action determined by the model should be implemented at a uniform rate over the next 5 minutes. As the 5-min spot price is much more volatile than the hourly spot price, operating the
battery at the 5-minute time scale is much more effective than operating it at the one-hour
time scale.

The present work can be extended in several directions. The theoretical analysis could be extended to handle the case of an approximate evaluation of the Bellman iterations, and to handle approximate periodic value functions of a given approximation architecture. The value of a periodic policy used in a rolling-horizon fashion for appropriate classes of nonstationary problems could be studied in theory and numerically. The concept of using a cyclo-stationary reward process to approximate value functions at a terminal stage could be adapted to other approaches to stochastic optimization besides the Markov Decision Process framework.

A more realistic model for the battery should be implemented, to include the limited life cycles for batteries. We will discuss this model in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

Battery Operation with Aging

The material of this chapter has been published in paper


3.1 Introduction

With renewable energy having an increasing impact on power grid operations, research and development has been very active in energy storage technology [27, 96]. Meanwhile, more attention has been given to improve the operation of energy storage devices [57, 63]. While the basic strategy for market-based energy storage operations is to buy at low prices and sell at high prices [104], with battery storage the charging-discharging cycles also count against the life of the storage device [71]. The battery-life effect may affect optimal storage operations much more significantly than with other storage technologies. Therefore, the present paper focuses on optimal control algorithms for storage devices where aging induced by operations is significant.

3.1.1 Contributions and Related Work

The structure of optimal policies for battery operation problems is well known and has been analyzed previously, see e.g. [79, 104, 38, 92, 53, 54]. However, since batteries are
expensive to replace — see e.g. [2] — the aging phenomenon is expected to have a strong influence on the overall return on investment. Batteries experience degradations in terms of capacity fading and increased resistance with time. The factors affecting degradation include operation temperature, depth of discharge, and state-of-charge [49]. [71] provide a model which takes capacity degradations into account, through a so-called degradation function. In their analysis, they assume that the lost capacity is replaced immediately and model this as an instantaneous penalty. Our approach differs in that with our model the stage of deterioration of the battery is being tracked through an additional state variable, and the goal is to maximize the expected profit from operations over the entire battery life.

The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- We incorporate the aging phenomenon into a grid-level battery operation problem and formulate it as a Markov Decision Process with expected cumulated discounted rewards [84, 77, 44] where random electricity prices follow a given distribution. The optimal policy for this problem has the structure of a threshold policy, similarly to many problems admitting an optimal monotone policy [101, 36] that are often encountered in inventory theory.

- The value of modeling the end-of-life of the battery in the optimal control problem, versus neglecting it, is assessed in our computational work.

- We provide an algorithm for optimizing the set of state-dependent thresholds defining the policy. The algorithm is based on solving a sequence of quasiconvex optimization problems. The algorithm could be viewed as a policy-iteration scheme that utilizes problem structure to determine optimal parameters in the optimal order, owing to the decomposition of the global optimization problem into subproblems that can be solved to near-optimality. Under the assumption that the prices are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the proposed algorithm works directly in the continuous state space, and finds the exact optimal thresholds within the tolerance of the quasiconvex optimization subroutine.
• Computational results confirm that the proposed algorithm is faster and more accurate than general-purpose dynamic programming algorithms such as value iteration. With the proposed algorithm, there are no details to tune (such as the details of the finite state space approximation for value iteration), and the complexity is not affected by the discount factor.

• We provide the error analysis of the propagation of suboptimal solutions caused by the finite tolerance of the optimization subroutine. If the absolute tolerance of the subroutine solving the quasiconvex optimization problems is $\epsilon \geq 0$, the error on the value function of the problem is bounded by $\epsilon/(1-\gamma)$, where $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor.

• We later extend our threshold optimization approach to a more general type of price process, in particular, to a class of Markovian regime-switching processes. Our analysis establishes the global convergence and locally quadratic convergence of the sequence of iterates used to find the optimal thresholds.

Relating our results back to the existing algorithmic literature on dynamic programming, we note that the error bound for the proposed algorithm is the same as the error bound of approximate value iteration, which is known to be $\limsup_{k \to \infty} \|J_k - J^*\| \leq \epsilon/(1-\gamma)$, see e.g. [8], where in this expression $J^*$ is the optimal value function, $J_k$ is the approximate value function at iteration $k$ assuming that $\sup_s |J_k(s) - [TJ_{k-1}](s)| \leq \epsilon$, and $TJ_{k-1}$ denotes the update of the approximate value function $J_{k-1}$ by exact Bellman iteration. There is a difference in those bounds, however, in that with approximate value iteration $\epsilon$ can be relatively large (it is the largest approximation error among all states) while with the proposed approach, $\epsilon$ is related to the user-controlled tolerance of the optimization subroutine.

Concerning the convergence rate result, we recall that under ideal conditions, policy iteration converges to an optimal policy at a quadratic rate [78]. However, as pointed out by [87], these conditions involve an exact optimization for each state. The algorithm proposed here operates over the parameters of a parametric policy, belonging to a class containing
an optimal policy. The resulting problem, being finite-dimensional, can be solved to an arbitrary precision, thereby circumventing the impossibility, in a continuous state space, of finding an optimal decision for each state individually.

3.1.2 Organization

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 formulates the Markov Decision Process model for the battery operation problem. Section 3.3 provides the results related to the structure of the optimal policy. Section 3.4 develops the procedure that finds a sequence of optimal thresholds describing the optimal policy by maximizing a sequence of quasiconcave objective functions. Section 3.5 provides our error analysis for the purpose of showing that the proposed scheme is robust with respect to the finite tolerance of the optimization subroutine. Section 3.6 refines the battery model to take into account capacity deterioration and charging inefficiencies. Section 3.7 compares the proposed algorithm to the classical value iteration algorithm, illustrates the effect of variants in the battery model, and assesses the economic value of having the battery controlled by a policy aware of finite-life effects. Section 3.8 extends the price process model to a Markovian regime-switching model and establishes convergence rate results. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.

3.2 Model Description

This section describes the Markov Decision Process of the battery operation problem subject to battery aging. The time horizon for this problem is infinite, as battery aging is assumed not to occur when the battery is idle. The problem is described using the following notation.

- \( \mathcal{S} \) is the state space. The state at time \( t \), denoted \( S_t \), has three components: the charge level \( c_t \in \{0, 1\} \), the remaining life \( n_t \in \{0, 1, \ldots, N\} \) interpreted as a number of remaining charging cycles, and the market price \( p_t \), assumed to follow a given exogenous distribution. Thus, \( S_t = (c_t, n_t, p_t) \).

- \( \mathcal{A} \) is the decision space. The decision at time \( t \), denoted \( A_t \), is either \(-1 \) (discharge),
0 (idle), or +1 (charge). It is convenient to write \( \mathcal{D} \) for the subset of \( \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \) of feasible state-action pairs. The set of admissible decisions when being in state \( s \) is then denoted \( D(s) = \{ a \in \mathcal{A} : (s, a) \in \mathcal{D} \} \).

- \( P \) is the state transition probability function, that describes for each \( (s, a) \in \mathcal{D} \) the probability of going to the next state \( S_{t+1} \) when being in state \( S_t = s \) and choosing action \( A_t = a \).

- \( R : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \mapsto \mathbb{R} \) is the reward function, such that the reward at time \( t \) given \( S_t = s \), \( A_t = a \), is \( r_t = R(s, a) \).

The goal for this problem is to maximize the expected return over the infinite horizon, that is, to maximize the expected discounted sum of instantaneous rewards:

\[
V(s) = \max_\pi \mathbb{E}^\pi \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(S_t, A^\pi(S_t)) \mid S_0 = s \right],
\]

where \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) is the discount factor, and \( \pi \) is the policy that maps states to admissible decisions, as \( a_t = A^\pi(s_t) \in D(s_t) \). Without loss of optimality we assume that the policy is stationary, see e.g. [77].

The transition function can be described as follows.

- The price follows a known distribution. The prices are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) among time periods. (This is revisited in Section 3.8.)

- When \( n_t \geq 1 \), whenever the battery is discharged \( (a_t = -1) \) the remaining life cycle counter \( n_t \) is decremented of one unit. During charge or idle operations, the remaining life cycle counter does not change. Thus,

\[
(c_{t+1}, n_{t+1}) = \begin{cases} 
(c_t + a_t, n_t) & \text{if } a_t \in \{0, 1\}, \\
(c_t + a_t, n_t - 1) & \text{if } a_t = -1.
\end{cases}
\]

- \( n_t = 0 \) is a terminal state (end of battery life). By the transition rule above, the charge level always becomes \( c_t = 0 \) when entering \( n_t = 0 \). The price \( p_t \) continues to
evolve but we may as well assume the full state process $S_t$ is stopped when entering $n_t = 0$.

The reward function is described as

$$R(s_t, a_t) = p_t(-a_t)$$

under the convention that $a_t$ is admissible in state $s_t$. In states with $c_t = 1$, $a_t \in \{-1, 0\}$.

In states with $n_t \geq 1$ and $c_t = 0$, $a_t \in \{0, 1\}$. (The battery storage model is revisited in Section 3.6.)

### 3.3 Threshold Policy

In this section, we analyze the properties of the problem modeled in Section 3.2. Proposition 4 shows that there are price thresholds that determine the optimal decisions.

**Proposition 4.** For each remaining life cycles $n \geq 1$,

a) There exists a critical price level $\theta^{1,*}_{n_t}$, depending on $n$, such that an optimal action in each state $S_t = (c_t, n_t, p_t)$ for $c_t = 1$ is

$$A^\pi(1, n_t, p_t) = \begin{cases} 
-1 & \text{if } p_t \geq \theta^{1,*}_{n_t}, \\
0 & \text{if } p_t < \theta^{1,*}_{n_t}.
\end{cases}$$

b) There exists a critical price level $\theta^{0,*}_{n_t}$, depending on $n$, such that an optimal action in each state $S_t = (c_t, n_t, p_t)$ for $c_t = 0$ is

$$A^\pi(0, n_t, p_t) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } p_t \leq \theta^{0,*}_{n_t}, \\
0 & \text{if } p_t > \theta^{0,*}_{n_t}.
\end{cases}$$

**Proof of Proposition 4.** (For convenience, in this proof we omit the subscript $t$ in $c_t, n_t, p_t$ and $s_t, a_t$. The next price is still written $p_{t+1}$.)
The instantaneous reward $R(s,a)$ defined in (3.3) only depends on the price state variable $p$ and the decision $a$, so for simplicity we use the shorthand notation $R(p,a)$. We write the value function (3.1) as

$$V(c,n,p) = \max_{a \in A(c,n)} Q(c,n,p,a)$$

where

$$Q(c,n,p,a) = R(p,a) + \gamma E[V(c+a,n-1 \mid n \geq 1, a=-1, p_{t+1})].$$

Note that $V(c,0,p) = 0$ since there is no future reward when $n$ attains 0.

Fix some arbitrary prices $p, p'$ such that $p < p'$. Whenever $a = 0$ we have $Q(c,n,p,a) = Q(c,n,p',a) = E[V(c,n,p_{t+1})]$ since $R(\cdot,0) = 0$ and the distribution of $p_{t+1}$ does not depend on $p$.

If $c = 1$ then

$$Q(1,n,p,-1) = p + \gamma E[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})]$$

$$< p' + \gamma E[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})] = Q(1,n,p',-1).$$

Thus if $c = 1$ and $a = -1$ is optimal at price $p$, meaning $Q(1,n,p,-1) \geq Q(1,n,p,0)$, we also have

$$Q(1,n,p',-1) > Q(1,n,p,-1) \geq Q(1,n,p,0) = Q(1,n,p',0),$$

that is, $a = -1$ is also optimal at any price $p' > p$. Hence there exists a critical threshold price $\theta_{n}^{1,*}$ such that $a = 0$ if $p < \theta_{n}^{1,*}$ and $a = 1$ if $p \geq \theta_{n}^{1,*}$.

If $c = 0$ then

$$Q(0,n,p,1) = -p + \gamma E[V(1,n,p_{t+1})]$$

$$> -p' + \gamma E[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] = Q(0,n,p',1).$$

Thus if $c = 0$ and $a = 1$ is optimal at price $p'$, meaning $Q(0,n,p',1) \geq Q(0,n,p',0)$, we
also have
\[ Q(0, n, p, 1) > Q(0, n, p', 1) \geq Q(0, n, p', 0) = Q(0, n, p, 0), \]

that is, \( a = 1 \) is also optimal at any price \( p < p' \). Hence there exists a critical threshold price \( \theta^n_{*}^p \) such that \( a = 0 \) if \( p > \theta^n_{*}^p \) and \( a = 1 \) if \( p \leq \theta^n_{*}^p \).

The optimal thresholds can be related to the optimal value function (3.1). This is done in Proposition 5, below. First, we state two simple properties of the value function.

**Lemma 3.3.1.** The value function \( V(c, n, p) \) is nondecreasing in \( n \) for each fixed \( (c, p) \).

*Proof.* Fix \( c \) and \( p \). If \( n < n' \) then \( V(c, n, p) \leq V(c, n', p) \) since it is always possible, starting from \( n' \), to pretend we are starting at \( n'' = n \), use the corresponding optimal policy, and then remain forever idle \( (a = 0) \) when \( n'' \) reaches 0, even though \( n' - n \) cycles remain in reality.

**Lemma 3.3.2.** Assuming the price is always nonnegative, the value function \( V(c, n, p) \) is nondecreasing in \( c \) for each fixed \( (n, p) \). In fact, \( 0 \leq V(1, n, p) - V(0, n, p) \leq p \).

*Proof.* Fix \( c, c' \) such that \( 0 = c < c' = 1 \). We have \( V(c', n, p) \geq V(c, n, p) \) since from \( c' \) it is always possible to pretend we are starting from \( c \) and use the corresponding policy, except that the first time the policy prescribes \( a_t = 1 \) assuming \( c_t = 0 \), which costs \( p_t \), we use \( a_t = 0 \) at \( c_t = 1 \), which costs 0. In both cases we arrive at \( c_{t+1} = 1 \) and \( n_{t+1} = n \). This establishes \( V(1, n, p) - V(0, n, p) \geq 0 \) assuming \( p_t \) is always nonnegative.

We also have
\[
p + V(0, n, p) = p + \max\{Q(0, n, p, 0), Q(0, n, p, 1)\}
\]
\[
= p + \max\{\gamma \mathbb{E}[V(0, n, p_{t+1})], -p + \gamma \mathbb{E}[V(1, n, p_{t+1})]\}
\]
\[
= \max\{p + \gamma \mathbb{E}[V(0, n, p_{t+1})], \gamma \mathbb{E}[V(1, n, p_{t+1})]\}
\]
\[
\geq \max\{p + \gamma \mathbb{E}[V(0, n - 1, p_{t+1})], \gamma \mathbb{E}[V(1, n, p_{t+1})]\}
\]
\[
= \max\{Q(1, n, p, -1), Q(1, n, p, 0)\} = V(1, n, p),
\]

where the inequality is due to Lemma 3.3.1. Thus \( V(1, n, p) - V(0, n, p) \leq p \).
Proposition 5. There exist optimal price thresholds $\theta_{n,0}^*, \theta_{n,1}^*$ that can be expressed using the optimal value function (3.1):

\begin{align*}
\theta_{n,0}^* &= \gamma(\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] - \mathbb{E}[V(0,n,p_{t+1})]), \\
\theta_{n,1}^* &= \gamma(\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] - \mathbb{E}[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})]).
\end{align*}

In particular, $\theta_{n,1}^* - \theta_{n,0}^* = \gamma(\mathbb{E}[V(0,n,p_{t+1})] - \mathbb{E}[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})]) \geq 0$.

Proof. Fix $n$. An optimal threshold $\theta_{n,0}^*$ at life $n$ can be uniquely chosen as

\begin{align*}
\theta_{n,0}^* &= \arg\max_p \{ p : Q(0,n,p,1) \geq Q(0,n,p,0) \} \\
&= \arg\max_p \{ p : -p + \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] \geq \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(0,n,p_{t+1})] \} \\
&= \arg\max_p \{ p : -p + \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] = \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(0,n,p_{t+1})] \} \\
&= \gamma(\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] - \mathbb{E}[V(0,n,p_{t+1})]).
\end{align*}

Similarly, an optimal threshold $\theta_{n,1}^*$ at life $n$ can be uniquely chosen as

\begin{align*}
\theta_{n,1}^* &= \arg\min_p \{ p : Q(1,n,p,-1) \geq Q(1,n,p,0) \} \\
&= \arg\min_p \{ p : p + \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})] \geq \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] \} \\
&= \arg\min_p \{ p : p + \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})] = \gamma\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] \} \\
&= \gamma(\mathbb{E}[V(1,n,p_{t+1})] - \mathbb{E}[V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})]).
\end{align*}

The sign of $(\theta_{n,1}^* - \theta_{n,0}^*)$ is due to Lemma 3.3.1 applied to each $p = p_{t+1}$. □

This section concludes with a few remarks.

- Proposition 5 shows that the existence of two distinct thresholds is due to the finiteness of the battery life. Indeed, if $n \to \infty$, we have $\lim_{n \to \infty} V(0,n,p_{t+1}) = \lim_{n \to \infty} V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})$ and thus $\lim_{n \to \infty} (\theta_{n,1}^* - \theta_{n,0}^*) = 0$. Furthermore, if $n \to \infty$, the single inequality in the proof of Lemma 3.3.2 becomes an equality, leading to
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} [V(0, n, p_{t+1}) - V(1, n, p_{t+1})] = p. \]

It then follows from (3.4) and (3.5) that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_n^{1*} = \lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_n^{0*} = \gamma \mathbb{E}[p_{t+1}],
\]

recovering a known result for battery operations without life limit constraints.

- Independently of the state of charge, the battery is necessarily idle when the price remains in the interval \((\theta_n^{0*}, \theta_n^{1*})\). This because the battery remains idle when \(c_t = 0\) and the price is above \(\theta_n^{0*}\), and when \(c_t = 1\) and the price is below \(\theta_n^{1*}\).

- Proposition 5 shows that \(\theta_n^{0*} \leq \theta_n^{1*}\) for all \(n\), and Equation (3.6) suggests that when a new storage device is put in service with \(n\) sufficiently large, the two thresholds coincide. This can suggest that as the battery ages \((n \to 0)\), the spread \((\theta_n^{1*} - \theta_n^{0*})\) widens. The existence of an optimal policy for which the spread widens monotonically with \(n\) will be formally established by Proposition 10 in Section 3.4, and also illustrated in Section 3.7. Since the spread widens, the storage device is expected to spend more time sitting idle as it ages.

### 3.4 Analysis

Dynamic programming methods such as value iteration, policy iteration or linear optimization can solve the model described in Section 3.2, or at least a finite-state approximation thereof. However, we seek to avoid an explicit computation of the value function, due to the following shortages:

- If the price state variable is discretized, the determination of the optimal thresholds is inaccurate.

- Convergence may be slow, especially when the discount factor is close to 1.

- There is limited value in establishing the structure of an optimal policy if ultimately, numerical calculations are unable to exploit it.
In this section, we analyze the problem of directly finding the optimal thresholds without constructing a value function such as $V(c, n, p)$. This section establishes that we can calculate the optimal thresholds by maximizing a sequence of quasiconcave functions.

### 3.4.1 Threshold Policy Evaluation

In this section, we fix a threshold policy $\pi$ described by some arbitrary thresholds $\theta^0_n$ and $\theta^1_n$ for $1 \leq n \leq N$, and we evaluate the expected value of this policy:

$$V^\pi(s) = \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R(S_t, A^\pi(S_t)) \bigg| S_0 = s \right]. \quad (3.7)$$

We assume that the prices $p_t$ are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (The price process model is extended in Section 3.8.) We assume that $p_t$ admits a probability density function (pdf) denoted $f$. The corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) is denoted $F$.

At the beginning of period $t$, the price $p_t$ is posted. The state $(c_t, n_t, p_t)$ is known, and so is the action $a_t$ since we fixed the policy. As we know $a_t$, at the beginning of period $t$ we can also predict the next state of charge $c_{t+1}$ and the next remaining life $n_{t+1}$. The only part of the next state that remain uncertain is the next price $p_{t+1}$ (denoted $p'$ in the sequel).

Let $\pi_n$ be the probability that charging will occur at the next period, given that the remaining life will be $n$ at the next period, the next state of charge will be $c = 0$, and given the price of the current period. Noting that the next price and next action are independent of the current price conditionally to knowing $n$ and $c$, charging will occur if the next price $p'$ is less than or equal to $\theta^0_n$, thus

$$\pi_n = \text{Prob}(p' \leq \theta^0_n) = \int_0^{\theta^0_n} f(p)dp = F(\theta^0_n). \quad (3.8)$$

Let $e^0_n$ denote the expected price at the next period, if charging occurs at the next period, the remaining life at the next period is $n$, and knowing the current price. By the same
token we have

\[ e_n^0 = \mathbb{E}[p' \mid p' \leq \theta_n^0] = \int_0^{\theta_n^0} pf(p)dp / \pi_n. \] (3.9)

Similarly, let \( \rho_n \) be the probability that discharging will occur at the next period, given that the remaining life will be \( n \) at the next period, the next state of charge will be \( c = 1 \), and knowing the current price. Discharging will occur if the next price \( p' \) is greater than or equal to \( \theta_n^1 \), thus

\[ \rho_n = \text{Prob}(p' \geq \theta_n^1) = \int_{\theta_n^1}^{\infty} f(p)dp = 1 - F(\theta_n^1). \] (3.10)

Let \( e_n^1 \) denote the expected price at the next period, if discharging occurs at the next period, the remaining life at the next period is \( n \), and knowing the current price. We have

\[ e_n^1 = \mathbb{E}[p' \mid p' \geq \theta_n^1] = \int_{\theta_n^1}^{\infty} pf(p)dp / \rho_n. \] (3.11)

Let \( \tilde{V}_{n,c}^{\pi} \) with \( c \in \{0, 1\} \), \( 1 \leq n \leq N \), denote the expected value function at the next state, when the next state of charge is \( c \), the next remaining-life state is \( n \), the current price is known, and we follow policy \( \pi \). By the same logic as before,

\[ \tilde{V}_{n}^{0,\pi} := \mathbb{E}_{p'}[V^\pi(0,n,p')], \] (3.12)

\[ \tilde{V}_{n}^{1,\pi} := \mathbb{E}_{p'}[V^\pi(1,n,p')]. \] (3.13)

We evaluate \( \tilde{V}_{n,c}^{\pi} \) by backward induction, as follows. If charging occurs at the next period, the expected reward is \(-e_n^0\). If discharging occurs at the next period, the expected reward is \( e_n^1 \). If the battery remains idle, the reward is 0. For convenience, set \( \tilde{V}_0^{0,\pi} = 0 \); then by backward induction, with \( n = 1, \ldots, N \),

\[ \tilde{V}_{n}^{1,\pi} = (1 - \rho_n)[0 + \gamma \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{1,\pi}] + \rho_n[e_n^1 + \gamma \tilde{V}_{n}^{0,\pi}], \] (3.14)

\[ \tilde{V}_{n}^{0,\pi} = (1 - \pi_n)[0 + \gamma \tilde{V}_{n}^{0,\pi}] + \pi_n[-e_n^0 + \gamma \tilde{V}_{n}^{1,\pi}]. \] (3.15)
Equivalently,
\[
\bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} = \frac{-\pi_n e_n^0}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n^n)} + \frac{\gamma \pi_n V_n^{1,\pi}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n^n)},
\]
\( (3.16) \)
\[
\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi} = \frac{\rho_n e_n^1}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n^n)} + \frac{\gamma \rho_n \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n^n)}.
\]
\( (3.17) \)

The value function \((3.7)\) for policy \(\pi\) can then be obtained from the values \(\bar{V}_n^{\pi,\pi}\), noting that the value of being in state \(s = (c, n, p)\) and following policy \(\pi\) is
\[
V^\pi(s) = \begin{cases} 
-p + \gamma \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi} & \text{if } c = 0 \text{ and } p \leq \theta_n^0, \\
\gamma \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} & \text{if } c = 0 \text{ and } p > \theta_n^0, \\
p + \gamma \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi} & \text{if } c = 1 \text{ and } p \geq \theta_n^1, \\
\gamma \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi} & \text{if } c = 1 \text{ and } p < \theta_n^1.
\end{cases}
\]
\( (3.18) \)

We stress that the entities intervening in \((3.8–3.18)\), namely \(\pi_n, \rho_n, e_n^0, e_n^1, \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}, \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\), all depend on the policy \(\pi\) under evaluation, which is parameterized by the thresholds \(\theta = \{\theta_n^0, \theta_n^1\}_{1 \leq n \leq N}\). That is, these entities depend on \(\theta\).

### 3.4.2 Threshold Policy Optimization

Consider \(\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\) in \((3.17)\). Observe that \(\rho_n\) and \(e_n^1\) only depend on \(\theta_n^1\), while \(\bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}\) does not depend on \(\theta_n^1\), and actually only depends on \(\theta_k^1\) and \(\theta_k^0\) for \(k = 1, \ldots, n - 1\). Also observe that since \(\gamma \rho_n/(1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n))\) is nonnegative by virtue of \(0 < \gamma < 1\) and \(0 \leq \rho_n \leq 1\), we can maximize \(\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\) by first having \(\bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi}\) maximized, and then maximizing \(\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\) over \(\theta_n^1\) only.

The same reasoning applies to \(\bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}\) in \((3.16)\): we can maximize \(\bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}\) by first having \(\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\) maximized, and then maximizing \(\bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi}\) over \(\theta_n^0\) only, since \(\pi_n\) and \(e_n^0\) only depend on \(\theta_n^0\), while \(\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}\) only depends on \(\theta_n^1\) and on \(\theta_k^0\) and \(\theta_k^1\) for \(k = 1, \ldots, n - 1\), and since \(\gamma \pi_n/(1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n^n))\) is nonnegative.

Therefore we essentially have \(V_n^{0,\pi} := V^0(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}), V_n^{1,\pi} := V^1(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi})\), and we can determine optimal threshold parameters \(\theta_n^{0,*}, \theta_n^{1,*}\) by setting \(V_0^{0,*} = 0\) for convenience and
solving the nested scalar maximization problems for \( n = 1, \ldots, N \),

\[
\bar{V}_1 = \max_{\theta_1^*} \bar{V}_1(\theta_1, \bar{V}_{n-1}) = \max_{\theta_n^*} \frac{\rho_n e_1 + \gamma \rho_n V_{n-1}^*}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)} \\
= \max_{\theta_n^*} \int_0^\infty p f(p) dp + \gamma (1 - F(\theta_n)) \bar{V}_{n-1}^*,
\]

(3.19)

\[
\bar{V}_0 = \max_{\theta_0^*} \bar{V}_0(\theta_0, \bar{V}_1^*) = \max_{\theta_n^*} \frac{-\pi_n e_0 + \gamma \pi_n \bar{V}_1^*}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)} \\
= \max_{\theta_n^*} -\int_0^\theta \pi_n(p) \frac{pf(p) dp + \gamma F(\theta_n) \bar{V}_1^*}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)}.
\]

(3.20)

Hence we have a chain of optimization problems to solve in the following order:

\[
0 \xrightarrow{\theta_1^*} \bar{V}_1^* \xrightarrow{\theta_0^*} \bar{V}_0^* \xrightarrow{\theta_1^*} \bar{V}_1^* \xrightarrow{\theta_0^*} \bar{V}_0^* \xrightarrow{\theta_1^*} \bar{V}_1^* \ldots \xrightarrow{\theta_N^*} \bar{V}_N^*.
\]

The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 6 below.

**Lemma 3.4.1.** \( \bar{V}_{n}^{0,\pi} \) is upper-bounded by

\[
\bar{V}_n^{0,*} = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[ \gamma \mu F(\gamma \mu) - \int_0^{\gamma \mu} p f(p) dp \right]
\]

where \( \mu := E[p_{t+1}] \).

In particular, this implies the inequality

\[
(1 - \gamma) \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} \leq \gamma \mu.
\]

(3.21)

**Proof of Lemma 3.4.1.** By definition, \( \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} \leq \bar{V}_n^{0,*} \). From Lemma 3.3.1, we know that \( V(0, n, p) \leq V(0, n + 1, p) \) for each \( p \). In particular, \( V(0, n, p) \leq \lim_{n' \to \infty} V(0, n', p) \).

Therefore, by the monotone convergence theorem,

\[
\bar{V}_n^{0,*} = E[V(0, n, p_{t+1})] \leq E[V(0, n', p_{t+1})] = \lim_{n' \to \infty} \bar{V}_n^{0,*} := \bar{V}_n^{0,*}.
\]

By (3.6), \( \bar{V}_\infty^{0,*} \) is attained at \( \theta = \lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_n^0 = \lim_{n \to \infty} \theta_n^1 = \gamma \mu \), where \( \mu = E[p_{t+1}] \).
Define
\[
\rho = \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n = 1 - F(\gamma \mu), \quad \pi = \lim_{n \to \infty} \pi_n = F(\gamma \mu),
\]
\[
e^0 = \lim_{n \to \infty} e^0_n = \int_0^{\gamma \mu} p f(p) dp / \pi, \quad e^1 = \lim_{n \to \infty} e^1_n = \int_{\gamma \mu}^{\infty} p f(p) dp / \rho.
\]

Note the relations \(\rho = 1 - \pi\) and \(\pi e^0 + \rho e^1 = \mu\), which do not hold for finite \(n\). Substituting (3.17) into (3.16) with \(n \to \infty\), we get
\[
\bar{V}_{0,*}^\infty = \frac{-\pi e^0}{1 - \gamma(1 - \pi)} + \frac{\gamma \pi}{1 - \gamma(1 - \pi)} \left[ \frac{\mu - \pi e^0}{1 - \gamma \pi} + \frac{\gamma(1 - \pi) \bar{V}_{0,*}^\infty}{1 - \gamma \pi} \right].
\]

After some simple manipulations the solution reduces to
\[
\bar{V}_{0,*}^\infty = \frac{\pi(\gamma \mu - e^0)}{1 - \gamma} = \frac{\gamma \mu F(\gamma \mu) - \int_0^{\gamma \mu} p f(p) f p}{1 - \gamma}.
\]

(3.21) is due to \(\bar{V}_{n,*}^0 \leq \bar{V}_{\infty,*}^0\), \(\gamma \mu \geq 0\), \(F(\gamma \mu) \leq 1\), and \(\int_0^{\gamma \mu} p f(p) f p \geq 0\).

**Proposition 6.** The function \(\bar{V}^0(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_{n,1,*}^1)\) is quasiconcave in the threshold \(\theta_n^0\). Furthermore, if the price distribution is supported on \((0, +\infty)\), then \(\bar{V}^0(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_{n,1,*}^1)\) is strictly quasiconcave in \(\theta_n^0\).

Similarly, the function \(\bar{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_{n,0,*}^0)\) is quasiconcave in \(\theta_n^1\), and strictly quasiconcave in \(\theta_n^1\) if the price distribution is supported on \((0, +\infty)\).

**Proof.** The partial derivative of \(\bar{V}^0\) with respect to \(\theta_n^0\) is
\[
\frac{\partial \bar{V}^0}{\partial \theta_n^0} = \frac{f(\theta_n^0) g(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_{n,1,*}^1)}{(1 - \gamma(1 - F(\theta_n^0)))^2},
\]
where we have defined
\[
g(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_{n,1,*}^1) := \gamma(1 - \gamma) \bar{V}_{n,1,*}^1 - (1 - \gamma) \theta_n^0 - \gamma \theta_n^0 F(\theta_n^0) + \gamma \int_0^{\theta_n^0} p f(p) dp. \tag{3.22}
\]

If we can show that there is a point \(\theta_n^0\) such that \(\frac{\partial \bar{V}^0}{\partial \theta_n^0} \geq 0\) on \((0, \theta_n^0)\) and \(\frac{\partial \bar{V}^0}{\partial \theta_n^0} \leq 0\) on \((\theta_n^0, \infty)\), then we will have showed that the function \(\bar{V}^0\) is quasiconcave in \(\theta_n^0\), see e.g. [9].
If the inequalities are strict, we will have showed that the function is strictly quasiconcave.

Clearly, the denominator is positive: \[1 - \gamma(1 - F(\theta_n^0))^2 > 0,\] since \(0 < \gamma < 1\). Clearly, \(f(\theta_n^0) \geq 0\), and if the price is supported on \((0, +\infty)\), then \(f(\theta_n^0) > 0\) on that interval. Therefore we are left with studying the sign of \(g\).

We have
\[
g(0, \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) = \gamma(1 - \gamma)\bar{V}_n^{1,*} \geq 0,
\]
assuming \(\bar{V}_n^{1,*} \geq 0\) since the always-idle policy attains the zero expected value.

The partial derivative of \(g\) with respect to \(\theta_n^0\) is
\[
\frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta_n^0} = -(1 - \gamma) - \gamma F(\theta_n^0) - \gamma\theta_n^0 f(\theta_n^0) + \gamma \theta_n^0 f(\theta_n^0)
\]
\[
= -1 + \gamma(1 - F(\theta_n^0)) < 0.
\]

Therefore \(g(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_n^{1,*})\) is decreasing in \(\theta_n^0\), and considering the sign of \(g\) at 0, we can conclude that there exist a critical \(\theta_n^0\) such that \(g(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) > 0\) on \((0, \theta_n^0)\) and \(g(\theta_n^0) < 0\) on \((\theta_n^0, \infty)\). It follows that \(\bar{V}^0\) is quasiconcave in \(\theta_n^0\), and strictly quasiconcave provided \(f(\theta_n^0) > 0\) on \((0, +\infty)\).

The proof is similar for \(\bar{V}^1\), except that it requires Lemma 3.4.1. The proof of the quasiconcavity \(\bar{V}^1\) in \(\theta_n^1\) relies on the following expressions:

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{V}^1}{\partial \theta_n^1} = \frac{f(\theta_n^1)h(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_n^{0,*})}{(1 - \gamma F(\theta_n^1))^2},
\]
where
\[
h(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) := -\theta_n^1 - \gamma(1 - \gamma)\bar{V}_n^{0,*} + \theta_n^1 \gamma F(\theta_n^1) + \gamma \int_{\theta_n^1}^{\infty} pf(p)dp,
\]
Equation (3.21) in Lemma 3.4.1 is used to assert that \(h(0, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) \geq 0\). Therefore, since \(\partial h/\partial \theta_n^1 < -(1 - \gamma) < 0\), there exists a critical \(\theta_n^1\) such that \(h > 0\) on \((0, \theta_n^1)\) and \(h < 0\) on \((\theta_n^1, \infty)\).

First-order optimality conditions for quasiconvex optimization problems are well known but rely on a generalization of the notion of subdifferential [32, 47]. If the problem is strictly
quasiconvex, then the usual subdifferential or gradient is sufficient to express first-order optimality conditions.

The proof of Proposition 6 shows that the objective is not strictly quasiconcave due to the possibility of having regions where the probability density function of the price is zero. This leads to the following result.

**Proposition 7.** Sufficient optimality conditions for the thresholds $\theta_n^0$, $\theta_n^1$ are given by the implicit equations

\[ g(\theta_n^{0,*}, \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) = 0, \quad (3.24) \]
\[ h(\theta_n^{1,*}, \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,*}) = 0, \quad (3.25) \]

with the functions $g$ and $h$ defined by (3.22) and (3.23). The solutions to (3.24) and (3.25) are unique.

**Proof.** Without loss of optimality, we can always restrict the thresholds to lie on the set where the density of the price is nonzero. Therefore, for maximizing $\bar{V}_0$ and $\bar{V}_1$, we can replace the necessary conditions $\partial \bar{V}_0 / \partial \theta_n^0 = 0$ and $\partial \bar{V}_1 / \partial \theta_n^1 = 0$ by the sufficient conditions (3.24), (3.25).

The uniqueness of the solution to each equation follows from the implicit function theorem [25] applied separately to each equation, where

\[ \frac{\partial g}{\partial \theta_n^0} = -1 + \gamma (1 - F(\theta_n^0)) < 0, \quad \frac{\partial h}{\partial \theta_n^1} = -1 + \gamma F(\theta_n^1) < 0, \]

showing that the partial derivatives are invertible. \(\square\)

**Proposition 8.** Let the thresholds $\theta_n^{0,*}, \theta_n^{1,*}$ be determined by (3.24) and (3.25). Then we have

\[ \bar{V}_n^{1,*} = \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,*} + \theta_n^{1,*} / \gamma, \quad \bar{V}_n^{0,*} = \bar{V}_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*} / \gamma. \]
Table 3.1: Algorithm for optimizing the thresholds.

Let $\bar{V}_0 = 0$. Then for $n = 1, \ldots, N$:

1. Solve $h(\theta_1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}) = 0$ given by (3.23) to find $\theta_1^{1,*}$.

2. Compute $\tilde{V}_n = \tilde{V}_{n-1} + \theta_1^{1,*}/\gamma$.

3. Solve $g(\theta_0, \tilde{V}_n) = 0$ given by (3.22) to find $\theta_0^{1,*}$.

4. Compute $\bar{V}_n = \tilde{V}_n - \theta_0^{1,*}/\gamma$.

Proof. From (3.23), $h(\theta_1^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_{n-1}) = 0$ implies in particular

$$\int_{\theta_1^{1,*}}^{\infty} pf(p) dp = \theta_1^{1,*}/\gamma + (1 - \gamma)|\tilde{V}_{n-1} - \theta_0^{1,*}F(\theta_1^{1,*})|.$$ 

This expression is then substituted into the objective in (3.19).

From (3.22), $g(\theta_0^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n) = 0$ implies in particular

$$\int_{0}^{\theta_0^{1,*}} pf(p) dp = (1 - \gamma)(\theta_0^{1,*}/\gamma - \tilde{V}_n) + \theta_0^{1,*}F(\theta_0^{1,*}).$$

This expression is then substituted into the objective in (3.20).

Alternatively, we use (3.4) and (3.5) to directly show the result.

Our algorithm for determining optimal thresholds is based on Propositions 7 and 8. It is summarized in Table 3.1.

**Proposition 9.** Suppose $g(\theta_0^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n) = 0$ and $h(\theta_0^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_{n-1}) = 0$. Then the solution $\theta_0$ to $g(\theta_0, \tilde{V}) = 0$ for $\tilde{V}$ in a neighborhood of $\tilde{V}_n$, and the solution $\theta_1$ to $h(\theta_1, \tilde{V}_0) = 0$ for $\tilde{V}_0$ in a neighborhood of $\tilde{V}_{n-1}$, admit first-order expansions described as

$$\theta_0 = \theta_0^{1,*} + \frac{(1 - \gamma)\gamma}{1 - \gamma(1 - F(\theta_0^{1,*}))}(|\tilde{V}_n - \tilde{V}_1^{1,*}|) + o(|\tilde{V}_n - \tilde{V}_1^{1,*}|),$$

$$\theta_1 = \theta_1^{1,*} - \frac{(1 - \gamma)\gamma}{1 - \gamma F(\theta_1^{1,*})}(|\tilde{V}_0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0|) + o(|\tilde{V}_0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0|).$$
Proof of Proposition 9. This follows from implicit differentiation applied to the implicit equation $g(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_n^1) = 0$ in a neighborhood of the solution $(\theta_n^0, \bar{V}_n^1)$ and from implicit differentiation of $h(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_n^0) = 0$ in a neighborhood of the solution $(\theta_n^1, \bar{V}_n^0)$, noting that $\partial g/\partial \theta_n^0 < 0, \partial h/\partial \theta_n^1 < 0$, and $\partial g/\partial \bar{V}_n^1 = \gamma(1-\gamma) = -\partial h/\partial \bar{V}_n^0$.

**Proposition 10.** The calculated optimal thresholds are such that $\theta_n^{0,*}$ is nondecreasing in $n$ and $\theta_n^{1,*}$ is nonincreasing in $n$.

Proof of Proposition 10. From Lemma 3.3.1 at each $p = p_{t+1}$ we have $\bar{V}_n^{1,*} - \bar{V}_n^{1,-} = E[V(1,n,p_{t+1})-V(1,n-1,p_{t+1})] \geq 0$ and $\bar{V}_n^{0,*} - \bar{V}_n^{0,-} = E[V(0,n,p_{t+1})-V(0,n-1,p_{t+1})] \geq 0$, that is, $\bar{V}_n^{1,*} - \bar{V}_n^{1,-} \geq 0$ and $\bar{V}_n^{0,*} - \bar{V}_n^{0,-} \geq 0$.

The threshold $\theta_n^{0,*}$ is defined by the implicit equation $g(\theta_n^{0,*}, \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) = 0$. From the proof of Proposition 6, $g$ is decreasing in $\theta_n^0$. It can be seen from (3.22) that $g$ is increasing in $\bar{V}_n^{1,*}$. Therefore, since the threshold $\theta_n^{0,*}$ is described by the implicit equation $g(\theta_n^{0,*}, \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) = 0$, it follows that $\bar{V}_n^{1,*} \leq \bar{V}_n^{1,*}$ implies $\theta_n^{0,*} \leq \theta_n^{0,*}$.

Similarly, $\theta_n^{1,*}$ is defined by $h(\theta_n^{1,*}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) = 0$. From the proof of Proposition 6, $h$ is decreasing in $\theta_n^1$. It can be seen from (3.23) that $h$ is decreasing in $\bar{V}_n^{0,*}$. Therefore, since the threshold $\theta_n^{1,*}$ is defined by $g(\theta_n^{1,*}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) = 0$, it follows that $\bar{V}_n^{0,*} \geq \bar{V}_n^{0,*}$ implies $\theta_n^{1,*} \leq \theta_n^{1,*}$.

Recall from Proposition 5 that $\theta_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*} \geq 0$, and from (3.6) that $\lim_{n \to \infty} (\theta_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*}) = 0$. Proposition 10 allows us to conclude that as $n$ increases, $\theta_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*}$ monotonically decreases to 0.

It also follows from Proposition 10 that $\bar{V}_n^{1,*} - \bar{V}_n^{0,*} \leq \bar{V}_n^{1,*} - \bar{V}_n^{0,*}$, given (3.4) combined with $\theta_n^{0,*} \leq \theta_n^{0,*}$.

### 3.5 Error Analysis

This section evaluates the propagation of errors when the steps of the algorithm summarized in Table 3.1 are not carried out exactly.
Given \( \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 \), let

\[
\tilde{V}_1^* = \max_{\tilde{\theta}_n^1} \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0), \quad \tilde{\theta}_n^1 = \arg\max_{\theta_n^1} \tilde{V}_n^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0)
\]

be the exact optimal value to the perturbed optimization problem obtained by replacing \( \bar{V}_{n-1}^0 \) by \( \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 \) in (3.19), and the corresponding optimal solution uniquely defined by

\[
g(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) = 0. \quad \text{In particular we have} \quad \tilde{V}_1^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) = \tilde{V}_1^1.
\]

It is assumed that a near-optimal value \( \tilde{V}_1^* \) can be found for the perturbed optimization problem, in the sense that

\[
\tilde{V}_1^1 + \epsilon \geq \tilde{V}_1^*, \quad \text{for some } \epsilon > 0.
\] (3.26)

We denote by \( \tilde{\theta}_n^1 \) the near-optimal solution that attains \( \tilde{V}_1^1 = \tilde{V}_1^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) \).

Similarly, let

\[
\tilde{V}_0^* = \max_{\tilde{\theta}_n^0} \tilde{V}_n^0(\tilde{\theta}_n^0, \tilde{V}_1^1), \quad \tilde{\theta}_n^0 = \arg\max_{\theta_n^0} \tilde{V}_n^0(\theta_n^0, \tilde{V}_1^1)
\]

be the exact optimal value to the perturbed optimization problem obtained by replacing \( \tilde{V}_1^1 \) by \( \tilde{V}_n^1 \) in (3.20), and the corresponding optimal solution uniquely defined by

\[
h(\tilde{\theta}_n^0, \tilde{V}_1^1) = 0. \quad \text{In particular we have} \quad \tilde{V}_0(\tilde{\theta}_n^0, \tilde{V}_1^1) = \tilde{V}_0^*.
\]

It is assumed that a near-optimal value \( \tilde{V}_n^0 \) can be found for the perturbed optimization problem, in the sense that

\[
\tilde{V}_n^0 + \epsilon \geq \tilde{V}_n^0, \quad \text{for some } \epsilon > 0.
\] (3.27)

We denote by \( \tilde{\theta}_n^0 \) the near-optimal solution that attains \( \tilde{V}_n^0 = \tilde{V}_0^0(\tilde{\theta}_n^0, \tilde{V}_1^1) \).

**Lemma 3.5.1.** The function \( c_\gamma(x) := \frac{x}{1-\gamma(1-x)} \) defined over \( x \in [0, 1] \) satisfies \( 0 \leq c_\gamma(x) \leq 1 \).

**Proof.** Assume \( x \in [0, 1] \) and \( 0 < \gamma < 1 \). The function \( c_\gamma \) is increasing since \( dc_\gamma/dx = (1 - \gamma)/(1 - \gamma(1 - x))^2 > 0 \), thus its minimum and maximum are attained at \( x = 0 \) and
$x = 1$ respectively.

Lemma 3.5.2. Suppose $|\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0,*}| \leq \delta_n$. Then we have $|\tilde{V}_n^1 - \tilde{V}_n^{1,*}| \leq \gamma \delta_n + \epsilon$.

Proof. By definition of $\tilde{V}_n^1$ and $\tilde{V}_n^{1,*}$, we have

$$0 \leq \tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^1 = \tilde{V}^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0}) - \tilde{V}^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_n^{0}) \leq \epsilon. \quad (3.28)$$

By definition of $\tilde{V}_n^{1,*}$, for any $\theta_n^1$ we have

$$\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} = \tilde{V}^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0}) \geq \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_n^{0}). \quad (3.29)$$

First, consider the case where $\tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0,*} \geq \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0$ and thus $\tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0,*} - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 \leq \delta_n$. We will establish that $0 \leq \tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^1 \leq \gamma \delta_n + \epsilon$.

From (3.16), for any fixed $\theta_n^1$ we have

$$\tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0,*}) - \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) = \frac{\gamma \rho_n}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)} (V_{n-1}^{0,*} - V_{n-1}^0).$$

Lemma 3.5.1 with $x = \rho_n \in [0, 1]$ then implies

$$0 \leq \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0,*}) - \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^1, \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) \leq \gamma (V_{n-1}^{0,*} - V_{n-1}^0). \quad (3.30)$$

We then proceed with evaluating

$$\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^1$$

$$\quad = \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0,*}) - \tilde{V}^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{V}_n^{0})$$

$$\quad \leq \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0,*}) - \tilde{V}^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0}) + \epsilon \quad \text{by rightmost inequality of (3.28)}$$

$$\quad \leq \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0,*}) - \tilde{V}^1(\theta_n^{1,*}, \tilde{V}_n^{0}) + \epsilon \quad \text{by (3.29) with } \theta_n^1 = \theta_n^{1,*}$$

$$\quad \leq \gamma (V_{n-1}^{0,*} - V_{n-1}^0) + \epsilon \quad \text{by rightmost inequality of (3.30) with } \theta_n^1 = \theta_n^{1,*}$$

$$\quad \leq \gamma \delta_n + \epsilon.$$
We also have
\[
\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^1 = \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0)
\]
\[
\geq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by leftmost inequality of (3.28)}
\]
\[
\geq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by definition of } \tilde{V}_n^{1,*}
\]
\[
\geq 0 \quad \text{by (3.30) with } \theta_n^1 = \tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}.
\]

Second, consider the case where \(\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 \leq \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0\) and thus \(\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 \leq \delta_n\). We will establish that \(\epsilon \leq \tilde{\theta}_n^1 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{1,*} \leq \gamma \delta_n\).

From (3.16) and Lemma 3.5.1 we have, for any \(\tilde{\theta}_n^1\),
\[
0 \leq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^1, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \leq \gamma(\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0).
\] (3.31)

We then proceed with evaluating
\[
\tilde{V}_n^1 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{1,*} = \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0)
\]
\[
\leq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by (3.29)}
\]
\[
\leq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by definition of } \tilde{V}_n^{1,*}
\]
\[
\leq \gamma(\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by rightmost inequality of (3.31) with } \theta_n^1 = \tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}
\]
\[
\leq \gamma \delta_n.
\]

We also have
\[
\tilde{V}_n^1 - \tilde{V}_{n-1}^{1,*} = \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0)
\]
\[
\geq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by (3.28)}
\]
\[
\geq \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) - \tilde{V}_n^1(\tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}, \tilde{\theta}_{n-1}^0) \quad \text{by definition of } \tilde{V}_n^{1,*}
\]
\[
\geq -\epsilon \quad \text{by leftmost inequality of (3.31) with } \theta_n^1 = \tilde{\theta}_n^{1,*}.
\]

From the two cases, it follows that the inequality of the proposition is verified. □
**Lemma 3.5.3.** Suppose $|\tilde{V}_n^1 - \hat{V}_n^{1,*}| \leq \delta'_n$. Then we have $|\tilde{V}_n^0 - \hat{V}_n^{0,*}| \leq \gamma \delta'_n + \epsilon$.

The proof of Lemma 3.5.3 is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 3.5.2 and is thus omitted.

The results of Lemmas 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 remain valid under the assumption that $|\tilde{V}_n^1 - \hat{V}_n^{1,*}| \leq \epsilon$ and $|\tilde{V}_n^0 - \hat{V}_n^{0,*}| \leq \epsilon$. Those inequalities are slightly weaker than (3.26) and (3.27) and correspond to the case where the optimal value is not estimated precisely. The corresponding proof works by replacing 0 by $-\epsilon$ in the lefthand side of (3.28).

**Proposition 11.** Let the algorithm in Table 3.1 be implemented, except that $\hat{V}_{n-1}^0$ is replaced by $\tilde{V}_{n-1}^0$ following (3.27), and $\hat{V}_n^{1,*}$ is replaced by $\tilde{V}_n^1$ following (3.26). We initialize with $\tilde{V}_0^0 = 0$. Then, the propagation of errors among iterations is such that

$$|\tilde{V}_n^1 - \hat{V}_n^1| \leq \frac{1 - \gamma^{2n-1}}{1 - \gamma} \epsilon \quad \text{and} \quad |\tilde{V}_n^0 - \hat{V}_n^0| \leq \frac{1 - \gamma^{2n}}{1 - \gamma} \epsilon,$$

guaranteeing that $|\tilde{V}_n^{c,*} - \hat{V}_n^{c,*}| \leq \epsilon/(1 - \gamma)$ for all $n$ and for $c = 0, 1$.

**Proof.** Using Lemma 3.5.2 and Lemma 3.5.3 alternatively, starting from $V_0^{0,*} = \hat{V}_0^0 = 0$, we obtain

$$|\tilde{V}_1^1 - \hat{V}_1^1| \leq \gamma \cdot 0 + \epsilon = \epsilon,$$

$$|\tilde{V}_1^0 - \hat{V}_1^0| \leq \gamma \epsilon + \epsilon,$$

$$|\tilde{V}_2^1 - \hat{V}_2^1| \leq \gamma (\gamma \epsilon + \epsilon) + \epsilon = \gamma^2 \epsilon + \gamma \epsilon + \epsilon,$$

$$|\tilde{V}_2^0 - \hat{V}_2^0| \leq \gamma^3 \epsilon + \gamma^2 \epsilon + \gamma \epsilon + \epsilon,$$

and thus in general for $n \geq 1$,

$$|\tilde{V}_n^1 - \hat{V}_n^1| \leq \sum_{k=0}^{2n-2} \gamma^k \epsilon = \frac{1 - \gamma^{2n-1}}{1 - \gamma} \epsilon, \quad |\tilde{V}_n^0 - \hat{V}_n^0| \leq \sum_{k=0}^{2n-1} \gamma^k \epsilon = \frac{1 - \gamma^{2n}}{1 - \gamma} \epsilon.$$

$\blacksquare$
Table 3.2: Algorithm for optimizing the price thresholds under battery capacity deterioration and inefficiencies.

Set \((C_0/C_1)\tilde{V}_0 = 0\) for convenience. Then for \(n = 1, \ldots, N:\)

1. Solve \(h(\theta_{1*}^n, (\eta_{\text{dis}}^n)^{-1}(C_{n-1}/C_n)\tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0*}) = 0\) with \(h\) given by (3.23) to find \(\theta_{1*}^n\).

2. Compute \(\tilde{V}_1 = (C_{n-1}/C_n)\tilde{V}_{n-1}^{0*} + (\eta_{\text{ch}}^n / \gamma)\theta_{1*}^n\).

3. Solve \(g(\theta_{0*}^n, \eta_{\text{ch}} \tilde{V}_1) = 0\) with \(g\) given by (3.22) to find \(\theta_{0*}^n\).

4. Compute \(\tilde{V}_0 = \tilde{V}_1 - \theta_{0*}^n / (\gamma \eta_{\text{ch}}^n)\).

### 3.6 Extensions of the Storage Device Model

This section considers modifications of the storage device model, so as to represent other non-ideal characteristics of battery storage. It shows how the results of the previous sections can be extended to solve the modified problem.

First, we now recognize that charging cycles adversely affect storage capacity. The battery model is completed by a *capacity function* \(C\) that describes the storage capacity as a function of the remaining cycles:

\[
C_n = C(n).
\]  

(3.32)

We assume \(C\) is nondecreasing in \(n\), and nonnegative.

Second, we now recognize that energy losses occur during the charging and discharging operations. We suppose that the cost of charging a unit-capacity battery is \((\eta_{\text{ch}}^n)^{-1} p_t > p_t\), and the reward of discharging a unit-capacity battery is \(\eta_{\text{dis}}^n p_t < p_t\), where \(\eta_{\text{ch}}^n, \eta_{\text{dis}}^n \in (0, 1]\) are the charging and discharging efficiency coefficients, possibly dependent on the remaining life \(n\).

**Proposition 12.** Suppose the storage device has non-ideal characteristics: a deteriorating storage capacity \(C(n)\), and charging and discharging efficiencies \(\eta_{\text{ch}}^n, \eta_{\text{dis}}^n \in (0, 1]\). Then, optimal thresholds can be computed by the algorithm in Table 3.2.
Proof. Observe that if the capacity of the battery is a constant $\beta$, the reward function defined for a unit capacity battery is scaled by $\beta$, and so are the value functions. Furthermore, the threshold policy for the unit-capacity device is still optimal for the $\beta$-capacity device.

Suppose we keep the convention that $\bar{V}_n^1$ and $\bar{V}_n^0$ are defined for unit-capacity storage devices. Then, (3.16) and (3.17) become

$$C_n \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} = \frac{-(\eta_n^{ch})^{-1}C_n\pi_n e_0}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)} + \frac{\gamma \pi_n C_n \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)},$$

$$C_n \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi} = \frac{\eta_n^{dis} C_n \rho_n e_n^1}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)} + \frac{\gamma \rho_n C_n^{-1} \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}_{n-1}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)}.$$

We get the optimal threshold $\theta_n^{1,*}$ by maximizing the scaled objective

$$\bar{V}_n^{1,\pi} / \eta_n^{dis} = \frac{\rho_n e_n^1}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)} + \frac{\gamma \rho_n (\eta_n^{dis})^{-1} (C_{n-1}/C_n) \bar{V}_n^{0,*}_{n-1}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)},$$

that is, by solving $h(\theta_n^{1,*}, (\eta_n^{dis})^{-1} (C_{n-1}/C_n) \bar{V}_n^{0,*}_{n-1}) = 0$. The optimal $\bar{V}_n^{1,*}$ is then described as

$$\bar{V}_n^{1,*} = (C_{n-1}/C_n) \bar{V}_n^{0,*}_{n-1} + (\eta_n^{dis} / \gamma) \theta_n^{1,*}.$$

Similarly, we get the optimal threshold $\theta_n^{0,*}$ by maximizing the scaled objective

$$\eta_n^{ch} \bar{V}_n^{0} = \frac{-\pi_n e_0}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)} + \frac{\gamma \pi_n \eta_n^{ch} \bar{V}_n^{1,*}}{1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n)},$$

that is, by solving $g(\theta_n^{0,*}, \eta_n^{ch} \bar{V}_n^{1,*}) = 0$. The optimal $\bar{V}_n^{0,*}$ is then described as

$$\bar{V}_n^{0,*} = \bar{V}_n^{1,*} - (\eta_n^{ch})^{-1} \theta_n^{0,*}.$$
3.7 Computational Results

Our computational results are presented in this section.

We consider a problem where the discount factor is $\gamma = 0.999$, and the battery has a life of $N = 2000$ cycles. We assume the price follows a lognormal distribution $LN(\mu_0, \sigma_0^2)$ with $\mu_0 = 4$ and $\sigma_0 = 0.50$. Thus, the optimal price threshold for the infinite-life battery is $\theta^*_\infty = \gamma E[p_{t+1}] = \gamma \exp(\mu_0 + \sigma_0^2/2) = 61.8059$. We also consider a variant of the problem where $\gamma = 0.9999$ and thus $\theta^*_\infty = 61.8616$.

Our codes are written in Matlab and are run on a pc equipped with a 2.80GHz Intel Xeon processor.

3.7.1 Performance of the Proposed Algorithm

We compare the proposed approach to the value iteration algorithm from the literature [8], in terms of accuracy and computational speed. Both algorithms have access to the density $f$ and cumulative distribution function $F$ of the price.

The value iteration (VI) algorithm approximates the continuous price state into discrete price states for the purpose of assigning a decision to each price level. Thus, in value iteration there is a tradeoff between accuracy and complexity. We use a uniform grid of price states $p^m = 0.00, 0.01, \ldots, 500.00$, noting that $\text{Prob}(p_{t+1} > 500) < 10^{-5}$. The price $p^m$ is assigned the probability $w^m = F((p^{m+1} + p^m)/2) - F((p^m + p^{m-1})/2)$. By convention, for $p^m = 0$ we have $p^{m-1} = 0$, and for $p^m = 500$ we have $p^{m+1} = \infty$. We also take advantage of the analysis of the paper, by maximizing the discrete-price approximation $V_{VI}$ of $V(c, n, p)$ sequentially: for a fixed $n$, we use the following iteration over $k$ until convergence,

$$V_{VI}^{k+1}(1, n, p^m) = \max\{ + p^m + \gamma \sum_i w^i V_{VI}^k(0, n - 1, p^i),$$
$$0 + \sum_i w^i V_{VI}^k(1, n, p^i) \} \quad \text{for all } m,$$

$$V_{VI}^{k+1}(0, n, p^m) = \max\{ - p^m + \gamma \sum_i w^i V_{VI}^{k+1}(1, n, p^i),$$
$$0 + \sum_i w^i V_{VI}^k(0, n, p^i) \} \quad \text{for all } m.$$
Table 3.3: Price thresholds calculated by Value Iteration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life state $n$</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>1000</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.999$</td>
<td>$\theta_{n}^{1,*}$</td>
<td>131.61</td>
<td>95.76</td>
<td>83.15</td>
<td>64.37</td>
<td>62.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\theta_{n}^{0,*}$</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>44.46</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>60.12</td>
<td>61.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.9999$</td>
<td>$\theta_{n}^{1,*}$</td>
<td>194.31</td>
<td>148.74</td>
<td>131.19</td>
<td>95.67</td>
<td>83.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\theta_{n}^{0,*}$</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>30.43</td>
<td>34.06</td>
<td>44.61</td>
<td>49.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that only $\sum_{i} w_i V_{VI}^{*}(0, n - 1, p^i)$ is transferred to the next fixed-point problem relative to the next $n$. Intermediate variables (not shown) store sums calculated once. In summary, we solve small fixed-point problems to converge to $V_{VI}^{*}(\cdot, n, \cdot)$, for $n = 1, \ldots, N$, instead of maximizing $V_{VI}$ via a single large fixed-point problem.

The results are reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. It can be seen from the tables that the threshold values are very close. In terms of computational times however, for the case $\gamma = 0.999$ it takes 9.6 seconds to solve the problem with value iteration, compared to 0.75 seconds to solve the problem exactly with the proposed threshold optimization algorithm. Thus, the proposed algorithm is significantly faster.

If we reduce the number of price states to accelerate value iteration, the accuracy starts deteriorating, relatively to the exact results of Table 3.4. For instance, if we truncate the price distribution at 350 instead of 500, noting that $P(p_{t+1} > 350) \simeq 10^{-4}$, we obtain $\theta_{10}^{1} = 131.55$ instead of the exact value 131.6191, while the computational time is reduced to 6.7 seconds.

It is well known that the complexity of value iteration or policy iteration is greatly affected by the proximity to 1 of the discount factor, see [88]. This is confirmed here, where we observe that value iteration now takes 40 seconds if the discount factor is set to $\gamma = 0.9999$. Unlike value iteration, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is independent of the discount factor, and it takes a similarly short time of 0.78 seconds to compute the thresholds with $\gamma = 0.9999$. 

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Table 3.4: Price thresholds calculated by our algorithm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life state n</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>1000</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 0.999 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_n^{1,*} )</td>
<td>131.619</td>
<td>95.7515</td>
<td>83.1412</td>
<td>64.3610</td>
<td>62.1062</td>
<td>61.8106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_n^{0,*} )</td>
<td>33.7848</td>
<td>44.4674</td>
<td>49.8020</td>
<td>60.1277</td>
<td>61.6049</td>
<td>61.8028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 0.9999 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_n^{1,*} )</td>
<td>194.4449</td>
<td>148.7545</td>
<td>131.1973</td>
<td>95.6708</td>
<td>83.1240</td>
<td>72.9190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_n^{0,*} )</td>
<td>23.7513</td>
<td>30.4317</td>
<td>34.0608</td>
<td>44.6154</td>
<td>49.9148</td>
<td>55.1110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.7.2 Impact of Non-Ideal Battery Characteristics

We illustrate the impact of the deteriorating battery capacity and of inefficiencies on the optimal price thresholds. Using \( \gamma = 0.999 \) and the same lognormal distribution for the price, the capacity deterioration is described by specifying the capacity when \( n \) cycles remain,

\[
C_n = n/(100 + n) \quad \text{for } n = 1, \ldots, N.
\]

In particular, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} C_n = 1 \). The efficiencies are \( \eta_n^{\text{ch}} = \eta_n^{\text{dis}} = 0.9 \). (Hence the round-trip efficiency is \( \eta_n^{\text{ch},\text{dis}} = 0.81 \).) The impact of the model modifications are presented in Figure 3.1. Since the threshold computation algorithm works by rescaling the value functions that parameterize the equations \( h = 0 \) and \( g = 0 \), and since the impact of altering the value function is well understood (proof of Proposition 10), we expect to see a greater value for the difference \( \theta_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*} \), which is indeed an effect visible on the figure.

We also report some indicators on the usage of the battery device. We report the probability \( \pi_n = F(\theta_n^{0,*}) \) that a discharged battery buys energy, and the probability \( \rho_n = 1 - F(\theta_n^{1,*}) \) that a charged battery sells energy, as a function of \( n \). This is done in Figure 3.2a for the three battery models described above. As the number of remaining cycles decreases, the probability of battery operation (charging or discharging) decreases.

It is useful to relate the probabilities \( \pi_n, \rho_n \) to the expected number of periods the battery occupies state \( n \), i.e. to the expected \( n \)-th cycle time. This cycle time is equal to

\[
\tau_n := \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (i + 1) \pi_n (1 - \pi_n) + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (j + 1) \rho_n (1 - \rho_n) = 1/\pi_n + 1/\rho_n,
\]
Figure 3.1: Comparison of price thresholds, as a function of $n$. Continuous line: base case corresponding to Table 3.4 ($\gamma = 0.999$). Dashed: With capacity deterioration. Dotted: With capacity deterioration and charging-discharging inefficiency.

Figure 3.2: Information on storage usage. Continuous line: base case ($\gamma = 0.999$). Dashed: With capacity deterioration. Dotted: With capacity deterioration and charging-discharging inefficiency.
where $i$ and $j$ correspond to the time spent idle before charging and discharging respectively.

We also show, on Figure 3.2b, the expected discounted profit of the $n$-th charge-discharge cycle, assuming the time is set to 0 when entering state $n$. This profit, denoted $\bar{v}_n$, is defined in three steps, with $i$ and $j$ interpreted as the idle times,

$$
\bar{v}_1^n = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (1 - \rho_n)^j \rho_n \gamma^j (\eta^{\text{dis}} c_{1n}^1) = \rho_n (\eta^{\text{dis}} c_{1n}^1) / [1 - \gamma (1 - \rho_n)]
$$

$$
\bar{v}_0^n = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} (1 - \pi_n)^i \pi_n \gamma^i (- (e_{0n} / \eta^{\text{ch}}) + \gamma \bar{v}_1^n) = \pi_n (-e_{0n} / \eta^{\text{ch}} + \gamma \bar{v}_1^n) /
$$

$$
1 - \gamma (1 - \pi_n),
$$

$$
\bar{v}_n = C_n \cdot \bar{v}_0^n.
$$

### 3.7.3 Economic Value of the Finite-Life Model

Finally, we comment on the value of taking into account the finiteness of the battery life in formulating the battery control problem, and on the impact of the discount factor $\gamma$.

To do this, we adopt the thresholds that are optimal for an infinite-life battery ($N \to \infty$), and compute the value of the objective (3.7) under this policy. For the perfectly efficient battery with infinite life, the thresholds are given by (3.6). Table 3.5 compares those values to the optimal objective values attained by the policy aware of the finiteness of battery life. The difference in expected values underscores the importance of implementing the control law optimized with the correct assumptions on battery life. When $\gamma = 0.999$, we have $\gamma^N = 0.1352$ if $N = 2000$, indicating that the objective will not weight much the return obtained at the end of the battery life. When $\gamma = 0.9999$, we have $\gamma^N = 0.8187$ if $N = 2000$, which explains that in this case, the value of taking into account the finiteness of the battery life is now clearly visible.

### 3.8 Extension of the Price Model

This section considers an extension of the price process to a regime-switching price model, in order to be able to capture more realistic price processes.

We assume that the price $p_t$, conditionally to being in state $m_t = m$, has density $f_m$ (cdf: $F_m$), where $m_t \in \{1, \ldots, M\}$ is a finite-state Markov chain. The state $m_t$ is used to
Table 3.5: Value of taking into account the finite life of the storage device.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery life N</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>1000</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.999$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{V}<em>{N}^{0,\pi} \mid \theta</em>{n}^{c} = \theta_{\infty}^{c}$</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>2287</td>
<td>4144</td>
<td>10655</td>
<td>11986</td>
<td>12174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{V}<em>{N}^{0,*} \mid \theta</em>{n}^{c} = \theta_{n}^{c,*}$</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>3936</td>
<td>5985</td>
<td>11191</td>
<td>12057</td>
<td>12175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>147.97%</td>
<td>72.12%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>5.03%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.9999$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{V}<em>{N}^{0,\pi} \mid \theta</em>{n}^{c} = \theta_{\infty}^{c}$</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3185</td>
<td>6284</td>
<td>28218</td>
<td>49625</td>
<td>78187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{V}<em>{N}^{0,*} \mid \theta</em>{n}^{c} = \theta_{n}^{c,*}$</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7460</td>
<td>12773</td>
<td>39862</td>
<td>60335</td>
<td>84689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>208.99%</td>
<td>134.22%</td>
<td>103.28%</td>
<td>41.27%</td>
<td>21.58%</td>
<td>8.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

indicate the regime for the price process. The one-step state transition probability matrix for $m_t$ is denoted $T \in \mathbb{R}^{M \times M}$. Thus:

$$\text{Prob}(m_{t+1} = j \mid m_t = i) = T_{ij}, \quad \text{Prob}(p_t \leq p \mid m_t = m) = F_m(p).$$

(3.33)

The regime state can be used as a device to distinguish periods of low prices versus price spikes, periods of low versus high price volatility, the time index of a seasonal process, etc. See [65] and [108] for discussions.

In the limit case where the densities $f_m$ degenerate to a single point, $m_t$ becomes a sufficient statistic for $p_t$, and the price process degenerates to a finite-state Markov chain.

From the conditional independence assumption in (3.33), an optimal policy can still be described using a finite number of thresholds, now indexed by the state $m$. Thus, we can restrict the search to policies such that

$$a_t = A^{\pi}(c_t, n_t, p_t, m_t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c_t = 0 \text{ and } p_t \leq \theta_{n_t, m_t}^{0}, \\ -1 & \text{if } c_t = 1 \text{ and } p_t \geq \theta_{n_t, m_t}^{1}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases}$$

(3.34)

where $\theta_{n,m}^{0}, \theta_{n,m}^{1}$ are the threshold parameters describing a policy $\pi$. 65
3.8.1 Threshold Policy Evaluation

Generalizing previous definitions, let \( \bar{V}_{n,m}^{c,\pi} \) be the expected value function at the successor state when the current regime state is \( m \), the next state of charge is \( c \in \{0, 1\} \), the next remaining-life state is \( n \), and the policy \( \pi \) is followed. Thus, the expectation is over the next regime state and price. It is easy to verify on the two-regime case (\( M = 2 \)) that by backward induction,

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\bar{V}_{n,1}^{0,\pi} \\
\bar{V}_{n,2}^{0,\pi}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
T_{11} & T_{12} \\
T_{21} & T_{22}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
(1 - \pi_{n,1})[0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,1}^{0,\pi}] + \pi_{n,1}[-e_{n,1}^0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,1}^{1,\pi}] \\
(1 - \pi_{n,2})[0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,2}^{0,\pi}] + \pi_{n,2}[-e_{n,2}^0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,2}^{1,\pi}]
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\bar{V}_{n,1}^{1,\pi} \\
\bar{V}_{n,2}^{1,\pi}
\end{bmatrix} =
\begin{bmatrix}
T_{11} & T_{12} \\
T_{21} & T_{22}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
(1 - \rho_{n,1})[0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,1}^{1,\pi}] + \rho_{n,1}[e_{n,1}^1 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n-1,1}^{0,\pi}] \\
(1 - \rho_{n,2})[0 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n,2}^{1,\pi}] + \rho_{n,2}[e_{n,2}^1 + \gamma \bar{V}_{n-1,2}^{0,\pi}]
\end{bmatrix},
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_{n,m} &= F_m(\theta_{n,m}^0), \\
e_{n,m}^0 &= \int_0^\theta_{n,m}^0 p f_m(p) dp / \pi_{n,m}, \quad (3.8\text{-}3.9') \\
\rho_{n,m} &= 1 - F_m(\theta_{n,m}^1), \\
e_{n,m}^1 &= \int_\theta_{n,m}^1^\infty p f_m(p) dp / \rho_{n,m}. \quad (3.10\text{-}3.11')
\end{align*}
\]

By convention, \( \pi_{n,m} e_{n,m}^0 = 0 \) if \( \pi_{n,m} = 0 \), and \( \rho_{n,m} e_{n,m}^1 = 0 \) if \( \rho_{n,m} = 0 \). This arises if one respectively never charges or never discharges when being in regime \( m \).

We can write this in vector form, as follows (the extension to \( M > 2 \) is then immediate).

Let \( \text{Diag}(x) \) denote the diagonal matrix with diagonal \( x \). Let \( I \) be the identity matrix.

Define

\[
\begin{align*}
V_n^{c,\pi} &= \begin{bmatrix} V_{n,1}^{c,\pi} \\ V_{n,2}^{c,\pi} \end{bmatrix}, \\
e_n^c &= \begin{bmatrix} e_{n,1}^c \\ e_{n,2}^c \end{bmatrix}, \\
\pi_n &= \begin{bmatrix} \pi_{n,1} \\ \pi_{n,2} \end{bmatrix}, \\
\rho_n &= \begin{bmatrix} \rho_{n,1} \\ \rho_{n,2} \end{bmatrix}, \\
D_{\pi_n} &= \text{Diag}(\pi_n), \\
D_{\rho_n} &= \text{Diag}(\rho_n).
\end{align*}
\]

From the expression \( \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} = T(I - D_{\pi_n}) \gamma \bar{V}_n^{0,\pi} + TD_{\pi_n}(-e_n^0 + \gamma \bar{V}_n^{1,\pi}) \) and similarly from
the expression \( \bar{V}^1_n = T(I - D_{\rho_n}) \gamma V^1_n + TD_{\rho_n}(e^1_n + \gamma V^0_{n-1}) \) we obtain

\[
\bar{V}^0_n = A^{-1}_{\pi_n} TD_{\pi_n}(e^0_n + \gamma \bar{V}^1_n), \quad A_{\pi_n} = I - \gamma T(I - D_{\pi_n}), \tag{3.16'}
\]

\[
\bar{V}^1_n = A^{-1}_{\rho_n} TD_{\rho_n}(e^1_n + \gamma \bar{V}^0_{n-1}), \quad A_{\rho_n} = I - \gamma T(I - D_{\rho_n}). \tag{3.17'}
\]

We stress that (3.8'-3.9'), (3.10'-3.11'), (3.16'), (3.17') are valid for a policy described by any, not necessarily optimal, \( \theta = \{\theta^0_n, \theta^1_n\}_{1 \leq n \leq N} \) (where \( \theta^c_n = \begin{bmatrix} \theta^c_{n,1} \\ \theta^c_{n,2} \end{bmatrix} \) if \( M = 2 \).

3.8.2 Threshold Policy Optimization

Let the notation \( \bar{V}^0_n = \bar{V}^0(\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_n) \) stress that there is a functional relation between \( (\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_n) \) and \( \bar{V}^0_n \), given by (3.16'). Let \( \bar{V}^0_{n,*} = \bar{V}^0(\theta^0_{n,*}, \bar{V}^1_{n,*}) \) denote the optimal expected value function attained by a policy with optimal parameters \( \theta^0_{n,*} \). Similarly let \( \bar{V}^1_{n,*} = \bar{V}^1(\theta^1_{n,*}, \bar{V}^0_{n-1,*}) \) with optimal parameters \( \theta^1_{n,*} \). By backward induction, if \( \bar{V}^1_{n,*} \) is optimal, then each \( \bar{V}^0_{n,m} \) is maximized by optimizing over \( \theta^0_n \).

For convenience, in the sequel we write \( \bar{V}^0_n \) instead of \( \bar{V}^0 \) even though the index \( n \) does not alter the function. We adopt the approach of seeking to optimize \( \bar{V}^0_{n,m} \) for all \( m \) at the same time. To do this, we evaluate the derivative of \( \bar{V}^0_{n,j} \) with respect to \( \theta^0_{n,j} \) for each \( i, j \); that is, we evaluate the Jacobian matrix \( J^0_n \) with elements \( J^0_{n,ij} \).

Let \( f^0_n \) denote the vector with \( m \)-th element \( f^0_{n,m} = f_m(\theta^0_{n,m}) \).

**Proposition 13.** The Jacobian matrix \( J^0_n \) with elements \( J^0_{n,ij} = \partial \bar{V}^0_{n,j}/\partial \theta^0_{n,j} \), evaluated at \( (\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_{n,*}) \), is described by

\[
J^0_n = A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T \text{Diag}(f^0_n) \text{Diag}(\gamma(\bar{V}^1_{n,*} - \bar{V}^0_n) - \theta^0_n). \tag{3.35}
\]

Equivalently,

\[
J^0_n = A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T \text{Diag}(f^0_n) \text{Diag}(A^{-1}_{\pi_n} g(\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_{n,*})), \tag{3.36}
\]

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where
\[
g(\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^{1,*}_n) = \gamma(I - \gamma T)\bar{V}^{1,*}_n - (I - \gamma T)\theta^0_n - \gamma T D_{\pi_n} \theta^0_n + \gamma T D_{\pi_n} e^0_n. \tag{3.22'}
\]

**Proof.** Calculus is done using the differential operator \(d\), in order to identify the Jacobian matrix \(J^0_n\) via \(d\bar{V}^0_n = J^0_n d\theta^0_n\), see [60] Chapter 9. We define \(b^0_n = -e^0_n + \gamma \bar{V}^{1,*}_n\), thus from (3.16'), \(\bar{V}^0_n = A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T D_{\pi_n} b^0_n\). Then
\[
d\bar{V}^0_n = d(A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T D_{\pi_n} b^0_n)
= d(A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T D_{\pi_n} b^0_n) + A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T d(D_{\pi_n}) b^0_n + A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T D_{\pi_n} dB^0_n. \tag{3.37}
\]
We have \(\partial_{\pi_n,m}/\partial\theta^0_{n,m} = f^0_{n,m}\). From \(\partial e^0_{n,m}/\partial\theta^0_{n,m} = (\theta^0_{n,m} - e^0_{n,m}) f^0_{n,m}/\pi_{n,m}\) and \(\partial e^0_{n,m}/\partial\theta^0_{n,j} = 0\) for \(j \neq m\) we obtain
\[
db^0_n = -de^0_n = D^{-1}_{\pi_n} \text{Diag}(e^0_n - \theta^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n.
\]
We calculate, for any fixed vector \(x \in \mathbb{R}^M\),
\[
d(D_{\pi_n})x = \text{Diag}(f^0_n) \text{Diag}(d\theta^0_n) x = \text{Diag}(x) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n,
\]
\[
d(A_{\pi_n})x = \gamma T d(D_{\pi_n}) x = \gamma T \text{Diag}(x) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n,
\]
\[
d(A^{-1}_{\pi_n})x = -A^{-1}_{\pi_n} d(A_{\pi_n}) A^{-1}_{\pi_n} x = -A^{-1}_{\pi_n} \gamma T \text{Diag}(A^{-1}_{\pi_n} x) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n.
\]
Therefore overall, (3.37) becomes
\[
d\bar{V}^0_n = -A^{-1}_{\pi_n} \gamma T \text{Diag}(A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T D_{\pi_n} b^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n
+ A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T \text{Diag}(b^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n
+ A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T \text{Diag}(e^0_n - \theta^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n
= A^{-1}_{\pi_n} T \text{Diag}(y^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n) d\theta^0_n \quad (y^0_n \text{ defined below})
\]
where we have defined
\[
y_n^0 := -\gamma A_{\pi_n}^{-1} TD\pi_n b_n^0 + b_n^0 + e_n^0 - \theta_n^0
\]
\[
= -\gamma V_n^0 + (-e_n^0 + \gamma V_n^{1,*}) + e_n^0 - \theta_n^0
\]
\[
= \gamma (\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - V_n^0) - \theta_n^0.
\] (3.38)

By identification via \(d\tilde{V}_n^0 = J_n^0 d\theta_n^0\), we get (3.35).

To get (3.36) and (3.22'), we use \(y_n^0 = A_{\pi_n}^{-1} A_{\pi_n} y_n^0\) and
\[
g(\theta_n^0, V_n^{1,*}) := A_{\pi_n} y_n^0
\]
\[
= \gamma A_{\pi_n} V_n^{1,*} - \gamma TD\pi_n (-e_n^0 + \gamma V_n^{1,*}) - A_{\pi_n} \theta_n^0
\]
\[
= \gamma (A_{\pi_n} - \gamma TD\pi_n) V_n^{1,*} + \gamma TD\pi_n e_n^0 - A_{\pi_n} \theta_n^0
\]
\[
= \gamma (I - \gamma T) V_n^{1,*} + \gamma TD\pi_n e_n^0 - (I - \gamma T + \gamma TD\pi_n) \theta_n^0.
\]

From Proposition 13 the following remarks are in order:

- At optimality, the Jacobian matrix must be identically zero. To see this, note that at any optimal \(\tilde{V}_{n,i}^0\), the threshold policy needs to satisfy \(\partial \tilde{V}_{n,i}^0 / \partial \theta_{n,j}^0 = 0\) for all \(j\) to be optimal.

- From (3.35), the Jacobian matrix is identically zero if \(\gamma (\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^0) - \theta_n^0 = 0\). Thus a threshold vector \(\theta_n^{0,*}\) satisfying
\[
\theta_n^{0,*} = \gamma (\tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \tilde{V}_n^{0,*})
\] (3.4')
is optimal.

- From (3.4'), Step 4 in Table 3.1 generalizes to \(\tilde{V}_n^{0,*} = \tilde{V}_n^{1,*} - \theta_n^{0,*} / \gamma\).

- It is easy to check that \(A_{\pi_n}\) is strictly row diagonally dominant, with positive diagonal elements. Hence \(A_{\pi_n}\) is invertible, and furthermore, \(A_{\pi_n}^{-1}\) is nonnegative, see e.g. [73].
• From (3.36), the Jacobian matrix is identically zero if

\[ g(\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_n) = 0. \] (3.24')

• Equation (3.36) eliminates \( \bar{V}^0_n \) from (3.35), to eliminate a recursion that would otherwise appear in the second-order differentiation (used in Prop. 14 below).

• It is easy to see that (3.22') reduces to (3.22) in the case \( M = 1 \), where necessarily \( T = 1, D_{\pi_n} = \pi_n = F(\theta^0_n), \) and \( A_{\pi_n} = 1 - \gamma(1 - \pi_n) \).

The following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 7. Let \( J_{g, \theta^0_n} \) denote the Jacobian matrix of \( g \) with respect to \( \theta^0_n \), evaluated at \( \theta^0_n \).

**Proposition 14.** A sufficient optimality condition for the thresholds \( \theta^0_n \) is given by the implicit equation (3.24'). At any \( \theta^0_n \) we have \( J_{g, \theta^0_n} = -A_{\pi_n} \). The solution \( \theta^0_n^* \) is unique, assuming the thresholds lie on the support of the price distributions.

**Proof.** The Jacobian matrix of \( g \) with respect to \( \theta^0_n \) can be identified by calculating

\[
dg = -(I - \gamma T)d\theta^0_n + \gamma T d(D_{\pi_n})(-\theta^0_n + e^0_n) - \gamma TD_{\pi_n} d\theta^0_n + \gamma TD_{\pi_n} de^0_n
\]

\[
= -(I + \gamma T - \gamma TD_{\pi_n})d\theta^0_n + \gamma T \text{Diag}(-\theta^0_n + e^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n)d\theta^0_n
\]

\[
+ \gamma TD_{\pi_n}[D_{\pi_n}^{-1} \text{Diag}(\theta^0_n - e^0_n) \text{Diag}(f^0_n)d\theta^0_n]
\]

\[
= -(I - \gamma T(I - D_{\pi_n}))d\theta^0_n
\]

\[
= -A_{\pi_n} d\theta^0_n,
\]

thus the Jacobian matrix of \( g \) is \( J_{g, \theta^0_n} = -A_{\pi_n} \), which is strictly row diagonally dominant and thus invertible. The uniqueness of the solution to \( g(\theta^0_n, \bar{V}^1_n^*) = 0 \) then follows from the implicit function theorem. \( \square \)

Several methods can be used to solve the implicit equation (3.24'). The following proposition furnishes a simple iterative procedure.
Proposition 15. To find the solution \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \) to \( g(\theta_{n}^{0,*}, V_{n}^{1,*}) = 0 \) for a fixed \( V_{n}^{1,*} \), let the sequence of iterates \((\theta_{n}^{0,k}, V_{n}^{0,k})\), \( k = 1, 2, \ldots \), be defined by

\[
\theta_{n}^{0,k+1} = \gamma(V_{n}^{1,*} - V_{n}^{0,k}),
\]

(3.39)

where \( V_{n}^{0,k} \) is the value relative to \( \theta_{n}^{0,k} \) given by (3.16) with \( V_{n}^{1,*} \) set to \( V_{n}^{1,*} \), and the other entities computed for \( \theta_{n}^{0,k} \).

Then, it holds that the sequence of iterates \( \theta_{n}^{0,k} \) converges to \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \). Additionally, if \( \theta_{n}^{0,k} \) is sufficiently close to \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \), the rate of convergence is quadratic.

Proof. Newton’s method is used to solve the nonlinear system \( g(\theta_{n}^{0}, V_{n}^{1,*}) = 0 \). Assuming a full Newton step, the update is

\[
\theta_{n}^{0,k+1} = \theta_{n}^{0,k} - J_{g, \theta_{n}^{0}}^{-1} g(\theta_{n}^{0,k}, V_{n}^{1,*}) = \theta_{n}^{0,k} - [-A_{\pi_{n}}^{-1}][A_{\pi_{n}} y_{n}^{0,k}] \quad \text{with } y_{n}^{0,k} \text{ defined as in (3.38)}
\]

\[
= \theta_{n}^{0,k} + \gamma(V_{n}^{1,*} - V_{n}^{0,k}) - \theta_{n}^{0,k}
\]

\[
= \gamma(V_{n}^{1,*} - V_{n}^{0,k}).
\]

Theorem 11.2 in [69] ensures that for a starting point \( \theta_{n}^{0,1} \) sufficiently close to a solution \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \) with \( J_{g, \theta_{n}^{0}} \) nonsingular, the sequence of iterates converges to \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \). Now, since \( J_{g, \theta_{n}^{0}} = -A_{\pi_{n}} \) is strictly diagonally dominant for any \( \theta_{n}^{0} \), we have \( \|J_{g, \theta_{n}^{0}}\|_{\infty} < 1 / \min_{i} \{|A_{\pi_{n},ii}| - \sum_{j \neq i}|A_{\pi_{n},ij}|\} \), see [105]. Each row of \( T(I - D_{\pi_{n}}) \) has the sum of its elements between 0 and 1, implying that each row of \( A_{\pi_{n}} \) has the sum of its elements between 1 - \( \gamma \) and 1. Therefore, for any \( \theta_{n}^{0} \) arbitrarily far from \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \),

\[
\|J_{g, \theta_{n}^{0}}^{-1}\|_{\infty} < 1/(1 - \gamma),
\]

(3.40)

which implies \( \theta_{n}^{0,k+1} - \theta_{n}^{0,*} = o(\|\theta_{n}^{0,k} - \theta_{n}^{0,*}\|) \) (through the proof of Theorem 11.2). Moreover, since \( g \) is differentiable and thus in particular Lipschitz continuous, by the cited Theorem 11.2 it holds that for \( \theta_{n}^{0,k} \) sufficiently close to \( \theta_{n}^{0,*} \) we have \( \theta_{n}^{0,k+1} - \theta_{n}^{0,*} = O(\|\theta_{n}^{0,k} - \theta_{n}^{0,*}\|^2) \), indicating convergence of the quadratic kind.
We conclude this section with the following remarks.

- The results for optimizing $\bar{V}_n^{1}$ in (3.17') over $\theta_n^{1}$ given $\bar{V}_n^{0,*}$ are established similarly.

Let $f_n^{1}$ denote the vector with $m$-th element $f_m(\theta_n^{1,m})$. Let $J_n^{1}$ denote the Jacobian matrix of $\bar{V}_n^{1}$ with respect to $\theta_n^{1}$. Let $J_{h,\theta_n^{1}}$ be the Jacobian matrix of the function $h$ (defined below) with respect to $\theta_n^{1}$. Then we have

$$J_n^{1} = A_{\rho_n}^{-1} T \text{Diag}(f_n^{1}) \text{Diag}(\gamma(\bar{V}_n^{1} - \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) - \theta_n^{1})$$

$$= A_{\rho_n}^{-1} T \text{Diag}(f_n^{1}) \text{Diag}(\gamma h(\theta_n^{1}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*})),$$

$$h(\theta_n^{1}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) = -\theta_n^{1} - \gamma(I - \gamma T)\bar{V}_n^{0,*} + \gamma(T(I - D_{\rho_n})\theta_n^{1} + \gamma TD_{\rho_n}e_n^{1}.$$ (3.23')

A sufficient optimality condition for the thresholds $\theta_n^{1}$ is given by the implicit equation

$$h(\theta_n^{1}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) = 0.$$ (3.25')

We have $J_{h,\theta_n^{1}} = -A_{\rho_n}$, which is always invertible, so the solution $\theta_n^{1,*}$ is unique, assuming the thresholds lie on the support of the price distributions.

- The solution $\theta_n^{1,*}$ to $h(\theta_n^{1,*}, \bar{V}_n^{0,*}) = 0$ for a fixed $\bar{V}_n^{0,*}$ can be obtained via the sequence of iterates $(\theta_n^{1,k}, \bar{V}_n^{1,k})$, $k = 1, 2, \ldots$, defined by

$$\theta_n^{1,k+1} = \gamma(\bar{V}_n^{1,k} - \bar{V}_n^{0,*}),$$ (3.41)

where $\bar{V}_n^{1,k}$ is the value relative to $\theta_n^{1,k}$ obtained via (3.17') with $\bar{V}_n^{0,\pi}$ set to $\bar{V}_n^{0,*}$.

- The overall algorithm for determining all the optimal thresholds is described by Table 3.1 of Section 3.4, with all the entities in Table 3.1 now referring to the entities in bold letters defined in the present section. If the implicit equations are solved by the iterative method described in Proposition 15, then Step 2 is a byproduct of Step 1, and Step 4 is a byproduct of Step 3. Since the convergence is quadratic, only a few iterations are typically needed to complete Step 1 and Step 3. What is more, $\theta_n^{c,*}$ tends to be close to $\theta_n^{c,*}$, making $\theta_n^{1,c} = \theta_n^{c,*}$ a natural starting point of the
iteration for $\theta_{n+1}^{c\ast}$.

- Non-ideal battery characteristics are handled exactly as in Section 3.6, so it is easy to combine the results obtained so far. The starting point is the policy evaluation step to calculate the expected value functions per unit of capacity,

$$C_n \bar{V}_{n}^{0,\pi} = A_n^{-1}TD_{\pi_n}(-C_n e_n^0/\eta_n^{ch} + \gamma C_{n} \bar{V}_{n}^{1,\pi}),$$

$$C_n \bar{V}_{n}^{1,\pi} = A_n^{-1}TD_{\rho_n}(C_n e_n^1/\eta_n^{dis} + \gamma C_{n-1} \bar{V}_{n-1}^{0,\pi}). \quad (3.42)$$

The overall optimization algorithm for determining the optimal thresholds under non-ideal battery characteristics is described by Table 3.2 of Section 3.6, with all the entities in the table now referring to the entities in bold letters defined in the present section.

### 3.8.3 Illustration

We illustrate the behavior of the optimal policy on a simple regime-switching price process with two regimes.

As in Section 3.7.2, the battery has efficiency parameters $\eta_m^{ch} = 0.9$, $\eta_m^{dis} = 0.9$. The capacity deteriorates following $C_n = n/(100 + n)$.

The Markov chain governing the regime $m_t$ has $T = \begin{bmatrix} 0.90 & 0.10 \\ 0.95 & 0.05 \end{bmatrix}$. The price $p_t$ follows $LN(\mu_m, \sigma_m^2)$ with $\mu_1 = 2$, $\sigma_1 = 0.7$ for regime 1 and $\mu_2 = 4$, $\sigma_2 = 0.5$ for regime 2. The discount factor is $\gamma = 0.999$.

Figure 3.3 depicts the behavior of the optimal policy on a sample path of the price process over $t = 1, \ldots, 100$. The charging and discharging decisions are marked with triangles on the sample path. On Figure 3.3a, the battery starts from $n_t = 1000$ at $t = 1$ and attains $n_t = 981$ at $t = 100$. On Figure 3.3b, the battery starts from $n_1 = 50$ and attains $n_{100} = 43$. Thus the battery completes 19 cycles in case (a) but only 7 cycles in case (b).

If we were to operate the battery using the optimal thresholds but assuming 1000 cycles remain while actually 50 remain, the policy, being more active, would exhaust the battery
(a) Starting from $n = 1000$ remaining cycles. (b) Starting from $n = 50$ remaining cycles.

Figure 3.3: Simulation of the optimal policy on the same sample path of a price process but starting from two different ages. Decisions: Charge (▲), Discharge (▼).

sooner and attain $C_{50} \Gamma_{50,1}^{0,\pi|n_1=1000} = 265$ calculated using the recursion (3.42). This is to be compared to the optimal value with the correct assumption of 50 cycles remaining, equal to $C_{50} \Gamma_{50,1}^{0,\pi|n_1=50} = 485$. Thus, there is high value in considering battery aging when optimizing operations.

### 3.9 Conclusion

This chapter considers the market-based battery operation problem with aging phenomenon. The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov Decision Process with a continuous price state and a discrete remaining life state. An efficient optimization algorithm is proposed which exploits the structure of the optimal policy and is based on solving a sequence of optimization problems. An error analysis and a computational study demonstrate the performance of the algorithm in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Since the algorithm is fast, it would be practical to embed it into a rollout scheme used as a policy for approximately solving more complex problems.

While the stochastic price models used in this chapter are simple, the solution to the stochastic optimal control problem is already sufficient to offer managerial insights. In particular, the awareness of the finiteness of the battery life dramatically increases the optimal price spread required for storage operations. The spread widens when the battery
approaches its end-of-life. Capacity deterioration compounds the widening effect. This behavior contrasts with the optimal price spread caused by the need for compensating for inefficiencies during a single storage cycle, which is present as soon as the storage device is put into service. This suggests that the contribution of storage devices to market-based operations could sharply decrease when devices near their end-of-life, with the typical price spreads of the market becoming insufficient to justify participation. Decreased participation could thus occur much sooner than expected from a count of remaining cycles.
Chapter 4

On the Price Impact of
Distributed Energy Storage

4.1 Introduction

Given installed electricity storage devices for consumers and suppliers, we are concerned with the problem of managing the inflows and outflows of electricity between the power grid and the storage devices, to maximize the expected discounted cumulated welfare of consumers and suppliers in the market over an infinite horizon.

In this chapter, two key aspects that are taken into consideration are (i) the sensitivity of the supply and demand to electricity prices, that are to be determined endogenously to maintain the power balance, and (ii) the sensitivity of the demand curve to exogenous stochastic factors.

Furthermore, since prices affect in opposite directions the utility of the demand and the utility of the supply, and since storage actions influence prices, an issue that arises for determining optimal battery operations and equilibrium prices is the role of ownership of battery capacity. The repartition between the demand side and the supply side is therefore expected to play a role, inasmuch as market participants are expected to behave strategically.

Our problem relates closely to storage management problems found in the commodity
storage literature [72, 85], for which rational expectation (RE) models have been proposed. [110] provides a stochastic valuation of energy storage framework and an energy storage optimization model. However, this deterministic model does not consider price uncertainty. [95] considers the impact of large storage devices on the electricity price, thus on the welfare on generators and consumers separately. Welfare effects from storage in different market are studies [94]. To capture the recursive relationship between decisions and future expected prices, the RE model is formulated as an optimal control problem [56], which can in theory be solved by dynamic programming, possibly by exploiting a favorable structure [35]. Otherwise, approximate dynamic programming (ADP) techniques are needed to solve the dynamic program heuristically [76, 7]. [43] describes approximate solution techniques that are applied to solve RE models.

In the context of managing energy storage resources, several stochastic models have been proposed and investigated, often using an exogenous stochastic processes for the price, [112, 14]. In these models, the value of energy storage devices comes from buying low price energy and selling high price energy. However, in reality, electricity prices are affected by the supply and demand of energy. Hence, if storage devices are connected to the grid, they also balance supply and demand and have an influence on the electricity prices. While the influence on prices may be negligible for a single device acting in isolation, it would be imprudent to ignore the impact on prices of large ensembles of devices working in a coordinated fashion, e.g. to correct for imbalances.

To address a variety of questions related to the presence of energy storage, several market equilibrium models have been proposed [89, 109, 59, 26, 51, 50, 20, 3]. In these models, the prices are produced as a byproduct of balancing supply and demand, following the logic of the spot pricing of electricity [90]. However, a limitation of existing equilibrium models, sometimes apparent only when it comes to the numerical work, lies in the use of net demand curves whose evolution is deterministic, in contrast to the stochastic dynamic programming framework adopted here where the net demand curve is kept stochastic within the numerical solution algorithm. Keeping uncertainty at each stage of the multistage storage problem is critical to justify energy storage economically, otherwise conventional
generation can be planned to be started up with any lead time to adapt production and reserves to net demand variations at minimal cost.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an introduction on Nash equilibrium and bimatrix games. Section 4.2.3 formulates the Markov Game model. Section 4.3 provides the value iteration framework to obtain equilibrium policies for both players. Section 4.4 shows the numerical experiments and generalizes the basic model to implicit curve and non-perfect efficiency cases. Section 4.5 discusses the effect of incomplete information on charge level. Section 4.6 presents the impact from the ownership of energy storage. Section 4.7 concludes.

4.2 Technical Methods

We formulate our model as a Markov game in Section 4.2.4. During each time period in the Markov game, we deal with bimatrix games and find Nash equilibrium. In this section, we introduce related concepts and algorithms in the literature.

4.2.1 Markov Games

A typical Markov game \( \Gamma = [S, N, A, T, R, \gamma] \) includes state space \( S \), a set of players \( N = \{1, 2, ..., n\} \), a set of actions for each player in each state \( \{A_{i,s}\}_{i \in N, s \in S} \), a transition function \( T : S \times A \times S \mapsto [0, 1] \) giving transition probabilities, a reward function \( R : S \times A \mapsto \mathbb{R}^n \) and a discount factor \( \gamma \).

A stationary policy \( \pi_i \) for player \( i \) is a mapping \( \pi_i : S \times A \mapsto [0, 1] \) assigning probabilities to state-action pairs in the sense that in state \( s \) the action \( a \) is chosen with probability \( \pi_i(s,a) \).

The value of the set of policies \( \pi = \{\pi_i\}_{i \in N} \) for player \( i \) can be described by

\[
V^i_\pi(s) = \sum_{a \in A} \pi(s,a)Q^i_\pi(s,a) ,
\]

\[
Q^i_\pi(s,a) = R^i(s,a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} T(s,a,s')V^i_\pi(s') .
\]
A Nash equilibrium set of policies $\pi^*$ will be such that

$$V_i^{\{\pi_1^*, \ldots, \pi_{i-1}^*, \pi_i^*, \pi_{i+1}^*, \ldots, \pi_n^*\}} (s) \geq V_i^{\{\pi_1^*, \ldots, \pi_{i-1}^*, \pi_i, \pi_{i+1}^*, \ldots, \pi_n^*\}} (s)$$

for all $s \in S$ and each $i \in N$.

Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature to solve Markov games. [70] discuss challenges to solve Markov games in multi-agent systems. [55] describes several Value Iteration based reinforcement-learning algorithms to find a Nash equilibrium in multiagent Markov games. Although some theoretical guarantees under certain assumptions are provided, convergence results in the general Markov game case remain unknown.

[113] show that value iteration may not be sufficient to learn an equilibrium policy in general Markov games. In 2012, [19] provide a polynomial-time algorithm called FolkEgal to find a Nash equilibrium for repeated two-players stochastic games.

### 4.2.2 Nash Equilibrium and Bimatrix Games

In this section, we discuss several algorithms that have been introduced to find Nash equilibria in finite bimatrix games.

A bimatrix game is a simultaneous game for two players where each player has a finite number of possible actions. There are two payoff matrices $A, B$ for the two players. $A, B$ are $m \times n$ matrices where $m, n$ are cardinalities of action space of row player and column player. If the row player selects the $i$-th action and the column player selects the $j$-th action, the payoff to the row player is $A[i, j]$ and that to the column player is $B[i, j]$. The players can also play mixed strategies. A mixed strategy for row player is a probability vector $x$ with length $m$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i = 1$, and that for column player is a probability vector $y$ with length $n$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i = 1$. The expected payoff of the row player is $x^T A y$ and the expected payoff of the column player is $x^T B y$. 

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Assume we maximize the revenue for both players. If there is a pair \((x^*, y^*)\) such that

\[
(x^*)^T A y^* \geq x^T A y^*, \forall x, \\
(x^*)^T B y^* \geq (x^*)^T B y, \forall y,
\]

then \((x^*, y^*)\) is a Nash equilibrium.

A bimatrix game is called zero-sum game if \(A + B = 0\). Otherwise, it is a non-zero-sum game.

In 1950, Nash proved that every finite game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium [68]. A variety of methods for finding a Nash equilibrium have been provided since then. [52] provide an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix games. This algorithm is a pivoting algorithm and referred to as the Lemke-Howson algorithm nowadays. The main idea is to formulate the problem as a special case of linear complementarity problem (LCP) and use the Lemke-Howson to solve the LCP. The LCP formulation is described as follows:

\[
w = M z + q, \ w \geq 0, \ z \geq 0, \ w^T z = 0,
\]

where

\[
M = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & A \\
B^T & 0
\end{bmatrix}, \ q = \begin{bmatrix} e_m \\
e_n
\end{bmatrix}, \ w = \begin{bmatrix} e_m - A y \\
en - B^T x
\end{bmatrix}, \ z = \begin{bmatrix} x \\
y
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The vectors \(e_m, e_n\) refer to the vectors of all 1’s of size \(m\) and \(n\) respectively. More details can be found in [66].

[74] provide a search method, referred to as Porter, Nudelman and Shoham (PNS) for computing a Nash equilibrium. The idea is to eliminate conditionally dominated actions and use heuristics to determine as quickly as possible the support of the mixed strategies, i.e. the set of decisions with a nonzero probability to be chosen. This algorithm can be generalized to \(n\)-players games.
[86] present a mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation to find a Nash equilibrium. Four different formulations are provided. Their first formulation makes it possible to specify a supplementary objective that can be used to select an equilibrium among the set of mixed equilibria, such as maximizing the payoff of a given player, or minimizing the payoff difference between the two players.

4.2.3 Model Description and Assumptions

In our model, there are two players in the market, the consumer and the supplier, both of whom control storage devices. There could be multiple storage devices, which are distributed. We aggregated them by owner type, i.e. consumer or supplier. Storage device owners influence the electricity price through operating their own storage devices until an equilibrium price is attained that balances supply and demand of power including the net power injection from storage.

Our basic setting corresponds to a full information stochastic game, which can be generalized to incomplete information game, see Section 4.5.

The full information game is played as follows. The initial state $X_0$ is given. At stage $t = 0, 1, \ldots$, the current state $X_t$ is revealed to both players. The state consists of state variables described in Section 4.2.4. Then both players make their decisions at the same time. Based on the current state and decisions from both players, the next state $X_{t+1}$ is drawn according to a transition function and corresponding probability and . Rewards for both players at stage $t$ are computed and then the game proceeds to stage $t + 1$.

First, we describe the supply curve, demand curve as follows:

$$S_t = f_s(P_t), \quad D_t = f_d(P_t),$$
where $P_t$ is the price at time $t$. The quantity of energy\(^1\) change for the storage is

$$H_t = h(P_t) = S_t - D_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.1)

Note that if $H_t > 0$, the storage device is being charged while $H_t < 0$ means that is being discharged. Since we have two players in the market, the value of energy change in equation (4.1) is aggregated, consisting of two parts: energy from supplier’s storage $H^s_t$ and that from consumer’s storage $H^c_t$,

$$H_t = H^s_t + H^c_t.$$  

We assume that the supply curve $s$ is nondecreasing in the price and the demand curve $d$ is nonincreasing in the price. This assumption is natural since in general, if price increases, there is less demand and more supply. Based on the equation (4.1), the function $h$ giving the net energy being charged is nondecreasing in the price. We strengthen these conditions by requiring that $h$ is continuous and increasing in price $P_t$. It then follows that $h$ has an inverse $h^{-1}$ which is continuous and increasing in $H_t$. The increasing property means that higher prices are obtained with more energy withdrawn to charge the storage devices. The continuity assumption implies that any target price in a price interval can be obtained by adjusting the quantity of energy withdrawn for charging storage devices.

The demand curve $s$ is assumed to depend on exogenous random variables. One example is provided in Section 4.2.5.

### 4.2.4 Model Formulation

In this section, we formulate the mathematical model. The problem is described using the following notation.

- $\mathcal{X}$ is the state space. The state at time $t$, denoted $X_t$, has three components: the

\(^1\)We think of supply and demand as power. Then $H_t$ is the total net power that is withdrawn from the grid by the storage devices. We need exact balance at all times, hence (4.1). The model is simplified by assuming the prices and power injections or withdrawals are held constant during a period of time, then one can view $S_t$ and $D_t$ as power integrated over one time period, that is, energy.
stored energy level for consumer $X^c_t$ and the stored energy level for supplier $X^s_t$ and a demand curve state $W_t$. Thus, $X_t = (X^c_t, X^s_t, W_t)$. As mentioned earlier, it’s a full information game where each player can observe the full state.

- $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}^c \times \mathcal{H}^s$ is the decision space. The decision at time $t$, denoted $H_t$, has two components: the storage decision from consumer $H^c_t$ and supplier $H^s_t$. From the discussion later in section (4.3), we may have mixed strategies (probability vectors for possible actions), denoted as $(u^c, u^s)$. Let $U^c : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H}^c \mapsto (0, 1]$ be the decision probability function of consumer $c$, such that $p = U^c(x, H^c)$ is the probability that consumer $c$ choose action $H^c$ while being in state $x$. Let $U^s : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H}^s \mapsto (0, 1]$ be the decision probability function of supplier $s$, such that $p = U^s(x, H^s)$ is the probability that supplier $s$ choose action $H^s$ while being in state $x$. Assuming the decision space $\mathcal{H}$ is discrete and consumer’s action $H^c \in \{H^c_1, H^c_2, ..., H^c_m\}$ ($m$ possible actions in total), then consumer’s probability vector $u^c$ can be computed as $u^c_i = U^c(x, H^c_i), i = 1, 2, ..., m$. Similar results can be obtained for supplier, $u^s_i = U^s(x, H^s_i), i = 1, 2, ..., n$.

- $P : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{X} \mapsto [0, 1]$ is the state transition probability function, such that $\text{Prob}(X_{t+1} = x' \mid X_t = x, H_t = a) = P(x, a, x')$.

- $R^c : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is the reward function for consumer such that the reward at time $t$ given $X_t = x, H^c_t = a^c, H^s_t = a^s$ is $r^c_t = R^c(x, a^c, a^s)$.

- $R^s : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is the reward function for supplier such that the reward at time $t$ given $X_t = x, H^s_t = a^s, H^c_t = a^c$ is $r^s_t = R^s(x, a^c, a^s)$.

The detail of definition of reward function $R^c, R^s$ is described later in this section.

The charge levels of consumer and supplier are kept track of through $X^c_t, X^s_t$, which represents the quantities of stored energy at the beginning of each time period $t$. Then, the difference between two consecutive time periods is

$$X^c_{t+1} - X^c_t = g^c(H^c_t),$$

$$X^s_{t+1} - X^s_t = g^s(H^s_t).$$
In particular, if the storage devices have perfect efficiency, we have \( g^c(H^c_t) = H^c_t \) and \( g^s(H^s_t) = H^s_t \). The generalized inefficiency model is discussed further in Section 4.4.5.

With storage capacities \( K^c \) and \( K^s \) for consumer’s and supplier’s storage devices and since charge levels must be nonnegative, it is straightforward that \( 0 \leq X^c_t \leq K^c \) and \( 0 \leq X^s_t \leq K^s \). We scaled the energy units by \( X^c_t, X^s_t, K^c, K^s \) so that one unit of power during one time period corresponds to one unit of energy.

Both players want to maximize their expected reward along the infinite horizon

\[
V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^c = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma R^c_t \mid X_0 \right],
\]

\[
V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^s = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma R^s_t \mid X_0 \right].
\]

We are looking for policies \( \pi^c, \pi^s \) such that

\[
V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^c \geq V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^c \quad \forall \pi^c,
\]

\[
V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^s \geq V_{\pi^c, \pi^s}^c \quad \forall \pi^s.
\]

This is a stochastic dynamic program over an infinite horizon where \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) is the discount factor and \( X_0 \) is the initial state.

Define demand reward \( R^d_t \), consumer’s storage reward \( R^c_t \), generation reward \( R^g_t \) and supplier’s storage reward \( R^s_t \) as

\[
R^d_t = \int_0^{D_t} \left[ f_d^{-1}(q) - P_t \right] dq,
\]

\[
R^g_t = \int_0^{S_t} \left[ P_t - f_s^{-1}(q) \right] dq,
\]

\[
R^c_t = -P_t H^c_t,
\]

\[
R^s_t = -P_t H^s_t,
\]

where \( f_d^{-1}, f_s^{-1} \) are inverse function of \( f_d, f_s \) defined in Section 4.2.3.

Then consumer’s reward function \( R^c_t \) is the sum of demand reward \( R^d_t \) and consumer’s storage reward \( R^c_t \) while supplier’s reward function \( R^s_t \) is the sum of generation reward \( R^g_t \).

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and supplier’s storage reward $R_{t}^{ss}$

$$R_{t}^{c} = R_{t}^{d} + R_{t}^{cs}, \quad (4.2)$$

$$R_{t}^{s} = R_{t}^{q} + R_{t}^{ss}.$$ 

### 4.2.5 Demand and Supplier Curve

In theory, the curve functions related to demand and supply can be either closed-form functions or implicit function. In our basic model, we assume a closed-form expression for the equilibrium price as a function of the demand and supply. In particular, the inverse function of supply curve is quadratic and that of demand curve is linear, as follows:

$$f_{s}^{-1}(q) = cq + dq^2, \quad f_{d}^{-1}(q) = b - dq,$$

where $a, c, d > 0$ are fixed parameters and $b$ is a random variable with an i.i.d Normal distribution. The detail of analytic solutions for equilibrium price and reward functions can be found in Appendix C.1.

More general, if the curves are represented in implicit functions, we can still find the equilibrium price numerically, which is described in Section 4.4.4.

### 4.3 Algorithms

In the example mentioned in 4.2.5, we assume the actions for both players are known. In this section, we show how these actions can be obtained by finding a Nash Equilibrium. As we mentioned in section 4.2, a mixed Nash Equilibrium strategy is guaranteed to exist in finite games.

For most one-objective function MDP problems, we enumerate all the possible actions for each state and pick the most profitable action. Since we have two players in our problem, we find the optimal actions for both players through finding the Nash equilibrium. We discretize the state space, including the charge levels for both storage devices as well as the distribution parameter for demand curve. With discretized charge levels, we obtain
discretized action space for both players.

We provide the Value Iteration framework to solve the Markov game. However, value iteration schemes are not guaranteed to find an equilibrium for non-zero sum Markov games [113]. In Section 4.4.3, we show numerically the gap between the equilibrium policy and the sub-optimal policy we get is very small.

1. Initialization: Guess initial value functions $V^c_0(x), V^s_0(x)$ for all possible states (for instance, $V^c_0(x) \equiv 0, V^s_0(x) \equiv 0$ for $\forall x$). Set iteration $k = 1$.

2. For all state $x$ and actions $H^c_i, H^s_j$ ($i$ is the index for consumer’s action and $j$ is that for supplier), compute the pure-strategy cumulated cost-to-go values

$$A_{k,ij}(x) = R^c(x, H^c_i, H^s_j) + \gamma \mathbb{E}[V^c_{k-1}(x') | x, H^c_i, H^s_j],$$

$$B_{k,ij}(x) = R^s(x, H^c_i, H^s_j) + \gamma \mathbb{E}[V^s_{k-1}(x') | x, H^c_i, H^s_j].$$

3. For each state $x$, find the optimal strategies (probability vectors) $u^c(x), u^s(x)$ for both players by solving the bimatrix game with payoff matrices $(A_k, B_k)$, see Section 4.2.

Then the value functions can be updated based on

$$V^c_k(x) = (u^c(x))^\top A_k(x) u^s(x),$$

$$V^s_k(x) = (u^c(x))^\top B_k(x) u^s(x).$$

4. Set $k \leftarrow k + 1$ and repeat Step 2 until a maximum iteration number is reached. We obtain the policy $U^c, U^s$.

We use the PATH Solver [22] to find Nash equilibrium in our Value Iteration framework. PATH is provided by Ferris et al., which solves linear complementarity problem. This solver is efficient but it stops whenever it finds a Nash equilibrium (Multiple Nash equilibriums are possible for some $A, B$) and due to the LCP formulation, there is no easy way of specifying a selection process when several equilibria exist.
4.4 Numerical Experiments

In this section, we show numerical results on a linear/piecewise linear curves case and discuss the sub-optimality of policies obtained. Another simpler case study is shown in C.2

4.4.1 Parameters setting

We use a linear demand curve and piecewise linear supply curve,

\[ d^{-1}(q) = b - 60q \]

where \( b \) has a Normal Distribution \( \mathcal{N}(800, 60^2) \), which is approximated by a discrete distribution with 61 different states.

Capacities for both storages are \( K_c = K_s = 0.4 \), discretized with step length 0.05.

4.4.2 Numerical Results

![Figure 4.1: Bellman residual for both players as a function of iteration. red: consumer. blue: supplier. Inset graph: first 20 iterations.](image)

Figure 4.1 shows the difference between two consecutive stages’ value functions for both players. In this particular case, the policy stabilizes after first 20 iterations.

Figure (4.1) shows charging amount and (4.3) show the next charge levels for both players when the value iteration algorithm stops. When mixed strategy occurs, the weighted mean of decision is shown. These policies are highly dependent on the curvature of demand
and supplier curves. It instructs the decision makers how they should behave in different situations.

Figure 4.2: Charging amount for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve level (parameter $b$ as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.

Figure 4.3: Next charge levels for both players (y-axis) as a function of the demand curve level (parameter $b$ as x-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.

4.4.3 Sub-optimality of Policy

After the value iteration stops, we obtain policy $U^c, U^s$ for both players. With these fixed policies, we can compute the value of the policy for consumer and supplier as $V^c(U^c, U^s)$
and $V^s(U^c, U^s)$. By the definition of Nash equilibrium policy, if $U^c$ and $U^s$ are equilibrium policy, we should have

$$V^c(U^c, U^s) \geq V^c(\hat{U}^c, U^s),$$

$$V^s(U^c, U^s) \geq V^s(U^c, \hat{U}^s),$$

where $\hat{U}^c$ and $\hat{U}^s$ are some policies other than $U^c$ and $U^s$.

When we fix the policy for supplier $U^s$, we can compute the optimal policy for consumer. This is equivalent to a traditional one-player game where optimal policy is guaranteed through value iteration. We denote the optimal policy as $\hat{U}^c$ and the new value of policy is $V^c(\hat{U}^c, U^s)$.

Then we compute the difference

$$V^c(\hat{U}^c, U^s) - V^c(U^c, U^s).$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: fix supplier’s policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supplier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 4.1, The gain for consumer is very small while the loss for supplier is around 0.02%. This means both players have little intention to change their current policies.

Similarly, if we fixed consumer’s policy $U^c$, we compute the optimal policy for supplier, denoted as $\hat{U}^s$. Then we compute the difference

$$V^s(U^c, \hat{U}^s) - V^s(U^c, U^s).$$
Table 4.2: fix consumer’s policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>old policy</th>
<th>new policy</th>
<th>difference</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>consumer</td>
<td>279142.73</td>
<td>279132.41</td>
<td>-10.32</td>
<td>-0.004%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supplier</td>
<td>180706.58</td>
<td>180706.64</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence, we can conclude that both players are very unlikely to deviate from the current policy and the policies from our framework is very close to the Nash equilibrium policies.

4.4.4 Extensions: Implicit Curve for Demand and Supply

In Section 4.2.5, we assume the demand and response curve are given explicitly. So we can compute the price and rewards in closed form. In general, we may find the equilibrium price $P_t$ by solving equation (4.1)

$$H_t = f_s(P_t) - f_d(P_t)$$

numerically, e.g. by zero-finding using Brents method. A data driven example is provided in Section 4.6.

4.4.5 Extensions: Storage Devices with Non-Perfect Efficiency

In the basic model in Section 4.2.4, we assume the storage devices have perfect efficiency. We can generalize this model into inefficiency case easily.

$$g^c(y) = \begin{cases} 
\eta^c_{ch}y & y \geq 0 \\
\frac{1}{\eta^c_{dis}}y & y < 0 
\end{cases}$$

$$g^s(y) = \begin{cases} 
\eta^s_{ch}y & y \geq 0 \\
\frac{1}{\eta^s_{dis}}y & y < 0 
\end{cases}$$

(4.5)

$\eta^c_{ch}, \eta^c_{dis} \in (0, 1]$ are consumer’s efficiency parameters for charging and discharging respectively while $\eta^s_{ch}, \eta^s_{dis} \in (0, 1]$ are those of supplier’s. Thus, different storage technologies can be modeled with different efficiency parameters.
4.5 **Incomplete Information Game**

The Markov game described in Section 4.2.4 is a full information game, where both players know the supply curve, the demand curve and charge levels of both storages. In this section, we investigate the consequences of not sharing the charge level information.

4.5.1 **Model Description and Assumption**

This section is based on Section 4.2.4. The storage capacity $K^i$ are still common knowledge. The main difference is that the charge level is not shared to the other player, which makes the problem no longer a full information game. The game is played as follows.

1. As the game begins, each player starts with his own charge level $c^i_1$ (where $i$ is the index for players). For player $i$, he also maintains an uncertainty set $[lb^{-i}_1, ub^{-i}_1] = [0, K^{-i}]$ of the other player $-i$.

2. At time period $t$, the demand curve and the supply curve information are revealed. Both players make their decisions at the same time, then they are able to observe the price (which depends on their actions).

3. Based on the new information (and older observation), they may update their uncertainty set $[lb_t^i, ub_t^i]$.

4. Based on transition functions, charge levels are updated. In addition, the rewards for both players are computed and the game proceeds to the next time period $t + 1$.

4.5.2 **Estimation of the Other Player’s Charge Level**

At time period $t$, after the players make their decisions $H^c_t, H^s_t$, they observe the equilibrium price $P_t$. Based on equation (4.1)

$$H^c_t + H^s_t = H_t = S_t - D_t = f_s(P_t) - f_d(P_t),$$

where $f_s$ and $f_d$ are known supply and demand curve, they can compute the other player’s action (in closed form or numerically). Note that the other player’s charge level is still
unknown.

However, based on the uncertainty charge level set and actions of the other player, it is possible for each player to estimate the other player’s charge level. For simplicity, in the following context, we assume we play as the consumer and the following algorithm shows how one can get a good estimation of the supplier’s charge level.

Table 4.3: Update Uncertainty Set Algorithm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm: Updated Uncertainty Set</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data:</strong> Capacity $K^s$, Uncertainty Set $[lb_t, ub_t]$, Action Quantity $H_t^s$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Update:**

$$lb_{t+1} = \max\{0, \min\{lb_t + H_t^s, K^s\}\}$$

$$ub_{t+1} = \max\{0, \min\{ub_t + H_t^s, K^s\}\}$$

With the Update Uncertainty Set algorithm above, we have following propositions:

**Proposition 16.** The uncertainty charge level set is non-expansive, i.e.,

$$ub_{t+1} - lb_{t+1} \leq ub_t - lb_t .$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.6)

**Proof.** We discuss the possible $H_t^s$ case by case

- If $H_t^s = 0$, then $ub_{t+1} = ub_t$ and $lb_{t+1} = lb_t$. Inequality (4.6) holds as equality.

- If $H_t^s > 0$, then $lb_{t+1} = lb_t + H_t^s$. Since $ub_{t+1} = \min\{ub_t + H_t^s, K^s\}$
  
  - if $ub_{t+1} = ub_t + H_t^s$, inequality (4.6) holds as equality.
  
  - if $ub_{t+1} = K^s < ub_t + H_t^s$, clearly, $ub_{t+1} - lb_{t+1} < ub_t - lb_t$.

- If $H_t^s < 0$, then $ub_{t+1} = ub_t + H_t^s$. Since $lb_{t+1} = \max\{lb_t + H_t^s, 0\}$
  
  - if $lb_{t+1} = lb_t + H_t^s$, inequality (4.6) holds as equality.
  
  - if $lb_{t+1} = 0 > lb_t + H_t^s$, clearly, $ub_{t+1} - lb_{t+1} < ub_t - lb_t$.  

Hence, we finish our proof.

Note that we don’t have to store all the historical actions of the other player if we maintain our uncertainty set every time period.

**Proposition 17.** For some finite time period $T$, if

$$|\sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s| \geq \epsilon$$

for some $\epsilon > 0$, then we can guarantee that there exist $\delta = K^s - \epsilon$ such that

$$ub_T - lb_T \leq \delta,$$

we call this property almost sure contraction.

In particular, if $\epsilon = K^s$, which indicates that $\delta = 0$, $ub_T = lb_T$, the charge level of the other player is known exactly.

**Proof.** Assume at time period $t = 1$, we have uncertainty set $[lb, ub]$ where $lb \geq 0, ub \leq K^s$, then at time period $T$, we have uncertainty set

$$\Omega = [lb + \sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s, ub + \sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s].$$

• If $\sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s > 0$, then the lower bound $lb_T = lb + \sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s \geq 0 + \epsilon$ while upper bound $ub_T \leq K^s$. Hence, the range of the uncertainty set $ub_T - lb_T \leq K^s - \epsilon = \delta$.

• If $\sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s < 0$, then the lower bound $lb_T \geq 0$ while upper bound $ub_T = ub + \sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s \leq ub - \epsilon \leq K^s - \epsilon$. Hence, the range of the uncertainty set $ub_T - lb_T \leq K^s - \epsilon = \delta$.

The $\delta = 0$ case means that during the $T$ time periods, if the cumulated action $\sum_{t=1}^{T} H_t^s$ of the supplier is $K^s$ (charged an amount corresponding to his capacity $K^s$) or $-K^s$ (discharged an amount corresponding to his capacity $K^s$), then we can conclude immediately his charge level is $K^s$ (if charge) or 0 (if discharge).
4.5.3 Impact of incomplete information

In last section, we discuss that as a player (consumer), how we can estimate the other player’s (supplier’s) charge level as the game proceed. This raises a question whether knowing this information will affect the overall rewards for each player and the total welfare.

**Pessimistic Decision**

From proposition 17, we can see that as the game proceeds long enough, both players are most probably certain about the other player’s charge level, making the problem as a full information game, which has been studied in Section 4.2.4. Here, we are interested in the time periods where information is incomplete. We assume the two players adopt a pessimistic approach based on their uncertainty set when they are not sure about the other player’s charge level.

Assume we’ve computed the pay-off matrices $A(s), B(s)$ for each state $s = (x^c, x^s, w)$, we show how we select our pessimistic action as a consumer.

- Our current charge level $x^c$ is known as well as the demand curve information $w$. We have the uncertainty set of supplier’s charge level $\hat{X}^s = [lb^s, ub^s]$.

- For each $x^s \in \hat{X}^s$, we obtain the pay-off matrix $A(x^s)$, which depends on $x^s$. For each fixed $x^s$, the pay-off matrix $A(x^s)$ has dimension $m \times n$, where $m, n$ are numbers of possible actions for consumer and supplier respectively, $m = |\mathcal{H}^c|, n = |\mathcal{H}^s|$. Hence, the matrix of $A(\hat{X}^s)$ has dimension $m \times n \times k$, where $k = |\hat{X}^s|$, the cardinality of the uncertainty set of supplier’s charge level.

- The pessimistic action for consumer is

$$H^{cs} = \arg \max_{H^c \in \mathcal{H}^c} \min_{H^s \in \mathcal{H}^s, x^s \in \hat{X}^s} A(\hat{X}^s).$$

Similarly, we can obtain the pessimistic action for supplier

$$H^{ss} = \arg \max_{H^s \in \mathcal{H}^s} \min_{H^c \in \mathcal{H}^c, x^c \in \hat{X}^c} B(\hat{X}^c).$$
If the consumer takes the pessimistic action, he is guaranteed to get pay-off at least $A_p$ no matter which charge level the supplier is at and what he chooses, where $A_p = \max_{H^c \in \mathcal{H}^c} \min_{H^s \in \mathcal{H}^s, x^s \in \hat{X}^s} A(\hat{X}^s)$.

**Simulation and Numerical Results**

We use similar parameter setting from Section 4.4.1. The initial uncertainty set is the interval $[0, K^i]$. The simulation is described as follows:

1. At each time period $t$, the random parameter $b$ is drawn according to the discretized normal distribution approximation.

2. For uncertainty case, players adopt pessimistic actions described in section 4.5.3, uncertainty set are updated.

3. For certainty case, players adopt actions based on the optimal policy.

4. If both uncertainty set have length 1, simulation stops (game enters full information phase).

Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of time duration of incomplete information game. We can see the two players basically know each other’s charge level after 40 time periods.

Table 4.4 shows the comparison of rewards for both players between certainty case (full information) and uncertainty case (incomplete information). In particular, this simulation
stops at iteration 10.

Table 4.4: Reward comparison between full and incomplete information game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>consumer</td>
<td>24.86</td>
<td>24.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supplier</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>14.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no big difference (less than 0.1%) in the cumulated rewards for certainty case and uncertainty case for both players.

Figure 4.5 shows an example of the evolution of uncertainty set. We stopped the simulation when both players know the other player charge level exactly.

![Figure 4.5: Evolution of uncertainty set](image)

4.5.4 Summary

Based on the numerical results, we conclude that

- The cumulated rewards of each player doesn’t have much difference even if they don’t know the other player’s charge level at the beginning.

- This difference will be diminished even more as the game enters the full information phase.
Overall, keeping the charge level as long as possible may benefit a little, but not much (as we can see in Table 4.4), it is not recommended to keep this information private.

4.6 Impact of storage ownership on the price

In this section, we discuss the impact of the storage ownership on the price. For the extreme cases, where only one of them controls energy storage device, the device owner holds the whole power to affect the price by operating the device. However, when both of them control some storage devices, they try to affect the price to achieve their best interests.

4.6.1 Parameter setting

In our numerical work, we assume there are 8 units of storage in total. The parameters are the same as those in Section 4.4.1. We discuss 9 different cases, where consumer-supplier ownership are \([0.8, 0], [0.7, 1], [0.6, 2], \ldots, [0, 0.8]\).

4.6.2 Numerical Results

All the following rewards are approximated on simulation with time period length \(T = 200\),

\[
\bar{R}_t = \frac{1}{1-\gamma^T} \mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \gamma^t R_t .
\]

With different distribution of ownership, the price volatility is shown in Fig 4.6, with the increases of supplier’s ownership, the volatility of price increases.
The total cumulated rewards are shown in Fig. 4.7. With more storage ownership over his competitor, the player increases his reward. Compared to consumer, when supplier controls more storage, he intends to increase the variance of price. We believe this is due to the very steep curvature for the supplier curve. Instead, in this simulation, consumer favors more stable price.
4.7 Conclusion

This chapter considers the impact of distributed energy storage ownership under uncertainty on the price. The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov Game with a random demand curve. A value iteration framework is provided to find the sub-optimal equilibrium policies for both players. The actions at each iteration are obtained by solving bimatrix games. A computational study demonstrates the gap between the policies obtained from our approach and the Nash equilibrium policies is very small. Another computational study shows that the benefit from hiding charge level information is not significant. Thus, it is suggested to share the information with each other. The impact
of storage ownership study offers insights about how much storage a player will need if he
wants to make a real impact on the price and his profits.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this dissertation, we present models for stochastic optimal control of grid-level storages, especially battery storages. In the basic storage operation problem, storage device owner is the decision maker. The owner makes profit by buying and selling energy from the grid, given the price varies during different time periods. The stochasticity comes from the uncertainty of price or the uncertainty of demand and supplier. A popular way to model a storage operation problem is Markov Decision Process (MDP). An infinite horizon MDP with discount factor can be formulated naturally and the objective function is to maximize the expected discounted total profit for the device owner. Classical algorithms for solving MDP problems include value iteration and policy iteration.

We propose several MDP-based models in different market settings and provide related algorithms and analysis to find the optimal or sub-optimal policies. Corresponding numerical experiments perform well and give us more insights about the model.

- In Chapter 2, we extend basic MDP model into $p$-periodic MDP model, which is suitable for mitigating end-of-horizon effects. The idea is to recalibrate the model every $p$ time periods in a rolling-horizon fashion. We provide a tighter bound with stationary value functions on an augmented state space than general bounds. An implementation on grid-level storage operation problem where price follows daily patterns is studied.

- In Chapter 3, battery degradation (aging phenomenon) is incorporated in the MDP
model. We introduce an extra state variable remaining life cycle to denote the aging status of the battery. Electricity price is assumed to follow a given independent and identically distributed distribution or a Markovian regime-switching process. Compared to value iteration, by utilizing the problem structure, we provide a faster and more accurate algorithm to solve the problem. The algorithm returns the optimal policies by solving a sequence of quasiconvex optimization problems.

- In Chapter 4, instead of the single player in previous two chapters, we consider two-players problems. Electricity price now not only depends on the relationship between demand and supplier, which is stochastic, but also on the decisions of two storage device owners. The problem is formulated as an infinite-horizon Markov game and a value iteration framework is proposed to find the sub-optimal policies for both players. In each iteration, on contrast to return the optimal action by maximizing the \( Q \) function in MDP model, we solve a bimatrix game in Markov game. In addition, we also study a related incomplete information game and the impact of repartition of the energy storage.
Bibliography


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Appendix A

Threshold policy

In Appendix A, we provide some nice properties of the model and some analysis on the optimal policy. The proof are based on [91].

The state variables are $s_i = (l_i, p_i)$ and the reward function is (let $\frac{\Delta}{k} = 1$)

$$R_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
- p_t \eta_{\text{charge}} a_t, & a_t > 0 \\
0 & \\
- p_t \eta_{\text{discharge}} a_t, & a_t < 0 
\end{cases}.$$ 

For simplicity, let $\eta^c = \eta_{\text{charge}} < 1, \eta^d = \eta_{\text{discharge}} < 1.$

Correspondingly, the value function becomes

$$V_t(l_t, p_t, a_t) = \max_{a \in A} [R_t(l_t, p_t, a_t) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{p}_{j+1}} [V_{t+1}(l_{t+1} + a_t, \tilde{p}_{j+1})]].$$

And $V_T(l_T, p_T) = \max_{a \in A} -p_T \eta^a a_T,$ i.e., discharge or do nothing.

Let

$$U_T(l, p) = 0,$$

$$U_t(l, p) = \gamma \mathbb{E} [V_{t+1}(l, \tilde{p}_{t+1}) | \tilde{p}_t = p] \quad t \in T \setminus \{T\}.$$
A.1 Concavity

In time period $t \in T$, the functions $U_t(l, p)$ and $V_t(l, p)$ are concave in $l \in L$ for each given $p$.

**Proof:** By induction.

For time period $T$: Clearly hold. Discharge as much as possible.

Assume the property holds for $t + 1$, i.e., $V_{t+1}(l, p_{t+1})$ is concave in $x$, given $p_{t+1}$,

$$V_{t+1}(l^\phi, p_{t+1}) \geq \phi V_{t+1}(l^1, p_{t+1}) + (1 - \phi) V_{t+1}(l^2, p_{t+1}) .$$

Consider time period $t$. Pick $\phi \in [0, 1]$ and $l^1, l^2$. Let $l^\phi = \phi l^1 + (1 - \phi) l^2$, which clearly is in $L$. Based on the assumption that price is finite, we know that $U_t(l, p)$ should be bounded, which implies that it is real value in $l \in L$ for each given $p$. Discounting and taking expectations on both sides

$$U_t(l^\phi, p) \geq \phi U_t(l^1, p) + (1 - \phi) U_t(l^2, p) , \tag{*}$$

which implies that $U_t(l, p)$ is concave in $l \in L$ for given $p$.

Let $a^i$ be a feasible action at storage level $l^i$, $i = 1, 2$, and define $a^\phi = \phi a^1 + (1 - \phi) a^2$. The convexity of the storage action set $C$ implies that $(l^\phi, a^\phi) \in C$, then

$$U_t(l^\phi + a^\phi, p) \geq \phi U_t(l^1 + a^1, p) + (1 - \phi) U_t(l^2 + a^2, p) .$$

The reward function $R_t(a, p)$ is piecewise linear and concave in $a$ given $p$. Combine with (*), $R_t(l_t, p_t, a_t) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{p}_{j+1}}[V_{t+1}(l_t + a_t, \tilde{p}_{j+1})]$ is jointly concave in $(l, a) \in C$ for given $p$. By proposition B-4 in Heyman, $V_t(l, p)$ is concave in $l \in L$ for given $p$. Thus, the property holds in time period $t$. We finish our proof.
A.2 Optimal basestock targets

In each time period, there exist critical storage level \( b_t(p), \bar{b}_t(p) \in \mathcal{L} \) with \( b_t(p) < \bar{b}_t(p) \), which depend on price \( p \) such that an optimal action in each state \((l, p)\) is

\[
a_t^*(l, p) = \begin{cases} 
(b_t(p) - l) \wedge \bar{a} & \text{if } l \in [l, b_t(p)) \\
0 & \text{if } l \in [b_t(p), \bar{b}_t(p)] \\
(\bar{b}_t(p) - l) \wedge a & \text{if } l \in (\bar{b}_t(p), \bar{l}] 
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \bar{a}, a \) are maximum charge rate and discharge rate and \( \bar{l}, l \) are maximum and minimum capacity of the device.

**Proof.** Consider any time period \( t \) and pick state \((l, p)\). Relax the ramping constraint \((a \leq a \leq \bar{a})\) First. Let \( y = l + a \) be the decision variable, then the optimization problem without ramping constraint become

\[
\max_y R_t(y - l, p) + U_t(y, p)
\]

Depending on whether \( y \geq l \) or \( y \leq l \), the respective objective function become

\[
U_t(y, p) - \eta^c p y + \eta^c pl , \tag{A.1}
\]
\[
U_t(y, p) - \eta^d p y + \eta^d pl . \tag{A.2}
\]

Then, the original problem can be approached by finding optimal solutions to the problems

\[
\max_{y \in [l, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^c p y + \eta^c pl , \tag{A.3}
\]
\[
\max_{y \in [l, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^d p y + \eta^d pl , \tag{A.4}
\]

and taking the optimal solution to the original problem to be the one with the highest objective function value.
In particular, at \( l = \underline{l} \) and \( \bar{l} = \tilde{l} \), the original problem become

\[
\max_{y \in [\underline{l}, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^c p y + \eta^c p l, \\
\max_{y \in [\underline{l}, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^d p y + \eta^d p l,
\]

which can be simplified to

\[
\max_{y \in [\underline{l}, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^c p y, \\
\max_{y \in [\underline{l}, \bar{l}]} U_t(y, p) - \eta^d p y.
\]

Let \( \underline{b}_j(p) \) and \( \bar{b}_j(p) \) be optimal solutions to (7), (8) respectively.

Since \( U_t(y, p) \) is concave in \( y \) given \( p \) and so is \( U_t(y, p) - \eta^c p y \) and \( U_t(y, p) - \eta^d p y \). In addition, it holds that \( \eta^c \geq \eta^d \). Hence, the optimal solution to (7) \( \underline{b}_j(p) \) is never greater than an optimal solution \( \bar{b}_j(p) \) to (8). The optimal solution for (7) is \( \frac{\partial U_t(y, p)}{\partial y} - \eta^c p \) while the optimal solution for (8) should be \( \frac{\partial U_t(y, p)}{\partial y} - \eta^d p \).

Consider the original problem for any \( l \in [\underline{l}, \underline{b}_j(p)) \). It is clear that \( \underline{b}_j(p) \) is an optimal (3). It also hold that \( l \) is an optimal solution to (4). The reason is that \( \bar{b}_j(p) \) maximizes (2) when \( y \) can take any value in the whole range. But in (4), \( y \leq l \). We know that \( \bar{b}_j(p) \geq \underline{b}_j(p) \geq l \) is the optimal solution for (8), which implies that in the range \([\underline{l}, \bar{l}]\), (4) is increasing in \( y \), given \( p \). Hence, \( l \) is the optimal solution to (4).

Moreover, \( l \) is a feasible solution to (3), so that

\[
U_t(\underline{b}_j(l), p) - \eta^c p \underline{b}_j + \eta^c p l \geq U_t(l, p).
\]

Thus, we conclude that \( \underline{b}_j(p) \) optimize the original problem and \( a_j^*(l, p) = (\underline{b}_j(p) - x) \land \bar{C} \).

Consider the range \( l \in [\bar{b}_j(p), \bar{b}_j(p)] \), storage level \( l \) optimizes both (3) and (4) because \( \bar{b}_j(p) \) and \( \bar{b}_j(p) \) maximize (8) and (9) on \([\underline{l}, \bar{l}]\) and \( \underline{l} \leq l \leq \bar{l} \). It follows that \( a_j^*(l, p) = 0 \).

The case where \( l \in (\bar{b}_j(p), \bar{l}] \) can be dealt with similarly to the first case \( l \in [\underline{l}, \underline{b}_j(p)) \).
A.3 Price monotonicity

**Assumption 2:** (Spot-price process) For every $t \in T \setminus T$:

(a) The distribution function of random variable $\tilde{p}_{t+1}$ conditional on the spot price is time period $t$ stochastically increase in $p \in P_t$.

(b) The function $\delta_t \mathbb{E}_t[\frac{1}{\eta c} \tilde{p}_{t+1} | \tilde{p}_t = p] - \eta^d p$ decreases in $p \in P_t$

**Proposition 2** If assumption 2 holds, then every time period $j \in J$ the optimal basestock target function $b_t(p)$ and $\bar{b}_t(p)$ decrease in the spot price $p \in P$.

**Proof:** By induction. And there are three statements to prove to hold at every iterations.

- the optimal basestock target function $b_t(p)$ and $\bar{b}_t(p)$ decrease in the spot price $p \in P$
- $U'_t(l, p)$ increase in $p \in P_t$, given $l$.
- functions $U'_t(l, p) - \frac{1}{\eta c} p$ and $U'_t(l, p) - \eta^d p$ decrease in $p \in P_t$ for each given $l$.

For stage $T$:

- The value function is
  \[ V_T(l_T, p_T) = \max_{a \in A} -p_T \eta^f a_T. \]

It is easy to verify that if $p_T < 0$ $b_T(p) = \bar{l}$ and $\bar{b}_T(p) = \bar{l}$, otherwise, $b_T(p) = \bar{b}_T(p) = l$.

- $U'_T(l, p) = 0$. Trivial.

- Functions
  \[ U'_T(l, p) - \frac{1}{\eta c} p = -\frac{1}{\eta c} p \]
  \[ U'_T(l, p) - \eta^d p = -\eta^d p \]

decrease in $p$, given $l$. 


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Consider $j$. By proposition 1, the objective functions (7) and (8) are concave in the decision variable $y$ and $b_t(p), \bar{b}_t(p)$ are maximal solutions are these two functions. Hence, our goal is to show that the partial derivative respect to $y$,

$$U_T'(y, p) - \frac{1}{\eta^c} p$$

$$U_T'(y, p) - \eta^d p$$

both decrease in $p$ given $y$.

In order to achieve this, pick $(l, p) \in \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{P}$ and consider function $U_t(l, p) = \delta_t \mathbb{E}_t[V_{t+1}(l, \bar{b}_{t+1})|p_t = p]$. Focus on the function $V_{t+1}(l, z)$ in feasible state $(x, z)$ in stage $t + 1$. Consider the optimal action. There are five mutually exclusive cases need to be considered.

- Discharge is optimal but $\bar{b}_{t+1}(z)$ cannot be reached from $l$; that is, only $l + a$ can be reached from $l$
- Discharge is optimal and $\bar{b}_{t+1}(z)$ can be reached from $l$
- Do nothing is optimal
- Charge is optimal and $b_{t+1}(z)$ can be reached from $l$
- Charge is optimal and $b_{t+1}(z)$ cannot be reached from $l$; that is, only $l + a$ can be reached from $l$

Accordingly, define the following mutually exclusive events:

- $A_{t+1}^1(l, z) := \{l + a > \bar{b}_{t+1}(z)\}$
- $A_{t+1}^2(l, z) := \{l + a < \bar{b}_{t+1}(z), l > \bar{b}_{t+1}(z)\}$
- $A_{t+1}^3(l, z) := \{b_{t+1}(z) \leq l \leq \bar{b}_{t+1}(z)\}$
- $A_{t+1}^4(l, z) := \{l + a > \bar{b}_{t+1}(z), l < b_{t+1}(z)\}$
- $A_{t+1}^5(l, z) := \{l + a < b_{t+1}(z)\}$
Let $\mathbf{1}\{\}$ equals 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise. Then $V_{t+1}(l, z)$ can be written as

$$V_{t+1}(l, z) = [-\eta^d z a + U_{t+1}(l + a, z)] \mathbf{1}\{A^1_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ \{ -\eta^d z [\bar{b}_{t+1}(z) - l] + U_{t+1}(\bar{b}_{t+1}(z), z)\} \mathbf{1}\{A^2_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ U_{t+1}(l, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^3_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ \{ -\frac{1}{\eta^c} z [\bar{b}_{t+1}(z) - l] + U_{t+1}(\bar{b}_{t+1}(z), z)\} \mathbf{1}\{A^4_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ \{-\frac{1}{\eta^c} z \bar{a} + U_{t+1}(l + \bar{a}, z)\} \mathbf{1}\{A^5_{t+1}(l, z)\}.$$  

Consider the function

$$V'_{t+1}(l, z) = U'_{t+1}(l + a, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^1_{t+1}(l, z)\} + (\eta^d z) \mathbf{1}\{A^2_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ U'_{t+1}(l, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^3_{t+1}(l, z)\}$$

$$+ (\frac{1}{\eta^c}) \mathbf{1}\{A^4_{t+1}(l, z)\} + U'_{t+1}(l + \bar{a}, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^5_{t+1}(l, z)\}.$$  

Arrange it and define $f^1_{t+1}(l, z)$ and $f^2_{t+1}(l, z)$

$$V'_{t+1}(l, z) = \begin{cases} 
[U'_{t+1}(l + a, z) - \eta^d z] \mathbf{1}\{A^1_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
\frac{1}{\eta^d} - \frac{1}{\eta^d} \mathbf{1}\{A^1_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
[\eta^d z - \eta^d z] \mathbf{1}\{A^2_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
\frac{1}{\eta^c} - \frac{1}{\eta^c} \mathbf{1}\{A^3_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
\frac{1}{\eta^c} \mathbf{1}\{A^4_{t+1}(l, z)\} + \mathbf{1}\{A^5_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
U'_{t+1}(l, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^3_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
((\eta^d)) [\mathbf{1}\{A^1_{t+1}(l, z)\} + \mathbf{1}\{A^2_{t+1}(l, z)\}] \\
+ U'_{t+1}(l, z) \mathbf{1}\{A^3_{t+1}(l, z)\} \\
+ (\frac{1}{\eta^c}) [\mathbf{1}\{A^4_{t+1}(l, z)\} + \mathbf{1}\{A^5_{t+1}(l, z)\}] \end{cases} = f^1_{t+1}(l, z)$$

We need to study the behavior of the functions $f^1_{t+1}(l, z)$ and $f^2_{t+1}(l, z)$ in $z$ given $l$. Consider the determination of an optimal action in state $(l, z)$ in period $t + 1$ as $p$ varies in $P_{t+1}$. By the first induction hypothesis, there exist no more than four ordered prices that depend
on $l$, denoted, with a slightly abuse of notation, by $p_{t+1}^1(l), p_{t+1}^2(l), p_{t+1}^3(l), p_{t+1}^4(l)$, with $p_{t+1}^1(l) < p_{t+1}^2(l) < p_{t+1}^3(l) < p_{t+1}^4(l)$, that can be used to partition set $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}$ into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets

- $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}^1(l) := (p_{t+1}^4(l), \infty) \cap \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$
- $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}^2(l) := (p_{t+1}^3(l), p_{t+1}^4(l)) \cap \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$
- $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}^3(l) := [p_{t+1}^2(l), p_{t+1}^4(l)] \cap \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$
- $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}^4(l) := [p_{t+1}^1(l), p_{t+1}^2(l)) \cap \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$
- $\mathcal{P}_{t+1}^5(l) := [0, p_{t+1}^1(l)) \cap \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$

which satisfy the property that $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^k$ if and only if $1\{A_{t+1}^k(l, z)\} = 1$ for all $k \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$. Consider different case, we obtain those inequalities as following:

\[
\begin{align*}
U_{t+1}'(l + a, z) - \eta^d z &\leq 0, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^1 \\
U_{t+1}'(l, z) &\leq \eta^d z, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^2 \\
U_{t+1}'(l + a, z) - \eta^d z &\geq 0, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^2 \\
U_{t+1}'(l, z) &\geq \eta^c z, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^4 \\
U_{t+1}'(l + \bar{a}, z) - \frac{1}{\eta^c} z &\leq 0, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^4 \\
U_{t+1}'(l + \bar{a}, z) - \frac{1}{\eta^c} z &\geq 0, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^5 \\
\eta^d z &\leq U_{t+1}'(l, z) \leq \frac{1}{\eta^c} z, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^3.
\end{align*}
\]

Consider $f_{t+1}^1(l, z)$, given $l$, this function is positive for $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^5$, zero for $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^2 \cup \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^3 \cup \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^4$, negative for $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^1$. Moreover, the third induction hypothesis implies that this function decreases in $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$. Assumption 2 and Corollary in [102] imply that

$$\delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^1(l, \bar{p}_{t+1}) | \bar{p}_t = p]$$

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decreases in $p \in \mathcal{P}_t$.

Consider $f_{t+1}^2(l, z)$, given $l$, combined with the second induction hypothesis, we have $f_{t+1}^2(l, z)$ increases in $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$ and $f_{t+1}^2(l, z) \leq \frac{1}{\eta^c}, \forall z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$.

Hence, we have

$$\delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^2(l, \bar{p}_{t+1}) | \bar{p}_t = p] - \frac{1}{\eta^c} \text{ decrease in } p \in \mathcal{P}_t,$$

$$\delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^2(l, \bar{p}_{t+1}) | \bar{p}_t = p] - \eta^d \text{ decrease in } p \in \mathcal{P}_t.$$

And from Lemma 7, we have

$$U_{t+1}'(l, p) - \frac{1}{\eta^c} = \delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^1(l, \bar{p}_{t+1}) | \bar{p} = p] + \delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^2(l, \bar{p}_t) | \bar{p}_t = p] - \frac{1}{\eta^c},$$

$$U_{t+1}'(l, p) - \eta^c = \delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^1(l, \bar{p}_{t+1}) | \bar{p} = p] + \delta_t \mathbb{E}[f_{t+1}^2(l, \bar{p}_t) | \bar{p}_t = p] - \eta^c.$$

Then both $U_{t+1}'(l, p) - \frac{1}{\eta^c}$ and $U_{t+1}'(l, p) - \eta^c$ decrease in $p \in \mathcal{P}_t$ for given $l$. Then we show that $U_{t+1}'(l, p)$ increases in $p \in \mathcal{P}_t$ for given $l$. We know that

$$U_{t+1}'(l + a, z) \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^5(l)\} + \frac{1}{\eta^c} \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^5(l)\}$$

increases in $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^1(l) \cup \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^5(l)$.

And

$$\frac{1}{\eta^d} \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^4(l)\} + U_{t+1}'(l, z) \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^3(l)\} + (\eta^d) \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^2(l)\}$$

increases in $z \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^1(l) \cup \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^3(l) \cup \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^2(l)\}.$

And

$$U_{t+1}'(l + a, z) \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^2(l)\} + (\eta^d) \mathbb{1}\{z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}^1(l)\}$$

increases in $z \in \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^2(l) \cup \mathcal{S}_{t+1}^1(l)$}. Thus $V_{t+1}'(l, z)$ increases in $z \in \mathcal{P}_{t+1}$. And by Corollary 3.9.1(a) in [102], we have $U_t(l, p_t) = \delta_t \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}'(l, \bar{p}_t = p)]$ increases in $p \in \mathcal{P}_t$.
Appendix B

Price process

The power industry has become an open, competitive environment and the uncertainty of price is one of the key components of this environment. In the related literature, many different models have been studied [81]. The complexity of a model depends on the data that is available. At the time these models were proposed, data on the deregulated electricity markets was scarce.

According to [58], in order to develop a price process model, the following properties should be taken into consideration: mean reversion, time of day effects, weekend/weekday effects, seasonal effects, time-varying volatility and extreme values/price spikes. Several price models are provided in [58], including mean-reverting process, time-varying mean, jump-diffusion process, time-dependent jump intensity, ARMAX.

In [13], Burger et al. present a general model called Spot Market Price simulation (SMaPS-model) that simultaneously takes into account seasonal patterns, price spikes, mean reversion, price dependent volatilities and long-term non-stationarity.

In my research, in order to incorporate the price process into the battery operation model, sometimes a relatively simple model has been chosen although a more complicated model can replace the simpler model. We give 3 examples of stochastic processes for the price.
B.1 Periodic Price Model with i.i.d noise

Assuming the price varies periodically with period $T$ subject to i.i.d. noise, we have the following price process

$$p_{t+1} = \mu_j + \sigma_j \epsilon_{t+1}$$

where

- $j = \text{mod}(t + 1, T)$ the index of $t + 1$ in the cycle of period $T$
- $\mu_j =$ the expected price at time index $j$ in the cycle
- $\sigma_j =$ the standard deviation of random noise at time index $j$ in the cycle
- $\epsilon_{t+1} \sim N(0, 1)$ a standard normal noise

This process may be the simplest price process we can find. The price at certain time period $t$ only depends on its own mean and variance. However, if we evaluate the logarithm of all the data before we use this price model, this model can be extend to so-called lognormal distribution, which we used in Chapter 2.

B.2 Periodic autoregressive process of order 1

Consider another model where the price is a periodic autoregressive model of order 1 (PAR(1) process) which exhibits mean-reversion to the periodic mean of period $T$. We can describe this as follows:

$$p_{t+1} - p_t = (\mu_j - \mu_i) + \kappa_i (\mu_i - p_t) \Delta t + \sigma_j \sqrt{\Delta t} \epsilon_{t+1}$$

where

- $i = \text{mod}(t, T)$ the index of $t$ in the cycle of period $T$
- $j = \text{mod}(t + 1, T)$ the index of $t + 1$ in the cycle of period $T$
- $\mu_j =$ the expected price at time index $j$ in the cycle
- $\kappa_i =$ the mean-reversion parameter at time index $j$ in the cycle
- $\sigma_j =$ the standard deviation of random noise at time index $j$ in the cycle
- $\epsilon_{t+1} \sim N(0, 1)$ a standard normal noise
Compared with Model 1, prices in Model 2 depend on its mean, variance and its precedent price. The parameter \( \kappa \) controls the rate at which the price reverts back to the nominal value \( \mu_i \).

B.3 PAR(1) with spikes

The third model we provide here incorporates a probability of random price spike. To describe this model, we first define

\[
\begin{align*}
w_{t+1}^b &\sim B(1, b) \text{: A Bernoulli random variable equal to 1 with probability } b \text{ to indicate a spiking regime.} \\
w_{t+1}^\epsilon &\sim N(0, 1) \text{ a standard Normal noise.} \\
f &\text{ A function to replace a base price by a spike price}
\end{align*}
\]

Then the model can be described as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{t+1} &= w_{t+1}^b \xi_{t+1} + (1 - w_{t+1}^b)f(\xi_{t+1}) \\
(\xi_{t+1} - \xi_t) &= (\mu_j - \mu_i) + \kappa(\mu_i - \xi_t)\Delta_t + \sigma_j\sqrt{\Delta_t}w_{t+1}^\epsilon
\end{align*}
\]

The numerical work for this model has not been finished yet, but hopefully, we can obtain a better prediction of price in a short term.
Appendix C

Linear and Quadratic Curve Case Study

C.1 Analytic Solution for Equilibrium Price and Reward Functions: Linear and Quadratic Curve Case

With fixed $a$, we obtain

\[ S_t = f_s(P_t) = \frac{-c + \sqrt{c^2 + 4dP_t}}{2d}, \]  

\[ D_t = f_d(P_t) = \frac{b - P_t}{a}. \]  

If we know both players’ actions $H^c_t, H^s_t$, then we know the quantity of aggregated energy change $H_t = H^c_t + H^s_t$. By solving equation (4.1), we have the price $P_t$ given known actions. Plugging $P_t$ back into equations (C.1), we obtain the demand and supply given known actions as well,

\[ P_t(H_t) = \frac{1}{2} \left( 2b + \frac{a^2}{d} + \frac{ac}{d} + 2aH_t - \frac{a\sqrt{a^2 + 2ac + c^2 + 4bd + 4adH_t}}{d} \right), \]

\[ D_t(H_t) = -\frac{a + c + 2dH_t - \sqrt{(a + c)^2 + 4bd + 4adH_t}}{2d}, \]

\[ S_t(H_t) = \frac{1}{2d} \left( -c + \Phi(H_t) + \Psi(H_t) \right). \]
where

$$\Phi(H_t) = 2a^2 + c^2 + 4bd,$$

$$\Psi(H_t) = 2a(c + 2dH_t - \sqrt{(a+c)^2 + 4bd + 4adH_t}).$$

In addition, we compute the demand reward $R^d_t$ and generation reward $R^g_t$

$$R^d_t = \frac{a}{8d^2} \left( a + c + 2dH_t - \sqrt{(a+c)^2 + 4bd + 4adH_t} \right)^2,$$

$$R^g_t = \frac{1}{24d^2} (c - \Phi(H_t))^2 (c + \Phi(H_t)).$$

The storage reward for consumer and supplier are

$$R^{cs}_t = -H^c_t P_t(H_t),$$

$$R^{ss}_t = -H^s_t P_t(H_t).$$

With equation (4.2), we obtain the reward functions for both players given known actions $H^c_t, H^s_t$.

C.2 Numerical Experiment: Linear and Quadratic Curve Case

We use similar setting with Section 4.4.1, instead of the piecewise for supply curve, we use a simple quadratic curve

$$s^{-1}(q) = 2q + 0.5q^2,$$

where $b$ has a Normal Distribution $\mathcal{N}(800, 60^2)$, which is approximated by a discrete distribution with 61 different states.

Capacities for both storages are $K_c = K_s = 2$, discretized with step length 0.1.

In this linear/quadratic case, consumer has tendency to discharge with higher demand.
level $b$ while supplier tries to charge.

Figure C.1: Charging amount for both players ($y$-axis) as a function of the demand curve level (parameter $b/100$ as $x$-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.

Figure C.2: Next charge levels for both players ($y$-axis) as a function of the demand curve level (parameter $b/100$ as $x$-axis). red: consumer. blue: supplier.
Biography

Yuhai Hu earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Industrial Engineering from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 2012. In 2012, he joined the doctoral program in Industrial Engineering at Lehigh University. He is keenly interested in almost all areas of mathematical optimization and his research focus is on stochastic optimal control of grid-level storage. He spent the summer of 2015 working as Data Mining Intern at Bosch RTC in Palo Alto, CA and the fall of 2016 working part-time as Computational Modeling Intern at AirProducts in Allentown, PA.