

Lehigh University

Lehigh Preserve

Volume 37 - The New Malaysia (2019)

Perspectives on Business and Economics

1-1-2019

Sons of the Soil: The Past, Present, and Future of Malaysia's Bumiputera

Calvin W. Floyd
Lehigh University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v37>

Recommended Citation

Floyd, Calvin W., "Sons of the Soil: The Past, Present, and Future of Malaysia's Bumiputera" (2019).
Volume 37 - The New Malaysia (2019). 14.
<https://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v37/14>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Volume 37 - The New Malaysia (2019) by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.

SONS OF THE SOIL: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF MALAYSIA'S BUMIPUTERA

Calvin W. Floyd



The majority of Malaysia's population is classified as bumiputera based on their ethnic and religious background. These bumiputera receive special privileges, as they have historically been on the low end of an economic disparity. This article examines the policies supporting said privileges, their suitability in the present, and the future of the bumiputera.

Introduction

Malaysia's politics have long been intertwined with conscious attempts to support its native peoples, who have been recognized as economically disadvantaged. Aboriginal tribes, such as the Orang Asli, and indigenous Southeast Asian Malay peoples are known collectively as the bumiputera (BP). These "Sons of the Soil" have tended to live in rural areas in both the western mainland peninsular region of the country and in the northern Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak to the east. Living largely agricultural lifestyles, the BP have suffered economically by comparison with later Chinese and Indian ethnic groups, who tended to locate in what have become the more urban regions of Kuala Lumpur and Penang. In contrast to many nations where the numbers of original native peoples have fallen into the distinct minority, the BP comprise the majority at around two-thirds of the nation's population (Sawe).

These Muslim Malay and indigenous peoples led long-suffering lives at the hands of numerous colonial powers, including Chinese Buddhist and Indian Hindu traders and Portuguese and Dutch settlers, and culminating with the British, who established a branch of the East India Company in Penang dating from 1786 ("Malaysia: History"). Following Malaysia's unification and emergence as an independent nation in 1957, attention to Malay economic deprivation began to emerge centered around a political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Originally founded as a counterinsurgency to the rise of communism following the end of World War II, the UMNO became the largest member party of what would become the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional.

Recognizing the economic disparities experienced by the BP, the federal government under Barisan Nasional leadership implemented a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1969. Through legislated economic subsidies, education

scholarships and job training programs, and political office appointments, the goal was to lift up these disadvantaged groups. Well intentioned and initially successful, this set of policies, organized on an ethnic basis, has become increasingly ineffective in narrowing the economic disparities between the rural BP and the more urban Chinese and Indian groups of Malaysian citizens. In this essay I examine the origins, contemporary implications, and longer-term concerns regarding BP needs, privileges, and realities.

United Malays National Organization and New Economic Policy History

Throughout the colonial period, an ethnic-based inequality between the Malay people and immigrant Chinese populations began to form, with a significant part of urban areas populated by the Chinese. With this concentration of population came a wealth disparity between the ethnic groups—the Chinese inhabitants were relatively wealthy whereas the Malay people were mostly living in poverty. Much of this disparity was the direct result of the Chinese locating primarily in these urban centers, where there was a greater flow of money, while the native Malay people were concentrated in poorer, rural areas of the country. Along with these physical location differences came opportunity for entrepreneurship, which led to wealth accumulation and a greater ability to build capital. (In 2014 the median incomes for rural and urban populations were RM3,831 and RM6,833, respectively [“Report...”].) When Malaysia became an independent nation, this economic divide had been well established and continued as a source of racially charged conflict across the country. By the time the 1969 national election arrived, this conflict had escalated to include protests against the ethnic economic divide.

On May 13, 1969, a procession in support of the UMNO was planned to be held outside Kuala Lumpur, a primarily Chinese city at the time (“May 13, Never Again”). Crowds of Malays originating from many of the surrounding rural areas gathered for the procession in order to support their political party of choice. According to government records of the events,

Chinese residents taunted a group of Malays some distance away from the gathering. The Malay travelers responded violently and began to throw bottles and rocks at the Chinese taunters. The incident quickly escalated into a full-blown fight between the groups. This initial conflict started a chain of events that became difficult to stop. Once the massive crowds gathering for the UMNO procession caught wind of the violence, many Malays originally present at the procession traveled toward the city. Within the hour, these Malays were raiding shops, lighting cars on fire, and even committing murders. At least 8 Chinese were killed. This initial attack by the Malays triggered a further retaliation from prepared Chinese organizations, escalating the conflict and bringing forth a government-issued 24-hour curfew. Despite the curfew, further riots ensued. When the casualties were counted, more than 80 Chinese and Malay had been killed. Those from the morning were all Chinese, those from the time of the raids and retaliation were evenly split between races, and those from the curfew period were, once again, primarily Chinese. The government later released an official statement claiming that the incident arose from racial politics, without blaming either side. There is some evidence, however, that the whole tragedy was actually a planned coup d’état with the intention of attaining Malay dominance (Soong). Nevertheless, the incident left the country scarred and indicated the need for drastic change.

In response to this “13 May Incident,” an emergency government called the National Operations Council formed for a period of 2 years in order to develop an array of constitutional policies, including the NEP. These policies endured once Parliament was reestablished in 1971 and are in place as the derivative of laws and culture to this day. The NEP contributed greatly to the installation of special privileges for one ethnic group in Malaysia, the BP, thereby creating a distinct divide between what is considered the native ethnicity and other groups, in particular the large Chinese population. As a constitutional monarchy, the regulation of these policies was overseen by an elected monarch and head of

state, known as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or the King. The Malaysian constitution, Article 153, defines these parameters:

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions...to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure [them] of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service...and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government ("Federal Constitution").

In other words, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the absolute ability to implement privileges and regulations to help support members of the "special position" in this range of areas through ill-defined affirmative action. This essentially gives a boost to the ethnic majority in Malaysia, while members of the remaining minority are left academically and economically unaided regardless of individual socioeconomic status. The resulting laws touch on many areas, including education, training programs, and political office positions (Thillainathan and Cheong). They also include requirements for certain companies, including foreign companies, to have a minimum 30% BP ownership of equity, greater access to higher-education preparation courses, BP-specific governmental mutual funds, housing discounts, and a plethora of other advantages (Whah).

In order to effectively investigate the BP special privileges engendered by the NEP, which was later replaced by the National Development Policy and its subsequent related laws, it is important to define what it means to be BP as well as the premise behind the implemented laws. Because the BP is the population receiving significant advantages, there is a need for detailed guidelines to determine if a Malaysian citizen qualifies as a member of this ethnic group, although these guidelines seem vague in the Constitution itself. One discrepancy that arises from these laws is the inconsistency of the definitions depending on whether a Malay is born in Peninsular Malaysia

or in the states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. As it stands, in order to be qualified as BP born in Peninsular Malaysia, at least one of a child's parents must be a Muslim Malay or Orang Asli ("Federal Constitution"); in other words, the qualification for these rights is tied to Islam. This is important because it implies the necessity to follow the Islam religion in order to have access to the privileges, despite any economic disadvantage that they may have. This kind of religious affiliation has the potential to create greater tensions when considering changing the policies, because such efforts may be seen as an attack on the religion rather than a purely secular development.

Meanwhile, in Sabah, a child only must be born in the state and have at least one native parent to be considered BP. However, a child born in Sarawak must have two native Sarawak parents. Although there also seems to be a notable difference between the number of native parents required for qualification between Sabah and Sarawak states, the most distinct difference between the state laws lies in the religious affiliation that comes from the peninsular regulations, differing from the purely parental requirements in Borneo. This indicates that there are both Muslim BP, originating primarily from the western part of Malaysia, and non-Muslim BP (NMB), who typically originate from the Borneo areas of Malaysia. In addition to the complications arising from significant non-BP populations like the Chinese not receiving the same privileges despite similar individual income levels or education, this religious difference within the BP group has the potential to cause national tension and political turmoil as certain in-groups are able to take greater advantage of the privileges than others due to the political ties to Islam that are also in place. Borneo, in addition, has lower income rates and higher rural percentages than most other states in Malaysia and, therefore, is in greater need of affirmative action laws. Since these states have less strict and religiously tied definitions of BP, the expectation is that a greater number of people would be aided and that improvement of economic equality substantial. This, however, is not entirely the case.

Contemporary Implications of the New Economic Policy

The original implementation of the NEP, as well as the subsequent laws, had the primary intention of lifting up the BP population as a whole, specifically because of the group's significant poverty compared to that of the Chinese and Indian populations. At first glance, the policies seem to have worked. Over the past few decades, Malay people have seen an increase in average household income, improvements in the tertiary education rate, and an overall strengthening of the middle class ("Malaysia: 30 Years..."). The gap between the Chinese and the BP has been narrowed in these respects. Nonetheless, notable economic disparities between the cultural groups continue to exist.

Although the income disparity between BP and non-BP has improved over the past few decades, this may not be representative of the reality of income differences. Compared to mean monthly incomes of around RM3,500 and RM2,000 for Chinese and BP, respectively, in 2000, a subsequent 2012 report noted incomes averaging around RM5,000 and RM3,400 for Chinese and BP, respectively (Hishamh). The monthly incomes for the Indian population have remained on par with the national Malaysian average since the 1970s; therefore, I focus on the Chinese. These changes have indicated an increase in absolute levels of economic affluence, but the relative mean income difference between the Chinese and BP has not significantly changed. Based on the rising education and income rates of the BP, described previously, this minimal amelioration of the Chinese-BP income difference stands as a major discrepancy from the expected. Considering the intentions of the NEP, if there were to be any change, an overall decrease in the ratio between Chinese and Malay income rates would be expected, which is not the case. The way that these results occurred can be related to how favoring the BP was twisted from its original intention to be used in political pandering and business advancement.

One possible theory implies that once the laws were in place, those with the proper connections and influence within the BP category were able to monopolize the

advantages provided. Wealthier BP continued to gain power and income, at the same time securing the education and health options that often are bragged about by those referring to the NEP's success. Meanwhile, many more impoverished BP have actually had their potential for economic growth stifled. The consequences of this situation are indicated in national statistics for the bottom 40% (B40), middle 40% (M40), and top 20% (T20) of earners. For Malaysia, the parameters for these percentages are a median monthly household income of at least RM13,148 for the T20 group; RM6,275 for the M40 group; and RM3,000 for the B40 as of 2019 ("The T20 ..."). These exact numbers are dynamic; however, they provide an approximation of the earnings spread. The BP make up nearly 73% of the B40 and around 54% the T20, standing as the majority for both. These percentages compared to the roughly 62% total BP population indicate a disproportionate number of BP still in the B40 and too few in the T20. From another perspective, when looking at the statistics within the BP classification, only around 16% of BP are in the T20, 4% less than ideal, whereas 45% fall in the B40, 5% more than ideal ("Yoursay..."). These numbers not only indicate a significant income gap that has developed within the BP community but also emphasize the persistent prevalence of BP economic inequality with regard to income, bringing into question the real success of the NEP-related policies. At the same time, the strong majority of high-earning BP find jobs through the government rather than through entrepreneurial or other methods ("Bumiputera..."). This is likely related to the NEP policies that guarantee jobs to the BP population and can be easily taken advantage of by those with the proper connections. There are similar trends of income inequality within the Chinese population, such that there is a general trend toward increased intra-ethnic income inequality across the board (Bhattacharjee and Ho). Hence, it seems that there should not be a focus on ethnic-oriented policies but rather some other factors.

Another persistent instance of inequality is between urban and rural populations. Generally speaking, those living in an urban setting have higher incomes than those in the

rural setting. As alluded to previously, a majority of BP live in rural communities—64% of these rural BP are among the B40. In contrast, only 33% of BP in the urban setting are in the same B40 category (“Bumis...”). Ideally, the percent in the B40 is 40% for all subsections; therefore, it is apparent that there is significantly less wealth in rural communities. Since most BPs are rural, it comes as no surprise that the average income of BP is lower than that of the Chinese, who are more concentrated in urban centers, and that this income gap is a product of urban versus rural income differences rather than direct racial differences. A more appropriate way of aiding those with larger need is to target those with lower income or in rural communities rather than those identifying as a certain race. Meanwhile, the current approach enables the more fortunate BP to take greater advantage of the privileges compared to the BP who are more in need.

The increase in the income gap within the BP community, however, is not solely due to the monopolization of opportunities by the well off. Rather, there has also been a shift in motivation. In a keynote speech at the “Congress on the Future of Bumiputera and the Nation 2018,” or KBN 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad emphasized that cash aids and handouts only serve to weaken the motivation and intellectuality of the BP, in particular, and therefore the entirety of the country (Rodzi). The claim is that the BP have learned to rely on the aid, whether they actually need to or not, leading to a lackadaisical approach to their own lives. This opens up a new issue stemming from the implementation of the special rights of the Malay. Further claims have been made that as BP secure placement in educational institutions that otherwise may have been offered to more qualified students, they do not necessarily follow through in the quality of their acquired skills and education. Similarly, even though it may be easier for those qualifying to obtain jobs due to the favoritism of affirmative action, with less developed skills and motivation to competitively succeed, there is no maintenance of upward mobility. Instead, members of the BP community continue to expect government handouts to keep them afloat—an unsustainable strategy. At the

same time, there are accounts stating that this is a false impression of the BP, but hiring companies under this impression end up offering fewer interviews and job opportunities to fully qualified BP (Mutum). No matter which scenario is true, or even if both have aspects of truth to them, the point holds that the policies underlying them are faulty and thus ineffective.

Further complicating the situation, brain drain has grown into a substantial issue with more than 1 million Malaysian citizens of the total current population of around 30 million living in foreign lands as of 2011 (Nadaraj). Seats in the classroom and places in the workforce may be offered to Malays with less drive than minority groups, but the latter turn to resources outside of Malaysia to secure an education and career. A similar situation faces those who may not receive job opportunities as a result of previous erroneous notions of their aptitude. Such emigration eats away at the number and quality of Malaysian specialists, which can easily affect the well-being of the country over time.

Looking closer at the NEP and its BP favoritism, it seems that a majority of positives that are pressed to the forefront of public information by the government are mostly ways of manipulating data in order to make them look favorable, particularly to the BP majority whose support is needed to win an election. Yes, more BP are now receiving tertiary education and jobs, but, without the drive to continue to work toward their own success, their upward mobility remains limited. As a result, they still make up a disproportionate majority of the B40. As a race-based policy, the fewer numbers of BP who were in more advantageous positions at the time of the NEP, or managed to reach such a place afterwards, have been able to reap its rewards to a greater extent. For the whole of Malaysia, this means that a select few, well-connected Malays receive a huge advantage while non-Malays and less fortunate BP are pushed down.

For instance, despite Malaysia managing to improve its overall poverty rate to as low as .6%, 34% of the indigenous NMB group, the Orang Asli, are impoverished. Similarly, Sarawak NMB have a poverty rate of 7.3%, well above the average. This is partially due

to a somewhat flawed analysis of how poverty is defined. The official analysis of poverty comes from a measure of absolute poverty based on the gross household income required for essentials, including food and non-food items (“Poverty Profile: Executive Summary Malaysia”). This absolute measure remains in contrast to the rates of relative economic inequality, which can be seen through the significant earning divide between the T20 and the lower wage earners (Teoh), when taking into account inflation, migration from rural to urban centers, climbing costs of living, and ethnic disparities (Bradley). Without proper evaluation, these trends will not show up in the official statistics, particularly when they are released by a government run primarily by members of this small, elite group. In other words, there is significant economic inequality between different BP groups, but this inequality is obscured by generalized statistics.

Possibilities Moving Forward

During the 2018 congress, no real accomplishments were made according to businessmen attending the conference (Ibrahim and Amin), but this may not necessarily be true. Although no new legislation was created or updated, real attention was brought to the possibility of modifying the warped agendas that originally stemmed from the NEP decades ago. A significant amount of hope for change has been instilled in the general population regarding these issues. News sources are aflame with discussions of reasoning behind the flaws in the current BP system, and with these discussions arise potential solutions and suggestions for the PH to consider. One of the more common suggestions revolves around stripping the racial connotations that are required to benefit from the special rights (“The NEP is a Tongkat...”). The original NEP had the goal of uplifting the more impoverished of the BP population, due to their historically inequitable position. By taking an ethnic-oriented approach instead of one solely based on affluence, many of the previously discussed issues developed and inadvertently fostered racial tensions. Should the new government attempt to remodel what the NEP was supposed to be by refocusing on poverty levels, it may

be a benefit to developing greater equality between all Malaysians.

The biggest barrier to any reform, however, is the backlash from threatening the livelihood of the BP in any way, whether this threat is real or only perceived. Prime Minister Mahathir attended the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, pledging to ratify all of the core UN human rights policies (“Tun Mahathir...”). This commitment was met with a great uproar from many Malaysian people, especially the Malays, due to a policy dubbed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD). ICERD is aimed at committing participating countries to the elimination of racial discrimination, with only 14 countries in the entire world not having ratified it (Gnanasagaran). Using erroneous judgements and rumors about the effects of ICERD on Malaysia, opposition parties like UMNO managed to rally support for an anti-ICERD movement, planning the largest demonstration in Malaysian history, scheduled for December 8, 2018. The irrational and unrealistic fear was that the laws would degrade Malay special rights by attacking Article 153 of the constitution and possibly even Islam as the country’s declared religion. Although this fear is not entirely valid, as there are stipulations in ICERD that permit these types of laws when deemed necessary, support for the anti-ICERD movement spread across Malaysia. The new government was clearly fazed by the opposition backlash, rescinding the ratification of ICERD. The planned demonstration turned into a celebration instead.

The ICERD reaction casts doubt on Malaysia’s ability to actually proceed with any changes to the current special rights of the BP. Because a convention with possible exemptions for culturally specific policies like those for BP led to an extreme reaction, any reformations that directly target BP seem at best difficult, if not impossible, to execute. With this in mind, it is likely necessary that steps should be taken to allow some BP populations the ability to use certain rights to their advantage, while excluding them from utilizing others. In other words, since an intra-ethnic income gap is evident, restricting upper-class BP from using many of the privileges may be helpful. This way,

the rights themselves may remain in place but political manipulation and string-pulling are less likely to occur at the higher income level. Meanwhile, poorer rural Malays and other low-income BP groups would still have access to the education and career opportunities that may provide them with upward mobility. One way that this may be revised is the application of means testing, analyzing the income or affluence of individuals or households in order to determine if they should be receiving federal aid. This approach would bypass racial biases and their associated political tensions by targeting those who truly deserve aid based on actual need.

Nevertheless, no matter what the proposed solution is to the persistent economic divide in Malaysia, both at the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic levels there likely will need to be changes made that involve the alteration of the BP privileges. As the ICERD reaction exemplified, however, revised regulations could lead the opposition to play on the fear associated with potential loss of BP privileges in order to cause chaos and doubt, even if the regulations may not have any notable effect on said privileges. Moving forward, it will be important for the government to remain open and communicative with the public about any shift away from current racially oriented policies to ones more truly economically targeted, if it hopes to avoid further turmoil and closed-minded behavior. The public must understand clearly and specifically why and how any policy changes are implemented, and these changes may need to occur slowly rather than all at once. Should the political climate shift back toward the opposition consisting of UMNO and PAS (the Islamic party in Malaysia) and reclaim power in the next election or in the near future, these kinds of changes are likely not possible.

Conclusion

Malaysia's history, filled with racial divides and distinct differences in economic status, set the scene for the implementation of many policies aimed at supporting the BP community with the intention of revitalizing the country's equality, but this has not proved the case in the long term. Because of the racial and religiously skewed nature of the privileges associated with this support, the policies have not been able to complete the original goals in their entirety. Rather than supporting all of those in need of government aid, certain parts of the population are left in poverty, whereas others have been able to unfairly take advantage of the political expectations and opportunities provided to the BP. In addition, the general BP community seems unwilling to budge on the idea of changing the laws, seeing a threat to their livelihood, even if they are not able to take full advantage of them in actuality. This uninformed pushback is exemplified by the recent denial of ICERD out of fear of BP rights being compromised. Malaysia is now at the apex of a major turning point in its history, and it remains unclear if it will be able to effectively change its ethnically skewed socioeconomic policies in order to create a more equal Malaysia. Its ability to do so will be highly dependent on the ability of the new government to tactfully drive this change with proper education of and communication with the public, which has already proved a challenge. The question lingers as to whether Malaysia will be able to continue toward its goal of achieving real equality or fall back into old ways.

References

- "Bhattacharjee, Rash Behari, and Samantha Ho. "Cover Story: Income Gap Between Rich and Poor Chinese Widens." *Edge Markets*. November 16, 2017.
- Bradley, Olivia. "Is Malaysia Poor?" *Borgen Project*. October 5, 2017.
- "Bumiputera Job Seekers Prefer Public Sector Jobs." *Borneo Post*. December 13, 2018.
- "Bumis Majority of Top Earners - But Disparity Widest, Too." *Malaysiakini*. November 25, 2015.
- "Federal Constitution." Malaysia Government. December 27, 2007.
- Gnanasagaran, Angaindrankumar. "ICERD Non-Ratification Tarnishes Malaysia's Image." *ASEAN Post*. December 18, 2018.
- Hishamh. "Documenting Income Inequality: 2012 Update." *Economics Malaysia*. September 11, 2013.
- Ibrahim, Zaim, and S. M. Amin. "Same Old Ideas at Bumi Congress, Say Businessmen." *Malaysian Insight*. September 3, 2018.
- "Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction, Growth and Racial Harmony." Putrajaya, Malaysia: Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, 2004.
- "Malaysia: History." The Commonwealth. 2019.
- "May 13, Never Again." *Malaysiakini*. May 13, 2019.
- Mutum, Dilip. "Are Ethnic Chinese Still Dominating the Malaysian Economy After So Many Decades of Affirmative Actions in Favor of Malays?" *Quora*. April 29, 2018.
- Nadaraj, Vanitha. "Malaysia's Brain Drain Reaching Critical Stage." *ASEAN Today*. March 18, 2016.
- "The NEP is a Tongkat for The Malays and Must End." *Malaysia Today*. December 31, 2018.
- "Poverty Profile: Executive Summary, Malaysia." Japan Bank for International Cooperation. February 2001.
- "Report of Household Income and Basic Amenities Survey 2014." Department of Statistics Malaysia. June 22, 2015.
- Rodzi, Nadirah H. "Malaysia to Train Bumiputera to be More Competitive Rather than Spoon-feed Them: Mahathir." *Straits Times*. September 1, 2018.
- Sawe, Benjamin Elisha. "Ethnic Groups of Malaysia." *World Atlas*. June 7, 2018.
- Soong, Kua Kia. "Racial Conflict in Malaysia: Against the Official History." *Race & Class*. Vol. 49, No. 3, 2008, pp. 33-53.
- "The T20, M40, And B40 Income Classifications in Malaysia." *Compare Hero*. November 7, 2018.
- Teoh, Shannon. "Study Shows Malaysia's Income Gap Has Doubled in Two Decades." *Straits Times*. October 16, 2018.
- Thillainathan, R., and Kee-Cheok Cheong. "Malaysia's New Economic Policy, Growth and Distribution: Revisiting the Debate." *Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies*. Vol. 53, No. 1, 2016, pp. 51-68.
- "Tun Mahathir on ICERD: The Malays Fears over Bumiputera Special Privileges - Malays Had Demanded for Special Privileges in Exchange for Giving Citizenship to the Non-Malays." *Coverage*. December 7, 2018.
- Whah, Chin Yee, and Benny Teh Cheng Guan. "Malaysia's Protracted Affirmative Action Policy and the Evolving Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community." *ISEAS Economics Working Paper*. December 2015.
- "Yoursay: 50 Years Later, We're Still Talking about 'Malay Dilemma'." *Malaysiakini*. September 2, 2018.